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Social Movements and the State in Russia

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Social Movements and the State in Russia russian analytical russian analytical digest 50/08 digest analysis Russia’s “Nashi” Youth Movement: The Rise and Fall of a Putin-Era Political Technology Project By Regina Heller, Hamburg Abstract The Russian Nashi (Ours) youth movement is the best known and most successful of the government-friend- ly youth organizations that sprang up in Russia in recent years. However, Nashi, mainly known for its head- line-grabbing events and aggressive behavior towards the opposition, is not a grassroots youth movement, but a Putin-era political technology project. Nashi was founded in response to the “Color Revolutions” in the post-Soviet space in order to foster “anti-orange” sentiment among Russian youth and to prevent mass mo- bilization for the Duma and presidential elections of 2007/2008. Putin adviser Vladislav Surkov apparent- ly guided the movement from the Kremlin. In order to enhance Nashi’s mobilization potential, the govern- ment provided considerable administrative and financial resources. The strategy was successful as Russia’s political leadership steered safely through the turbulent election period. Now the authorities are looking for ways to return the genie to the bottle. The Nashi Youth Movement elections of 2007/2008. The “Color Revolutions” in the About half a dozen government-friendly youth move- post-Soviet space sowed fear among Russian govern- ments have emerged in Russia in the past few years. ment representatives that similar upheavals could spill These groups have managed to bring young people onto over into Russia. This fear was stoked in particular by the streets in droves and mobilize them for their politi- Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s longtime adviser, chief ideolo- cal ends. Their attraction is remarkable, given that the gist, and deputy head of the presidential administration. majority of Russian youth are considered to be politi- Against the backdrop of the Orange Revolution, Surkov cally disinterested and apathetic. Among these political had claimed that the liberal opposition and Western youth organizations, the pro-Putin Nashi (Ours) youth countries were trying to start a revolution in Russia as movement, founded in March 2005, has doubtlessly well and undermine the state’s authority. In this situa- experienced the most rapid success: Within only three tion, the perceived pressure on the government to take years, its membership figures grew to over 120,000, and measures preserving the political status quo in Russia the number of sympathizers is likely even higher. was increasing. Nashi garnered publicity through headline-grab- Political strategists were particularly attentive to the bing events and mass rallies that were staged in a me- role of young people. Events in Ukraine had shown that dia-friendly format and attended by an average of sev- youth organizations critical of the regime were instru- eral tens of thousands of young people. Their activities mental in convincing the public to take to the streets so far have been directed mainly at the political opposi- against the government there, and had thus made an tion in Russia, but Nashi has not shied away from pro- essential contribution to the change of power. Also, ac- tests against Western countries either. The group gained tivists from Ukraine, Georgia, and Serbia – some of international attention in spring 2007 as mass protests them financed by Western NGOs – had begun to ex- against the relocation of a Soviet war memorial in the port their knowledge and practices to other countries in Estonian capital of Tallinn turned violent, with street the post-Soviet space, including Russia. Both of these fighting and physical attacks on the Estonian ambas- factors are likely to have contributed to the creation of sador to Moscow. Nashi in March 2005 as a counter-movement to the youth organizations critical of the regimes in the post- A Political Test-Tube Baby Soviet space. Considerable evidence suggests that Nashi was found- ed by political strategists advising then-president Putin Vladislav Surkov: Pulling strings in the in response to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in or- Kremlin der to foster “anti-orange” sentiment on Russia’s streets There can be little doubt that Kremlin strategist Surkov and to prevent possible mass mobilization against the is the creator of Nashi. The author of such concepts as political regime ahead of the Duma and presidential “directed” and “sovereign” democracy has been linked 2 russian analytical russian analytical digest 50/08 digest frequently with the youth organization; he has repeat- warts. The annual Nashi summer camps at Lake Seliger edly made public pronouncements on Nashi and its alone are alleged to cost between US$6 and 7 million. activities. Surkov is also a longtime acquaintance of Financial support has been extended both directly and 36-year-old Vasily Yakemenko, the official founder and, indirectly, i.e., the government