Club Med. Orange Ties to Kuchma Era Strongman Viktor Medvedchuk

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Club Med. Orange Ties to Kuchma Era Strongman Viktor Medvedchuk Club Med Orange ties to Kuchma era strongman Viktor Medvedchuk remain strong Taras Kuzio Business Ukraine 26 www.businessukraine.com.ua POLITICS arly April saw accusations and counter- far more about the President and his willing- the same time as the parties of other busi- accusations traded by the President and ness to work with notorious figures from the ness clans. It was dubbed the ‘Kyiv clan’ in EPrime Minister over their continued old regime than they do about the PM Yulia the same manner as the Trudova Ukrayina use of figures tied to former Social Democratic Tymoshenko. The SDPUo has always been (Labour Ukraine) party was dubbed that united Party (SDPUo) personnel and its leader, the President’s bogey man, the one centrist of the ‘Dnipropetrovsk clan’. In reality, the the Kuchma era presidential chief of staff pro-Kuchma political party that Viktor Yush- SDPUo never became the ‘Kyiv clan’ as it was Viktor Medvedchuk. This latest evidence of a chenko could never work with, but that has always unpopular in its home base of Kyiv split at the top of the Orange coalition is both not stopped him building alliances around key where today the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc has pointless and poignant. Pointless because it personnel who first entered politics alongside 70% support. In the 1999 Kyiv mayoral elec- continues the presidential policy of washing Mr. Medvedchuk. tions SDPUo candidate Hryhoriy Surkis was dirty linen in public in a vein and futile trounced by Oleksandr Omelchenko. attempt at undermining the government’s The creation of a Kyiv clan The SDPUo retreated to the economically popularity. Poignant because the accusations The SDPUo first appeared on the political underdeveloped and politically isolated Trans- of using Mr. Medvedchuk’s men actually say map in the 1998 parliamentary elections at Carpathian region, a very poor economic : April 14-20, 2008 27 : cousin of Kyiv indeed. This region was controlled Medvedchuk the position of National Security of the state-owned Ukrnafta which has long by SDPUo stalwarts such as Viktor Baloha until and Defence Council secretary in return for his been alleged to be under the de facto control he switched sides in the 2002 parliamentary legal support in the spring 2007 political crisis. of Privat. elections to Mr. Yushchenko’s then newly created Our Ukraine bloc. Mr. Baloha became Tymoshenko attracts Club Med accusations famous and a Yushchenko “martyr” in the April business establishment Why then, has Mr. Yushchenko made a point 2004 Mukachevo mayoral elections, which This is not to say that the Tymoshenko bloc and of accusing the Tymoshenko government of saw the first instance of political violence in a the current government does not also include working hand in glove with figures connected year that was to become dramatic and reach a former supporters of Mr. Kuchma such as to Mr. Medvedchuk? The answers are to be climax with the Orange Revolution. Bohdan Hubsky, but these figures are far fewer sought in Mr. Yushchenko’s personality and in number than former “Kuchmaites” in the politics. Of the myriad of pro-Kuchma centrist The Poroshenko connection Yushchenko camp. The fact remains that both political parties which used to populate Another senior Our Ukraine leader who the Tymoshenko bloc and Mr. Yushchenko’s the Ukrainian parliament he only ever saw entered politics in 1998 on the coat strings of team have reached out to big business. the SDPUo as his enemy. Mr. Yushchenko Mr. Medvedchuk’s SDPUo was today’s National Serhiy Tyhipko, head of Viktor Yanukovych’s never looked in the same hostile manner at Bank chairman Petro Poroshenko. He defected 2004 election campaign and Industrial Union the People’s Democratic Party (NDP), Mr. two years earlier than Mr. Baloha to establish a of Donbas co-chairman Vitaliy Haydiuk Kuchma’s first, failed party of power in the late Solidarity parliamentary faction and Solidarity have recently been made advisers to the 1990s, nor the Agrarians, Labour Ukraine or Party with, as the Melnychenko tapes appear Tymoshenko government. Both represent even the Party of Regions. Relations between to demonstrate, funds provided by former the pragmatic wing of Ukraine’s big business Mr. Yushchenko and the Party of Regions until president Leonid Kuchma. At the time, Mr. which has long supported a separation of busi- the 2004 elections were cordially facilitated by Kuchma is thought to have wanted another ness and politics. During the first days of the Mr. Poroshenko. centrist political force to act as a counter- Orange Revolution Mr. Tyhipko left Ukrainian Volodymyr Lytvyn was offered the position balance to the SDPUo. politics and the Labour Ukraine party to focus of head of Our Ukraine’s 2002 election bloc; Mr. Poroshenko assisted in the creation of on business. Valery Khoroshkovskiy, who led a Mr. Kuchma turned down the offer as Mr. the Party of Regions in 