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John Locke on Knowledge of the Natural Law

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Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations 1958 John Locke on Knowledge of the Natural Law Arthur F. McGovern Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation McGovern, Arthur F., "John Locke on Knowledge of the Natural Law" (1958). Master's Theses. 1635. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/1635 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1958 Arthur F. McGovern JOHN LOCU ON KNOWLEOGE OF THE NATURAL LAW by Arthur F. H~Govern. S .. J. A Tbesl s Sublnl tted to the Facul ty of the Graduate Schoo) of Lovola University in 'artial FulfIllment of the Requirements for the Oegree of Has tor of Arts August ,gsa UFE Arthur Francis MeGovern, S.J. was born in CoIUMbu$, Ohio. December 4.1929. He was graduated from St. Char} es aorromeo Nigh School, Col umbus, Ohio. June, 1947. and from Georgetown University, Washington. D.C •• June, 1951, with the degree of Bachelor of Arts. ae entered the Society of Jesus in August. J9SJ and attended the ttl • ford brandt of Xavi.r University 'rom 19S1 to 1954. He enrolled in the West Baden Coll.,e of Loyola UnIversity in August, 1954, and completed his graduate courses in philosophy In June, 1956. Since 1956 the author h•• been teaching ..thematies at St. Ignatius High School, ChIcago, .llinoi •• ill TABLE OF CONTIHTI Chapter Page I. THE PROBLEM . ., . .. I The publ i cat ion of Locke's Essays .2!1!bt..ldM 2f watu,.--The effe~t of the I r appearance--RealOns fo'rst'Uiyi ng them--New II gilt on Locke's other works ... -tnaportance of natura 1 law--The relation of the l,srX! to his later work .... -Haw the problem of IIIOrall ty gave r .. to t~!.. X S9M!!1'ft i n~ HY!!!J Under- !t.nd1ns..... The thesis concor with the vall lty .nd exm- • i stency of Locke IS .r..,.ent for a law of nature--Import.nc:e of these problems. II. THE PROPOSITION: THIRE DISTS A LAW OF NATURI ","Iat CAN BE KtDIN BY REASON THROUGH IINSI IXPIR IltCl • • •• •••••• 10 An analysis of the prob)ens considered and the answer gIven In each of the eight asMYS. considered se... rately--Von Leyden's synthesl. end criticism of the. essays--An an ...r to von Leyden--A different I nterpretet I on of the essays more favor.le to Locke. III. ARE LOCU'S STATIMINI'S ON KNOWLDGI OF THI NATURAL LAW CONSISTENT WITH HIS LATER WORKS? ••••••••••• • • • 18 TWo comparisons needed to show consistency: (1) His theory of knowing In the early essays compared with hIs later epistemology; (2) HIs concept of natural 1_ in the early essays compared with- the co""'t In his l.ter works--The epistemology of hIs early .SI.ysrA~Eplstemology In his 'iNY Concern. AS H!@M Undet!t.nctL~!S"''''y@Xt' compared and d If c:u 1ties treated"-N.tuniT 1_ In the early es.ays ad In the later ESHy--Gn hedonl.--Natura' law In the early ....ys .nd In the Second Treatise gn ,Ivll 9<>vernmeot--Coracluslon. I V• ARE LOCKE'S ARGUKENTS FOR kNOWUDGE OF THE NATURAL LAW VAll 01 52 Probl. of Interpreting Locke's .r..... t.· .. von Leyden's over­ .11 su&ary .nd ~rltic:lsm--Another posslili. Interpret.tion offered"'-An ev.luation of Locke's argwnents in light of von Iv Leyden's criticism: (I) On the proof that there Is a law of nature; (II) On the proof that this law can be kn<Ml by us; (Ill) On the proof that this I aw Is bind I nl on all men; (IV) On the proof that the 1_ Is perpetual and unlversal--A flnel criticism of von Leyden's Inter­ pret.tlon·~luslon. BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • It • • • • • • • 76 v CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM ren years before John Locke's '§§s~ tqncgrnins Hyman Und!c!\andins received even its first rough form, the author's pen had been at work jotting down a group of essays on natural law. He never bothered to publish the essays, nor did anyone else unti I almost three ftl! i centuries later. In 1954, Wolfgang von leyden, using the authoritative Lovelace collection of Locke's work. edited these Essays .2!! ~qe .bm! 2! NI\Ure, Just why Locke never published these essays is unknown. Von Leyden offers several plausible reasons.' But Whatever the reasons, the essays would certain Iy not have caused the stir that his ~!iiax. Conc!rqins Human Understanding did; and they have not been heralded as prtceless dIscoveries even not/. Their