Quick viewing(Text Mode)

The Creation and Politics of International Protectorates in the > Balkans: Bridges Over Troubled Waters

The Creation and Politics of International Protectorates in the > Balkans: Bridges Over Troubled Waters

Alexandros Yannis The Creation and Politics of International in the > : Bridges Over Troubled Waters

The Creation of Inter- in the 1990s is the result of the national Protectorates in combined impact of the violent dissolu- South- tion of the former that prompt- ed the need for an international response The creations of what are com- and the return of protectorates to inter- monly known as the international national politics that provided the basis protectorates of Bosnia-Herzegovina for these extraordinary interventions. Fail- and Kosovo are the products of two ure to understand and analyse develop- parallel historical processes that ments in the in the 1990s in terms marked South-eastern Europe in the of both processes often lies behind a 1990s. First, they form part of the wider mutual misunderstanding between those, changes of the post- internation- mostly from within the region, who per- al environment and particularly the incli- ceive the international protectorates as nation of the Western-led international being merely an extension of the foreign community to respond to post-Cold War policies of big powers and those, mostly conflicts and related sources of instability from outside the region, who perceive the with assertive diplomacy, military inter- international presence almost exclusively ventions and coercive peace operations. as a noble and disinterested international Second, they are part of the particular endeavour to bring peace and stability to challenges of the process of the disintegra- the Balkans. The short-lived international tion of the former Socialist Federal Re- in Eastern Slavonia in Croatia public of Yugoslavia (hereinafter “former and the current international presence in Yugoslavia”) and, especially the interna- the Former Yugoslav of Mace- tional response to the violent inter-ethnic donia (FYROM), while belonging to the and territorial conflicts that engulfed the same historical experience, are not dis- Balkans as a consequence of the break-up cussed in this analysis respectively due to of the former Yugoslavia. their limited duration and extent. This In other words, the creation of inter- article discusses the international and local national protectorates in South-eastern contexts that produced the international

258 JIRD (2002) 5(3), 258-274 Copyright  2002 by Faculty of Social Sciences, Centre of International Relations Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3 protectorates in Bosnia-Herzegovina and believed that the global policing role of Kosovo and their role and politics in bring- the UN Security Council, the way it was ing stability to the region. originally envisaged by the ’ President Roosevelt and the other victo- The Return of Inter- rious protagonists of the Second World national Protectorates Wa r, was seemingly close to becoming a At the end of the Cold War and with reality. On 31 January 1992, during the first the decolonisation process nearly com- ever UN Security Council meeting at the pleted, it was widely believed that protec- level of Heads of and , torates, mandates and trusteeships also the participants agreed that ‘their meet- belonged irreversibly to the past. By the ing was a timely recognition of the fact end of the 1990s, the return of interna- that there are new favourable internation- The Creation tional protectorates in the form of multi- al circumstances under which the Security and Politics of lateral coercive peace operations had be- Council has begun to fulfil more effec- International come a familiar feature of the post-Cold tively its primary responsibility for the Protectorates War international politics, as illustrated maintenance of international peace and in the Balkans: by the establishment of varying forms of security’ (UN Security Council 1992a:2). Bridges Over international administrations in response The UN Security Council was indeed Troubled to several crises around the world, most perceived and portrayed in the early stages Wa ters prominently in Cambodia, Bosnia-Herze- of the post-Cold War period as a potential govina, Kosovo and . credible international mechanism to pro- In the aftermath of the Cold War, the vide international society with the much proponents of the theories of the “End of needed authoritative and legitimate col- History” and the “ Order” lective security means to ensure interna- were advocating that the principles of a tional peace and security. The post-Cold market economy and multiparty democ- War efforts, however, of the UN Security racy coupled with assertive multilateral- Council to translate the doctrines of the ism, when needed under the reinvigorat- “New World Order” and the “Agenda for ed collective security mechanisms of the Peace” into action have been a frustrating United Nations (UN), were emerging as experience. Freudenschuß (1994:530-1) con- the global recipes for economic and social cluded his examination of the UN Sec- development, as well as for international urity Council’s practice in authorising the peace and stability. The “Agenda for Peace” use of force under Chapter VII in the launched in 1992 by Boutros-Boutros post-Cold War period stating that Ghali, the then UN Secretary General, as a strategy of the international community while the objective criteria — universality for peace and development in the twenty- and a legal framework — for a system of first century largely echoed this opti- collective security have existed for quite mism. The global equilibrium of power some time now, its subjective elements such that was unfavourable to overt coercive as consistent international solidarity, con- intervention in domestic conflicts during sensus on what is wrong, preparedness to the Cold War had disappeared, and the cede executive authority to the UN, readi- political and military predominance of ness “to bear any burden and pay any price” the United States-led in- for the consequences of collective decisions creasingly favoured the adoption of as- — have always been lacking and are likely sertive responses to international chal- to continue to be so. As long as the much lenges. In the early 1990s, it was widely quoted “international community” remains

