Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, I99I

FIJI November 1991, was For , 1991 was a year of continuing elected to the presidency ofthe party, political turbulence and economic winning 9 ofthe 19 votes cast to Adi uncertainty. The country weathered Lady Lala Mara's 6 and William several actual and threatened industrial Toganivalu's 4. strikes, and witnessed the emergence of The election of a commoner a number of political parties in antici­ (although an uncommon one) over two pation ofthe general elections sched­ high-ranking chiefs to head a chiefs' uled for May 1992. The economy faced party provoked much comment. Some the full onslaught of the interim Fijian observers raised fundamental regime's deregulation measures, which questions about the inevitably corro­ brought it into confrontation with sive impact on the fijian chiefly system trade unions and other opposition par­ of chiefs participating in the hurly­ ties. The year will be remembered as burly of electoral politics as traditional pregnant with many ominous possibili­ representatives oftheir people. Others ties, and some ofthem will be manifest saw the formation of the SVT as essen­ m 1992. tially an attempt by the eastern-domi­ On the political front, several nated chiefly establishment to control important developments took place. the political destiny of the taukei, and The political party backed by the Great to maintain the status quo. Council of Chiefs, the Soqosoqo ni One of these was the ever-mercurial Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), whose Apisai Tora, who at various times in formation was approved by the council his checkered political career has in June 1990, formalized its constitu­ belonged to the Indo-fijian-backed tion and began the highly divisive pro­ National Federation Party, the Alli­ cess of selecting candidates to contest ance, and in 1987 the violence-threat­ the 37 Fijian communal seats. The SVT, ening, stridently anti-Coalition Taukei says its constitution, will promote the Movement. "Our firm view," he said interests of the taukei, the indigenous "remains that the Bose Levu Vaka­ , "in association with other eth­ turaga [] nic communities in Fiji," seek to rees­ should be at the pinnacle of Fijian soci­ tablish Fiji's links to the British Crown ety, totally removed from the taint of and with the Commonwealth, and pur­ ordinary politicking" (FT, 10 Oct 1991). sue economic policies that promote In July, he launched his own party, the economic growth and development All National Congress (ANC), a move within an essentially deregulated envi­ that brought the wrath of the interim ronment to allow "world market forces regime and cost him his cabinet posi­ to determine prices and production for tion in the interim government. With export and local markets through an its base in western Fiji, a place with a efficient and productive private sector long history of political dissent against enterprise" (SVT constitution, 10). In both the colonial state and the postco- THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. FALL 1992 lonial Alliance government, the ANC personal political aspirations, mean presented itself as a multiracial party that political fragmentation will be a for all the people ofFiji. To no one's continuing feature of taukei political surprise, Tora presented himself as a life. changed person, "a moderate and a On the Indo-Fijian side, too, there is democrat," saying that Fiji had to find evidence of political fragmentation. In a home for all its people on the basis of 1991 a number ofparties emerged, justice and fairness: "The people of essentially fragments of bodies for­ Fiji, whether we are Fijians, Indians or merly associated with the now-defunct Europeans, or whatever, are here and . Among them were the here to stay. There is no place else for Fiji Indian Congress and the Indian us to go" (FT, 7 Aug 1991). In 1987 Tora Liberal Party. However, these parties was among those calling for the emas­ are not likely to have any major elec­ culation ofIndo-Fijians' political toral impact; some may even vanish rights. He hopes to win a number of before election day 1992. Although seats in western as well as a dormant since the coups of1987, the few ANc-aligned General Voter seats to National Federation Party (NFP) hold the balance ofpower in the next remains the dominant, representative parliament. voice ofthe Indo-Fijian community. Several other Fijian splinter parties, The combination of a racially discrimi­ such as the Fijian Conservative Party natory constitution that gives Indo­ and Sakiasi Butadroka's Fijian Chris­ Fijians (nearly half the total popula­ tian Nationalist Party (formerly the tion) only 27 of the 71 seats, various ), hope for a pro-Fijian policies of the interim similar outcome. Butadroka's party has regime, and a general sense ofhelpless­ changed its name but not its platform. ness has given the party (and its con­ It still demands the political oblitera­ stituency) a sense of cohesiveness that tion ofthe Indo-Fijians and complete it has rarely enjoyed in the past. Fijian control ofthe economy, includ­ In September 1991, the NFP decided ing the return of all fee simple and to participate in the forthcoming elec­ other lands to indigenous hands. In tions under protest. The decision was November, Fijians in western Viti Levu taken to prevent the Indo-Fijian seats launched their own Fijian Landowners from being occupied by "irresponsible Party, with a pro-western Fijian plat­ people," in Jai Ram Reddy's words (FT, form similar to the policies ofthe West­ 21 Sept 1991). There was also the reali­ ern United Front of the 1980s (Lal, zation that, whatever the NFP'S atti­ 1983). The emergence of splinter Fijian tudes, many Indo-Fijians would con­ parties is not altogether surprising, test the seats for reasons of their own, though their impact on the Fijian polit­ including settling old scores. Boycot­ ical scene is not likely to be significant. ting the elections, the party leaders A diminishing fear of the threat of apprehended, would be disastrous for Indo-Fijian political dominance, a their community's broader interests quiet but strong suspicion ofthe hege­ and severely detrimental to the party's monic ambition ofeastern Fijians, and future survival. ,I, ! i'1III' ... ~. ••• ';.;h" • l1'l'i"", • i.," ""

