Situating the Mortar in the Future of the British Army: Vision for 2020+

Colonel John Musgrave Assistant Director Offensive Support Combat Support Capability Directorate HQ Army

Context behind Artillery Involvement in this Conference  If Mortars are operated in the British ORBAT by the Infantry so why should a Royal Artillery Officer be talking to you?  My response is:  We need to look at Joint Fires support to the manoeuvre battle in its totality  Hence given that it is the total effect that is required we need to recognise that their may be balance of investment decisions between components  The artillery have lead the way in technology fields which may be applicable to mortars  The British artillery has a formal responsibility to certify mortars before operational deployment  I will contend that greater synergy is required

Scope

 Historical context  Strengths and weaknesses of the Mortar as part of the Joint Fires support of the Manoeuvre Battle  Possible Capability Enhancement:  Defining the Spectrum of Precision  Addressing the Accuracy of Unguided Shells/Bombs  Balance Between ‘True Precision’, Course Corrected and Unguided Bombs, Shells and Rockets  Opportunities for Longer Range  Universal Observers?  Summary

Historical Context

 Direct support ‘battalion’ guns (usually a pair of 3 or 4 Pounders) have been attached to infantry units since the 17th Century  In addition Field artillery has been largely been used in direct support of infantry until longer range small arm fire forced the indirect fire revolution and the resultant deep battle  Hence, for most armies, the close support role switched in WW1 to mortars; weapons that had hither to been restricted to siege warfare Why the Mortar is an Ideal Infantry Support Weapon?

 Low velocity, and for fin-stabilised, no requirement to withstand the rotational forces allows the bomb to have greater explosive yield than a similarly sized artillery shell  Together with a high rate of fire this equals high lethality in return for a small crew:  WW2 Operational Analysis determined that the 3” Mortar caused twice the casualties as similarly crewed Vickers Medium Machine Gun  Easy to operate  Ability to engage targets in cover with plunging fire  Ease of concealing and protecting  Transportability over almost any terrain  It is not as burdened by the logistical support needed for artillery Resultant Disadvantages

 Low velocity = short range = cannot adequately support armoured manoeuvre  Fin stabilised = reduced accuracy  Plunging fire = high trajectory = instant WLR detection and thus counter fire  Easy to operate = reluctance to increase technology  All terrain mobility = man-portable = slow into and out of action  Light logistics = inability to sustain high rate of fire Challenges for the Mortar

Capability Areas to Address:  Greater accuracy and consistency  Range  Increased agility to avoid counter fire Deductions:  Recognition that the current compromises in a single general purpose mortar (81mm) whilst providing excellent support in dismounted operations is inadequate for armoured CAM  Requirement to embrace technological enhancements whilst keeping the system simple Greater Accuracy and Consistency

Defining the Spectrum of Artillery Precision

Either guided weapons Artillery Problem or precision weapons not adequately using mensurate understood or target coordination addressed

‘True’ Precision Near Precision Modern Some Post Unregistered Cat 1 Target Artillery 1917 Artillery Fire Location Error Spectrum of Precision: Artillery Balance of Investment

Balance of Indirect Investment Area for Fire Modern Artillery Inefficient

Either guided weapons Artillery Problem or precision weapons not adequately using mensurate understood or target coordination addressed

‘True’ Precision Near Precision Modern Some Post Unregistered Cat 1 Target Artillery 1917 Artillery Fire Location Error Spectrum of Mortar Precision

Mortars with Mortars Most Mortars Course systematically reliant on Corrected addressing ‘shooting out Fuses & Cat 1 accuracy the error’ TLE

Either guided weapons Artillery Problem or precision weapons not adequately using mensurate understood or target coordination addressed

‘True’ Precision Near Precision Modern Some Post Unregistered Cat 1 Target Artillery 1917 Artillery Fire Location Error (TLE) Addressing the Accuracy of Unguided Shells

 Met: 300 – 350m  Survey:  Fixation: 100m  Survey Orientation: 5mils  Gun Laying: 2mils  MV Calibration (including ballistics)  Wear / AMV error 3 m/s  Occasion to Occasion 3 m/s (during Fire Missions)  Charge Temperature 4 degrees