259 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3

an elusive phenomenon, true collective secu- introduction of direct UN Trusteeship. rity will remain an elusive chimera as well. Since then, there has been an ever-expand- ing literature on the subject of the resus- A genuine system of collective securi- citation of UN Trusteeships and interna- ty may have failed to be established, yet a tional protectorates. The underlying logic kind of new interventionism slowly em- of proponents of the return of interna- erged in the 1990s. Its major characteris- tional protectorates has been that the inter- tic has been the selective preparedness of national community has a responsibility the Western world to intervene militarily to move in and govern where and order in domestic conflicts with the aim to halt have collapsed and and chaos pre- violence, to prevent regional destabilisa- vail. Alexandros tion, to avert humanitarian crises and to More recently, particularly after the Yannis contribute to the reconstruction of state events of 11 September 2001 this debate institutions and the re-establishment of has also started to revolve around the need stability. One of the main new features of to re-think imperialism. Mallaby (2002:4) this post-Cold War interventionism has argued, for instance, that been what Hobsbawm (1999:9) defined as the disappearing distinction between inter- when such power vacuums threatened nal conflicts and international ones as the great powers in the past, they had a ready Kosovo conflict most prominently demon- solution: imperialism. But since World War strated. Another key feature has been the II, that option has been ruled out. After improvised solutions imposed by the new more than two millennia of , order- interventionists in trying to resolve domes- ly societies now refuse to impose their own tic conflicts, illustrated most prominently institutions on disorderly ones. This anti- in the Balkans by the establishment of inter- imperialist restraint is becoming harder to national protectorates. sustain, however, as the disorder in poor In this new environment, interest in the countries grows more threatening. resuscitation of international protectorates in the 1990s as a mechanism to resolve In a more sober and balanced analysis, conflicts partly originated in the growing Cooper (2001:6) argued in favour of ‘a frustration of the Western world over the new kind of imperialism’ that can tackle proliferation around the globe of violent domestic conflicts and the instability and domestic conflicts and instability. Helman misery that dominates today big parts of and Ratner (1992-1993:3) stated that the world; problems that the politics of nation-states have failed to settle. from Haiti in the Western Hemisphere to The return, however, of the interna- the remnants of Yugoslavia in Europe, from tional protectorates in the form of inter- , and in to national administrations has taken place Cambodia in Southeast , a disturbing out of the practical experience of the new phenomenon is emerging: the failed international community with military nation-state, utterly incapable of sustain- interventions to domestic conflicts in the ing itself as a member of the international 1990s. The 1992-95 international opera- community. tions in Somalia indeed plunged the inter- national community headlong into its first They continued by recommending a num- serious encounter with the requirements ber of solutions under the rubric of the of the new interventionism and the reali- “UN Conservatorship”, including the re- ties of the new generation of peace opera-

260 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3 tions. The Somalia intervention set a must acknowledge its role in the exercise of precedent in international politics be- executive political authority. It needs an cause it was the first time the UN Security independent, political decision-making ca- Council authorised the use of coercive pability in the field, as well as its own military force under Chapter VII of the institutions of law and order. Reliance on UN Charter, not as response to an act of local authority structures, while at the aggression, but for humanitarian reasons same time attempting to reconstitute a new and, eventually for peacebuilding opera- authority, is self-defeating. tions in a domestic conflict (Mayall 1996). The Somalia intervention also attempted Afew years later, the same author would to set a pattern for international respons- argue that ‘peace-maintenance as a unified es to the security challenges of the post- concept for multifunctional UN operations The Creation Cold War world. Speaking during the UN needs to integrate diplomatic, military and and Politics of Security Council meeting of 3 December humanitarian activities as part of an over- International 1992 that authorised the United States-led all political strategy’ (Chopra 1999:17). Protectorates “humanitarian intervention” in Somalia, The new generation of international in the Balkans: the then United States representative to protectorates in the 1990s was indeed also Bridges Over the UN stated that ‘by acting in response partly born out of this debate about the con- Troubled to the tragic events in Somalia, the inter- ceptual and operational requirements for Wa ters national community is also taking an the new interventionism that was prom- important step in developing a strategy for pted by the accumulated experience and dealing with the potential disorder and the lessons of the military interventions conflicts of the post-Cold War world’ (UN and the peace operations of that period. Security Council 1992b:36). The Kosovo intervention in 1999 gener- However, the international operation ated particular interest in this direction in Somalia, while it was instrumental in and pushed the debate a step further both mitigating the effects of the famine and conceptually and operationally. Mayall the humanitarian crisis, failed to produce (2000:185) argued in the context of the a political settlement and the re-estab- Kosovo intervention that lishment of a central authority that would help to restore peace and stability in the the relief of suffering is an end in itself, but country. This was partly because of the intervention will only be able to claim suc- lack of political will of the parties in- cess if stability is restored. This hardly seems volved in the conflict to reach an agree- compatible with exit strategies announced ment and partly because of the poor in advance. The implications of an emerging premises and strategy of the operation system of UN Trusteeships (whatever they and the lack of sustained political com- may be called in practice) needs further mitment and backing for the internation- study. al involvement (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung et al. 1995). A big part of this criticism The underlying logic of the emerging par- focused on the lack of preparedness by adigm today is that, while military inter- the international community to assume vention can address the symptoms of a cri- its full responsibility for managing the sis and bring peace, a more comprehensive Somali crisis in accordance with the per- peace operation is required in order to ad- ceived requirements of the new genera- dress the root causes of a crisis and restore tion of peace operations. Chopra (1996: lasting stability. A very similar debate took 525) argued at the time that the UN place again following the fall of the Tali-

261 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3

ban regime in the aftermath of the 11 Sep- ter, preferably authorised by the UN and tember 2001 terrorist attacks in the United where needed run by the UN itself, their States and the United States-led interven- highly intrusive nature manifested by the tion in Afghanistan. The key question has development of a comprehensive and far- been whether the removal of the Taliban reaching set of political, military and civil- regime has basically fulfilled the objec- ian functions and, finally, their interim tives of the intervention or whether a character as their ultimate objective is the comprehensive follow-up peace operation restoration of order, normality and full is needed in order to help restore lasting self-rule by the local population. While stability in the country. their underlying logic projects a noble Today, most international observers cause worthy of every support, their Alexandros agree that international administrations implicit departure from the principle of Yannis and protectorates are in certain cases sim- sovereign equality that dominated world ply the best option available for address- politics from the creation of the UN has ing domestic conflicts and their associat- rendered the re-emergence of interna- ed challenges to international security. In tional protectorates highly controversial his conclusions, Caplan (2002:84) encap- and for many commentators highly prob- sulated the predominant international lematic. Gordon (1995:346-7), in com- thinking when he stated that ‘the interna- menting on the debate on the suggested tional administrations of war-torn territo- resuscitation of UN Trusteeships, cau- ries may be costly and imperfect, but less tioned that interventionist measures, in some cases are worse alternatives.’ While the return rather than focusing on various forms of of international protectorates is increas- dependency, we should explore creative ingly welcomed as a policy option to ad- mechanisms to assist, rather than direct, dress the security challenges of our times, peoples in determining and realizing their there are some observers who remain ambition to determine and control their sceptical about the wisdom and the limits own destiny. The means, as well as the ends, of the new interventionism. For example, should be independence rather than depen- Hobsbawm (2002:13) when referring to dency. the establishment of international pro- tectorates in the Balkans argued that Protectorates historically refer to a form of relationship in which a state sur- whether a general model for the future con- renders part of its to another. trol of armed conflict can emerge from such While there have been several forms of interventions remains unclear. [In my protectorates, they all share two major view] the balance of war and peace in the characteristics. First, the protectorate 21st century will depend not on devising nominally retains its sovereignty and, sec- more effective mechanisms for negotiation ond, its territory remains distinct from and settlement but on internal stability that of the protector. The direct analogy and the avoidance of military conflict. of these two features with those of most of the experiments in the 1990s, particu- The return of international protecto- larly in the Balkans, may explain why the rates in the 1990s took the form of multi- term protectorates tends to be preferred lateral peace operations and varying degre- by many commentators even though it is es of international administrations. Their not used officially mostly because of its key features are their multilateral charac- inevitable association with the imperialist

