The United Kingdom and the European Union
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DGAPanalyse Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider (Hrsg.) Otto Wolff-Direktor des Forschungsinstituts der DGAP e. V. September 2014 N° 16 The United Kingdom and the European Union: What would a “Brexit” mean for the EU and other States around the World? Edited by Almut Möller and Tim Oliver With a foreword by Alexander Stubb The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author(s). DGAPanalyse 16 | September 2014 Summary The United Kingdom and the European Union: What would a “Brexit” mean for the EU and other States around the World? Edited by Almut Möller and Tim Oliver The possibility of Britain withdrawing from the European Union – a “Brexit” – has been receiving growing attention. Reports have largely focused on what this withdrawal could mean for the United Kingdom; however, there has been little analysis of what it could mean for the rest of the Union, its individual members, wider Europe, and other states around the world such as the United States and Japan. This analysis gathers 26 views from think-tanks, research institutions, and universities from sixteen EU member states, nine non-EU coun- tries, and a view from the EU’s institutions in Brussels. Five overall themes emerge from the contributions: 1. Developments in the UK have not passed unnoticed, but there are varying levels of understanding as to what is driving UK behavior as well as a great deal of uncertainty about the potential impact for the EU and the countries covered. While no country seems to be planning actively for a Brexit, many are aware that this step may become necessary because of developments in the UK’s domestic debate. 2. Awareness of the UK’s position is largely framed by wider concerns facing the EU, especially the euro zone. For many states, the UK is important, and the EU would be a lesser place without it. Yet while the UK’s reform agenda does appeal to some states, the real pressure for reform will remain within the euro zone. Reform agendas might hap- pen to overlap with London’s, but with the euro zone continuing to move ahead, they might increasingly diverge. Countries within the euro zone, the pre-in countries, and even Denmark with its opt-out have focused on Germany and France for leadership and have tried to secure a place close to euro zone decision-making. London has become a bystander. 3. While there is some support for the UK’s positions on EU reform, conceptual clarity and language are crucial. States like the Netherlands and Germany seek better enforcement of the principle of subsidiarity, not repatriation. A multispeed EU is considered a possibil- ity, but not – as the UK might hope – in a pick-and-choose fashion; there is less and less appetite in Brussels for “third ways” like Switzerland. And because many EU members perceive the UK’s long-term EU agenda as opaque or unpredictable, they are hesitant to align with London. 4. Countries both inside and outside the EU are clearly concerned about the economic and, to a lesser degree, security consequences of a British exit. Britain’s economic approach – especially its free-market, liberal outlook – would be the most noticeable loss. Yet some countries note a growing “mercantilist” attitude in British thinking; its economic con- nections to some traditionally close countries have been in decline for some time; and some states will seek to exploit economically Britain’s marginalization, using this tactic to strengthen their appeal to global investors. In European foreign, security, and defense 1 DGAPanalyse 16 | September 2014 policies, the UK is not easily replaced, and the EU and Europe’s place in the world would lose from a British withdrawal: France would face Germany’s “culture of restraint” on external affairs, while for the United States a Brexit would further complicate transatlantic relations by stunting not only its long- sought improvements to the European arm of NATO but also a reduction in Europe’s dependence on the United States and efforts to make Europe take on a more global role. Furthermore, outside powers may seek to play on divisions, choosing between bilateral and multilateral relations when necessary. 5. While these economic and security concerns serve to remind other countries of the UK’s role in the EU, they do not necessarily generate sympathy for it, but rather exasperation at the country’s inability to offer leadership other than “negative leadership.” The UK’s debate on limiting immigration is seen as a direct attack on the fundamental right of the free movement of people and labor in the single market. EU countries fear the influence of British Euroskeptics on their own domestic debate and are frustrated with London for not successfully confronting the issue at home. In view of previous episodes of UK-EU difficulties, the EU today is much larger and in parts much deeper. Some member states have little if any attachment to the UK. The British government’s rapprochement with Germany while neglecting, and in some areas abusing, relations with former close partners in central and eastern Europe and Scandinavia means it has found itself on the sidelines of EU politics. Some of the UK’s criticisms of the EU and proposals for its reform are seen as legitimate. What is not seen as legitimate is advancing these as a purely national interest and using the threat of a Brexit as leverage. London will have to work harder and engage in more effective coalition-building if it wants to succeed in shaping the ongoing debates about EU reform. 2 DGAPanalyse 16 | September 2014 Contents Foreword........................................................... 7 Introduction ......................................................... 9 France............................................................ 11 Vivien Pertusot United States of America.............................................. 15 Jeff Lightfoot and Tim Oliver Canada ........................................................... 19 Charles Pentland Germany .......................................................... 23 Almut Möller Poland............................................................ 27 Roderick Parkes Ireland ............................................................ 31 James Kilcourse China............................................................. 35 Lirong Liu Slovenia........................................................... 39 Marko Lovec Norway ........................................................... 43 Kristin Haugevik Austria............................................................ 47 Emmanuel Sigalas Romania .......................................................... 51 Agnes Nicolescu Bulgaria........................................................... 55 Antoinette Primatarova 3 DGAPanalyse 16 | September 2014 The View from Brussels ............................................... 59 Fabian Zuleeg Switzerland ........................................................ 63 Christian Nünlist Denmark .......................................................... 67 Henrik Larsen Australia and New Zealand ............................................ 71 Ben Wellings and Annmarie Elijah Hungary .......................................................... 75 Krisztina Vida Sweden........................................................... 77 Erik Brattberg Italy .............................................................. 79 Eleonora Poli Spain............................................................. 83 Laia Mestres Finland ........................................................... 87 Juha Jokela Greece ........................................................... 91 George Tzogopoulos Japan ............................................................ 93 Michito Tsuruoka Singapore ......................................................... 97 Reuben Wong The Netherlands .................................................... 99 Rem Korteweg Brazil ............................................................ 103 Elena Lazarou Conclusion ....................................................... 105 Almut Möller and Tim Oliver About the Authors .................................................. 109 Notes ........................................................... 111 4 DGAPanalyse 16 | September 2014 5 DGAPanalyse 16 | September 2014 6 DGAPanalyse 16 | September 2014 Foreword In many ways, Britain is a second home to me. In First of all, with 28 members, treaty change would 1999, I wrote my doctoral thesis on flexible integra- be immensely complicated; once you open the tion at the London School of Economics. My dear treaties, there will be 28 different views on what wife is British, and our family is of mixed Finnish to do. We have been too obsessed with European and British heritage. I owe Britain a lot. I am a true processes and institutional revisions. The EU is friend of Britain, but a worried friend. not about to become a federal superstate. What we really need to focus on are European outputs. Britain’s relationship with the European Union The EU needs to evolve through pragmatic steps, is under intense scrutiny and subject to heated improving its practical output in terms of growth debate; this publication is proof of that. There is and jobs. talk about renegotiation and repatriation. There is speculation on a possible “Brexit.” There are Second, there may have been an assumption that initiatives for in/out referendums. There is a lot of treaties need revisiting because fixing the euro Euroskepticism,