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Annex I: the Rules for an MBC

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Annex I: the Rules for an MBC Annex I: The Rules for an MBC AI.1 The Players In any democracy, the first requirement is to decide: (a) who will chair the proceedings—the premier at a cabinet meeting, Mr Speaker in parliament, the commissioners in an independent enquiry, the chairperson of a committee, or whosoever; (b) who will assist the chair—the elected consensors, as well as a time-keeper and a computer operator; this should certainly be the norm in any parliament and maybe too in other settings; (c) who is entitled to participate in the debate—the MPs in parliament, the public in an independent commission, those constituting at least a quorum in any com- mittee meeting, a random sample in a deliberative democracy event, and so on; (d) who is entitled to propose a policy option—any political party represented in parliament, any individual in a public enquiry, any committee member, or any participant in a deliberative exercise; (e) who is entitled to vote—the MPs in parliament, the electorate in a referendum, all committee members present, all participants in a deliberative event; (f) which consensus coefficient demarcations shall be applied to which MBC out- comes (Sects. 5.2.1.3 and AI.4). AI.2 The Debate The following actions may occur during the course of the debate. i. Those concerned, [Sect. AI.1(d)], may propose options. ii. The team of consensors shall accept any and every relevant option which does not infringe an agreed norm such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to be relevant, every option must be a complete policy. © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 117 P. Emerson, From Majority Rule to Inclusive Politics, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-23500-4 118 Annex I: The Rules for an MBC iii. The consensors shall list all options ‘on the table’ on a dedicated web-page and, if need be in summary, on a computer screen. iv. Participants may ask questions, seek clarifications, propose composites, with- draw their own motion, or even propose a new one (although at any one moment, any one party/individual may only have one option ‘on the table’). v. At all times, by editing if necessary, the consensors shall ensure, firstly, that the options are in a common format and phraseology; secondly, that the list of options reflects the range of the debate and is balanced across that range. vi. If at any stage the chair so decides, she may call for a vote to be taken; in so doing, on any topic which is complex, she first asks the consensors to finalise a (short) list of about four to six options; next she allows each of the movers of those motions on this final list to confirm that the list reflects their particular proposal, be it verbatim, edited or composited; and when all concerned have agreed to this final list, she asks the given electorate to cast their preferences. If no one option or composite gets a sufficiently high score, the outcome can be regarded as a straw poll, and if a cluster of options is seen to be more popular than the rest, this may be regarded as the basis of any further debate. vii. If at any stage, the participants suggest a composite, propose a new motion or withdraw their own, the consensors shall adjust the list accordingly. If at any further stage only one option remains, this may be regarded as the verbal consensus. If however—and this is more likely in any parliament—such a verbal consensus proves to be elusive, then, at the end of the debate, the chair may call for a (paper or electronic) vote, in which case the above procedure (vi.) is used (again). viii. The consensors display the voters’ profile and analyse the results. If one option is much more popular than the rest, and if it has surpassed the necessary consensus coefficient (Sect. AI.4), it may be regarded as the winner. If two options are, as it were, neck and neck, the consensors may wish to form a composite of the two, and if its combined consensus coefficient surpasses the same demarcation, then this may be deemed to be the outcome. If, in a third scenario, the leading option is only just above the mean, then obviously, some if not all of the other options will be at a similar level of support; it must therefore be assumed that there is no consensus, that no decision can be taken, that in the meantime the status quo remains, and that the debate shall be resumed. AI.3 The Art of Compromise If the debate is on a very simple topic such as dog licences, with options of, say, A zero, B £2, C £5, D £10 and E £20, then it might be expected that a voter’s set of preferences will be single-peaked (Emerson 2007: 22–3). In this case, the collective set of preferences will also be single-peaked. If that collective peak is between option C and option D, then, depending on the exact position of the peak, the Annex I: The Rules for an MBC 119 Table AI.1 Consensus Coefficients consensors may well decide that the collective decision is £ 7.50, £8.0, or whatever. These calculations can be quite precise. AI.4 Consensus coefficients In an MBC vote, if all the participants cast a full slate of preferences, then while the maximum consensus coefficient is always 1.0, the minimum varies according to the number of options on the ballot. Accordingly, the mean also varies, as do the various demarcations. (If all the voters submit partial ballots, then of course one or more options might get the absolute minimum MBC score of zero.) Table AI.1 shows all the minimum, mean and maximum consensus coefficients for MBC ballots of three to ten options. {It also includes a row in tint, for a (majoritarian) two-option ballot, but only to show how the mathematics vary. Obviously, a two-option yes-or-no MBC is the same, mathematically, as a majority vote, and if everybody submits a 1st preference ‘yes’ (2 points) and a 2nd prefer- ence ‘no’ (1 point), then ‘yes’ will get the maximum consensus coefficient of 1.0 while the ‘no’ option gets the full ballot minimum of 0.5.} Every forum should state, in standing orders, just what demarcation is required before the outcome of any ballot can be enacted. Table AI.1 lists some suggested levels for a five-option ballot, but these could well be considered to be far too high for the realpolitik of a contemporary parliament. Initially at least, therefore, it might be expected that on matters controversial, many MPs will opt to cast a partial ballot, so maybe standing orders should stipulate rather less ambitious levels of, say, 0.40, 0.45 and 0.50 respectively, or whatever. In time, standing orders may insist on the levels shown in Table AI.1, levels which could be adopted much earlier in civic society. 120 Annex I: The Rules for an MBC AI.5 Social Choices and Social Rankings As a general rule, if and when the subject is complex and/or contentious, it is advisable to have a (short) list of about four to six options. If the subject matter is not complex—to take a flippant example, if parliament were to choose the colour with which to paint the bathroom door—there could be as many options as there are persons eligible to make a proposal. If the number of options, n, is such that: n 10 then those voting may be asked to list all n options. If on the other hand, N > 10 those voting may be asked to list just n options, where n ¼ 6: If the purpose of the vote is not so much to take a decision—i.e., make a social choice—but rather, to draw up a prioritisation—make a social ranking—and if it is required to draw up a short list of, say, six options, then again, if N > 10, those voting may be asked to cast a maximum of just six preferences. If in the count, the seventh most popular option is very close to the sixth, while the eighth is quite far behind, then the consensors may well decide that the final short-list shall consist of all seven options. Reference Emerson, P. (2007). Designing an all-inclusive democracy. Heidelberg: Springer. Annex II: The Rules for a Matrix Vote Election AII.1 The Milieu In a parliament where proportionality is considered to be important, the first count of a matrix vote election should be conducted according to the rules of a QBS; hence the term ‘QBS matrix vote’, (which therefore involves both a QBS and an MBC count). In organisations in civic society where internal tensions are not so keenly felt, reliance can be placed on an MBC election, in which case the expression ‘MBC matrix vote’ may be used, (and this involves two MBC counts). For the purposes of this text, the following rules apply to a QBS matrix vote. AII.2 Prior to the Vote Each member of the given electorate, the entire parliament in the case of all-party power-sharing arrangement, shall be issued with a (paper or electronic) ballot. At the same time, a list of all the members shall be made available, with indications as to who is not able to stand (because they have already served a fixed number of terms/years) and/or who does not wish to stand (because of old age or whatever).
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