Annex I: the Rules for an MBC

Annex I: The Rules for an MBC

AI.1 The Players

In any democracy, the ﬁrst requirement is to decide: (a) who will chair the proceedings—the premier at a cabinet meeting, Mr Speaker in parliament, the commissioners in an independent enquiry, the chairperson of a committee, or whosoever; (b) who will assist the chair—the elected consensors, as well as a time-keeper and a computer operator; this should certainly be the norm in any parliament and maybe too in other settings; (c) who is entitled to participate in the debate—the MPs in parliament, the public in an independent commission, those constituting at least a quorum in any committee meeting, a random sample in a deliberative democracy event, and so on; (d) who is entitled to propose a policy option—any political party represented in parliament, any individual in a public enquiry, any committee member, or any participant in a deliberative exercise; (e) who is entitled to vote—the MPs in parliament, the electorate in a referendum, all committee members present, all participants in a deliberative event; (f) which consensus coefﬁcient demarcations shall be applied to which MBC out- comes (Sects. 5.2.1.3 and AI.4).

AI.2 The Debate

The following actions may occur during the course of the debate. i. Those concerned, [Sect. AI.1(d)], may propose options. ii. The team of consensors shall accept any and every relevant option which does not infringe an agreed norm such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to be relevant, every option must be a complete policy.

iii. The consensors shall list all options ‘on the table’ on a dedicated web-page and, if need be in summary, on a computer screen. iv. Participants may ask questions, seek clarifications, propose composites, withdraw their own motion, or even propose a new one (although at any one moment, any one party/individual may only have one option ‘on the table’). v. At all times, by editing if necessary, the consensors shall ensure, firstly, that the options are in a common format and phraseology; secondly, that the list of options reflects the range of the debate and is balanced across that range. vi. If at any stage the chair so decides, she may call for a vote to be taken; in so doing, on any topic which is complex, she first asks the consensors to finalise a (short) list of about four to six options; next she allows each of the movers of those motions on this final list to confirm that the list reflects their particular proposal, be it verbatim, edited or composited; and when all concerned have agreed to this final list, she asks the given electorate to cast their preferences. If no one option or composite gets a sufficiently high score, the outcome can be regarded as a straw poll, and if a cluster of options is seen to be more popular than the rest, this may be regarded as the basis of any further debate. vii. If at any stage, the participants suggest a composite, propose a new motion or withdraw their own, the consensors shall adjust the list accordingly. If at any further stage only one option remains, this may be regarded as the verbal consensus. If however—and this is more likely in any parliament—such a verbal consensus proves to be elusive, then, at the end of the debate, the chair may call for a (paper or electronic) vote, in which case the above procedure (vi.) is used (again). viii. The consensors display the voters’ profile and analyse the results. If one option is much more popular than the rest, and if it has surpassed the necessary consensus coefficient (Sect. AI.4), it may be regarded as the winner. If two options are, as it were, neck and neck, the consensors may wish to form a composite of the two, and if its combined consensus coefficient surpasses the same demarcation, then this may be deemed to be the outcome. If, in a third scenario, the leading option is only just above the mean, then obviously, some if not all of the other options will be at a similar level of support; it must therefore be assumed that there is no consensus, that no decision can be taken, that in the meantime the status quo remains, and that the debate shall be resumed.

AI.3 The Art of Compromise

If the debate is on a very simple topic such as dog licences, with options of, say, A zero, B £2, C £5, D £10 and E £20, then it might be expected that a voter’s set of preferences will be single-peaked (Emerson 2007: 22–3). In this case, the collective set of preferences will also be single-peaked. If that collective peak is between option C and option D, then, depending on the exact position of the peak, the Annex I: The Rules for an MBC 119

Table AI.1 Consensus Coefﬁcients

consensors may well decide that the collective decision is £ 7.50, £8.0, or whatever. These calculations can be quite precise.

AI.4 Consensus coefﬁcients

In an MBC vote, if all the participants cast a full slate of preferences, then while the maximum consensus coefficient is always 1.0, the minimum varies according to the number of options on the ballot. Accordingly, the mean also varies, as do the various demarcations. (If all the voters submit partial ballots, then of course one or more options might get the absolute minimum MBC score of zero.) Table AI.1 shows all the minimum, mean and maximum consensus coefficients for MBC ballots of three to ten options. {It also includes a row in tint, for a (majoritarian) two-option ballot, but only to show how the mathematics vary. Obviously, a two-option yes-or-no MBC is the same, mathematically, as a majority vote, and if everybody submits a 1st preference ‘yes’ (2 points) and a 2nd preference ‘no’ (1 point), then ‘yes’ will get the maximum consensus coefficient of 1.0 while the ‘no’ option gets the full ballot minimum of 0.5.} Every forum should state, in standing orders, just what demarcation is required before the outcome of any ballot can be enacted. Table AI.1 lists some suggested levels for a five-option ballot, but these could well be considered to be far too high for the realpolitik of a contemporary parliament. Initially at least, therefore, it might be expected that on matters controversial, many MPs will opt to cast a partial ballot, so maybe standing orders should stipulate rather less ambitious levels of, say, 0.40, 0.45 and 0.50 respectively, or whatever. In time, standing orders may insist on the levels shown in Table AI.1, levels which could be adopted much earlier in civic society. 120 Annex I: The Rules for an MBC

AI.5 Social Choices and Social Rankings

As a general rule, if and when the subject is complex and/or contentious, it is advisable to have a (short) list of about four to six options. If the subject matter is not complex—to take a ﬂippant example, if parliament were to choose the colour with which to paint the bathroom door—there could be as many options as there are persons eligible to make a proposal. If the number of options, n, is such that:

n 10 then those voting may be asked to list all n options. If on the other hand,

N > 10 those voting may be asked to list just n options, where

n ¼ 6:

If the purpose of the vote is not so much to take a decision—i.e., make a social choice—but rather, to draw up a prioritisation—make a social ranking—and if it is required to draw up a short list of, say, six options, then again, if N > 10, those voting may be asked to cast a maximum of just six preferences. If in the count, the seventh most popular option is very close to the sixth, while the eighth is quite far behind, then the consensors may well decide that the ﬁnal short-list shall consist of all seven options.

