IAI COMMENTARIES 19 | 66 - NOVEMBER 2019 ISSN 2532-6570 © 2019 IAI 1 Tamirace Fakhoury isan Associate Professor of Political Science and thedirector of the funded by theErasmus+ Programme of theEuropean Union. This paper is published in theframework of theJean-Monnet Network EUMENIAco- Institute for Social Justice and Conflict Resolution at theLebanese American University. called 2005CedarUprising. previous protest cycles, such as the so- even though thecountry haswitnessed movements that gripped the region would stay isolated from theprotest wave, many argued that In thecontext of the2011Arab spring draw comparisons. Revolution in , leading many to historical events, including the October fall of theBerlinWall or othericonic important anniversaries, such asthe the movement roughly coincided with as theOctoberuprising, thetimingof streets andpublic squares.Dubbed movement took hold of Lebanon’s Last month, anunprecedented protest by Tamirace Fakhoury Drivers Order? TheOctoberUprising andits The Unmaking of Lebanon’s Sectarian which religious groups share power power-sharing, apolitical systemin one of thelastbastions of sectarian Lebanon’s political system represents politics of sectarianismandcorruption. the movement also decried the inept huge garbagecrisis in 2015. Back then, to aprecursor wave of protests over a movement may traceits roots back sectarianism. Arguably, theprotest leaders and the eradication of political calling for thesackingof political WhatsApp tax,people have been to Sidon. In thewake of aproposed to various Lebanesecities from Tripoli movement hasmaterialised, spreading wave, anunprecedented protest Still, eight years aftertheArab protest The Unmaking of Lebanon’s Sectarian Order? The October Uprising and its Drivers

according to rigid sectarian quotas. Acting as key agents in amplifying the Since 1943, key executive coalitions and demands of the protesters, they have led legislatures have abided by unalterable and staged demonstrations, coalescing sectarian criteria. According to the around the principles of social justice, seminal work of Donald Horowitz, this freedoms and human rights. was one of the key reasons that led to the onset of the 1975–1990 Civil War.1 Many did not think such a protest Today, it is this system that Lebanon’s movement would happen in the final

© 2019 IAI protesters seek to overcome. months of 2019. Still, the timing is rooted in the complex disintegration To attract attention and disrupt normal of political, sociological and economic life, protesters have used a wide structures upon which Lebanon’s post- range of techniques. Roadblocks, sit- war order was built. ins in front of financial and political institutions and the homes of political Thirty years after the signing of leaders, graffiti deploring corruption Lebanon’s post-Civil War agreement and the political ’s in October 1989, known as the Ta’if ISSN 2532-6570 post-war order are among the most Agreement, sectarian patronage evident. At the core of this protest networks have become more movement is the overarching feeling entrenched than before. In contrast that Lebanon’s political leaders have to the pre-war period, when people bitterly disappointed their domestic married and mingled across sects, constituencies. contrived political and sectarian discourses have spread across Lebanon Inept governance and rampant since the war’s ending, erecting walls corruption in addition to of separation among citizens. mismanagement of public resources and squandering of public funds have Contentious files such as electricity and brought protesters together. Indeed, services, quarries, internet, gas and oil, a striking feature of this protest reconstruction and development have movement is that it is not staged or been persistently hijacked by sectarian driven by political parties or civil interests. More than that, deliberations society organisations. Leaderless, and on their management have remained overwhelmingly cross-sectarian, it has restricted to sectarian leaders, making brought together people from different citizens unable to participate in issues walks of life. Some of the protesters I that are most impactful in their daily spoke to have never participated in an life. episode of contention in Lebanon’s history. In early October 2019, the Lebanese parliament passed its first budget since Women and students have been 2005, a first step towards unlocking the heart of the protest movement. 11 billion US dollars of grants and loans promised by the international community, pending economic 1 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985. reforms. Hailed as a victory, the move IAI COMMENTARIES 19 | 66 - NOVEMBER 2019 19 | 66 - NOVEMBER IAI COMMENTARIES

2 The Unmaking of Lebanon’s Sectarian Order? The October Uprising and its Drivers

left Lebanese citizens sceptical. Indeed, over reforms, sectarian rhetoric and worrisome signs of longstanding polarisation over external conflicts economic mismanagement have left have dominated the policymaking Lebanese convinced that the small agenda. polity was heading downhill. On the other, it unveils the deeper Lebanon’s national debt amounts to agentic forces moving Lebanon’s more than 79 billion US dollars, the society forward. Women, students,

© 2019 IAI third highest in the world. Faring badly LGBTQ groups, vendors, lawyers, on job creation and on the restructuring intellectuals and scholars have arisen of its market economy, Lebanon has as the grassroots challengers of this also witnessed an uptake in youth sectarian order. This has dispelled emigration. By 2017, dwindling tourism two assumptions: the assumption that in the context of regional instability, Lebanon’s citizenry is dormant and the growing fiscal deficits and a loss of assumption that Lebanon has sectarian confidence in Lebanon’s economy, a rather than national constituencies. crucial condition for investment flows, ISSN 2532-6570 had converged, hinting at an imminent Notwithstanding this throbbing protest economic collapse. wave, several short-term challenges await. The unmaking of Lebanon’s Still, the political class remained sectarian order will not come by easily. gripped in deadlock, failing to develop an economy rescue plan. Instead, Firstly, after more than a month austerity measures and tax hikes of unrelenting protests, the created deep feelings of alienation. political establishment has been In a nutshell, precursor signs to this overwhelmingly unresponsive. While uprising were evident in the everyday the government has resigned, the lives of citizens. A case in point is that political class has so far not endorsed Lebanese are estimated to have hidden the protesters’ demands, which a billion dollars in their homes.2 include the formation of a technocratic government, the convening of early Against this backdrop, the protest elections and the establishment of movement comes as no surprise.3 Its accountability mechanisms penalising causes are both structural and agency impunity and financial crimes. related. On the one hand, it signals the structural disintegration of a precarious Instead, politicians have clung on post-war order in which buying time to their posts, drawing on several arguments to justify their insistence to stay in power. They have played on the 2 Thaer Abbas, “Panicked… The Lebanese Hide fear of sectarian strife. They have also a Billion Dollars Inside Their Homes”, in Asharq al-Awsat, 28 September 2019, https://aawsat. argued that traditional political parties com/english/node/1922341. such as , the Free Patriotic 3 Tamirace Fakhoury, “Lebanon Protests: Why Movement and the Sunni Current a WhatsApp Tax Sparked a Political Movement”, represent most Lebanese. in The Political Quarterly Blog, 18 November 2019, https://wp.me/p9PVIh-Mc. IAI COMMENTARIES 19 | 66 - NOVEMBER 2019 19 | 66 - NOVEMBER IAI COMMENTARIES

