IN 'I'HE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

E^u State ex rel., THE HONORABLE ANGELA R. STOKES,

Relator, Case No. 2014-0467

V.

THE HONORABLE RONALD B. ADRINE. Original Action in Prohibition

Respondent.

MERIT BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 'TI=[E HONORABLE RONALD B. ADRINE

Richard C. Alkire (0024816) Alvin E. Mathews, Jr.* (0038660) Dean Nieding (0003532) *Counsel ofRec.ord Gerhardt A. Gosnell II (0064919) RICxARD C. ALKIRE Co., LPA 6060 Rockside Woods Blvd., Suite 250 JAVIES E. ARNOLD & ASSOCIATES, LPA Independence, Ohio 44131-2335 115 W. Main Street, 4th Floor Ph: 216-674-0550 Columbus, Ohio 43215 Fax: 216-674-0104 Ph: 614-460-1600 [email protected] Fax: 614-469-1134 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Cou.nsel for Relator The Honoj°able Angela R. Stokes Counsel for Respondent The Honorable Ronald B. Adrine

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.... £..' ..,ff ^ ^,^ TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODU C'TION ...... 1

II. BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ...... 2

III. ARGUMENT ...... 8

Proposition of Law: An administrative judge of a multi-judge municipal court does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue administrative orders that transfer all criminal cases from one municipal court judge and temporarily remove that judge from the criminal case draw in response to the judge's on-going abusive conduct on criminal matters when such temporary administrative actions are necessary to restore the public's confidence in the legal system, ensure the orderly administration of justice, and prevent further harm to the operations of the entire municipal court ...... 8

A. To be entitled to writ of a prohibition, Relator must establish that Respondent patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to issue the Administrative Orders ...... 8

B. Respondent did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue the Administrative Orders ...... 9

1. Administrative judges, such as Judge Adrine, have broad authority and discretion to manage the dockets in multi-judge courts, including the authority to transfer cases ...... 9

2. The Administrative Orders do not amount to a usurpation of this Court's authority to discipline attorneys and judges because the Administrative Orders are not discipline ...... 11

3. Respondent did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue the Administrative Orders under Art. IV, § 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution or Sup.R. 36 ...... 15

4. Respondent did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue the Administrative Orders pursuant to Crim. R. 25(B) ...... 16

5. Respondent did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue the Administrative Orders pursuant to R.C. 2701.031 ...... 17

6. Respondent did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue the Adtninistrative Orders by operation of R.C. 1901.31(E) because Relator's access to criminal files has not been denied or impeded ...... 178

i IV. CONCLUSION ...... 20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...... 21

APPENDIX ...... 22

ii APPENDIX

Exhibit 1 Affidavit of the Honorable Ronald B. Adrine

Exhibit 2 R.C. 1901.15

Exhibit 3 Gov. Jud. R. I, § 1

Exhibit 4 Gov. Jud. R. II, §8

Exhibit 5 Gov. Bar R. V, §6(B)

Exhibit 6 Gov. Bar R. V, §8(D)

iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Brickman & Sons, Inc., v. National City Bank, 106 Ohio St. 30, 2005-Ohio-3559, 830 N.E.2d 1151 ...... _...... 10

IVelling v. Stralka, 12 Ohio St.3d 105, 465 N.E.2d 857 (1984) ...... 14

Schucker v. tLletcalf, 22 Ohio St.3d 33, 488 N.E.2d 210 (1986) ...... 10

State ex rel. Adams, v. Gusweiler, 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 285 N.E.2d 22 (1972) ...... 8

State ex rel. Buck v. Maloney, 102 Ohio St.3d 250, 2004-Ohio-2590, 809 N.E.2d 20 ...... 13 State ex rel. Carr v. McDonnell, 184 Ohio App.3d 373, 2009-Ohio-2488, 921 N.E.2d 251 (8th Dist.) ...... 10

State ex rel. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Henson, 102 Ohio St.3d 349, 2004-Ohio-3208, 810 N.E.2d 953 ...... 8-9

State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner, 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 656 N.E.2d 1288 (1995) ...... 8 State ex rel. Mexagram v. Friedland, 8th Dist. No. 87089 & 87105, 2005-Ohio-6764 ...... 10 State ex rel. ll%Iayer v. Henson, 97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223 ...... 9 State ex rel. Russo v McDonnell, I 10 Ohio St.3d 144, 2006-Ohio-3459, 852 N.E.2d 145...... 10 State ex rel. Stefanick v. Municipal Court of Marietta, 21 Ohio St.2d 102, 255 N.E.2d 634 ( 1970) ...... 8

State ex rel. Torrestoro v. Donnelly, 8th Dist. No. 97050, 2011-Ohio-4832 ...... 17 State ex rel. Triplett v. Ross, 111 Ohio St.3d 231, 2006-Ohio-4705, 855 N.E.2d 1174 ...... 15 State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Bur. ofMotor Vehicles, 87 Ohio St.3d 184, 718 N.E.2d 908 ( 1999) ...... 8

State v. Calloway, 1 st Dist. No. C-810420, 1982 WL 8454 (April 7, 1982) ...... 17 State v. Mathews, 10th Dist. No. 75AP-90, 1975 WL 181631 (Aug. 5, 1975) ...... 17 State v. Torrestoro, 8th Dist. No. 97224, 2012-Ohio-601 ...... 17

Constitutional Provisions

Article IV, Section 2(B)(1) of the Ohio Constitution ...... 11 Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution ...... 15

lv Statutes

R.C. 1901.08 ...... _,...... 2 R.C. 1901.15 ...... 9 R.C. 1901.31 ...... 18 R.C. 1901.181 ...... 13

R,C. Chapter 2101 ...... 13 R.C. 2301.03 ...... 13 R.C. 2701.031 ...... 2, 11, 16-17

Rules

Crim. R. 25(B) ...... 2, 11, 16-17

Gov. Bar R. V, Section 5a ...... 11 Gov. Bar R. V, Section 6(B) ...... 12

Gov. Bar R. V, Section 8(D) ...... 12 Gov. Jud. R. I, Section 1 ...... 12 Gov. Jud. R. II, Section 8(C) ...... 12 Sup. R. 36 ...... 1,11,15,16 Sup. R. 4.01 ...... 1, 16

Sup. R. 4.01(A) ...... 6, 9, 14 Sup. R. 4.01(C) ...... 6, 9 Sup. R. 4.01(K) ...... 9 S up. R. 4.02 ...... 7

Sup. R. 36.20 - 36.28 ...... 13 Sup. R. 49 - 49.12 ...... 13

v I. INTRODUCTION

The issue presented in this original action is whether Respondent, the Administrative

Judge of the Cleveland Municipal Court, patently and unambiguously lacked the authority to

issue certain administrative orders concerning the management of the court's docket. These

administrative orders, which temporarily remove all criminal cases from Relator's docket, were

issued as a last resort to prevent Relator's abusive practices related to lter criminal docket and the

continuation of a dysfunctional courtroom that was undermining the operations of the entire

Cleveland Municipal Court arld the orderly administration of justice. Issued in response to an

untenable situation created by Relator, the administrative orders are fully consistent with an

administrative judge's general "responsibility for" and "control over the administration, docket,

and calendar of the court" pursuant to Sup.R. 4.01 and this Court's applicable case law.

None of the arguments Relator assert here establishes that Respondent patently and

unambiguously lacked the authority to issue the administrative orders. First, the administrative

orders do not amount to a usurpation of this Court's exclusive authority to discipline lawyers and

judges because nothing in the administrative orders constitutes discipline. Relator continues to

serve as a municipal court judge on the Cleveland Municipal Court, receiving her full salary and

benefits.

Second, nothing in the administrative orders is inconsistent with this Court's authority to

prescribe rules of procedure, including those set forth in Sup.R. 36, concerning the default procedures for initially assigning cases and sessions in multi-judge courts. The administrative orders do not prescribe a different rule of procedure for the Cleveland Municipal Court, change the general applicability of Sup.R. 36 to the Cleveland Municipal Court, or exempt the Cleveland

Municipal Court from its provisions. The administrative orders merely concern the assignment of cases for one of 13 judges on the Cleveland Municipal Court.

1 Third, the administrative orders are not inconsistent with various criminal procedural

rules, including those concerning post-trial sentencing (Crim. R. 25(B)), motions for

disqualification (R.C. 2701.031), or the municipal court clerk's general authority pursuant to

R.C. 1901.31(E) over the court's criminal case files. Crim. R. 25(B) is a protection afforded to

criminal defendants, not members of the judiciary. Relator has no standing to enforce the

mandates of Crim. R. 25(B) independent of the criminal defendants in such cases. Similarly,

R.C. 2701.031 provides a mechanism by which parties may seek the disqualification of a

municipal court judge. While denial of such motions may be dispositive and binding as to the

parties in those cases, such rulings do not bind an administrative judge or preclude the transfer of

cases pursuant to an administrative judge's general supervisory authority. Finally, none of the

administrative orders, or the subsequent actions of Respondent, has interfered with Relator's

access to any court files.

In short, Respondent's actions are fully consistent with the authority of an administrative

judge to mange the docket and calendar of a multi-judge municipal court. Because Respondent

did not patently and unambiguously lack the authority to issue the administrative orders,

Relator's request for a writ of prohibition should be denied.

II. BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

Relator, The Honorable Angela R. Stokes ("Relator" or "Judge Stokes"), is one of 13

elected judges to the Cleveland Municipal Court. See R.C. 1901.08. Respondent, The Honorable

Ronald B. Adrine ("Respondent" or "Judge Adrine"), is the administrative and presiding judge of the Cleveland Municipal Court, a position he has held since 2008. (Affidavit of the Honorable

Ronald B. Adrine ("Adrine Affidavit") (Appendix, Ex. 1) at ¶1.)'

1 The Adrine Affidavit was filed with the Court on September 23, 2014, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix Exhibit 1.

2 Relator seeks a writ of prohibition to effectively reverse and suspend the operation of a

series of administrative orders issued by Judge Adrine as administrative judge in March 2014

(the "Administrative Orders").2 The Administrative Orders were the culmination of years of

persistent complaints received by Judge Adrine about the way Judge Stokes operated her

criminal docket and her repeated refusal to modify or correct such conduct. (See generally

Adrine Affidavit at ¶¶3-9.) The Administrative Orders were specifically issued, in Judge

Adrine's capacity as administrative judge, as a last resort to prevent the continuation of what

Judge Adrine believed had become a dysfunctional courtroom, which had the cumulative effect

of undermining the adjudication of criminal cases, the orderly administration of justice, and the

operations of the entire Cleveland Municipal Court. (Adrine Affidavit at ¶¶9-10.)

.7udge Stokes'Abusive and Disruptive Conduct

As explained in more detail in Judge Adrine's Affidavit submitted to this Court on

September 23, 2014 (copy attached hereto as Exhibit 1), since the begimling of his tenure as

administrative judge in 2008, Judge Adrine and his staff received literally hundreds of

complaints from the bar, public, and court staff concerning the workflow and court-room

practices of Judge Stokes relating to her haiidling of her criminal docket. (Adrine Affidavit at

¶3.) These allegations included mistreatment of participants in criminal hearings, including

defendants, witnesses, police officers, prosecutors, private defense counsel, public defenders,

court personnel, and other members of the general public. (Id.) In addition, every department of the Cleveland Municipal Court was negatively impacted by Judge Stokes' grossly disproportionate use of human and material resources compared to other judges of the court. (Id.)

2 Copies of the Administrative Orders are attached as Exhibits A through I to the Stipulation of the Parties ("Stipulation") filed with the Court on September 23, 2014.

3 At first, Judge Adrine attempted to find alternative administrative solutions to address the

ongoing disruptions to the orderly administration of justice occasioned bv Judge Stokes'

mishandling of her criminal docket. For example, because Judge Stokes routinely held court

well into the evening hours without taking lunch or other breaks, Judge Adrine was forced to

strictly enforce rules mandating lunch breaks for employees and was required to create a special

rule requiring all court support personnel to abandon their posts no later than one hour after the

court's stated closing hour. (Id. at T4.) These rules were required not only to ensure that the

court personnel were given the breaks to which they were entitled, but also to prevent the accrual

of excessive amount of staff compensatory time and alleviate a significant burden on court staff

and the public. (Id) Frequently, however, once a viable solution was put in place, Judge Stokes

devised a way to render it ineffective in order to engage in her preferred method of operation.

(See generally Id. at ¶5 (describing Judge Stokes' practice of waiting until the end of the day to

complete the necessary paperwork to transport detainees to detention, which usually meant that

the Deputy Bailiffs serving in her room were required to remain at their posts well into the

evening to secure those individuals).)

Based upon the numerous complaints conceining Judge Stokes' conduct and management

of her criminal docket, a disciplinary complaint against Judge Stokes was filed by the

Disciplinary Counsel on October 14, 2013, Disciplinary Case No. 2013-057. (Adrine Affidavit at

¶6 and Exhibit A thereto.) The Complaint filed by Disciplinary Counsel in October 2013, and the Amended Disciplinary Complaint filed in April 2014, describe in detail a pattern of abusive and unprofessional conduct by Judge Stokes concerning her handling of her criminal docket, including claims that she committed abuse of court resources, abuse of court personnel, abuse of

4 lawyers, abuse of defendants and the public, abuse of constitutional freedoms, and numerous

abusive legal errors. (Id. at ¶6-7 and Exhibits A & B thereto.)3

Despite Judge Adrine's efforts to find alternative administrative solutions and despite the

filing of the Disciplinary Complaint by Disciplinary Counsel, Judge Stokes did not modify any

of her court-room practices. (Adrine Affidavit at ¶8.) Judge Adrine continued to field complaints

from employees, defense attorneys, prosecuting attorneys, police officers, outside agencies and

the general public about the manner in which Judge Stokes' courtroom operated. (Id.) Judge

Adrine and/or his staff received informal complaints on a continuous, almost a daily, basis, and

received approximately one formal complaint against Judge Stokes every week. (Id.)

Judge Stokes' conduct is notorious in the community and has diminished the way that the

public views the court, including negative portrayals in the media. (Id at ¶3.) In March 2014,

the Cuyahoga County Public Defender took the extraordinary step of filing a formal motion to

have Judge Stokes' criminal cases transferred and to stop further assignment of criminal cases to

her docket. (Id. at ¶8.)

The Administrative Orders

In early 2014, Judge Adrine determined that further action was necessary to ensure the

orderly administration ofjustice. (Id at ¶9.) To that end, Judge Adrine issued the Administrative

Orders, which generally transferred all of the criminal cases then-assigned to Judge Stokes' personal docket and removed Judge Stokes from the court's random draw of criminal cases during the pendency of the on-going disciplinary proceedings.

3 T'ellingly, Judge Stokes' dismissive attitude to the applicable rules and procedures continues even in this case. On October 3, 2014, Relator submitted a "third" affidavit as an exhibit to her Merit Brief, despite the fact that this Court had set a deadline of September 23, 2014, for the submission of evidence.

5 Specifically, Administrative Order No. 2014-003 (Stipulation Ex. B) transferred all

criminal misdemeanor, criminal minor misdemeanor, and traffic matters then-assigned to the

Judge Stokes' personal docket to Judge Adrine for review and reassignment. Administrative

Order No. 2014-004 (Stipulation Ex. D) transferred the responsibility for the supervision of all

criminal defendants on probation on Judge Stokes' personal docket to Judge Adrine for review

and possible reassignment. Administrative Order No. 2014-005 (Stipulation Ex. F) transferred

responsibility for status review of all criminal defendants sentenced to a period of incarceration

by Judge Stokes to Judge Adrine. Administrative Order No. 2014-006 (Stipulation Ex. G)

removed Judge Stokes from the court's random draw of criminal cases and proportionally

increased the percentage of civil cases to be assigned to her. Pursuant to Administrative Order

No. 2014-008 (Stipulation Ex. I), Judge Adrine then instructed the Clerk and the Central

Scheduling Office to exercise all due diligence to retrieve all of the criminal case files in the

custody of Judge Stokes. Finally, in an Inter-Office Memorandum (Stipulation Ex. J), Judge

Adrine informed Judge Stokes that to the extent she required access to some criminal case files

to assist her in the defense to the Disciplinary Complaint, she would be provided access to such

files through the office of the Administrative Judge.

The Administrative Orders were not intended as any form of punishment or discipline

against Judge Stokes but were taken as a last resort to prevent the continuation of what Judge

Adrine believed had become a dysfunctional courtroom that was underinining the operations of the entire Cleveland Municipal Court. (Adrine Affidavit at ¶10.) All of the Administrative

Orders were issued pursuant to the authority granted Judge Adrine under Sup.R. 4.01(A), Sup.R.

4.01(C), and "in order to maintain and enhance public confidence in the legal system as set forth in Paragraph 1, Preamble, Code of Judicial Conduct." (See Stipulation Exhibits B, D, & F.)

6 While in the Administrative Orders rernained in effect, Judge Stokes continued to preside

over her civil docket. (Adrine Affidavit at ¶12.) She continued to receive the same salary,

benefits, and staffing levels as before. (Id) She received the same salary, benefits, and staffing

levels as all other associate judges on the Cleveland Municipal Court. (Id.)

While the Administrative Orders were in effect, no new complaints about Judge Stokes

were received by Judge Adrine. (Id. at ¶14,) The managers of all court departments have

indicated that the morale and productivity of the court staff substantially improved following the

issuance of the Administrative Orders. (Id.)

Relat©r's Cornplaint and Subsequent Proceedings

Without following established administrative procedures by seeking to have the

Administrative Orders modified or vacated by a vote of all of the judges on the Cleveland

Municipal Court as provided under Sup.R. 4.02, Relator instead filed her Complaint in this Court

seeking writs of quo warranto, mandamus, and prohibition. On September 3, 2014, this Court

dismissed the writs of quo warranto and mandamus. The Court, however, granted an alternative

writ of prohibition and set a schedule for the presentation of evidence and filing of briefs.

On September 22, 2014, Judge Adrine filed a Motion for Clarification of his obligations

pursuant to the Court's alternative writ. In particular, Judge Adrine sought clarification as to

whether the alternative writ mandated that he restore Relator to the criminal docket pending final resolution of this matter. To Date, the Court has not issued any order or decision in response to

Judge Adrine's Motion for Clarification. In the interim, however, Relator has filed a Motion to

Show Cause why Judge Adrine should not be held in contempt for failing to immediately reverse his Administrative Orders despite the pendency of Judge Adrine's request for clarification from this Court.

7 III. ARGUMENT

Proposition of Law: An administrative judge of a multi-judgernunicipal court does not patentlv and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue administrative orders that transfer all criminal cases from one municipal court judge and temporarily remove that judge from the criminal case draw in response to the judge's on-going abusive conduct on criminal matters when such temporary administrative actions are necessary to restore the public's confidence in the legal systein, ensure the orderly administration of justice, and prevent further harm to the operations of the entire municipal court.

A. To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Relator must establish that Respondent patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to issue the Administrative Orders.

In order for a writ of prohibition to issue, the Relator must demonstrate that: (1) the

Respondent is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial authority, (2) the exercise of the

judicial or quasi-judicial authority is not authorized by law, and (3) the denial of the writ will

cause injury to the Relator for wlaich no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of

the law. State ex rel: Wright v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 87 Ohio St.3d 184, 185, 718 N.E.2d

908 (1999). "Prohibition is a preventive rather than a corrective remedy and is designed to

prevent a tribunal from proceeding in a matter which it is not authorized to hear and determine."

State ex rel. Stefanick v. Municipal Court of Nlarietta, 21 Ohio St.2d 102, 104, 255 N.E.2d 634

(1970).

Accordingly, prohibition may be invoked to correct the results of prior actions only

where the court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the cause. State ex rel.

Fogle v. Steiner, 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 161, 656 N.E.2d 1288 (1995); see also State ex r•el. Adams, v. Gusweiler, 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 285 N.E.2d 22 (1972) paragraph two of the syllabus ("Where there is a total want of jurisdiction on the part of a court, a writ of prohibition will be allowed to arrest the continuing effect of an order issued by such court, even though the order was entered on the journal of the court prior to the application for the writ of prohibition."); State ex rel.

8 Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Henson, 102 Ohio St.3d 349, 2004-Ohio-3208, 810 N.E.2d 953, ¶

12, ("'[I]f a lower court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a cause,

prohibition * * * will issue to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to

correct the results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions."') quoting State ex r^el. Mayer v.

Henson, 97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12.

Here, Relator seeks to suspend the effect of Judge Adrine's prior actions of issuing the

Administrative Orders. As such, Relator is required to show that Judge Adrine patently and

unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to issue the Administrative Orders. On that test, Relator fails.

B. Respondent did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue the Administrative Orders.

1. Administrative judges, such as Judge Adrine, have broad authority and discretion to manage the dockets in multi-judge courts, including the authority to transfer cases.

As an administrative judge of a municipal court, Judge Adrine "has general supervision

of the business of the court and may classify and distribute among the judges the business

pending in the court." R.C. 1901.15 (Appendix, Ex. 2). Sup.R. 4.01(A) expressly provides that

an administrative judge shall "[b]e responsible for and exercise control over the administration,

docket, and calendar of the court or division." Sup.R. 4.01(C) provides that administrative judges have the authority to assign cases to individual judges of the court or division pursuant to

Sup.R. 36. Finally, Sup.R. 4.01(K) grants administrative judges broad authority to "[p]erform

any other duties in furtherance of the responsibilities of the administrative judge."

Consistent with these provisions, this Court has recognized the broad discretion afforded administrative judges in rnulti judge courts to manage the dockets of the judges and to transfer andfor reassign cases. As this Court stated in 1986, "the administrative judge ... does have power to transfer cases, and whether that power was properly used is a subject for appeal."

9 Schucker v. Metcalf, 22 Ohio St.3d 33, 36, 488 N.E.2d 210 (1986), fn. 2. Thus, "(t]he transfer of

a case involves an exercise of judicial discretion, with which this court generally will not

interfere." Id.; see also Brickmarr & Sons, Inc., v. National City Bank, 106 Ohio St. 30, 2005-

Ohio-3559, 830 N.E.2d 1151 (administrative judge did not abuse discretion in transferring case

to himself even though transfer order failed to state the reason for the transfer).

While this Court has granted extraordinary writs in rare circumstances to prevent certain

transfers of individual cases, those cases involved transfers to judges who clearly and

unambigtaously lacked jurisdiction to proceed. See, e.g., State ex rel. Russo v NlcDonnell, 110

Ohio St.3d 144, 2006-Ohio-3459, 852 N.E.2d 145 (prohibition would lie to prevent

administrative judge from assigning case to private judge for jury trial because jury trials were

not authorized in civil actions referred to private judges); Schucker, supra (prohibition would lie

to prevent transfer of case from general division to judge of probate division since any decree by

probate court judge would be void).

Accordingly, lower courts have routinely held that an extraordinary writ challenging the

transfer of cases will not lie where the transferee judge has jurisdiction over the matter

transferred. See, e.g., State ex rel. Carr v. McDonnell, 184 Ohio App.3d 373, 2009-Ohio-2488,

921 N.E.2d 251, ¶19 (8th Dist.) (neither prohibition nor mandamus would lie to prevent transfer

of case to commercial docket; recognizing that "administrative judge of the Cuyahoga County

Court of Common Pleas possesses the discretionary authority to reassign any case between different judges of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas"); State ex rel. Hexagranna v.

Friedland, 8th Dist. No. 87089 & 87105, 2005-Ohio-6764, ¶4 (because administrative judge did not have a clear legal duty to transfer action back to visiting judge to whom case was temporarily assigned, defendant in underlying action was not entitled to writs of mandamus or prohibition;

10 recognizing that administrative judge possessed fizll responsibility and control over the

administration, docket and calendar of the court and had power to assign cases). Here, of course,

Judge Adrine and the other municipal court judges have jurisdiction and authority to preside over

the criminal cases filed in the Cleveland Municipal Court and any of the cases reassigned from

Judge Stokes.

Relator cites no case law in support of her contention that she has a clear legal right to be

reinstated to the cases transferred from her docket or that she has a clear legal right to participate

in the criminal case draw. Rather, Relator argues that: (1) the Administrative Orders amount to a

usurpation of this Court's exclusive jurisdiction to discipline lawyers and judges; (2) Sup.R. 36

requires that cases be assigned using the individual and particular session assignment procedures

outlined therein; (3) the transfer of Judge Stokes' probation and sentence review matters

(Administrative Orders 2014-004 & 2014-005) violates Crim. R. 25(B); (4) that Judge Adrine is

precluded from transferring those specific cases where recusal motions filed by defendants

pursuant to R.C. 2701.031 had been previously denied; and (5) that Judge Adrine's directive that

Relator may have access to certain criminal files through the office of the administrative judge

violates R.C. 1901.31(E). None of Relator's arguments establishes that Judge Adrine patently

and unambiguously lacked the jurisdiction to issue the Administrative Orders.

2. The Administrative Orders do not amount to a usurpation of this Court's authority to discipline attorneys and judges because the Administrative Orders are not discipline.

Despite Respondent's general authority to manage the court's dockets and calendar,

Relator contends that the Administrative Orders have usurped this Court's exclusive authority under Article IV § 2(B)(1) of the Ohio Constitution to discipline persons admitted to the bar and its exclusive authority pursuant to the Gov. Bar R. V, Section 5a to suspend judges during the pendency of a disciplinary matter. See generally Relator's Brief at 15-20. No one disputes that

il this Court has the exclusive authority to discipline lawyers and judges. The Administrative

Orders, however, do not amount to discipline and have not resulted in an interim remedial

suspension of Judge Stokes pending the outcome of the Disciplinary Complaint.

A "disciplinary sanction" has a specific meaning and is defined as "any of the sanctions

set forth in Gov. Bar. R. V, Section 6, removal, oi- suspension from office." Gov. Jud. R. II,

§8(C) (Appendix, Ex. 4). Accordingly, discipline includes: (i) disbarment, (ii) indefinite

suspension, (iii) suspension for a period of six months to two years, (iv) probation, (v) public

reprimand, and (vi) removal or suspension from office. See Gov. Bar. V, §6(B) (Appendix,

Ex. 5); see also Gov. Jud. R. I, § 1(Appendix, Ex. 3) (stating that the willful breach of the Rules

of Professional Conduct or Code of Judicial Conduct "shall be punished by reprimand,

suspension, disbarment, or probation as provided in Gov. Jud. R. II and Gov. Bar R. V.").

The Administrative Orders do not amount to any of these types of discipline. Judge

Stokes has not been publicly reprimanded, disbarred, suspended from the practice of law

(indefinitely or for a period of time), or placed on probation. Judge Stokes has not been removed

from office, and she has not been suspended from public office in any way. No notice or

publication of any disciplinary action has been issued. See generally Gov. Bar. R. V, §8(D)(1) &

(2) (Appendix, Ex. 6).

Rather, throughout the period that the Administrative Orders were in effect, Judge Stokes continued to serve as a judge on the Cleveland Municipal Court. Judge Stokes received the same salary, benefits, and staffing levels that she received before the Administrative Orders and the saine as all other associate judges on the Cleveland Municipal Court. (Adrine Affidavit at T12.)

There is nothing unique, let alone punitive, about the fact that the Administrative Orders limit Judge Stokes' docket to civil matters. This is particularly true where Relator's abusive

12 practices concerning her criminal docket had created a circumstance where Respondent has been

left with no other reasotlable choice. Indeed, Ohio's judicial system is replete with examples of

judges that have a limited or specialized docket. See, e.g., R.C. 1901.181 (setting forth the

exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the housing division in the Cleveland and Toledo

municipal cour-ts and the environmental division in the Franklin county municipal court); Sup.R.

36.20 - 36.28 & Appendix I (governing specialized docket standards); Sup.R. 49 - 49.12

(establishing and governing the commercial docket); R.C. 2301.03 (designation of domestic

relations, juvenile, and probate court division jurisdiction and duties); R.C. Chapter 2101

(governing probate court jurisdiction and procedure).

The cases relied upon by Relator, see geney-ally Relator's Brief at 18-19, do not support

the issuance of a writ of prohibition here. All those cases involved court orders purporting to

liYnit the practice of law. None concerned the administration and control of the court's docket in

a multi-judge court.

