Model International Court of Justice (MICJ)

Case #1

Republic of (Respondent)

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)

Arkansas Model United Nations (AMUN) November 20-21, 2020

Uganda’s Response

Court of Justice (henceforth ICJ) reject the pleading submitted by the Democratic

Republic of the Congo (henceforth Congo) requesting interim measures for the ongoing conflict in the Great Lakes region based on the fact that both Uganda and the Congo are party to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (herein Lusaka Agreement), which

Uganda views as the most feasible means of attaining a resolution of the dispute in question. Uganda finds that the Lusaka Agreement is the most accepted means of resolution both regionally and internationally.1

Uganda believes it has acted within its rights, as delineated in article 51 of the

United Nations (henceforth UN) Charter, to engage in self-defense.

Uganda maintains that any and all actions taken were in response to violations by the Congo of the UN Charter, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations, the

Lusaka Agreement, and customary international law.2

Uganda contends that the Congo is guilty of violation of Article 22, Article 24,

Article 25, Article 26, and Article 29 of the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations due to actions taken by the Congo denying Ugandan diplomats and other nationals exit from the receiving country, violating the premises of and destroying the Ugandan embassy, destroying archives and records possessive of the Ugandan embassy, and perpetrating violence toward Ugandan diplomats and nationals within the Congo.3

Uganda finds the aforementioned acts to also be in violation of customary international law and articles 1 and 2 of the Lusaka Agreement.

Uganda asserts that the Congo is additionally in violation of the principle of non- intervention as stipulated within article 2(4) of the UN Charter as well as the Lusaka

Agreement and customary international law due to actions taken in support of anti-

Uganda rebels who used the support to cause instability at Uganda’s borders.4

Uganda feels that, with the invitation to join Congolese forces by President

Laurent Kaliba in May of 1977, receipt of formal consent from the government of the

Congo concerning the entrance of Ugandan troops onto Congolese territory, and the subsequent signing of the Lusaka Agreement in July of 1999—Uganda has acted in accordance with its obligations a party state to the Lusaka Agreement and within the interest of homeland security.5

Due to the circumstances surrounding the conflict and the agreements made by both parties in compliance with the Lusaka Agreement in an effort to fairly address and resolve disputes regarding the ongoing conflict with the borders of the Congo, Uganda requests the ICJ reject the application made by the Congo in favor of allowing the mediation to take place in respect of the terms of the Lusaka Agreement.

Historical Context

It all begins with the country Zaïre. As a result of the mounting pressure from

Western powers to democratize, Zaïre’s former president, put into action what one might call a distant cousin of democracy that effectively sent the nation into a state of chaos. The military reacted violently to the implementation of this so- called “democracy,” looting and pillaging in major business areas, destroying the business market and driving away international corporations (MNCs). Inflation soared

above 23,700%, the economy shrank by 7.4%, and the output of the mining sector (the nation’s largest industry) shrunk to just 10% of what it had been previously.6

In the midst of Zaïre’s unraveling, the events of the Rwandan genocide were mounting. In 1994, Hutu Rwandan President Juvenal Habiyarimana dies when his plane is downed in an event orchestrated by unknown terrorists, kickstarting the genocidal rampage against ethnic Tutsis (and moderate Hutus) that overtakes the country.

800,000 people are murdered between the Rwandan Army and a militia calling themselves “Interahamwe.” The rampage doesn’t end until the country is overthrown by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RDF), led by Tutsi who becomes the nation’s new president.7

As a result of the events in , we see more than 2 million Hutus flee to the eastern region of Zaïre. The Interahamwe militia had formed a base there and found many new recruits within the newly arrived Hutus.8

While Rwanda and Zaïre were struggling, Uganda had been thriving. Nearby,

Burundi was also struggling. The Ugandan government, led by President Yoweri

Musevini, was greatly concerned with the unrest wreaking havoc in its neighboring states for fear that the events would put a damper on the economic success the country had enjoyed for over a decade. 9

