SECULARISM & Kettell, S 2013 Faithless: The politics of new atheism. Secularism and ISSSC Nonreligion, 2: 61-72, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/snr.al NSRN NONRELIGION RESEARCH ARTICLE Faithless: The politics of new atheism Steven Kettell*1 The emergence of ‘new atheism’ during the course of the last decade helped fuel an upsurge of interest in issues around religion. But scholarly analysis of new atheism, particularly its political dimensions, remains embryonic. This paper addresses this lacuna by examining the politics of new atheism across a variety of themes related to politics. These include the causal factors underpinning its emergence and development, its organisational structure and composition, the political strategies pursued by its proponents, and the various internal tensions and conflicts that these dynamics have produced. Introduction One area that has been peculiarly absent from studies of The early years of the twenty-first century thrust issues new atheism, however, has been its political dimension). around religion to the forefront of public and political The point is exemplified by a recently edited volume on debate. One of the defining features of this was the emer- new atheism, purporting to offer a rounded examination gence of a more activist form of atheism, known as the of the topic, which includes work from “the fields of reli- ‘new atheism’, which sought to openly challenge and criti- gious studies, sociology of religion, sociology of science, cise religious beliefs and to promote the virtues of reason, philosophy, and theology” (Amarasingham, 2010: 2), but rationality and science. Fueled by a series of best-selling contains nothing in the way of political analysis. Studies publications, and accompanied by high levels of media addressing this lacuna have recently started to emerge, interest, new atheism soon became something of a cul- with work examining various, specific aspects within new tural phenomenon. By the summer of 2007, Tom Flynn, atheism. For instance, some notable and useful recent arti- Executive Director of the Council for Secular Humanism, cles examine the influence of radical atheism and power could declare that, “A movement was aborning, or at least in the British political context; Taira (2012) examines the being written about with feverish energy” (Flynn, 2010). use of identity politics within new atheism; and Schulzke Scholarly research into new atheism, though, remains (2013) has analysed the ideological dimension of new athe- embryonic. The vast majority of works on the topic to date ist thought, exploring its links to broader liberal values. have been directed at a popular audience, and have been Research in this area, however, remains limited. The largely crude and superficial in content, typically attempt- broader dynamics of new atheism, including its politi- ing to defend certain theological positions rather than cal aims, organisation and strategies, particularly beyond examine the dynamics of new atheism itself (e.g. McGrath, the small number of high-profile authors who are typi- 2004; Beattie, 2007; Haught, 2008; Eagleton, 2010). Seri- cally taken to represent new atheism as a whole, remain ous academic analyses have been more useful, but also largely unexplored. This omission is especially disconcert- problematic in various ways. First, there are a relatively ing since political activism is one of the hallmarks of new small number of such studies, a shortcoming that reflects atheism itself. Comparing the huge discrepancies in the a more general lack of research into atheism and non-reli- power and resources being commanded by atheism and gion. As Lee and Bullivant (2010: 26) observe, the study religion in the United States, for example, Richard Dawk- of atheism remains “a long-term, collective blind spot ins (2007), probably the most well-known of all new athe- in research”. Analyses of new atheism have also centred ists, makes the point abundantly clear, “[O]ur struggle”, he on a comparatively limited number of areas. Principally, says, “is not so much an intellectual struggle, as a political these have focused on its historical context (e.g. Hyman, one: What are we going to do about it?”. 2010, LeDrew, 2012), its sociological qualities (e.g. Bulli- The purpose of this paper is to establish a baseline for vant, 2008; Cimino & Smith, 2007, 2011), its philosophical further research into the political dimensions of new athe- properties (e.g. Kitcher, 2012) and the psychological char- ism by providing a broad overview of new atheism’s most acteristics of its adherents (e.g. Hunsberger & Altemeyer, salient political features, focusing, in particular, on the 2006; Baker & Robbins, 2012). organisational, strategic and public policy dimensions of new atheism. It begins by discussing some of the main ide- ational features of new atheism, and by considering some of the causal factors that have underpinned its emergence * University of Warwick, United Kingdom and development. The paper then examines the organisa- [email protected] tional