POLITICAL REVIEWS

Although the decision to participate Rabuka backed down when Ganilau, may have pleased many disenchanted who is also Rabuka's paramount chief, Indo-Fijians, it deeply dismayed the said he was "extremely disappointed, NFP'S coalition partner, the Fiji Labour dismayed and shocked" by the general's Party (FLP), which had resolved earlier utterances and demanded an uncondi­ to boycott the elections. How could the tional apology from him; this was party contest elections under a consti­ offered to both Ganilau and Mara and tution it had proclaimed to the world his cabinet colleagues. According to to be racist, feudalistic, authoritarian, confidential sources within the interim and unjust? Participation in the elec­ government, Rabuka had planned to tions, argued the FLP leaders, would sack the government and replace it give legitimacy to the constitution and with a "national front" administration, amount to its acceptance. But princi­ but the move failed when senior offi­ pled resolve eventually gave way to cers ofthe army balked. Doing an practical realities. Fearing political incredible about-turn a month later, marginalization and urged by their Rabuka accepted Mara's invitation to supporters, the FLP'S indigenous Fijian join the cabinet as co-deputy prime strategists effectively jettisoned their minister and minister for home affairs previous position and began to explore (which oversees the army, police, and ways offorging a common ground security forces). Mara had outma­ with other independents and like­ neuvered the erratic general, or so it minded parties to oppose the SVT seemed for a while. (Daily Post, 29 Oct 1991). As the year While in the administration, how­ drew to a close, several FLP Fijians ever, Rabuka continued to be an irri­ were preparing to stand as indepen­ tant to his cabinet colleagues. He made dents. The difference of opinion no secret of his desire to become prime between the FLP and the NFP, on con­ minister "to fulfil my objectives and my testing the election, ended the coalition promises of1987" (PIM, Aug 1991). Pro­ arrangement between them. jecting himself as a populist consensus The fluctuating fortunes of Sitiveni maker, Rabuka helped to resolve the Rabuka frequently made the headlines sugar dispute. He angered many chiefs in 199I. The news that shook Fiji in by insisting, as the Coalition had done June 1991 was Rabuka's stinging criti­ in 1987, that they should not mix their cism of the interim government, which, traditional political roles. His distinc­ the general said, had lost touch with tion between "meritorious" chiefs and the people, "got it all wrong," and "traditional" chiefs displeased many, ought to resign. "This government is a especially his remark that the domi­ reactionary government," Rabuka said, nance of Fijian chiefs would end soon "made up of overpaid people who sit with "replacement of traditional aris­ on their laurels and wait for something tocracy with meritocracy" (FT, 29 Aug to happen before they react" (FT, 5June 1991). In November, Rabuka was 1991). He even threatened to "repossess elected to the presidency of the SVT, power" he had invested in the presi­ providing Mara with the opportunity dent. Two days later, however, to force his resignation from Cabinet. 39° THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. FALL 1992