262 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3 past of the Western world. A major new the same and the interventionist impulse feature in the 1990s is that the protector of the post-Cold War period to address tends to be multilateral organisations, new challenges with assertive responses such as the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty pays little attention to terminology or, as Organization (NATO), the Organization Lyon (1993:108) argued ‘names apart, the for Security and Co-operation in Europe best spirit of trusteeship needs revising and others, rather than individual states. and revitalising.’ The term UN Trusteeship is also used by In summary, the return of internation- commentators to describe the revival of al protectorates has been the result of the international protectorates. Yet, there are combined impact of the ideological for- important reasons why the term “trustee- mations of the 1990s that favoured the ship” is quite inappropriate. UN Truste- return of interventionist and dependency The Creation eships, like the Mandates under the League models in resolving conflicts and address- and Politics of of Nations and before them, ing the root causes of crises around the International were based on the assumption that cer- world with the practice of intervention in Protectorates tain peoples were to be governed by oth- the 1990s that gradually necessitated the in the Balkans: ers because they were incapable of gov- development of comprehensive models of Bridges Over erning themselves. Further, the stated peace operations to complement coercive Troubled objective of the UN Trusteeships system interventions in building lasting stability. Wa ters was to prepare the territories under truste- It is highly unlikely that the international eship for independence. protectorates in South-eastern Europe Today, perhaps with the notable would ever have been established in the exception of East Timor that largely rep- 1990s outside of these circumstances, no resented a delayed case of decolonisation matter how intense the violence on the in which the international administration ground may have been. Yet, without the was mandated to prepare this territory for disintegration of former Yugoslavia and independence, gradual crystallisation of the ensuing violent conflicts in the region, the legal principle of the self-determina- there would also not have been an oppor- tion of peoples does not permit the treat- tunity for intervention and the establish- ing of countries as non-self-governing ter- ment of protectorates. ritories but rather as sovereign entities ravaged by domestic conflict and necessi- The Disintegration of tating a legitimate third party involve- Former Yugoslavia ment. Thus, neither of the key character- The violent conflicts that engulfed the istics of the UN Trusteeship system can Balkans in the 1990s were an integral part be found in the international protec- of the process of the of former torates of the 1990s. In any case, political Yugoslavia. The crisis originated partly in correctness and the fact that the interna- the inability and partly in the unwilling- tional administrations of the 1990s form ness of the local actors as well as partly in part of different historical experiences do the failure of the international actors in- not encourage official use of the term volved to peacefully manage the inevitable “trusteeship”. Today, the most common change prompted by the wider geopoliti- official terms to describe the return of cal changes in the world and the region international protectorates are: “transi- after the end of the Cold War and, more tional political authority”, “interim inter- specifically, by the challenges posed by national administration” and “complex the process of the break-up of former peace operation”. Yet the phenomenon is Yugoslavia (Glenny 1993). While all vio-

263 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3

lent conflicts of the succession wars in twentieth century. filled this former Yugoslavia can trace their origin vacuum with disputes not about power to real and imagined collective memories and the form of government but about of old ethnic antagonisms and disputes, control over territory and thereby in- their escalation to full-blown violent con- evitably involved zero-sum conflicts. flicts in the 1990s is primarily the result of These realities, which surpassed the the destabilising effect of the fall of the conflict prevention means and skills of Berlin Wall on the domestic order of for- the international community, generated mer Yugoslavia that eventually led to its enormous grievances that have produced total destruction. Hobsbawm (1994:255) spirals of instability, violence, destruction sharply observed that ‘the end of the Cold and misery throughout the region. The Alexandros War suddenly removed the props which very same problems still unsettle the Yannis had held up the international structure region today from Bosnia-Herzegovina and, to an extent not yet appreciated, the through Montenegro, Kosovo and South- structures of the world’s domestic politi- ern Serbia to the FYROM. The continu- cal systems.’ ing instability in the region is essentially The Balkans, like many other parts of about the unfinished process of the disso- the world, was caught off guard by the lution of former Yugoslavia and the polit- winds of change. The transformative effect ical vacuum that was left behind, i.e. the of the disintegration of former Yugoslavia questionable legitimacy of the make-up on the societies and entities that emerged of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Federal Republic out of its ashes were devastating. The spi- of Yugoslavia (FRY), and the FYROM ralling territorial revisionism, compound- among its de facto constituent ethnic ed by exalted historical claims and un- groups. abated nationalistic fervour that swept The international response to the pro- the lands and peoples of former Yugosla- cess of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia via in the 1990s were both a cause and over the first few years was marked by a consequence of the dissolution of former lack of unity and determination. The initial Yugoslavia. Both the local leadership and hesitant attitude towards the secessionist the population at large are to blame for dynamics on the ground naturally failed to the nationalistic hysteria of the 1990s achieve the original goal of preserving the because too many people abdicated their unity of former Yugoslavia. The subse- responsibilities (Judah 1997/2000). The quent change of policy and, particularly, ensuing descent into inter-ethnic violence the formal international recognition of the consolidated divisions and led to a pro- seceding states was not accompanied for found political vacuum. This vacuum, some time by either a common or a deter- which was exploited by the forces of mined response to prevent or halt the spi- nationalism and opportunistic political ral of violence unleashed by the disinte- leaders, was the legitimacy deficit among grating former Yugoslavia. David Owen the constituent ethnic groups of most of (1995:366 -7), the mediator of the European the new state structures and polities that Union (EU) in former Yugoslavia between emerged out of former Yugoslavia. This is 1992-95, argued that because the break-up of former Yugosla- via had also fractured the social contract what the Clinton Administration seemed and forces that had kept a modicum of to want until 1994, when they first began peaceful coexistence between the ethnic asserting themselves positively in the groups who lived together for most of the Balkans, was power without responsibility