With its nation’s best interests in mind, Uganda joined forces with Rwanda and

Burundi in an effort to stabilize Zaïre. The leaders of the countries (Musevini, Kagame, and Pierre Buyoya, respectively) decided that Zaïrean leader Seko was to blame for the difficulties being faced within the country's borders. Therefore, they orchestrated a plan to ensure his removal from office.10

The three nations chose to plant Laurent Kabila among Zaïreans as a recognizable leader of the uprisings against Seko. Kabila gained support from many of

Zaïre’s tribes who felt neglected by Seko’s regime—especially due to his infamous mismanagement and his regime’s refusal to grant citizenship to ethnic Tutsis.11

With the support of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, Kabila’s political group, the

Alliance for the Liberation of Congo-Zaïre (AFDL), was able to conquer Zaïre and drive

Seko out of office, subsequently renaming the nation “the Democratic Republic of the

Congo-Zaïre” (DRC).12

However, the newly formed Congo’s democratic foundation did not last very long, nor did the allies Kabila formed on his journey to defeat Seko. The democratic foundation crumbled as soon as Kabila assumed his seat as president. Upon establishing his office, Kabila promptly removed his former Rwandan allies from his government and instated rule by decree—banning opposing political parties in the process.13

He then began persecuting the Tutsi of eastern Congo-Zaïre in pursuit of his political goals. These actions started another wave of civil unrest in former Zaïre, still based in part on Seko’s mismanagement, but now aimed at Kabila.14

The unrest in neighboring Congo put a strain on Rwanda as cross-border raids executed by Congolese rebels were affecting the country’s ability to regain stability after the genocide. As a result, the Rwandan government requested Kabila allow them to aid in the retraining of the Congolese Military.15

When given the opportunity, President Kagame of Rwanda, after deciding Kabila was quickly becoming the new Seko, urged Congolese Soldiers to stage a revolt. In retaliation, Kabila armed Hutu rebels in Rwanda.

Now came time for a second rebellion. This time, Uganda and Rwanda joined forces in an attempt to remove Kabila, the man they helped rise into power. Specifically,

Rwanda backed RCD, the Congolese Rally for Democracy; and Uganda backed MLC, the Congolese Liberation Movement.16

What began as a political struggle between four states, quickly evolved into a regional conflict affecting the entire Great Lakes region of Africa. Zimbabwean,

Chadian, Namibian, and Angolan armed forces were sent to the Congo in support of

Kabila’s regime. Rwanda and Uganda were supporting Congolese rebels in an effort to thwart Kabila and deployed their own soldiers to secure their shared borders. Burundi dispatched troops to control rebel activity at its shared borders with the Congo.17

After various unsuccessful pre-negotiations, UN Resolution 1234 required an end to the hostilities creating chaos in the Great Lakes region and the immediate signing of a ceasefire agreement among the involved states.18

Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999)

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement is the result of UN Resolution 1234, a ceasefire agreement signed with the intention to end the hostilities surrounding what is now often called Africa’s First World War—the conflict surrounding the Congo.19

The Lusaka Agreement was by no means an early result of peace talks. It was difficult to find mediators all party states agreed on, difficult to find timeframes that worked for all the heads of states involved. Additionally, President Laurent Kabila, acutely aware of his undesirable position politically due to the unrest within his country, was especially disruptive to the process. Alas, the agreement was eventually signed in

Lusaka, Zambia on July 10, 1999.20

The Lusaka Agreement consisted of three articles and thirteen chapters. Article 1 called for a ceasefire and halt of all hostilities among member-states. Article two required member-states react with immediacy to any security threats detected within the

Congo or within the territory of any other member-state.21

Article three outlined the many principles of the agreement. Concerning the release of detained or hostage persons, the allowance of access to the International

Committee of the Red Cross to all member-states from all member-states, the facilitation of humanitarian efforts by member-states, the creation of a Joint Military

Commision (JMC) and peacekeeping process facilitated by the UN Security Council, and many other principles surrounding deescalation, prohibition of acts of war, and outlining the method by which the agreement was to be amended.22