Reference Emerson, P. (2007). Designing an all-inclusive democracy. Heidelberg: Springer. Annex II: The Rules for a Matrix Vote Election

AII.1 The Milieu

In a parliament where proportionality is considered to be important, the ﬁrst count of a matrix vote election should be conducted according to the rules of a QBS; hence the term ‘QBS matrix vote’, (which therefore involves both a QBS and an MBC count). In organisations in civic society where internal tensions are not so keenly felt, reliance can be placed on an MBC election, in which case the expression ‘MBC matrix vote’ may be used, (and this involves two MBC counts). For the purposes of this text, the following rules apply to a QBS matrix vote.

AII.2 Prior to the Vote

Each member of the given electorate, the entire parliament in the case of all-party power-sharing arrangement, shall be issued with a (paper or electronic) ballot. At the same time, a list of all the members shall be made available, with indications as to who is not able to stand (because they have already served a fixed number of terms/years) and/or who does not wish to stand (because of old age or whatever). In addition, the list shall indicate any instances in which a particular MP does not want to stand for a particular post; not everyone, for example, would want to take on finance, and likewise, some might opt out of defence. There are two principles involved in all this. The first is that, in a consensual polity, people do not so openly promote themselves. If someone wishes to opt out, they may. But no-one stands on the hustings to sing his own praises. Secondly, as in Quaker meetings, if the consensus of all concerned is that a certain individual should indeed by PM, for example, then even if she had not wanted to take on this post, she should nevertheless respect the wishes of parliament and comply (Sect. 6.2.4.2).

AII.3 Prior to the Count

In a paper count, the ﬁrst tasks are as follows: (a) Count the valid vote—i.e. the total of full and partial votes—and calculate the quota. (b) Convert all preferences cast into points, paying close attention to any partial votes. (c) List all the 1st preferences and points cast (as was done in Tables 6.10 and 6.21, or as could be counted in Table AIV.1). It is of course necessary to record all the points cast; some preferences (and therefore points) may have been cast to appoint the particular candidate to a certain portfolio, but other preferences (points) may not have been allocated to a portfolio as the voters concerned might not have cast some or indeed any of their As. Accordingly, use should be made of the right-hand column in Table AIV.1. (d) Identify which candidates have one or more quotas of 1st preferences. (e) Count the number of each candidate’s 2nd preferences. Assuming a paper count, ballots should be separated into different bundles of candidates’ 1st preferences; and each bundle into separate batches of candidates’ 2nd preferences. (f) Identify which pairs of candidates have two quotas of 1st/2nd preferences. (g) Add the points recorded in (c) above, so to identify each candidate’s sum for each portfolio; and then add the sums to get each candidate’s MBC score, as well as each portfolio’s MBC score; by now, the data should resemble that shown in Tables 6.11 or 6.22, or as would appear in Table AIV.2.Asin (c) above, the points cast for a candidate but not allocated to a particular portfolio should also be recorded, in the penultimate right-hand column of Table AIV.2. (h) When Part I of the count has been completed, (see below), identify which pairs have one quota of 1st/2nd preferences.

AII.4 The QBS Count

In the examples used in this book, the QBS election shall be counted in two parts and four stages, as shown in Table AII.1. [In a more sophisticated setting, the count could be conducted in seven stages (Emerson 2007: 44–5)]. If at the end of any stage, there are still seats to be ﬁlled, the count proceeds to the next stage. Annex II: The Rules for a Matrix Vote Election 123

Table AII.1 The QBS count Part I Stage (i) All candidates gaining at least one quota of 1st preferences are elected. Stage (ii) The second candidates in all pairs of candidates1 gaining two quotas of 1st/2nd preferences are elected. Part II. From hence forth, any candidates who were elected in Part I are no long taken into account. Stage (iii) Any pairs of candidates gaining just one quota of 1st/2nd preferences are awarded one seat, the actual seat going to whichever candidate of the pair has the higher MBC score. Stage (iv) All remaining seats are awarded to those with the highest MBC scores.

The result will be a social ranking of the n candidates: in the event of a tie between candidates with the same number of quotas, precedence is given to the one with the higher MBC score; if the candidates are still tied, precedence is given to the candidate with the more 1st preferences; and if still equal, to the one with the more 2nd preferences, and so on.

AII.5 The MBC Count

In a matrix vote election of n persons, the above QBS count identiﬁes the n most popular candidates or, in the event of a tie for the nth post, the top (n + 1) candidates. The data could now be displayed in a manner shown in Tables 6.12 or 6.23,oras would be in Table AIV.3, with both the candidates and the portfolios listed, top-to- bottom in descending order from the QBS election, and left-to-right in descending order of the various portfolio MBC scores, respectively. Appointments are now made to the different portfolios in order, starting with the highest sum in the main body of the matrix, that is, the area enclosed by the thick border in Table AIV.3. In the event of a sum tie between two candidates both competing for the same portfolio, precedence is given to the more popular candidate, as measured in the QBS election. If there is a sum tie with one candidate vying for two portfolios, precedence is given to the portfolio with the higher MBC score, as recorded in the bottom row. If and when two candidates competing for the ﬁnal nth portfolio are tied in the QBS ranking, the appointment of one will automatically lead to the elimination of the other. If at any stage, the appointment of a candidate to a particular portfolio means that another candidate’s sum for that portfolio is now redundant, the latter candidate’s As shall be examined, to see if any of these As might be eligible for transfer to Bs. Such information can be displayed as was shown in Tables 6.13 or 6.24, 6.25 and 6.26.

