Briefing Paper Syrian Independent Exile

November 2020 – by Biljana Tatomir, Enrico de Angelis and Maryia Sadouskaya-Komlach

Briefing Paper

Syrian Independent Exile Media

Syria IMS Briefing Paper – Syrian Independent Exile Media Published in Denmark by IMS in 2019

Editor Rune Friberg Lyme

Design NR2154

Publisher IMS

ISBN 978-87-9220-965-8

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Contents

2 Introduction

6 Executive Summary Part 1 Part 2

14 Part I Independent exile media globally — practices, policies and lessons learned

30 Part II Syrian exile media organisations and institutions

56 Annex Annex I: Methodology Annex II b): List of interviews Annex II c) 2 / Syrian Independent Exile Media Introduction IMS Briefing Paper / 3

This study focuses on the Syrian inde- Within a relatively short time-frame in trying to silence independent voices pendent exile media (SEM) organisa- of eight years, the sector went through is just one source of extreme insecu- tions and institutions that have devel- several distinct phases. The first phase rity and threat to the safety of those oped since the 2011 uprising. These (2011) was sudden and chaotic, as media trying to practise independent jour- media emerged and developed amid a outlets mushroomed, with many open- nalism in Syria. Syrian journalists are war of unprecedented scope and coming and closing shortly afterwards. Dur- persecuted by both state and non-state plexity; a war that has taken a heavy ing this period, media emanated directly actors. According to Reporters With- toll on Syria’s civilians and displaced from the uprising, in particular from out Borders’ 2017 report, 211 journalists a huge portion of its population. The actors belonging to peaceful move- and citizen journalists have been killed dynamics of the war and its impact on ments. Between 2011 and 2012, inde- in Syria’s civil war and “Syria has for the ground forced most if not all of the pendent media began to flourish in a dis- years been the world’s deadliest coun- independent media organisations and ordered but lively manner. This phase try for journalists and citizen journal- institutions that emerged after 2011 to was characterised by the first efforts to ists, who are caught between the Assad leave Syria. shift from media activism to more pro- regime and its allies, Islamic State and fessional media production. Activists many other radical Jihadi groups, and The development of the Syrian inde- and new journalists still widely believed the Kurdish forces.” 1 pendent media organisations and insti- that the regime would rapidly fall, pav- tutions was itself a kind of revolution ing the way to a transition to democracy. The case of the Syrian independent that challenged and provided an alter- The period between 2013 and 2015 saw media sector proves that professional native to the highly controlled, vertical the establishment of more media organ- development and achievement is pos- structure that characterised the pre-war isations and their move towards profes- sible even in the most extreme situa- Syrian media landscape. The result of sionalisation. As the security situation on tions. Efforts to consolidate the media this development after eight years is a the ground worsened, they were forced organisations professionally and institu- distinctly independent media sector that to move their operations abroad either tionally continues, even if, with far less is plural and diverse in nature. It exists partially or completely. Since 2016, even support available, many media organ- outside the framework of either state or more media and journalists have been isations are closing or have been con- corporate ownership; it is founded and forced to leave the country. sidering doing so. A number of media led by individuals with no links to any organisations are trying to adjust their political or other interest-based group, It should not be forgotten that the Syr- strategies to survive amid the crisis while and who are committed to professional ian alternative and independent media maintaining their professional develop- values. For these reasons, in terms of sector developed not only against the ment. In other words, the Syrian alterna- both ownership and content, the sector backdrop of war but against the back- tive and independent media sector is at can be considered independent. drop of systemic persecution of inde- a crossroads. Ironically, while the sec- pendent actors. The regime’s brutality tor is much more advanced and mature 4 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

The alternative and independent media sector …embodies invaluable democratic and professional capital. If lost because of a lack of support today, it will be hard to re-build it later.

than at any point in its recent history, it MENA region, which is, according to are well positioned, as their journalists faces an uncertain future, as the mini- a Freedom House report in 2017, the for the most part belong to the same gen- mum donor support required to ensure second-worst region for press freedom eration as their target audience (and thus its survival seems to be unavailable at (where 16 of the region’s 20 countries share their sensibility). They are also the moment. are classified as not free).2 There is no technology-savvy, and have the poten- evidence that this negative trend can be tial to tap into their audience’s chang- The relevance of the Syrian alternative reversed in the short- to medium-term, ing preferences and habits. and independent media sector and its as the major drivers originate from the role in the formation of an alternative re-consolidation of authoritarianism that It is highly relevant what type of media discourse in the Syrian public sphere varies in its intensity from one country will continue to influence the public cannot be denied. It is quite an unprec- to another. Finally, the global trends sphere now as well as during the post-war edented phenomenon for an independent are negative, too. These are the ele- period. There are hardly any grounds for media sector to evolve and exist as the ments of a broader context to be taken thinking that post-war Syria will embark only alternative to state- and factions- into account when it comes to strate- on political transformation (one that is influenced media, and it has the poten- gic considerations about Syrian alter- democratically oriented) and media tial (if it survives) to play a significant native and independent media organ- landscape reform. The moment to act is role in the post-conflict period. isations and institutions. now, rather than in the future post-war period. The alternative and independent The end of the Syrian civil war is not yet On the plus side, the Syrian independent media sector now operating in exile has clearly on the horizon. Nevertheless, the media sector faces opportunities deriv- the potential to contribute to peace and kind of media environment that will be ing from other regional trends. One trend reconciliation, accountability and trans- created by peace and post-war arrange- with long-term transformational poten- parency. The sector embodies invalua- ments matters even more for the future tial, particularly in its effect on younger ble democratic and professional capi- of the independent media organisations populations across the MENA region, tal. If lost because of a lack of support and institutions. Guarantees of freedom is “digital disruption”. The media land- today, it will be hard to re-build it later. of expression and to independent media scape is undergoing a paradigm shift, The sector’s development and progress to operate freely in Syria have not been one where the region’s developing infra- could be short-lived if its very survival part of any talks so far. Some of the structure alongside changing consumer becomes uncertain. countries involved in the war, as well as behaviour and growing demand for Ara- some of those attempting to take more bic-language content and specific for- The role of local media is undisputed, prominent role as “brokers of peace”, are mats are all relevant for Syrian alterna- as other comparative conflict and post- known for their own dismal records vis- tive and independent media, regardless conflict frameworks prove. Though oper- à-vis freedom of expression and media of whether they are digital-only or use ating in exile out of necessity, the Syr- freedom. The same applies to the entire multiple platforms. In that regard, they ian alternative and independent media IMS Briefing Paper / 5

organisations and institutions retain all that these outlets play a role today that of the prerogatives of local media: they cannot be limited to the vision of a have been set up and are run by Syri- future transition, but rather is relevant ans, they are focused on locally relevant today. They already constitute an actor topics and target a local audience, they that competes with and confronts other rely on reporters’ networks in Syria, and media actors on the scene: governmental they are de-facto local media with tem- and private, regional and international. porary headquarters abroad. Moving away from a transition para- We hope that this study provides the digm, in other words, would enable us foundation for compelling arguments to better assess the value of the media in favour of immediate and sustained considered in this report, as well as their support for the independent media sec- future prospects. tor in exile for all of the reasons mentioned above. We consider it a privilege to be given the chance to contribute with this study There are four main types of actors and to documenting the history and state of potential beneficiaries of this study: the Syrian alternative and independent donors,3 media development organisa- media sector today, one that is commit- tions,4 Syrian media institutions, and ted to independence and professional- Syrian media organisations. We also ism. This development would not have hope that our effort in contextualising been possible without the extraordi- the development of Syrian exile media nary sacrifices of the Syrian actors or in the global exile media framework, the support of a few committed media assistance and support policies in con- development organisations and donors. flict, post-conflict and fragile countries, Finally, we hope that the study docu- as well as several case studies (Zimba- ments one chapter of history in antic- bwe, Burma/Myanmar, Belarus, Azer- ipation of a future that will be made baijan, Russia and Iran) will shed more possible by expanding the supporting light on lessons learned and inspire community of donors and media devel- donors in particular to engage in the opment organisations. best and most efficient manner.

At the same time, as discussed above, the Syrian case is unique. Defining these media as “exiled” is also a matter for discussion. First, we are confronted with the shaping of a potentially complete alternative media landscape, not just individual media outlets. Second, in today’s global media environment, geographic borders no longer have the meaning they once did. Syrian alternative media, as mentioned above, can reach Notes local audiences and still have still net- 1 “In Syria, 211 journalists killed in conflict that began six years ago”, works of reporters within Syria. Third, Reporters Without Borders, 16 March 2017, available at https://rsf. these journalists tend to consider exile org/en/news/syria-211-journalists-killed-conflict-began-six-years- ago (accessed 10 October 2019) (hereafter, RSF, “In Syria, 211 jour- to be a temporary phase, while using it nalists killed in conflict that began six years ago”). to strengthen their organisations and 2 The Economist, “The global slump in press freedom”, 23 July limit the difficulties of operating out- 2018, available at https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/07/23/the-global-slump-in-press-freedom (accessed side the country. 10 October 2019) (hereafter, The Economist, “The global slump in press freedom”).

However, we decided to use the term 3 By donors, we refer exclusively to those actors who provide fund- “exile” as a main definition in our report. ing: government agencies, ministries, private foundations, etc.