appearance in Locke's time would have aroused little excitement because few people then doubted the exIstence or knowability of the natural Jaw. I n fact, 1Von Leyden's book contains, besides the Latin and English texts of the essays on the law of nature, a number of Locke's other writings, unpublished before now. and a lengthy introduction of some ninety pages or so in which von Leyden comments on different points of hIstorical interest and analyzes the arguments presented. Included among these introductory pages are reasons sug­ gested why the essays on natural Jaw remained unpublished. Von Leyden lists five such reasons: (I) the translation of the essays into English would prove too laborious for locke; (2) many of his Ideas were placed in the Ellay in­ stead; (3) he lacked conviction about the subject. particularly in light of his later hedonistic morals; (4) his views on authority changed considerably; (5) Locke may have felt that the essays lacked maturity of thought. John Locke, Essavs .sm the ~.2.f. Nature, ed. W. von Leyden (Oxford, 1954). p. 14. Tni s book will hencefort~ referred to 85 the Ea!ays. I 2 scholars used natural law as an initial premise in most of their discussions on morality and civil Jaw. The appearance of the essays in our day has aroused little excitement because many ItmoderiY' theories proudly disdain the natural Jaw doctrine. and even the growing number of proponents of natural law can find many another more adequate exPOsition of their position. Why bother, then, to expend ener9Y on these essays? The reasons are multi pte. For one thing, the very way modern tbeorists slough off the topic demands that a 1ess careless consideration be given to a doctrine that has had stuff enough to stay standing for twenty centurIes or so. Also, these essays fill in a I aeun. in Locke' s other t«)rK.s. They offer some Jus t f fJ cat i on for hIs f requen references to the natural Jaw as the basis for his political theories, and they help bridge the gap between the dominant eq>irfcism In his epistemolOgical work and the rationalism of his other writings. FInally, the essays lend further evidence of Locke's genius in doing one thing--asking provocative questions. Locke asked questfons which philosophers from his tlme on have tried to answer. Sometimes his very way of stating problems only ereated greater diffi­ culties. but his thought never failed to stimulate. so much so that his "phil_ osophy exercises undisputed sway over the Ideas of the entire eighteenth centu­ ry.1I 2 He interrupted the flow of philosophy to ask one particularly pertinent questIon: IIJust how much do we really know?" D.J. O'Connor in his conmentary on Locke remarks: !lBy thus raiSing the nature of knowing as a problem, Locke was introducing a new point of view into European philosophy. And this point 2, sai ah Berl in, Ihe Age .2f. Enll 9btepment (Boston, J 956), p. ,30. 3 of view, for good or iiI. has dominated philosophy since his time.1f3 "Just how much do we really know?u He had a very practical reason for asking the question. Locke did not sport at dialectics. He put the question ,;lnd searched for its answer with another problem in mind. Unless he determined how we know and how much we know. Locke cou J d not t aekl e the d iff i cu It i as· wh i ch his contemporaries posed to him about morality and the natural law. I n fact, his EJJsl £2ncernlns Human Underat,nding might never have taken shape except for Locke'S pressing interest in how we come to know the rules of morality that should govern us. Von Leyden gives the fol Jowing, interes,ting account of how it was that a discussion on morality and the natural Jaw gave rise to the ~s!ax Concrern i OS H2!J!1!P Under! tlnd i ns. A gnoup of five or six of Locke'S friends were gathered for a discussion at the London home of Anthony Ashley Cooper, sometIme In 1671. Locke informs us that the topic discussed by the group at the outset was "a subject very remotet l from the special Inquiries into the understand­ ing which arose out of the discussions at a Jater stage and of which the Essay of 1690 was the final outcome. TyrelPs comment on this point is more ext) t i c:1 t. liThe discourse," he says. It began abou t the p ri nc i pies of mrs) ity and reveal'd rei igron.1f Now that we have come to know more about Locke's lIterary activities about 1671.
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