264 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3

[...] The member states of the European local leaders to retain authority over the Union and their Foreign Ministers did territories under their effective control accept responsibility [...] but they never (Holbrooke 1998). The Dayton Peace Ac- exercised power. cords produced an international protec- torate that preserved the constitutional fic- The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was tion of a unified state while on the ground it the third violent conflict in the course of recognised the virtual separation of the the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. The three competing ethnic communities of first war lasted for ten days in June/July Serbs, Croats and Bosnians, prominently 1991 in Slovenia, followed by a more intense illustrated by the recognition of the contin- conflict in Croatia from July 1991 to Janu- uing existence of three armies operating ary 1992. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina independently. This unique political com- The Creation began in April 1992. Following three years promise and its labyrinthine arrangements and Politics of of a devastating war, the radical change of have inevitably been interpreted by com- International the United States’ policy in August 1995 mentators as a blueprint both for Protectorates manifested by a considerably greater po- and for the consolidation of a in the Balkans: litical and military commitment to resolv- (Glenny 1999). In reality, the Dayton Peace Bridges Over ing the conflict coupled with the chang- Accords left open the question of the Troubled ing fortunes on the ground of the local future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What cur- Wa ters rivals in summer 1995, led a few months rently ensures the viability of this fragile later in November/December 1995 to the compromise is the international presence. Dayton Peace Accords and the beginning The establishment of the internation- of establishing international protecto- al protectorate in Kosovo a few years later rates in South-eastern Europe. in June 1999 is the product of a similar The cardinal objective of the Dayton compromise. The underlying logic of this Peace Accords was to bring the long-lasting compromise was to reconcile the values violent conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina to and interests of the international commu- an end. In addition to persisting concerns nity to preserve even nominally the unity over the impact of the conflict on regional and territorial integrity of the FRY with peace and stability and the disturbing inces- the realities on the ground that required sant flood of refugees mostly pouring granting effective control of the territory towards , the very credibil- — under the rubric of substantial autono- ity of the Western-led international com- my — to the Kosovo Albanians, who form munity was at stake, as for more than three the overwhelming majority of its popula- years both the United States and the EU tion. The key difference in Kosovo is the remained powerless to halt a conflict taking degree of power assumed by the interna- place virtually in the heart of Europe. The tional administration. The role of the political and military pressure exerted in international administration there was to the second half of 1995 particularly by the replace the authorities of the FRY and to United States under the statesmanship of assume full interim administrative respon- its envoy Richard Holbrooke was eventual- sibility, turning the Kosovo protectorate ly backed by the projection of a political into the most far-reaching endeavour of vision which aimed to reconcile the politi- this type of the international community cal and moral values and interests of the and the UN ever (Yannis 2001a). international community to preserve the However, UN Security Council Reso- unity of a multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina lution 1244 that established the interna- with the interests and aspirations of the tional administration in Kosovo is to a cer-

265 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3

tain extent also an accident of history. finish the NATO air campaign against The United States and other key NATO the FRY, second, to reverse the effects of members originally did not wish even to the ethnic cleansing against Kosovo Al- internationalise the Kosovo dispute (Cap- banians and bring an end to the surging lan 1998). The Kosovo crisis was effective- humanitarian disaster in the region and, ly sparked following the virtual abroga- third, to lay the grounds for a political tion of the autonomy status of Kosovo by settlement of the Kosovo conflict. Reso- Belgrade in 1989, and started spinning lution 1244 did in fact put an end to open uncontrollably following the formal disin- conflict — that between NATO and the tegration of former Yugoslavia and the FRY. It also rather swiftly achieved its refusal of the international community to second underlying objective; the effort to Alexandros address this problem in Dayton. The es- reverse the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Yannis calation of the dispute to a full-blown vio- Albanians. This was greatly facilitated by lent conflict by 1998-99 eventually forced the spontaneous return of over 700,000 the international community to inter- Kosovo Albanians to Kosovo in a relative- vene, albeit still with the intention to ly short period of time, the large majority establish a lighter protectorate at most, simply following in the footsteps of the along more or less the lines of Bosnia- deployment of the NATO-led Kosovo For- Herzegovina (Weller 1999). However, the ce (KFOR). However, laying the grounds draft Rambouillet Accord that aimed to for a political settlement in Kosovo was replicate the logic of the Dayton Peace from the outset a relatively difficult Accords failed to gain the consent of objective. Resolution 1244 was neither Belgrade and, when President MiloπeviÊ the product of an agreement between of the FRY called the bluff of NATO’s Serbs and Kosovo Albanians containing a threats of bombardment, NATO felt it road map on how to implement a political had no other option than to intervene settlement of the Kosovo conflict, nor an militarily against the FRY in order to agreement between exhausted opponents safeguard its credibility. From that mo- seeking a compromise and an end to their ment on, the spiral of the conflict, i.e. the conflict. It neither foresaw any definitive intensification of the NATO bombard- political solution for Kosovo, nor deter- ment and escalation of the ethnic cleans- mined its future status. It did not address ing campaign against Kosovo Albanians the underlying causes of the conflict and by Belgrade, would alter radically the left Kosovo in limbo (Judah 2000:311-12). political dynamics on the ground and Here, again, what keeps the peace is the eventually necessitate the imposition of presence of the international community. an outright international protectorate in In conclusion, the creation of the Kosovo. international protectorates in South-east- Resolution 1244 was the product of ern Europe forms part of the Western-led unique geopolitical circumstances involv- international community’s response to ing the military intervention of NATO in the violent dissolution of former Yugo- the FRYand particularly an extraordinary slavia. More specifically, they have served international consensus on a way out of to bring an end to fighting based on a an increasingly unpredictable military con- compromise between the values and in- frontation and its increasingly destabilis- terests of the international community to ing consequences. The underlying object- preserve the unity of successor states of ives of the agreements that produced Reso- former Yugoslavia and discourage further lution 1244 were (Yannis 2001b), first, to disintegration in the Balkans, and the

