Brian Martin, Technology for nonviolent struggle (London: War Resisters’ International, 2001) Chapter 5 Communication An effective military depends heavily on effec- join in. Therefore, the struggle cannot have tive communication, including transmission of commanders in the military sense, since obedi- commands, coordination of actions, transmis- ence to orders cannot be enforced. A nonvio- sion of information about enemy activities and lent struggle can, however, have leaders. Noted about the progress of battles, among others. To examples include Mohandas Gandhi, Martin serve the needs of military communication, Luther King, Jr. and Aung San Suu Kyi. In massive investments are made into research, these and other cases, leaders have influence development and production of communica- through their example, intelligence, commit- tion systems. For example, specially designed ment and charisma. But it is not wise to satellites are used to collect information about depend too strongly on such individuals to enemy installations. Massive computer systems provide guidance. Many nonviolence leaders are used to decipher foreign and domestic take a front-line role, participating in civil telecommunications. Satellites are also used to disobedience and other confrontations with the detect enemy missile launches, and special opponent. They may be arrested, imprisoned or facilities are ready to transmit orders to launch killed. In general, they are much more nuclear attacks. Military communications are vulnerable than military commanders, who designed to be highly secure and to enable usually stay away from the fighting. Therefore, transmission of commands even when some nonviolent activists must be prepared to con- channels have been incapacitated. tinue the struggle effectively in the absence of Communication is even more central to their most experienced and knowledgeable nonviolent struggle, but the type of communi- members. All of this means that as many cation most useful for nonviolent struggle is people as possible should be ready and able to quite different than for military purposes. In analyse the situation, initiate action, make the military, the role of the commanding offi- decisions and in general carry on the struggle. cer is central: that person must have reliable For these reasons, nonviolent struggle is best information and be able to issue commands. served by a decentralised, interactive and This explains why there is so much attention to cooperative system of communication, deci- maintaining secure communications to the sion-making and action.1 This provides a very commander-in-chief in the face of attack. different set of priorities for science and tech- Extraordinary efforts—bomb shelters, special nology than military agendas. telephones, personal guards—are used to The following sections examine a number of protect commanders, especially in times of communication media: television, radio, cas- crisis. Ordinary soldiers are trained to obey, not settes, newspapers, leaflets and the under- to take independent initiatives. Soldiers who ground press, telephone and fax, the post, disobey orders are usually subject to severe conversations and meetings, and computer penalties; in wartime, they may be executed. networks. In each case, I comment on the In a nonviolent struggle, participation must value of the medium for nonviolent struggle be voluntary: there is no way to force people to and on ways in which this value might be Communication 43 increased. When giving case studies, I try to methods for nonviolent struggle, they might provide some context for the role of communi- well be willing to participate by hindering cation technology which, in every case, is only efforts by aggressors to control television and one component of a complex struggle in which by enabling popular concerns to be broadcast. social factors are of central importance. The Redesigning broadcast facilities and making chapter concludes with a general assessment of advance preparations could aid the use (or the types of communication technology most interruption) of television in a nonviolent likely to be useful for nonviolent struggle, struggle. For example, broadcast facilities could drawing on theoretical considerations as well as be designed so that technicians, staff or even the case studies. viewers could interrupt transmission in case of a hostile takeover. Some means would be necessary to prevent use of this facility in Television “normal” times, such as the need for a consid- Television is an enormously powerful medium. erable number of people to enter codes. Broad- Most people in western societies watch it for cast facilities could be designed so that, in case many hours each week. Furthermore, there is a of emergency, a special signal indicating a great deal of trust in the image of reality pre- hostile takeover was transmitted along with the sented on the TV screen, more than in news- picture. Special tapes could be produced— papers for example. dealing with methods of nonviolence, ways to There is very little opportunity for participa- undermine control of television by aggressors, tion in the production of broadcast television. etc.—and stored safely for transmission in case It is essentially an autocratic medium. A very of emergency. few people make decisions about content, Heavy consumption of broadcast television which is then transmitted to a large audience. makes a society more vulnerable to takeover. Furthermore, the television image is quite an For long-term security based on nonviolent artificial and manipulated production. Few techniques, the role of television should be people are aware of the tremendous effort that reduced. If most people are active transmitters goes into shaping each moment on the screen. rather than just receivers of messages, then Producing a high-quality television programme there is less possibility for manipulation and requires a lot of skill, equipment and money. central control. This means that experienced professionals Occasionally, television broadcasts inadver- produce most programmes, especially the ones tently aid nonviolent struggle, as in East that most people prefer to watch. Germany. From 1945, East Germany was For these reasons, television is ideal for ruled by a communist dictatorship. Secret rulers. They can influence popular perceptions police monitored activity in all spheres of life. by appointing or controlling a small number of However, West German radio and television television executives and producers. Dictator- broadcasts were readily received throughout ships are only willing to allow television that is East Germany, giving an attractive—indeed under their control. It is no surprise, then, that perhaps unrealistically attractive—picture of one of the prime targets in military coups is life under capitalism. In 1961, the border with television stations.2 Precisely because it is an West Germany was walled off to prevent undemocratic medium, it is highly useful to emigration. aggressors. Hence, it is important to develop Under the Soviet Union’s new policies in ways to subvert or disable it when a hostile the late 1980s, there was no longer a guaran- takeover occurs. Many television journalists, tee of armed intervention to support client producers and technicians are sympathetic to states in Eastern Europe. On 11 September popular movements. If they are aware of 1989, Hungary opened its borders with 44 Technology for nonviolent struggle Austria. East Germans, by going “on holiday” independence for Algeria was inevitable, began to Hungary, could escape to the west. As word negotiations with the independence move- spread, including via news on West German ment. French generals in Algeria, bitterly radio and television, the initial trickle of opposed to this course of action, staged a coup emigration became a torrent. At the same time, on the night of 21-22 April 1961. There was there were public rallies against the regime in even the possibility that they might lead an East German cities. Initially attracting only a invasion of France. few people, in the space of weeks the rallies Opposition to the coup was quickly demon- were attended by hundreds of thousands. News strated in France. There was a national one- of the growing open dissent was again provided hour strike and massive rallies. After vacillating by West German mass media. In the face of a few days, de Gaulle made a passionate plea massive emigration and enormous protests, for troops to refuse to join the rebels. Mean- East German leaders resigned. The regime while, in Algeria the rebelling generals failed to collapsed in the face of nonviolent expression gain the support of the troops, many of whom of opposition.3 were conscripts. Troops heard de Gaulle’s If television is produced locally for small broadcast on transistor radios that they had audiences, its vulnerability to takeover is refused to turn in as instructed. Many soldiers reduced, especially if there are numerous inde- just stayed in their barracks. Others reported pendent channels. For the purposes of nonvio- for duty but purposely failed to do it. About lent resistance, a multitude of locally controlled one-third of the fighter aircraft were flown out broadcasts is the direction to go.4 But the of the country, never to return. The coup technical skills and costs to produce high collapsed after four days without a shot being quality programmes are significant obstacles to fired against it.5 such a goal. The most prominent example showing the power of radio for nonviolent struggle is the Czechoslovak resistance to the Soviet-led Radio invasion in 1968. During 1967 and 1968, communist rule in Czechoslovakia was rapidly In an examination of nonviolent struggle, large liberalised, a process supported throughout the and powerful radio stations with many listeners country. This was a severe threat to the Soviet are similar to television stations. They are rulers, who organised an invasion of the coun- prime targets for an aggressor, since they can be try in August. Military resistance would have controlled by a few people and have an been futile and there was no help from the enormous influence. A long-term goal in devel- West.