1 As noted in fn. 1 of Sect. (6.1.1.3), if x voters give a 1st preference to Joan and a 2nd preference to Jean, and if y voters give a 1st preference to Jean and a 2nd preference to Joan, and if (x+y) 2 quotas, then the Jean/Joan pair is deemed to have two quotas. 124 Annex II: The Rules for a Matrix Vote Election

The ﬁnal outcome will consist of data similar to that shown in Tables 6.14 and 6.27.

Reference

Emerson, P. (2007). Designing an all-inclusive democracy. Heidelberg: Springer. Annex III: Examples of Valid and Invalid Ballots

AIII.1 The Principle

As always, the guiding principle in any count is to regard a vote as valid if the voter’s intentions are clear. Every step, of course, must be taken to ensure that those voting understand everything, which in any parliament should be feasible. Accord- ingly, the ballot paper for a vote as in Table 6.1, in electronic or hard copy, would be presented along the lines shown in Table AIII.1.

Table AIII.1 A Sample Ballot Paper

A Matrix Vote Ballot: Electing a 6-Person Executive

Write the name of your 1st preference candidate in the 1st row of the left-hand (tinted) column. You may also write the name of your 2nd and subsequent preferences in this column. In addition, by writing the letter A in the appropriate column opposite each name, you may indicate in which portfolio you would like each of your nominees to serve. And just in case your candidate is elected but that ministry is already occupied by the time he/she is due to be appointed, you may also write the letter B in another column, and the letter C in another as well.

(continued)

A valid full and completed vote consists of six different valid names in the tinted column, as well as six As in the untinted matrix, one A in each column and one A in each row.

The vote shall be analysed by two counts: a QBS count of the tinted data, to identify the six most popular candidates; and an MBC count, to appoint each of these candidates to a particular portfolio, depending on the candidates’ MBC points sums in the untinted matrix. In the QBS count, a 1st preference is always a 1st preference; a 2nd is always a 2nd, and so on. In the MBC count, however, points awarded to preferences may vary, as follows:

If you vote for: 123456 candidate(s) your 1st preference gets 1 pt 2 pts 3 pts 4 pts 5 pts 6 pts your 2nd preference gets 1 pt 2 pts 3 pts 4 pts 5 pts your 3rd preference gets 1 pt 2 pts 3 pts 4 pts your 4th preference gets 1 pt 2 pts 3 pts your 5th preference gets 1 pt 2 pts your 6th preference gets 1 pt

Examples of valid and invalid full and partial ballots now follow, ﬁrstly for MBC ballots as in decision-making; and secondly, for matrix vote ballots. Annex III: Examples of Valid and Invalid Ballots 127

AIII.2 MBC Ballots

In a preference vote, the minimum requirement is that a 1st preference should be included. Table AIII.2 shows a valid partial vote in a four-option MBC, and the same would apply to a four-candidate ballot; in this instance, the individual’s vote is BÀ1. Table AIII.3 shows another person’s valid partial vote; on this occasion, she votes BÀ1, DÀ2, AÀ3. If for whatever reason, the voter has cast two in number 2nd preferences, as shown in Table AIII.4, then the 1st preference remains valid but nothing else is certain; accordingly, what might have been intended to be a valid partial vote of three preferences becomes a valid partial vote of only one preference, like the ballot of Table AIII.2. The same applies if the voter has also given a 3rd preference to option C,as shown in Table AIII.5. In this case, it is not clear if the voter preferred option A to

Table AIII.2 A valid partial Options Preferences MBC vote A – B 1 C – D –

Table AIII.3 A second valid Options Preferences partial MBC vote A 3 B 1 C – D 2

Table AIII.4 A query Options Preferences A 2 B 1 C – D 2

Table AIII.5 A further Options Preferences query A 2 B 1 C 3 D 2 128 Annex III: Examples of Valid and Invalid Ballots

Table AIII.6 A valid full Options Preferences MBC vote A 3 B 1 C 4 D 2 option C, or was it option D to C? In this regard, his intentions are unclear, so it remains a valid partial vote of BÀ1. Table AIII.6 is a valid full ballot, where the voter votes BÀ1, DÀ2, AÀ3, CÀ4.