We think it is important for Syrian jour- 4 nalists, media development organisa- By media development organisations, we refer exclusively to those actors that specialise in managing and directing funding for media tions and donors alike to acknowledge support activities. 6 / Syrian Independent Exile Media Executive Summary

The Syrian independent exile media as a sector is at the core of this study. To understand the unique nature of this sector, the study contextualises the issues pertaining to the Syrian independent exile media in the wider framework of exile media globally, and donors’ approaches to media development in the context of conflict, post- conflict and fragile states (including approaches to exile media); it also discusses lessons learned more generally and draws on examples through case studies. The study is divided into two parts: 1. Independent exile media globally — practices, policies and lessons learned; and 2. Syrian exile organisations and institutions. IMS Briefing Paper / 7

Part 1

Independent exile media globally — practices, policies and lessons learned

I II III Independent media in exile are by no As much as the exile modus operandi Exile media exist by default outside means a phenomenon associated with the reflects a choice made out of necessity, the traditional nexus of state and mar- past. Even though there has not been any most exile media consider their condi- ket forces. Although operating in exile recent census providing the exact num- tions of exile to be temporary and main- is the last resort for media, it allows ber of independent exile media operat- tain the goal of returning to their coun- them to avoid constant state pressure in ing today, there is no reason to believe try of origin. However, their exile modus cases where the state creates conditions that this number is falling. The decline operandi can take longer than expected; in which independent journalism is no in press freedom over the past decade,1 there are examples of media that spent longer possible within the state’s terri- resurgent authoritarianism and wars almost two decades abroad before relo- torial boundaries. Consequently, exile have all forced many media into exile. cation to their country of origin. There media have demonstrated notable suc- are also case studies of influential inde- cess in circumventing the state’s monop- pendent exile media that ceased to exist oly on information. Operating outside after many years before they were ever any particular country’s media market, given the chance to return. this type of media is also not influenced by market dynamics until they relocate to their homeland and merge into the existing media market of the country. The negative effects of the market have not been identified as a factor that drives media into exile. Those factors remain political. 8 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

IV VI VIII Hypothetically, the default position A specific challenge for exile media Lack of sustained sources of funding, outside the traditional nexus provides is how to define its target audience. i.e. the economic base of exile media, greater freedom to exercise indepen- While its ultimate objective is to reach appears to be one of the most important dent journalism and tackle a wide range an audience at home which is deprived aspects of their vulnerability and a lead- of issues; offer diverse points of view; of diverse and independent sources of ing factor in their closure. Exile media and tackle taboos. The countries of ori- information, in reality exile media are is, by default, donor-dependent with very gin of exile media are typically those faced with two additional types of tar- few possibilities to generate alternative where the ruling regime for its own get audience: exiled and diaspora pop- sources of funding over a longer period interest attempts to monopolise pub- ulations from their country of origin of time if they want to remain indepen- lic discourse and, by doing so, uses its who have different grievances and con- dent of politically charged diaspora cap- coercive power to limit or block access cerns than those who stayed, as well as ital. Even though it is possible to set up to information, thus impeding the right a larger international/regional commu- a leaner and less costly media opera- to information. In that context, exile nity that often lacks local angles and a tion in the digital age, the reliance on media could be considered a conduit deeper understanding of the nuances donor funding is still predominant and of this right by providing an alterna- with respect to developments on the has no viable alternative. Advertising tive stream of information. ground. As their modus operandi con- revenues, when acquired, are always a tinues and sometimes stretches over a small fraction of the overall necessary longer period of time, exile media have financial means and we have found no V to apply extra effort to stay in context examples in which crowd-funding pro- By building networks of correspondents and remain relevant to audiences in their vided sufficient operating funds over in their country of origin, exile media home countries. any period of time. provide journalists who remain with an opportunity to exercise journalism that maintains professional standards. By VII IX exploiting avenues of digital technol- Independent media in exile are usually Sources of strength, as mentioned above, ogy, they also create opportunities for formed by journalists (as in the case can at the same time be sources of weak- local audiences to become active con- of Zimbabwe, Belarus and Russia), by ness. For instance, operating outside the tributors to the content; to comment and groups of activists (as in the case of Bur- traditional nexus of state and market participate; and to nurture a culture of mese and Azerbaijani exile media), or forces means relying on donor funding participation that can counter efforts sometimes by a mix of both (see the Ira- and provides very little opportunity to by the ruling regime to curtail space nian media case study). The experience generate income that could reduce this for an active and informed citizenry. of the Burmese and Azerbaijani exile reliance, which is sometimes framed as These characteristics of independent media demonstrates that even when the “donor dependency”. Donor funding is media in exile can be considered liber- founders originate from dissident student usually granted to short-term interven- ating and progressive in a wider sense. activists, exile media evolve and positions (revolving around one-year fund- All of the factors described above nat- tion themselves as independent media ing cycles) while professional develop- urally apply only in cases of indepen- devoted to the ethics of professional ment requires a medium to long-term dent media in exile that declare their journalism. Some quickly realise that funding commitment. For most inde- mission to be in accordance with the in order to present a trustworthy alter- pendent media in exile, access to emer- ethical values of independent journal- native, independent and high-quality gency funds at the beginning of their ism and exclude exile media that are journalism is the way to go. While the operations is easier to attract, but stra- set up by opposing political groups or tradition of journalism in the countries tegic planning and development beyond businesses with vested political inter- of origin of exile media may not meet pure survival requires stable sources of ests, or groups that consider media only professional standards, most exile media funding. Multi-donor sustained support as an extended arm of activism and are receive training and in turn train their over a longer period in time (Burmese engaged in promoting a narrow inter- networks of correspondents in order to exile media being a case in point) has est-based discourse. cultivate a new generation of journal- fuelled the development of strong brands ists who have a clearer understanding among exile media, as well as enabling of what adhering to professional stan- their impact and professional output. dards entails. To become a brand that attracts local and international audiences requires time as well as adherence to standards. IMS Briefing Paper / 9

X: approaches, one can conclude that a big- evaluations, closure may be considered The development of exile media requires ger problem is the disagreement about a failure. However, not all donors or the flexible donors that, apart from a hand- what are the essential elements of donor community of practice would reach such ful of governmental donors, are more engagement in the complex and politi- a conclusion. They would underline the likely to be private sources. The expe- cally sensitive frameworks and, specifi- impact of the media and the role they rience further points to the reliance on cally, what flexible mechanisms need to played during the course of their exis- funding from one donor being a par- be in place to enable such engagement tence as leaders and standard-setters ticularly acute source of vulnerability with a view to long-term development. of new, more professional journalistic for exile media. Donor co-operation is practices, and because they preserved essential as it facilitates the special needs human, professional capital. of the exile media sector more success- XII fully. Donors often have different possi- The community of practice (media devel- bilities for funding and while some have opment organisations) often highlights XV both the mechanisms in place and the that the conflict as well as the post- Notwithstanding the possibility that understanding of the importance of cov- conflict framework can hardly be gen- some within the exile media commu- ering operating costs, others lean more eralised. Understanding the context is nity can become stuck in a perpetuated towards training, and legal and techni- crucial, as the drivers of conflict differ model of donor dependency, exile con- cal support. It is usually through a com- from one conflict to another. The post- ditions are never easy and the major- bination of all of the different inputs in conflict context can encompass many ity are keen to return. At a minimum a complementary manner (through co- features of varying intensity, like pro- there should be guarantees in place that operation) that the various needs of exile longed violence and fragility. It can also exile media can return without retribu- media can be met. be marked by heightened authoritarian tion (as was the case in Burma/Myan- tendencies or by the ambition to create mar, but not in Zimbabwe) and that there conditions for lasting peace by strength- are, at the very least, minimum condi- XI ening democracy. The emphasis on con- tions in place to guarantee freedom of The policies of providing support to text-sensitive approaches can help avoid expression. These considerations are media development in conflict, post- generalisation and donor interventions so context-specific that generalisation conflict and fragile states are still based on templates. is impossible. being debated by donors, and various approaches apply, leading to difficulties identifying consistency. In general, stud- XIII XVI ies point to a sort of “donor aversion” to Efforts to formulate the basis for a pol- The post-authoritarian or post-war period supporting independent media directly, icy of support to exile media, as well as can be very complex, with a high level and the decisions to support exile media to facilitate peer learning and sharing of overall insecurity. Sometimes, amid are considered highly politically sensi- among those media, marked the period declared openness and a commitment to tive. There are donor countries as well between 2010 and 2015. The ideas of transformation — whereby actors from as private donors that engage in media creating an exile media network and the former regime remain present, some- development in conflict, post-conflict a donor working group on exile media times in power-sharing roles or with con- and fragile states by acknowledging the have not come to fruition. However, this trol of significant economic resources importance of sustaining the local inde- period remains a strong testament to the (often directed towards the media) — pendent sector where it exists. They fur- recognition of the exile media’s impor- the window can close rapidly, with the ther acknowledge the importance of that tance, and to the collaborative effort to transformation proceeding messily and sector during wartime as well as dur- identify policy approaches by taking unevenly. Donors can swiftly shift their ing the post-conflict period. Where the stock of those media’s specific needs. focus towards in-country engagement, conditions do not exist for media outlets sometimes prematurely making deci- and organisations to operate within the sions to prioritise other fields than the country, exile media may become part XIV media, with long-term consequences of the media development intervention. One of the most pertinent issues concerns for an independent media sector that The aforementioned contexts usually how long exile media should receive sup- is either not mature enough yet or is require a swift and multifaceted reac- port. When the temporary modus ope- forced to operate alongside state and tion by donors. When media development randi (exile) becomes longer than the state-proxy media, on an uneven play- exists as part of a donor engagement, it media could foresee, and temporariness ing field. However, their exile modus is often built around short time-frames begins to look more like permanence, operandi cannot be considered perma- and specific interventions, while the donors — even the most committed nent, so the independent media in exile conditions often require a longer-term among them — may start to withdraw. should take note of donors’ potentially and multi-faceted approach. Therefore, As a result, highly donor-dependent exile shifting interests well ahead of time. rather than detecting inconsistencies in media may close down. In results-driven 10 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

