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Understanding and Supporting Decision-Making in Electronic Auctions: a Neurois Approach

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Understanding and Supporting Decision-Making in Electronic Auctions: a Neurois Approach Understanding and Supporting Decision-Making in Electronic Auctions: A NeuroIS Approach Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Dr. rer. pol.) von der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften am Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT) genehmigte Dissertation von M. Sc. Marius Benedikt Müller Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 24.06.2016 Referent: Prof. Dr. Christof Weinhardt Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Marc T. P. Adam 2016 Karlsruhe Acknowledgements The support, time, and encouragement of numerous people has made this thesis possible. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Prof. Dr. Christof Weinhardt for giving me the opportunity to pursue my research interests at the Institute of Information Systems and Marketing (IISM) and for his support and advice throughout my dissertation. I would further like to very much thank my co-advisor Prof. Dr. Marc T. P. Adam for his constant support, guidance, and inspiration without whom this work would not have been possible. My thanks also go to Prof. Dr. Hansjörg Fromm and Prof. Dr. Melanie Schienle for serving on the board of examiners. Moreover, I acknowledge the support of all professors and students at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) with whom I had the honor to work over the past years. I am very grateful to all my colleagues at the IISM. In particular, I would like to thank my colleague Felix Fritz for always asking the real questions and providing inspiring thoughts. Also, I am very grateful to Anuja Hariharan, Yolanda Hermida Hernandez, Jan Höffer, Niklas Horstmann, Jan Krämer, Tobias Kranz, Tim Straub, and Timm Teubner for their constant feedback, support, and advice—at the office and beyond. It has been a privilege to be a member of this inspiring and enthusiastic team. Furthermore, I gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Karlsruhe House of Young Scientists (KHYS) for my research stay at the University of Newcastle, Australia. Finally, but most importantly, I thank my family and friends. I thank my parents Birgit and Karl-Heinz as well as my sisters Katherina and Claudia for their constant backing and love throughout my life. I owe them all more than I can ever put in words. Karlsruhe, June 2016 Marius B. Müller Contents I. Introduction 1 1. Introduction 3 1.1. Human Decision-Making in Electronic Auctions . .4 1.2. Physiological Data in Information Systems Research . .6 1.3. Research Outline and Structure . .8 II. Understanding 13 2. The Role of Physiological Arousal and Bidding Behavior 15 2.1. Introduction . 15 2.2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses . 18 2.2.1. The Impact of Time Pressure on Arousal and Bids . 21 2.2.2. The Impact of Social Competition on Arousal and Bids . 22 2.2.3. The Mediating Role of Arousal . 23 2.2.4. Immediate Emotions in Response to the Auction Outcome . 24 2.3. Experimental Design . 25 2.3.1. Treatment Structure . 26 2.3.2. Procedure . 28 2.3.3. Physiological Measures . 29 2.4. Results . 30 2.4.1. Final Prices . 30 2.4.2. The Effect of Time Pressure and Social Competition on Arousal . 32 2.4.3. The Effect of Time Pressure and Social Competition on Bids . 33 2.4.4. The Mediating Role of Arousal on Bids . 35 2.4.5. Immediate Emotions in Response to Auction Outcome . 36 2.4.6. Supplementary Robustness Analyses . 38 2.5. Discussion . 46 2.6. Conclusion . 46 3. Competitive Arousal and Bidding Behavior in Ascending Auctions 49 3.1. Introduction . 49 3.2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses . 50 3.3. Experimental Design . 51 3.3.1. Treatment Structure . 53 i Contents 3.3.2. Procedure . 54 3.3.3. Instrument Development . 56 3.4. Results . 58 3.4.1. Manipulation Check . 58 3.4.2. Final Prices . 58 3.4.3. The Effect of Time Pressure and Social Competition on Arousal . 59 3.4.4. The Effect of Time Pressure and Social Competition on Bids . 59 3.4.5. The Mediating Role of Arousal on Bids . 63 3.4.6. Immediate Emotions in Response to Auction Outcome . 64 3.4.7. Supplementary Robustness Analyses . 66 3.5. Discussion . 66 3.5.1. Summary of Results and Theoretical Implications . 66 3.5.2. Managerial Implications . 70 3.5.3. Limitations and Future Research . 72 3.6. Conclusion . 74 III.Supporting 77 4. Predicting Bidding Behavior Using Physiological Data 79 4.1. Introduction . 79 4.2. Dataset . 81 4.2.1. Behavioral Data . 82 4.2.2. Physiological Data . 83 4.3. Methods . 85 4.3.1. Performance Metrics . 85 4.3.2. Evolutionary Algorithm . 88 4.3.3. Prediction Models . 89 4.3.4. Robustness . 90 4.4. Results and Discussion . 91 4.4.1. Descriptive Results . 91 4.4.2. Limitations . 96 4.4.3. Implications and Future Work . 96 4.5. Conclusion . 97 5. Using Physiological Feedback in IS Research 99 5.1. Introduction . 99 5.2. Theoretical Foundations . 101 5.2.1. Neuro-Adaptive IS and Live Biofeedback . 