266 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3 interests and aspirations of the local pro- mon vision of all ethnic groups in the tagonists to re-draw the map of former region. If the original historical role of Yugoslavia along ethnic lines as a result of establishing the international protecto- a seemingly delayed national awakening rates was to stop the fighting, their ultimate manipulated by opportunist leaders. The contribution to politics of the region realities created on the ground following would be to serve as bridges linking the the eruption of violent conflicts did not past with the future without any further permit the international community to violence, suffering and destruction. In this pursue either the immediate restoration effort, the international administrations and consolidation of fully integrated mul- must skilfully navigate the uncertainties tiethnic entities nor did they favour the and ambiguities of their mandates, partic- continuation of disintegration along eth- ularly the absence of any clear road map The Creation nic lines without further significant eth- agreed by all parties in the region on their and Politics of nic cleansing and regional destabilisation. very steps. To achieve this, they need to International The creation of the international protec- focus on balancing the requirements of Protectorates torates was a fragile compromise with un- accountability/legitimacy and efficiency/ in the Balkans: certain long-term implications and conse- state building or, in other words, the re- Bridges Over quences. Much would depend on the pol- quirement for increasing reliance and on Troubled itics of the international protectorates local self-rule encouraging local responsi- Wa ters which by now have become central fea- bility with the imperative for gradually tures of the international involvement in building local partnerships and function- the Balkans and critical variables of the ing state structures. Both are indispens- political landscape in the region. More- able long-term pre-conditions for laying over, what were initially conceived as short- the foundations for eventual membership term operations and what political rhetoric in the EU. calls “interim” and “transitional” appear to be developing into a rather long-term The Politics of Account- international presence and to a relatively ability and Legitimacy far-reaching international involvement in The return of international protecto- the region. rates to international politics is taking place in a radically different environment from that which originally produced them The Politics of the Inter- in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Since national Protectorates the creation of the UN, the international community has been moving slowly but Today, the main challenge of the inexorably towards realisation of the prin- international protectorates in South- ciple that all peoples are capable of gov- eastern Europe is twofold. In the erning themselves, encapsulated in the short term, to preserve the peace and in cardinal principles of the UN Charter on the long term to contribute to building the self-determination of peoples and so- the bridges that will enable the region to vereign equality. However, Said (1993:8; move from the violent nationalism and original emphasis) cautioned that experi- territorial antagonisms of the 1990s to ence has shown that new patterns of regional co-operation and eventually to full participation in the pro- neither imperialism nor colonialism is a cess of EU integration. The EU is perhaps simple act of accumulation and acquisi- today the only shared objective and com- tion. Both are supported and perhaps even

267 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3

impelled by impressive ideological forma- in a sovereign kingdom.’ The tions that include notions that certain ter- truth though lies somewhere in the mid- ritories and people require and beseech dle. Modern protectorates may have a domination, as well as forms of knowledge serious democratic deficit vis-à-vis the affiliated with domination. local population. But they operate in a far more sophisticated international environ- The risk of crossing this fine line is inher- ment with developed international legal ent in the peace operations and the inter- machinery and an advanced political cul- national protectorates established in the ture and international institutions, includ- 1990s in several parts of the world, includ- ing strong media and , all of ing Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The which provide considerable checks and Alexandros often self-righteous conviction of inter- balances against abuses. Yannis national administrators and international However, the question of accountabil- administrative personnel about the a pri- ity of the modern international protec- ori noble, impartial and constructive role torates remains crucial. First, as Stanton of their efforts inevitably clashes with the (1993:15) argued because ‘sovereignty, in patriotic and defiant attitude of local the most basic sense of ultimate authority elites and the population at large who per- over a specified territory, remains integral ceive the international administrations to the construction of the very political present in their countries at best as part- arrangements that are desired.’ In Bosnia- ners in the process of peace and recon- Herzegovina, the significant powers vest- struction, and at worst as an integral part ed in the international community with- of their disputes and conflicts. Straddling out clear democratic scrutiny was con- the task of remaining a constructive part ceived as corrective for the unwillingness in the peace process and the task of avoid- of the local political forces to engage in ing sliding into becoming part of the implementation of the Dayton Peace problem is a major challenge for the inter- Accords on any substantial level and for national protectorates of our times. their attempts to maintain the divide Another aspect of the same problem between the nations in Bosnia for their is the serious democratic and legitimacy own interests (Bieber 2001). In Kosovo a deficit of international administrations few years later and starting from the real- whose acts are not accountable to the ity of an outright protectorate, one of the local peoples over whom they are entrust- most frequently asked questions in the ed to rule. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the first months by Bernard Kouchner, the powers vested in the international admin- first Special Representative of the UN istration were considerable, yet limited. Secretary General (SRSG) and the head In Kosovo they were enormous. The of the international administration in international community assumed full Kosovo, was exactly whether the interna- interim administrative responsibility, vir- tional community should rule Kosovo as a tually suspending the FRY’s sovereignty colonial administrator or as a partner over Kosovo (Yannis 2001a:32). Chopra sharing a certain degree of power with the (2000:28) described the powers of the local leadership. His clear inclination to head of the international administration opt for the latter was not originally shared in East Timor, whose mandate was very by the entire international community similar to that of the head of the interna- (Yannis 2001b). Today, however, this ap- tional administration in Kosovo, as ‘com- proach forms the cornerstone of the parable with that of a pre-constitutional international administration’s engagement