Part 2

Syrian independent exile organisations and institutions

I Syrian alternative media organisa- would rapidly fall and pave the way to tions undergo a remarkable develop- a transition to democracy. The period ment after 2011 between 2013 and 2015 saw the establishment of more media organisations The Syrian alternative media sector and their move towards professionali- has come a very long way since 2011. sation. As the security situation on the Its history has been marked by several ground worsened, they were forced to distinct phases. The first (2011) was sud- move their operations abroad either den and chaotic, as media outlets mush- partially or completely. Since 2016, roomed, with many opening and closing even more media and journalists have shortly afterwards. Between 2011 and been forced to leave the country. While 2012, media began to flourish in a dis- efforts to consolidate media organisa- ordered but lively manner. This phase tions professionally and institutionally is characterised by the first efforts to have continued, donor support is sig- shift from media activism to a more nificantly less available and, as a result, professional media production. In this many media organisations have closed period, the media emanated directly or have been considering doing so. A from the Syrian uprising, in particu- number of media organisations are try- lar from actors belonging to peaceful ing to adjust their strategies to survive movements. Activists and new journal- amid the crisis while maintaining their ists still widely believed that the regime professional development. IMS Briefing Paper / 11

II IV VI Syrian alternative media organisa- The exile modus operandi has bene- Shifts in some donors’ approaches tions constitute a plural independ- fitted the professional and organisa- pose a risk for the survival of the exile ent media sector with diverse media tional development of the media organ- media organisations and institutions outlets and institutions isations in question, even though it poses a number of specific challenges Some donors’ sudden shifts in approach, The Syrian alternative media organisa- specifically lapses in funding, create a tions present a diverse spectrum of media The major benefit is the opportunity to situation of vulnerability and uncer- — newspapers, radio stations, online and develop professionally and organisation- tainty for the exile media sector. A par- TV. Some define themselves as niche ally from a safer location, outside the ticularly devastating shift would be if media (as per their target audience) while reach of all forces that on the ground donors chose to prematurely abandon some attempt to reach a nationwide audi- present a threat to safety as well as to the alternative media sector in exile and ence. The media institutions range from professional journalism. This means that focus their support exclusively on local freedom of expression organisations, to the exile modus operandi has also cre- media emerging in areas liberated from professional associations, to organisations ated an opportunity for journalistic con- ISIS and in regime-controlled areas. targeting specific issues and audiences. tent that would not otherwise have been Such a shift would undermine the trans- made available to the public. In pursu- formative potential of this media sector What is considered here to be a dis- ing their role, the alternative media are — a sort of “democratic capital” — and tinct sector are the media outlets and not only a sector in and of themselves, would squander the significant efforts institutions set up outside the frame- but also a critical factor in the forma- made so far by the Syrians and interna- work of state or business ownership, i.e. tion of an alternative discourse in the tional media development organisations they were founded by individuals with- public sphere. and the donors that backed those efforts. out links to any political or other interest-based group. Furthermore, these are media outlets and institutions that V VII base their mission on professional val- The independent media sector is at The sector has not yet found ways ues and want to produce quality journal- a crossroads to capitalise on its importance ism. Most of the media organisations in question have embraced the importance The number of alternative media organi- There are many examples of cross-media of institutional/organisational develop- sations and institutions has been decreas- co-operation, as there is recognition of ment, but they vary in their degree of ing, which in itself is a natural process commonly shared values. Yet each out- organisational development. In terms of because the sector could not continue let is focused on or dragged into find- both ownership and content, they rep- to develop horizontally. Funding has ing a solution for itself, with no move resent an independent sector. not always been a key reason, but it towards formulating a response to the is certainly one of the most important needs of the sector, let alone acting as factors driving the closure of some a sector (understandably so, given their III media outlets. There is a link between individual struggle for survival). The The prevailing modus operandi of the level of institutional/organisational Syrian alternative media organisations this sector is exile development and the ability of organi- and institutions have not yet found ways sations to survive. Those that stream- to act and express themselves as a sec- This modus operandi is not a deliberate lined their operations and strengthened tor more coherently and jointly advo- choice but the result of a range of non- their management and outreach capac- cate their needs. The individual solu- permissive factors inside the country. ity have demonstrated higher levels of tions, while important, do not provide The high risk and low level of safety can resilience; however, if the trend con- a necessary level of certainty for any be found in all given contexts — from tinues, their existence will be at stake. individual organisation unless there is government-controlled to rebel-held to Alternative strategies of revenue gener- wider recognition of the sector’s impor- Kurdish-controlled areas. All alternative ation, while being explored and applied tance by donors. While the Syrian organ- media organisations in exile have as their by some organisations, constitute only isations should continue working on ultimate goal to be able to fully operate a fraction of their organisational needs, organisational streamlining internally, in the country. All have a level of pres- and the possibility of achieving finan- they should more proactively seek ways ence in the country through a network cial viability is not feasible in the given to establish a strong voice as a sector of reporters and watch closely in-coun- circumstances. in order to jointly convey the sector’s try developments to assess the possibil- needs to donors. ity of increasing their presence on the ground with at least a small office. The prevailing assessment is that conditions have not presented an opportunity yet. 12 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

VIII IX X Prospects for the full transition of Syrian alternative media fit well into Donors’ approaches should be independent exile media and institu- regional trends that present opportu- informed by the achievements and tions to in-country operation remains nities in the longer term potential of the independent media uncertain in the short term sector One trend with long-term transforma- For the majority of media outlets in tional potential, particularly as it affects In the case of Syria, very few donors exile, minimum conditions have to be younger populations, is “digital disrup- remain continually engaged. While their in place encompassing a guarantee to tion”. The Middle East has one of the support facilitated the emergence of the operate on the ground with a certain level fastest rates of adopting digital tech- alternative media sector, their policies of safety and a level of respect for free- nology in the world. Given the region’s were not informed by a long-term view; dom of expression. While those condi- large share of the youth segment, its pop- have been highly uncoordinated; and tions constitute a reasonable minimum, ulation is forecast to continue to favour have proved to be susceptible to sudden overall developments on the ground are digital platforms. The region’s media shifts in priority. The prevailing method volatile to the extent that any projected landscape is undergoing a paradigm of involvement by some donors is proj- timeline would be unrealistic. shift driven by the region’s developing ect-based, where the media exist not as infrastructure and consumer behaviour. an objective in itself but as a means to Syrian alternative media organisations Also, there is increasing demand for realise other objectives. This type of should not be rushed into making a deci- Arabic-language content and specific engagement does not cater for the devel- sion to fully relocate to Syria before the formats. These trends are relevant for opment needs of the Syrian alternative minimum conditions are in place. It is the Syrian alternative media, regard- media, but rather diverts their atten- realistic that the timeframe is medium less of whether they are digital-only or tion from their own development pri- term, rather than short term, due to the use multiple platforms. In that regard, orities to those built into donor-priori- nature of developments on the ground. they are well positioned with respect to tised projects. This timeframe would allow the organ- regional trends, as their journalists for isations in question to carefully assess the most part belong to the same gener- The donors should acknowledge the rel- their opportunities and prepare for their ation as their target audience (and thus evance of the Syrian independent and return. Efforts could also be made to share their sensibility). They are also alternative media sector and their role in reinforce the outreach of exile media technology-savvy, and have the poten- the formation of an alternative discourse inside the country, and to explore col- tial to tap into their audience’s chang- in the Syrian public sphere. They should laborations with local journalists and ing preferences and habits. acknowledge the almost unique develop- organisations. ment of a type of media and institution To benefit from that potential advantage, that, in a relatively short time-frame, has the media groups in question need to be seen significant progress from activism well connected with their natural profes- to professionalism; provided the only sional community both regionally and alternative to state- and factions-influ- globally, in order to share with or bene- enced media; and still carries the poten- fit from technological (and other) inno- tial (if they survive) of playing the role vations and good examples of efforts to of professional media in the post-con- find viable business models. flict period. This calls for donors to prioritise the survival and further professional and institutional development of the media in question, which mostly operate in exile, as these are the media with the potential to contribute to peace and reconciliation, accountability and transparency. The donors should formulate approaches to media development that are informed and anchored in a longer-term vision but also act quickly to pre-empt the regression and potential loss of the existing media sector. IMS Briefing Paper / 13

Notes

1 Reporters Without Borders, “Data of press freedom ranking 2019”, available at https://rsf.org/en/ranking_table (accessed 10 Octo- ber 2019). 14 / Syrian Independent Exile Media Part I

Independent exile media globally — practices, policies and lessons learned

The exile media globally since the 1990s

Syrian independent media in exile are The community of independent exile at the core of this study, yet they repre- media that emerged in the 1990s dif- sent only a fraction of the independent ferentiates itself from classic diaspora exile media community globally. In an media (i.e. media set up by diaspora effort to contextualise the issues per- groups with the diaspora as its target taining to Syrian independent media in audience, in preservation of cultural and exile, this study examines the dynam- societal bonds), as well as from inter- ics of exile media development glob- national media with programming in ally since the 1990s and the main les- local languages (e.g. Radio Free Europe/ sons learned. Though the history of Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, BBC exile media extends much further than programmes in foreign languages, Voice the last 30 years, the media develop- of America, etc.). The major difference ment that covers assistance to media, is that the exile media that we refer to including to exile media, has started have been set up and run by nationals of to profile itself within the more distinct the countries in question, with the pri- field of development aid since 1990. The mary aim to provide content which, due media development practice and expe- to restrictions in their countries of ori- rience and the body of knowledge gath- gin, is unavailable to the public. While ered over this period of time is thus rel- using the advantages of a safe location evant to this study. abroad for their editorial offices, their IMS Briefing Paper / 15