AIII.3 Matrix Vote Ballots

The same principles apply in any matrix vote. In an election for a three-person Cabinet consisting of three Ministers—those of Finance, Foreign Affairs and Climate Change—Table AIII.7 shows the minimum requirement, namely, one valid name in the 1st preference slot of the tinted part. Table AIII.8 shows a little more information, with an ‘A’ indicating the voter’s wish that Kate should become the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and again, it is valid. Table AIII.9 shows a ballot of two preferences, but there is doubt as to which ofﬁce the voter wishes Kate to undertake. Accordingly, the partial vote shown in Table AIII.9 should be interpreted to be the valid partial vote shown in Table AIII.10. As implied in the text, in a three-post matrix vote, a full ballot would consist of three different valid names, listed in the left hand section of the ballot paper, here shown in tint. If she so wishes, the voter may cast an A to indicate in which portfolio she wishes each of these nominees to serve. Accordingly, such a full and completed ballot would show one A in each column and one A in each row, as in Table AIII.11. A full vote, then, is one in which the voter has cast a full valid slate of valid preferences in the tinted column. If she has also cast a full slate of As, one in each column and one in each row, then this is a full and completed ballot. If a voter wishes to indicate an alternative portfolio for one or more of her nominees, just in case that candidate is not the ﬁrst to be elected and if, when he is chosen, that particular posting has already been occupied, she (the voter) may also write a B or even a C for a second or third alternative posting. An example is shown in Table AIII.12. Finally, then, an example of a six-candidate matrix vote is shown in Table AIII.13. This valid full and completed vote contains six different valid names in the tinted part of the ballot; while in the matrix, it shows six As, one in each column and one in each row. It may also show up to six Bs and six Cs. There are no rules governing the number or the positioning of the Bs and Cs. Annex III: Examples of Valid and Invalid Ballots 129

Table AIII.7 A valid partial matrix vote

Table AIII.8 A second valid partial matrix vote

Table AIII.9 A third valid partial matrix vote

Table AIII.10 A fourth valid partial matrix vote 130 Annex III: Examples of Valid and Invalid Ballots

Table AIII.11 A valid full and complete matrix vote

Table AIII.12 A second valid full and complete matrix vote

Table AIII.13 Another valid full and complete vote Annex IV: Sample Forms Required for a Matrix Vote Paper Count

AIV.1 The 1st Preferences and the Points

The preferences on each paper should ﬁrst be converted into points. In a ballot for the election of six persons, where a full (and completed) ballot consists of six preferences, then 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 points shall be awarded to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th preferences. If, however, the voter has cast only four preferences, then his 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th preferences shall be awarded 4, 3, 2, 1 points (fn. 9 to Sect. 2.2). When recording all the 1st preferences in the light-tinted ‘1st’ columns, and the points cast, in the (much larger than here represented) ‘P’ columns (Sect. AII.3.c), the points for any ticks (as in Table 5.2) or As (Table 6.2) awarded to a particular portfolio shall be inserted in the appropriate column, while the points for any preferences awarded but not given a tick or an A should be recorded in the right- hand column of Table AIV.1. In the examples of Chap. 6, Tables 6.10 and 6.21, this right-hand column was not shown.

Table AIV.1 The 1st preferences and points cast

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 131 P. Emerson, From Majority Rule to Inclusive Politics, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-23500-4 132 Annex IV: Sample Forms Required for a Matrix Vote Paper Count

Table AIV.2 The quotas gained and MBC sums awarded

AIV.2 The Quotas Gained and MBC Sums Awarded

When recording the quotas in the light-tinted Q columns and MBC sums in the untinted M columns (Sect. AII.3.g), each candidate’s MBC score will be the addition of all his or her sums for the various portfolios, plus any points not allocated to a portfolio, and these scores shall be shown in the penultimate right-hand column of Table AIV.2. Needless to say, the total of all the MBC scores at the bottom of the right-hand column should be the same as the total of all the MBC scores in the bottom row. In the examples of Chap. 6, this information was recorded in Tables 6.11 and 6.22.

AIV.3 The Successful Candidates

By the time the successful candidates have been identiﬁed, any points awarded to any of the unsuccessful candidates may be added up for each portfolio and inserted in the ‘others’ row, as in Table AIV.3. In the examples of Chap. 6, this information was recorded in Tables 6.12 and 6.13 for the ﬁrst example, and in 6.23, 6.24, 6.25 and 6.26 for the second, by which point, of course, the candidates were in order of popularity, top to bottom, while the portfolios were also in order, left to right.

AIV.4 The Outcome

On the basis of the candidates’ sums for the various portfolios, starting with the highest sums in the main body of the matrix, shown inside the bold border, and proceeding in descending sum order, the successful candidates may be appointed to the various ministerial posts. The process continues (Sect. AII.5), if need be using a Annex IV: Sample Forms Required for a Matrix Vote Paper Count 133

Table AIV.3 The successful candidates

Table AIV.4 The outcome The Cabinet: Ministers of... The candidates: ...... MBC scores ......

MBC scores Total

new form if and when any As are transferred into Bs or Cs, until the last candidate has been appointed. The outcome, as in Tables 6.14 and 6.27, may be published in the format of Table AIV.4. All the successful candidates’ MBC scores should be included, as well as the one total of those scores, but only those sums which are relevant to the appointment of the said candidates to their respective portfolios are necessary; in other words, the electorate’s collective opinion shall be presented in the same format as the will of each individual voter (Sect. 6.2.1, Table 6.2): for an n-candidate election, there should usually be n sums, one in each column and one in each row. There is a remote possibility that the nth candidate will be appointed by default, i.e., that he will be the nth candidate as per the QBS count but, in the MBC count, he will have received no points for this nth appointment. In a free vote in any multi- party parliament of over 100 members, as noted earlier, the chances of such are inﬁnitesimally small. Glossary

