US Role in the 1971 Indo-Pak War: Implications for Bangladesh-US Relations

ISAS Working Paper No. 165 – 15 February 2013 469A Bukit Timah Road #07-01, Tower Block, Singapore 259770 Tel: 6516 6179 / 6516 4239 Fax: 6776 7505 / 6314 5447 Email: [email protected] Website: www.isas.nus.edu.sg US Role in the 1971 Indo-Pak War: Implications for Bangladesh-US Relations Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury1 Introduction The year 1971 witnessed a major redrawing of the map of South Asia. It saw the emergence of a new nation, which a few decades down the line became the world’s sixth largest country in terms of population, the third largest Muslim State, a democracy, albeit a volatile one: Bangladesh. It was a bipolar world in those Cold War days, with two preponderantly dominant superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. After years of perceived exploitation by Pakistan of its eastern wing, East Pakistan, a rebellion, or a ‘struggle for liberation’ as the latter liked to call it, had flared up, with initially tacit and later overt support from the regional pre-eminent power, India. It obtained the backing of the Soviet Union. Pakistan, led by its military ruler, President Yahya Khan, a General, endeavoured to suppress the uprising which eventually led it into a war with India. The ‘Bangladesh Movement’ was being led by the Awami League (which had massively won the 1970 elections but was being denied transfer of power by a combination of Yahya and the Pakistani leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto), whose head Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was incarcerated in Pakistani prison. Despite many predictions, its superpower ally the United States did not come down in its support unlike India’s superpower ally the Soviet Union. 1 Dr Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. He is a former Foreign Advisor (Foreign Minister) of Bangladesh, and he can be contacted at [email protected]. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of ISAS. The American decision of non-intervention appeared to run against the grain of the sentiments of the Nixon Administration. That was because – as this essay will demonstrate – of the deep dichotomy within the US community, with a huge segment of public opinion favouring the East Pakistani struggle. There were two major results - one immediate and the other long term. Immediately a Superpower conflict, that could have turned nuclear, was averted. In the long run over the years it facilitated a close relationship and partnership with Bangladesh that has lasted into the twenty first century. Backdrop to the Crisis The South Asian Crisis of 1971 was ill-timed for the US. There appeared to be a brightening of prospects for the success of the US foreign policy both globally and in the Asian region. Globally the US Administration saw the beginnings of a new relationship between the US and the People’s Republic of China;2 concrete progress on important issues in US-Soviet relations;3 the Nixon Doctrine took effect reducing US military involvement in Vietnam;4 all these leading to a maturing of the relationship with East Asia. With regard to Pakistan, Yahya’s continuation as the head of government (he had assumed power in 1969 after the resignation of President M Ayub Khan and the declaration of yet another Martial Law, Pakistan’s second in 1969. First, he had an ‘extraordinary relationship’ with the American Ambassador, Joseph Farland;5 and second, he was being of invaluable help as a conduit linking the US to China.6 Interestingly, had there been a peaceful transfer of power to the Awami League following the 1970 elections, the US would also have had no cause for worries. First, an Awami League government in Pakistan would have augured well for Indo-Pakistan relations thereby generally easing the security complexities in South Asia for the US, and second an Awami League government was likely to tack close to the US, given that its main leader, now late, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, onetime Prime Minister of Pakistan, and Mujib’s mentor, was staunchly pro-US. Indeed, the Americans would need to be more wary of Bhutto, never a friend.7 In other words, on the eve of the 1971 crisis, US interests dictated a united Pakistan preferably with Yahya at its head, or failing that, with Mujib at the helm. What the Americans 2 See, Henry Kissinger: Does America Need A Foreign Policy? Towards a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, (New York: Simon& Schuster, 2001) pp. 134-149. 3 The Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), later signed in 1972, was being negotiated. 4 The ‘Nixon Doctrine’ was announced by President Richard Nixon in Guam on 25 July 1969, which stated that while the US would assist in the ‘defence and development’ of its allies, it would NOT attempt to undertake the defence of ‘all the free nations of the world’, implying ‘Vietnamisation’ of the Vietnam War. See Peter Beinart, ‘Return of the Nixon Doctrine’, Time, 1 April 2007. 