For example, in State ex rel. Buck v. Maloney, 102 Ohio St.3d 250, 2004-Ohio-2590, 809

N.E.2d 20, attorney Buck sought a writ of prohibitioii seeking to overturn an order by Mahoning

County Probate Court Judge Maloney barring Buck from practicing law in any case before the

probate court until further order of the Court. Id, at ¶¶2-4. This Court ultimately issued a writ of

prohibition, holding that Judge Maloney acted without jurisdiction. Id at ¶17. In so doing, this

Court reasoned that by prohibiting Buck from practicing law in all future proceedings in the probate court, Judge Maloney had usurped this Court's exclusive jurisdiction over the attorney discipline. Id. at ¶¶7-11.

The Administrative Orders at issue here are different in both degree and kind than the order invalidated in Buck. First, the order in Buck indefinitely barred an attorney from

13 practicing law, a matter directly and expressly within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.

The Administrative Orders do not bar Relator from anything, let alone from serving as judge on

the Cleveland Municipal Court. Moreover, the Administrative Orders involve matters over

which this Court has never asserted exclusive jurisdiction - the management of judicial dockets

in multi-judge courts. In fact, as explained above, the applicable rules and relevant case law

expressly grant general "responsibility" and "control" over such matters to administrative judges

such as Judge Adrine. See Sup.R. 4.01(A).

Relator's reliance on Melling v. Stralka, 12 Ohio St.3d 105, 465 N.E.2d 857 (1984), is

equally misplaced. In Melling, this Court held that a municipal court judge did not have the

authority to issue an order prohibiting all city solicitors, law directors, municipal and county

prosecutors, and their assistants from representing defendants in criminal matters before the

municipal court. Id. at 106-07. Melling did not involve aNvrit of prohibition, contrary to the

suggestion by Relator. See Relator's Brief at 19. More to the point, like in Buck, Melling

involved an order prohibiting attorneys from practicing law, not an order concerning the

management of a court's docket. And unlike here, the order in Melling applied to an entire

group of attorneys, a fact that was significant to this Court's analysis that the order was invalid

because "[s]uch rules of general application, which place limits on an attorney's ability to practice law and/or impose `across-the-board' disciplinary measure on rnembers of the bar, are within the exclusive authority of the Supreme court, and they may not be promulgated by the trial or appellate courts of this state." See Id. at 107 (emphasis added). Here, of course, the

Administrative Orders involve a specific judge arid are designed to remedy specific administrative concerns.

14 Finally, State ex rel. Triplett v. Ross, 111 Ohio St.3d 231, 2006-Ohio-4705, 855 N.E.2d

1174, has no application here. In Triplett, this Court granted a writ prohibiting municipal court

judges from requiring attorneys who sought court appointments to complete a declaration form

specified by the Ohio Patriot Act. Id. at ¶50. In so doing, this Court held that the language of the

Patriot Act only required those persons receiving funding from the government in an aggregate

amount greater than $100,000 to complete the declaration form. Id. at ¶45. Thus, this Court's

Ti°iplett decision was based solely on statutory construction and not on any finding that the

declaration requirement usurped this Court's exclusive jurisdiction over all matters related to the

practice of law in Ohio. In fact, this Court expressly disclaimed addressing that issue. Id at

¶¶51-53.

In sum, the Administrative Orders involve matters over which this Court has never

asserted exclusive jurisdiction - the management of judicial dockets in multi-judge courts. In

fact, as explained above, the applicable rules and relevant case law expressly grant general

"responsibility" and "control" over such matters to administrative judges such as Judge Adrine.

3. Respondent did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue the Administrative Orders under Art. IV, §5(B) of the Ohio Constitution or Sup.R. 36.

Relator mistakenly contends that the Administrative Orders "contraven[e] the authority of

the Ohio Supreme Court to prescribe rules of procedure applicable to all the courts of the state under Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution," and in particular; the general provisions under Sup.R. 36 that cases be assigned using the individual and particular session assignment procedures outlined therein. See Relator's Brief at 20-22.

First, nothing in the Administrative Orders contravenes this Court's constitutional authority to prescribe rules of procedure applicable to all the courts. The Administrative Orders do not purport to prescribe a i°zrle of procedure for the Cleveland Municipal Court, change the

15 general applicability of Sup.R. 36 to the Cleveland Municipal Court, or exempt the Cleveland

Municipal Court from its provisions. The Administrative Orders concern the assignment of

cases for one of 13 judges on the Cleveland Municipal Court for a limited duration.

Second, Sup.R. 36 merely establishes the default procedures for initially assigning cases

and sessions in multi-judge courts. Sup.R. 36 does not trump an administrative judge's

"responsibility for" and "control over the administration, docket, and calendar of the court"

pursuant to Sup.R. 4.01 and this Court's applicable case law.

Relator cites no authority for the untenable notion that Sup.R. 36 limits an administrative

judge from transferring cases previously assigned and/or temporarily removing a judge from the

court's criminal case draw. And Relator can cite no authority that precludes such actions where

the administrative judge, like Judge Adrine here, has concluded that such actions are necessary to

maintain the public's confidence in the legal system and as a last resort to prevent the

continuation of what Judge Adrine believed had become a dysfunctional courtroom undermining

the operations of the entire Cleveland Municipal Court.

4. Respondent did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue the Administrative Orders pursuant to Crim. R. 25(B).

Relator argues that the Administrative Orders, in particular those transferring Judge

Stokes' probation and sentence review matters (Administrative Orders 2014-004 & 2014-005),

violate Crim. R. 25(B). Crim. R. 25(B) does not apply here and did not divest Respondent of jurisdiction to issue the Administrative Orders.

Crim. R. 25(B) generally prohibits a criminal defendant from being sentenced by a different judge than the one that presided during his or her criminal trial. It does not apply to probation and sentence review matters addressed by Administrative Orders 2014-004 & 005.

16 See State v. Matlaews, 10th Dist. No. 75AP-90, 1975 WL 181631, *1 (Aug. 5, 1975) (Crim. R.

25(B) did not preclude different judge from hearing probation revocation proceedings).

Moreover, Crim. R. 25(B) is a protection afforded to criminal defendants, not members

of the judiciary. In fact, the protections of Crim. R. 25(B) can be waived by a defendant. See

State v. Callotii^ay, 1 st Dist. No. C-810420, 1982 WL 8454, *2 (April 7, 1982) (recognizing a

criminal sentence imposed by another judge is not void and that defendant waived any violation

of Crim. R. 25(B) by not objecting); State v. Torrestoro, 8th Dist. No. 97224, 2012-Ohio-601,

¶ 8 (orders signed in violation of Crim. R. 25(B) are voidable). Judge Stokes has no standing to

enforce the mandates of Crim. R. 25(B) independent of the criminal defendants in such cases.

And there is no basis under Crim. R. 25(B) for an extraordinary writ by anyone, let alone Judge

Stokes, to return those cases to her. See State ex rel. Torrestoro v. Donnelly, 8th Dist. No.

97050, 2011-Ohio-4832, ¶ 3 (holding that any alleged violation of Crim. R. 25(B) is properly

addressed on appeal by the criminal defendant and not through an extraordinary writ).

Finally, it is worth noting that to the extent Crim. R. 25(B) has any relevance here, which

it does not, it would only apply to those cases concerning probation and status review transferred

after a criminal trial. See Administrative Order No. 2014-004 & 005. Crim. R. 25(B) has no

applicability to those Administrative Orders that reassigned Judge Stokes' criminal cases before

trial and removed Judge Stokes from the criminal draw. See Administrative Orders No. 2014-003

& 008.

5. Respondent did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue the Administrative-0rders pursuant to R.C. 2701.031.

Relator asserts that criminal defendants in four of the cases transferred pursuant to the

Administrative Orders had previously filed recusal motions against Judge Stokes pursuant to the procedures established by R.C. 2701.031 and that all of those motions had been denied. Relator

17 mistakenly argues that as to these four cases, the Administrative Orders "in essence" violate R.C.

2701.03 1. See Relator's Brief at 23.

First, it is again worth recognizing the limited scope of Relator's argument here. At most,

it only concerns the four specific cases identified by Relator where criminal defendants filed

motions to disqualify and were denied. Relator's argument has no relevance to any other case

transferred and has no relevance to the authority of Judge Adrine to remove Judge Stokes from

the criminal draw temporarily.

More to the point, Relator fails to explain how a denial of motions to disqualify Judge

Stokes filed by criminal defendants pursuant to R.C. 2701.031 bars Judge Adrine's

Administrative Orders. By its terms, R.C. 2701.031 provides a mechanism by which parties

may seek the disqualification of a municipal court judge. While denial of such motions may be

dispositive and binding as to the parties in those cases, there is no authority that such rulings bind

an administrative judge or preclude the transfer of the case by the administrative judge pursuant

to his or her general supervisory authority In short, R.C. Section 2701.031 provides no

limitation on Judge Adrine's authority here.

6. Respondent did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue the Administrative Orders by operation of R.C. 1901.31(E) because Relator's access to criminal files has not been denied or impeded.

Relator asserts that Respondent's Inter-Office Memorandum to Judge Stokes (Stipulation

Ex. J), which informed Judge Stoked that her future access to criminal case files may be obtained through the office of the Administrative Judge while the Administrative Orders were in effect violates R.C. 1901.31. Relator liowever fails to explain how R.C. 1901.31, which generally outlines the duties of the municipal court clerk, divests Judge Adrine of authority to issue any of the Administrative Orders.

18 Other than Administrative Order No. 2014-008 (Stipulation, Ex. I), which concerned the

physical retrieval of the criminal case files then in Judge Stokes' possession, none of the

Administrative Orders concerns Judge Stokes' on-going access to court records. As to

Administrative Order No. 2014-008, Relator can not assert that Judge Adrine lacked to authority

to ensure that the case files were retrieved and transferred to the judge that has been assigned to

hear those cases.

More significantly, none of the Administrative Orders, or the subsequent actions of

Respondent, have interfered with Judge Stokes' access to court files. While Relator suggest that

she is required to give Respondent notice of the case files she wants to access under the "edict"

contained in the March 14, 2014 Inter-Office Memo (Stipulation Ex. J), there is no such notice

requirement contained in that Memo, and there is no evidence that Respondent has interfered

with Judge Stokes' access to court files.

In fact, Judge Stokes has requested access to many criminal files. (Adrine Affidavit at

¶13.) All such requests were made directly to the Clerk of Court, the court's Probation

Department or its Court Reporter's Department. (Id.) Judge Adrine was copied on some, but not

all of those requests. (Id.) Judge Adrine has not questioned or inquired into the reasons for

Relator's requests. (Id.) All such requests have been honored, and all such files have been

promptly delivered to her by court and/or clerk administrative staff, not Judge Adrine. (Id.)

There is no evidence that Judge Stokes has ever complained to anyone that that her access to any

file has been denied or hindered. (See Id.)

Finally, to the extent Relator has any concerns that the process by which she seeks access to the court records is an unwarranted intrusion into her defense of the Disciplinary Complaint, see Relator's Brief at 24-25, Respondent hereby informs both Relator and this Court that no such

19 notice to Respondent is, or ever was, required. Simply put, Judge Stokes' access to court files

has not been and will not be impeded by anything Judge Adrine has done, let alone the

Administrative Orders at issue in this case.

IV. CONCLUSION

Judge Adrine did not patently and unambiguously lack the jurisdiction to issue the

Administrative Orders. As such, Relator has failed to establish that she is entitled to the extraordinary relief prohibition to reverse and suspend the operation of the Administrative

Orders.

^ in E. Mathews, Jr. (008660 Gerhardt A. Gosnell II (0064919 James E. Arnold & Associates, LPA 115 W. Main Street, 4th Floor Columbus, Ohio 43215 Ph: 614-460-1600 Fax: 614-469-1134 [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Respondent The Honorable Ronald B. Adrine

20 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true copy of the foregoing Merit Brief of

Respondent The Honorable Ronald B. Adrine was served via electronic mail and regular U.S.

Mail,p osta g p e p, re ^day aid this of October, 2014, upon the following:

Richard C. Alkire, Esq. Dean Nieding, Esq. Richard C. Alkire Co., LPA 6060 Rockside Woods Blvd. Suite 250 Independence, Oh

Counsel for Rel The Tlonorable

21 APPENDIX

Exhibit I Affidavit of the Honorable Ronald B. Adrine

Exhibit 2 R.C. 1901.15

Exhibit 3 Gov. Jud. R. 1, § I

Exhibit 4 Gov. Jud. R. II, §8

Exhibit 5 Gov. Bar R. V, §6(B)

Exhibit 6 Gov. Bar R. V, §8(D)

22 Exhibit I INTU FSLLPRENIE CC)UIZ'I' OF 0I110

State ex rcl.,. 1I^^ HO:NC?^UBLL.:%N U z.; ^^-'1 R. s`rOKES,

o. 20 14-0467

V.

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if defendants, witnesses, police officers, prosecutors, private defense counsel, public defenders,

court persofulel and otller nZ en7bers of the general pl7bilic. In addition, every department of the

court was negatively inipacted by Judge Stokes' grossly disproportionate use of 17uman and

niaterial resources conipared to other judges of the colut. Judge Stokes has demonstrated a

blatant andpersistent disregard for following the law, ineluding unwarranted and burden5ome

decisions, sentences, and probationary terms. Judge Stokes conduct is notorious in the

eomniuriity asad has diminished the way that the public views the court, inciuding negative

portrayals in the rnedia. The abusive and disruptive iYature of Judge Stokes conduct is described

in detail in the Disciplinary Gomplaints attached hereto as Exhibits A and 13.

4. For nearly the entire first three years of nay tenctre as Adniinistrative judge, I

agonized over the appropriate actions to take to address the ongoing disruptions to the orderly

adniiiiisfration ofjustice occasioned by Judge Stokes' nlishandling ofihcr erin-iinal docket in a

way that created crippling administrative conundrums. At first, I attenlpted to woi-k around the problems by adoptuig administrative soiutions. k'or exaniple, when I first became the

Adnlinistrative and Presiding Judge, I was awar-e that Judge Stokes t'outinely lleld court into the eariy and mid-evening lzours and occasionally into the late night, requiring the caurt staff to work excessive overtime servicing hcr dockets, and for titigants to wait for inordinately long periods of time to laave ttleir cases heard. She also routinely held court all day without tal(ing lunch or other breaks to which the c.ourt's staff is entitled and accustonied. These actions caused the accrual of excessive aznowlts of staff compensatory tinae and i7uposed a signifrcant burden on court staff and the public. As a result, ttie court had to strictly enforce rules that mandated lwich breaks f^or eznployees and created a special rule that reduired all court suppori peisonnel to abandon thcir posts no later than one hour after the court's stated closing hour.

2 By the middle of2011, liowever, f-iiiding workarounds became inet-casingly

difficult. Frequently, once a viable solution was put in place, Judge Stokes devised a way to

render it ineffective and a way to continue to engage in her preferred nacthod of operation. For

instance, I prohibited Deputy Bailiffs froni i-emaiziing at their posts past 5:00 pm daily. In -ludge

Stokes's eourtroozxz, after an initial pei-iod of comlaliance, thejudge began, on a daily basis, to

identify individuals dtiring her docket that she intended to incai-cerate. lnstead ofdealing witli

those individtials right away, sbc ordered theni hcld, but tiid not complete the necessaty

paperwork for their transport and acceptance into detention unti€ after sbe Cinishecf all of lier

otlier cases, which usually meant that the Deputy Bailiffs serving in her rooni were required to

reniain at tlieir posts well into the evening to secure those individuals who weredetained. As

such, I was fielding complaints about the operation oflier courtrooni on almost a daily basis.

Many of those complaints can:ic fi-om individuals who did not want to chal€enge .ludge Stokes

publicly or offcialiy, alt€ZOUgh they did want their complaints registered.

6. In October 2013, the Disciplinary Coutiset filed a Complaint against.ludge Stokes

with the Board of Coiiiniissioners on Grievances ancl Discipline. Attached tiereto as Lxhibit A is

a certified copy of the certiried coiziplaint tliat was filed with thc Board of'Comnlissioners on

Grievances aizd Discipline on (7ctober 14, 2013, against Judge Angela Stokes. Case No. 2013-

057.

7. Attaclied hereto as Exhibit B is a cei-tified copy of the certified an7elided

cojnplaint that was Bled with the Board of Comn-iissioners on Grievances and Discipline on

Apri€ 24, 2014, against Judge Angela Stokes, Case No. 2013-057.

8. Despite the filing of the Certified Grievance Complaint against her by the

Disciplinary Counsel in October 2013, Judge Stokes did not niodify any of ller court-room practices, and I continued to field comptaints fi•om employees, defense attol-neys, prosecuting

attoa-iieys, police officers, outside agencies and the general pubkic about the n3ai2iler in wliich her

courtroom operated. My staff continued to receive informal coniplaints o11 a contiinious, almost

a daily, basis. On average, the court also had approximately one formal complaint filed against

the judge every week durint;; this pei-iod, In Marc112014, the Cuyahooa County Puiilic Defender

took the extraordinary step of filing a farrnal motion to have .Iudl;e Stokes' crirninal cases

transferred and to stop fi.irther assignment ofcrirninal cases to her docket-

9. In early 2014, 1 detertnined that some i-elief fi•onti the continuing problenls that

everyone associated with any criminal case that appeared before .Iudge Stokes in any capacity

might face due to her insistence oii continuing lier practices was necessary to ensure the orderly

administratiors of justice. Aftersonxe research, I concluded that as tl-ie adnainistrative. judge I had

the authority to temporarily n-iodify her work assignmeiit in order to provide that relief'.

10. Since all of the coi-itplaints against Judge Stokes concei-ned her handling of

criminal iiiatters and there had been no eonaplaints about the way she bandled her civil caseload,

I reassigned all ofher criminal responsibilities to myself, and I increased her civil case

assignments, pend'€ilg the #inal outcome of the Grievance Gonaplaint. These actions were not

intended as any form of discipline against .Tudge Stokes but were taken as a last resort to prevent

the continuation of what I believed had becon7e a dysfunctional courtroom that was tindertnining

the operations of the entire Cleveland Municipal Court. "I'hese actions were taken pursuant to a series of Adnlinistrative Orders in March, 2014, specifically, Administrative Orders 20 14-003 through 2014-008 (collectively, the ".Adniinistrative Ch-ders"). 11. While the Administrative fJrdet•s were in ef'1`ect, Iudge Stokes took flo steps to

have a1iy of tlaezia reversed by a vote of all of the judges of the Cleveland Municipal Court. To

my hz7owledge Judge Stokes never sought any such vote. Nor did aliy such vote occur.

1?. While the Adiiiiilistrative Orders were in effect, Judge Stokes presided over her

civil docket. She contiaiued to receive the same salary azad benetits as before. She retaiiied all

levels of staffing as before. She retained the sai-ric salary, benet'tts, and staffing as all other

associate judges oii the Cleveland Municipal Court.

13. While the Administrative Orders were in ef f'ect, Judge Stokes requested access to

many crinlinaI files for purposes of preparint) her defense to the Disciplinary Coiirplaint. All

such requests were iiiade directly to the Clerk of Court, the court's 1'i-obation Department or its

Court Reporter's Departiiient. I was copied oii sorne, but aiot all of those requests. I have not

cluestioned or inquired into the reasons foz• her requests. All such reqiiests liave been hotlored,

and all such files have been pi-onlptly delivered to her by cow-t andlor clerl.administrative staff.

Judge Stokes has nevez• con.iplained to me that her aceess to any file that she requested has beeii denied or hijldered. Iani aware of no iiistances that Judge Stokes has ever complairied to anyone that her access to aiiy file that she IZas requested has been denied or hi;idered.

14. Whilc the Adnrinistrative Orders were in effect, no new complaints were received by me froi.x any person agaii7st Judge Stokes. The managers of all cour-t departnients reported

5 that rtora(e ;:^^^^l moductivity of the court's mam^^.m.°iiri:_mG .44i}T and manimd

A. in amn, ;d. q..^ fbilt>lAn€^ the issuance oftlxc° Ac:3mrni,;i:!..; ui d _r_;: f'LR7"H^^^^ ^^^"FTAN'I` SAYETH NOT.

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6 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a ti-ue copy of the foregoing 4f^dai,it of The

I-Ionorable Ronald B. Adrine was served via electronic mail and regular U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this 23rd day of 5epteiliber, 2014, upon the following:

Richard C. Alkire, Esq. Dean Nieding, Esq. Richard C. Alkire Co., LPA 6060 Rockside Woods Blvd. Suite 250 Independence, Ohio 44131-2335

Counsel for Rela The Honorable A Exhibit A `.^^.: ^ u . ^ ^^... ^^. T^,^ ^^^I I I s

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In re: SEP 2 5 20i3 Complaint against ;:30^tF^D OF CO^,^MISSIONERS Ilon. Angela T2ochelle Stokes :^N aRlEi!ANCCS & DISCIPLINE CleveZaxzd Municipal Court 1200 Ontario St. P.O. 13ox 94894 No. 13 ^ ^ 5 7 ? 1 C1evelanc1; OR 44113

.El.ttor,uey Re.istration No. (0025650) COJVI,I'SJAifNI' AND CL< .R f'II; IC.ATE

Respobde:nt, (Rule V ot;'tlae Suprezue Court Rules for tbe Government of tDze Bar of Ohio.) K': ^^V^ Disciplinary Counsel IL^M 250 Civic Center Drive, Suite 325 OCT Columbus, Ohio 43215-7411

1>a) GIS{^V^,`' (,;(J[^,JhLf^ ftelator. A(vCE,, g IiJSGIF'Lf,vL"

Now comes relator, Discipliiiary Counsel, and alleges that respondeitt, fi,ngela RochelIe

Stokes, an attorney at law, dulY at3rziittecl to the practice of Iaw zn, the state of Ohio, is guilty of

t.he following rnisconduct:

1 R.espondent was admitted to the practice of law in, the state of Ohio on October 29, 1984i.

2 Respondent was elected to tkie Cleveland Munici.pa! Couz-t in November 1995 and has

served as a_judge of that court since that time. She is citrrec3tly one of 13 judgcs on the

court.

3. As an attorney and a,judicial of'ficer, xespond.erit is subject to the Code of i'rofessional

Responsil•Sility, the Ohio Rttles of Professionai Condiict, and the Ohio Code o,f':iudiciUl

Conduct. C:ouut One - Abuse of Court Resources

Since taking the taench in 1995, respondent lias consuiz3ed a disproportionate amount e>f

the court's human and matersal resoczrces due to her inability to administer h er docl:et in a

tiir3eiy rnEuzrxer, her lack of organization, and lier unreason.able expectation that all court ernployees be at her beck and call.

Starting in az- around 2000, the Cleveland Muiiicfpal Court bLgan enacting several "court- wide" niles in an attempt to address respandent's inordinate cosisuinptioji of couxt resources. In addition, cacl^ departmetit within the court has revised its policies and procedures to addi-ess issues created by zespondent's behavior, actions, and dexziands.

For exaznple_

a. The court enacted a rule requiring tlle bailiff clepart.ment to transport all prisoners back to the workhouse by 4:00 P.NI. I-he i-u1e was later amended to require the bailiffdeparLment to collect all prisoners at 12:451',M. for return to the work.house.

b. The court enacted a rule requiring that the Cleveiazid House of Corrections he in charge of coordinating all transportation to and froin psychiatric treatrnent facilities,

c. The court ezaact.ed mandatoz•y Iuzacli breaks for employees.

tI. The court enacted a"I0-miraute" rule requirizzg probation officers, case managers, psychiatric cIiiiic employees, and izzterpreters to return to their assigned workstations if not utilized within teii m.inutes of arrival in a courtroom to wliicli they liave becn, suanranoned.

e. The court enacted a tule that no judge c;in oecupy more than 10% of any court administrative staff's time. l•1.dditional.Iy, eacli. adrzainistrative staff inernber is limited to spending 30 minutes in any given judge's courtroom, after whicli the etnployee is to return to tlicir wot•kplace.

1: The couz-t enacted a rule giviuzg the head of the probation departrnent the autliority to question referrals or conditions of"probation when hefslie does not believe tlaat tlle referral or condition is appropriately related !:o tlie offense. In such cases, the hea.d of the probation departinent is to contact the referring jtEdge, tho presiding judge, and the court administrator wheretapon a

,2. conference will be held to determine what should be done with the case as it relates to probation.

g. 'I'he court enacted a ivle requesting that all official courtroom business end by 5:00 P.M. and permitting employees to leave the courtroom if the timeline is not adhered to.

h. The court enacted a rule ordering that no probation officer or case nianager be called to a courtr•oorn after 3:45 P.M. unless the individual would be able to leave the coureroom by 4:00 P.M.

i. The bailiff department and probafiort departmerYt sclieduled some einployees to work four 10-liour days rather than five 8-hour days to accoin.m.odate respondent's late courtxoorri liours.

j. The court enacted a rule limiting the reqrrest for second psychia.tric evaluation requests to two per riuarter,

lc, The court: eriacted a rule ordering the probation departixzent not to conduct any substance abuse screens and/or assessments on individuals cltarged with driving wider suspension, no driver's license, hit-skip, or escalated tzrovuzg violations uz3less tlhe cliarge is also accompanied by a charge invo3ving alcohol, drugs, or other mind-altering substances.

1. The court enacted a i-ule reyuiring psychiafi-ic clinic staff to interview victirns azrd/o-r witn.esses only if they deemed it to be appropriate in their professional clinical judgment regardless of what ixzay be stated on the referral form.

in. `flae court enaeted. a rule requiring judges to contact probatiol-i officers assigiied to a specific case if assistaDce is needed. If the probation officer assigned to a case is not available, then the fdllowing individuals should be contacted in order listed: the probatioxx officer's supervisor, the supervisor of the day, the deputy clzief proba.tion officer, and the chzefprobation offieer.

6. Tzz addition to the above rules, several agezacies, as well as departments within the court,

have reduced rotations in respondent's cotirtroorn to avoid staff burnout. For example,

seeurity bailiffs are only assigned to four-hour shifts in respond.erdt's courtroom, whereas

they a:re assigned to eight-l7our sbifts in all other courtrooms. Public ciefenders only se.rve

a two-znoxzth rotatzon in respondent's courtroorn, wlZereas they serve a tlzree-rnonth

rotation in other couz-troonis. M.oreover, after completing a two-nlonth rotation in

-3- respotzdent's courtroom, ptzblic defenders are perxnittc;d to pick the courtroom that they

would like to serve thezr next three-month rotation irt as a"re'Nard."

7. Similarly, the probation department assigns ca.se.s frarxt respondent's courixoom to a

speci ic set of probatioia officers. This is in Iat-ge part due to respondent's difficult-to-

deciplzer refen-al forrus, tlie inordinate atnoutzt of requixeznents that respondent places on

defetidants, and the fact that respondent does not provide the probation depazttneat mritlz

relevant infbrtnatiozi in a tizneiy tnartmer• making it difficult for respondent's probation

cases to be nxonitored.

8. As alleged in Coua-tt '1'wo, respondetxt treats secuxity bailifls in her courtrootn in a rude,

demeaning, atzd u,tzprofessiona:l n1a.tixacr. In an attempt to limit t'he confrotttatiosis that

niay occur fi-om respondent's er-ratic treatment of sescmity bailiffs in her courtrootn, the

bailiff department has created a list of "restricted assigzun.ent" bailiffs. Bailiffs on this

list are prohibited froirz serving in respondei3t's couxtrooaU for a restric.ted period oi'tirne

rangi.ng -ftorn a few weeks to irkdefataitely. There are currently 14 bailiffs on this list, The

"restricted a.ssignnaent" list only applies to respondent's courtroom - no other courtroorn

has need for a"restricted. assigrurnent" list because in iao otlier courtroom are bailifl;s

subjected to tkre treatment they receive from respondent.