has supplied funds of until recently, head of Nashi. Their relationship goes its own, but has also encouraged state-controlled cor- back to the early Putin years, when the up-and-com- porations, such as energy giant Gazprom, to support ing Yakemenko was briefly a staff member in the pres- Nashi’s activities financially. idential administration. It was also Yakemenko who, The ability of Nashi to mobilize young people has during this period and presumably with the backing been further strengthened by giving the organization of Surkov, founded the first youth organization loyal privileged access to state-controlled media. This intense to the Kremlin, Idushie Vmyestye (Walking Together). media presence has catalyzed the dissemination of its is- Even then, Surkov was already actively supporting the sues in all Russian regions. Public attention was drawn creation of government-friendly youth organizations to Nashi by means of shrill, loud, and provocative ac- and emphasized that the government needed the sup- tion, while opposition voices and concerns were dis- port of the street in order to prevail in the country’s lodged from public perception. Another factor that is political battles. certain to have favored mobilization was the overt prox- While the first Kremlin-friendly youth organiza- imity of Nashi to then-president Putin and his political tions had no definable agenda beyond a strong fixa- entourage. On more than one occasion, influential pres- tion on Putin’s personality, and instead were noted for idential advisers Surkov and Gleb Pavlovsky as well as erratic stunts that were occasionally highly controver- the deputy prime ministers at the time, Sergei Ivanov sial within Russian society, Nashi was strongly orient- and Dmitry Medvedev, visited the summer camp and ed towards battling the “orange peril” and designed to considerably raised the status of the organization and create, as quickly as possible, an “anti-orange” senti- its activists in the public consciousness. Even Putin ment among Russia’s younger generation. To this end, himself met with select Nashi representatives on sev- the organization was bolstered with a patriotic-nation- eral occasions. alist ideology that guides its program. Nashi supports Putin’s political goals and regards itself – in line with After Putin: What Next For Nashi? Surkov’s idiom and purpose – as a bulwark against all The end of the Putin era seems also to mark the end of who might conspire against these objectives. In its man- Nashi’s success story. As early as 2007, there were ru- ifesto, the organization refers to an “unpatriotic coali- mors circulating among the public that the government tion of oligarchs, anti-Semites, Nazis, and liberals” who was aiming to rid itself of its youthful street fighters. want Russia to descend into crisis and who must there- This change in fortune was indicated by plans to shut fore be stopped. Nashi was committed to the task at down at least 45 of Nashi’s 50 regional branches and to hand by Surkov himself. At its founding congress in merge the movement with other pro-Kremlin youth or- February 2005, he urged the young people: “We will not ganizations. Perks such as free mobile phones for Nashi allow the revolutions in Georgia, Serbia, and Ukraine commissars have been cancelled, and the allocation of […] to be repeated in Russia.” financial resources is being subjected to greater scrutiny. Events were called off, and even the leadership of the State Resources Increase Mobilization organization has dispersed in recent months: Leonid Potential Kurza, the head of the St. Petersburg branch, has tak- While the maneuvering space of groups criticizing the en up studies abroad, while Yakemenko was appointed government was successively cut back by the Putin ad- to a government position in early 2008. He is now in ministration, the government-friendly youth organi- charge of the state commission for youth affairs. zation has evidently been given easy access to state re- Evidently, the aim is not so much to dissolve Nashi sources. Nashi’s strong mobilization potential in recent completely, but to reduce the organization’s capacity years has been made possible not least by massive finan- to act. This tactical approach can be best explained by cial and administrative support from the Putin admin- an abatement of the “orange panic” in government cir- istration. It is estimated that the government has been cles after the Russian election marathon: The Kremlin’s spending several hundreds of thousands of US dollars favored parties and candidates were shepherded safely a month on financing Nashi and other youth organi- through the critical election phase, the regime’s politi- zations that have proved themselves to be regime stal- cal continuity is assured, and mass protests have failed 3 russian analytical russian analytical digest 50/08 digest to materialize in the streets of Russia. Thus, Nashi has equally against the liberal opposition and the West in fulfilled its purpose and is no longer required as the ex- the streets of Russia did not fit this new image.
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