Addressing the Accuracy of Unguided Shells

 Met: 300–350m 100–150m

 Survey:  Fixation: 100m 10m  Survey Orientation: 5mils 0.5mils  Gun Laying: 2mils 1mils  MV Calibration (including ballistics)  Wear / AMV error 3 m/s 2 m/s  Occasion to Occasion 3 m/s 3 m/s (during Fire Missions)  Charge Temperature 4 degrees 1 degree

Error Budget Breakdown

 Met 60%  Calibration, MV 25%  Survey 15% Where does the RA stand in addressing its error budget?  Met : RA have addressed most of the savings  Calibration, MV : greater accuracy can be delivered (adopting MVs round to round)  Survey: greater accuracy can be delivered in target location during mobile operations

Utility of Course-Corrected Fuzes

 Status. Several contenders including the European Course Corrected Fuse (ECF) and Precision Guidance Kits (PGK) which is currently deployed with US 120mm Mortars  Limitations. Needs an accurate grid and most of the mortars error accounted for  Analysis:  Delivers significantly improved accuracy at least c30M CEP over all ranges  Separating accuracy and consistency from range therefore makes Base Bleed and RAP effective  Pointless for Smoke and Illumination

Deductions on the Utility of Course-Correction

 Will allow increase in range through countering the inaccuracy of Base Bleed or RAP  Will allow effective first round fire  Impact of a ‘circular’ as opposed to a ‘cigar’ distribution of fire on close support tactics  However. Requires all the other elements of the error budget to be addressed increasing the overall complexity of the mortar system True Precision

 Static Target. accurately and consistently hitting a point (usually described as a grid reference) • Mobile Target: • either a Man-in-Loop to guided the projectile to the target Excalibur (usually indirectly Increment IB GNC Base Warhead through designating Assembly Assembly CAS with a laser or directly GNU

‘flying’ the projectile); HOB Sensor or • the projectile having its own target seeking

Radome capability Fins Canards What is Criteria to Judge the Correct Balance between Precision and Guided Projectiles

 The RA believes that posing a choice between ‘precision’ and ‘suppression’ is false and divisive, principally because:  Modern artillery area fires are precise  Suppression is an effect on the target  The true choice is between:  the level of accuracy and consistency required to effectively engage a target;  recognising that the nature of the target and its environment (own troop safety and avoidance of collateral damage) will dictate the level of precision

‘Just as the machine gun is a valid choice to engage an area target in the direct fire battle so are, in many circumstances, unguided shells’ Integrating Joint Fires: Fire Support Team (FST)

Signaller Driver

FST Commander Arty Controller

Mortar Fire Controller

Arty Controller

Forward Air Controller

Attack Helicopter Controller Fire Support Team (FST)

• Precision Fire (Cat 1 TLE) through: • FIRESTORM differential GPS and laser range finder • Mensuration applications • Long range location and identification • Communications • Ground to Ground • Ground to Air • Data transfer

• Down load of full FAC motion video

FST MORTAR ARTY COMD

ATTACK HEL Merging of Artillery and Mortar Observers?

 Option 1: Separate capabilities with limited effective integration  Option 2: Building on the FST concept look at further integration of the two separate capabilities  Option 3: Universal observer trained to cover all aspects of the Joint Fires system

Wireless Ridge – Falklands 1982

‘In contrast to their battle at Goose Green, this time 2 Para could call on massive fire support. The support units included two Batteries of artillery, or five in total if the situation became desperate, HMS Ambuscade, 3 Para's mortars as well as their own and they had two Scorpion and two Scimitar tanks’ Summary

 In the British inventory the 60mm mortar is hugely effective in its role, as is the 81mm mortar on current operations, however this capability has not embraced enhancements possible due to the revolution in the Joint Fires capability  The role of the mortar in support of dismounted infantry remains at least as important as previously, but the current 81mm:  Unmodified its role in armoured operations is problematic;  it can be greatly enhanced through addressing the Met/Survey/calibration error budget;  Course Corrected Bombs offer a further significant accuracy enhancement; and  with base bleed/RAP a real increase in range  Further integration into the Joint Fires capability are possible

Questions?