9. i'xior to the enactment of the above tnetrtionecf rules andlor policy changes, it wotztd not

have been t1n11sLlal:

a. For rPspotxdent to be holding court until 7:00 P.M. or even 8:00 P.M. "vlieii other judges ori the court ltad typically conipleted their dockets I>y 3:00 1'.M,;

b. For six to eight prisonezs to be held for several hours - in a lio).ciing cell designed for two prisoners - while waiting for xespondent to call their cases;

c. For city einployces and a.ttorraeys, such as prosecutors, ptlblic defenders, bailiffs, probation officers, and staff support, to work well beyond their

-4- scheduled hours incurring excessive arnouIits of overfime or coixipensatory tinie;

d. For bailiffs to transport defendants assigited to respondent's docket to local hospitals and wait for several Ilours while the prisoner's evaluatioza was being completed;

e. For respotadent. to reclnest that a second psychiatric evaiuation be perfonned wheri she was riot satisfied with the results of the first exaznixration; a.nd

#: For court personnei who respondeit sum.inoned to her courtroortz to wait in excess of 30 tninutes before being utilizecl.

10. Even after the enactnac^:nt of the above-niention:ed Lules, respondent lias persisted in

conduct that led to the iinposition of the rules in the first place. For example:

a. On April 29, 2004, Judge L,any A. lories, who was the Presiding and Adininistrative Judge at the time, issued an inter-offee correspondence stating that "interviews conducted by the doctor aixd staff of the Glevetand Municipal Court's Psycluatric Clinic of alleged victims s.rrid/or witnesses shall be restricted to those occasiorzs when it is deenied appropriate by the cloctor usirzg his or her profiessionai clinic jiadgznent."

b. llespite this naemoranduzn, respondent continued to request that psychiatric elilzic staff interview victims andfor witnesses.

c. On one particular occasion, on September 24, 2008, respondent refiised to proceed with a mitigatiozi hearing because the court psychiatric clinic declined to interview three witnesses that resporzdent requested be interviewed, In open court, respondent berated the psyclsiatric clinic and stated that it had "victimized,'the witnesses again- by-choosin.g.notto "piclc.up.a telephonr," ar►d 41tervievr the witnesses. Respondent continixed the znatter until the witnesses could be subpoenaed to "voice their opinion" as to whether the deferzda.nt. should be released.

11. In respondent's courtroom, it is not u.nustial for amatter to be eontiiiued fiive or six times

before being resolved tlius requiring repeat appearances by attortteys, eourt staff, and

defendants. In fact, when Gieveland State University professors Dana J. Hubbard and

Wendy C. Regoeczi reviewed respondent's courtroom and practices as part of a

cornpreiiensive review of Cleveland Mljnicipal Cuurt prot;razns, they noted that

_5^ continnaiaces in respondent's courtroorn were 300% greater than in ai1y other judge's

courtronsn on the C.'Ievelaiid Muaiicipal Court.

12. A majority of tlie continuejnces in respondent's courtroozn are designated as being at the

"de#endazii's requo.st," when in reality they are not.

13. Due to the manzler in which respondent conducts her docket, the cour°t ariniinistrative

office has P. difficult tiane finding assigned counsel to liazrdle cases in respondent's

courtroozn when the public defender's ofCiee is conflicted off a case,

14. Many attorneys on t.lie court's assigned couat.sel list will aiot accept cases in respondent's

courtroozn given the amount of tirne they aixtiGipate Npending on a case and the maximurn

fee to which they are entitied for the case.

I 5. Responden.t regtrlariy exhausts her yearly allotment of funds for dYiig and alcolrol testing

early in tire year and tnucl7 earlier than any other jtidge on the Cleveland Murricil>a1 Gourt

because she orders defendants to undergo drug and alcohol testing even wkten it has no

reasonable relation to the charges against the defendant. ror exampie:

a, In 2009, eacb judge was allotted $5,000 for their Indigent Driver's Alcohol. Assessnient Fund. Respondent's fizzid was exhausted by May 1, 2009. At that tin-ie, every other judge on the court had at least $2,727.83 remaining.

b. In 2009, each judge was allotted $5,000 for their Defendant Drug Testing Account. Respondent's f-uzzd was exhausted on Or about April 14, 2009. At that time, every other judge had at least $4,127 renaaiz-itig,

c. Zri 2010, respondent's Indigent Driver's Alcohol Assessinei3t Fund was exliausted on or a.bout July 31, 2010,

d. In 2011, each judge was allotted $5,000 £or their Defendant Drug Testing. Account. Respondent's Drug Testing Aecount was exhausted on or about July 18, 2011.

-6- l d. 'Afhen respondcnt's aliotnient. of fwads for drug aS Zd alcohol testing is exliausted, slze

requires defendants to pa}' for their ov.rn testing ezft.entimes causing a hazdsliip on

defendants with liznited financial resoufces•

17. Re.spondent's concluct as outJined above violates the Code of .7udieial Conduct, the Code

of Professional Responsi.biiity, al'id the Rules of 1'rofessional Cozzduct, specifically Canon

1(a judge shall uphold the integrity ancl independezzce of the judiciary), Canoii 2 (a judge

shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at a1l tifnes in a rnanner that promotes

pt,blie coxiftdence in the integrity and impartiality of tlte judiciary) and 7ud R. 1.2 (a

judge shall act at all tinles in a xrzaz7ner that promotes public confidence in the

iLy, and in^partiality of tlze judiciar'y); Canon 3(c)(1) (a juclge shall independence, inteff

diligently discharge the judge's administrative duties without bias or preju.dice and

maintain professional cotnpetence in judicial administratXon, and should cooperate with R:L.5 (a other judges and court officials in the administration of coui-t justice) and Jud.

judge shall perforzn judicial and administrattve duties competently aiad diligently and

shall cornpiy with guidetxnes set forth in the Rules of Superintendence f'or the Courts of

Ohio); and DR 1-1 02(A)(5) (a lawyer slaall not engage in conduct that is prejudici.al to the

Cond. R. 8.4 (d) (a lawyer slrall not engage in conduct ad3nin:istration of justice) and Prof.

Ilaat is prejudiciat to the adxiiinistration of justice)-

CozYnt Tvvo - Abuse of Court k'ez'sonnel

18. Relator incorpoxates paragxaphs I through 17,

19. Respondent regularly acts ir-, a rude, demeaning, and unprofessional nianner towards

court persorrnel assigned to lier courtroonn. J^or exam:ple.

-,- a. Respondent has regularly subjected personal bailiffs and security bailiffs assigned to her cou7trooni to "smell tests" in order to determine whether iliey are wearing any perfiugne, cologne, or scented lotions, to wllictl respondent allegettIy has a sensitivity. In doing so, respo3idcrrt invades or cau.ses another to invade tlie personal space of her bailiffs.

b_ Respondent eXpels collrt per3Qlll2el fro2n her courtroom for coughing or sneezing w}Ltle malCing corlulnents such as "we don't wa.nt to expose this erftare courtroom to whatever you have." on one occasion, respondent toId a court employee not to come to work for six weeks because the employee's rnother had slringles and the employee's daughter znay bave had ch.ickenpox. Even affer the employee provided respo3ident with a doctor's note indicating that sbingles were rtot cozxtagious ajid that her daughter did not have cliickezxpox, respondent still accused the employee of exposing her to "diseases."

c, Responclent regularly makes unprofessional personal comzaients about court personnel. Fox exainple, respondent accused one of her personal bailiffs of being a "bad mother," a.ztd she accu.sed a security bailiff of "switclung," i.c, waik.ing wit11 expressed hip rrroveznent.

20. R.esponderxt regularly accu.ses bailiffs aaid probation officers in her courtroom of being

incoru:petent and not. knowing how to do their jobs. Respondent makes ttiese accusations

in open court and in front of znembers of the public.

21. I.ZesponEient iAiaposes requirements on bailiffs in lier coiirtxoom tbat preveikt tb.erll froni

doing their jobs; however, wllen tliey attexnpt to perform their jobs andloar abide by

respondent's r.estijctive requireanesats, they are publically humiliated by respondent. For

example;

a. Respondent does not allow ber bailiffs to answer general questions from the public, but then accuses the bailiffs of incom.petence or of not doing their job when a per°sora ii-iterrtipts court to asic respon.de:nt a slttestion.

b. Respondent does not allow bailiffs to speak in colrrt evea if it is to ask someone to be quiet, but then accuses the bail"zffs ofincompc,tence or of not doing their job when the courtroom becomes too loud.

c, Respondent does not allow bailiffs to remove a person from tkae court.roonn for any rcason without Iter permission, btri: then accuses the bailiffs of incompetence or of not doing their job when the courtroom beconxes too loud

-8- ar:dJor a bailiff i;iternipts res;>ondetat to request permission to reniove an individual fronz the courtroom.

d. Respondent does not allow bailiffs in her cour-troon, to review iles in advazrce of court, but then accuses the bailiffs of izzcornpetence or of not coing their jobs when the bailiffs ar4 not aware of what happenect on a previous day in court.

22. Iizcidents occurring on May 2, 2013 are illustrative of conduct that regularly occurs in

respondent's courtroorrr. On May 2, 2013, Audene Vasquez was assigned to

respo,ndent's courtroom as a security batliff

a. [Jpon arrival in respondent's eolzrtrool n at approximately 12:20 P.M., another secmity bailiif asked Vasquez to obtain inforination frorn a man standing near the journalizer's desk. As Vasquez was attempting to do so, respond.eza:t asked Vast{uez vah:at she was doing. Vasquez responded that she was trying to obtain inforir2 atiori from the z-nata; however, respotyd.ent stated that she did not ask her to do that. Vasquez never obtained the znan's inforxnation,

b. Shortly iitereafter, Vasquez positioned herself at the back door of rc:spoxzden.t's courtroom. Moments later, Defen.dant Dyanthea Taylox• entexed the courtxoorn and attempted to speak to Vasquez. Vasquez inforzned Taylor not to speak. 'When respondent saw Taylor atternptirzg to speak to Vasquez, slie stated in a rude and dezrleazaing manner that Taylor cotild not "continue to disrupt" court, that the bailiffs could not answer her qtsestions, and that if Taylor had a question, she needed to direct it to the court. Respoxldent infon-ned Taylor that if she disrupted court one more time, she would be placed in a holdir:ig cell. Taylor apparently rolied her eyes, whereupon respondent had Taylor irnznediately placed in the holding cell,

c, Respondent ordered that another security bai3iff in the courtroozn, Terry Gallagher, place Taylor in the holding cell and that Vasquez assist Gallagher in doing so. Once i.n the holding cell area, Galiagher told Taylor to apologize to respondent, and Taylor agreed to do so. Taylor, Gallagher, and Vasquez began to re-enter the couttz-oorrz; however, as soon as respondent saw thern, she ordered them baclt to the holding cell area. After re-entering the hoJ.ding cell area, Taylor infomaed Vasquez that she was a diabetic and that she did not have her inedication with her. Stze furtkrer inforrned Vasquez that she bad been at the courthouse since 8:30 A.M. (approximately 4 Yz ltotirs) waiting for her case to be called. Vasquez then contacted a. bailiff depaauuerrt supervisor re;ar.ding Taytor.

d. A short tir^.^e later, respondent asked aziot#zer bailiff in the courtroom to hand sonxe f3les to Vasquez to take to probation. Respondent then requested those

-9- sa3ne files back, while znalcing tlte offhand comment that she (responden.t] lras to do the bailiffs' jobs.

e, Sometitne during the course of tne day, a defendant, Tyisha iVlor-rison, pTei-fiallife inforrned Vasquez ttiat she had recently d to dka forher twi^s, wartd wcre still in the hospitai. Morrison asked Vasquez Vas uez bowed her head and Vasquez said that slie vtoulci. Later in the day, q prayed for Morrison and her twins. At the end of Vasquez's silen.t prayer, she szzriled. At that moment, respondent her conrtroorrra, for s;^tanding and h`Iaughing„ respondent had requested come to with Vasquez. f. 13etween ihe incidents listed above and prior incide3its, Vasquez felt so iZUrt and disrespected by respondent that she had to leave tlie courtrooin.

Respondent requires tliat colut personnel act inkt-nediately upon Izer request. If action is 23. iaot takear immediately, respondent will accuse the employee of incompetence,

insubord.ination, and/or li.ave the employee rezxioved from her courtz-oozxs.

Respondent's public criticism of and/or personal cornznents about court em.ployces has 24 reduced several errAployees to tears. Moreover, respondent's public criticism of

employees makes it very diff`icult for employees to perforAn thcir jobs because their

credibility lras been dimin.ished. 25. Respondent's irripossible standards and dictates create an extren7ely stressful aFid hostile

worlt environrnerlt. In an aEtempt to addr.ess the work environment in respondertt's

courtroorri, security bail.if-fs oz-Ay serve a fUUr-hour shift in respondent's courtroom, rather

than the regizlar eight-hour shift in other courtrooms.

26. in add'ztion, the coirrt has decided not to provide respondent with a personal bailiff since

respondent has employed 21 differe.-zt personal bailiffs at 27 different times siz

the bezrc.ki in 1995, IZespondent's personal bailiffs have resigned fTon-r their position - a

position that pays itearly doubic ttxe salary of a security bailiff -- after a year or less.

IQ 27. Respondent's conduct as ootliaed above violates the Ulxio Rules of Judicial Conduct and

the Ohio R.tifes of Professional Conduct, specificaliy Canon 1(A judge shall upl7old the

integrity and independeiice of the judiciary), Canon2(a judge shall respeet and coraply

witli tJle law azid shall act at al; times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the

integrity and impartiality of the judicia.ry), and Jud. R. 1.2 (A judge shall act at all tiines

in a manner that promotes public eozifideiice in the izadepeaidence, integrity, and

impartiality of the judiciary); Canon 3(B)(4) (A judge shall be patient, dignified, and

courteous to litigants, ji3rors, witnesses, lawyers azid others v,dtli whozn the judge deals in

an official capacity) aaid Jud. R. 2.8 (A judge shall be patie.nt, dignified, and courteoEis to

litigaxits, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, coiiat staff, court officials, and others with wliozn the

judge deals in an official capacity); and DR 1-102(A.)(S) (a lawyer shall izot en.ga-ge in

conduct that is Prejlad'icial to the adrrzirustration of justice and 1'rol:: Cond. R. 8.4(d) (a

lawyer shall not erzgage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).

Count Tl.irce --Abusc of Lawvyers

2$. Relator incorporates Paragraphs I through 27.

29, Prosecutors, public defenders, and private dGfense counsel that appear be:foxe resposrderrt

a1-e prohibited froni. asking questions about courtroom procedure or requesting further

clnrification of respotident's rulings. .lf they do so, they a.re told that they are "out of

order" and threatened with contempt or referral to a clisciplir ►az•y authority. 'Fhe following

are some examples of the coiifrontations that respondent has bad with prosecutors, public

defenders, and private defense counsel in her courtroom.

David ErdemmzlJer

-11- 30. C)n vla}, 21 , 2009, Matthew Gabriel appeared before respoi3dezlt with his attorney, David

for sente^lcing on a Driving Under Suspension (DUS) cbarge. (CaseNo. . l 2008 TRD 0"71751.) Gabriel's license had been suspended elne to a DUt convactiori.

31. TYie rriaximuin penalty for 1JL7^S is 180 days iar jail and a$1.,d00 fzne.

32. Gabriel had already spent two days in jail. Respondent sezzteneed Gabriel to an

;rciditionat t.hree days in jail and a $300 fine. She suspended the remaiirhxg 175 days.

33. Respondent requested the location of Gabriel's vehicle so that stre could have it

i3ncizobilized.

34. Gabriel infonnect respondent that he had sold the vehicle in Jantiary 2009, but that he did

not have- proof of the sale with hizn in court.

35. Respondent noted that the probation report indicated that as ofApril. 21, 2009, Gabriel

siill appeaxed to be to the titled owner of the vehicle.

36, Based on this information, respon.den.t ordered the full 178 d.ays into execution, but set

the inat#er for a rnitigation hearing o;r MaY 27, 2009.

37, When Eidern;zller tried to advocate on beiialf of his client and explain that the probatiorx

report only reflects the last person -who registered the vehicle, xespondent threatened to

hold 1•;ideuxniller in conteinpt and place hiri1 in the bolding cell with Gabriel.

38. The following day, G ;abriel's faonily was able to provide proof that the velricie had beeii

sold, and respoildent reduced Gabr.iel's sentence to the original three days,

mictaael f'Vinsfon

39. On August 19, 2010, l^eynazx Wiliiams pled no cotztest to aminor inzsdemeanor Divg

Abuse maxijuana charge and a 3'^ degree Driving Uzlder Suspension (DUS) charp,e in

-12.. exchange fdr a4 "' degree Upen Contairier charge and a niinor naisdeineanor seat belt

charge being dismissed. (Casc nos. 2010 CRI3 021617 and 2010 TRD 038170.)

40, On August 23, 20I0, YNilliams was in court with his attorney, Michael Winston, for

sentencing.

41 On the DUS charge, respondent sentenced Williams to 180 days injail with 178 days

suspendecf and a$1,000 fine witla $800 suspended. [)n the drug abuse charge, respondent

fiiied Williams $50.

42, }'•..espondent also ord.ered Williams 1:0 one year of active probation with random

breathalyzer and urinalysis testing.

43. After the sentencing, Williams was taken to the ho3dinl; cell. After Williams lefL the

courtroorzi, Winston atterrrpted to make an ob3ection ozi the record. as to the imposition of

active probation b ecause it was lZUt reiated to the DUS charge azld not permitted by the

drug abuse charge.

44. Respondent proceeded to say that "this nzakes absolutely no sense" and that she would

Iiave never accepted the plea if she icnevY> that Willia.tns objected to getting tzeatrxient. She

tlie7i tlueatened to sentence Williams to the full 180 days because op'Winstozi's objecti.on.

During the conSrorztation, respondent told Winston twice to "slaut your mouth" and

tnxeatened to place hiin in the 1-iolding cell with Wiliiall'Is on contempt charges.

Tirxo 1 r-icarichi

45. On October 28, 2010, Tina Tricarichi was in respor4deiit's courtroorn with her clicnt,

(Case nos, 2010 CR73 040350, 2010 Darius Andrews, for sentenciilg on several oases.

CR.13 008032, 2.01{3 TRD 001047.)

-13- 46, Durizig tlre sentencing, Tricarichi did not hear one of the conditions imposed on Andrews

becatise Andrews was talkizzg to her.

47. Tricariclai said "Pardon," ancl repeated what she believed was the coiadition to ezAsure that

she had lieard it correctly.

48. Respondent stated that 'T'ricarichi was correct, but that she should have been listening to

the court in the first place. Respondent further stated that it was "outrageotrs" that she

had to repeat herself "thxee or four tirpes" during a sentencing.

49. After the senteticing was complete, Andrews stated "Thank you, your Honor,"

50. ResponderLt continued to berate Tricarichi by stating, `°Ile [the defendarat] tznderstaz-sds.

Ffe knows. She [Tricarich.kl doesn't understand what the court is sayi.ng.'>

51. Respondetit accused Tricarichi of talking during the sentencing, but when Tricai-ichi

attenzpted to explain herself, responderat stated tha# she was "tixed of going through this

f'or the past two montlis" and that she was not "going to tolerate it."

52. Respondent then stated--in open court--that s17e had already spoken to Tricarichi's

supea^visors about Tricarichi.

53, The confrontation erided with respondent threatening to hold `I`rioaiachi zra contempt and

placing Iier in the liolciitxg cclf i.#'slle said "one other word."

Angela Roci'riquez

54. On Ianua-,T 13, 2011, Attomey Angela. Rodxi.quez was assigned. to resporzderat's

courtroom as the city prosecutor.

55. On at least two occasioirs, respondent asked Rodriquez what was reflected on the LEADS

report for various defendants without being specific as to what type of iz3fortnatiorr sl'te

-14- was scekijzt , i.e. riuznber of PreviUUS comrictions, z1umber of previous driver's license

suspensions, or both. xiate, and respondent did no't ask Rodricluez answercd as she believed approp 56, In eac,li case> follow uP questions or reqi^ste additiozxal infonnatioyr i ater, when additional infomxation on the SIEADS repozfi. was revealed, respo;xde^t 57. ublically accused IZodrique7 o'f i.ntentioxzally prouiding #1#c court with inaccurate p

information.

Scott Matbusa

S8. On 7une 16, 2011, AMnieY Scott Malbasa was i-epresexxtixtg a defeiidant in a trial before

respondent. rosecutor; bowevcr, the ^ 59. One of the defense witnesses was beizag cross-ex.az'.xinect by tlxe a af the odiutn 4vith

individuai was not seated in the witness stand. ^e was staxxd^.ng I^

Mat1>asa, ke satne , At one point during the prosacutor's questioning, the wx^ess began talkang at tl 6fl

titne as the pr^^secutor. R ondent izrterrupted tl^.e trial and instructecl the witness not to speak at the sazne tizrle 61. eSp

as the prpsecutor. 62 be better fox the in.dividual to sit in the witness stand iderat ther^ stafecl [hat it rvo^3id . R.espoz because lxe was "aut of control in this courtroon:z" and she was "not gozng to perrnit it.

At that paint, Malt^asa attempted to place an objection oax tlxe recoxd, 63 an,d the situatzon tluicyk.l ►, 64. Responslent «ould not permit Malbasa to znalce l-ds objectxox to a shouting rcratch bet`^`^ee3'. Mall.iasa and respondexxt with respondent detc:riorated xn lalbasa to "shut your 3nouth" and tbreatenang #.o liold him in conten3pt. tellasxg N

-15- Henry 1-lilow

65. On Septcmber 25, 2032, Attoi-ney He,ary Hilorv was iyj court with his clierit, pxank

Petrucci, for a first pre--trial. (C.ase No.. 2Q I2 TRC 05093 9.)

66. Hilowand Peti-ucci both ehecked in at approximately $:30 A.M.; however, the case was

not called until approximately 11:AQ A.M.

67. Wherr the case was called, Hilow informed respondent t:hat: he had already spoken to the

prosecutor and tzat the prosecutor had agreed to a conthiarance. Hilow requeste:d that tlle

pre-trial be rescheduled for October 24, 2012.

68. After confirming 7Elow's statements with the prosecutor, respondent asked FTilow wlaat

time he would like the pre-traa] to be set.

69. Hilow incluired into wlaether it would be appropriate to request a later start time because

based orr his observations, respondent called cases witli police officers first.

70. Respoiid.ent stated that Hilow's observations were incorrect for various reasozrs.

71. When SSiJo-w infoznied respor3dcnt that lie was not trying to insult the cottrt, respontlent

r.eplied "Y think that you are. I thirilc you are out of order. This court is not going to

accept it:." Rcsponclent then told. fIilow that ixe was "out of order" again and that he

zaecc3etl to "watch his conr3uct" in thr; courtroorn.

rI sl7ley J'ones/lonnna Lopez

72. 011 May 7, 2013, Attorney Ash]ey Jones wa.s in cotu-t with her client, Robert Downing.

Down_ing had been charged with Driving Untler the Tn#luerice of Aicoho]/L?rugs (DUI).

(Case No. 2013 TJ2C 0 16088)

-16- Down.ing's 3`a DUI in 6 years; therefore, the offense carried rrian.dat.oay jail time 73. This was

and mandatory vehicie forfeiture. 7q. Prior to Downing's case beierg called, Jones had advised ttre city prosecutor, 3oanna

Lopez, that Downing was willing to plead guilty to the DUI, so long as some kind of deal

could be worked out where the vehicle would ixot forfeited. Jones inforxned Lopez that

the velucle was a fal-nily vehicle and that it wotild cause hardsliip onthe family if it was

forfeited. Jones i:urther infortned Lopez that she believed tbere was some type of

h dshi eYception in tlae statute that would allow the vehicle not to be f.orfeited.

75. Jones and Lopez cliscussed all sorts of possibilities including am.ending the charge to a na

in 6, wlZich did not require mandatory vehicle forfeiture. I.7ltimately, Jones and Lopez

agreed to approaclr respo.tdent with details of their possible plea offer.

76. At the first sidebar, respondent was initially receptive to the idea of a hardship exaeption,

but was concerned with the legality of such a proposal. Jones offered to brief the issue

for the court; however, respondent woii.ld not permit it. She ultimately iztformed Sorzes

and Lopez that she would not accept a plea offer without ixraildatory vehicle forfeiture,

and tlxat she would recall the case in a few monlents.

77. 3ones left the sidebar and inforined her client as to what respondent had stated at the

sidebar. Downing then informed Jones that 11e wanted a juiy trial.

jg, At a seconcl sidebar, Jones infonned respondent that l,er client wan.ted a jury trial.

Respondent tlien stated that Jones was the reason this case was not beitig resolved today

and tlrat sbe could not believe that 7ories and L,opez would ask her to do soF-nething

"illegal." Respondent informed Jones and Lopez that she was "disgusted" by them and

that she should report t.lrem to the Supreme Court oi Obao for ethical violations.

-17- 79. Respondent's coridtict as outlined above violates the Ohio Rules of Judicial Conduct and

the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Jud. R. 1.2 (a judge shall act at all

tintes in a manner that promotes public coiilidezace in the independence, integrity, and

irnpartiality of the judiciary, and silall avoid i3azpropriety and the appearan.ce of

i.r.npxopriety); Jud. R. 2.8 (a judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants,

jurors, wata-iesses, iawyez:s, court. staff, court officials, and others with whom the judge

deals in aii official capacity); azrd Prof. C,'ond. R. 8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage ix,

conduct t.ha( . is piejudicial to the administration of justice).

Coran:t• Four - Abuse of Defendan.ts and the JPriiJlic

80. Relator incorporates Paragraphs 1 throut;li 79,

81. The C:leve.land Municipal E;ourt receives conrplaints frorxi defendants and the geiiez•al

public about every judge on the court; however, the number of complaints received

against respondent is proportionally n-iuch higlrer than aszy other judge on the court.

a. Most, if not all, of the coinplaints allege that respondent's attitude towards them was patronizing, deuseariing, instziting, or disrnissive.

b. Ma.n:y of the complaints allege that respoiideiit bas no respect for their time. The complaints highligxkt scenarios in which a de.fendant was in court_a.tl day waiting for his or her case to be called, oiily to be told that he or she ateeded to return the next day. In some cases, a defendant has beeii reciuired to conic back for a lliird day.

c. Many ofthe coFnplaiaits also allege that an inciividual has or is in danger of losing his or her job due to the amount of tirrie spent in respondent's courtrooxn.

82. Respoaident also txeats defendants and the public in 11er couztxooni in azi inipaticnt and

unprofessionai manner. She put7lically repriinazRds individuals, expels them from her

courtroom, or places thedn in holding cells for min.or infractions such as whispering.

-18- 83. Respondent regularly confzscates alE cell phones in her colxrtloorn due to pxesence of a

single displayed or ringing phone.

84. As with attorneys in her courtroom, if an irzdividual speaks up ° claims iru7ocence or

a.tteznpts to explain hzs or lier conduct,- res,pozIclerrt will threaten tlae individual with

contem.pt of court and up to three days in jai.l.

85. Below are sorile ex.axtzples of respondent's vnipatient and unreasonable ten-tperaxnealt iti

inclazding cell phone usage: response to acti:vity in her cour'troosn,

Cell Phone Usage

86. Qrz October 28, 2010, respondent confzscated all cell phones in the cn^^rooz^.

87. Ozz 3uly 20, 2011, respondent cotxfiscated cell phozles belongin8to two individuals and

had tlae indivzduals tYsrown out of the courtrooin for usizig the phones. She also

tlareatened to place the ilydividtsais in a laoldinl; cell.

88. On August 9, 2011, respondent publically berated a woxn.an in fhe courtxoosrz because her

cell phone rang. Specifically: a. Oaz August 9, 2011, respondent was in th.e process of sentencing a defendanb.

b. 1'}urir,g tize plea cOlloquy, respondent heard a cell phone say "drpid."

C. 1Zespondent ordered that the phone be confiscated, but either out of ^ear or because she was unaware that it was l^er pl^one rnaking tlze noise, tl^e wozz1an did not admit ownership o{' the pb.one.

d. Wljezi no one admitted owzzersl-zip of'tl"ie offending phone, respondent ordered her bailiif's to confiscate all cell phones in the courtroom.