5 Jack Anderson with George Clifford, The Anderson Papers (New York: Ballantine Books, 1974), p. 274. 6 See Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), p. 714. 7 Bhutto’s anti-American sentiments find ample expression in his book, The Myth of Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). 2 needed least was another global flashpoint that was likely to attract adversary attention which would, thereby, adversely impact on, in Nixon’s words,’ the emerging structure of peace’ in the 1970s.8 Role of the US Administration The US Administration perceived the emerging crisis in South Asia at three levels; first, the humanitarian problems of the Bengali refugees in India and of the millions who remained behind in Pakistan; second the problem of political settlement between East and West Pakistan; and, third, the danger of war between Pakistan and India.9 Nixon’s response to the first level, according to him, was the commitment of US$ 91 million through the United Nations for the refugees in India, and US$ 158 million for those suffering in Pakistan. At the second level he claimed that he had been able to obtain assurance from Yahya that Mujib would not be executed, that civilian government in East Pakistan would be restored, and rapprochement sought with the Awami League (to that end the American Administration said they were able to establish contact with some prominent exiled Awami Leaguers in Calcutta).10 With regard to the third level, Nixon stated that he sought to avert war by keeping India apprised of all US initiatives, talking to the Soviet Union, and culminating in the US Secretary of State William Rogers informing the Indian Ambassador on 11 August 1971 that the US would not continue economic assistance to a country that started the war11 – a clear warning to India. Unfortunately for the Administration, the responses at all three levels appeared to backfire. First, the assistance to India for refugees did not generate the kind of gratitude the US had hoped for, since it seemed an answer to the call of the UN Secretary General and was therefore viewed as discharging an international obligation.12 Indeed, the relief to East Pakistan, channelled through the Pakistani government evoked Bangladeshi criticism of possible, indeed probable, diversion to the Pakistan military.13 Second, the attempt to establish linkage with the Awami Leaguers, mainly the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Bangladesh Government set up on 10 April 1971, Khandker Mushtaque Ahmed, only led to his isolation from the Provisional Acting President Syed Nazrul Islam and Provisional Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed, and the distancing of the latter two from the Americans.14 Third, the threats made to the Indian Ambassador only further 8 Richard M. Nixon, US Foreign Policy in the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace, A Report to the Congress, 9 February, 1972. 9 Ibid, p.143. 10 Ibid, p.145. 11 Ibid, pp. 145-146. 12 UN Secretary General had made such an appeal on 19 May 1971. Asian Recorder, 18-24 June 1971, p. 10219. 13 Ibid, 6-12 August 1971, pp. 10298-9. 14 Ibid, p. 10299. 3 upset Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, already deeply annoyed at Washington and seeking linkages with Moscow. As events rapidly unfolded in South Asia, considerable evidence of Washington’s leanings towards Pakistan began to come to the fore. First, though on 20 April 1971 the State Department had assured Senator Edward Kennedy, a Bangladeshi sympathiser, that there were no arms supplies in the pipeline for Pakistan15, a Pakistani ship Padma sailed from New York on 21 June 1971 with arms for Pakistan.16 The Indian Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh told an angry Parliament in New Delhi that India had urged the US Administration to stop the ship from proceeding to its destination.17 Not only was the shipment not prevented, there is no record of any pressure to dissuade the Pakistanis from using the American arms from their operations in East Pakistan. Second, the Administration was anxious to continue economic assistance to Pakistan thus appearing to prop up the Yahya regime. In June 1971 the Aid to Pakistan Consortium under the aegis of the World Bank met to consider a Bank report that suggested that contrary to Pakistan’s stated views, the situation in the East was far from normal, and under these conditions assistance could not be fruitfully utilised.18 Ten of the eleven members of the Consortium concurred with the Report, but the US did not.19 Later on 3 August 1971 when the US House of Representatives passed the Foreign Aid Bill after including the Gallagher amendment for stoppage of assistance to Pakistan, Nixon protested that engaging in ‘public pressures’ on Pakistan would be ‘counter- productive’, and the crisis demanded discussions ‘in private channels’ (rather than influencing legislation).20 Third, the Administration, even when the matter became public knowledge, did not disapprove of Pakistani use of American aircraft to shift troops from West to East Pakistan.

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