Rabuka insists that he considers him­ ning factory, hoping to produce IS mil­ self the front-runner for prime minis­ lion pineapples for export in 1994. ter, but most people in Fiji think (and Malaysia's Borneo Finance Group hope) that the post should go to Jose­ began a joint venture with the govern­ fata Kamikamica, the clean technocrat ment-owned National Bank of Fiji in widely credited with improving the April. In July, the Fiji National Petro­ performance of the Fijian economy. leum Company (Finpeco) gave Malay­ Rabuka's changing fortune is not sia the sole right to distribute petro­ difficult to explain. His professed lack leum products in Fiji, even though of interest in politics, as expressed in independent assessments show this last 1987, has been overtaken by his ambi­ move especially to be expensive. tion to become prime minister or at At the same time, the regime contin­ least playa prominent role in national ued its program ofderegulating the politics for about fifteen years. This economy. The tax-free-zone scheme, explains why he embraced populist which gives significant tax and other positions to widen his appeal and concessions to companies that export power base. But such activities dis­ 90 percent of their produce, continued. pleased others, like Mara, who had In July, 313 companies representing an hoped that after executing the coups, investment of $102 million, operated in Rabuka would disappear from center Fiji under the scheme, while another stage and leave the chiefs of the old 114 proposals were approved (PR, 21 Alliance party to run the government. Aug 1991). Plans were also approved to Rabuka refused, seeing himself, again extend the tax-free base beyond the like Mara, as being indispensable to garment industry to include timber the destiny ofhis people. Tension processing and light manufacture of between the two men, who are alike in technical equipment. There is no doubt both their autocratic temperament and that the scheme has been a significant their highly developed sense ofper­ shot in the ailing economy's arm, pro­ sonal mana, will continue to make viding employment and improving the waves in Fijian politics. balance ofpayments. Yet, independent On the economic front, the interim research confirms increasing poverty regime continued its multipronged among lower-income families in Fiji effort to resuscitate the economy (Barr, 1990). severely battered by the coups and in In related economic changes, the 1991 growing at the sluggish rate of 1.5 interim regime proposed to introduce a percent instead of the projected 3-4 per­ 10 percent value-added tax on all cent (SSD, 25 Oct 1991). It continued to major goods and services, a move its court investment from Asian countries critics say will increase the cost ofmost to break the monopoly ofAustralia major items by 6 to 8 percent and and New Zealand. Pakistan's Habib which the government says will reduce Bank opened in March 1991, and a the marginal tax rate from 40 percent Korean company bought 1200 hectares to 35 percent and abolish the basic tax. of fee simple land in Vanua Levu to The value-added tax will come into establish a pineapple farming and can- effect in 1992. ,/ ....:., ..,;, J': /