C. As the brailifl's were confiscatizig pliones, the woman's phozze said "droid" again, and respondent idezrtitiec3 the plxone as beionging to ttze womaai.

f The wonlazl began to say that size t3iough.t her phone was off, hut respondent accused Iier of lyinl; and ordered her to be placed 'zn the holding cell.

-19- g. The wornan attempted to say that she did not ]cnow that it was her ph_ozze that was ringing; however, respondent woulcf zrot pernit her to speak. Respondent fuil.her stated that if t.he woixiati said another word, she would hold her in contempt and place her in jail for "three cotisectttive days" because taer co;iduct in the cout:-troorn was "out.rageous."

89. On March 21, 2013, there were two people in the cowtroom wbo were using their

cellular phones; however, the phones did not create a zioticeable ciisniption to eotitrtroozn

proceedittgs. Ratller than just confiscating the phones that were beirig tised, respondent

ordered that evezy phorre iax the courtrootii be confiscated.

90. The above listed examples are only a sanlpling of the titnes when respondent has

confiscated either an individual's or the eritire courtroom's phones.

Novella Black

91. On October 28, 2010, Novella Black was in court on charges of domestic vioIexice arid

endangering cliiJdren. (Case No. 2010 CRB 421049.)

92. '1,-',be public defender's office was unable to represeiat. Black ciue to a conflict of interest;

therefore, the inatter was cozrtizzued for appointxnent of ccjtunsel.

93. As Black was leaving the courtroom, tlae doors to the courtrooni made an, audible noise.

94. Respondent uzstructed her bailiffs to bring Black back into the courtroorrz.

95. Wheu 13(ack re-entered, respondent stated that she was holding Black in contempt a.itd

placing her in the laolciin.g cell.

96. Black asked respoizdent what she had done, and respozadent stated that Black had

slarximed the doors arrd was nide to thc court,

97. Black stated that she did not slarn the doors, but -respondent spoke over Black and ordered

her bailiffs to take Black into custody. Respondent then ordered Black not to "say

another word to this Coirt before you go to jail for three days_"

-20- 98. Black was taken into custoc3y at approaimateIy 11:43 A.M. later), Black was bzoxiglat back into the 9}. At approximately 2:55 F,M. (over three hours

courtroom.

100. Respondent asked Black if*there was anyth7ng she wanted to say. }31ack replied that slie

had notliin.g to say.

101. Respondent then stated that iS'B1ack did not apologize to the court, shc would be placed

iza jail for three days. Respondent "offered" to place Black back in the hold'ing cell to

give her time to think about wliether she waited to apologize to the eourt.

102. At that point, Black abruptly stated, "7 apologrze to the couri."

C'harlorte ^Sh^tes

103. Oil September 27, 2011, Claaxlotte Shtrtes was in court with her son, who had a case

before respondent.

104. Upon entering the courtroozr., Shutes was advised to remove her earpiece because

responcierit pemiitted absolutely no taikirag in the courtroom. Shutes did as iixstruc:ted.

105. At one poiizt, Shutes left the courtroom to pay her son's fine, Wheii sh.e rctuzxred, she

haided the payment receipt to her soii, who said "Thanks" or "ThaiA You," A few

rrsiriutes later, Sliutes was expelled l.^onti the courtroom for tallcilig.

106. Sliutes was humiliated by the situation.

SYratauna Moore

107, On Noveniber 20, 2012, Slxatauna Moore was in court with her attorney, Margaret Walsh,

for a probation violatioix .laearijlg. (,Case No. 2012 I'RD{10'7856_)

21- 108. Tvioore liad also been charged wit31 a feloiry that was set for a pre-traal on the followirrg

day, November 21, 2012.

109. W-czlsh recluested a cozztinuance of the probation violation hearing due to the fact that the

felony was still pendinl;.

1.10. In deciding whether or not to grant the continuance, respondent began reviewing Moore's

file. l l k. Respondent inquired into wliether Moore had takert a uritialysis test reeently. Moore

stated that she had approxiniately two weeks eariier tlzrouf;h Key Decisions Tzeatinent

Center.

112. Resporideazt ii}forrned Moore that she needed to take a urinalysis test through. the

probation departtnent and that she needed to do it before she would grant a continu.ance

of the probation violation laearing.

113. Walsh advised respondent that Moore did not have the $9 to pay for the urin.alysis test

that day, but that she could have it the followizig day.

1.14, RespondeRxt told Moore theat she was not going to place the inateer on her docket for

tomorrow arzd that Moore needed to figure out how she was boirig to pay for the

urinalysis test that day.

115. Moore respoirded by rolling lier eyes.

1.16. At first, respondent stated that if Moore rolled her eyes one more time, she was going to

take More into custody; however, responcleiit quiclcly changed her inind and deeided to

take Moore into custody immediately for rolling hcr eyes.

-2?.- Kenneth T'ay1ot-

117. 0n Novezxxber 27, 2012, Kenneth Taylor was representing Irimself pro se against a sninor

misdemeanor charge of disorderly conduct. (Case No. 2012 CRB 038736.}

118. A few days earlier, Taylor hacE filed a Motion to Disnliss, wtiich the c-ity had not yet

responded to.

119, The ca.se was continued until December 14, 2012 so .hat the city could respond to the

Motion to Disrniss.

120. Taylor calmly stated that lie would like to 7nake another Motion to Dismiss because this

was ?ais third time in co qrt with no of[iver present.

121. Respondent replied in a rude and condescending manner:

Sir, let me tell you somethinl;. 'I'llat's what you don't understand. 'T'hat's why you need to hire an attorney because you don't have a clue as to what you are doing in a courtroozn. You filed the motion. The city has a right to respond to the anotxon. She just got the motion and she's gonna respond. And it's set for a heazing December 14 at 2;00 P,M. Is there anything else?

122. 'Wnlei. Taylor attempted to address another raotion that he had filed, respondent requested

that Taylor be escoa-ted to the elevator. As Taylor was leaving, respondent instz7ieted her

bailiff.to bring Taylor back into the courtroom to go to the workhouse ifhe does

"anything out of line" or if be "says another word."

Jamese Johnson, ,Iasmine .L'dwerrds, and Lzscl Barbee

123, On March 5, 2013, Jamese .Tolurson was in resnondent's courtrooin on a charge of Petty

Tlicft. She was acconipanied by her mother-in-law, Lisa F3arbee. (Case No. 2011 CRB

043197.)

-23- 12/4., On the same day, Jasmine Edwards was also in respondent's courtroozn on charges of

Driving Uncier Suspension, Driving while J.Jnder the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs, and

other charges that were eventually ciisnrissed. (Case Nos. 2011 I'1LC 002970 and 2(112

'fRD 068011.) 125. 7ohnson and Edwards did not kraow each other; however, while waiting for their

respective cases to be called, Joluzson (and 13arbee) and Edwards sat nl the same row.

126. At approximately 11:45 A.IvJ., .Tohrzson catight her hair irz the zipper of a piece of clothing

that she was wearizig. Johnson reacted by sayiarg "4ucli," "F-k," or something similar

to express the moanentay pain caused by getting her hair catight in tl-ie zipper.

127. Respondent hcard Jolmson's expression, but attributed it to Edwards. Without requesting

Yne or an explanation, respondent ordered her bailiff any ;further inforcnation, such as a na.

to place Edwards in the holding cell. had said something, 128. At that point, Johnson spoke up and stated that she was the one who

not .clwazds. Responden.t therz ordered her bailiff to place Edward.s and Jolnison in the

holding celi.

129. As the bailiif approached, Baybee stated that l;dwards acrd Johnson llad done nothing

wron.g. At that point, respondent ord.ered: "all th.ree" (Edwards, Jobnson, anc.i Barbee) to

be placed in the holding cell.

130. E-dwaz'ds aisd Johnsoii were in the holding cell for approxiznately 30 minutes to an hour,

and Barbee was in the holding cell for 15-20 irlinutes longer tharr them.

131. Duz'iug the above events, 11.ttorriey Jan rriedman was present. Although closer in

physical proximit}r to Johnson, Edwards, and Barbec than respoixd.ent, he dict not hear arry

-24- discussion or disrtiptive behavior frofi-i tlzem prior to resporiden.t ordering her bailiff to

place Ec[wai-ds in the holdizkb cell.

132. Attorney Bryan Ramsey was alst, preseiit during the above events. He heard sonae type

of audible iioise shortly before respondent ordered Edwards to be plaeed in the holding

cell; however, the noise was not clisrraptive to conr.t proceectings.

133. Respondent's conduct as outlined above violates the Ohio Code of Judicial Cond-uct and

the Ohio Rules of Professional Condtzct, specifically .1Erd. R. 1.2 (a. judge shall act at all

tiznes in a 3nann:er that promotes public con-,fidence in the izidependence, integrity, and

irzapartiality oftlie judiciary); .Tud. R. 2.6 (a jtirdge shall accozd to every person who has a

legal interest in a proceedii3g the right to be heard aceording to the law); Jud. R. 2.8 (a

judge sb.al113e patient, digi2ified, and coaz-teous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lav,ryyers,

court staff, eourt officials, aad others with wboin the jljdge deals in an official capacity);

aaid k'rof. Cond.12.. 8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage i.n conduct that is prejudicial to the

administration of justice).

Count 1+i-ve -- Abuse of Constittirtional Freeclow:s

134. - Relator incorporates Pazagraphs 1.througli 133.

135. Respondent requires a1l individuals entering her courtroozii, including t;aniily and 1'rzends

of defendants, to sipn in and provide inforrrzation as to wl3y they are in ttie courtroorn. At

times, respondent has also prohibited iczdividuals frorza, leaving her courtroom, even if it is

to Il,se tkse restroom.

136. These practices inhibit iJ-ie free 1-7ow of indivicluals fiot-n a public courtroom azid may

even impact an individuktl's ability or willingness to attend a public proceedirit;.

-25- respolideni oversees thc court's Project Hope docket. 137. As discussed further in C3uz.It Six, When respondent conducts these dockets, they oftenf'tnies have a religious overtone. 1' or

examplc:, dttring past Project Hope con3pliance hearings, respondent has had an

inrlividual standing by lier side on the bench that served as her "religious adviser." Ozi at

least one occasion, a rnember of respondent's cliurcil presented Projeet Hope participants

witlc a scarfthat had a cross on it and blessed each par-ticipan.t as they received t,ie scarf.

138. Respondent regularly proliibits or inhibits the right of defendants to rep^esent then-zselves

se. Respondent will question defendasits aboiit their choice to represent themselves pro and. itnply that 't.hey may be se.ntenced to a longer jail scritence or larger fine if they do not

obtain counsel. In at least one case, respondent told a pro se defendarrt that he had to be

represented by counsel in her courtroom. Below arc soin.e of the most offcnsive

examples of instances wl^ere respondent has reqnzred or implied that a deFenJaz^t needs to

be represented by counsel.

Carolyn A4assengade-I.fcrsan

pn Ja.ni.sary ?_0, 2011, Carolyn Massengale-Hasan was in court on a License Required to 139. Operate, Seat Belt, and l:.xpired Sticker clrarges. (C.,ase No. 2010 TRD (177438.)

140. lvlassezigale-Hasan inforineci responcient that she was not repzssented by couiisel.

141. Respondcnt asker[ Massen^ale-Slasan what she intended. to do about her legal courzsel in

a case that carried a nxaxicnwn fine of tip to six jiiont3.ls i-o jail and a $ 1,000 fine,

142, Masseiigale-Hasan asked respondent whether shc was peranstted to ask a qaestion,

143. Respondent would not ljerxnil M:assengale-l-lasan to ask a questzon tmtil Massengate-

Ilasan had answered respondent's previous question a.bout legal coun5el,

-26- 144. Massengale-l:lasan again infor

respondent continued the matter until .Taxnlary 21, 2011.

145. Massengale-Hasan informed respondent that she had school on tne 21 S`, to which

respondent stated that that was Ma.ssengale-Hasan's problern. Responctent stated that

Massengale-l-lasan had to be in court on the 21.s' or a capias would be issued for her

arrest,

146. )?Jhen Ma.ssengate-Hasan attempted to speak, respondent threatened to hoid Masseogale-

Nasan- in contemZat of couzt. Respondent then had Massengale-l-Iasan escorted otxt of the

codirtroon2 so that she would not "slana doors os act up in tl-iis courtroozn."

147. Ivdassengale-I Iasan retunied to respondent's courtroom on January 21, 2013 with counsel

that she retained in the ha[lway }tist prior to entering the couztroorn. She pled tio contest

to the License Required to Operate charge, and the remainder of the charges were

dismissed.

Dezi Walker

14g. 011 March 2, 2011, Walker appeared in court on. a trat-:fc coiitrol violation (nYnn.ing a re(i

light); however, the matter had been-cliarged as a 3"l degree misdemeanor, (Case No.

2011 TRD 007301)

149. Walker appeared in court witlaout counsel. I-le iixf''ormed respondent that he had spoken to

the public defender's office, but that they would not represent him.

150. The public defender asszgned to respondent's courtrooaxa then infcirmed respondent that

W alker d'id not qualify for assastance,

151. Respoizdent informed W aSlcer tbat he had "options," but the oiily option she gave hirn was

to continue his case to obtain counsel.

-27- 152, Walker attempt ta make a i-aotion to dismiss b(:cause tf)e off.zcer was not present;

Iiowever, respojldent inforrrzed Walker that tJ-ie anatter was not set for trial and that since it

was a 3`a degree misdemeanor carrying up to a$5Ufl fine and 60 days in jail, he sieeded to

discuss the mattcr with an atl:orney.

153, Respondent continued the inat#er until March. 29, 2011,

154. On March 29, 2011, Walker appeared wil:hotrt couzasel. Although he still did not qua3ify

for assistance, the public defender assigned to respondcnt's courtroom agreed to assist

Walker if he wanted to resolve the znatter that day. The ptrtbJ€c defende.T infarnied Walker

that the prosecutor would probably reduce the charge to a 4`h degree misdemeanor, but

Walker sta.ted that he was ►aot guitty.

15S. Respondent cositiriued the matter z intii April 13, 2011 at 9:00 A.M. and advised Walker

that he had to retaiii counsel and that his counsel haci. to be present on April 13, 2011.

156. Although Walker's case was scheduled for 9:00 A.M. on April 13, 2011, it was not called

until 5:40 P.M. after the public defexider had left fnr the day. 5i.rice Walker did irot liave

re#a.ined coutasel with him, respondealt inquired into whether he ^,,vanted the rnatter

co2 rtitiued so that ]ae could be represented by t.he public deferider.

157. Walktr stated that he did r7ot want a continuance. and that he warited the matter set for

trial, I2.espondent stated that Walker needed the public defender's office to ncake: that

determination for him, but since the public defetrder was zao longer there, she was

continuing the matter until the following day.

158. Walker informed respondent that he could not appear the following day, so respoxident

arbitrarily set the anatter for April 18, 2011. Wlien Walker attempted to question

respondent about why his case kept getting continued, respondent stated that she was ilat

-28- going t.o "argue" witla hirn. As u'alker continued to talk, resl"}ondezit threateined him witl}

contempt and tiine in the lioldin8 celk the next tiine he appeared in co-tut.

159. Walker f

#(p. 7lie matter came be£ore respondent again on lune 29, 2011 at which time the prosec"tor

distnissed the charges because they had been incorrectly charged as a 3ra degree

misdeineanor ratlier than a minor znisdemeanor and the tinie foa briaging the mattcr to

trial had passeri.

Ferrzrrdo Taylor

161. On May 25, 2011, rernaclo Taylor vaas in court oll a cllarge of Tow Truck/City License.

(Case No. 2011 CRB 015357.) 162. Taylor was not represented by counsel, nor did he want a contiruance to seek legal

c^unsel. 161 Respondent wonld not allow Taylor to procecd witli his case asad stated tlaat "in this

couxtrooan, you need to be represented by an attorney."

164. Respondent then told. Taylox to "sit dovm" and "think about tlxis." She then mun.-ibled

under lter breath, "this is outrageous,"

165, Wl-tile Taylor was wa3ting for llis case to be recalled, a bailiff in the courtroorn izrfonned

Taylor tbat the only way he was going to be ab}e to resolve his case is if he retained

counsel.

166. When Taylor's case was recalled, he stated tltat 11e would obtain ars. attorney, which he

subsequezatly did.

167. Respondent's conduct as outlined above violates the Ohio Code of Jtzdicial Conduct,

specifIcally Carzon l(a judge shall uphold the indepeDdenee and integrity of the

-29- udiciary) ai^d hid R. 1.2 (a judge shall act at all tixr^es in a n7anner t11at protnotes pu.blic ^ Canox^sirz^paxtiality of2 the judiciaty};(A ^at c:onfidence in the independence, integrity, and

judge shall respect and comPlY'x'ith the law and shall act at all times in a xn^1er

romotes public coniidenee in the integrity and i^rPartiality of the judiciary} and 7ud. R. P and shall perform all duties of judicial of ice law, 2.2 (A judge shalt uphold and apply the l a^^ryer shall not engage in conduct that is fairly and iznprirtially}; and DR 1-1Q2(.h•)(5){a

rejud•zcial ta the adnainistratian of andjustice} 1'rof. Cond- R. ^.`t{d} (a la^er shall not P engage in coildtict that is prejudicial to the adiniriistration of justice)-

Goiznt Six - Abusive Legal Error's

169. Relator incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 167. 169. Respondent regulaxly caerces pleas fioin defendants by implying tt'attl^ey vaill receive t^

harsher sentence if t11ey go to trial ox by 1icating r3elentlants in a frustrated and iznpat^ent

manner until they enter a plea to the chart;es. 70ReS orxdent regularly solicits inforznatia^^ from defendants about their znental bealttr 1 P status andlor drug arid al.cohol use even when it has rao reasonable relationship to the

charges against the defendant. Oftentirnes, r•espondent will xeveai this information in essailal and open cQtirt, k.e, i-eaduig from psyctliatric reports, tlaus publically xevealing p

confdenti.trl irafoinrati.on about defendants aiid m-akit'g defendants very uncoMfortable in

the coV4rtroozn. gasty Decisions

} 71.. Resporzdent uses informatian learned froni defendazits about their mental healtli stattits

andlox drug and aicohol use to zaake hasty aztd unwan.anted clecisions about tlie

defendants and/or about conditions foT pl•obation. For example:

-30- ,Iames .Luster•

172, On January 31, 2002, Jaiincs Luster appeared before respondent with his attorncy,

Margaret Walsh, for sentencing on a License Required to Operate Charge. (Case No.

2001 TRD 108484.)

173. Luster had previously been in court on January 7, 2002 and fanuary 30, 2002 for

sentencing; however both titnes, Luster's senteircing }2ad been cont►aaued.

174. OFi Sazruary 31, 2002, respondent sentenced Luster to 184 days in j ail, with 150 days

suspended, aii alcohol assessment, mrd substanec abuse counseling, She also fined Luster

$100.

175. Following the sentenci-ng order, Walsli Ghallengetl the cotxa-t's irnpositioix of an alcohol

assessanezxt and substance abuse counseling because they were not reasonably related to

the charge against Luster. Walsh also requested that Luster be given credit for time

served for the two days that Luster spent in respondent's courtroom waiting for his

sezrtencing hearing.

176, 12.cspandent denied Walsh's request az3d instead decided to suspend only 120 days of

Luster's sentence thereby doubling Luster's actual ti.rne ira. jail to 60 days.

177. On February 15, 2002, Luster filed a Notice of Appeal with the Eighth District Court of

Appeals.

178, On March 15, 2002, respor3dent suspended all fines abairrst Luster alid gave lrirn credit

for the 34 days ol' jail. time that he had already served. She suspetrded the renaaining 146

days of Luster's sentence.

179. 011 November 27, 2002, the Coiirt. of :ss.ppeals disniissed Lusier's appeal as nzoot because

Luster had already scrved liis time in jail; however, the court noted that "a trial court

-31- abuses its discretion when it iznpc?ses a sentence based upon the conduct of the defense

attorney."

Gabriel .lv.lctttlfiew

180, See Paragraphs 30 tlrrouglt 39 of Cotilnt Two for fa:cts zegarding GaUriel Matthew.

Daniel O'Reilly

181. Oo. Jurze 3, 2009, Dafiiei O'Reilly appeared before respondepi# on charges of aggravated

trespass and aggravated n2enacing, (Case No. 2009 Lj-^B 014228.) He was not

represented by counsel. 182. O'Reiily politely asked respotaderrt foz perinission to say sornething on ll.is own Uelza]f,

pelIXtit 11i1n to speakwithout legal counsel preSeiit. At tUat Ul3t reSpO1Td( Jlt would not

point, Attomey faavid Eid.en.miller (puUlic defe,nder) agreed to assist O'Reilly with his

case. 183. O'Reilly's file iradicated ihat O'Reiliy llad some kind of trzerrtal illness, Accordin.gly,

respondent asked O'Reilly wU.effier Ue: was taking his rriedlcation.

184. O'Reilly responded that he vlas not taking his xnedication and that he had not taken his

medication for over 30 clays due to a nuinber of reasons involviztg Medicare, Social

Security, etc. 1 85. Respondent #laen requested a siciebar on the record; however, l^alfway #lzrough tlle

sidebar, respondent inuted atl microphones in the courtroosn.

196. During the sidebar, O'Reilly agreed. to speak widl Jexorne Saunclers, a cow.-t psychiatric

eniployee, regarding his cnental healtU. conditioli and lack of medication.

187. `i hereafter, O'Reilly nact with Saunders.

32 188, O'Reilly's case was recalled approxirnatcly two hour.s later.

189, 'V'+rlien the case was recalled, respondent asked Saunders to place bis findings on the

record as to whether O'Reilly wps suicidal, l.omicidal., or needed emergency psychiatric

hospitalization.

190. Saunders testified that O'Reilly was not suicidal or homicidal and tllat he did pot require

eznerl;ency psyclsiatric hospitalization. Saunders stated, llowever, that O'Reilly n.eeded to

obtaiia and take his inedication.

191. I'3ased on Saunder's testimony, respondent continued the matter unti] June 9, 2009 (six

days later). Slxe allowed O'Reilly's pe;sonal bond. to rernain in effect on condition that

he not go to Tower City Mall, not liave any contact with his alleged victiin, and go

irruried'zately to LalC.ewood 1-lospital to obtain his medication. O'Reilly confsrmed tiiat h.e

uncierstood tlie court's orders and that he would abide by thein.

1922, As e-veryone was Preparing to leave the coull:.room or anove on to the next case,

respoaicient told Saunders that O'Reilly takes four 7'ylenoI PM per iiiglit, which was

against the dosage recojnmezkdation on the box.

193. Saunders stated that O'Reilly had tiot told him this inforrnation during their conversation,

but that he still believed that O'Reilly was willing and able to obtaizi his medicatioii as

previousl.y indicated.

194, Respondent then corz3snented that if O'Reilly overdoses ox1 the'1'ylenol PM, it will be "on

all our coi3scierices for the rest of ol3r lives."

195. Respondent then ordered that O'Reilly appea.r in her coui-troom on JtYn.e 4, 2009, ratlaer

thaii June 9, 2009, with proof that lie had gone to Lakewood Hospital to obtain his

medication.

-33- 196, 7'hexeafter, respondent changed h.er 1nind again because she did not have "peace" with the

sittration. },eS orrder+t ordered tYReiSly to be taken into cl.istody i7rimediat.ely and transported to St.

I97.Vin P conscience It rs cerrt's Chaxity 1losPital. She stated that "it is rZOt going to f^e on my

not going to be on rrzy conscierace." She then cont.inued n'Reilly's case until June 5,

2009. (F,mphasis added.) On June 5, 2009, 0'ReiIly a.ppeaxed in cow^ with A.ltorney Eidenrniiler. 198 Giaezuniller ia^foa rs^ed the court that C)'Reilly had been seen by the cotrr.t's psychiatric 199 'sattd both l^.a.d released h^l withoi;t providing him with auy clinic alxci by St. V incent

medications. to release 200, Based on this irzformation, respondent initially stated that she was i2ot goi.ng others.

O'Reilly fzona custody because skxe believed that he was a harrn to hin.aself and

She stated, "Xf I don't have peace, he won't be xetease3." a1 bond on 241 mizrd. and gave {?'Itexil) a persoz3 . 14owever, respondent later chaziged her

condition that lae obtain his medication izpzTIediately.

Melvin Culy counsel, Thom.as Kxaus. 202. On T)ecember 21, 20i0, MelVin Cary was in. court with his

(Case No. 2010 TRD 064130.) led no corrtest lo tlze two charges against him -- Drivit"g Under Suspexlsion and Full 203 CarY p Time and Atten.tion The rnatter was refersed to the probatiorr departn''eo.t for a pre-

19, 2011 . senteneing report and was contizlued until 3anuary

Qn jairuary 19, ?01 I, Cary appeared with Kxaus for senteaacing. The pre--senten.cing 204 re ort indicated that this was Cary's 12`1' conviction for driving under suspearsion and that p

-34- he had last used alcohol aiid. marijuana in early December 2010. 'lfiere was no

iriformation siaggestinl; that Cary's alcohol or marijuaira usage was co.s7nected to tlre

pending charge.

205. Based on this infonnation, resporiderrt sentenced Cal'y to 180 (lays in jail and placed him

on two years of active probatiori with raiidom drug and alcohol screeni,al;. RespoDdent

set the matter for a mitigation hearing on February 24, 2011; however, it was later

continued until March 8, 2011.

206, On March 8, 2011, Cary appeared with Kraus for a niitigatio)l hearing.

207. L?uring this hearing, respondent expressed concerzas with Cary's rnarijuana and alcoliol

use aard stated that it was a "huge risk" to release Cary inta the public.

208. She stated that if she relea.sed him frorrr custody, sl7e ^vas corxsidering placing hinz on

house arrest andlor requiring hi.in to wear a contilluous alcohol inonitorit3g device.

209. The xnatter was continued -until March 9, 2011 in order to obtain details, i.e, cost a.bout

the coiltinuous alcohol monitoring device.

210. Uu. Marclx 9, 2011, respondent suspended the rezx3ainder of Cary's sentence on condition

that he coznplete out.p

211. Thereafter, a cozztixit.tous alcohol monitoring device was l^lac ed ozi Cary, s^rhich he wore

until August 4, 2011.

Denise Peder•s017

212. On August 29, 2011,17errise I'edersora was in court on an open c,ontaixier charge.

Pederson vtas represented by counsel, (Case No. 2011 CRB 029832.)

213. Pederson plc;d no contest to the charge and was sentenced to a $20 fiiae, which was to be

paid within the next 24 hours-

-35- 21.4. Pederson iF11oi'med respondeiit that she was unable to pay the fine within 24 hours

because she was on disability and wolrld riot receive her next disabiiity check uxitil

Septenzber 3, 2011.

215. Respondent asked Pederson what Iter disability was. Pedersoar stated that she was

scllizophxenic, bi3t that she was not required to take medication.

216. Based on this information, respondent placed Pederson on one year of active probation

and referr'ed her to the coutt's psyct,iatric clinic.

217, At that poiztt, Pederson's attorney stated that it niight be best if Ped.ersoz witlydr.ew her no

contest plea.

218. Kespondent stated that she would altow lyedersan to withdraw Iier rio contest plea;

however, she was still reierring Pederson to the court psychiatric e3itaic because Pederson

needed to be evaluated.

219. PedeXson was then taken into custody.

Btxx•densome Conciitions

220, Be,sporz,dent also places unduly burdensome conditions on individuals charged witix other

offenses including, but n.ot limited to solicitation.

Project Ilope

221. Project I-tope is a tiane-intensive specialized docket for defendants, priinarily wotncn,

who are on probation from soliciting offenses. Each iiiozitti, Project kiope participants are

required to attezxd monthly compliance meetiEig;s.