2001 when his Soli- failed political project called the Winter Crop Lytvyn was destined to be instead head of darity Party became one of the five parties that Generation in the 2002 elections, has now been the For a United Ukraine bloc. Mr. Lytvyn and merged to create the new centrist force that brought into the Tymoshenko government. Yushchenko-Poroshenko had long been oppo- represented the “Donetsk clan.” Another of nents of the SDPUo. the five parties was current Kyiv Mayor Leonid Looking for pragmatic partnerships Chernovetsky’s Party for a Beautiful Ukraine, Since sweeping to power in 2004 Mr. Yush- Creating a third way an appropriately named party for somebody chenko has favoured building bridges with polit- A journalist fired earlier this year from the commonly referred to as Leon the Spaceman. ical forces closer to the ousted old guard. He Channel 5 television station claimed that his Another senior SDPUo member to later courted the Party of Regions in the September removal came after he had aired stories alleging go to assist Mr. Yushchenko was Oleksandr 2005 and Spring 2007 political crises, signing an Mr. Poroshenko’s funding of the Lytvyn bloc Zinchenko, who broke with the SDPUo in 2003- infamous memorandum with Mr. Yanukovych in the 2007 elections. Such allegations would 2004, or significantly later than Mr. Porosh- in the first and agreeing to support a grand certainly fit with a general model of Yush- enko (2000) or Mr. Baloha (2002). He then ran coalition after the September 2007 elections in chenko allies seeking to create political middle Mr. Yushchenko’s 2004 election campaign and the second. Following the 2006 elections Mr. ground. In founding Our Ukraine in 2001-2002, took on a prominent role during the Orange Yushchenko instructed then-prime minister Yushchenko and Poroshenko saw it as a third Revolution itself before becoming his presiden- Yuriy Yekhanurov to negotiate a grand coalition force that was neither in opposition nor with tial head of staff for much of Mr. Yushchenko’s with the Party of Regions that reached agree- the pro-regime camp. This explains its inability first year in office. ment on keeping himself as Prime Minister and to decide if it was allied to Mrs. Tymoshenko Mr. Yanukovych as speaker. Failed attempts to or Mr. Kuchma. Medvedchuk remains unseat Mrs. Tymoshenko two months ago are well-represented said to have involved a similar plan to install Mr. Medvedchuk and the bad boyars Defectors from the SDPUo and other pro- Baloha as Prime Minister with Mr. Yanukovych Mr. Yushchenko has never been able to blame Kuchma parties also have prominent positions as parliamentary speaker. Mr. Kuchma for anything that occurred during in Our Ukraine (numerous businessmen), the The Privat group, one of Ukraine’s most his decade-long presidency. Indeed, during National Security and Defence Council (i.e. Party extensive business empires headed by Ihor the Kuchmagate crisis, Mr. Yushchenko (then of Regions faction leader Raisa Bohatioriova) Kolomoysky, has been close to Mr. Yushchenko prime minister) saved Mr. Kuchma’s career and the presidential secretariat (i.e. former since 2006. Mr. Kolomoysky placed some of his by refusing to back calls by Mrs. Tymoshenko presidential representative in parliament business associates in the 2007 Our Ukraine- and Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz for the Roman Besmertnyi, who was nicknamed the Peoples Self Defence election list and as a President’s impeachment. This stance is not “Little Medvedchuk” during the Kuchmagate direct result of this alliance the Tymoshenko surprising as Mr. Yushchenko had served Mr. crisis for his staunch defence of Mr. Kuchma). government has received no presidential Kuchma for seven of his ten years in office. This Mr. Yushchenko also apparently offered Mr. support in its attempts to wrestle back control problem actually runs deep, as Mr. Yushchenko 28 www.businessukraine.com.ua preferring instead to live off less obvious POLITICS Orange Revolution campaign manager Oleksandr Zinchenko (with moustache, means. Abroad, the SDPUo failed to attract right) is one of many figures close to the any legitimacy and it was refused membership current government who started out in of Socialist International. Mr. Moroz’s Socialist politics under Viktor Medvedchuk’s wing Party, meanwhile, did become a member of that organisation. Post-Orange nosedive Following the Orange Revolution the SDPUo went into steep decline as Mr. Medvedchuk was implicated in many of the dirty tactics used in the 2004 Mukachevo mayoral elections and against Mr. Yushchenko in the 2004 presiden- tial elections. Deputy SDPUo leader Mr. Satsiuk was linked to Mr. Yushchenko’s poisoning after a dinner held in Satsiuk’s dacha. SDPUo governor of Trans-Carpathia Mr. Rizak was arrested for his links to organised crime. The 2006 and 2007 elections should have seen the SDPUo return to power as they had always done well in the proportional side – like many in his Our Ukraine party – has always the proposed coalition fell apart.
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