3 The Unmaking of Lebanon’s Sectarian Order? The October Uprising and its Drivers

Secondly, grassroots divisions have Russia, which endorses key actors in the arisen in the wake of the protests. Iran-led axis such as Hezbollah and the Roadblocks and the disruption of Syrian regime, has argued against side- daily life have led to the formation lining Lebanon’s traditional powers in of a counter-protest movement, the formation of the new government. though its strength and numbers are Conversely, the US administration, substantially smaller. Some segments a fierce critic of Iran and Hezbollah, of the Lebanese population have has encouraged the rash formation

© 2019 IAI contested prevalent protest tactics for of a government that conforms to the harming their economic interests. The protesters’ demands, in a not so subtle recent clashes between protesters and effort to sideline Hezbollah. Meanwhile, members of the Shia groups Hezbollah news of the US Trump administration and Amal are a worrying signal in this withholding 105 million US dollars in respect. Adding to this, rifts have arisen military aid for the Lebanese Armed between intellectuals who have called Forces (LAF) until the latter increases for boycotting the political class and its distance from Hezbollah is another those who called for negotiating with it. worrying signal of increasing foreign ISSN 2532-6570 intervention. Thirdly, the role of external powers, both regional and international, will In such a setting, international actors prove critical. External interference may such as the European Union, face significantly weaken the grassroots several tough calls. Should international movement and politicise it. So far, actors seek to scale up dialogue with protesters have sought to distance Lebanon’s governmental actors whose themselves from both Western and legitimacy is deeply contested by their Middle Eastern actors. On 12 November, constituencies or begin to side-line civil society groups refused to meet a them? Should they support the fall or senior French official. Still, to weaken the survival of the regime in a region in the movement’s legitimacy, some which crumbling governance systems political leaders have been arguing that have unleashed instability? Most protesters are in collusion with foreign importantly, how can the EU ensure that actors. Lebanon does not (again) evolve into a battleground for US-Iranian rivalries in Notwithstanding this, the hijacking the context of these protests? of the protest movement by external agendas arises as a key threat to its Fourthly, and most importantly, the trajectory. Historically, Lebanon’s protest movement is yet to figure out competing leaders have relied on the trajectory for Lebanon’s political foreign brokers to maximise their transition. Many protesters have bargaining leverage and shift the so far framed leaderlessness and domestic distribution of power in their horizontalism to be the key strengths favour. This makes it easier for external of the protest wave. Still, literature that actors to intrude on Lebanon’s political has documented social movements and scene. revolutions teaches us that there are several complex episodes of contention IAI COMMENTARIES 19 | 66 - NOVEMBER 2019 19 | 66 - NOVEMBER IAI COMMENTARIES

4 The Unmaking of Lebanon’s Sectarian Order? The October Uprising and its Drivers

that unfold after the first victories of the street.

Thus, initial episodes of popular contestation usually give way to more organised cycles in which challengers may bring about change through several means. They either successfully

© 2019 IAI negotiate with the political class who agrees to a gradual transition, or they cause intra-elite rifts that lead some key political actors to exit the establishment and join the protesters.

All in all, a successful protest movement needs to institutionalise the change that it is calling for or develop an ISSN 2532-6570 organisational leadership structure that would allow the movement to achieve the intended policy and legal reforms.

Whether and how institutionalising change will happen in Lebanon remains to be seen. Yet, the protest movement is promising to draw a new trajectory for the country. If successful, this trajectory will not only impact the current post- Civil War order. It will also reconfigure the very institutions and architecture of a state built since 1943 on an elite- driven form of sectarian power-sharing that is no longer capable of responding to the rights and demands of Lebanese citizens.

28 November 2019 IAI COMMENTARIES 19 | 66 - NOVEMBER 2019 19 | 66 - NOVEMBER IAI COMMENTARIES

5 The Unmaking of Lebanon’s Sectarian Order? The October Uprising and its Drivers

Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) is a private, independent non-profit think tank, founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli. IAI seeks to promote awareness of international politics and to contribute to the advancement of European integration and multilateral cooperation. Its focus embraces topics of strategic relevance such as European integration, security and defence, international economics and global governance, energy, climate and Italian foreign policy; as well as the dynamics of cooperation and conflict in key geographical regions such as the Mediterranean and , Asia, Eurasia, Africa and © 2019 IAI the Americas. IAI publishes an English-language quarterly (The International Spectator), an online webzine (Affarinternazionali), three book series (Global Politics and Security, Quaderni IAI and IAI Research Studies) and some papers’ series related to IAI research projects (Documenti IAI, IAI Papers, etc.).

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