222. Respondent oversees the Project I:-Iope docket.

-36- in 2011 by Cleveland State Univezsity Professors Daxxa 223. `Mren Project 1•'Topc: was reviewed J. Hubbard and Wenciy C. kegoeczi as part of conlprehensive review of eight court

progarns for effectiveness and efficiency, the iollowisig obscrvations vrere made:

a. '7'here are no clear goals for the progranr. For exanrple, the prograin was initially designed for woinexz convicted of solicitatiox.,but at t.he time of the review, the caseload consisted of 19 cases iricluding five "jol-xns," one male solicitor, and one woman convicted of open container and disoxderly of."fenses.

b. Motivational speakers are brought in every nlorrth to speak to Project T-lolae participants; howevcr, the speakers are not likely to have any effect on recidivism rates.

c. There is no incentzve for participants who do well irz the program to continue doing well, i.e. graduated meeting attendance. Participants axe required to attend montbJ.y compliance mLetiiz{;s regardless of the circumstances, and they kixow that if they do not attend for arty reason or if tlley say something "wrong" at the cotnplian.ce meeting, they will be sentenced to jail. At the time ofttie re'view, most of the participarzts expressed concern that they would never complete the Project Hope docket becalise their cases wcre constantly beiaig contiuaued so flaat another assessmetrt could be performed, another social sex"vice ageLicy could be contacted, or more information could be obtaitied.

d. Respondent publically criticizes the Project Hope probatiozi officer in front of the participants. This creates confusion for the participants regarding whom they should trust or listen to.

e. Respondent has no respect for the participazlts' time. k'roject I-lope participants are often required to be in the courtrooin by 9:00 A.M., but the docket will not start until 10;30 A.M. or 11:00 A.M. It then.talte.s'respondent the whole day to coniplete the docket. Many participants have stated that they are fearful of leaving the courtroom to make a phoare call or go to the bathroom because they are afraid that respondent will sentence them to jail. Maxty participants have also reported having problerns with employers, child care, or other coxnmitrnents due to Project flope compliance meetings.

224. on one occasion, a Project Hope participant file.d a motion requesting that her jail

senten.ce be ordereci into execut3on so that she could cease attexadance at the monthly

Projec't Hope compliance meetings.

a. 011 November 17, 2009, Sharon T awson-Deiux.is appeared before respondent on two charges of public intoxication, two charges of laaving an operz

-37- coritainer, one charge of hitchl^ikirag, ^rd one charge o'. enteririg or leaving a rnovizag vehicle. In exchange for T.,awsonDerwis's no ^^^Eecaz taine , and tlre Q17 charge of public intoxicatiov, one cliarge of liavingthe relnainirIg cllarges agaizlst cbaTge of entering or leaving a rnotor 'vehicle, Z,alusorz-Dennis were dismis ^ a^^8 ^^^^^1 2^B 036f^88, 2009 TRD 032231, 2009 CR13 015822, lier credi b. Respondent sentenced La ^li s spended^Jiebemaining 22 days for eight days aftirrre served. eSpondent cars of active probation ofLawson-Derrnis's sentezice and placed 1`,er on tv

any solicitation offenses, c. Between Novesaber 17, 2009 aizd Apri125, 2011,1-•awson-Dex?nis attended at least 14 I'roject ldope compliance sneetings. She was also recluired to srzeet uriii witb her probation officerattensd grief c.ounseling, and subzn^xt screerrs, undergo a psyGhratrie evaluation, herself for a vocational slcills assessxnent. icipant

d. At the April 25, 2011 cornpl'san.ce rraeeting, anotb.er. Project 1`lope partbe ausL bxought pictures of her chilc^ Respondent ins r^cedrLa.w^ on- l^er daughter had reces7tly passed way uld Dennis to leave th Qt^uLaw ^n ^.) ^i.s pushed tl^exdoo?r of the ou t oQm too leaving tY;e courtro , and o hard and it slarnm,ed shirt. 1Zesponden:t had Lawsozr-Dernris brought back the courtroom whereupon respondent proceeded to hold her in con.tesnp order the .fiz1122 days of her sentence into execution. Lawson 1.)eiinis 'was held in custody for three clays until Apri:l 28, 2011,

e. On Aprx128, 2011, Lawson-Dennis was brougllt back before respondent on a the Motion to Mitigrate her sentence. Responde nJgr'^^SdSae r fused to re easc c and released Lawson-Dennis from custody, S,awsor.-Deiuiis frozu active probatiorz as requested.

f. Lawson-Dennis attended Project Hope casnpliance meetings in May of 2011

and. June 2011. gr. On July 14,2011, LawsozrDcnrais, tluougli lzex attorney, James C. Young, early. cclternative,a ozdered ^woon- iiled a motian to tsthe r ema^n ie aozf her }ai Denzus ret^uested that execution so that she would riot have to attend azry fzather Project Hope

cornpliance meetings. inot t hat b„ On Axzgust 22, 2011, a}iearing wfls heldion upon sher onlyl ha time, Lawsosi-1<^ennis withdrew her mot }a two ixronths left of active probation.

-38- 225. In thcir June 2011 fina.l i-eport regarding court programs and e-fficiency, Hubbard and

Regoeczi recomniended that Yroject Hope be srrsperrded, 3-evatriped, and/or handled by

another judge.

226. O11 .Iur:e 9, 2011, Chief S'xobatiorl Officer .lerry Krakowski submitted a proposed list of

Project Hope gr:iidelines to respoirdent for her review and approval_ These guideliries

included but were not lirrrit.ed to the following:

a. Only persons charged with or corrvicted of solicitation will be assigned to Project plope;

b. "7olu.zs" or buyers of prostitrition will not assigned to Project Hope;

c. The probation ofCcer will detemiine what services will best assist the defendant,s; however, it will be znandatoi:y for Project Hope pat-ticipants to complete a substance abuse assessrnent, weekly urinalysis testing, HIV arrd SID education classes, atxd educational or vocatiozra[ training;

d. '1'he probation officer will determine if it is necessary for Project Hope participants to a.tt:ezzd monthly compliance rneetings with the caveat that all Project Hope par•ticipauits will attend at least one comptiance ineetiarg before successfirl completion of the program;

e. Project Hope participants will be required to complete all recomxnended treatment plarxs and prograrn.s; and

£ The judge sha11 b.e zrotified:of all positive.drng screens and 'zfthe'participant may be in danger or a danger to therrzselves.

227. Respondent sxever contacted Krakowski regarding these recornmezrdations, nor did she

take any fonxzal steps to implement the recommendations.

Bobbi fViffiarn.ss

228. Bobbi Williams was charged -tx%ith a 1" degree misdemeanor of Allowing Anot:her to

Operate a Motor Vehicle without the Legal Right to Do So. Williams was zepreseirted by

coizAxsel. (Case No. 2013 TIZD 004239.}

-39- 229. VJilliains' boyfi-iend, Fredclic Johnson, had opexated the vellicle, and he had also been

charged with vaxious n7istierneanors, including hut not tirnitecl to, License TZequireci to

Operate.

230. loluison appeared in coui-t on February 14, 2013 and pled iaot guilty to the charges against

him. A. subsequent cotul date was set for February 19, 2013; Erowever, 3ohnsoil failed to

appear. Accordingly, a capias was issued for lohnsoFa.

231. 011 Febiliary 21, 2013, Williams appeared in court. and pled no contest to the

rnisdemeaiior charge abain.st her. During the sentencing portion of Williams' case,

respondent becaaiie aware that a capias had beeai issued for .7ohnson.

232. Respondent refused to corltin:re sentencing Williaxns until lolmson appeared.

233. Respondent stated "It's her boyfriend. Sbe can rn.ake sure that he con7es into this

courtroom, or I can impose the jail time that I believe is appropriate tod4y." (Emphasis

added.) 234. Williams' attorney uied to iizfo.rm respondent that Williams could ziot rnalcc her boyfriend

appear. In a very irritated matiner, responclent then proceeded to sentence Wiltiarns to

two days in jail and a $100 fine.

Bond Ixiereases

235. Respondent increases bonds for defendants who request a trial, For example:

a. Qn June 30, 2009, Maul'ice Tucker appeared before respozicieDt of.a two cliarges - a recent Driving Uiader Suspension (DrJS) charge and a 2008 nxinor misderneanor traffic charge for which a capias had been issued. (Case Nos, 2008 TRS) 052369 and 2009 TRD 040E>82.}

b. Tucker was represented by A.ttorney David Eidenmitler.

c. "Iuclcer had a $1,500 bond on the DUS charge and a personal bond on tl}e traf'fic charge.

-40- d. Eidenmiller infoimed the cotrrt that Tucker titiished to enter a no contest plea to ttxe txaffic charge, bttt that lie wanted a continuance on th.e DTJS charge.

e. Respozadent accepted this proposal, but xather than granting a continuance, she set the matter for trial. SI-ie also inquired into whether 'rucker wou(d be able to pay the $1,500 bond on the DUS charge.

f As the parties were tryin.p, to pick a trial date, Eidetkniiller reclxzested that the trial be for both the DUS clxarge and the 2008 traffic charge.

g. Responderst stated that she was fizre witii Txlcker withdrawing his no con.test plea on the 2008 traffic violation, hut that if he warited a trial oz-i t}ie 2008 traffic vxolatioxis, she was going to increase the bond c>n tEie DUS charge t3ecattse Tucker "doesn't con-ie to court" on the traffic charge.

h. Respoix.dent further stated that "when we set bonds, we take everything into consid.eration, aard this is a gentlemen that does 3iot conic baelc to court." She specifically noted, liowever, that she did not warat to set a bond on a minor misdemeanor case,

i. At the time that respondent initially set the $1,500 bond, she had all tl7e same inforznation available to her as when she decided to increase th.e bond. The oiUy difference was that Tucker had reqiiested a trial.

Tnnpz-opez- i:Zevocafion.

236. On at least one occasion, respondent improperly revoked a defendant's probation dl.tc to

what she perceived to be rude and disrespectfuI conduct to the eourt,

a. On lvlarch 8, 2012, Angela Beckwitli pled no contest to a clxarge of solicitation. (Case No. 2012 CRB 002544.)

b. She was sentenced to 180 days in jail witlx all I 80 da}rs suspended and a$290 fine. She was also placed on two years of active probation with aia osder that she cozarplete the court's Project Hope Prugratn.

c. On. r3ecerxzber 17, 2012, Beckwith was in c:otu-z for a Project Hope compiiance zneeting. Late in the afternoon, r3eckwitTi's case was c;alled. I3eckwii^h was preseztted witl? a Certificate of Achievement axid some gifts .frotn local donors.

d. As Beckwith was feaving the courtroozn, the door slarnmed because Beckwitka's Ixands were full. Respoxxdent asked her bailiffs to bring f3eckwith.

-41- back into the courtroom whereupon responden.t iniorzlz.eci. I3ecicwith that she was beinp, held in contesnpt.

e. Respondent then order-ed the .fi.zfl 180 days of I3eckwitlx's sentence iz-zto executiotr without a#fordirit;l3eckwitiz any due process or conducting a proper contempt hearing.

Respondeztt set the matter for a mitigation hearing on Deceznber 19, 2012 at which tir.ae respondeiit ordered F3eckwith to be held in custody for five additional days. g. Respondent suspended the rema.inin.g 172 days of I3eckwith's sentence.

237'. As noted in previous cauzrts, iiadivic]taals (prosecutoxs, defcnse coz1nsel, and deferzdants)

are not pexznitted to question respondent's rUl.ings or cf ecisiorzs Without beitzg tlzrea:tened

with contempt. 238. Respondent's conduct as outiined above violates the Ohio Code of:Ju.clicial Conductaszd

tlze Ohio Rules of .^rofessioz^al Conduct specizeally Canon 1(3 judge shall uphol.d the

independence and integrity of tlte ju(iiciary) and Jud R. 1.2 (a judge shall act at all times

in a maniier that prom.otes public coz-Xidence in the izidependence, integrity, and

irnpaztiality of the judiciary); Czsion 2 (A judge shall xespect and comply with the law

and shall act at all tirrzes in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and

irzrpartiality o#'tize judiciary) and Ttid. R. 2.2 (A. jzadge shall uph.old and apply the law, and

slzall pei•foz`zn all duties of judicial o£tice fairly and iznpaz-tiallY)> DR 1-1Q2(A)(5) (a

lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is pre}udic3al to thP admi3iistration of justice) aald

Prof. Cond. R. 8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to tlie

administration of justice); and DR 1-I02(A)(6) (a lawyer shall irot engage in any other

corzduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law) azxd 3'rof. Cond, R.

8.4(h) (a lawyer shall ziot engage in'conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness

to practice law).

-42- Courrt Seveia - l_LeqtYest for 11!tetrta[ X-Iealtti rvalwition

239- Relator incoporates Paragrapixs 1 th.rough 238.

240. As alleged in Clie counts above, it is clear that for the past several years respondent:

a. I-las been unable to efficiently run a courtroom;

b. Perceives probiems where there are zaoaze;

c. Engages irr unprofessioa3al conduct, inciudiuig needless shouting matches with prosecutors, defense counsel, court employees, and the public; and

d. Views cortv:n.entsltluestions abou.t her decisions or actions as a personal attack ozz her and the itr.tegrity of the court.

241. Frorn a global perspective, responden.t's behavior bas nugatively impacted every

component ol:°the criminal justice system that she lia.s come into contact with as a judicial

officer ificl.uding prosecutors, public defenders, security bailiffs, persoDal bailiffs, court

reporters, psycl-datric olinic employees, probation officers, defendants, and the public --

and has led to the adoptioir of several court-wide rules or departmental policy changes in

order to accommodate respondent's unwarranted use of cotirt resources and constaiitly

changing expectatioiis.

242. Dcspite these accorrunodations, respondent has been unable or tlnwillitzg to recognize that

znost, if not a-ll, of the problems in her courtroona are the result of her own actiozis.

Rather tIian accepting responsibility fon c(:r conduct and working towards a resolutior),

respondent persists in blarnning others foz' tlie problerris in her courtroom.

243. Based upon the above facts and allegations, relator believes that respondent may be

suffering fi•oin a mental illness that su.bstaittially impairs lier ability to perforrn ber duties

as a judicial officer. In accordance witir Gov. Bar R.. V (7)(C), relator reqla.ests tliat the

Board of Commissioners on. Csrievaaices aird Disciplure or the laearislg panel ass:gned to

-43- this case order a psychiatric examination of respondent by one or jnorz pliysicians t3esignated'by the Board or hearing paziel.

_q.4.. CONCLUSION

VJherefore, pursuai.t to Gov. Bar R. V, the Ohio Code of Judicial Corrdu.ct, and the Uliio

Ruies of Professiflrzal Cozaducf, relator alleges that respondent is chargeable with miscond:rct; therefnre, relator requests that respondent be (lisciplined pursuant to Rule V of the Ruies of the

(3overa)rr,)ent of tlie Bar of Ohio.

^_ 9 v^ „` , l r t737^7,b^f.'} Mick^aUl E. Miriman (00290 6) Specia3 Proseetitor to ttle Uffice of Discitsli:iiary Couzisel 14701 Detroit Averiue, Suite 555 Lakewood, Ohio 44107 (216) 228-6996 -- Plaon.e (216) 226-9011 - F 'acsirnite

-^5- CER.TIRICATE

The undersigned, Ionatlian E. Coughla7r, Discipliiiary Ctnu-isel, of the Office of

Disciplinary Cotinsek of tl-re Suprenrae Court of Ohio llereby certifies that Michael E. ivlt.innan is duly authorized to represent relator in the premises and has aceeptecl the responsibility of prosecutin; the complaint to its conclusion. After investigation, relator believes reasonable cause exists to warrant a heari.iag on such complaint.

Da.ted: Septembe ^ ^ , 2013

for• Fi.lirig a Corrzplaint. Gov. Bar K. V, § 4(3) Requirernetats

(1) Defznition, "Cornplaint" means a forznal vGrriiten allegatioil of n-iisconduct or mental illness of a persozi designated as the respondent. ^* *- rricva.n.ce Committee. Six copies o£ all corriplaint.s shall be (°7) Complaint Filed by Certified C' filed with the Secre-tary of the Board. Corxi,plairits filed by a Certified Grievance Cotamiittee shall be filed in the riame of the committee as relator, 'I'be cornplaint shall not be accepted for filing ui7less signed by one or iiiore a.ttonreys admitted to the practice of law in Ohio, who sha.ll be caunsel for thexelator.. The corzrplaint shall be accompanied by a written certification, signad by the president, secretary, or chair of the Certified Grievance Committee, that the counsel are authorizad to represent tbe relator in the action and have accepted the responsibility of prosecuting the complaint to conc.lusion. The certification shall constitute tlie authoa-izatiozi of flze counsel to xepresent the relator in the action as fully and completely as if desipiiated aa7d appointed by orcler of the Supreme Court with all the privileges and iznm.unities of an officer o; the Supreme Court. The coanplaint also ii1ay be signed by the grievant. (y) Complairrt Filed by Uisciplinary Counsel. Six copies of all complaints shall be filed with the Secretary of the Board. Cornplaints filed by ttae Disciplinary Cotznsel shall be filed in the narne of the Disciplinary Cousisel as relator. (9) Service. Upon the filing of a complaint wit1-i the Seczetary of the Board, the relafor shall forNuard a copy of the complaint to the Disciplinary Counsel, the Certified Grievance Committee of the Ohio St:atc Bar Association, the local bar association, and any Cei-tiiied Grievance Committee serving the county or counties in which the respoiident resides and maintains an office and for ttze couarty frorn wl-rich the cornplaint arose.

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14Y G{)rlt'lt, ;tf?ll ; \p7";;',' ^ FILED

BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS APR 2 4 2014 ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE OF BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO ON GRIEVANCES & DISCIPLINE

In re:

Complaint against

Hon. Angela Rochelle Stokes Cleveland Municipal Courf 1200 Ontario St. P.O. Box 94894 No. Cleveland, OH 44113

Attorney Registration No. (0025650) FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND CERTIFICATE Respondent, (Rule V of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio.) Disciplinary Counsel 250 Civic Center Drive, Suite 325 Columbus, Ohio 43215-7411

Relator.

Now comes relator, Disciplinary Counsel, and alleges that respondent, Angela Rochelle

Stokes, an attorney at law, duly admitted to the practice of law in the state of Ohio, is guilty of

the follovving misconduct:

1. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the state of Ohio on October 29, 1984.

2. Respondent was elected to the Cleveland Municipal Court in November 1995 and has

served as a judge of that court since that time. She is currently one of 13 judges on the

court.

3. As an attorney and a judicial officer, respondent is subject to the Code of Professional

Responslbillty, the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, and the Ohio Code of Judicial

Conduct. Count One - Abuse of Court Resources

4. Since taking the bench in 1995, respondent has consumed a disproportionate amount of

the court's human and material resources due to her inability to administer her docket in a

timely manner, her lack of organization, and her unreasonable expectation that all court

employees be at her beck and call.

5. Starting in or around 2000, the Cleveland Municipal Court began enacting several °`court-

wide" rules in an attempt to address respondent's inordinate consumption of court

resources. In addition, each depai-tment within the court has revised its policies and

procedures to address issues created by respondent's behavior, actions, and demands.

For example:

a. The court enacted a rule requiring the bailiff department to transpoi-r all prisoners back to the workhouse by 4:00 F.M. The rule was later amended to require the bailiff department to collect all prisoners at 12:45 P.M. for return to the workhouse.

b. The court enacted a rule requiring that the Cleveland House of Corrections be in charge of coordinating all transportation to and from psychiatric treat7nent facilities.

c. The court enacted naandatoay lunch breaks for employees.

d. T'he court enacted a"10-minute" rule requiring probation officers, case managers, psychiatric clinic employees, and interpreters to return to their assigned workstations if not utilized within ten minutes of arrival in a courtroom to which they have been surnmoned.

e. The court enacted a ri.ile that no judge can occupy more than 10% of any court adininistrative staff s time. Additionally, each adn3inistrative staff member is limited to spending 301ninutes in any given judge's courtroom, after which the employee is to return to their workplace.

f. The court enacted a rule giving the head of the probation department the authority to question referrals or conditions of probation when he/she does not believe that the referral or condition is appropriately related to the offense. In such cases, the head of the probation department is to contact the referring judge, the presiding judge, and the court administrator whereupon a

-2- conference will be held to determine what should be done with the case as it relates to probation.

g. The court enacted a rule requesting that all official cout-troom business end by 5:00 P.M. and permitting employees to leave the courtroom if the tiineline is not adhered to.

h. The court enacted a rule ordering that no probation officer or case manager be called to a cottrtroom after 3:45 P,M. unless the individual would be able to leave the courtroom by 4:00 P.M.

i. The bailiff department and probation department scheduled some employees to work four 10-hour days rather than five 8-hour days to accommodate respondent's late courtroom hours.

The court enacted a rule limiting the request for second psychiatric evaluation requests to two per quarter.

k. The court enacted a rule ordering the probation department not to conduct any substance abuse screens and/or assessments on individuals charged with driving under suspension, no driver's license, hit-skip, or escalated moving violations unless the charge is also accompanied by a charge involving alcohol, drugs, or other mind-altering substances.

1. The court enacted a rule requiring psychiatric clinic staff to interview victims and/or witnesses only if they deemed it to be appropriate in their professional clinical judgment regardless of what may be stated on the referral form.

m. The court enacted a rule requiring judges to contact probation officers assigned to a specific case if assistance is needed. If the probation officer assigned to a case is not available, then the following individuals should be contacted in order listed: the probation officer's supervisor, the supervisor of the day, the deputy chief probation officer, and the chief probation officer.

6. In addition to the above rules, several agencies, as well as departments within the court,

have reduced rotations in respondent's courtroom to avoid staff burnout. For example,

security bailiffs are only assigned to four-hour shifts in respondent's courtroom, whereas

they are assigned to eight-hour shifts in all other courtrooms. Public defenders only serve

a two-month rotation in respondent's courtroom, wlaereas they serve a three-month

rotation in other couz-trooms. Moreover, after completing a two-montli rotation in

-3- respondent's courtroom, public dcfenders are permitted to pick the courtroom that they

vvould like to serve their next tlu-ee-month rotation in as a "reward."

7. Similarly, the probation department assigns cases from respondent's courtroom to a

specific set of probation officers, This is in large part due to respondent's difficult-to-

decipher referral forms, the inordinate amount of requirements that respondent places on

defendants, and the fact that respondent does not provide the probation department with

relevant information in a timely manner making it difficult for respondent's probation

cases to be monitored.

8. As alleged in Count Two, respondent treats security bailiffs in her courtroom in a rtlde,

demeaning, and unprofessional manner. In an attempt to limit the confrontations that

may occur froni respondent's erratic treatment of security bailiffs in her courtroom, the

bailiff department has created a list of "restricted assignment" bailiffs. Bailiffs on this

list are prohibited from serving in respondent's courtroom for a restricted period of time

ranging from a few weeks to indefinitely. There are currently 14 bailiffs on this list. Tlie

"restricted assignment" list only applies to respondent's courtroom - no other courtroom

has need for a"restricted assignment" list because in no other courtroom are bailiffs

subjected to the treatment they receive from respondent.

9. Prior to the enactment of the above mentioned rules and/or policy changes, it would not

have been unusual:

a. For respondent to be holding court until 7:00 P.M. or even 8:00 P.M. when other judges on the court liad typically completed their dockets by 3:00 P,M.;

b. For six to eight prisoners to be held for several hours - in a holding cell designed for two prisoners - while waiting for respondent to call their cases;

c. For city employees and attorneys, such as prosecutors, public defenders, bailiffs, probation officers, and staff support, to work well beyond their

-4- scheduled hours incurring excessive amounts of overtime or compensatory time;

d. For bailiffs to transport defendants assigned to respondent's docket to local hospitals and wait for several hours while the prisoner's evaluation was being completed;

e. For respondent to request that a second psychiatric evaluation be performed wlien she was not satisfied with the restiIts of the first examination; and

f. For court personnel who respondent summoned to her courtroom to wait in excess of 30 minutes before being utilized.

10. Even after the enactment of the above-mentioned rules, respondent has persisted in

conduct that led to the imposition of the rules in the first place. For example:

a. On April 29, 2004, Judge Larry A. Jones, who was the Presiding and Administrative Judge at the time, issued an inter-office correspondence stating that "interviews conducted by the doctor and staff of the Cleveland Municipal Court's Psychiatric Clinic of alleged victims and/or witnesses shall be restricted to those occasions when it is deemed appropriate by the doctor using his or her professional clinic judgment."

b. Despite this memorandum, respondent continued to request that psychiatric clinic staff intei view victims and/or witnesses.

c. On one particular occasion, on September 24, 2008, respondent refused to proceed with a mitigation hearing because the court psychiatric clinic declined to interview three witnesses that respondent requested be interviewed. In open court, respondent berated the psychiatric clinic and stated that it had "victimized" the witnesses again by choosing not to "pick up a telephone" and interview the witnesses. Respondent continued the matter until the witnesses could be subpoenaed to "voice their opinion" as to whether the defendant should be released.

11. In respondent's courtrooin, it is not unusual for a matter to be cozitinued five or six times

before being resolved thus requiring repeat appearances by attorneys, court staff, and

defenda.nts. In fact, when Cleveland State University professors Dana J. Hubbard and

Wendy C. Regoeczi reviewed respondent's courtroom and practices as part of a

coniprehensive review of Cleveland Municipal Court programs, they noted that

-5- continuances in respondent's courtroom were 300°/fl greater than in any other judge's

courtroom on the Cleveland Municipal Court.

12. A rnajority of the continuances in respondent's courtroom are designated as being at the

"defendant's request," when in reality they are not.

13. Due to the manner in which respondent conducts her docket, the court administrative

office has a difficult time finding assigned counsel to handle cases in respondent's

courtroom when the public defender's office is conflicted off a case.

14. Many attorneys on the court's assigned counsel list will not accept cases in respondent's

cour-troonl given the axnount of time they anticipate spending on a case and the maximum

fee to which they are entitled for the case.

15. Respondent regularly exhausts her yearly allotment of funds for drug and alcohol testing

early in the year and much earlier than any other judge on the Cleveland 1Viunicipal Court

because she orders defendants to undergo drug and alcohol testing even when it has no

reasonable relation to the charges against the defendant. For exanlple:

a. In 2009, each judge was allotted $5,000 for their Indigent Driver's Alcohol Assessment Fund. Respondent's fund was exhausted by May 1, 2009. At that time, every other judge on the court had at least $2,727.83 remaining.

b. In 2009, each judge was allotted $5,000 for their Defendant Drug Testing Account. Respondent's fund was exhausted on or about April 14, 2009. At that time, every other judge had at least $4,127 remaining.

c. In 2010, respondent's Indigent Driver's Alcohol Assessment Fund was exhausted on or about July 31, 2010.

d. In 2011, each judge was allotted $5,000 for their Defendant Drug Testing Account. Respondent's Drug Testing Account was exhausted on or about July 18, 2011.

-6- 16. When respondent's allotment of funds for drug and alcohol testing is exhausted, she

requires defendants to pay for their own testing oftentimes causing a hardship on

defendants with limited financial resources.

17. Respondent's conduct as outlined above violates the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Code

of Professional Responsibility, and the Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Canon

1(a judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary), Canon 2 (a judge

shall respect and coniply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes

public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary) and Jud R. 1.2 (a

judge shall act at all times in a rnamler that promotes public confidence in the

independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary); Canon 3(c)(1) (a judge shall

diligently discharge the judge's administrative duties without bias or prejudice and

maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and should cooperate with

other judges and court officials in the administration of court justice) and Jud. R. 2.5 (a

judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties competently and diligently and

shall comply with guidelines set forth in the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of

Ohio); and DR 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the

administration of justice) and Prof. Cond. R. 8.4 (d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct

that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).

Count Two - Abuse of Court Personnel

18. Relator incorporates paragraphs I through 17.

19. Respondent regularly acts in a rude, deineaning, and unprofessional manner towards

court personnel assigned to her courtroom. For exanlple:

-7- a. Respondent has regularly subjected personal bailiffs and security bailiffs assigned to her courtroo3n to "smell tests" in order to determine whether they are wearing any perfun-ie, cologne, or scented lotions, to which respondent allegedly has a sensitivity. In doing so, respondent invades or causes another to invade the personal space of her bailiffs.

b. Respondent expels court persomlel from her courtroom for coughing or sneezing while making comments such as "we don't want to expose this entire courtroom to whatever you have." On one occasion, respondent told a court employee not to come to work for six weeks because the employee's mother had shingles and the employee's daughter may have had chickenpox. Everi after the employee provided respondent witll a doctor's note indicating that shingles were not contagious and that her daughter did not have chickenpox, respondent still accused the employee of exposing her to "diseases."

c. Respondent regularly makes unprofessional personal comments about court personnel. For example, respondent accused one of her personal bailiffs of being a "bad mother," and she accused a security bailiff of "switching," i.e. walking with expressed hip movement.

