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Extensions of Remarks March 8, 1988 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS 3549 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS THE IRAN/CONTRA AFFAIR constitutional system of shared powers be­ initiatives and were supplied misleading in­ tween the Congress and the President be formation. made to work in the formulation and imple­ Colonel North said, "I did not want to HON. LEE H. HAMILTON mentation of foreign policy in a dangerous show the Congress a single word." OF INDIANA world?" In the Iran/Contra affair, secrecy was IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES III. WHY DID THE COMMITTEES HOLD PUBLIC used to justify lies to the Congress, to the Tuesday, March 8, 1988 HEARINGS? Attorney General, to Cabinet officers and The Committees were created to find even to the CIA. Secrecy was used not as a Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to shield against our adversaries but as a insert a copy of a speech that I gave summa­ facts, and to investigate the process failures. Our purpose was to get the facts, not the weapon against our own democratic institu­ rizing the Iran/Contra affair into the CONGRES­ President. tions. SIONAL RECORD: The Congress gets information principally Admiral Poindexter wrote in one of his THE IRAN/CONTRA AFFAIR through holding hearings. The Select Com­ prof notes, "Withhold true objectives from staffs." I. WHY WERE THE HEARINGS HELD? mittees obtained large amounts of evidence through staff work and private depositions <4> Intelligence was misused. The hearings were held because in the Too often intelligence estimates were used course of the conduct of the Government's but the open hearings contributed to the public understanding of these events and as a tool to make policy look good rather business something went seriously wrong. than as a tool for making good policy. The Two policies led to the inquiry: The arms the workings of our system of government. We examined over 300,000 pages of docu­ Secretary of State testified that he did not sales to Iran and the diversion of funds trust the intelligence that he received with from those sales to the Nicaraguan Contras. ments, more than 500 witnesses. We held 41 days of public hearings. respect to these events. The first began with a document the Presi­ (5) There was too much reliance on pri­ dent forgot and the second began without Extremely complex facts had to be ana­ his knowledge. lyzed in testimony drawn out of the wit­ vate citizens and foreign governments to nesses who were often uncooperative. Be­ carry out American policy. The President's decision to sell arms se­ The NSC staff turned to private parties c~etly to Iran contradicted the long held, cause the task of the Committees was to Widely supported public policies of the inform rather than prosecute, strict court and third countries to do the government's United· States to make no concessions to ter­ room rules of evidence did not apply. Wit­ business. Sensitive negotiations were con­ rorists, to remain neutral in the Persian nesses could be forced to testify if granted ducted by parties with little experience in limited immunity and they could consult diplomacy and a financial interest of their Gulf war, and to stop the flow of arms to own. General Secord and Albert Hakim took Ira~. By selling arms to a nation officially lawyers before answering questions. designated by our government as a terrorist Since the witnesses were reluctant, adver­ $4% million in commission and used $2.2 state, major damage was done to U.S. credi­ sarial, inconsistent and often could not million for their personal benefit. bility. Because of these policies, President recall significant events, pointed, tough, The solicitation of foreign funds by an ad­ Reagan was catapulted into the most seri­ probing questions were necessary. ministration to pursue foreign policy goals ous policy crisis of his presidency. Doing all of this in a public form rather rejected by the Congress is dangerous and The basic problem was that we were tell­ than behind closed doors let Americans improper. Such solicitations creates a risk ing all the world that we were doing one decide for themselves if the investigation that the foreign country will expect and thing, when in fact we were secretly doing was fair and thorough. There is no better demand something in return. When there is something else. way than television to present all of this to a quid, there is a quo. Our public policy was to remain neutral in the people of America. Moreover, under the Constitution only the war. Our secret policy was to sell arms the Congress can provide funds for the ex­ IV. WHAT THEN WERE THE MAJOR CONCLUSIONS ecutive branch. The power of the purse is to Iran. OF THE HEARINGS? Our public policy was not to make any one of the principle checks on the executive concessions for the release of hostages. Our <1) The Committees found no smoking action. It is designed among other things to secret policy was to trade weapons to get gun evidence that President Reagan was in­ prevent the executive from involving this the hostages back. volved in wrong doing, such as engaging in a country unilaterally in a foreign conflict. Our public policy was to ban arms ship­ cover up for approving the diversion of arms The Constitution does not prohibit the ments to Iran and to exhort our allies to ob­ sales money to the Contras. They did show President from asking a foreign state, or serve the embargo. Our secret policy was to that he allowed his aides to carry out secret anyone else, to contribute funds to a third sell sophisticated missiles to Iran and to policies with little supervision. party. But it does prohibit such solicitation promise more. <2> The Committees found there was too where the United States exercises control Our public policy was to urge all states to little accountability for decisions and ac­ over the receipt and expenditure. By cir­ punish terrorism. Our secret policy was to tions taken in the name of elected officials. cumventing Congress' power of the purse reward terrorism by selling them the arms A small number of officials made policy out­ through third-country and private contribu­ they wanted. side the democratic process. tions to the Contras, the administration un­ Our public policy was to observe the letter <3> Admiral Poindexter said, "The buck dermined a cardinal principle of the Consti­ and the spirit of the Boland Amendment stops with me." tution. which prescribed military assistance to the There was too much secrecy and decep­ (6) Covert actions were mis-used. Contras. Our secret policy was to fund the tion in government. Covert actions should always be used to Contras' military effort. The common ingredients of the Iran/ supplement, not to contradict our foreign Our public policy was to conduct covert Contra policies were secrecy, deception and policy. They should not be used to impose a operations solely through the CIA. Our disdain for the law. ' foreign policy that the American people do secret policy was to permit the NSC staff to These officials told neither the Secretary not support. They should be conducted in become an operational agency and to use of State, the Congress, nor the American accordance with strict rules of accountabil­ private, non-accountable agents to conduct people of their actions. ity and oversight. covert activities concealed from the Con­ When their exposure was threatened, It is unwise to rely on covert actions as gress. they destroyed official documents and lied the core of our policy. But it was precisely The hearings were held because we sought to Cabinet officials, to the public, and to the because the public would not support the to discover how these events happened and elected representatives in Congress. They Contra policy and was unlikely to favor the how they could be prevented. even withheld key facts from the President. arms deal with Iran that the National Secu­ Crucial information was withheld from rity Council went underground. II. WHAT WERE THE CENTRAL ISSUES OF THE the Congress, from important allies, and <7> Throughout Iran/Contra there was HEARINGS? from the American people. The Secretaries shown a disdain for the Congress. The central question before the Select of Defense and State and even the President Officials holding no elected office repeat­ Committees-at least for me-was, "Can our were not informed of major foreign policy edly evidenced disrespect for Congress' ef- • This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor. Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor. 3550 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS March 8, 1988 forts to perform its constitutional oversight There is no evidence that the Vice Presi­ without informing the Congress as Admiral role in foreign policy. dent was aware of the diversion. He attend­ Poindexter did. Admiral Poindexter testified, "I simply ed several meetings on the Iran initiative Unresolved questions remain. We don't did not want any outside interference." but none of the participants could recall his know what happened to all the money. We Elliott Abrams acknowledged in his testi­ views. don't know why the President agreed to sell mony that unless Members of Congress One of his advisors was told about the ac­ arms to Iran. We don't know what created asked "exactly the right question using ex­ tivities of Col. North but he testified that the climate in the White House that led actly the right words they weren't going to he did not consider these facts worthy of aides to believe secrecy and short cuts were get the right answers." the Vice President's attention.
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