Absolute majority More than 50 % of the valid vote. See also simple majority. Agalev A Belgian GP. See also Ecolo. All-party state See party state. Approval voting In approval voting, the voter may vote for, i.e., ‘approve’ of, as many options as she wishes. The outcome is the option with the most approvals. AV In the alternative vote, the voter may cast one, some or all of his preferences. The count is a series of plurality votes; after each round, the least popular option is eliminated and its votes may be transferred in accordance with its voters’ 2nd and subsequent preferences; the process continues until one option or candidate gets 50 % plus of the votes. It is a decision-making process which can also be used in elections, as in Australia. BC Borda count.Inann-option/candidate ballot, voters may cast up to n preferences. In the count, points are awarded to (1st, 2nd ... penultimate, ultimate) preferences according to either the original rule, (n, nÀ1 ... 2, 1), or the more usual (nÀ1, nÀ2 ...1, 0). See also MBC. Bundestag The German Parliament. Chad In voting machines used in the US, a small piece of paper—a chad—indicates the vote has been cast. Chairperson An impartial individual (s)elected by the participants to guide the meeting. Coalition The coming together of two or more political parties, sometimes to stand together prior to an election, as in India; sometimes after an election to work together in government, as in Germany; and occasionally, as again in India, there can be a post-election coalition of parties and coalitions. Coalition gov- ernments fall into four categories: a minority coalition consists of two or more political parties, the elected members of which number less than 50 % of the seats in parliament; a majority coalition consists of two or more political parties, the elected members of which number more than 50 % of the seats in parliament, either a

few more as in a narrow coalition, or many more as in a broader arrangement; a grand coalition usually consists of two big parties, but the term is more applicable to countries like Germany where, because of MMP, there are invariably only two big parties. In Estonia, in contrast, where they use a low threshold form of PR-list, quite a few parties vie for a leading role, and any coalition of two of them may be little grander than a majority coalition; an all-party coalition or GNU consists of MPs from all the main parties in parliament. Condorcet In a Condorcet ballot, voters cast one, some or all of their preferences. In the count, pairs of options are compared, and a Condorcet winner (if there is one) is the option which wins the most pairings. Confidence and supply In a minority administration, the party in power may rely on a smaller partner to vote in support on any important matter such as a vote of confidence. The term is associated with the Westminster model. Consensor One of a team of impartial facilitators—in a parliamentary setting, they would best be elected by the legislature from the judiciary; their responsibilities are as follows: • to allow all relevant options to be ‘on the table’, if and only if these proposals comply with some agreed norm like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; • to draw up and then maintain a balanced list of these options; • to form a composite if and when there is a consensus for such an action; • to produce a (short) list of about four to six options (or of more, if the subject is not complex), when the chairperson calls for a vote; • to adjudicate on the electorate; • to analyse any vote, if need be by producing a composite; • to display the voters’ profile, and • to declare the outcome. Consensual polity See governance. Consensus A consensus decision is one reached either in discussion and/or via a consensus vote, an MBC. It implies that all concerned have overcome their differences and found common ground or at least a compromise. It is not to be confused with unanimity. Consensus coefficient The consensus coefficient of option A is defined as A’s MBC score divided by the maximum possible MBC score. In theory, it varies from a minimum of 0.0 to a maximum of 1.0. Consensus voting A generic term to cover the MBC in decision-making, QBS in elections, and the matrix vote in governance. Consociational voting See governance, consociationalism. Consociationalism See governance. Constructive vote of confidence A vote between two positive proposals in which the choice is either an existing or an alternative administration. Glossary 137

Constituency A group of individuals who vote, as it were, as one unit. The distinction can be geographical, as in a general election; or it can be partisan, as in consociational votes in Belgium or NI. Dail Eíreann The Irish Parliament. Designations Prior to any key consociational votes in the NI Assembly, MLAs are required to designate themselves as ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘other’. Die Linke The Left, a German political party. d’Hondt divisor In a PR-list election, every candidate’s total vote is divided by the divisors 1, 2, 3, 4 ... and seats are awarded to the subsequent numbers in descending order. This methodology tends to favour larger parties. Droop See quota. Ecolo Confederated ecologists for the organisation of original struggles, a Belgian GP. See also Agalev. Electorate The set of voters eligible to vote. Ethno-colour blindness A voting procedure is said to be ethno-colour blind if both the voting procedure and the count take no account of the voter’s gender, party allegiance, native language, confessional belief, ethnic origin or any other such distinction like sexual orientation. Fatah The Palestine National Liberation Movement based mainly in the West Bank. Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina One of two entities in the country. See also Republika-Srpska. Fianna Fail An Irish political party. Fidesz The Hungarian Civic Alliance, a political party. Fine Gael An Irish political party. FPP First-past-the-post. A plurality vote used in an election. Full ballot In a preferential vote on n options/candidates in which the voter is asked to cast up to n preferences, a full ballot is one in which he does indeed cast n valid preferences. See also partial ballot. Full and completed ballot In a matrix vote, a full and completed ballot is one in which the voter has not only cast a full slate of n valid preferences, but has also assigned n valid ticks or As, one in each column of the matrix and one in each row. See also partial ballot. GNU Government of National Unity; see coalition, all-party. Governance Governance may be based on: a minority administration in which the largest party relies on one or more smaller parties, either in some loose arrangement on an issue-by-issue basis, or in a more solid “confidence and supply” relationship; majoritarianism, whereby rule is exercised by the majority; in a parliament, majority rule can be effected by either one party or a coalition of parties, as long as it consists of more than 50 % of the MPs; consociationalism, in which the electorate is divided into two or more ethno- religious-linguistic groups and whereby decisions are taken/ratified by majority vote only if supported by majorities in both/all constituencies; 138 Glossary