20. Respondent regularly accuses bailiffs and probation officers in her courtroom of being

incoanpetent and not knowing how to do their jobs. Respondent makes these accusations

in open court and in front of members of the public.

21. Respondent imposes requirements on bailiffs in her courtroom that prevent them from

doing their jobs; however, when they attempt to perform their jobs andlor abide by

respondent's restrictive requirements, they are publicly lzwniliated by respondent. For

example:

a. Respondent does not allow her bailiffs to answer general questions fron} the public, but then accuses the bailiffs of incompetence or of not doing their job when a person interrupts court to ask respondent a question,

b. Respondent does not allow bailiffs to speak in court even if it is to ask someone to be quiet, but then accuses the bailiffs of incompetence or of not doing their job when the courtroom becomes too loud.

c. Respondent does not allow bailiffs to remove a person from the courtroom for any reason without her permission, but then accuses the bailiffs of incompetence or of not doing their job when the courtroom becomes too loud

-8- andlor a bailiff iriterrupts respondent to request permission to remove an individual from the courtroom.

d. Respondent does not allow bailiffs in her courtroom to review files in advance of court, but then accuses the bailiffs of ineoinpetence or of not doing their jobs when the bailiffs are not aware of what laappened on a previous day in court.

22. Incidents occurring on May 2, 2013 are illustrative of conduct that regularly occurs in

respondent's eourtroom. On May 2, 2013, Audene Vasquez was assigned to

respondent's courtroom as a security bailiff.

a. Upon arrival in respondent's courtroom at approximately 12:20 P.M., another security bailiff asked Vasquez to obtain information from a man standing near the journalizer's desk. As Vasquez was attenlpting to do so, respondent asked Vasquez what she was doing. Vasquez responded that she was trying to obtain information froxn the man; however, respondent stated that she did not ask her to do that. Vasquez never obtained the man's information,

b. Shortly thereafter, Vasquez positioned herself at the back door of respondent's courtroom. Momnts later, Defendant Dyanthea Taylor entered the courtroom and attempted to speak to Vasquez. Vasquez informed Taylor not to speak.. When respondent saw Taylor attempting to speak to Vasquez, she stated in a rude and demeaning manner that Taylor could not "continue to disrupt" court, that the bailiffs could not answer her questions, and that if Taylor had a question, she needed to direct it to the court. Respondent informed Taylor that if she disrupted court one more time, she would be placed in a holding cell. Taylor apparently rolled her eyes, whereupon respondent had Taylor immediately placed in the holding cell.

c. Respondent ordered that another security bailiff in the courtroom, Terry Gallagher, place Taylor in the holding cell and that Vasquez assist Gallagher in doing so. Once in the holding cell area, Gallagher told Taylor to apologize to respondent, and Taylor agreed to do so. Taylor, Gallagher, and Vasquez began to re-enter the courtroom; however, as soon as respondent saw them, she ordered them back to the holding cell area. After re-eritering the holding cell area, Taylor informed Vasquez that she was a diabetic and that she did not have her medication with her. She further informed Vasquez that she had been at the courthouse since 8:30 A.M. (approximately 4'/2 hours) waiting for her case to be called. Vasquez then contacted a bailiff department supervisor regarding Taylor.

d. A short time later, respondent asked another bailiff in the courtroom to hand some files to Vasquez to take to probation. Respondent then requested those

-9- same files back, while making the offhand comment that she [respondent] has to do the bailiffs' jobs.

e. Sometinie during the course of the day, a defendant, Tyisha Morrison, informed Vasquez that she had recently delivered premature twins who were still in the hospital. Morrison asked Vasquez to pray for her twins, and Vasquez said that she would. Later in the day, Vasquez bowed her head and prayed for Morrison and her twins, At the end of Vasquez's silent prayer, she smiled. At that moment, respondent berated a bailiff supervisor, whom respondent had requested come to her courtroom, for standing aiid "laughing" with Vasquez.

f. Between the in.cidents listed above and prior incidents, Vasquez felt so hurt and disrespected by respondent that she had to leave the courtroom.

23. Respondent requires that court personnel act immediately upon her request. If action is

not taken inlniediately, respondent will accuse the employee of incornpetence,

insubordination, andfor have the employee removed from her courtroom.

24. Respondent's public criticism of and/or personal comments about court employees has

reduced several eniployees to tears. Moreover, respondent's public criticism of

employees makes it very difficult for employees to perform their jobs because their

credibility has been diminished.

25. Respondent's impossible standards and dictates create an extremely stressful and hostile

work environment. In an attempt to address the work environ.3.nent in respondent's

courtroom, security bailiffs only serve a four-hour shift in respondent's courtroom, ratller

than the regular eight-hour shift in other courtrooms.

26. In addition, the court has decided not to provide respondent with a personal bailiff since

respondent has employed 21 different personal bailiffs at 27 different times since taking

the bench in 1995. Respondent's personal bailiffs have resigned from their position - a

position that pays nearly double the salary of a security bailiff - after a year or less.

-10- 27. Respondent's conduct as outlined above violates the Ohio Rules of Judicial Conduct and

the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Canon 1(A judge shall uphold the

integrity and independence of the judiciary), Canon 2 (a judge shall respect and comply

with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the

integrity and impartiality of the judiciary), and Jud. R. 1.2 (A judge shall act at all times

in a manner that promotes public confdence in the independence, integrity, and

impartiality of the judiciary); {Caaron 3(B)(4) (A judge shall be patient, dignified, and

courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in

an official capacity) and Jud. R. 2.8 (A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to

litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others with whom the

judge deals in an official capacity); and DR 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not engage in

conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice and Prof. Cond. R. 8.4(d) (a

lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejtadicial to the administration of justice).

Count Three - Abuse of Lawyers

28. Relator incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 27.

29. Prosecutors, public defenders, and private defense counsel that appear before respondent

are prohibited from asking questions about courtroom procedure or requesting further

clarification of respondent's a:ulings. If they do so, they are told that they are "out of

order" atid threatened with contempt or referral to a disciplinary authority. The following

are some examples of the confrontations that respondent has had with prosecutors, public

defenders, and private defense counsel in her courtroom.

David Eidentniller

-11- 30. On May 21, 2009,1Vlatthew Gabriel appeared before respondent with his attorney, David

Eidennziller, for sentencing on a Driving Under Suspension (DUS) charge. (Case No.

2008 TRD 071751.) Gabriel's license had been suspended due to a DUI conviction.

31. The maximum penalty for DUS is 180 days in jail and a $1,000 fine.

32. Gabriel had already spent two days in jail. Respondent sentenced Gabriel to an

additional three days in jail and a $300 fine. She suspended the reinaining 175 days.

33. Respondent requested the location of Gabriel's vehicle so that she could have it

immobilized.

34. Gabriel informed responderit that he had sold the vehicle in January 2009, but that he did

not have proof of the sale with him in court.

35. Respondent noted that the probation report indicated that as of April 21, 2009, Gabriel

still appeared to be to the titled owner of the vehicle.

36. Based on this information, respondent ordered the full 178 days into execution, but set

the matter for a niitigation hearing on May 27, 2009.

37. When Eidenmiller tried to advocate on behalf of his clierit and explain that the probation

report only reflects the last person who registered the vehicle, respondent threatened to

hold Eidennliller in contenlpt and place him in the holding cell with Gabriel,

38. The following day, Gabriel's family was able to provide proof that the vehicle had been

sold, and respondent reduced Gabriel's sentence to the original three days,

Michael Winston

39. On August 19, 2010, Keynan Willia►ns pled no contest to a minor misdemeanor Drug

Abuse marijuana charge and a lst degree Driving Under Suspension (DUS) charge in

-12- exchange for a 4"' degree Open Container charge and a minor misdemeanor seat belt

charge being dismissed. (Case nos. 2010 CRB 021617 and 2010 TI^D 038170.)

40. On August 23, 2010, Williams was in court with his attorney, Michael Winston, for

sentencing.

41. On the DUS charge, respondent sentenced Williams to 180 days in jail with 178 days

suspended and a$1,000 fine with $800 suspended. On the drug abuse charge, respondent

fined Williams$50.

42. Respondent also ordered Williams to one year of active probation with randoni

breathalyzer and urinalysis testing.

43. After the seiitencing, Williams was taken to the holding cell. After Williams left the

courtroom, Winston attenipted to make an objection on the record as to the imposition of

active probation because it was not related to the DUS charge and not permitted by the

drug abuse charge.

44. Respondent proceeded to say that "t11is makes absolutely no sense" and that she would

have never accepted the plea if she knew that Williams objected to getting treatment. She

then threatened to sentence Williams to the full 180 days because of Winston's objection.

During the confrontation, respondent told Winston twice to "shut your mouth" and

tlireatened to place him in the holding cell with Willianis on contempt charges.

Tiria Tricarichi

45. On October 28, 2010, Tina Tricarichi was in respondent's courtroom with her client,

Darius Andrews, for sentencing on several cases. (Case nos. 2010 CRB 040350, 2010

CRB 008032, 2010 TRD 001047.)

-13- 46. During the sentencing, Tricarichi did not lxear one of the conditions imposed on Andrews

because Andrews was talking to her.

47. Tricarichi said "Pardon," and repeated what she believed was the condition to ensure that

she had heard it correctly.

48. Resporident stated that Tricarichi was correct, but that she should have been listening to

the court in the first place. Respondent further stated that it was "outrageous" that she

had to repeat herself "three or four times" during a sentencing.

49. After the sentencing was coznplete, Andrews stated "Thank you, your Honor."

50. Respondent continued to berate Tricarichi by stating, "He [tlle defendant] understands.

He knows. She [Tricarichi] doesn't understand what the court is saying."

51. Respondent accused Tricarichi of talking during the sentencing, but when Tricarichi

attempted to explain herself, respondent stated that she was "tired of going through this

for the past two months" and that she was not "going to tolerate it."

52. Respondent then stated--in open court--that she had already spoken to Tricarichi's

supervisors about Tricarichi.

53. The confrontation ended with respondent threatening to hold Tricarichi in contempt and

placing her in the holding cell if she said "one other word."

Angela Rodriquez

54. On January 13, 2011, Attorney Angela Rodriquez was assigned to respondent's

courtroom as the city prosecutor.

55. On at least two occasions, respondent asked Rodriquez what was reflected on the LEADS

report for various defendants without being specific as to what type of information she

-14- was seeking, i.e. number of previous convictions, number of previous driver's license

suspensions, or both.

56. In each case, Rodriquez answered as she believed appropriate, and respondent did not ask

follow-up questions or request additional inforination.

57. Later, when additional infoi-ination on the LEADS report was revealed, respondent

publicly accused Rodriquez of intentionally providing the court with inaccurate

inforination.

Scott Malbasa

58. On June 16, 2011, Attorney Scott Malbasa was representing a defendant in a trial before

respondent.

59. O;ie of the defense witnesses was being cross-examined by the prosecutor; however, the

lndivldual was not seated in the witness stand. He was standing at the podium witli

Malbasa.

60. At one point during the prosecutor's questioning, the witness began talking at the same

time as the prosecutor.

61. Respondent interrupted the trial and instructed the witness not to speak at the same time

as the prosecutor.

62. Respondent then stated that it would be better for the individual to sit in tlae witness stand

because he was "out of control in this courtroom" and she was "not going to peranit it."

63. At that point, Malbasa attempted to place an objection on the record.

64. Respoaident would not permit Malbasa to make his objection, and the situation quickly

deteriorated into a shouting match between Malbasa and respondent with respondent

telling Malbasa to "shut your mouth" and threatening to hold him in contempt.

-15- Henry Hilow

65. On September 25, 2012, Attorn.ey fienry Hilow was in court with his client, Frank

Petrucci, for a first pre-trial. (Case No. 2012 TRC 050939.)

66. Hilow and Petrucci both checked in at approximately 8:30 A.M.; however, the case was

not called until approximately 11:40 A.M.

67. When the case was called, Hilow informed respondent that he had already spoken to the

prosecutor and that the prosecutor had agreed to a continuance. Ililow requested that the

pre-trial be rescheduled for October 24, 2012.

68. After confirnling Hilow's statements with the prosecutor, respondent asked Hilow what

time he would like the pre-trial to be set.

69. I-Iilow inquired into wliether it would be appropriate to request a later start time because

based on his observations, respondent called cases with police officers first.

70. Respondent stated that Hilow's observations were incorrect for various reasons.

71. When Hilow informed respondent that he was not trying to insult the court, respondent

replied "I think that you are. I think you are out of order. This court is not going to

accept it." Respondent then told Hilow that he was "out of order" again and that he

needed to "watch his conduct" in the courtroom.

Ashley Janesl,Ioanna Lopez

72. On May 7, 2013, Attorney Ashley Jones was in court ivith her client, Robert Downing.

Downing had been charged with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs (DUl).

(Case No. 2013 TRC 016088.)

-16- 73. This was Downing's 3d DUI in 6 years; therefore, the offense car-ried mandatory jail tinle

and mandatory vehicle forfeiture.

74. Prior to Dowiling's case being called, Jones had advised the city prosecutor, Joanna

Lopez, that Downing was willing to plead guilty to the DUI, so long as some kind of deal

could be worked out where the vehicle would not forfeited. Jones informed Lopez that

the vehicle was a family vehicle and that it would cause hardship on the family if it was

forfeited. Jones further informed Lopez that she believed there was some type of

hardship exception in the statute that would allow the vehicle not to be forfeited.

75. Jones and Lopez discussed all sorts of possibilities including anlending the charge to a 2"a

in 6, which did not require mandatory vehicle forfeiture. Ultimately, Jones and Lopez

agreed to approach respondent with details of their possible plea offer.

76. At the first sidebar, respondent was initially receptive to the idea of a hardship exception,

but was concerned with the legality of such a proposal. Jones offered to brief the issue

for the court; however, respondent would not permit it. She ultimately informed Jones

and Lopez that she would not accept a plea offer without mandatory vehicle forfeiture,

and that she would recall the case in a few moments.

77. Jones left the sidebar and informed her client as to what respondent had stated at the

sidebar. Downing then informed Jones that he wanted a jury trial,

78. At a second sidebar, Jones informed respondent that her client wanted a jury trial.

Respondent then stated that Jones was the reason this case ivas not being resolved today

and that slie could not believe that Jones and Lopez would ask her to do sornething

"illegal." Respondent informed Jones and Lopez that she was "disgusted" by them and

that she should report them to the Supreme Court of Ohio for ethical violations.

-17- 79. Respondent's conduct as outlined above violates the Ohio Rules of Judicial Conduct and

the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Jud. R. 1.2 (a judge shall act at all

times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independenee, integrity, and

impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of

impropriety); Jud. R. 2.8 (a judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants,

jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others with whom the judge

deals in ann official capacity); atad Prof. Cond. R. 8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in

conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice).

Count Four - Abuse of Defendants and the Public

80. Relator incorporates Paragraphs I through 79.

81. The Cleveland Municipal Court receives complaints from defendatits and the general

public about every judge on the court; however, the number of complaints received

against respondent is proportionally much higher than any other judge on the court.

a. Most, if not all, of the complaints allege that respondent's attitude towards them was patronizing, demeaning, insulting, or dismissive.

b. Many of the complaints allege that respondent has no respect for their time. The complaints highlight scenarios in which a defendant was in court all day waiting for his or her case to be called, only to be told that he or she needed to return the next day. In some cases, a defendant has been required to come back for a third day.

c. Many of the complaints also allege that an individual has or is in danger of losing his or her job due to the amount of time spent in respondent's courtroom.

82. Respondent also treats defendants and the public in her courtroom in an impatient and

unprofessional manner. She publicly reprimands individuals, expels them from her

courtroom, or places them in holding cells for minor infractions such as whispering.

-18- 83. Respondent regularly confiscates all cell phones in her courtroom due to the presence of a

single displayed or ringing phone.

84. As with attorneys in her courtroom, if an individual speaks up - claims innocence or

attempts to explain his or her conduct - respondent will threaten the individual with

contempt of court and up to three days in jail.

85. Below are some examples of respondent's impatient and unreasonable temperament in

response to activity in her courtroom, including cell phone usage:

Cell Phone Usage

86. On October 28, 2010, respondent confiscated all eell phones in the courtroom.

87. On July 20, 2011, respondent confiscated cell phones belonging to two individuals and

had the individuals thrown out of the courtroom for using the phones. She also

threatened to place the individuals in a holding cell.

88. On August 9, 2011, respondent publicly berated a woman in the courtroonl because her

cell phone rai7g. Specifically:

a. On August 9, 2011, respondent was in the process of sentencing a defendant.

b. During the plea colloquy, respondent heard a cell phone say "droid."

c. Respondent ordered that the phone be confiscated, but either out of fear or because she was unaware that it was her phone making the noise, the woman did not adinit ownership of the phone.

d. When no one adniitted ownership of the offending phone, respondent ordered her bailiffs to confiscate all cell phones in the courtroom.

e. As the bailiffs were confiscating phones, the woman's phone said "droid" again, and respondent identified the phone as belonging to the woman.

f. The woman began to say that she thought her phone was off, but respondent accused her of lying and ordered her to be placed in the holding cell.

-19- g. The wonian attempted to say that she did not know that it was her phone that was ringing; however, respondent would not permit her to speak. Respondent further stated that if the woman said another word, she would hold her in contempt and place her in jail for "three consecutive days" because her conduct in the courtroom was "outrageous."

89. On March 21, 2013, there were two people in the courtroom who were using their

cellular phones; however, the phones did not create a noticeable disruption to courtroom

proceedings. Rather than just confiscating the phones that were being used, respondent

ordered that every phone in the courtroom be confiscated.

90. The above listed examples are only a sanipling of the times when respondent has

confiscated either aii individual's or the entire courtroom's phones.

Novella Black

91. On October 28, 2010, Novella Black was in court on charges of domestic violence and

endangerin.g children. (Case No. 2010 CRB 021049.)

92. The public defender's office was unable to represent Black due to a conflict of interest;

therefore, the matter was continued for appointment of counsel.

93. As Black was leaving the courtroom, the doors to the courtroom made an audible noise.

94. Respondent instructed her bailiffs to bring Black back into the courtrooin.

95. When Black re-entered, respondent stated that she was holding Black in contempt and

placing her in the holding cell.

96. Black asked respondent what she had done, and respondent stated that Black had

slammed the doors and was rude to the court.

97. Black stated that she did not slam the doors, but respondent spoke over Black and ordered

her bailiffs to take Black into custody. Respondent then ordered Black not to "say

another word to this Court before you go to jail for three days."

-20- 98. Black ivas taken into custody at approximately 11:43 A.M. .

99. At approxiinately 2:55 P.M. (over three hours later), Black was brought back into the

courtroom.

100. Respondent asked Black if there was anything she wanted to say. Black replied that she

had nothing to say.

101. Respondent then stated that if Black did not apologize to the court, she would be placed

in,jail for three days. Respondent "offered" to place Black back in the holding cell to

give her time to think about whether she wanted to apologize to the court.

102. At that point, Black abruptly stated, "I apologize to the court."

Charlotte Shutes

103.

before respondent.

104. Upon entering the courtroom, Shutes was advised to remove her earpiece because

respondent permitted absolutely no talking in the courtroom. Shutes did as insti-ucted.

105. At one point, Shutes left the courtroom to pay her son's fine. When she returned, she

handed the payment receipt to her son, who said "Thanks" or "Thank You." A few

minutes later, Shutes was expelled from the courtroom for talking.

106. Shutes was humiliated by the situation.

,S'hatauna Moore

107. On November 20, 2012, Shatauna Moore was in court with her attorney, Margaret Walsh,

for a probation violation hearing. (Case No. 2012 TRD 007856.)

-21- }

108. Moore had also been charged with a felony that was set for a pre-trial on the following

day, November 21, 2012,.

109. Walsh requested a continuance of the probation violation laearing due to the fact that the

felony was still pending.

110. In deciding whether or not to grant the continuance, respondent began reviewing Moore's

file.

111. Respondent inquired into whetlier Moore had taken a urinalysis test recently. Moore

stated that she had approximately two weeks earlier through Key Decisions Treatment

Center.

112. Respondent informed Moore that she needed to take a urinalysis test through the

probation departYnent and that she needed to do it before she would grant a continuaaice

of the probation violation hearing.

113. Walsh advised respondent that Moore did not have the $9 to pay for the urinalysis test

that day, but that she could have it the following day.

114. Respondent told Moore that she was not going to place the matter on her docket for

tomorrow aiid that Moore needed to figure out how she was going to pay for the

urinalysis test that day.

115, Moore responded by rolling her eyes.

116. At first, respondent stated that if Moore rolled her eyes one more time, she was going to

take Moore into custody; however, respondent quickly changed her mind and decided to

take Moore into custody immediately for rolling her eyes.

-22- Kennelh 7aylor

117. On November 27, 2012, Kenneth Taylor was representing himself pro se against a miiior

misdemeanor charge of disorderly conduct. (Case No. 2012 CRB 038736.)

118. A few days earlier, Taylor had filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the city had not yet

responded to.

119. The case was continued until December 14, 2012 so that the city could respond to the

Motion to Dismiss.

120. Taylor calmly stated that he would like to make anotller Motion to Dismiss because this

was his third time in court with no officer present.

121. Respondent replied in a rude and condescending manner:

Sir, let me tell you something. That's what you don't understand. That's why you need to hire an attorney because you don't have a clue as to what you are doing in a courtroom. You filed the motion. The city has a right to respond to the motion. She just got the motion and she's gonna respond. And it's set for a hearing December 14 at 2:00 P.M. Is there anything else?

122. When Taylor attempted to address another motion that he had filed, respondent requested

that Taylor be escorted to the elevator. As Taylor was leaving, respondent instructed her

bailiff to bring Taylor back into the courtroom to go to the workhouse if he does

"anything out of line" or if he "says another word."

Jamese Johnson, Jasmine Eelvvar•ds, and Lisa Barbee

123. On March 5, 2013, Jamese Johnson was in respondent's cotartroom on a charge of Petty

Theft. She was accompanied by her mother-in-law, Lisa Barbee. (Case No. 2011 CRB

043197.)

-23- 124. On the saine day, Jasmine Edwards was also in respondent's courtroom on charges of

Driving Under Suspension, Driving while Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs, and

other cliarges that were eventually dismissed. (Case Nos. 2011 TRC 002970 and 2012

TRD 068011.)

125. Johnson and Edwards did not know each otller, however, while waiting for their

respective cases to be called, Jolanson (and Barbee) and Edwards sat in the same row.

126. At approximately 11:45 A.M., Johnson caught her hair in the zipper of a piece of clothing

that she was wearing. Johnson reacted by saying "C)ueh," "F k," or something similar

to express the momentary pain caused by getting her hair caugllt in the zipper.

127. Respondent heard Johnson's expression, but attributed it to Edwards. Without requesting

any further information, such as a name or an explanation, respondent ordered her bailiff

to place EdNvardsin the holding cell.

128. At that point, Jolinson spoke up and stated that she was the one who had said something,

not Edwards. Respondent then ordered her bailiff to place Edwards and Jolinson in the

holding cell.

129. As the bailiff approached, Barbee stated that Edwards and Jolztrson had done nothing

wrong. At that point, respondent ordered "all three" (Edwards, Johnson, and Barbee) to

be placed in the holding cell.

130. Edwards and Jolnason were in the holding cell for approximately 30 minutes to an hour,

and Barbee was in the holding cell for 15-20 minutes longer than them.

131. During the above events, Attorney Ian Friedman was present. Although closer in

physical proximity to Johnson, Edwards, and Barbee than respondent, he did not hear any

-24- discussion or disruptive behavior from thein prior to respondent ordering her bailiff to

place Edwards in the holding cell,

132. Attorney Bryan Ramsey was also present during the above events. He heard some type

of audible noise shortly before respondent ordered Edwards to be placed in the holding

cell; however, the noise was not disruptive to court proceedings.

133. Respondent's conduct as outlined above violates the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct and

the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Jud. R. 1.2 (a judge shall act at all

times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and

impartiality of the judiciary); Jud. R. 2.6 (a judge shall accord to every person who has a

legal interest in a proceeding the riglit to be heard according to the law); Jud. R. 2.8 (a

judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigaiats, jurors, witnesses, lawyers,

court staff, court officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity);

and Prof. Cond. R, 8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the

administration of justice).

Count Five - Abuse of Constitutional Freedoms

134. Relator incorporates Paragraphs I through 133.

135. Respondent requires all individuals entering her courtrooni, including family and friends

of defendants, to sign in and provide information as to why they are in the courtroom. At

times, respondent has also prolubited individuals from leaving her courtroom, even if it is

to use the restroom.

136. These practices inhibit the free flow of individuals from a public courtroom and may

even impact an individual's ability or willingness to attend a public proceeding.

-25- 137. As discussed further in Count Six, respondent oversees the court's Project Hope docket.

Vyjhen respondent conducts these dockets, they oftentimes have a religious overtone. For

example, during past Project Hope compliance hearings, respondent has had an

individual standing by her side on the bench that served as her "religious adviser." On at

least one occasion, a meinber of respondent's church presented Project Hope participatnts

with a scarf that had a cross on it and blessed each participant as they received the scarf.

138. Respondent regularly prohibits or inhibits the right of defendants to represent themselves

pro se. Respondent will question defendants about their choice to represent themselves

and imply that they n-iay be sentenced to a longer jail sentence or larger fine if they do not

obtain counsel. In at least one case, respondent told a pro se defendant that he had to be

represented by counsel in her courtroom. Below are some of the most offensive

examples of instances where respondent has required or implied that a defendant needs to

be represented by counsel.

Carolyn Massengale-Hasan

139. On January 20, 2011, Carolyn Massengale-Hasan was in court on a Lacense Required to

Operate, Seat Belt, and Expired Sticker charges. (Case No. 2010 TRD 077438.)

140, Massengale-Hasan informed respondent that she was not represented by counsel.

141. Respondent asked Massengale-flasan what she intended to do about her legal counsel in

a case that cai-ried a maximum fine of up to six months in jail and a$1,000 fine.

142. Massengale-Hasan asked respondent whether she was permitted to ask a question.

143. Respondent would not permit. Masserigale-Hasan to ask a question until Massengale-

Hasan had answered respondent's previous question about legal counsel.

-26- 144. Massengale-Hasan again informed respondent that she did not have legal counsel, so

respondent continued the matter until January 21, 2011.

145. Massengale-Hasan informed respondent that sbe had school on the 215t, to which

respondent stated that that was Massengale-Hasan's problem. Respondent stated that

MassengaIe-Hasan had to be in cour-t on the 21 St or a capias would be issued for her

arrest.

146. When Massengale-Hasan attetnpted to speak, respondent threatened to hold Massengale-

Hasan in contempt of court. Respondent then had Massengale-Hasan escorted out of the

courtroom so that she would not "slani doors or act up in this courtroom.°"

147. Massengale-Hasan returned to respondent's courtroom on January 21, 2011 with counsel

that she retained in the hallway just prior to entering the courtroom. She pled no contest

to the License Required to Operate charge, and the remainder of the charges were

disniissed.

Dezi Tfalker

148. On March 2, 2011, Walker appeared in court on a traffic control violation (running a red

light); however, the matter had been charged as a 3d degree misdemeanor. (Case No.

2011 TRD 007301.)

149. Walker appeared in court without counsel. He informed respondent that he had spoken to

the public defender's office, but that they would not represent him.

150. The public defender assigned to respondent's courtroom then informed respondent that

Walker did not qualify for assistance.

151. Respondent informed Walker that he had "options," but the only option she gave him was

to continue his case to obtain counsel.

-27- 152. Walker attempt to make a motion to dismiss because the officer was not present;

however, respondent informed Walker that the matter was not set for trial and that since it

was a 3d degree misdemeanor carrying up to a $500 fine and 60 days in jail, he needed to

discuss the matter with an attorney.

