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Exploring the Role of New Media in Terrorist Recruitment Within the United States

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Exploring the Role of New Media in Terrorist Recruitment Within the United States VIRTUAL IMPETUS? EXPLORING THE ROLE OF NEW MEDIA IN TERRORIST RECRUITMENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies By Sarah D. Hengemuhle, B.A. Washington, D.C. April 12, 2010 Copyright 2010 by Sarah D. Hengemuhle All Rights Reserved ii VIRTUAL IMPETUS? EXPLORING THE ROLE OF NEW MEDIA IN TERRORIST RECRUITMENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. S. D. Hengemuhle, B.A. Thesis Advisor: J. A. Rosenthal, Ph.D. ABSTRACT The influence of new media on terrorist recruitment, particularly within the United States, has been the subject of much discussion in recent years. New media has been considered a logical factor inducing U.S. citizens to Islamist terrorism. However, the assumption that new media is a significant factor in recruitment has been largely accepted as valid without systematic quantitative analysis. This study examines whether new media is a significant factor in recruitment by examining 63 individual cases of homegrown jihad from post-9/11 to December 2009. This analysis found new media was not a significant or contributing factor to recruitment in the majority of cases. This negative correlation suggests other dynamics are responsible for leading individuals to choose violent jihad. Pursuant to this, a number of other factors, including socioeconomic, religiosity, and social networks, were analyzed in each case. In the majority of cases, physical bonds of kinship or friendship were the predominant factor leading individuals to become Islamist terrorists. These findings could potentially dampen many of the fears that new media will result in an epidemic of homegrown jihadists and strengthens the position that anti- radicalization and counterterrorism efforts should be focused at the community and social network level. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 1 PROJECT INTENT AND CONTRIBUTION .............................................................................. 3 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................... 3 METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................................... 7 ASSUMPTIONS, DEFINITIONS AND ANALYTIC TOOLS .................................................... 7 HYPOTHESES .............................................................................................................................. 9 DATA REVIEW AND ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 12 NEW MEDIA USE ...................................................................................................................... 12 SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE .................................................................................................. 18 AGE & EDUCATION ................................................................................................................... 18 INCOME, OCCUPATION & LIVING CONDITIONS ................................................................. 20 CRIMINAL HISTORY ................................................................................................................... 22 ETHNICITY ................................................................................................................................. 24 FOREIGN TRAVEL .................................................................................................................... 27 RELIGIOSITY…………………………………………………………………………………..28 NETWORKS……..………...……………………………………………………………………31 TERRORIST TIES………………………………………..………………………………………………...31 COMMUNITY TIES AND SOCIAL NETWORK ........................................................................... 33 ANALYTIC CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................... 36 iv POLICY IMPLICATIONS ........................................................................................................ 41 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………….... .45 APPENDIX A: INCLUDED CASES ........................................................................................ 47 APPENDIX B: EXCLUDED CASES & JUSTIFICATIONS ................................................. 50 APPENDIX C: NEW MEDIA USE........................................................................................... 52 APPENDIX D: SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS .................................................................... 58 APPENDIX E: ETHNICITY………..…………………………………………………………76 APPENDIX F: FOREIGN TRAVEL…………………………………...……………………..82 APPENDIX G: RELIGIOSITY……………………………………………………………... ...87 APPENDIX H: NETWORKS – TERRORIST TIES .............................................................. 94 APPENDIX I: COMMUNITY TIES & SOCIAL NETWORK ............................................. 98 APPENDIX J: ALL GRAPHED CASES AND FACTORS .................................................. 107 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 117 v LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS CHART 1: Distribution of New Media Use Across All Cases…….………………………13 CHART 2: New Media as a Significant Factor in Recruitment…………….…………….14 CHART 3: New Media as a Contributing Factor in Recruitment………….…………….15 CHART 4: Distribution of Active and Passive New Media Users….…………………….16 CHART 5: Age by Decade………………………………………….……………………….18 CHART 6: Education……………………………………………….……………………….20 CHART 7: Income Distribution……………………………….……………………………21 CHART 8: Occupation……………………………………………………………………. ... 22 CHART 9: Criminal History………………………………………………………………..23 CHART 10: Ethnic Background……………………………………………………………24 CHART 11: Ethnic Background by Region………………………………………………..25 CHART 12: Residence Status in Relation to Motivations..……………………………….26 CHART 13: Foreign Travel…………………………………………………………………27 CHART 14: Mosque Type…………………………………………………………………..28 CHART 15: Number of Individuals per Mosque………………………………………….29 CHART 16: Terrorist Group Affiliation……………………………………………….…..31 CHART 17: Terrorist Ties by Type………………………………………………………...32 CHART 18: Community Ties….…….………………………………………………….…..34 CHART 19: Social Recruitment Mechanisms………………………...……………………35 vi INTRODUCTION It had been three years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Syed Haris Ahmed, a middle class, 21 year old engineering student at Georgia Tech, should have been enjoying his comfortable suburban lifestyle and carefree college years. Instead, he was spending innumerable hours online, visiting jihadist websites, viewing violent videos, and chatting with terrorists. Less than a year later, “armchair jihad”1 was not enough for the Pakistani native and, along with a friend from the local Sunni mosque; Ahmed sought to become part of an active terrorist cell. Through his virtual connections, he obtained a meeting with an Islamist terrorist group in Toronto, Canada. In an attempt to grab the attention of renowned online jihadist “Irhaby007” (Terrorist 007) the young men made a casing video of Washington, D.C. landmarks and posted it online as an audition tape to “establish extremist credentials.” 2 Ahmed sealed his commitment to Islamist terrorism a few months later, traveling overseas in an attempt to attend a terrorist training camp. 3 How did a young American with a seemingly bright future ahead become an international terrorist plotting against the United States in the span of a couple of years? Had the Internet played a key role in his recruitment to violent jihad? America has seemed immune from the factors which had allowed other Western nations to become breeding grounds for terrorists. In the search for an answer, many have cited the power of the Internet in inciting Americans to violent jihad. Al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups have a significant web presence and are known to use their platform to disseminate propaganda, 1 Hannah Rogan, "Jihadism Online - a Study of How Al-Qaida and Radical Islamist Groups Use the Internet for Terrorist Purposes," (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2006): 15. 2 Atlanta Field Office Federal Bureau of Investigation, "The Path to Terror: The Jihadists of Georgia, Part 1,"(December 15, 2009), http://www.fbi.gov/page2/dec09/jihadists_121509.html. 3 Northern District of Georgia U.S. attorney, "Terrorism Defendants Sentenced: Ehsanul Islam Sadequee Receives 17 Years in Prison; Co-Defendant Syed Haris Ahmed Receives 13 Years," ed. Department of Justice (Atlanta December 14, 2009). 1 provide direction to recruits, and conduct operational planning. 4 U.S. media touts anecdotal evidence that these jihadist sites and online interactions with terrorists turn average Americans like Syed Ahmed into jihadists intent on committing violence against the United States. 5 The fear has been that physical social networks are being replaced by virtual ones, with individuals connecting with fellow potential jihadists via the Internet. Anecdotal evidence suggests the Internet is making it easier for individuals to become terrorists – both through facilitating contact with other extremists and by allowing them to filter information intake, shutting out alternative, and perhaps ameliorating, perspectives. The argument that “…the Internet has become a crucial front in the ever-shifting war on terrorism”
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