The thirteen chapters went on to describe these principles with more specificity, with the thirteenth outlining the timeframe in which the process outlined in the document was to be implemented and the peace was to be attained.23

One major critique of the Lusaka Agreement is that the agreement projected its implementation to require only a measly 270 days to attain peace. However, timeframe

aside, the most detrimental factor of the ceasefire agreement was that many of the signatories were not invested in peace.24

It was clear, with Seko and democratization in Zaïre, that coercion into action can cause chaos. Coercion by the UN Security Council into a ceasefire agreement is what doomed the Lusaka Agreement before it was even drafted. That many party states to the agreement were still fully invested in the conflict is illuminated by the rather quick disintegration of the agreement.25

In January of 2001, President Laurent Kabila was assassinated and succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila, who made it clear that he was more committed to the Lusaka

Agreement than his distinctly contrarian father. This wasn’t enough to save the agreement, however, as it was still flawed at its core. Peace was in the best interests of some member-states, while the continuation of the conflict better suited the interests of others.26

The Lusaka Agreement failed to embody the true essence of compromise, minimizing its strength and ultimately rendering it ineffective.

Recent Developments

In November of 2001, the ICJ found Uganda guilty of violating the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions, and customary international law. 27

In December of 2005, the court found that: it could not be proven that the Congo had given support to anti-Uganda militias or rebels, thereby not warranting any actions claimed to be acted within self-defense; and the Congo was in violation of the Vienna

Conventions on Diplomatic Relations due to the violation of the Ugandan embassy and

maltreatment of Ugandan diplomats and other Ugandan nationals by Congolese armed forces.28

Regarding the Lusaka Agreement, the court deemed that neither the existence of the Lusaka Agreement nor the stipulations of the Lusaka Agreement had any bearing on the case at hand, nor did they warrant the presence of Ugandan armed forces in the

Congo.29

As a result of the 2005 ruling, it was decided that Ugandan owed the Congo reparations for damages incurred as a result of Uganda’s violations. The payment due date for the reparations was set as January 6, 2016. The payment due date was then extended to May 2016, then September 2016, and finally to November 22, 2016.30

On September 8, 2020, the court issued an order inquiring about the state of individual negotiations between Uganda and the Congo after, in 2016, the Congo requested a re-evaluation of the reparations due. At the time of the request, the two states decided they would attempt at reaching a resolution beyond the court.

Most recently in the case, ICJ order of 12 October 2020 detailed the appointment of 4 experts, Ms. Debarati Guha-Sapir, Mr. Henrik Udal, Mr. Michael Nest, and Mr.

Geoffrey Senogles to evaluate the reparations due.31

In terms of leadership of our three initial primarily concerned nations: the Congo,

Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, some interesting changes and stagnations are to be noticed.

Joseph Kabila, who succeeded his father former President Laurent Kabila, resigned from his seat in Congolese office in 2019.32

He was succeeded by Félix Tshisekedi, the son of Éttiene Tshisekedi who led the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), which was banned by former president Laurent Kabila during his stint in office.33

President Paul Kagame of Rwanda still holds his seat in the Rwandan government, though he faces criticism for alleged voter fraud—especially noted within

Rwanda’s 2017 presidential election which he won with over 98% of the vote.34

President Yoweri Musevini still holds his seat and is the longest serving Ugandan leader after rising to power as the result of a military coup in 1986. Though once a vibrant champion of democracy, Musevini has, too, been accused of voter fraud. He has abolished the term limits of the Ugandan presidency and is on the track to hold his office for the rest of his life.35

Unfortunately for Uganda, they cannot seem to escape consequences of being neighboring states with the Congo. As of 2019, Uganda was struggling to keep up with the influx of refugees crossing into their borders from the Congo due to increased violence caused by infighting between groups of Congolese herders and farmers.36

Former President Pierre Buyoya left Burundian office in 2003. In the recent

Burundian political sphere, Former President Pierre Nkurunziza was replaced by his successor Évariste Ndayishimiye after his untimely death as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak. Though President Ndayishimiye was elected by popular vote before