news-gathering and reporting has relied a country’s low score in terms of free- edged commonalities among them than on networks of reporters and the engage- dom of expression and the emergence an intended effort among actors to act ment of audiences at home. Most of them of exile media. together as a community. In the same place public-interest content high on their vein, the media development field rarely editorial agenda and make a remarkable In the reality, the picture is mixed and recognises the assistance to exile media effort to serve the traditional function countries often present context-spe- as a standalone field. of the media as an astute watchdog of cific conditions. Not every authoritar- developments at home, thus challenging ian regime completely closes the space The adjunct research related to media the state’s “red lines” and contributing for independent media. Some allow a development and, within that frame- to greater accountability and transpar- minimum of space if there is a greater work the media development of exile ency of power-holders at home. interest at stake while forcing those media, has been quite modest. Efforts media to operate in legally and eco- to invest more in media development-re- What distinguishes exile media from nomically uneven conditions, whereby lated research has increased over the what is usually considered local media their competitive power is curtailed by last decade. In the specific case of exile is their location — the fact that their edi- the privileged position of state-owned media, the research, where it exists, torial headquarters are abroad. Yet they and regime crony-owned media. Some mainly focuses on one country or even serve the role of the country’s media by allow a degree of open space for a par- more frequently on one exile media as effectively creating an alternative dis- ticular type of media, but maintain a a case study. course in the public domain (i.e. alter- monopoly in, say, the broadcast media native public spheres) of their countries sector. Finally, not every wartime situ- Almost a unique attempt to look at inde- of origin, which is otherwise dominated ation automatically creates a non-per- pendent media in exile as a wider, global by controlled and restricted media. The missive environment for independent community with distinct problems and argument that independent media in media. The war in Syria is, however, an specific needs is the Center for Interna- exile are a specific part of the country’s example of belligerent conditions that tional Media Assistance (CIMA) study information space has not always been over time and through different phases from 2011.1 At that time, as is the case acknowledged. However, those media have made it almost impossible for inde- today, there was no exhaustive census can be viewed as a de facto and active pendent media to remain in the country. of the media in exile; however, the study part of the media sector of the coun- made an estimate of around 50 exiled try, and a contributor to its information While exile is more often the only remain- news media outlets with an average of space, especially when more than one ing modus operandi available for inde- ten journalists each.2 The sample used for exile media from a country exist, thus pendent media in overtly authoritarian the CIMA study encompassed 33 exile helping to form a diverse spectrum of and totalitarian states and war-torn coun- news organisations from 18 countries. media in terms of type, content and tar- tries, it is possible to identify situations Although the sample was not homoge- get audience. where, despite otherwise non-permissive nous, in the sense that the independent environments for independent media, media in exile varied in size and sub- The community of independent media some still operate in the country while sequently in operating budget, it was in exile globally is rather dynamic. Typ- others opt for or are forced into exile. possible to identify issues commonly ically, as long as there are minimum Along similar lines, one can find situ- shared by them all. conditions for independent media to ations where, for instance, one type of fully operate in their respective coun- media still exists in the country, though Among the most frequently shared com- tries, they will attempt to do so. When in a very constrained manner, while the monalities are: 1) cause of exile: the persecution and legal and extra-legal country’s total monopoly in, for instance, type of regimes surrounding the media, threats and restrictions amount to con- the broadcast media sector forces those i.e. the countries of origin of the exile ditions in which independent, public-in- who fought unsuccessfully for a broad- media were, as the study found, the terest journalism is no longer possible cast licence to move beyond the coun- world’s most repressive regimes, with in a given country or, anticipating such try’s borders and operate as a radio or the worst records for press freedom; 2) changes in the near future, the media TV station in exile. paths of emergence: the two most com- typically go into exile. The decision to mon paths for the emergence of inde- relocate operations outside their coun- Global independent exile media have pendent media in exile were either jour- try’s borders is therefore usually taken much in common and face very simi- nalist groups active in their homelands when all other avenues are exhausted, lar challenges. Geographic dispersion, which transferred their efforts abroad i.e. the conditions impose exile modus a heavy focus on survival, safety and or groups of activists opposing a par- operandi as the only solution. Those other considerations, as well as a lack ticular regime, who later chose journal- conditions are more frequently present of knowledge of other exile media, limit ism as an effective way to offer alter- in relation to overt authoritarianism, the contact between them. The use of the native narratives; 3) openness to using totalitarian states and countries affected term “community of exile media glob- new technologies: independent media in by war. There is a correlation between ally” is more a reflection of the acknowl- exile were early adopters of technolog- 16 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

ical advances. Using all available con- ing provided sufficient operating funds eration, with the possible formation tent-dissemination platforms (particu- over time. In results-driven evaluations, of a donor working group for exile larly digital ones), their primary goal was closure may be considered a failure. media, and to ensure a sustained train- to reach audiences at home, exiled com- However, not all donors or the commu- ing programme to address the specific munities dispersed abroad and interna- nity of practice would reach this con- needs of exile media. Those initiatives tional audiences; and 4) active networks clusion. They would instead underscore arose independently of one another but at home: the great majority of surveyed the impact of those media and the role soon merged into a co-operative effort media had reporters or stringers work- they played over time, not least from the between Open Society Foundations, ing inside their countries of origin, amid perspective that they were leaders and the Swedish International Development high security and safety risks. standard-setters in a field that educated Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the FOJO a generation of journalists and preserved Media Institute, International Media Sup- Among the many challenges, the three human, professional capital.4 port (IMS) and the World Press Free- biggest that independent media in exile dom Committee (WPFC). encounter were: a) inconsistent and Co-operation of donors (governmental insufficient funding; b) technological and non-governmental) as well as media In 2008, the WPFC came up with the interference such as jammed radio sig- development organisations existed in idea of organising a conference with nals or blocked websites; and c) prob- several cases, typically around larger three expected outcomes: the creation of lems measuring their audience. Audi- media or countries where more media a network of independent exile media; ence surveys were rare due to conditions operated in exile. Where this co-oper- exchanges of information on techniques in the exile media’s countries of origin, ation existed, it proved to be beneficial among exile media; and the creation of as well as restrictions in their operating for all stakeholders involved. a statement of professional standards budgets. Many developed ways to gauge for exile media. the size of their audience, however. In Since the CIMA study, a number of the absence of systemic analytical tools newly exiled media have emerged, con- The Open Society Foundations Media Pro- and indicators to measure impact, vari- firming that the independent media in gram, as a supporter of a wide range of ous media outlets used a range of direct exile is by no means a phenomenon exile media under its then-existing Closed and indirect evidence of their impact. associated with the past. Even though Societies portfolio, started to consider the there has not been any recent census creation of a forum to facilitate network- As much as the exile modus operandi providing the exact number of inde- ing and information-exchange among the reflects a choice made out of necessity, pendent exile media operating today, exile media it supported. The first forum most exile media consider the conditions there is no reason to believe that this took place in Budapest, in 2009, and was of exile to be temporary and maintain number is falling. The decline in press entirely experimental, i.e. aimed at test- the goal of returning to their country of freedom over the past decade, resurgent ing the water and gauging the interest of origin. However, the modus operandi authoritarianism and wars have forced exile media in sharing knowledge and can take longer than expected; there are many media into exile. The use of dig- experience in an informal networking examples of media that spent almost two ital technologies has long been a resort set-up. Subsequent forums took place in decades abroad before returning to their for independent journalism and a way Chiang Mai, in 2010 (hosted by the three country of origin.3 There are also cases to bypass restrictive legislation that is Burmese exile media), and in Johannes- of influential independent exile media not permissive for new media entrants burg, in 2012 (hosted by the Zimbabwean that ceased to exist after many years of and is restrictive to those that already exile media); they were followed by two operation before they were ever given exist. That space has been increas- additional forums in London, in 2012 and the chance to return. ingly met with growing restrictions 2013. The forums also provided training usually found in compulsory licens- sessions and were attended by partner Among the points of vulnerability, the ing and containing difficult precondi- media development organisations and lack of sustained sources of funding, i.e. tions to meet; cyber-crime legislation; donors, too. The London meetings paved the economic base of exile media, was extension of criminal laws provisions the way for co-operation between The a leading factor in their closure. This to digital content, etc. Guardian and the exile media, includ- type of media is by default donor-de- ing a section in the newspaper that pub- pendent with very few possibilities to lished stories they produced.5 generate alternative sources of fund- Efforts to facilitate networking ing over a longer period of time if they and co-operation in support of The WPFC’s initial idea evolved into a want to remain independent of politi- media in exile conference organised by FOJO and IMS, cally charged diaspora capital. Adver- with SIDA’s support. Held in Stockholm tising revenues, when acquired, always In the late 2000s, several initiatives in 2010, it gathered a much broader represented a small fraction of the over- emerged among media development group of exile media, media develop- all necessary financial means and no actors aimed at facilitating exile media ment organisations and donors. One examples were found where crowdfund- networking and closer donor co-op- tangible result of this conference was a IMS Briefing Paper / 17