structure and composition of new atheism, center- 62 Kettell: Faithless ing, in particular, on its central groups and leadership fig- dence, they are also considered to be not just wrong, but ures, and on the use of identity politics in its political aims irrational, pathological and uniquely dangerous in that and strategies. The key fault lines and tensions around they foster exclusionary and divisive in-group mentali- new atheism and other elements within the broader athe- ties that lead to prejudice, discrimination and violence. As ist, secular and humanist population, are also explored, Dawkins (2004:158) explains, while religion might not be considering the extent to which new atheism can be said the only motivation for violence, it provides “the principal to have been thus far successful in its goals. label, and the most dangerous one, by which a ‘they’ as opposed to a ‘we’ can be identified….It is not an exaggera- Terms and conditions tion to say that religion is the most inflammatory enemy- Defining the parameters of new atheism is no easy task. labelling device in history”. Studies into the demographics of the ‘nonreligious’ typi- On this basis, new atheism adopts an avowedly critical cally make no distinction between different forms of posture towards religion. Claiming that religious views atheism in a fashion that would allow a category of ‘new have enjoyed a cosseted and excessively privileged sta- atheists’ to be easily identified. Some, such as Cragun et tus for far too long, and that they should be accorded no al. (2012), have attempted to disaggregate various sub- more respect or special treatment than any other view- streams of thought within atheism, but ’new atheism’ point or opinion, proponents of new atheism call for reli- remains elusive. Fine-grained distinctions are also fre- gious beliefs to be exposed to scrutiny wherever they are quently absent amongst atheists themselves. Not all of found in precisely the same way that one might critique those who might subscribe to the ethos of new atheism politics, literature or art. Though recognising that not all choose to identify themselves in this way, and the broader religious views are equally noxious, this stance is none- atheist, secular and humanist populations (subsumed theless applied to all forms of religious beliefs. As well as here under the collective noun of the ‘nonreligious’) attacking its more extreme varieties, ostensibly ‘moderate’ contain a number of overlapping identity markers and religious views are also challenged on the grounds that, labels, such as ‘agnostic’, ‘humanist’, ‘freethinker’, ‘skep- while they may not necessarily be dangerous in and of tic’, ‘secularist’ and so on. Although the links between themselves, they provide succour for more fundamental- them are by no means determinative or reciprocal, it is ist positions and help to sustain the cultural legitimacy not uncommon for ‘new atheists’ to ascribe to multiple of belief in unobservable, supernatural forces. As Greta identities and to simultaneously associate with other Christina (2012: loc.1045) writes, “moderate and progres- descriptors. Two of the most well-known new atheists, sive religion still encourages the basic idea of faith; the Richard Dawkins and AC Grayling, are also Vice Presi- idea that it’s acceptable, and even virtuous, to believe in dents of the British Humanist Association. Another, Dan- things you have no good reason to think are true”. iel Dennett (2003), has publicly declared his support for New atheism also involves claims about religion and using the term ‘Brights’ to denote people with a natural- morality. Here, new atheists assert that religion is not istic worldview. needed for moral behaviour, and is in many cases itself This diversity is reflected in the lack of any commonly deeply immoral, not least due to its negative social and agreed upon definition for what new atheism actually personal consequences. New atheists also tend to favour is. Its main progenitors, and its central ideas, are per- naturalistic explanations for moral behaviour, grounded haps most closely associated with a series of best-selling in the evolutionary merits of altruism and co-operation, books by four main authors, known colloquially as the and emphasise the ethical value of human life without ‘Four Horsemen’, during the middle of the previous dec- religion, as a fleeting moment of existence made all the ade: Sam Harris (The End of Faith, 2004), Daniel Dennett more valuable precisely by the absence of an afterlife. (Breaking the Spell, 2006), Richard Dawkins (The God Social scientific research showing that countries with the Delusion, 2006), and Christopher Hitchens (God is Not highest levels of morality (measurable by levels of social Great, 2007). Other proponents, such as Victor Stenger disorder, inequality, civil rights, happiness and so on) also (2009) and AC Grayling (2013), have also written in sup- tend to be the least religious (and vice versa) are com- port of new atheist ideas, as have numerous activists and monly emphasised too (e.g.