consensual polity, in which decisions are taken in a non-majoritarian preferential MBC vote. Hamas The Islamic Resistance Movement based in Palestine. Hare See quota. Herzeg-Bosna One of two sectarian-based areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina. See also Republika-Srpska. Hung parliament A parliament in which no one party has more than 50 % of the seats. Interahamwe The word means ‘those who fight together’; they led the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Knesset The Israeli parliament. Likud A centre-right political party in Israel. Majoritarianism See governance. Majority rule See governance, majoritarianism. Majority vote A vote on only two options or candidates. Matrix vote A tabular ballot in which the voter may choose, in order of preference, not only those whom he/she wants to be elected, but also the posts in which he/she wishes each of these nominees to serve. The analysis is based on two counts. In a QBS matrix vote, which is proportional, a QBS count identifies who shall be elected; and an MBC count identifies who shall serve in which post. In an MBC matrix vote, which is not proportional, both counts are based on an MBC. MBC Modified Borda count.Inann-option/candidate ballot, those concerned may cast m preferences, where n m 1. In the count, points are awarded to (1st, 2nd ...penultimate, ultimate) preferences according to the rule (m, mÀ1 ... 2, 1). See also BC. Mixed electoral system A mixed electoral system usually consists of two parts, the first FPP or TRS and the second PR-list, but does not guarantee overall proportionality. See also MMP. MMP Mixed-member proportional. A two-tier electoral system consisting of two ballots: the first is for an FPP election in small constituencies; the second, to ensure overall proportionality, a PR-list election in larger constituencies. It is used in Germany, Hungary and New Zealand for example. Multi-party state See party state. No-party state See party state. One-party state See party state. Partial ballot In a preferential vote on n options/candidates in which the voter is asked to cast up to n preferences, a partial ballot is one in which he/she casts only m preferences, where n > m 1. See also full ballot. Party state There may be a:

no-party state, as in Nauru, where every MP is non-partisan; one-party state, as in China, where although other smaller parties may exist, one very large party has a virtual monopoly of power; two-party state,asinUSA, where power alternates between two large parties, and where other parties ﬁnd it difﬁcult to compete; Glossary 139

multi-party state, as in the Netherlands, where many parties are represented in parliament; all-party state, in which all the main parties in parliament are represented in government. In effect, such a GNU, as in Switzerland, may be very similar to a no-party state. Plebiscite The more usual word for a constitutional referendum. Plurality vote In a plurality vote, the voter casts only one preference; in the count, the winner is the option or candidate with the most votes, if not a majority then the largest minority. See also FPP. Power-sharing Two or more parties sharing the responsibilities of government. In conflict zones (and in this book), the term normally implies an all-party administration. PR Proportional representation refers to an electoral system held in multi- member constituencies such that two or more candidates are elected in propor- tion to their share of the constituency vote. PR-list In a closed PR-list electoral system, voters vote for the party of their choice. In an open version, they may vote either for one party or for one particular candidate of that party, or (as in Belgium) for more than one candidate of one party, or (as in Switzerland) for more than one candidate of more than one party. PR-STV Proportional representation, single transferable vote. This is an AV (or STV) election in multi-member constituencies, in which voters may vote for as many candidates as they wish in their order of preference. Any candidate gaining a (Droop) quota of 1st preferences is deemed elected; the surplus over and above the quota of any elected candidate is transferred in accordance with the voters’ 2nd preferences. If seats remain to be filled, the candidate with the smallest total is eliminated, as in AV, and her votes are transferred in a similar fashion. The process continues until the requisite number of candidates has been elected. QBS The quota Borda system is an electoral system; in the vote, as in PR-STV, the voter may cast preferences. In the count, success depends on the candidates’ total of top preferences and/or MBC scores. Quota In an electoral system, a quota is a specific number of votes which, if attained, ensures the election of the candidate concerned. If V is the valid vote, and n is the number of representatives to be elected, then a Hare quota is defined as the integer greater than V/n while a Droop quota > V/(n + 1). The Droop quota tends to favour the larger parties, while the Hare is biased towards the smaller. Range voting In range voting, the voter is given a certain number of points, which he can allocate to one or more options/candidates. Referendum Usually a regional or national two-option vote on matters of unusual importance. Some countries like Finland, New Zealand and Uruguay have sometimes held multi-option referendums, normally under TRS. Republika-Srpska One of two entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. See also Federa- tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 140 Glossary

Serial voting If a number of options can be arranged in order, from cheap to expensive for example, then a serial vote is a series of majority votes between the two extreme options, until just one option remains; the latter is also the Condorcet winner. Shas An Israeli political party. Simple majority If there are some abstentions in a ballot of only two options, the winning option may have only the largest minority or a simple majority. See also absolute majority. Single-peaked preference A voter’s preferences are said to be single-peaked if, when her preferences are laid out on, say, a cheap-expensive spectrum, her 2nd and subsequent preferences lie in descending order to one and/or other side of her 1st preference. If in a five-option ballot, the cheapest option is option A, the next more expensive option B, etc., to the most expensive option E, then, if a voter’s 1st preference is option D, her 2nd preference will probably be either C or E, and so on. Two examples of single-peaked sets of preferences are D-C-E- B-A and D-C-B-A-E. A set which is not single-peaked might be D-A-C-E-B. Sinn Feín An Irish political party. SNTV In the single non-transferable vote, which is held in multi-member constituencies, the voter casts only one preference. STV The single transferable vote is another name for AV. Tanaiste Ireland’s Deputy Prime Minister. Taoiseach Ireland’s Prime Minister. Threshold The effective threshold of an electoral system is the minimum percentage of votes required for a candidate to be elected. It is the logical conse- quence of three factors: the mathematics of the electoral system, the size of the constituency and the number of representatives to be elected in that constituency. There can also be an additional legal threshold of, say, five per cent, as in Germany. TRS The two-round system can be used in decision-making or in an election. The first round is a plurality vote; if no one option/candidate gains 50 % plus of the vote, it is followed by a second round majority vote between the two-leading options/candidates from the first round. Turnout The percentage of the entire electorate which has participated in a ballot. Two-party state See party state. Two-tier A two-tier electoral system is based on two counts, the first in smaller constituencies, guarantees local representation; the second, in larger constituencies, ensures overall proportionality. The first ballot may be under FPP or PR; the second is invariably under a system of PR. Unanimity A decision may be judged unanimous if all concerned vote in favour. It implies that all are in agreement. It is not to be confused with consensus although, on issues which are not at all contentious, the unanimous and consensus opinions, as too the majority and any minority opinions, may all be the same. Valid vote The number of voters deemed to have submitted a valid full or partial ballot. Glossary 141