three-year training programme imple- The exile media development still Since 2015, research led by CIMA has mented by FOJO and supported by SIDA. appears to be a topic at international made significant progress in systematis- The Baseline Study6 that preceded the gatherings, such as the annual DW ing data on donor support to media devel- training programme came up with the Global Media Forum. The most recent opment, as well as in tracking trends in following key findings: a lack of knowl- effort to convene exile media and ena- this marginally researched area of devel- edge about what training opportuni- ble networking took place in February opment aid.12 The latest body of research, ties are available to help exile media 2019, in Amsterdam. The meeting was “Defending Independent Media: A Com- strengthen their institutional journalism hosted by Radio Zamaneh,9 a Dutch- prehensive Analysis of Aid Flows”,13 has capacity; a lack of time and money and based Iranian media outlet that oper- been the most comprehensive so far, even an absence of internal training and men- ates an exiled Persian web platform for though its sample did not include pri- toring among exile media have led to Iranians and employs Iranian staff. The vate donors.14 The research shows that low levels of engagement in training; a meeting was dedicated to challenges donor support for global media develop- gap between the main challenges facing and constraints, as well as to opportu- ment has remained relatively constant, exile media — managing staff and vir- nities of providing independent infor- if not slightly increased. Nevertheless, tual newsrooms, financial sustainability mation from exile. It was supported by an average figure of 0.3 percent of total and internal training resources — and consultants from Newsgain, a company official development assistance (ODA) stated training needs; a need for better that trained exile media outlets as part allocated to media development still communication between donors, media of FOJO’s 2013—2015 programme. represents a very modest contribution, development actors and exile media out- and also shows that support for inde- lets about training needs; and a strongly pendent media being a politically sen- expressed need for a co-ordinated net- Which donors’ policies frame sitive issue contributes to “substantial work for exile media. assistance to exile media? risk aversion” by some donors. Com- pared to bilateral government donors, The results of this assessment were the In terms of media development poli- private donors tend to give a larger por- starting point for a FOJO training pro- cies, it is difficult to map consistencies tion of their support to the media sec- gramme encompassing in-house work- or inconsistencies, as media develop- tor.15 Two of the report’s findings are shops in Basic Journalism and Ethics, ment has not been settled as a stan- particularly relevant to exile media: Multi-Platform Journalism and Con- dalone field of development aid and, support for independent media being vergence, and Newsroom Manage- in many cases, is still spread across a politically sensitive issue that con- ment and Mentoring, as well as regional more than one ministry of the donor tributes to “substantial risk aversion” workshops in Financial Sustainability country in question. Since the early by some donors; and direct assistance and Business Models and Training of 2000s, media development “found to media outlets not being among their Trainers for the Newsroom.7 The pro- something of a home for itself in the top thematic priorities.16 gramme was evaluated as successful ‘good governance agenda’” that had but, despite interest, it did not continue become a prominent part of interna- How to better integrate media develop- due to a lack of funding.8 tional development since the mid- ment into the governance agenda remains 1990s. As Thomas Carothers and Diane the subject of an ongoing debate. Aware- The initiatives described above marked de Gramont note, governance aid has ness that strong and independent media the period between 2010 and 2015, and expanded in size and scope over time, is one of the key principles of good are historically quite unique. Given and progressed from an exclusive governance, along with accountabil- the lack of long-term commitment to focus on government institutions to ity, transparency and the rule of law, is supporting media in exile, the rela- “demand-side assistance...that gen- widespread. Yet donor attitudes towards tively small number of donors will- erally began with grants and other media support in the context of developing to engage, and the dynamic nature assistance to citizen advocacy groups, ing countries generally tend to be more of the exile media community glob- media, and other social actors that sup- positive.17 On the other hand, more com- ally (whereby many among the most port reform in specific governance sec- plex environments, such as fragile states active promoters of networking either tors.”10 Donor strategies towards gov- and conflict-torn or post-conflict coun- relocated to their countries of origin ernance aid differ and, while some tries, present a particular challenge to or ceased to exist), the notion of creat- are extremely reluctant to associate the donor community. As one CIMA ing an exile media network and donor governance aid with democracy sup- report concluded: “Because support working group on exile media have not port, in an effort to avoid the appear- for independent media tends to be even come to fruition. However, this period ance of interference and a subsequent more politically sensitive than support remains a testament to the recognition backlash against democracy aid, oth- for elections and/or political parties, it of the exile media’s importance and of ers are building their approach around has a slim chance of making it into offi- the co-operative effort to identify pol- the relationship between strengthening cial consensus documents on strategic icy approaches by taking stock of the governance and fostering democracy.11 aid priorities.”18 exile media’s specific needs. 18 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

Since 2011, the donor community has ence of a strong state which includes, Media development in conflict and increasingly debated how to address among other features, a well-function- post-conflict countries is even more issues pertaining to fragile states. ing legal and judicial environment that a subject of debate and often leads to According to the Organisation for Eco- is able to apply checks and balances.”24 polarised views. The perception that the nomic Co-operation and Development media can contribute to war and foment (OECD), “a fragile region or state has Almost a decade later, a different view hatred that incites violence sometimes weak capacity to carry out basic gov- as to why media support in fragile states seems to dominate the discourse and ernance functions, and lacks the ability matters was presented in a BBC Media deter donors from engaging in media to develop mutually constructive rela- Action policy paper.25 Its author, James development in those contexts, spe- tions with society. Fragile states are also Deane, argued that “support to the media cifically when support to independent more vulnerable to internal or external in fragile states designed to minimise media is in question. shocks such as economic crises or natu- the risk of division and maximise the ral disasters.”19 The increased focus on opportunities for dialogue should feature Contrary to that view, UNESCO’s 2004 fragile states emphasised the intersec- more prominently in assistance to such Belgrade Declaration, “Support to Media tion between peace, security and devel- states.”26 Support for the establishment in Violent Conflict and in Countries in opment. The New Deal for Engagement of a professional and pluralistic media Transition”,28 stresses “the importance in Fragile States, agreed by the OECD landscape is therefore essential to pro- of access to a free flow of information in 2011, was considered a landmark vide a space for discussion for a polarised from a range of sources about conflict global policy agreement that reflected and fractured society and strengthen a situations to expose any abuses that may a commitment by development part- shared identity, which is seen by many occur and to create a climate in which the ners to support nationally-owned and experts as the basis for any reconcili- conflicts may be resolved” and empha- -led development plans and greater aid ation. In countries where governmen- sises “the need to involve the local news effectiveness in fragile situations.20 The tal structures have been weakened or media as a principal actor in the devel- New Deal is a key agreement between are non-existent, the media’s role in opment of any media strategies in con- fragile and conflict-affected states, devel- applying checks and balances is par- flict and post conflict zones.” It further opment partners and civil society to ticularly crucial. says that “when administering con- improve the current development pol- flict or post conflict zones, authorities icy and practice in those states.21 Media The policy paper highlights several mandated by the international commu- development, however, has not been an important media trends in fragile states. nity should promote and defend media integral part of the New Deal. One is the increase in people’s access to freedom and other human rights — not media and their capacity to communi- restrict them” and stresses that “while The debate about the role of the media cate. Within two decades, the explosion it may become necessary to deter direct in fragile states encompasses various, of access to satellite TV and other forms and effective incitements to violence that often diverging viewpoints. Some schol- of independent media has been accel- may be disseminated, authorities should ars have questioned the positive role of erated by the rapid spread of mobile- not confuse independent news and prop- independent media as forces of good in phone use in almost all fragile states. aganda that calls for violence; a plural- fragile states. James Putzel and Joost The use of new technologies (and social istic media requires the existence of a van der Zwan, in their critical reflec- media in particular) by ordinary citizens broad diversity of print, broadcast and tion of neoliberal media assistance in is another trend that has opened a new other media, reflecting the widest range the 1990s,22 argue that this template stream of communication in addition of opinion within the community.” The cannot work in frameworks that lack to the traditional streams occupied by Belgrade Declaration “strongly [urges] a minimum level of national cohesion: state and private actors. A third trend government and non-government donors “There are, however, serious prob- in most fragile states is the fragmenta- to include media development as part lems when relying on media freedom tion of media environments as a result of their strategy for reconstruction and to build national consensus in fragile of both technological innovation and development in conflict and post-con- states, especially those recently emerg- the media mushrooming. The fourth flict zones, and donors should co-ordi- ing from periods of violent conflict and trend relates to the changing media con- nate their responses for greatest effect.”29 war. In situations where national cohe- sumption habits of young people in frag- sion and consensus is lacking, state or ile states. Alongside these four trends, There are good practices that can further public involvement in the media can, the policy paper points to the increased inform the debate as well as the prac- as part of the equation, actually be a capacity of various factions in many tice. While the wars in the Balkans, for constructive force for the social, eco- fragile states “to co-opt and manipu- instance, are often highlighted as pro- nomic and political reconstruction and late the media and communication”.27 viding examples of media that “forged development of a country.”23 They fur- The main conclusion of the paper is that the war and incited conflicts”, most lit- ther believe that “the development of an media and communication increasingly erature does not emphasise enough that open and free media environment, like matter in fragile states. such media behaviour was prevailingly other liberal projects, requires the pres- associated with state-owned media that IMS Briefing Paper / 19

the state used as a “weapon of war”. But, tal and non-governmental) with a long that would result in holistic interven- following the outbreak of war, jour- history of supporting exile media on a tion. When media development exists nalists who refused to conform to this case-by-case basis. The decisions to sup- as part of donor engagement, it is often approach were determined to challenge port exile media are considered highly built around short time-frames and spe- the state discourse and report on the war politically sensitive. This may well be cific interventions, whereas the condi- and political developments accurately. the reason that so little information is tions often require a longer-term and They set up a number of independ- revealed publicly and systematically. multi-faceted approach. ent media, without which the popula- The other reason concerns consideration would not have had an alternative tion for the safety and security of the There are donor countries, as well as source of information. The battle for media actors in question. Private donors private donors, that engage in media independence was fought within the often have greater flexibility in making development in conflict, post-conflict professional associations of journalists, a decision to support exile media. Some and fragile states by acknowledging the which split in two. Civil society organi- private donors do not specifically dis- importance of sustaining the local inde- sations defended freedom of expression. tinguish between home-based (local) pendent sector where it exists, as well All of these actors were often the tar- and exile media, and are led by other as the importance of that sector during get of the ruling regime that used legal, overarching strategic objectives that wartime and in the post-conflict period. economic and other means to weaken include safeguarding independent and Where the conditions do not exist for them. Donors and media development public-interest journalism and the iden- media outlets and organisations to oper- organisations that were actively pres- tification of leaders/standard-setters in ate within a country, exile media may ent and developed demand-driven pro- this framework, regardless of whether become part of the media-development grammes of assistance were crucial to they operate from within the country, intervention. Despite extensive experi- sustaining the independent sector. The from exile or in a hybrid way.30 ence on the part of some donors, there is level of co-operation and co-ordina- still no broader consensus in the donor tion among stakeholders was high and The community of practice often high- community on the approaches. There- instrumental for a holistic approach. The lights that both conflict and post-conflict fore, rather than detecting inconsist- independent sector was also backed by frameworks can hardly be generalised. ency in their approaches, one can con- donors through diplomatic channels. It Understanding the context is crucial, as clude that the bigger problem is the is true, though, that their leverage was the drivers of conflict typically differ. lack of agreement about the essential high, as all of the countries involved in The post-conflict context can encom- elements of donor engagement in com- the conflict aspired to EU membership pass many features of varying intensity plex and politically sensitive frame- and were therefore, to various degrees, such as prolonged violence and fragility. works — and specifically what flexi- sensitive to possible diplomatic coun- The post-conflict context can be marked ble mechanisms need to be in place to ter-measures. Had the donors refrained by heightened authoritarian tendencies enable such engagement with a view to from supporting the emerging and strug- or the ambition to create conditions for long-term development. gling independent sector, it would not lasting peace through the strengthen- have survived in the face of restrictive ing of democracy. An emphasis on con- and discriminatory measures, and public text-sensitive approaches can help avoid discourse would have been completely generalisation and donor interventions shaped by the perpetrators. based on templates.

