Appendix Appendix Contents 50 Issues / Gaps - Partner Agencies 54 Statistics from Emergency Operations 54 Public Information (Communications) 61 EOC Activation Levels & Orders/Alerts Issued 71 Presentation and Interview with Robert Gray, Fire Ecologist 72 Climate Maps from Environment Canada 72 Documentaries & Interviews Reviewed 73 Cariboo Regional District Population Statistics 76 Consultation Meeting Overview 79 Top Five Topics by Meeting Location based on number of recorded comments Meeting Profiles: 81 100 Mile House 83 108 Mile Ranch 85 150 Mile House 87 Alexis Creek 89 Anahim Lake 91 Big Lake 93 Forest Grove 95 Horsefly 97 Interlakes 99 Kersley 101 Lac la Hache 103 Likely 105 McLeese Lake 107 Miocene 109 Nazko 113 Nimpo Lake 115 Quesnel 117 Riske Creek 119 Tatla Lake 121 Watch Lake 123 Wells 125 West Fraser 127 Wildwood 129 Williams Lake 131 Facebook Live 133 Comments from All Consultations By community meeting: 133 100 Mile House 136 108 Mile Ranch 144 150 Mile House 148 Alexis Creek 150 Anahim Lake 152 Big Lake 156 Forest Grove 159 Horsefly 161 Interlakes 167 Kersley 167 Lac la Hache 170 Likely 172 McLeese Lake 173 Miocene 177 Nazko 183 Nimpo Lake 186 Quesnel 189 Riske Creek 193 Tatla Lake 196 Watch Lake 199 Wells 200 West Fraser 203 Wildwood 206 Williams Lake 215 Facebook Live / Recording 218 Received Emails, Calls, and Facebook Messages/Comments 234 Survey Results 300 Information from Other Sources 301 Cellular Coverage Maps 302 Weather Forecasts - July 6 and 7 306 Seasonal Weather Forecast 317 Ranks of Fires 319 Canadian Wildland Fire Information System 321 Cariboo Fire Centre Prep July 6-7 326 Post-Wildfire Hazard Risk Assessment - C10784 Plateau 332 Alberta Wildfire Trend 334 Samples of Evacuation Communications 343 Community Descriptions 350 Glossary 351 Additional Citations Issues / Gaps - Partner Agencies Issues and gaps which are generally outside the jurisdiction of the Cariboo Regional District, along with suggested solutions (where applicable). Elected Officials Those in political positions caused some concern among residents this disaster, which is normal. Residents noted on numerous occasions they don’t see politicians as the experts, and prefer they take a secondary role supporting the response. This may be against what those in political roles would like, however, they must remember they are receiving information outside various Emergency Operations Centres, as elected officials do not have access to these centres. Elected officials do play an important role in relaying information between emergency operations and residents in both directions, as well as advocating for additional support for response from other governments. The most complicating factor to elected official’s response, was the change of government in British Columbia in the middle of the disaster. This was extremely poor timing, and should be avoided if at all possible with a delay in the exchange of power until after a Provincial State of Emergency is over. Local Knowledge As noted under recommendations, greater use of local knowledge is necessary in future emergencies. Local knowledge used to be essential to emergency response, with use of community liaisons, equipment, workers and accommodations. There was a clear gap in this emergency at all levels when using local resources and knowledge. Red Cross It appeared to residents that the Red Cross never seemed to get in a good groove, always struggling to keep up with the demand placed upon the organization. They found their service slow and complicated, perhaps made worse by provincial government funding and timing (which was also related to a change in government.) Tying ESS and Red Cross registrations, among others, into one registration system would significantly reduce stress placed upon residents. Other feedback provided by residents would provide further insight on improvements which the Red Cross and their partner, the province, could make to improve response. Canadian Armed Forces Residents appreciated the support of their forces. They would like them to be trained for their roles in assisting evacuations, at road blocks and wildfire fighting so they are better prepared for future events. Province of British Columbia Residents rated the province’s response the lowest among all agencies included in the survey. While the province had a large role in the overall response, locally they were not in a front-line position as compared to other agencies. Insight from the meetings suggests that improvements to prevention, preparedness, insurance for residents and compensation for tenure holders would improve overall rating. In addition, changing a government in the middle of the largest emergency in the province’s history was very poor timing. Search and Rescue Residents rated SAR efforts high in the survey. SAR played a vital role in completing evacuations throughout the CRD, among other tasks. Like other agencies, education on evacuation processes would improve their response. Local Fire Service There are vast areas of British Columbia which have no local fire suppression service. As an example, the nearest fire service for some residents may be a six hour drive away. Some solution must be put in place for these regions, in a combined effort between the province and regional districts. 