Erasmus of Rotterdam and Late Medieval Theologians on the Doctrine of Grace

ERASMUS OF ROTTERDAM AND LATE MEDIEVAL THEOLOGIANS ON THE DOCTRINE OF GRACE

Christoph Burger*

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN AUGUSTINE’S DOCTRINE OF GRACE, THE INFLUENCE OF ARISTOTLE, AND THE WISH NOT TO DISCOURAGE SINNERS IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES

The aim of this article is to throw some light on possible late-medieval back- grounds of Erasmus’ well-known propositions on the relationship between God’s grace and human free will in his De libero arbitrio diatribe sive collatio. The similarities between the propositions of some late-medieval theologians and those of Erasmus invite such comparisons, notwithstanding the fact that Erasmus, with his brilliant knowledge of the writings of the church fathers, was not forced to depend on these writers in approaching the question. When it comes to theories about the relationship between God’s grace and the human free will, the writings of Augustine dominated the debate in the Christian theology of the western part of the Roman Empire for a millennium. His struggle against Pelagius, Julianus of Eclanum and later against monks in southern France who strove for perfection had a deep influence on most west- ern theologians of the Early and High Middle Ages. Peter Lombard contributed greatly to this influence by quoting extensively from the writings of Augustine in his Sentences, a textbook used intensely by scholastic theologians. On the matter of the corruption of free will by sin, for example, he quoted Augustine’s Enchiridion: “When man used his free will in a bad way, he corrupted himself and free will. When sin was committed through free will, sin prevailed, and free will was lost”.1

* I should like to thank Dr M. Sherwood-Smith for improving the English in this article. 1 Augustine, Enchiridion ad Laurentium sive de fide, spe et charitate liber unus, 30: “Libero arbitrio male utens homo, et se perdidit et ipsum. Cum enim libero arbitrio pec- caretur, victore peccato, amissum est et liberum arbitrium”. See Aurelii Augustini […] opera omnia, ed. J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina [henceforth: PL], vol. 40 (Paris, 1861), col. 246; Aurelii Augustini Opera; pars 13.2, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina [henceforth: CCSL], vol. 46 (Turnhout, 1969), p. 65; cited by Petrus Lombardus, Sen- tentiae in IV libris distinctae, 2.7, tom. I, pars II, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum IV (Grottaferrata, 1971), p. 465, lines 18-20. Peter Lombard is not, however, one of the strictly anti-Pelagian theologians, cf. C. Burger, “Freiheit zur Liebe ist Geschenk Gottes. Hugolin von Orvieto († 1373) als Schüler Augustins”, in Augustine, the Harvest, and 226 CHRISTOPH BURGER

For a long time, western Christian theologians who disagreed with Augustine had to explain themselves. However, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, under the influence primarily of the writings of Aristotle, but also of the theological dispute about whether a mortal sinner had any chance whatso- ever of doing good, the moral autonomy of man came to be emphasised more and more, even among western theologians. Man came now to be seen not only as a member of the church, but also as a citizen of an earthly community. Many theologians accepted that, as such, man has to fulfil duties and is able to fulfil them without needing the help of God for every action that deserves the description “morally good”. Many thus found it necessary to admit a merely natural domain, beneath the levels of an ethical domain and a domain meritorious for eternal life. Giving alms to the poor, for example, could now be judged as a good work (actus bonus ex genere seu ex officio). If motivated by love towards one’s poor neighbour, such an act was even seen as a morally good work (actus moraliter bonus). If carried out in a state of grace and for the love of God, it was judged as meritorious for eternal life (actus meritorius aeternae vitae).2 Late-medieval adherents of Augustine’s doctrine of grace opposed these theologians. They emphasised that every truly good act must be carried out for the love of God and for the sake of God himself (ex amore Dei propter Deum ipsum). Furthermore, they argued, a Christian had a strict duty to fulfil God’s will according to God’s own purpose.3 On the other hand, these adherents of Augustine’s strictly anti-Pelagian doc- trine of grace had to explain how they could evade the pitfalls of philosophical determinism. In the thirteenth century, the philosophers Boethius of Dacia († before 1284) and Siger of Brabant (c. 1240 – c. 1284) had tried to understand the writings of Aristotle, to which they had access, as precisely as possible. One of the results was philosophical determinism. Of course, in this way the phi- losophers risked coming into conflict with Christian convictions. Étienne Tem-

Theology (1300-1650). Essays Dedicated to Heiko Augustinus Oberman in Honor of his Sixtieth Birthday, ed. K. Hagen (Leiden, 1990), pp. 21-40, at pp. 30-33. 2 Cf. M. Santos Noya, Die Sünden- und Gnadenlehre des Gregor von Rimini (Frank- furt, 1990), p. 53. 3 Cf. H. A. Oberman, Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine, a Fourteenth-Century Au- gustinian: A Study of His Theology in Its Historical Context (Utrecht, 1957; revised edition 1958). C. Burger, “Der Augustinschüler gegen die modernen Pelagianer: Das ‘auxilium speciale dei’ in der Gnadenlehre Gregors von Rimini”, in Gregor von Rimini. Werk und Wirkung bis zur Reformation, ed. H. A. Oberman (Berlin, 1981), pp. 195-240. C. Burger, “Freiheit zur Liebe” (as in n. 1). For a short synopsis, see C. Burger, “Gregor, Hugolin und der junge Luther”, Augustiniana 52 (2002), pp. 335-351, and C. Burger, “De receptie van Augustinus’ genadeleer: Gregorius van Rimini, Hugolinus van Orvieto, Erasmus en Luther (tot 1518)”, in Augustiniana Neerlandica. Aspecten van Augustinus’ spiritualiteit en haar doorwerking, ed. P. van Geest and J. van Oort (Leuven, 2005), pp. 413-425.