In conclusion, as media development is Some of the commonalities of conflicts not yet a separate and standalone field of are that independent journalism either development aid, and as a consequence collapses or becomes a target; that jour- policies differ from one donor country nalists are at particular risk of being not to another, the policies of assistance to just casualties but more often targets on independent media, as well as to exile both sides of the confrontation; technical media, are almost impossible to identify infrastructure is often destroyed; cen- either under “good governance”, “fragile sorship and hostility towards journalists countries” or “conflict and post-conflict” is exercised not only by the state but by frameworks. There is no separate policy all sides involved in the conflict; at the framework to guide assistance to exile same time, the population needs infor- media as part of media development. The mation even more than during peace- policy debates are still influenced by a time; and the situation calls for a swift variety of approaches as to whether the and multifaceted reaction. These needs media matter, how they matter and how are hardly being met in full, either via they should be supported. There have holistic interventions by donors or by been bilateral donors (both governmen- the co-ordinated input of various donors 20 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

Case studies: CASE STUDY Zimbabwe and Burma/Myanmar

Analysis of past cases of independ- Zimbabwe ent exile media is aimed at presenting different contexts and models such as hybrid cases of “co-existence” of exile The independent exile media have been case in the Supreme Court, and acted very media with independent media operat- a response to the political environment quickly to start broadcasting. But before ing in-country, as well as “pure” cases created over several decades of auto- the station was even up and running, it was whereby exile media are the only source cratic rule. Historically, exiled (and clan- closed down. The government declared of independent content. Along the same destine) media, in particular radio, were an Capital Radio to be an illegal radio station, lines, the case studies provide examples important part of the liberation movement shut it down in October 2000, and con- of exile media in transition to in-coun- against colonial power. In the post-colo- fiscated equipment from its hidden loca- try operations, by looking at the full set nial period, as Last Moyo writes, their focus tion. Jackson fled to the UK and set up a of preconditions that need to be in place has been on “a new form of liberation from radio station, SW Radio Africa (SWRA), externally and internally, as well as the emerging forms of oppression perpetrated in December 2001, with former journal- role that the media in question play in by the former liberators”. The content of ists of the state broadcaster, Zimbabwe their countries’ media landscape in their a new generation of exile media was con- Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC). Among post-exile existence. It is also relevant sumed by citizens alongside content from other objectives, the station sought to pro- to highlight examples of exile media state media, adding to the controlled infor- vide balanced and in-depth news cover- that closed after several or more years mation space a platform for communities age; to become a platform for discussion in operation and to analyse the internal to access and share different views. Oper- and debate; to be a platform for ordinary and external reasons for their closure. ating offshore created a space to articulate Zimbabweans to call for peaceful change; issues without political interference from and to be a platform for opposition parties All things considered, Zimbabwe and the state. denied access to state media. By declaring Burma/Myanmar were chosen as case itself to be independent, professional and studies with important lessons to draw. The Zimbabwean independent media in accurate media, SWRA aimed to promote In both cases, as with Syrian independ- exile mainly comprised journalists. In 2005, democracy and free speech, voter educa- ent exile media, more than one independ- there were at least 90 Zimbabwean jour- tion and human rights; and to expose cor- ent exile media outlet existed, i.e. there nalists who had left Zimbabwe as a direct ruption, mismanagement and human rights was a diverse exile media community of result of political persecution and the violations by the authorities. print, radio, TV and online media that shrinking space for the independent press. targeted a wide or niche audience, and Living in exile in South Africa, other Afri- SWRA broadcast on shortwave radio and, resembled an alternative media sector can countries, the United Kingdom and the to ensure wider reach, it streamed pro- in its nature. In both cases, the inde- United States, they formed one of the larg- grammes on its website, which also con- pendent exile media existed over a long est groups of exiled journalists in the world, tained radio archives, links to other news period of time and faced the challenge of according to the Committee to Protect websites and a section for listeners’ com- moving back to their country of origin. Journalists. The majority of former Zim- ments. The website had a dedicated video babwean broadcasters continued work- archive, audio archive and YouTube chan- ing for private radio stations such as Short nel, which allowed citizens to capture and Wave Radio Africa in London and Studio upload videos. Besides Twitter, email, Face- 7, which was hosted by Voice of America book and SMS, the use of mobile phones (VOA) in Washington D.C. and by Voice of assumed a central place in the operations the People (VOP), broadcast by Radio Neth- of the radio station. By taking advantage erlands. Former Daily News journalists and of the technology, SWRA created avenues others affected by closures have started for its audience to provide feedback and online publications such as Newzimbabwe. participate in SWRA’s programming pro- com, Zimnews.com, Zimbabwejournalists. cess without having to identify themselves com, ZimOnline.com, ZimDaily.com, and or pay for a call, by means of “beeping” the TheZimbabweTimes.com, among others. station’s Zimbabwean mobile number and being called back. Mobile phones have SW Radio Africa was a successor to the also increased opportunities for sourcing short-lived Capital Radio. Gerry Jackson, and disseminating news and story ideas, its founder, took the government to court mainly through subscription-based SMS over its monopoly of the airwaves, won her alerts. SWRA introduced a free SMS news IMS Briefing Paper / 21

headline service as a way of circumvent- The story of The Zimbabwean newspaper stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe. ing the jamming of its signal. At the time, began in 2005. The paper was founded by The ZANU-PF government promised to SMS technology was the dominant facil- Wilf Mbanga, the former editor of the Zim- ensure the immediate processing of all itator of participatory journalism in the babwe Inter-Africa News Agency (ZIANA). applications for re-registration and regis- African context. Alongside its network of He was declared by the president to be an tration (of broadcasters) in terms of both stringers in Zimbabwe, SWRA used avail- enemy of the state in 2000 for being the the Broadcasting Services Act as well as able technologies to interact with its audi- founder and first chief executive of Asso- the Access to Information and Protec- ence and enable its contribution to content ciated Newspapers of Zimbabwe, pub- tion of Privacy Act. The opposition in turn as well as debate. Not only did it enable the lishers of The Daily News. The pressure pledged to call on governments that were formation of a public-discourse alterna- against Mbanga peaked in 2003 and he hosting and/or funding external radio tive to that of the state-controlled media, decided to leave the country for The Neth- stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe to it engaged audiences in a participatory erlands. When he launched The Zimba- cease such activity. It pledged to encour- manner, i.e. it helped create a culture of bwean, he had in mind an authoritative and age Zimbabweans running or working for horizontal interaction and thus break the accurate newspaper of record and a relia- external radio stations broadcasting into dominant, top-down approach of seeing ble source of information for all those indi- Zimbabwe to return to Zimbabwe. audiences only as recipients. viduals, agencies and governments with an interest in Zimbabwe. The paper promised The subsequent opening resulted in the SWRA closed down in 2015, after almost to be accountable to its readers by provid- licensing of the News Day and the Daily 15 years, during which time it became a ing space for all viewpoints. According to News. However, as of today, no inde- recognised and trusted brand. Its closure observers, the newspaper fulfilled multiple pendent radio station in exile received a came as a direct consequence of dimin- roles both in exile and at home by provid- licence before closing down. The broad- ished funding. Many journalists at SWRA ing critical perspectives on the “Zimbabwe casting media sector continues to be an were stripped of their right to return; the crisis” to Zimbabweans “at home” in the area of particular sensitivity for the Zim- ban was only recently lifted. context of increasing repression of private babwean government, such that no com- media. The Zimbabwean offered news, munity radio has obtained a licence A similar fate was shared by another inde- information and entertainment, as well as either. Active bans on returning to Zim- pendent radio station in exile, Voice of the discussion forums on current affairs. At babwe that had been imposed on a num- People (VOP). Set up with offices in Harare, its peak, 60,000 copies were distributed in ber of journalists associated with exile it broadcast on shortwave radio with sup- South Africa and 60,000 in Zimbabwe once media were only recently lifted. However, port from Radio Netherlands. By August a week. Instead of recycling the unsold donors changed their approach in 2010 2002, the government had become uneasy papers, they were distributed by NGOs in when the focus shifted to media in Zim- about external Zimbabwean radio stations. rural areas for free. The Zimbabwean’s babwe, following the closure of a number The offices of VOP in Harare were raided website encouraged readers and bloggers of independent media in exile. and bombed, but it remained in the coun- to participate in the content. The news- try until 2006, when its leadership and jour- paper stopped printing in 2014; its web- nalists were threatened with arrest. It relo- site, which aggregates the most important cated first to Cape Town, in 2006, and news from Zimbabwe, is still available. subsequently to Johannesburg, in 2008. It still runs a website but has failed to obtain Consideration of moving back to Zim- a radio licence in Zimbabwe. Its founder babwe became part of the discussions lives in Harare and continues to cam- that were triggered by the hint of change paign through ZACRAS (Zimbabwe Asso- (which has not materialised) in 2009, when ciation of Community Radio Stations) for ZANU-PF and MDC signed an accord the licensing of community radio. At the to form a Government of National Unity time of interview, the government had shut (GNU). One of the articles of the signed down the internet to prevent mobilisation memorandum contained ZANU-PF’s of what was first meant to be a peaceful demand for the immediate disbandment or demonstration but resulted in the overt use demobilisation of foreign-based and for- of force against protesters. eign government-funded external radio 22 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

