Huawei and U.S. Law
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Huawei and U.S. Law February 23, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46693 SUMMARY R46693 Huawei and U.S. Law February 23, 2021 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (Huawei) has grown to be the world’s largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer since its founding in 1987 by a former engineer in Stephen P. Mulligan China’s People’s Liberation Army. The Shenzhen, China-based company has become the focus Legislative Attorney of a host of legal actions that seek to protect the United States’ national security and economy. In 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) released a report describing the potential counterintelligence and security threats posed by Huawei’s access to U.S. Chris D. Linebaugh telecommunications systems. Senior officials in the Trump Administration asserted that Legislative Attorney Huawei’s products present an inherent security threat because the Chinese government can force Huawei to share confidential information or create “backdoors” by which the Chinese government could access Huawei systems. Huawei denies that its products create a security threat, and third-party analysts have not reached uniform conclusions about the security of Huawei systems. Given the security debate, Congress and the executive branch have initiated a variety of legal efforts to limit Huawei’s access to international supply chains, telecommunications systems, and markets. These legal actions have evolved from narrow restrictions on federal spending to an effort to remove Huawei equipment from domestic and international telecommunications networks. After HPSCI’s 2012 report, the United States enacted several laws that restrict federal procurement of, and grant and loan spending on, Huawei systems. In 2019 and 2020, Congress and the President expanded their efforts and imposed Huawei- related restrictions on a broad set of public- and private-sector transactions. In May 2019, the Trump Administration added Huawei and its affiliates to the Entity List, thereby limiting U.S. companies’ ability to export products and services to Huawei. On the same day, President Trump issued Executive Order 13873, declaring a national emergency due to the threat of foreign adversaries exploiting vulnerabilities in U.S. information and communications technology and services (ICTS). The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has also taken steps to restrict Huawei’s access to U.S. communications infrastructure. In November 2019, the FCC prohibited telecommunications carriers from using Universal Service Fund (USF) subsidies to purchase Huawei products and services. This restriction particularly affects rural telecommunications carriers, many of which depend on the Universal Service Fund and already use Huawei equipment in their networks. In addition, in March 2020, the United States passed the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (Secure Networks Act), which similarly prohibits companies from using FCC-administered subsidies like the USF for certain communications equipment and services from Huawei and other entities that pose a national security risk. The law also directs the FCC to set up a program to reimburse carriers for removing and replacing such equipment in their networks. Following the Secure Networks Act, the FCC issued an additional order establishing the reimbursement program contemplated by the law. The order goes beyond the Secure Networks Act by requiring carriers receiving USF support to remove and replace existing Huawei equipment in their networks, regardless of whether they choose to participate in the reimbursement program. In other legal actions over the past two years, the United States has pursued criminal charges against Huawei and its Chief Financial Officer (CFO), issued visa restrictions for Huawei employees, and banned trade in Huawei securities. Most recently, the 116th Congress passed the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (FY2021 NDAA) over President Trump’s veto. The FY2021 NDAA embarks on a new endeavor of using federal programs to support private competitors to Huawei that can offer secure, alternative communications networks domestically and abroad. Some observers view the suite of legal actions involving Huawei as part of a broader effort to “decouple” the United States’ economy from problematic aspects of China’s economy. Others see it as a microcosm of the increasing complexity of challenges caused by China’s rise on the global stage. Some stakeholders argue that these legal actions may have unintended consequences, such as denying low-cost technology to American consumers, lost profits for American companies barred from selling to Huawei, and the risk that technology companies might move operations overseas to avoid U.S. trade restrictions. Efforts to account for these considerations are ongoing and may continue in the 117th Congress and the Biden Administration. This report outlines recent Huawei-related legal activities and examines the statutory authorities underlying each action. Congressional Research Service Huawei and U.S. Law Contents Background on Huawei ................................................................................................................... 3 Early Legal Actions and Congressional Interest .............................................................................. 3 Federal Spending Restrictions ......................................................................................................... 5 Appropriations Restrictions ...................................................................................................... 5 2018 NDAA .............................................................................................................................. 6 2019 NDAA .............................................................................................................................. 6 Huawei’s Legal Challenge to Section 889 of the 2019 NDAA .......................................... 7 Export Restrictions .......................................................................................................................... 8 Addition of Huawei to the Entity List ....................................................................................... 9 Foreign Direct Product Rule and De Minimis Rules ................................................................ 11 Conditions on Huawei’s Removal from the Entity List .......................................................... 13 Executive Orders Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) ............... 13 Executive Order 13873: Information and Communications Technology and Services .......... 14 ICTS Review Process ....................................................................................................... 15 Executive Order 13959: Securities Ban .................................................................................. 18 Other Supply Chain Protection Initiatives ..................................................................................... 18 Federal Communications Commission’s Actions.......................................................................... 19 2019 Order .............................................................................................................................. 21 2019 FNPRM .......................................................................................................................... 23 Secure Networks Act ............................................................................................................... 23 United States’ Criminal Prosecutions ............................................................................................ 25 Visa Restrictions ............................................................................................................................ 27 Diplomacy and Foreign Aid .......................................................................................................... 27 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (FY2021 NDAA) ............................... 29 Section 1058 ............................................................................................................................ 29 Section 9202 ............................................................................................................................ 29 Title XCIX: Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) for America ................................................................................................................................ 31 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 32 Contacts Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 33 Congressional Research Service Huawei and U.S. Law uawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (Huawei)—the world’s largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer1—is at the center of a host of legal activities that seek to protect H the United States’ national security and economy. In 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) released a report describing the counterintelligence and security threat posed by Huawei’s access to U.S. telecommunications systems and supply chains.2 Senior executive branch officials in the Trump Administration, including the Vice