Nkurunziza’s death, he has been accused of being in cahoots with Nkurunziza to commit voter fraud.37

In 2015, Burundi suffered a political crisis surrounding Nkurunziza pursuing a third presidential term. Mass protesting erupted and Burundi’s government has been accused of multiple human rights abuses surrounding violence against citizens.38

As of the September 2019 report of the UN Commision of Inquiry in Burundi, the bloodshed and human rights abuses continue.39

Summary

Uganda feels that it was placed within an impossible situation surrounding the events of the transition of power in the Congo circa 1999.

Uganda, as a neighboring state of the Congo, felt that civil and political unrest unfolding in the Congo would affect the stability of its homefront.

Uganda contends that, contrary to initial court orders by the ICJ, Uganda was taking actions in self-defense, as demonstrated by continuing political unrest in the

Congo and continuing strain placed on Uganda as a result of the Congo’s domestic affairs.

Uganda hopes that, as time has progressed and Uganda continues to act as a safe haven for Congolese peoples, the Congo will find itself able to reach an amicable agreement on the matters of this case outside of the ICJ.

Map A - Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Congo’s many border states are pictured.

Endnotes

1 Gathii, James Thuo. "Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)." The American Journal of International Law 101, no. 1 (2007): 142-49. Accessed November 2, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4149829 2 Kritsiotis, Dino, and Malcolm D. Evans. "Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda): Provisional Measures." The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2001): 662-70. Accessed November 2, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/761711 3 Gathii, James Thuo. "Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)." The American Journal of International Law 101, no. 1 (2007): 142-49. Accessed November 2, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4149829

4 Kritsiotis, Dino, and Malcolm D. Evans. "Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda): Provisional Measures." The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2001): 662-70. Accessed November 2, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/761711 5 Kritsiotis, Dino, and Malcolm D. Evans. "Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda): Provisional Measures." The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2001): 662-70. Accessed November 2, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/761711 6 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004. 7 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004 8 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004 9 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004 10 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004 11 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004 12 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004 13 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004

14 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004 15 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004 16 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004 17 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004 18 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004 19 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004 20 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004 21 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. July 10, 1999. UN Security Council, 1999. 22 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. July 10, 1999. UN Security Council, 1999. 23 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. July 10, 1999. UN Security Council, 1999. 24 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004 25 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004

26 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004 27 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Order of 29 November 2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 660 28 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports December 2005, p. 168 29 Gathii, James Thuo. "Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)." The American Journal of International Law 101, no. 1 (2007): 142-49. Accessed November 2, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4149829 30 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Order of 6 December 2016, I.C.J. Reports 2016, p. 1135 31 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Order of 12 October 2020, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p.1-4

32Reid, Kathryn. “DRC Conflict: Facts, FAQs, and How to Help.” World Vision. World Vision Inc, March 17, 2020. https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/drc- conflict-facts “Uganda: Conflict and Peace.” Peace Insight. Peace Direct, October 2017. https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/uganda/ 33 Solomon, Hussein, and Gerrie Swart. Conflict in the DRC: A Critical Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004 34 “Rwanda Country Profile.” BBC News. BBC, September 17, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14093238 35 “Uganda: Conflict and Peace.” Peace Insight. Peace Direct, October 2017. https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/uganda/ 36 “Uganda Strains as Thousands Flee Violence in DR Congo's Ituri.” Democratic Republic of the Congo . Al Jazeera, June 26, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/6/26/uganda-strains-as-thousands-flee-violence- in-dr-congos-ituri 37 “Burundi Country Profile.” BBC News. BBC, June 24, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13085064. 38 “How to Address Human Rights Abuses in Burundi?” Peace Insight, October 20, 2017. https://www.peaceinsight.org/blog/2017/10/how-address-human-rights-abuses- burundi/. 39 Paul Nantulya September 24, 2019. “Burundi, the Forgotten Crisis, Still Burns.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, June 22, 2020. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/burundi-the-forgotten-crisis-still-burns/