CASE STUDY

Burma/Myanmar

During five decades of military rule, Norwegian Worldview International Foun- lar causes. We believe that media must Burma regularly occupied a place among dation. In 2002, the DVB began to position be free and independent and we strive to the world’s top ten most difficult environ- itself as an independent media organisa- preserve press freedom.” While maintain- ments for press freedom. Except for a tion and to detach itself from the percep- ing this position, The Irrawaddy formulates short period linked to the 1988 revolution, tion that it was “a voice of NCGUB”. The an engaging nature of journalism: “Criti- when in a matter of weeks a number of DVB’s mission has four main goals: “(1) cal and independent media cannot sit idly media emerged, only to be closed down to provide accurate and unbiased news to and report news on crisis with detach- soon afterwards, the military regime has the people of Burma, (2) to promote under- ment. We believe media is part of the solu- used all means at its disposal to cut peo- standing and cooperation amongst the var- tion and not part of the problem. Thus, we ple off from access to diverging views. ious ethnic and religious groups of Burma, are not slaves to neutrality — our duty is to Following the 8888 Uprising, thousands (3) to encourage and sustain independent search for the truth and inform our read- of Burmese political dissidents and activ- public opinion and enable social and polit- ers.” The magazine became a monthly ists fled to neighbouring and Western ical debate and (4) to impart the ideals of publication promoting press freedom and countries. The emergence of news organ- democracy and human rights to the people independent media, and gained an interna- isations founded and run by Burmese of Burma.” tional reputation for balanced, informative exiled activists is directly tied to the gen- and in-depth reporting. The magazine was eration of student activists behind the With its headquarters in Oslo, the DVB suc- banned by the regime in Burma and any- 8888 Uprising. cessfully developed a studio in the Thai one found with a copy could be arrested city of Chiang Mai, and as of 2007 it has and imprisoned. In 1999, The Irrawaddy The media that were set up in neighbour- broadcast via several transmitters pro- expanded its coverage to include other ing countries and Europe are widely rec- grammes in both Burmese and various countries in Southeast Asia undergoing ognised for their large role in counter- minority languages. In the late 1990s, the transition to democratic forms of govern- ing the controlled information space, for DVB launched a website with content in ment, with a core focus on Burma. After telling uncensored stories about Burma both English and Burmese, and in 2005 it 2000, The Irrawaddy’s websites were abroad and back home, thus internally (in established a satellite-based television sta- launched, including English-language Burma) creating an alternative public dis- tion. The DVB has not yet obtained a terres- (2000) and Burmese-language (2001) course, and externally revealing stories trial licence and is therefore still broadcast- news sites. They were banned and blocked from Burma through the lens of the Bur- ing via satellite. In 2017, it was among five for 12 years, however, and could only be mese people. The exile media were often companies awarded a digital channel by accessed by a local audience via proxy perceived as part of a democratic move- the government. servers until 2011, when the ban was lifted. ment in a wider sense. The development The Irrawaddy was distributed legally in of Burmese independent media in exile The Irrawaddy news magazine has also Burma/Myanmar for the first time in 2013, is the story of media outlets set up by emerged as one of the most prominent and in 2014 the Irrawaddy Burmese weekly activists with little or no prior experience exile-run media outlets. Its predecessor, journal was launched, reaching readers in journalism and which evolved into the Burma Information Group (BIG), was across the country. The English edition of independent media organisations and established in 1992 in Bangkok, Thailand, The Irrawaddy stopped printing in English returned to Myanmar to continue their in order “to document the human rights in September 2015, and the Burmese edi- role as independent media in what was violations in Burma, including the unlaw- tion ended in early 2016, thus leaving only initially considered to be the beginning of ful detention of members of the demo- the digital platforms. “We cannot compete the transition process. cratic opposition, other dissidents and eth- with state-owned newspapers. Policies nic groups.” Transforming BIG, in 1993 that allow state-owned media to monopo- The Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) Aung Zaw and a group of fellow 1988 stu- lize advertising and the readership need to is one of the most prominent of these dent exile activists based in Chiang Mai be amended,” the outlet explained. media outlets; it started in 1992 as a launched the monthly English-language shortwave radio station. Originally, the publication The Irrawaddy, a news pub- Mizzima News was founded by three Bur- DVB represented a co-operative enter- lication unaffiliated with Burmese politi- mese student activists in New Delhi, India prise by the National Coalition Govern- cal dissent groups in Burma and in exile: in 1998. When the media outlet first went ment of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the “The Irrawaddy is neither an advocacy online in 2002, the primary function of the Norwegian Burma Committee, and the group nor an NGO campaigning for particu- then Mizzima News Group was “the col- IMS Briefing Paper / 23

The two case studies are based on a sample of three exile media per country and are examples of a plural independent media sector in exile. In the case of Zimbabwe, where donors, media development organisations and the media sector regularly convened co-ordination lection and dissemination of news and A number of media have emerged and meetings (e.g. the Zimbabwe Interna- information on Burma and Burma-re- the government has declared its commit- tional Partnership), there was an effort lated issues via Internet and fax”. In 2002, ment to embark on media reform. Several to identify the key needs of the sector Mizzima became a founding member of years down the road, initial optimism about and to adjust donor assistance to better Burma News International (BNI), a media the pace of the transition process has meet those needs. However, some of the group that initially comprised Mizzima and declined, with more criticism voiced as to key exile media ceased to exist before four other ethnic Burmese exile news out- incomplete reforms, increasing corruption they attempted to relocate to Zimbabwe, lets located along Myanmar/Burma’s west- and stagnation. Observers of media trends despite their acknowledged impact, as ern border, in India and Bangladesh. The point to a new phenomenon: the high risk a result of various factors: the hostil- group subsequently expanded to incorpo- of media capture by the state and a group ity of the regime towards exile media; rate various other Burmese news outlets of the regime’s business cronies. a ban on returning imposed on leading located along the Thai-Myanmar/Burma figures of some exile media; the high border, in Thailand (Mizzima, 8 Octo- Former exile media have returned to the cost of exile operations; shifts in donor ber 2013). In 2003, Mizzima launched a country to integrate into the new media support, etc. Unlike the Zimbabwean monthly print publication, Mizzima Monthly landscape and transform themselves from exile media, the Burmese exile media Journal, which was published in both Eng- fully donor-funded into commercially viable were given the option to return at the lish and Burmese. At the same time, Miz- media organisations. However, this effort beginning of the political transforma- zima developed a stronger network of is taking place in a market dominated by tion in Myanmar and to integrate into reporters within Burma. Additional Miz- state ownership and businesses close to the nascent and vibrant Myanmar media zima activities took the form of daily inter- the state, where the conditions are not scene. The key lessons learnt from the net news and email services, podcasting equal for all media players. two cases are: 1) the development and about Myanmar through www.mizzima.tv, subsequent impact requires more time and Burma Media Alert. to be built and commitment by donors; 2) return is possible only when mini- Until 2012, Mizzima’s main offices were in mum guarantees exist; and 3) organisa- Chiang Mai and New Delhi. In 2012, Miz- tions strengthened over years of work in zima began a commercial transformation, exile face different challenges on their setting up operations in Yangon and offi- return that require a new set of skills. cially registering as a Myanmar company (Mizzima Media Co. Ltd.). Today, Mizzima media products include its long-standing Burmese- and English-language websites (www.mizzimaburmese.com and www. mizzima.com) along with a digital daily newspaper in Burmese and a weekly Eng- lish-language magazine. In 2017, Mizzima was awarded one of five licences to operate an independent, free-to-air, digital TV channel (www.mizzima.tv).

Former exile media have long existed outside the traditional nexus of state and market forces. Moreover, long located outside traditional state influences, predominant exile media institutions have demonstrated notable success in circumventing the Bur- mese military’s monopoly on information. Since 2011, the country’s political landscape has undergone significant changes. 24 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