POLITICAL REVIEWS 391

The interim administration tended strike in May. The main issue in the to see all industrial problems as being dispute was the farmers' demand for caused by a hostile trade union move­ the payment in full ofthe forecast price ment bent on embarrassing it at every of F$43.70 per tonne of sugar. The Fiji opportunity. As a result in May at the Sugar Corporation proposed to pay national economic summit held in only F$34.96 per tonne, on the grounds Suva, the regime proposed (and later of declining world price for sugar, bad enacted) a number of far-reaching con­ weather, mill breakdowns, and harvest trols on the operation of trade unions delays (IBP, May 1991). After much in the country. The changes include the pressure, the corporation agreed to pay removal ofimmunity from prosecution F$6 more as part of the third and final oftrade unions in cases of damages payment. When the farmers refused to arising from "unlawful" trade disputes; accept this offer and demanded prompt the introduction ofcompany-based elections for the Sugar Cane Growers unions; the prohibition of industrial Council, through which they could air associations from acting as trade their grievances, the president pro­ unions; the use of postal or workplace mulgated decrees providing for four­ ballots for election of union officials teen-year jail sentences and fines up to (as opposed to election at annual meet­ F$IO,OOO for anyone who refused to ings); the amendment ofthe Trade Dis­ plant, grow, or harvest their crops, or putes Act to widen the definition of a in any way impaired the running of the strike to include other forms of indus­ sugar industry. When the farmers still trial action such as go-slow, work-to­ refused, the president threatened to use rule, and withdrawal ofgoodwill; and the army to harvest cane, a prospect the abolition ofwage councils because strongly condemned by Rabuka. In the "getting more people into jobs is con­ end, however, the farmers' pressure sidered a better way of addressing low paid off. The president, with the help household income than imposing an of General Rabuka, revoked the arbitrary minimum wage which denies decrees, and the farmers lifted their many people access to income" (FT, 3 boycott and agreed to participate in an Nov 1991). The Fiji Trades Union Con­ all-industry conference. gress claimed that these policies Subsequently, the farmers accused "appear to be fuelled by a savage intent the interim regime of reneging on its to constrain and ultimately destroy promises and delaying elections to the trade unions," (FT, 5 Nov 1991) and has Growers Council, and organized a vowed to enlist international support, three-day no-harvest strike in Novem­ including overseas shipping and airline ber. The tensions remain. The farmers' bans, to have them repealed. As 1991 anxiety was not relieved by the recom­ drew to a close, the stage was set for a mendations of a World Bank report bitter confrontation between the trade that included a steep increase in lease unions and the interim regime. rentals to bring them into line with Finally, disputes in the sugar indus­ world market prices. The recommen­ try also dominated the news in Fiji, dations are sure to become a sensitive bringing the country to the brink of a issue in the 1992 general elections. 392 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. FALL 1992

In sum, 1991 was a year of declared negotiation of development contracts intentions, pyrrhic victories, and hard­ for 1993-1997. ening positions on both sides ofthe The concept of economic redistribu­ political divide in Fiji, sowing seeds of tion for the territory, which at first had issues and concerns that will come to mostly involved the adoption ofthe life in 1992. To paraphrase the words provincial system, gradually evolved ofHerman Melville, 1991 was like a toward new concepts as the gap that ship on its passage out, not a journey existed between the large infrastructure complete. projects proposed by the provincial BRIJ V. LAL governments and the actual expecta­ tions and needs oflocal communities became apparent. Increasingly, deci­ References sions regarding development were Barr, Kevin. 1990. Poverty in Fiji. Suva: Fiji being taken at the level ofmunicipal Forum for Justice, Peace and the Integrity governments. A discrepancy exists of Creation. between the need of many municipali­ ties in the back country and the islands Daily Post. Suva. for public facilities and their financial FT, Fiji Times. Daily, Suva. resources. Recognition of this discrep­ ancy led to a proposal to the territorial IBP, Islands Business Pacific. Monthly, Suva. congress to establish for 1992 an Inter­ municipal Readjustment Fund (Fonds Lal, Brij V. 1983. The Fiji General Election Intercommunal de Perequation) to of 1982: The Tidal Wave that Never Came. finance these public facilities. The Journal ofPacific History 18 (2): 134-157. municipality of Noumea would not PIM, Pacific Islands Monthly. Suva. be a part of this system, and would instead operate under a State-City PR, Pacific Report. Fortnightly, Canberra. contract. SVT, Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei Alain Christnacht, the new high constitution (ms in author's possession). commissioner and central government SSD, South Sea Digest. Fortnightly, Sydney. delegate for New Caledonia, assumed his post in January 1991. He had served as secretary general for the territory from 1980 to 1982, and had been head NEW CALEDONIA of Cabinet for the minister for Over­ In the context of the continuing imple­ seas Territories since July 1988. mentation of policies arising from the In April, the RPCR (Rassembfement Matignon Accord, 1991 represents a pour fa Cafedonie dans fa Repubfique, year of transition between the creation the loyalist party) held its first conven­ of the new institutions-particularly tion since that ofJuly 1988, immedi­ the provincial system-and the politi­ ately after the signing of the Matignon cal reassessment to be accomplished in Accord. Jacques Lafleur, reelected 1992 by the independentists prior to the RPCR president, described how he