268 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3 in Kosovo and virtually nobody, including of Bosnian politics. It is also increasingly the new regime in Belgrade, disputes the less effective at bringing about real change wisdom and/or the inevitability of this in Bosnia society.’ The international admin- policy. In fact, the requirement to develop istration in Kosovo runs a similar risk if a model of good governance ensuring the the local political forces fail in the long international administration’s account- run to assume their political and adminis- ability to the local population through de- trative responsibilities for managing the mocratic representation and participation territory. in the work of the administration is in- The successes to date of the interna- creasingly becoming a widely accepted tional administration in Kosovo in estab- doctrine in complex peace operations and lishing democratic institutions of sub- the politics of the post-Cold War interna- stantial autonomy for the local popula- The Creation tional protectorates (Williams 2000). tion, i.e. from establishment of the Joint and Politics of Another reason why the questions of Interim Administrative Structures in Dec- International accountability and legitimacy are very ember 1999 to the municipal elections in Protectorates important in the politics of the interna- October 2000 and the Kosovo Assembly in the Balkans: tional protectorates in the Balkans is il- general elections in November 2001, with Bridges Over lustrated by the continuing political prob- risk indeed dissipating if the internation- Troubled lems in Bosnia-Herzegovina where local al administration fails to transfer signifi- Wa ters rivals appear to have largely instrumen- cant political and administrative power to talised the presence of the international the elected local representatives and to authority in the country in order to con- encourage and enable them to assume tinue their war and pursue their divisive their responsibilities. The broad powers agendas through other means. Wolfgang retained by the SRSG should progressive- Petritsch, the third High Representative ly be used almost exclusively for correc- of the international community in Bosnia- tive purposes, and the overall internation- Herzegovina, argued that al role should gradually scale down to the benefit of empowerment of the local in the long run the usage of the far-reach- political forces. In order to serve their ing powers lead to a type of dependency transformative role as a bridge from the syndrome. Local parties began to oppor- past to the future in both Bosnia-Her- tunistically rely too much on the political zegovina and Kosovo, the international intervention of the High Representative, protectorates should not become an especially when it came to unpopular mea- excuse for the abdication of the political sures. They can behave, despite being in responsibilities of local elites and their government, as if they were in opposition populations, nor for consolidating depen- and defend their ethno-nationalist goals dency on international assistance, nor for without need to compromise (quoted in inactivity and political and administrative Bieber 2001:41). paralysis. Judah (2000) argued that histo- ry in the Balkans in the 1990s was the ANovember 2001 paper by the Euro- continuation of war by other means. Me- pean Stability Initiative (2001:2) made eting the challenges of accountability and this point even clearer; it argued that legitimacy and enabling local self-rule ‘progressive superintendence by interna- would ensure that the international pro- tional institutions and the Peace Im- tectorates in the Balkans will not replace plementation Council’s Steering Board is history as a continuation of war by other becoming an obstacle to the development means.

269 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3

The Politics of Efficiency to move these territories from the nation- and State Building alist and territorial antagonisms of the While accountability is essential to suc- 1990s to regional co-operation and inte- cess, efficiency in bringing about change gration and towards the EU. In any case, and restoring and creating the state struc- changing the status of the territories or tures that can facilitate the return to stabil- the mandate of the international protec- ity, democratisation and development are torates appears today to be both unlikely equally indispensable factors for the inter- and dangerous. Improbable because in national protectorates’ success in South- neither place there is a real chance to gen- eastern Europe and, more specifically, for erate a local or international consensus and the preparation of conditions enabling the agreement for change, and dangerous be- Alexandros region to eventually join the EU. Stability cause such radical changes would inevitably Yannis requires some form of both legitimate and divert attention, efforts and resources away effective state structures and public author- from implementation of the current man- ities, particularly in multiethnic societies. If dates and towards new structures and po- accountability takes care of building the licies that could even destabilise the very required legitimacy, efficiency is needed for peace that has been so painstakingly a- building the required state structures need- chieved over the last few years. ed for stability and development. The bal- While keeping with the current reali- ancing act between achieving accountabili- ties may be easier in Bosnia-Herzegovina ty and legitimacy and pursuing efficiency where the status of the territory is, in and state building promises to remain very principle, settled, Kosovo presents a spe- delicate. cial challenge because the uncertainty of There are three requirements for the the final status is seen by many as being efficient involvement of the international itself a factor of instability (Rupnik 2001). protectorates in Bosnia-Herzegovina and The reality though may prove to be dif- Kosovo. First, they have to navigate skil- ferent. What is important in Kosovo fully the diametrically opposing objec- today is neither the return of the territo- tives and interests of the nationalist lead- ry to direct Serb rule which would almost ership of the ethnic groups in the region certainly re-ignite violence, nor indepen- with the aim to prevent them from con- dence which after all has not been helpful tinuing to pursue their separatist and in itself in bringing stability to Bosnia- extremist agendas. At the same time, they Herzegovina even after the Dayton Peace have to intensify their efforts to engage Accords. What is needed in Kosovo today the moderate forces from all sides in con- is the maintenance of a psychological eq- structive co-operation in the process of uilibrium between the Kosovo Albanians rebuilding a multiethnic future. Maintain- and the Serbs about the future of both in ing international commitment to the unity Kosovo. More specifically, Kosovo Al- of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to the sub- banians need constant reassurance that stantial autonomy of Kosovo are very they will never again fall under direct Serb critical factors. In reality, the current sta- rule, and the Serb minority needs to know tus of both territories, although different, that they will always be protected and feel serve the same purpose of freezing the safe in Kosovo. In this respect, the pres- zero-sum competition of local rivals in a ence of the international protectorates compromise that would hopefully enable could be catalytic. time and other forces, including the com- Further, while the status of both Bos- mitment of the international community, nia-Herzegovina and Kosovo remains un-