Venstre A Danish political party. Veto The ability to prevent a vote being passed. Vote of (no) confidence A majority vote for or against a government. See also constructive vote of no confidence Voters’ profile A voters’ profile is the set of all the preferences cast on all the options/candidates listed by all concerned. It is usually portrayed as a table with options or candidates listed on one axis, and the quantities of preferences cast in their favour on the other. Whip A party whip is an instruction from the party’s leadership to its elected representatives to vote in a certain way. The term may also be used to describe the functionary who issues such orders. Those who disobey may then loose the whip—and this is its third meaning—which means they also lose the party’s endorsement to stand as a candidate in the next election. Index

A China, 3, 6, 11, 13, 14, 112, 115 Abadi-al, H., 42 Chirac, J., 35 Abdullah, A., 55 Coalition, 17, 18, 36–43, 60, 66, 106, 107 Adedeji, A., 52 all-party, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 17, 19, 21, 23, 36, Afghanistan, 18, 55–56, 67 37, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 76, 108–110, Albania, 62 112, 114 Approval voting. See Decision-making and grand, 7, 17, 34, 39, 45, 59, 108, 109 Electoral systems majority, 7, 12, 17, 18, 34, 37, 38, 40, 41, Archdale, E., 3 56–62, 105, 107–109 Australia, 114 minority, 40, 109 Austria, 38, 39, 41 Consensors, 74–75, 110 AV. See Decision-making and Electoral Consensus, 3, 15, 16, 23, 40, 73, 75, 76, 80, 99, systems 100, 110, 112, 115 coefﬁcient, 75, 77, 114 level, 101–102 B Consensus voting, 6, 8, 15, 72–76, 112 Balkans. See Albania, Bosnia Consociational voting. See Decision-making BC. See Decision-making and Electoral systems Consociationalism. See Governance Belgium, 15, 19, 20, 27, 41–42, 66 Constructive vote of conﬁdence. See Vote of Blair, T., ix Croatia, 22, 48, 59 Borda de, Institute, 5 Cusanus, N., 2 Borda de, J-C., 2, 4–5 Cyprus, 22, 27, 44 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 4, 5, 21–24, 62, 68 Czech Republic, 57 Britain. See UK Brown, G., 38 Bulgaria, 59, 62 D Burundi, 50 Decision-making, 7, 12–15, 27–28, 48, 72–76. Bush, G., 35 See also Referendums approval voting, 13, 24 AV, 12, 24, 33 C BC, 2–5, 24 Cameron, D., 108 Condorcet, 13, 16, 24, 28 Canada, 31 consociational voting, 21, 22, 41, Caucasus, 48 63, 114

Decision-making (cont.) G majority vote, 2, 5, 7, 11–16, 18–22, 27, Gaddaﬁ, M., 23 32–34, 37, 38, 48–50, 53, 54, 63, 66, 68, Gender balance, 37, 69, 71, 80, 81 69, 72, 76, 104, 105, 107, 110, 112–115 Germany, 14, 16, 17, 38–39, 42, 107–109 MBC, 2–5, 13, 24, 26–28, 73, 76, 109, Ghani, A.A., 55 110, 112 Gibraltar, 2 plurality vote, 12, 15, 19, 24, 27, 28 Gorbachev, M., 57, 67, 115 serial voting, 19 Gore, Al, 35 TRS, 12, 19, 24, 28, 33 Governance, 8, 12, 16–19, 26–27, 48, 53–60, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 53 65–72 Denmark, 16, 17, 19, 28, 40, 41 consensus, 23–24, 109–115 Desalegn, H., 54 consociationalism, 19–23, 27 d’Hondt divisor, 68 majoritarianism, 2, 7, 11–24, 26, 31–43, 45, Droop quota, 84 49, 53, 54, 58, 60, 62, 65, 103–109, 115 Ðukanovic´, M., 59 majority coalition, 42 Dummett, M., 5 minority administration, 6, 12, 17, 18, 34, Duverger’s Law, 37, 44 37, 38, 40, 43, 57, 61, 107, 109 Greece, 45, 112 Gregory, T., 42 E Guam, 32 Egypt, 11, 50–52 Electoral systems, 6, 12, 15–16, 33–36, 48, 50–52, 66, 69–72, 106–109 H approval voting, 348 Hailsham, L., 104 AV, 16, 33, 42, 55, 114 Hare quota, 68 BC, 3–5, 59, 71 Higgins, M.D., 1 FPP, 12, 15, 16, 23, 33–35, 37, 42, 44, 50, Hitler, A., 27, 38, 66 52–55, 62, 108 hung parliament, 38, 42, 45, 106, 107, 109 majority vote, 69 Hungary, 56 matrix vote, 1–8, 69, 70, 79, 82–102, 110, 111 MBC, 5, 71, 79, 89–90, 96–97, 111 I MMP, 16, 33, 34, 38, 42, 56, 59 Iceland, 45 plurality vote, 35, 69 India, 17, 18, 54–55 PR,3,33 International Foundation for Electoral PR-list, 15, 16, 34, 39–41, 43, 45, 50, 56–58, Systems (IFES), xv 60, 62, 71, 80 Iraq, 14, 23, 42, 66, 72, 114 PR-STV, 4, 15, 34, 42, 45, 50, 70, 71, 80, 110 Ireland, 2, 5, 14, 34, 42, 45, 70, 73, 100, QBS, 5–6, 15, 71, 79–82, 87–89, 94–95, 110, 108, 111 111, 114 Israel, 60, 74 SNTV, 140 Italy, 45 TRS, 15, 35–36, 44, 50, 51, 55, 57, 59, 62 Izetbegovic´, A., 21 two-tier, 16, 60 el-Sisi, A.F., 52 Erdogan, R., 46 J Estonia, 57 Jackson, A., 35 EU, 4, 15, 58 Jospin, Lionel, 36