153. Respondent continued the matter until March 29, 2011.

154. On March 29, 2011, Walker appeared without counsel. Although he still did not qualify

for assistance, the public defender assigned to respondent's courtroom agreed to assist

Walker if he wanted to resolve the matter that day. The public defender informed Walker

that the prosecutor would probably reduce the charge to a 4th degree misdemeanor, but

Walker stated that he was not guilty.

155. Respondent continued the matter until April 13, 2011 at 9:00 A.M, and advised Walker

that he had to retain counsel and that his counsel had to be present on April 13, 2011.

156. Although Walker's case was scheduled for 9:00 A.M. on April 13, 2011, it was not called

unti15:40 P.M. after the public defender had left for the day. Since Walker did not liave

retained counsel with him, respondent inquired into whether he wanted the matter

continued so that he could be represented by the public defender.

157. Walker stated that he did not want a continuance and that he wanted the matter set for

trial. Respondent stated that Walker needed the public defender's office to make that

determination for hin7, but since the public defender was no longer there, she was

continuing the matter until the following day.

158. Walker informed respondent that he could not appear the following day, so respondent

arbitrarily set the matter for April 18, 2011. When Walker attempted to question

respondent about why his case kept getting continued, respondent stated that she was not

-28- going to "argue" witli him. As Walker continued to talk, respondent tlu-eatened hizn with

contempt and time in the holding cell the next time he appeared in court.

159. Walker failed to appear for his pre-trial on April 18, 2011.

160. The matter came before respondent again on June 29, 2011 at which time the prosecutor

disrnissed the charges because they had been incorrectly charged as a 3r^ degree

misdemeanor rather than a niinor misdemeanor and the time for bringing the matter to

trial had passed.

Fernado Taylor

161. On May 25, 2011, Fernado Taylor was in court on a charge of Tow Truck/City License.

(Case No. 2011 CR13 0 15357.)

162. Taylor was not represented by counsel, nor did he want a continuance to seek legal

counsel.

163. Respondent would not allow Taylor to proceed with his case and stated that "in this

courtroom, you need to be represented by an attorney."

164. Respondent then told Taylor to "sit down" and "think about tliis." She then mumbled

under her breath, "this is outrageous."

165. While 'faylor was waiting for his case to be recalled, a bailiff in the courtroom informed

Taylor that the only way he was going to be able to resolve his case is if he retained

counsel.

166. When Taylor's case was recalled, he stated that he would obtain an attorney, which he

subsequently did.

167. Respondent's conduct as outlined above violates the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct,

specifically Canon 1(a judge shall uphold the independence and integrity of the

-29- judiciary) and Jud R. 1,2 (a jtxdge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public

confidence in the independence, integrity, and irnpartiality of the judiciary); Canon 2 (A

judge shall respect and comply urith the law and shall act at all times in a manner that

promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary) and Jud. R.

2.2 (A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office

fairly and inlpartially); and DR 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is

prejudicial to the administration of justice) and Prof. Cond. R. 8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not

engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).

Count Six - Abusive Legal Errors

168. Relator incorporates Paragraphs I t1uough 167.

169. Respondent regularly coerces pleas from defendants by implying that they will receive a

harsher sentence if they go to trial or by treating defendants in a frustrated and impatient

manner until they enter a plea to the charges.

170. Respondent regularly solicits information from defendants about their mental health

status and/or drug aiid -alcohol use even when it has no reasonable relationship to the

charges against the defendant. Oftentimes, respondent will reveal this information in

open court, i.e. reading from psychiatric reports, thus publicly revealing personal and

confidential information about defendants and making defendants very uncomfortable in

the courtroom.

Hasty Decisions

171. Respondent uses inforniation learned from defendants about their mental health status

and/or drug and alcohol use to make hasty and unwazranted decisions about the

defendants and/or about conditions for probation. For example:

-30- Jafnes Luster

172. On January 31, 2002, Jatnes Luster appeared before respondent with his attorney,

Margaret Walsh, for sentencing on a License Required to Operate Charge. (Case No.

2001 TRD 108484.)

173. Luster had previously been in court on January 7, 2002 and January 30, 2002 for

sentencing; however both times, Luster's sentencing had been continued,

174. On January 31, 2002, respondent senteneed Luster to 180 days in jail, with 150 days

suspended, an alcohol assessment, and substance abuse counseling. She also fined Luster

$100.

175. Following the sentencing order, Walsh challenged the cout-t's imposition of an alcohol

assessment and substance abuse counseling because they were not reasonably related to

the charge against Luster. Walsh also requested that Luster be given credit for time

served for the two days that Luster spent in respondent's courtroom waiting for his

sentencing hearing.

176. Respondent denied Walsh's request and instead decided to suspend only 120 days of

Luster's sentence thereby doubling Luster's actual time in jail to 60 days.

177. On February 15, 2002, Luster filed a Notice of Appeal with the Eighth District Court of

Appeals.

178. On March 15, 2002, respondent suspended all fines against Luster and gave him credit

for the 34 days of,jail time that he had already served. She suspended the remaining 146

days of Luster's sentence.

179. On November 27, 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed Luster's appeal as moot because

Luster had already served his time in jail; however, the court noted that "a trial court

-31- abuses its discretion when it imposes a sentence based upon the conduct of the defense

attorney."

Gabriel Matthew

180. See Paragraphs 3 0 through 3 8 of Cotuit Two for facts regarding Gabriel Matthew.

Dataiel O'Reilly

181. On June 3, 2009, Daniel O'Reilly appeared before respondent on charges of aggravated

trespass and aggravated menacing. (Case No. 2009 CRB 014228.) He was not

represented by counsel.

182. O'Reilly politely asked respondent for permission to say something on his own behalf,

but respondent would not permit him to speak without legal counsel present. At that

point, Attorney David Eidenmiller (public defender) agreed to assist O'Reilly with his

case.

183, O'Reilly's file indicated that O'Reilly had some kind of mental illness. Accordingly,

respondent asked O'Reilly whether he was taking his medication.

184. O'Reilly responded that he was not taking his medication and that he had not taken his

medication for over 30 days due to a number of reasons involving Medicare, Social

Security, etc.

185. Respondent then requested a sidebar on the record; however, halfway through the

sidebar, respondent muted all microphones in the courtroom.

186. During the sidebar, O'Reilly agreed to speak with Jerome Saunders, a court psychiatric

employee, regarding his mental health condition and lack ofinedication.

187. Thereafter, O'Reilly met with Saunders.

-32- 188. O'Reilly's case was recalled approximately two hours later.

189. When the case was recalled, respondent asked Saunders to place his findings on the

record as to whetller O'Reilly was suicidal, homicidal, or needed ernergency psychiatric

hospitalization.

190. Saunders testified that O'Reilly was not suicidal or homicidal and that he did not require

emergency psychiatric hospitalization. Saunders stated, however, that O'Reilly needed to

obtain and take his medication.

191. Based on Saunders' testimony, respondent continued the inatter until June 9, 2009 (six

days later). She allowed O'Reilly's personal bond to rernain in effect on condition that

he not go to Tower City Mall, not have any contact with his alleged victini, and go

iznmediately to Lakewood Ilospital to obtain his medication. O'Reilly confirzned that he

understood the court's orders and that he would abide by thenl.

192. As everyone was preparing to leave the coui-troom or inove on to the next case,

respondent told Saunders that O'Reilly takes four Tylenol PM per night, which was

against the dosage recommendation on the box.

193. Saunders stated that O'Reilly had not told him this information during their conversation,

but that he still believed that O'Reilly was willing and able to obtain his medication as

previously indicated.

194. Respondeiat then comnrented that if O'Reilly overdoses on the Tylenol PM, it will be "on

all our consciences for the rest of our lives."

195. Respondent then ordered that O'Reilly appear in her courtroom on June 4, 2009, rather

than June 9, 2009, with proof tnat he had gone to Lakewood Hospital to obtain his

medication.

-33- 196. Thereafter, respondent changed her mind again. because she did not have "peace" with the

situation.

197. Respondent ordered O'Reilly to be taken into custody immediately and transported to St.

Vincent's Charity Hospital. She stated that "it is not going to be on my conscience. It is

not going to be on my conscience." She then continued O'Reilly's case until June 5,

2009. (Emphasis added.)

198. On June 5, 2009, O'Reilly appeared in court with Attorney Eidenmiller.

199. Eidenmiller informed the court that O'Reilly had been seen by the court's psychiatric

clinic and by St. Vincent's, and both had released him without providing him with any

medications.

200. Based on this inforniation, respondent initially stated that she was not going to release

O'Reilly from custody because she believed that he was a harm to himself and others.

She stated, "If I don't have peace, he won't be released."

201. However, respondent later changed her inind and gave O'Reilly a personal bond on

condition that he obtain his medication immediately.

AZelixin Cary

202. On December 21, 2010, Melvin Cary was in court with his counsel, Thomas Kraus.

(Case No. 2010 TRD 064130.)

203. Cary pled no contest to the two charges against him - Driving Under Suspension and Full

Time and Attention. The matter was referred to the probation department for a pre-

sentencing report and was continued until January 19, 2011.

204. On January 19, 201 l; Cary appeared with Kraus for sentencing. The pre-sentencing

report indicated that this was Cary's 12th conviction for driving under suspension and that

-34- he had last used alcohol and marijuana in early December 2010. There was no

information suggesting that Cary's alcohol or marijuana usage was connected to the

pending charge.

205. Based on this inforniat'ron, respondent sentenced Cary to 180 days in jail and placed him

on two years of active probation with random drug and alcohol screening. Respondent

set the matter for a initigation hearing on February 24, 2011; however, it was later

continued until March 8, 2011,

206. On March 8, 2011, Cary appeared with Kraus for a mitigation hearing.

207. During this hearing, respondent expressed concerns with Cary's marijuana and alcohol

use and stated that it was a"huge risk" to release Cary into the public.

208. She stated that if she released him from custody, she was considering placing him on

house arrest and/or requiring him to wear a continuous alcohol monitoring device.

209. The matter was continued until March 9, 2011 in order to obtain details, i.e. cost about

the continuous alcohol monitoring device.

210. On March 9, 2011, responderit suspended the remainder of Cary's sentence on condition

that he cotnplete outpatient treatment and wear a continuous alcohol monitoring d.evice.

211. Thereafter, a continuous alcohol monitoring device was placed on Cary, wlaich he wore

until August 4, 2011.

Denise Pederson

212. On August 29, 2011, Denise Pederson was in court on an open container charge.

Pederson was represented by counsel. (Case No. 2011 CRB 029832.)

213. Pederson pled iao contest to the charge and was sentenced to a $20 fine, which was to be

paid within the next 24 hours.

-35- 214, Pederson informed respondent that she was unable to pay the fine within 24 hours

because she was on disability and would not receive her next disability check until

September 3, 2011.

215. Respondent asked Pederson what her disability was. Pederson stated that she was

schizophrenic, but that she was not required to take medication.

216. Based on this information, respondent placed Pederson on one year of active probation

and referred her to the court's psychiatric clinic.

217. At that point, Pederson's attorney stated that it might be best if Pederson withdrew her no

contest plea.

218. Respondent stated that she would allow Pederson to withdraw her no contest plea;

however, she was still referring Pederson to the court psychiatric clinic because Pederson

needed to be evaluated.

219. Pederson was then taken into custody.

Burdensonie Conditions

220. Respondent also places unduly burdensome conditions on individuals charged with other

offenses incdudirig, but not limited to solicitation.

Project Holm

221. Project Hope is a time-intensive specialized docket for defendants, primarily women,

who are on probation from soliciting offenses. Each month, Project Hope participants are

required to attend monthly compliance meetings.

222. Respondent oversees the Project Hope docket.

-36- 223, When Project Hope was reviewed in 2011 by Cleveland State University Professors Dana

J. Hubbard and Wendy C. Regoeczi as part of comprehensive review of eight court

programs for effectiveness and efficieney, the following obser-Niations were made:

a. There are no clear goals for the program. For example, the prograni was initially designed for women convicted of solicitation, but at the time of the review, the caseload consisted of 19 cases including five "johns," one male solicitor, and one woman convicted of open container and disorderly offenses.

b. Motivational speakers are brought in every month to speak to Project Hope participants; however, the speakers are not likely to have any effect on recidivism rates.

c. There is no incentive for participants who do well in the prograan to continue doing well, i.e, graduated meeting attendance. Participants are required to attend monthly compliance meetings regardless of the circumstances, and they know that if they do not attend for any reason or if they say something "wrong" at the compliance meeting, they will be sentenced to jail. At the time of the review, most of the participants expressed concern that they would never complete the Project Hope docket because their cases were constantly being continued so that anotlier assessment could be performed, another social service agency could be contacted, or more inforination could be obtained.

d. Respondent publicly criticizes the Project Hope probation officer in front of the participants. This creates confusion for the participants regarding whom they should trust or listen to,

e. Respondent has no respect for the partieipants' time, Project Hope participants are often required to be in the courtroom by 9:00 A.M., but the docket will not start until 10:30 A.M. or 11:00 A.M, It then takes respondent the whole day to complete the docket. Many participants have stated that they are fearful of leaving the courtroom to make a phone call or go to the bathroom because they are afraid that respondent will sentence them to jail. Many participants have also reported having probleins with employers, child care, or other commitments due to Project Hope compliance meetings.

224. On one occasion, a Project Hope participant filed a motion requesting that her jail

sentence be ordered into execution so that she could cease attendance at the monthly

Project Hope compliance meetings,

a. On November 17, 2009, Sharon Lawson-Deimis appeared before respondent on two charges of publzc intoxication, two charges of having an open

-3 7- container, one charge of hitchhiking, and one charge of entering or leaving a moving vehicle. In exchange for Lawson-Deru7is's no contest plea to one charge of public intoxication, one charge of having an open container, and the charge of entering or leaving a motor vehicle, the reinaining charges against Lawson-Dennis were dismissed. Case Nos. 2009 CRB 036688, 2009 TRD 032231, 2009 CRB 015822, and 2008 TRD 003752.)

b. Respondent sentenced Lawson-Dennis to 30 days in jail, but gave her credit for eight days of time served. Respondent suspended the remaining 22 days of Lawson-Dennis's sentence and placed her on two-years of active probation through Project Hope even though Lawson-Dennis had not been charged with any solicitation offenses.

c. Between November 17, 2009 and April 25, 2011, Lawson-Dennis attended at least 14 Project Hope compliance meetings. She was also required to meet with her probation officer at least once a month, complete regular urinalysis screens, undergo a psychiatric evaluation, attend grief counseling, and submit herself for a vocational skills assessment.

d. At the April 25, 2011 compliance meeting, another Project Hope participant brought pictures of her child to share. Lawson-Dennis began crying because her daughter had recently passed away, Respondent instructed Lawson- Dennis to leave the courtroom until she could control herself. As she was leaving the courtroom, Lawson-Deiu7is pushed the door of the courtroom too hard and it slammed shut. Respondent had Lawson-Dennis brought back into the courtroom whereupon respondent proceeded to hold her in contempt and order the full 22 days of her sentence into execution. Lawson-Dennis was held in custody for three days until Apri128, 2011. e. On April 28, 2011, Lawson-Dennis was brought back before respondent on a Motion to Mitigate her sentence. Respondent granted the Motion to Mitigate and released Lawson-Dennis from custody; however, she refused to release Lawson-Dennis from active probatioii as requested. f. Lawson-Dennis attended Project Hope compliance meetings in May of 2011 and June 2011. g. On July 14, 2011, Lawson-Dennis, tlzrough her attorney, James C. Young, filed a motion to terminate her probation early. In the alternative, Lawson- Dennis requested that the remainder of her jail sentence be ordered into execution so that she would not have to attend any further Project Hope compliance meetings, h. On August 22, 2011, a hearing was held on Lawson-Dennis's motion. At that time, Lawson-Dennis withdrew her motion upon realizing that she only had two months left of active probation.

-38- 225, In their June 2011 final report regarding court programs and efficiency, Hubbard and

Regoeczi recommended that Project Hope be suspended, revamped, and/or handled by

another judge.

226. On June 9, 2011, Chief Probation Officer Jerry Krakowski submitted a proposed list of

Project Hope guidelines to respondent for her review and approval. These guidelines

included but were not limited to the following:

a. ®nly persons charged with or convicted of solicitation will be assigned to Project Hope;

b. "Johns" or buyers of prostitution will not assigned to Project Hope;

c. The probation officer will determine what services will best assist the defendants; however, it will be mandatory for Project Hope participants to complete a substance abuse assessment, weekly urinalysis testing, HIV and STD education classes, and educational or vocational training;

d. The probation officer will determine if it is necessary for Project Hope participants to attend monthly compliance nieetings with the caveat that all Project Hope participants will attend at least one compliance meeting before successful completion of the program;

e. Project Hope participants will be required to complete all recommended treatment plans and programs; and

f. The judge shall be notified of all positive drug screens and if the participant may be in danger or a danger to themselves.

227, Respondent never contacted Krakowski regarding these recommendations, nor did she

take any formal steps to implement the recommendations.

Bobbi Williams

228. Bobbi Williams was charged with a 1" degree misdemeanor of Allowing Another to

Operate a Motor Vehicle without the Legal Rigl7t to Do So. Williains was represented by

counsel. (Case No. 2013 TRD 004239.)

-39- 229. Williams' boyfriend, Freddie Johnson, had operated the vehicle, and he had also been

charged with various inisdemeanors, including but not limited to, License Required to

Operate.

230. Johnson appeared in court on February 14, 2013 and pled not guilty to the charges against

him. A subsequent court date was set for February 19, 2013; however, Johnson failed to

appear. Accordingly, a capias was issued for Johnson.

231. On February 21, 2013, Williarns appeared in court and pled no contest to the

misdemeanor charge against her. During the sentencing portion of Williams' case,

respondent became aware that a capias had been issued for Johnson.

232. Respondent refused to continue sentencing Williams until Jolmson appeared.

233. Respondent stated "It's her boyfriend. She can make sure that he comes into this

courtroom, or I can impose the jail time that I believe is appropriate today." (Emphasis

added.)

234. Williagns' attorney tried to inform respondent that Williams could not make her boyfriend

appear. In a very irritated manner, respondent then proceeded to sentence Williams to

two days in jail and a $100 fiaie.

Bond Increases

235. Respondent increases bonds for defendants who request a trial. For example:

a. On June 30, 2009, Maurice Tucker appeared before respondent on two charges - a recent Driving Under Suspension (DUS) cliarge and a 2008 minor misdemeanor traffic charge for which a capias had been issued. (Case Nos. 2008 TRD 052369 and 2009 TRD 040682.)

b. Tucker was represented by Attorney David Eidenmiller.

c. Tucker had a $1,500 bond on the DUS charge and a personal bond on the traffic charge.

-40- d. Eidenmiller infornied the court that Tucker wished to enter a no contest plea to the traffic charge, but that he wanted a continuance on the DUS charge.

e. Respondent accepted this proposal, but.rather than granting a continuance, she set the matter for trial. She also inquired into whether Tucker would be able to pay the $1,500 bond on the DUS charge.

f. As the parties were trying to pick a trial date, Eidenmiller requested that the trial be for both the DUS charge and the 2008 traffic charge.

g. Respondent stated that she was fine with Tucker withdrawing his no contest plea on the 2008 traffic violation, but that if he wanted a trial on the 2008 traffic violations, she was going to increase the bond on the DUS charge because Tucker "doesn't come to court" on the traffic charge.

h. Respondent further stated that "when we set bonds, we take everything into consideration, and this is a gentlemen that does not come back to court." She specifically noted, however, that she did not want to set a bond on a minor misdemeanor case.

i. At the time that respondent initially set the $1,500 bond, she had all the same information available to her as when she decided to increase the bond. The only differenee was that Tucker had requested a trial.

Improper Revocation

236. On at least one occasion, respondent ianproperly revoked a defendant's probation due to

what she perceived to be rude and disrespectful conduct to the court.

a. On March 8, 2012, Angela Beckwith pled no contest to a charge of solicitation. (Case No. 2012 CRB 002544)

b. She was sentenced to 180 days in jail with all 180 days suspended and a $200 fine. She was also placed on two years of active probation with an order that she conlplete the court's Project Hope Program.

c. On December 17, 2012, Beckwith was in court for a Project Hope compliance meeting. Late in the afternoon, Beckwith's case was cafled. Beckwith was presented with a Certificate of Achievement and some gifts from local donors.

d. As Beckwith was leaving the courtroom, the door slain.med because Beckwith's hands were full. Respondent asked her bailiffs to bring Beckwith

-41- back into the courtroom whereupon respondent informed Beckwith that she was being held in contempt.

e. Respondent then ordered the full 180 days of Beckwith's sentence into execution without affording Beckwith any due process or conducting a proper contempt hearing.

f. Respondent set the matter for a mitigation hearing on December 19, 2012 at which time respondent ordered Beckwith to be held in custody.for five additional days.

g. Respondent suspended the remaining 172 days of Beckwith's sentence.

237. As noted in previous counts, individuals (prosecutors, defense counsel, and defendants)

are not pertnitted to question respondent's 7-ulings or decisions without being threatened

with contempt.

238. Respondent's conduct as outlined above violates the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct and

the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct specifically Canon 1(a judge shall uphold the

independence and integrity of the judiciary) and Jud R. 1.2 (a judge shall act at all times

in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and

impartiality of the judiciary); Canon 2 (A judge shall respect and comply with the law

and shall act at all tinies in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and

impartiality of the judiciary) and Jud. R. 2.2 (A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and

shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially); DR 1-102(A)(5) (a

lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice) and

Prof. Cond. R. 8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the

administration ofjustice); and DR 1-102(A)(6) (a lawyer shall not engage in any other

conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law) and Prof-. Cond. R.

8.4(h) (a iavvyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness

to practice law).

-42- Count Seven - Request for Mental Health Evaluation

239. Relator incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 238.

240, As alleged in the counts above, it is clear that for the past several years respondent:

a. Has been unable to efficiently run a courtroom;

b. Perceives problems where tlaere are none;

c. Engages in unprofessional conduct, including needless shouting matches with prosecutors, defense counsel, court employees, and the public; and

d. Views comments/questions about her decisions or actions as a personal attack on her and the integrity of the court,

241. From a global perspective, respondent's behavior has negatively impacted every

component of the criminal justice system that she has come into contact with as a judicial

officer including prosecutors, public defenders, security bailiffs, personal bailiffs, court

reporters, psychiatric clinic employees, probation officers, defendants, and the public -

and has led to the adoption of several court-wide rules or departmental policy changes in

order to accommodate respondent's unwarranted use of court resources and constantly

changing expectations.

242. Despite these accominodations, respondent has been unable or unwilling to recognize that

most, if not all, of the problems in her courtroom are the result of her o-wn actions.

Rather than accepting responsibility for her conduct and working towards a resolution,

respondent persists in blaming others for the problems in her courtroom.

243. Based upon the above facts and allegations, relator believes that respondent may be

suffering from a mental illness that substantially impairs her ability to perform her duties

as a judicial officer. In accordance with Gov. Bar R. V (7)(C), relator requests that the

Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline or the hearing panel assigned to

-43- this case order a psychiatric examination of respondent by one or more physicians

designated by the Board or liearing panel.

Count Eight - Conduct Occurring After Receiving Notice of the Formal Complaint

Jamie Barlay-Soto

244. On or about June 4, 2013, Janlie Barlay-Soto was arrested and charged with Driving

Under the Influence of Alcohol, Drugs, or a Combination of Both; Driving Under the

Influence with a Breath Alcohol Level of .08-.17; and Driving in Marked Lanes. (Case

No. 2013 TRC 031821.)

245. On June 5, 2013, Barlay-Soto pled not guilty to the charges against her; however, on

September 6, 2013, Barlay-Soto withdrew her not guilty pleas and entered a plea of no

contest to an amended charge of Physical Control of Vehicle while Under the Influence.

The Driving Under the 7nfluence with a Breath Alcohol Level of .08-.17 charge and the

Driving in Marked Lanes charge were nolled/dismissed.

246. Respondent passed for sentencing on September 6, 2013 and requested a pre-sentence

investigation. Barlay-Soto's sentencing was scheduled for October 2, 2013.

247. On October 2, 2013, Barlay-Soto appeared with her attorney, Catherine Meehan, for

sentencing. Respondent sentenced Barlay-Soto to 180 days in jail (all suspended), five

Mothers Against Drunk Driving classes, one alcohol education class, and one year of

active probation. Respondent also suspended Barlay-Soto's license for six months.

248. After issuing her seiitence and stating that it would be journalized in a few minutes,

respondent continued to address certain issues related to Barlay-Soto's sentenec, such as

a time-to-pay date and driving privileges.

-44- 249. While addressing these issues, respondent continued to peruse the pre-sentencing

investigation report and noticed that the report indicated that Barlay-Soto had smoked

marijuana "in the past." Accordingly, respondent asked Barlay-Soto "How long ago did

you smoke marijuana?"

250. Barlay-Soto adamantly denied smoking marijuana or any other illegal substance in the

past. While doing so, Barlay-Soto inadvertently talked at the same as respondent, to

which respondent immediately threatened to place Barlay-Soto in jail for disrespectful

conduct.

251. In response to Barlay-Soto's claim that she had never used marijuana, respondent

requested that the pre-sentencing investigation officer vvho had conducted the pre-

sentencing interview and written the report come to the courtroom. Respondent called

other cases while waiting for the pre-sentencing officer to arrive.

252. When the pre-sentencing investigation officer arrived, resporident inquired into whether

the officer stood by her report. The officer stated that she did. The officer fuz-ther stated

that she included the indicator "in the past" because Barlay-Soto answered "No" wlien

asked "Do you smoke marijuana?" but "Yes" when asked "Have you ever smoked

marijuana?"

253. Barlay-Soto continued to deny - both to the pre-sentencing officer and respondent - that

she had ever smoked marijuana.

254. When it appeared that Barlay-Soto and the pre-sentencing officer were not going to agree

about what had occurred during the pre-sentencing interview, respondent abruptly

tertninated the conversation about Barlay-Soto's alleged marijuana use by or:dering

Barlay-Soto to serve one day in jail immediately.

-45- 255. Respondent claimed that Barlay-Soto's alleged rnarijuana usage had nothing to do with

her cl}ange in her sentence; however, this particular issue was the only difference

between respondent's original sentence and her new sentence.

Gus RinilAshle}, L. 7"liomcrs

256, On October 3, 2013, Ashley L. 'Thomas appeared before respondent on charges of

Driving Under Suspension, Failure to Control, Allowing Another to Operate a Motor

Vehicle without the Legal Right to Do So, Failure to Display Plates, and Lights R.equired.

(Case Nos, 2011 TRD 066038, 2013 TRD 041774, and 2013 TRD 050135.)

257. Although Thomas' case was scheduled for 8:30 AM, it was not called until 3:41 PM.

After her case was called, Thomas informed respondent that slie wished to seek legal

counsel to represent her in the matter.

258. Respondent continued the matter until October 9, 2013 at 10:00 AM.

259. On October 9, 2013, Thomas appeared with her attorney, Assistant Public Defender Gus

Rini. Although Thomas's case was scheduled for 10:00 AM, respondent did not call it

until 4:15 PM. When her case was called, Thomas pled no contest to the Driving Under

Suspension charge. All other charges against Thomas were nolled/dismissed.

260. Respondent passed for sentencing on October 9, 2013 and ordered Thomas to report to

the probation department for a pre-sentencing investigation report. Respondent also

ordered the prosecutor to subpoena Laurie Morton and her husband - witnesses

associated with Case No. 2013 TRD 050135 - to Thomas' sentencing hearing, which was

scheduled for October 23, 2013 at 2:00 PM.

-46- 261. On October 23, 2013, Thomas appeared for sentencing with Attorney Rini. The Mortons

were also present. Although Thomas's case was scheduled for 2:00 PM, it was not called

until 5:13 PM.

262. After Tlioinas' case was called, respondent spoke with the Mortons. The Mortons, who

had driven from Youngstown, Ohio (approximately two llours away) to appear pursuant

to the subpoena, informed respondent that they did not want Thomas to reimburse them

for a $250 deductible that they had to pay for damages caused to their vehicle by

Thomas.