270 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3 changed, a key requirement for efficiency is the international administration in Koso- to avoid paralysis. In other words, freezing vo must today continue pursuing imple- the status is no excuse for inactivity. The mentation of Resolution 1244 in a way international authorities should continue that meets the minimum objectives of focusing vigorously on implementation of both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs and the their mandates and, particularly the build- maximum of neither in an effort to gradu- ing of modern, democratic and multiethnic ally build the required local consensus state structures in both territories. The and partnerships over the role of the November 2001 report of the International international administration in the peace Crisis Group (ICG) on Bosnia-Herzegovi- process. Kosovo Albanians should be pro- na, among others, recommends that the gressively enabled to develop and lead High Representative should democratic institutions of self-govern- The Creation ment and substantial autonomy in Koso- and Politics of (a) intensify its efforts to endow the state vo and to become full partners in the pro- International with as many functioning central institu- cess of regional integration, while Serbs Protectorates tions as can be justified and funded under should be assisted in achieving greater in the Balkans: Dayton’s dispensation, (b) maintain and security and freedom of movement as well Bridges Over probably enhance its capacity in economic as greater opportunities for the return of Troubled analysis and monitoring, and (c) work Serbs to Kosovo through a system of great- Wa ters more closely with the international finan- er self-government in Serb areas (Yannis cial institutions (IFIs) (International 2001a). Addressing the requirements of Crisis Group 2001:4). building a solid civil administration, cred- ible judiciary, modern and transparent Indeed, the Dayton Peace Accords brought economy and lively civil society are essen- peace but have not yet brought stability tial objectives for all ethnic-groups in Ko- to Bosnia-Herzegovina, as illustrated by sovo and indispensable requirements to the virtually non-existing political inte- prepare the ground to move beyond the gration and the prevailing poor economic current stalemate. The uncertainty over conditions in the country evidenced by the current status of Kosovo and the am- the absence of local and international biguities of the international administra- confidence and investment (Bildt 2001). tion’s mandate should not result in losing While the complex arrangements of the sight of the pragmatic priorities for polit- Dayton Peace Accords may in part be ical, administrative, economic and social blamed for this, the degree of commit- reforms that have to be made regardless ment and focus by the international com- of the future status of Kosovo. munity on the required institutional and In Bosnia-Herzegovina, as Bieber (2001: administrative reforms also needs rethink- 42) argues, the ing and improvement. With regard to the establishment of a international presence seems likely to con- modicum of stability and democratic in- tinue until a new political elite emerges, stitutions of self-government, Kosovo is despite the current system, which might be just about to reach the stage at which more ready to consider a thorough institu- Bosnia-Herzegovina found itself soon tional reform. A key (or rather the only) after the Dayton Peace Accords. Yet, as in incentive for such a process might prove to Bosnia-Herzegovina a consensus for dia- be European integration, as integration logue, political solutions and inter-ethnic into European structures is not disputed by co-operation is still largely missing. Hence, any of the three nations or their represen-

271 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3

tatives. The possible integrative dynamic retain the political, military and financial of European integration has not yet been presence and commitment to the region seized upon in Bosnia. for as much time as needed to achieve its extremely difficult objectives of keeping In Kosovo, the international presence, the Balkans peaceful and stable as well as however scaled down and reformed, may in line with the perspective of regional be needed until Kosovo is ready one day to and European integration. become a member of the EU. The poten- tial stabilising dynamic of European inte- gration must also be pursued in a more Conclusion energetic manner in Kosovo and the rest of Alexandros Yugoslavia. For example, the magnet of the The creation of international pro- Yannis Stabilisation and Association Agreements tectorates in South-eastern Europe with the EU has been employed with con- in the 1990s emerged from the com- siderable success so far as a conflict pre- bined influence of two factors. First, vention technique in 2001 in the FYROM the post-Cold War re-emergence of inter- and in 2002 in the Serbia-Montenegro ventionism and the return of internation- Agreement. The potential of these agree- al protectorates as a means to ensure ments for changing the political frame- international peace and stability; and the work in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and in political will of the Western-led interna- Kosovo should also be explored. The sui tional community to use these instru- generis current status of Kosovo and the ments in the Balkans in order to stop the uncertainty over its final status should not fighting in the wars of succession to for- be obstacles in this respect, like other mer Yugoslavia. The establishment of the problems associated with the lack of clari- protectorates in Bosnia-Herzegovina and ty of the status of Kosovo, such as the lend- Kosovo was in both cases based on a sim- ing capacity of financial institutions, ilar historical compromise between the should not be allowed to halt progress in values and interests of the international Kosovo. Innovative approaches and solu- community to halt any further disintegra- tions are needed to address extraordinary tion of the Balkans, and the agendas of problems and circumstances. the local protagonists to further disinte- In sum, in order to be effective the grate the region along ethnic lines. The international protectorates in South-east- logic of this compromise was to give pre- ern Europe must: a) navigate the uncer- valence to the objective of stopping the tainties of the currently disputed status of violence, while effectively freezing the ter- the administered territories by the local ritorial claims of local rivals. Consequently leaders and peoples in the region who while they are credited with success in stop- often treat international protectorates ping the fighting, both Bosnia-Herzego- with an overdose of cynicism that com- vina and Kosovo have in practice remain- pels them to manipulate them in order to ed in limbo. continue their war through other means; The international protectorates can- b) continue and intensify their efforts to not by themselves provide any long-term build the political, economic and social political solution as they cannot substi- institutions and dynamics that will be tute the political will of the local rivals. essential down the road for the quantum Yet, should their presence gradually man- leap that takes the Balkans out of the mis- age to promote accountability and local ery of the 1990s and towards the EU; c) responsibility as well as efficiency and local