F K Finland, 19, 40 Kashmir, 14 FPP. See Electoral systems Kenya, 2, 23, 53–54, 66 France, 14, 15, 35–36, 44 Kenyatta, J., 53 Full ballot, 70, 74, 82 Kibaki, M., 54 Index 145

Kiir Majardit, S., 54 New Zealand, 28, 33 Kiribati, 59 Newfoundland, 32 Korea, 17 Nigeria, 14 Kosova, 58, 62 Nkomo, Joshua, 52 Northern Ireland, 1–3, 5, 13, 14, 19–24, 37, 48–50, 68–69, 71, 74, 99 L Norway, 19, 28, 39 Latvia, 57 Le Pen, J-M., 36 Lebanon, 24, 56, 67–68 O Lenin, V.I., 27 Odinga, O., 53 Libya, 23 Odinga, R., 54 Lithuania, 57, 62 Organisation for Security and Co-operation Llull, R., 2 in Europe (OSCE), 62 Luxembourg, 15

P M Paisley, I., 2, 3, 22 Macedonia, 59 Palestine, 60 McGuinness, M., 22 Papua New Guinea (PNG), 50, 55, 114 Majoritarianism. See Governance Partial ballot, 5, 24–26, 71, 81, 82, 87 Majority rule. See Governance, Plurality vote. See Decision-making and Majoritarianism Electoral systems Majority vote. See Decision-making and Poland, 57 Electoral systems Portugal, 36, 45 Malaki-al, N., 42 Power-sharing. See Coalition, all-party Malta, 45 PR. See Electoral systems Mandela, N., 79 PR-list. See Electoral systems Manipulatation, 99 PR-STV. See Electoral systems Ma´oZe´do¯ng, 13, 115 Putin, V., 57 Markov, S., 58 Maskey, A., 3 Matrix vote. See Electoral systems Q MBC. See Decision-making and Electoral QBS. See Electoral systems systems Quebec, 13 Mbeki, T., 52 Quota. See Droop or Hare Milosˇevic´, S., 58 Minority administration. See Governance MMP. See Electoral systems R Montenegro, 59 Radji-Histic´, P., 4 Morsi, M., 51 Referendums, 12, 13, 19, 22, 27, 33–34, 38, Mubarak, H., 50 48–50, 57, 58, 105, 110 Mugabe, R., 52, 66 Romania, 59 Myanmar, 23 Russia, 12, 14, 34, 49, 57, 67, 100, 111, 115 Rwanda, 2, 115 Ryzhkov, N., 67 N Nader, R., 35 Napoleon, Bonaparte, 27, 66 S Nauru, 59 Sakharov, A., 115 Netanyahu, B., 60 Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, S, 59 Netherlands, 35, 40–41, 66 Scandinavia. See Denmark, Finland New Ireland Group (NIG), 3–5 Scotland, 13, 32–33, 48, 74 146 Index

Self-determination, 13–14, 22, 31–33, 48 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73 Serbia, 22, 58 Uruguay, 28 Serial voting. See Decision-making USA, 17, 19, 21, 35, 54, 74, 110–112, 115 Sˇesˇelj, V., 58 USSR. See Russia Shaﬁk, A., 51 Single-peaked preferences, 140 Slovakia, 56 V Slovenia, 59 Valid/invalid votes, 8 SNTV. See electoral systems Van Rompuy, H., 42 South Sudan, 49, 54 Venezuela, 50 Soviet union. See Russia Vote of conﬁdence, 16–18, 37, 38, 57, 107 Spain, 2, 34, 36, 43 Sweden, 19, 28, 40, 105 Switzerland, 15, 19, 24, 36–37, 45, 67 W Syria, 72 Whips, party, 76, 104–105, 110, 112 Wilson, W., 13

T Tadic´, B., 58 X Thatcher, M., 66 Xı´, J., 3 Threshold, 34, 38–40, 42, 43, 45, 56–59, 108 Timoshenko, J., 51 TRS. See Decision-making and Electoral Y systems Yanukovich, V., 51, 58 Tsvangirai, M., 52 Yeltsin, B., 57 Turkey, 34, 45, 111 YEMEN, 19 Two-tier. See Electoral systems YUGOSLAVIA. See Bosnia, Croatia Yushchenko, V., 51

U UK, 2, 14, 17, 23, 31–35, 37–38, 42, 46, 66, Z 74, 100, 105, 107–108 Zapatero, J., 43 Ukraine, 33, 49, 51, 58 ZAIRE. See Democratic Republic of UN, 14, 54, 115 the Congo (DRC) Security Council, 14, 15, 36, 72, 114 Zimbabwe, 52, 66