263. Respondent then sentenced Thomas to tln•ee days in jail to be served immediately, a $200

fine plus court costs, and one year of inactive probation.

264. Respondent asked Rini whether Thoznas needed a"tiine to pay date" for the court costs

and fine. Rini replied, "Yes judge. I - I need to address a few things with you though."

265. Thereafter, Rini attempted to tell respondent that Thonlas had a four-year old child that

she needed to pick up from daycare. Respondent stated that slie would "quickly" listen to

what Rini had to say, but then prevented him from talking.

266. During the heated conversation that ensued, respondent stated four times that she was not

changing her mind and that Rini was "out of order." Respondent also stated in open

court that it was Rini's fault that Thomas' case was called so late.

October 23, 2013 - End of the Day

267. After his exchange with respondent regarding Ashley Thomas had concluded, Gus Rini,

the assistant public defender assigned to respondent's courtroom, left respondent's

courtroom for the day. He left at approximately 5:28 PM. The prosecutor had previously

left respondent's courtrooan for the day at approximately 5:00 PM.

-47- 268. Thereafter and continrring until approximately 6:05 PM, respondent continued to call and

hear cases of individuals without the prosecutor present.

269. Some of the defendants were represented by the public defender (Rini), who had

previously left the courtroom. In an attempt to deflect personal responsibility for the fact

that her conduct caused the docket to extend past 5:00 PM, respondent stated in open

court, "It's not this couz-t's fault that he [Rini] doesn't talk to you and know who his

clients are in this courtroom. That's not my fault. I feel badly when they do not get to

your cases but there's really nothing I can do. But, all I can do is maybe give you a

continuance. Step forward. I can call each of you one at a time. I am so sorry. One at a

time!.. "

270. She continued the case of one defendant who was represented by the now absent public

defender, "at the defendant's request."

271. After two more cases, she asked if everyone else in the courtroom was represented by the

public defender and two defendants stated that they were not. One of those defendants is

Christopher Behlolavek, whose case is explained below.

272. At one point, respondent stated, "I'm trying to help these people. You know? I will,

um. Tiffany is helping me but I'm trying to get to these people. When I stop to -vvrite, I

can't help them."

273. Another defendant was present for a minor nlisdemeanor but the respondent claimed that

she did not have lier file. This defendant told respondent that she had been sitting in the

courtroom since 8:30 AM. Respondent noted that an officer never appeared on her case

and asked her if there was a rnotion she would like to make. The defendant stated,

-48- "Dismiss, please." The respondent granted the defendant's motion without the

prosecutor being present.

274. Respondent stated to another defendant wlio was represented by the public defender,

"Attorstey Rini didn't get to people he represents. And he doesn't have your nazne on this

list. I'll let you see it. Your name -- He doesn't even have your name on this list. So

what are you gonna do?"

275. After hearing that case, respondent asked, "Anyone else not represented by the public

defender's office?" She then stated, "This is incredible. Mr. Rini. Did you hear him try

to blame me? How dare him."

276. The next defendaiit wanted to dispose of his case. Although he had already stated that lre

watrted to represent hiinself, the respondent asked him what he wanted to do about his

legal representation. After he decided to go to back to the public defender's office to

obtain representation, he tried to explain that he would need another continuance until

after a scheduled surgery. Respondent exclaimed, "This is ridiculous! These people are

waiting while you go on and oii and on about these things. It is your responsibility to

seek your legal representation on these matters."

277. The next defendant also wanted to dispose of his case. The respondent asked, "Well,

how are you gonna do that?" She continued, "Well, you didn't talk to the prosecutor and

I cannot play the role of a prosecutor and negotiate this. I doii't know what you wa7ina

do here. If you want a continuance to hire an attorney, if you just want to represent

yourself and talk to the public - the prosecutor about the case. I don't know what you

want to do." His case was ultimately continued "at the defendant's request."

-49- 278, The next defendant was represented by the public defender and requested a continuance,

Respondent became irritated and continued her case to the following week, even though

she had asked for additional time.

279. The next defendant wanted a jury trial but the respondent proceeded to ask him why he

would not seek the help of an attornev. The following exchange occurred:

RESPONDENT: Sir, but you're not an attorney! You're not licensed to practice. Not that you have to be to represent yourself but it's not wise to go forward on these, such serious charges. You've got two first degree misdemeanors which will - If there's a conviction there are mandatory penalties. Why, why risk that if you can have an attorney help you?

DEFENDANT: I'm not guilty and I, uh...

RESPONDENT: Sir, everybody who walks in here says not guilty! There's not one person who comes.

DEFENDANT: Yes ma'arn.

RESPONDENT: That's why they have all said not guilty. That's why they're on the docket. Everyone out of the arraignment room said not guilty. Every single one who's on our personal dockets. So, just because you see a lawyer doesn't mean you're admitting any guilt. It's to help you understand your legal rights! And I don't understand. I mean, you're taking a huge risk, which you can do. But it's not wise.

280. Later, respondent continued to say, "But why don't you get someone help you? Even in

your discussions with the prosecutor, I mean, you just, I, I mean - I'm not privy to those

conversations, but...{shakes her head as she looks at his file}. So what do you think you

think? If you want to represent yourself, that's fine but, uh, I will certainly respect that

choice. Did the prosecutor make an offer to you?

281. Respondent then asked the defendant about the plea bargain that the prosecutor had

offered. After discussing it, the defendant reiterated that he wanted a jury trial to which

respondent stated, "Because, I'm not - I keep telling you that you could - it - I don't

know what it is! Why won't you seek an attorriey to help you on such a serious offense?

-50- If there's a conviction on this one, and a judge is aware that there's another one, just

think about that. Even if it was outside of that six year period. I don't know why you

won't get legal help when you're not a lawyer. I mean.. ..It's - I just don't understand.

Tiffany, we're gonna write on these. He doesn't know what he wants to do. I've gotta

hurry up and do this...

282. Ultimately, the defendant decided to talk to a lawyer stating, "Urn, I think, um., um, as

many times as you've told me that I should, at least, talk to a lawyer and possibly get one,

I think maybe I should do tllat.

4ctobet• 8, 2013

283. Incidents occurring on October 8, 2013 are illustrative ofconduct that regularly occurs in

respondent's courtroom. During the course of the day, respondent:

a. publicly adnlonished several individuals for talking in court;

b. publicly admonished one individual for bringing a child into the courtrooin;

c. confiscated cell phones belonging to several individuals;

d. admonished several defendants for not retaining legal counsel and implied that she

would impose jail tiine on their cases if they did not seek legal representation;

e. placed one woman in the holding cell for using her cell phone to tell her boss why she

was not at work and stated that she "did not care" if that same woman lost her job

because if she did, it Nvould be a result of the wonian's conduct;

f. placed at least three other individuals, including Jodi Williaans (explained below), in

the holding cell for conduct that respondent perceived to be disrespectful without

giving the individuals an opportunity to explain their conduct;

g. yelled at everyone in the court that they were "all being irrespon.sible;"

-5 I - h. advised several individuals whose cases she did not call prior to the public defender

leaving for the day that she was "sorry" that the public defender had not gotten to

their cases; and

i. made one individual sit in the courtroom for two hours after she had already

continued the individual's case, and then threatened to hold that same individual

overnight for pushing too hard on the door when exiting the courtroom.

Jodi Y3illian2s

284, On August 16, 2013, Jodi Williains was cllarged with assault. (Case No. 2013 CRB

025290.)

285. The victims of the alleged assault are tenants in a property over which Williams is

landlord. The alleged assault occurred while Williams was attempting to evict the tenants

from the property.

286. On August 17, 2013, the tenants/victims requested and were gratlted an ex parte

temporary protection order against Willianls.

287. On September 20, 2013, Williams pled not guilty to the assault charge,

288. On October 8, 2013, Jodi Williams appeared before respondent for a first pre-trial.

Williams was represented by Assistant Public Defender Gus Rini.

289. After calling the case, respondent noted that a temporary protection order had been

granted ex parte, and she inquired into whether Williams was willing to consent to a

continued protection order or whether she wanted a hearing on the matter.

290. Rini informed respondent that he wanted to discuss the matter with Williams.

291. Respondent called other cases while Rini spoke with Williaans.

292. Williams' case was recalled at approximately 10:22 AM.

-52- 293. Wlien the case was recalled, Rini informed respondent that Williams was willing to

consent to a continued protection order on condition that the order did not interfere with

Williams' ability to serve the tenants/victims with an eviction notice.

294. Respondent approved/authorized that condition. Respondent then reviewed the

individual clauses of the temporary protection order with Williams to ensure that

Williams understood what she was and was not permitted to do.

295. At one point, respondent asked the tenants/victims whether Williams had any keys to

their residence or garage. The tenants/victims did not answer respondent immediately;

therefore, Williams stated that tenants/victims did not have access to the garage.

296. Although Williams had done nothing to previously provoke respondent, respondent

immediately slatx-trned her hand on the bench and stated "You know what Attorney Rini.

I've about had enough with her jWilliamsj. She needs to answer the court. Does she

have keys or garage door openers? Or I can call this case, there are 100---"

297. During respondent's tirade, Williams said "yes."

298. Respondent immediately ordered Williams to be placed in the holding cell for

"disrespectful" conduct.

299. Williams attempted to say that she did not mean to disrespect the court and that she was

just trying to answer the court's question.

300. In response, respondent stated "Excuse tne. Excuse me. I can't imagine how you act

outside of a courtroom if you act like this in a court of law. Attorney Rini, you can talk

to her in that holding cell. When she thinks that she can respect this court and herself

properly, I will recall the case. I have a I05--14 cases on this docket. I am not going to

tolerate it. I'm gonna recall this case when she can get herself together and apologize to

-53- the court. In the meantime, place her in the holding cell. I am not going to accept this.

Attorney Rini, you can speak to her, Outrageous her conduct. It's too much."

301. At approximately 12:20 PM, respondent recalled Williams' case and instructed the

bailiffs to bring Williams into the courtroom.

302, The prosecutor informed respondent that Williams had keys to the tenants/victims'

residence, but no garage door openers, to wllich respondent stated "So where are those

keys, Attorney Rini, because she has to turn over those keys."

303. Rini stated that the keys were for a propei-ty that Willianis owned and from Nvhich the

tenants/victims were being evicted. Respondent stated that pursuant to the temporary

protection order, the keys had to be turned over.

304. Rini infornled respondent that Williams did not have the keys with her, to which

respondent stated "dk, so what's she gonna do? Does slle [Williams] want to be held in

custody until she can turn over the keys?"

305. Williams started to inform respondent that the keys were at her home, but respondent cut

Willianis off mid-sentence and stated that she was going to recall the case when "you all

figure it out."

306. Respondent continued to say that it was her position that the keys had to be turned over to

the court, and they had to be turned over that day.

307. Rini attempted to tell respondent what he had arranged with the prosecutor regarding the

keys, but respondent would not hear it. She stated that her position was that the keys had

to be turned over to the court and that that they had to be turned over that day.

308. At approximately 1:29 PM, respondent, Rini, and the prosecutor had a sidebar regarding

the Willianis case. During the sidebar, respondent called Rini "nonsensical" and refused

-54- to listen to anything that Rini had to say about the keys, why they should not have to be

turned over, or logistical problems in getting the keys to the court since Williams was at

court. Respondent continued to insist that the keys be turned over that day.

309. At approximately 2:00 PM, someone brought several keys to the court for Williams.

Williams identified a key that she believed belonged to the tenants/victims' residence, but

was not sure if that was the actual key because she had not used it in at least two years.

310. Respondent then requested that the tenants/victims leave the court and return to their

residence to see if the key was the correct key. Respondent stated that she would recall

the case when the tenants/victims returned to court.

311. At. 4:59 PM, respondent recalled Williams' case. The tenants/victims infornied

respondent that tlae key they had tested was not the correct key. Respondent then

requested that the tenants/victims check a second key against their residence.

312. On behalf the teiaants/victims, the prosecutor stated that tenants/victims would advise the

court the following day as to whether the key was correct. It was agreed that if the key

was correct, respondent would choose a new pre-trial date. Respondent stated, however,

that if the key was not correct, Williams had to appear in coui1, the following day or

respondent would issue a warrant for her arrest.

313. O11 or about October 11, 2013, Willianis' key to the tenants/victims residence was

provided to the court and kept under seal.

314. On December 3, 2013, Williams withdrew her not guilty plea and pleaded no contest to

an amended charge of aggravated menacing. The key contained in the file was returned

to Williams.

-55- 315. Respondent sentenced Williams to 180 days in jail, but gave her credit for two days

already served and suspended the remaining 178 days. Respondent also fined Williams

$1,000, but suspended $800 of the fine. Finally, respondent ordered Williams to

conlpPete one year of active probation and to attend anger management classes.

Christopher 13elohlavek

316, On or about Septeniber 16, 2013, Christopher Belohlavek was charged with Driving

Under Suspension, Display of Fictitious Plates, and Driver Seatbelt Required. (Case No.

2013 TRD 053634)

317. On September 19, 2013, Belohlavek pled not guilty to the charges against hini.

318. On October 8, 2013, Belohlavek appeared before Judge Stokes for a pre-trial. At that

time, Belohlavek requested a continuance to seek legal counsel. Respondent granted the

continuance and rescheduled Belolavek's criminal pre-trial for October 23, 2013 at 11:00

AM.

319. Although his case was scheduled for 11:00 AM on October 23, 20.13, respondent did not

call Belohlavek's case until 5:41 PM. By that time, the prosecutor and public defender

had already left the courtroom for the day.

320. On October 23, 2013, Belohlavek inforined respondent that he mistakenly thought that

his next court date was on October 28, 2013 and that he did not realize that it was on

October 23, 2013 until just before he lrad to come to court. Accordingly, he had not

spoken to the public defender yet. Nevertheless, he infornied respondent that he thought

he would have been able to advise respondent of the above earlier in the day and then go

to see the public defender; however, he was afraid to leave the courtroom for fear of a

warrant being issued if he was not present when his case was called.

-56- 321. Respondent continued Belohlavek's case until October 29, 2013 at 2:00 PM.

322. Although it was scheduled for 2:001'M on October 29, 2013, Belohlavek's case was not

called until 4:28 PM. At that time, the public defender informed respondent that he did

not have a file on Belohlavek since Belohlavek had just registered with the public

defender's office that morning. Respondent continued the case until the next day,

October 30, 2013, at 9:00 AM.

323. Although it was scheduled for 9:00 AM on October 30, 2013, Belohlavek's case was not

called until 6:42 PM. At that time, Belohlavek withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a

plea of no contest to driving under suspension. The fictitious plates and the seatbelt

charges were nollecl/dismissed.

324. Respondent imposed a $1,000 fine against Belohlavek, but suspended $500 of the fine.

As to the remaining $500, respondent inquired into how Belolllavek wished to pay his

fine. Belohlavek stated that he wished to pay $50 every two weeks (when he received his

paycheck). Respondent initially stated that Belohlavek's request was "fine," but quickly

changed her mind without reasori or explanation and insisted that Belohlavek pay $50

every week since he was employed. Respondent's journal entry, however, stated that

Belohlavek was to pay $50 every two weeks.

Cynthia L. George

325. On November 26, 2013, Cyntliia L. George appeared before respondent on four separate

traffic charges - a license required to operate charge, a max speed/assured clear distance

charge, a driver seatbelt required charge, and a passenger seatbelt required charge.

326. George's case was scheduled for 8:30 AM; however, respondent did not call the case

until 1:44 PM.

-57- 327. At the time that respondent called George's case, the prosecutor was at lunch and not

present in the courtroom.

328. When respondent called George's case, she advised George that the license charge was a

first degree znisdemeanor and that it carried a maximum fine of $1,000 and up to six

months in jail. Respondent further advised George that she had the right to be

represent.ed by counsel and that she could either request a continuance to retain counsel

or consult with the public defender's office. In the alternative, respondent advised

George that she could represent berself. Respondent then asked George "What would

you like to do."

329. In response to respondent's question, George clearly stated that she wanted to represent

herself.

330. Respondent then advised George that she would have to speak to the prosecutor about her

case when he returned from lunch, which would be in approximately 25 minutes.

331. Respondent recalled George's case at 3:42 PM. At that time, the prosecutor advised

respondent that he had spoken to George, but that they were unable to resolve the case.

Respondent then asked George "What would you like to do?"

332. George clearly stated that she wanted the case "set for trial."

333. During the awkward silence that followed George's request, George stated "I'm pleading

not guilty" to which respondent stated, "Excuse me. You are so out of order."

Respondent then told George that she had already pled not guilty and could not plead

again.

334. Even though George had already advised respondent that she wanted to represent herself,

respondent asked George a second time "so what do you want to do about your legal

-58- representation?" Respondent continued to say, "Do you want an attorney to help you in

this matter since you don't obviously know what yoti are doing in the matter in the

courtrooirn?"

335. When George did not immediately answer respondent, respondent stated "you think

about it." George then tried to speak and inquire into why her case was being delayed yet

again; however, respondent would not permit her to speak.

336. George everitually managed to say "I don't understand what you're saying" to which

respondent stated "That's why you're going to have a seat to your right and I'm going to

explain it again as I have tried all day long. Have a seat to your right!" Respondent then

called the next case without giving George a meaningful oppol-tunity to speak.

337. Respondent recalled George's case at 4:041'M. Before anything was even said,

respondent sarcastically stated under her breath, "Try it again."

338. Upon recalling the case, the prosecutor again confirmed that he had not been able to

resolve the case with George.

339. Respondent asked George for a third time "What do you wannt to do about your legal

representation?"

340. Thereafter, the following exchange occurred:

GEORGE: I cannot afford legal representation.

RESPONDENT: So if you're indigent and cannot afford to hire an attorney, you can go to the public defender's office, They will give you free legal representatioiz. It's up to you.

GEORGE: I'm not --- I---You had asked me before if I wanted repres ---

RESPONDEI,IT: Right, but you don't know what you're doing, so wlry don't you seek legal counsel from the public defender's office if they will give you free legal representation --- to help you on this matter. But it's up to you.

-59- GEORGE: I would still like to represent myself.

RESPONDENT: Are you an attorney? You - - - you're trying to enter not guilty pleas when you previously entered not guilty pleas. Why won't you seek legal counsel from an attorney who can help you on this case to explain to you what you're doing? Why won't you get help?

GEORGE: Cause I have two kids and I don't have the time. My daughter has cerebral palsy - - -

RESPONDENT: But you know what, if you have a conviction, you inight to jail for up to six months on a case where you're not an attorney; you don't know what you're doing in the courtrooin, so why don't you ask them to help you. Don't think that I won't impose the jail time if I deein it appropriate, but why won't you get help. That's what the court cannot comprehend.

GEORGE: I don't--T don't have somebody to sit with my daughter.

RESPONDENT: But what are you going to do? You're not going to have a trial today. You're gonna have to come back if you want a trial or maybe Mr. London (public defender assigned to respondent's courtroom) would be kind enough to try to help you now on this case. Mr. London. Good Gracious.

341. Thereafter, respondent suggested that London to speak with George and advised him that

the License Required to Operate Charge should have actually been charged as Refusal to

Display License charge.

342. While London was speaking to George, respondent stated in open court in a frustrated

and demeaning manner "They have ample opportunity to seek legal counsel. They come

to the courtroom. They don't do that. They are told out of the arraignment room, Then

they don't know what they are doing in the courtroorn."

343. George ultimately withdrew her not guilty plea and entered a plea of no contest to an

amended charge of Refusal to Display a License. The other charges against George were

disfnissed/nolled. Ultimately respondent sentenced George to 180 days in jail and a

$1,000 fine; however, she suspended all 180 days of George's sentence and $900 of

George's fine.

-60- 344. Respondent's conduct as outlined above violates the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct,

specifically Jud R. 1.2 (a judge sliall act at all times in a manner that promotes public

confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary); Jud. R. 2.6 (a

judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding the right to be

heard according to the law); Jud. R. 2.8 (a judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous

to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others with whom

the judge deals in an official capacity); and Prof. Cond. R. 8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not

engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice),

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, pursuant to Gov, Bar R. V, the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Ohio

Rules of Professional Conduct, relator alleges that respondent is chargeable with misconduct; therefore, relator requests that respondent be disciplined pursuant to Rule V of the Rules of the

Government of the Bar of Ohio,

Scott J. Dre el 0091467) Disciplinary ^ ^ nsel Office of Disciplinary Counsel 250 Civic Center Dr., Ste. 325 Columbus, Ohio 43215 (614) 461-0256 (614) 461-7205 - Facsinuie

-61- CERTTFICATE

The undersigned, Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, of the Office of Disciplinary

Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio hereby certifies that Michael E. Murman is duly

authorized to represent relator in the premises and has accepted the responsibility of prosecuting

the complaint to its conclusion. After investigation, relator believes reasonable cause exists to

warrant a hearing on such complaint.

Dated: April 2-^ , 2(114

Scott . Drexe Di ciplinary Counsel

Gov. Bar R. V, § 4(I) Requr.remet:tsfor Filifag a C'ornnplaint.

(1) Definition. "Complaint" means a formal written allegation of misconduct or mental illness of a person designated as the respondent.

(7) Complaint Filed by Certified Grievance Committee. Six copies of all complaints shall be filed with the Secretary of the Board. Complaints filed by a Certified Grievance Committee shall be filed in the name of the committee as relator. The complaint shall not be accepted for #iling unless signed by one or more attorneys admitted to the practice of law in Ohio, who shall be counsel for the relator. The complaint shall be accompanied by a written certification, signed by the president, secretary, or chair of the Certified Grievance Committee, that the counsel are authorized to represent the relator in the action and have accepted the responsibility of prosecuting the complaint to conclusion. The certification shall constitute the authorization of the counsel to represent the relator in the action as fully and completely as if designated and appointed by order of the Supreme Court witlx all the privileges and immunities of an officer of the Supreme Court. The complaint also may be signed by the grievant. (8) Complaint Filed by Disciplinary Counsel. Six copies of all complaints shall be filed with the Secretary of the Board. Complaints filed by the Disciplinary Counsel shall be filed in the naine of the Disciplinary Counsel as relator. (9) Service. Upon the filing of a complaint with the Secretary of the Board, the relator sllall forward a copy of the complaint to the Disciplinary Counsel, the Certified Grievance Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association, the local bar association, and any Certified Grievance Committee serving the county or counties in which the respondent resides and maintains an office and for the county from which the complaint arose.

-62- Exhibit 2 Lawriter - ORC - 1901.15 Powers of the presiding municipal judge. Page 1 of 1

1901.15 Powers of the presiding municipal judge.

In addition to the exercise of all the powers of a municipal judge, the presiding municipal judge has the general supervision of the business of the court and may classify and distribute arnong the judges the business pending in the court. He shall determine the amount and approve the surety and the terms of all official bonds. The presiding municipal judge may appoint a qualified substitute to serve during the disability of an incumbent of any appointive office created by sections 1901.31 to 1901.33 of the Revised Code, who is temporarily absent or incapacitated from acting as such. Any temporary appointee may be dismissed or discharged by the presiding rnunicipal judge.

Effective Date: 08-19-1975

E?CI°tlBI'T

http://code s. ohio. gov/orc/ 1901.15 10/21/2014 Exhibit 3 SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF TIIE JUDICIARY OF OHIO

RULE I. Professional Responsibility and Judicial Ethics.

SectioiY 1. Applicability.

The Ohio Rules ofProfessional Conduct, effective February 1, 2007, as amended, shall be binding upon all persons admitted to practice law in Ohio. The willful breach of the Rules by a Justice, judge, or candidate for judicial office shall be punished by reprimand, suspension, disbarnient, or probation as provided in Gov. Jud. R. Il and Gov. Bar R. V. The Code of Judicial Conduct, as adopted by the Supreme Court, effective December 20, 1973, and set forth in 36 Ohio State 2d Reports, as amended, shall be binding upon all judicial officers of this state and candidates for judicial office. The willful breach of the Code shall be punished by reprimand, suspension, disbarment, or probation as pr-ovided in Gov. Jud. R. II and Gov. Bar R. V, or by retirement, removal, or suspension from office, as provided in Gov. Jud. R. III.

EXtilBl7' -^ - Exhibit 4 SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE JUDICIARY OF OHIO

RULE II. Disciplinary Procedure.

Section 8. Definitions.

As used in this rule:

(A) "Complaint," "probable cause," and "misconduct" have the same meanings as in Gov. Bar R. V; (B) "Costs" means expenses incurred by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, the Supreme Court, and any panel or commission ofjudges in conducting proceedings under this rule; (C) "Disciplinary sanction" means any of the sanctions set forth in Gov. Bar R. V, Section 6, removal, or suspension from office; (D) "Good cause," for purposes of Sections 4(A) and (B)(1) of this rule, means that, based on a review of a grievance and any response received, there exists an articulable legal and factual basis to warrant further investigation of the allegations contained in the grievance; (E) "Judicial candidate" has the same meaning as in Rule 4.6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

EXFi1BIT --A Exhibit 5 SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE GOVER^.lT1YIENT OF THE BAR OF OHIO

RULE V. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE

Section 6. Proceedings of the Board after Filing of the Complaint.

(A) Definitions. (1) Misconduct. "Misconduct" means any violation by a justice, judge, or an attorney of any provision of the oath of office taken upon admission to the practice of law in this state or any violation of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct or the Code of Judicial Conduct, disobedience of these rules or of the ternis of an order imposing probation or a suspension from the practice of law, or the commission or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. (2) Probable Cause. "Probable cause" means there is substantial, ci-edible evidence that misconduct, as defined in division (A)(1) of thissection, has been committed.

(B) Manner of Discipline. Anyjustice, judge, or attorney found guilty of misconduct shall be disciplined as follows: (1) Disbarment from the practice of law; (2) Suspension from the practice of law for an indefinite pet•iod subject to reinstatement as provided in Section 10 of this rule; (3) Suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months to two years subject to a stay in whole or in part; (4) Probation for a period of time upon conditions as the Supreme Court determines, but only in conjunction with a suspension ordered pursuant to division (B)(3) of this section; (5) Public reprimand.

f EXHlBil` b ^_ Exhibit 6 SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAR OF OHIO

RULE V. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE

Section 8. Review by Supreme Court; Orders; Costs; Publication; Duties of Disqualified or Resigned Attorney.

(D) Supreme Court Proceedings. After a hearing on objections, or if objections are not filed within the prescribed time, the Supreme Court shall enter an order as it finds proper. If the Court rejects the sanction contained in a certified report submitted pursuant to Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, the Court shall remand the matter to the board for a hearing. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, any disciplinary order or order accepting resignation shall be effective on the date that the order is announced by the court. The order may provide for reimbursement of costs and expenses incurred by the Board or panels. An order imposing a suspension for an indefinite period or for a period of six months to two years may allow full or partial credit for any period of suspension imposed under Section 5 of this rule.

(1) Notice. Upon the entry of any disciplinary order pursuant to this rule or the acceptance of a resignation from the practice of law, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall mail certified copies of the entry or acceptance to counsel of record, to the Board, to respondent at his or her last known address, to the Disciplinary Counsel, to the Certified Grievance Committee for and the local bar association of the county or counties in which the respondent resides and maintains his or her office and the county or counties from which the complaint arose, to the Ohio State Bar Association, to the administrative judge of the court of common pleas for each county in which the respondent resides or maintains an office, and to the chief judges of the United States District Courts in Ohio, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and to the Supreme Court of the United States.

(2) Publication. The Supreme Court Reporter shall publish any disciplinary order or acceptance of a resignation frarn the practice of law entered by the Supreme Court under this rule in the Ohio Offacial Reports, the Ohio State Bar Association Report, and in a publication, if any, of the local bar association. The publication shall include the citation of the case in which the disciplinary order or the acceptance of a resignation was issued. Publication also shall be made in a local newspaper having the largest general circulation in the county or counties designated by the Board. This publication shall be in the form of a paid legal advertisement, in a style and size commensurate with legal advertisements, and shall be published three times within the thirty days following the order of the Supreme Court. Publication fees shall be assessed against the respondent as part of the costs.

E^C^ilBl°^ b