101 5.2.2. Integrative Theoretical Framework on LBF . 105 5.3. Literature Review . 109 5.3.1. Methodology . 109 5.3.2. Moderations . 111 ii Contents 5.4. Discussion and Outlook . 117 5.4.1. Discussion and Limitations . 117 5.4.2. Outlook and Future Research . 119 5.4.3. Example: A NeuroIS Platform for Lab Experiments . 121 5.5. Conclusion . 127 IV.Finale 129 6. Conclusion and Future Research 131 6.1. Contributions . 131 6.2. Outlook . 134 6.3. Summary . 137 V. Appendix 139 A. Supplementary Material for Chapter 2 141 B. Supplementary Material for Chapter 3 153 C. Supplementary Material for Chapter 5 163 References 167 List of Abbreviations 193 List of Figures 195 List of Symbols 197 List of Tables 199 iii Part I. Introduction Chapter 1. Introduction Access to information hidden within human physiological data was long privileged to medicine and professional sports. Recently, however, advances in sensor technology en- abled real-time recording and analyses of human physiology, even for average consumers. Nowadays, sensors are smaller, more accurate, and more affordable than ever before— and they become increasingly ubiquitous (Al Osman et al., 2014). This not only relates to fitness trackers, which are now used by millions of fitness enthusiasts on a daily basis. Also sensors measuring, for example, heart rate and skin conductance, are increasingly integrated in more devices that surround people’s everyday lives, such as smartphones, smart wearable devices, and, in the near future, middle class cars (Audi AG, 2016) and clothing (Tsukada et al., 2014). Access to physiological data can provide great insights into a human’s inner state, their emotions, and ultimately can further the understanding of human behavior and the inner processes that drive decision-making. As “important decisions induce powerful emotions in decision-makers” (Loewenstein, 2000, p. 429), understanding the role of emotions can bring new insights to empirical evidence that often shows behavior differ from theoretical expectations. Especially, in the context of economic decision-making, such as electronic auctions, where most decisions are important due to their long-lasting, irreversible, and financial consequences. Here, understanding the role of emotions can aid the improvement of theories and create tangible monetary benefits by supporting decision-making (Lucey and Dowling, 2005). In order to make use of such advantages, decision-makers require support systems that can automatically record, analyze, and act based on decision-makers’ current physiolog- ical data—preferably all in real-time. Even at the most advanced electronic auctions, 3 Chapter 1. Introduction the financial trading industry, supporting human decision-makers becomes increasingly of interest. Thereby, “[a] lot of smart managers think their [algorithms] have gone as far as they can go. The next step is human optimization” (Solon, 2015). But also in non- professional auction environments, such as retail auctions, decision-makers can benefit from using support systems. By using the valuable information of their physiological data, decision-makers can use tools and methods, such as Neuro-Adaptive Information Systems (IS) and Live-Biofeedback (LBF), to control their actions, increase their self- awareness, and train their self-regulating abilities in order to decrease biases in their decision-making (Astor et al., 2014). To this end, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding and supporting of decision-making in electronic auctions by applying new NeuroIS methods that use insights derived from human physiological data. 1.1. Human Decision-Making in Electronic Auctions Based on classical economic literature, decision-making in electronic auctions follows a calculating and emotionless process. Factors, such as (personal) costs and payoffs, are frequently named as driving forces that lead decision-makers. Even as, over the last decades, decision-making in electronic auctions became more and more complex and cognitively demanding (e.g., more decisions, more information, and less time to decide), in theory, decisions are made by “the well informed, rational, utility maximizing” (Rothkopf, 1991, p. 40) Homo Economicus. This theoretical concept “has generally been depicted as a supra-rational, self-interested breed that possesses immense foresight and cognitive abilities [. ] but at the same time, ‘devoid of emotions’” (Lee et al., 2009, p. 183). In contrast to this concept, an increasing number of empirical studies showed that decision-making does not exclusively follow the rationale of the Homo Economicus (Hen- rich et al., 2001; Gintis, 2000). For example, effects such as winner’s curse (Kagel and Levin, 1986), bidder’s curse (Malmendier and Lee, 2011), and quasi-/pseudo endowment (Heyman et al., 2004) contradict the concept of the Homo Economicus. Such effects were even found in environments that are commonly described to be very calculating and emotionless, such as financial markets, where studies revealed decision-makers’ behav- ior that is more driven by ‘gut feeling’ than theoretical expectations (Fenton-O’Creevy 4 1.1.
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