50 RCMP RCMP and military members repeatedly ignored local knowledge, and it resulted in people becoming lost down roads which were not evacuation routes. This was coupled with CRD maps of the evacuation area not being made available to field officers or not able to be delivered due to lack of communications. The result was a general sense of confusion among residents, who were sometimes told a route did not exist, when it did, and the members were just unaware of roads. Using local detachment knowledge along with those the detachment would contact in the community to gain knowledge is a necessity in large disasters. Some RCMP members appeared scared or panicked in situations residents considered normal, including on the many smoky days, or when educating a resident about an alert (and sometimes misusing language to make it appear as though it were an order). We heard loudly in every corner that residents felt like criminals in their communities with the way RCMP and Canadian Armed Forces under their command treated them. Whether as evacuation orders or alerts were being put in place or at check points, residents were strongly against how they were treated. Urban officers must have a rural approach to residents. They were forceful, and neglected local issues, cultures and trust within communities. Use of outside members was necessary, however, residents did not appreciate being treated as if they were unknowledgeable or a criminal, specifically in remote rural areas. This was combined with other residents being given wrong directions, being ignored when pointing out road blocks were set up at ineffective positions, or being told to leave in the middle of the night due to an evacuation alert. While the support of the RCMP was incredible and appreciated, two major changes need to be in place prior to the next emergency. RCMP members need training on the definitions of evacuation orders and alerts, on how to treat rural Canadians with respect, and remaining calm during a disaster. RCMP command needs to make decisions utilizing local knowledge, as there were significant gaps noted by residents in decisions which in some cases narrowly avoided loss of life. In future emergencies, more improvements are necessary on both communications for remote locations and increased coordination related to regional permits. British Columbia Wildfire Service Residents noted the centralized model adopted by BCWS is not serving them well. Many preferred the old system which significantly utilized local knowledge and resources. This was particularly noted when IMT’s from outside the region were used, including those from outside the province. Local knowledge can be a useful resource if planned, and residents expect to have local knowledge used the next time. Information dissemination appears to have too much focus on individual communications such as Information Officers returning phone calls from residents, when they should be focused on mass communications. This approach is both negative to the overall response and is a poor use of resources. A community liaison could serve in this role, with Information Officers focused solely on mass communications. Residents want more local information more regularly. System improvements are necessary to allow this. Residents are looking for more regular updates on fire location, much like they see in other jurisdictions in Canada and the USA in recent years. This is of particular importance in rural areas where some residents were permitted to stay behind to care for ranches and provide essential and support services. Residents also noted the stark contrast of response and communications from the various fire centres and IMTs. 51 They do not understand why this contrast existed, or why it was maintained. At key times, during daily operations PREOC calls (internal), it was noted that fire centres did not join the call to provide information which was pivotal for decision-making. This was completely unacceptable to residents who were on those calls. They want all contrasts to be unnoticeable in future responses, to alleviate confusion, accountability and communication challenges created by these approaches. The BCWS was rated to have the lowest overall response rating among all agencies in the survey. In addition, most of the comments during meetings about the BCWS were negative. There are many other lessons within the comments provided from residents on how the BCWS could improve their overall response for residents. With focused public education, the BCWS could improve their reputation, by informing the public how and why they complete certain operations such as backburns, predicting fire potential fire locations, initial attack, training, and resource deployments. Other improvements to reputation would need to be considered through operational improvements and communication about those changes.