272 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3 participation in establishing the structures international protectorates in Bosnia-Her- needed for stability and development, the zegovina and Kosovo at best would be to international protectorates’ role could turn facilitate this process by ensuring peace. out to be useful not only with regard to Whether they can also serve as the bridge the short-term objective of peace but also to the future and succeed without currently with respect to the long-term objective of having either a clear road map or local con- stability. However, bridging the gap be- sensus on the very next steps in the region tween peace and stability also requires, if is both a formidable challenge and a big not primarily, the development of a com- question mark. mon vision among all ethnic groups in the region, particularly as the ongoing insta- First version received: March 2002. bility derives exactly from the continuing Final version accepted: July 2002. The Creation legitimacy deficit of some of the succes- and Politics of sor states of former Yugoslavia among its International ethnic components. Notes: Protectorates Einstein argued that the significant in the Balkans: problems we face cannot be solved at the Dr Alexandros Yannis is Research Fellow in Bridges Over same level of thinking we were at when we the Programme for Strategic and International Sec- Troubled created them. As the EU was conceived to urity Studies in Geneva (PSIS) and in the Hellenic Wa ters bring lasting peace to Europe after the Foundation for European and Foreign Policy in destruction of the Second World War, Athens (ELIAMEP). He was Political Advisor to regional integration in South-eastern Euro- Bernard Kouchner, the first Special Representative of pe and the prospect of the region’s full the UN Secretary General in Kosovo, and he has pub- incorporation into the process of European lished numerous articles in the fields of conflict pre- integration in the long run constitutes the vention, management and resolution and a book on only viable alternative for lasting stability in "Kosovo Under International Administration". Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and the Address: Alexandros Yannis, ELIAMEP, 4, region as a whole. The EU’s vision is shared Xenophontos st., 105 57 Athens, Greece [E-mail: by all peoples in the region. The role of [email protected]].

References

Bieber, Florian (2001) “Resolving Self-determination Conflicts through Complex Power Sharing: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina”. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, Centre of International Studies, Draft paper prepared for the project on Resolving Self-Determination Disputes through Complex Power-Sharing Arrangements. Bildt, Carl (2001) The Balkans’ Second Chance. Foreign Affairs 80(1), 148-59. Caplan, Richard (1998) Crisis in Kosovo. International Affairs 74(4), 745-61. Caplan, Richard (2002) “ANew Trusteeship? The International Administrations of War Torn Territories”. : The International Institute of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 341. Chopra, Jarat (1996) Achilles’ Heel in Somalia: Learning From a Conceptual Failure. Texas International Law Journal 31(3), 495-525. Chopra, Jarat (1999) Peace Maintenance: The Evolution of International Political Authority. London: Routledge. Chopra, Jarat (2000) The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor. Survival 42(3), 27-39. Cooper, Robert (2001) Dawn Chorus for the New Age of Empire. The Sunday Times, (28 October), 6. European Stability Initiative (2001) “In Search of Politics: the Evolving International Role in ”. Berlin, Brussels and Sarajevo: European Stability Initiative, ESI Discussion Paper.

273 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3

Freudenschuß, Helmut (1994) Between Universalism and Collective Security: Authorization of the Use of Force by the UN Security Council. European Journal of International Law 5, 492-531. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Life and Peace Institute, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in co-operation with the Lessons-Learned Unit of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (1995) Comprehensive Report on Lessons-Learned From United Nations Operation in Somalia, April 1992 – March 1996. New York: United Nations. Glenny, Misha (1993) The Fall of Yugoslavia. London: Penguin Books. Glenny, Misha (1999) The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers. London: Granta Books. Gordon, Ruth (1995) Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship. Cornell International Law Journal 28, 301-47. Helman Gerald and Steven Ratner (1992-1993) Saving Failed States. Foreign Policy (89), 3-20. Hobsbawm, Eric (1994) The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century (1914-1991). London: Abacus. Alexandros Hobsbawm, Eric (1999) The New Century. London: Little, Brown and Company. Yannis Hobsbawm, Eric (2002) War and Peace. The Guardian (23 February), 13. Holbrooke, Richard (1998) To End a War. New York: Random House. International Crisis Group (2001) “Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery” (29 November). Sarajevo and Brussels: ICG Balkans Reports No. 121. Judah, Tim (1997/2000) The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia. New Haven, CT and London: Yale Nota Bene. Judah, Tim (2000) Kosovo: War and Revenge. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press. Lyon, Peter (1993) The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival of International Trusteeship. Journal of Common Wealth and Comparative Politics 31, 96-110. Mallaby, Sebastian (2002) The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire. Foreign Affairs 81(2), 2-7. Mayall, James (1996) Introduction. In James Mayall (ed.)The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia, 1-9. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mayall, James (2000) The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention Revisited. In Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds) Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship, 180-98. New York: UNU Press. Owen, David (1995) Balkan Odyssey. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co. Rupnik, Jacques (2001) Yugoslavia after Milosevic. Survival 43(2), 19-30. Said, Edward (1993) Culture and Imperialism. London: Chatto & Windus. Stanton, Kimberly (1993) Pitfalls of Intervention: Sovereignty as a Foundation for Human Rights. Harvard International Review 26(1), 14-6. UN Secretary General (1992) An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. A/47/277 - S/24111 of 17 June. UN Security Council (1992a) Note by the President of the UN Security Council. S/235000 of 31 January.. UN Security Council (1992b) S/PV.3145 of 3 December. UN Security Council (1999) Resolution 1244 of 10 June. Weller, Marc, ed. (1999) International Documents and Analysis, Vol. 1: The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999 – From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia to Rambouillet and the Outbreak of Hostilities. Cambridge: Documents & Analysis Publishing. Williams, Michael (2000) “Introductory Paper — Ending Anarchy: International Rule and Reconstruction after Conflict”. Cambridge: 21st Century Trust, 5 — 13 October. Yannis, Alexandros (2001a) Kosovo Under International Administration.Survival 43(2), 31-48 Yannis, Alexandros (2001b) “Kosovo Under International Administration: An Unfinished Conflict.” Athens: Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva and the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy in Athens.

274

Top View