Case studies: Belarus, CASESeveral STUDY important observations stem Azerbaijan, Russia and Iran from the case studies above. Long- term efforts to support independent Media outlets selected for the case stud- broadcasting from abroad can be suc- ies below have been chosen in order Russiacessfully combined with the transfor- to demonstrate the variety of formats mation of supported exile media from that exiled news production and dis- more traditional outlets into digital-first tribution can take, as well as the chal- Foundedoutlets (Belarus, in 2014 by Iran). the former Severe editor- political media accounts and has publicly posted lenges these media face despite the in-chiefrepression of Lenta.ru, in the Galinahome Timchenko, country may its audience figures during its first few nature of the regimes back home. Two Meduzalimit exile (http://meduza.io) media’s ability operates to efficiently from years of existence, demonstrating its of the selected media outlets are only Latviafind andbut receivesretain high-qualitya significant reportersportion spirit of transparency. relatively recently in exile (around five ofon its the funding ground, from thus advertising making by Russianit more years), but have already passed the set- companieschallenging or businessesto reach and with retain a signifi audi- - Since 2016, Meduza has run its own ting-up stage, while two others have cantences presence with quality in Russia. and locally relevant summer school for Russian regional operated for almost 15 years. Two out- content (Azerbaijan, Iran). In the case journalists, called “Farm”. An attempt to lets, Meduza and Euroradio, have the Theof mild project authoritarianism began as a protest and by aTim devel- - organise it in Russia in 2019 has been possibility to operate legally in exile, chenko,oped digital whose economy, sacking from it is Lenta.possible for postponed. It has also organised confer- albeit in a limited fashion, while two ruan after exile 10 media years asoutlet editor-in-chief to get significant was ences in Russia, which signals that the others face the threat of serious repres- apparentlyrevenues by triggered competing by the with Kremlin’s non-exile authorities do not recognise the outlet sion. Three outlets, Euroradio, Zam- desireoutlets to for take advertising. control of this This influential should be as a threat. aneh Media and Meydan TV, are heav- portal.looked Following at as a window her sacking, of opportunity, 39 editors ily donor-dependent, while the fourth, and journaliststo survive voluntarily the exile resigned media should from In September 2018, the govern- Meduza, gets more than 60 percent of Lenta.ru.be prepared Some for formed the worsening the core of ofMedu con-- ment-controlled channel RT suggested its monthly profits from commercial rev- za’sditions first for newsroom. independent Latvia journalism was deemed and calling Meduza a “foreign agent” for enues. Meydan TV and Zamaneh tar- thebusiness easiest activities country to getin thestarted country in, as of having received foreign donor funding get rather broad demographics, while Timchenkoexile (Russia). had a residency permit there that could be spent for “political pur- Euroradio and Meduza have consist- as a property owner. Meduza is registered poses”. Unlike Radio Are Europe/Radio ently targeted young people as actors as a private company, with Timchenko as Liberty and its project Current Time, of change during the first several years its sole shareholder. It has received a mix or Voice of America, Meduza has not of their existence. of private investor loans and donor fund- been introduced into the list of ‘foreign ing (the latter is partially disclosed in offi- agent media’ yet. Still, if the authorities These media outlets share common fea- cial reports submitted by the company decide to crack down on Meduza, adver- tures that cannot be assigned to them and includes grants from SIDA and Oak tisers may become wary of associating based only on the specifics of their Foundation). themselves with the brand, and the out- respective political regimes or the cul- let may have to increase its dependence tural habits of their audiences. They all Significantly, Meduza has grown in popu- on donors. have a strong vision in terms of their larity among Russians, especially younger mission and audience, as well as a clear ones, for taking a very audience-centric Meduza has a monthly audience of editorial line and standards, and they approach to its formats. It was inspired by 28 million unique users, 70 percent of have combined independent journalism BuzzFeed and other popular foreign online whom are under 35. Its owners do not with a resistance to pressure at home, resources, and was one of the first media envisage returning to Russia, but staff- where they have often been called for- in/for Russia to introduce new types of ers regularly travel to Russia and do not eign “traitors” or “agents”. Those that “explainers” and quizzes, becoming one experience any pressure there. have existed for more than a decade of the first successful native advertisers have had to reformulate their editorial in Russia. strategies in order to keep up with the development of new technologies and the Currently, half of Meduza’s staff is based shifting habits of audiences at home. All in Riga (including editor-in-chief Ivan Kol- of them have people working for them pakov and director Timchenko), with the inside their home countries yet have no other half based in Moscow/Russia. The opportunity to return and continue fully outlet’s foreign status allows it to receive operating inside the country. funding from multiple stakeholders and does not prevent it from working with large Russian companies such as the state-owned airliner Aeroflot or Russian mobile operators. It has numerous social IMS Briefing Paper / 25

CASE STUDY

Belarus

In Belarus, the regime effectively silences strategies to suit new types of audience. the country changes, allowing for inde- any internal independent broadcasting, Currently, it offers three types of play- pendent broadcasters to receive a licence allowing limited press freedom only to list targeting different age groups, while without agreeing to be censored. Operat- a handful of print and online media out- its website and social media are rich with ing in a hybrid exile mode, Euroradio can- lets. This has prompted several groups of visual content that is not repeated on not accept payments to its Belarus-based media professionals to search for broad- air. Its studios in Minsk enable live visual office other than from its mother com- casting opportunities abroad. Currently, broadcasting of selected programmes pany, and it remains heavily reliant on those external broadcasters are heav- on all social media, while Warsaw-based donor money, most of which comes ily present online and, in a way, compete DJs work in close co-ordination with their from foreign governmental donors. To with the local market of independent Belarus-based counterparts. The Belaru- decrease dependency on donor funding, media. But they remain the only media sian secret services have attempted sev- Euroradio engages in native and tradi- able to provide independent news and eral times to arrest Euroradio’s staff and tional advertising, co-organises cultural programming on-air, and TV and radio threaten its management, but the station events and looks for other ways to get are still popular channels in terms of still enjoys rather mild treatment from additional revenues, e.g. by providing pro- Belarusian information-gathering habits. the authorities. duction-related services.

The most relevant case study is Euro- As per the station’s management, part of pean Radio for Belarus. Set up in Poland that success is Euroradio’s strict adher- in 2005 by a group of media profession- ence to impartiality and balanced con- als from Belarus who already had experi- tent. The station provides opinions from ence of both in-country and exiled broad- across the political spectrum and does casting, it has positioned itself as an not engage in highly politicised activity independent media project that aims to that would damage its integrity. Sociolog- return to Belarus when the democratic ical surveys in Belarus have shown that, transition starts. over the years, many Belarusians perceive Euroadio to be a local station and are una- European Radio for Belarus, or Euroradio, ware of its registration abroad. This has has prioritised both traditional ways of bothered the authorities, with authoritar- broadcasting (i.e. FM) and online broad- ian leader Alexander Lukashenka openly casting. It chose a specific target audi- naming it a “Polish” station during a ence — 15–35-year-olds — and created widely televised meeting with the press music, entertainment and news program- in 2019. However, despite being regis- ming aimed at this demographic. Its edi- tered in Poland, Euroradio considers itself torial and programming strategy was cre- to be a Belarusian media outlet and is ated on the basis of sociological surveys embedded in the Belarusian media scene. and focus groups. It has received several “free speech” awards from the Belarusian Associa- The station had to operate completely tion of Journalists and collaborates with underground in Belarus between 2006 Belarus-based NGOs, startups and com- and 2009, before it received accreditation mercial companies. With a monthly audi- for several correspondents in its bureau, ence of more than one million people on which has been extended annually ever its website and social media, it is listed since. However, the authorities have not among the top 15 independent media permitted Euroradio to apply for a broad- sites in Belarus, while its remaining FM casting licence. broadcasting from Poland reaches hundreds of thousands of offline listeners. Over time, with the growth of online access in Belarus, Euroradio has had A full return to Belarus is impossible for to adjust its programming and editorial the station unless the political situation in 26 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

CASE STUDY

Azerbaijan

In Azerbaijan, the regime effectively bans had to learn the rules of independent and In April 2019, Milli resigned as director, any independent media, including web- trustworthy journalism on the job, while saying he did not approve of anyone stay- sites, by jailing bloggers, journalists and already in exile. Berlin-based staff would ing in their management job for more activists and by applying other forms of regularly engage in public acts to attract than five years. This followed the closure pressure. The only outlets that provide attention to the Azerbaijani regime’s viola- of the Tbilisi office and several managers independent, balanced content have to tions of human rights. In turn, the author- leaving the station. The project contin- operate abroad and there is only a hand- ities arrested their family members on ues to operate from Germany and enjoys ful of them, including the Azerbaijani ser- trumped-up charges or forced them to multi-donor support, but its future will vices of the BBC and Radio Free Europe/ deny their ties to the “traitors” in exile. depend on the new leadership’s ability to Radio Liberty. keep Meydan TV’s popularity and credi- Meydan TV relies on a network of journal- bility among its target audiences. In this situation, Meydan TV, an online TV ists both inside and outside Azerbaijan. and multimedia platform set up by for- For security purposes, the identities of its The audience numbers of Meydan TV mer blogger Emin Milli in 2013, became in-country staff are hidden and remuner- ranges, and is based on the accessibil- an important new voice in trying to reach ation for their work has to be provided in ity of its platforms to users in Azerbai- the Azeri population from exile. Meydan secret. Exile-based authors of Meydan TV jan, where authorities often block access TV operates from Berlin, where it is reg- are more outspoken. The website and You- to its webpage as well as file complaints istered as a not-for-profit “public associ- Tube channel of Meydan TV largely deals about its content on YouTube and sup- ation”. Until early 2019, the station also with political affairs, social issues and port hacking its Facebook pages. At its had an office in Tbilisi, Georgia, which issues related to minorities and vulnerable peak, the outlet has claimed millions of was shut down as part of a consolida- groups and their rights. visitors/viewers monthly. tion process within Meydan TV. Run- ning a separate legal entity in a country Despite initial success in crowdfunding, close to Azerbaijan was useful from the the project has failed to collect recurrent point of view of lowering the cost of sal- payments from the Azeri diaspora and is aries and the possibility of transferring almost 100 percent dependent on grants cash to underground correspondents from international donors. The German inside Azerbaijan, but it was burdensome government does not provide funding to in terms of donor-funding transparency, Meydan TV, with no official reason given. management and legal support. An article in Foreign Policy in 2016 claimed that Germany feared damaging diplomatic Unlike projects set up by professional relations with Azerbaijan. In 2019, Meydan journalists, Meydan TV is intertwined TV came in for criticism from some exiled with an activist agenda. Emin Milli, an Azeri opposition politicians for the positive activist and blogger, had to emigrate remarks made by its director about Pres- to Germany in 2011 after spending 16 ident Ilham Aliyev’s pardoning of dozens months in jail, allegedly for “a fight in the of human rights defenders and journalists restaurant”. His sentencing was inter- (but keeping another dozen in jail). nationally regarded as repression for his criticism of the government. While To diversify its activities and impact, Mey- abroad, he has remained an open critic of dan TV’s founders started a social media- the government and received numerous only project, ROMB, which creates short threats for his views. Russian-language videos on current affairs and mostly targets Russia-based audi- The initial funding to start Meydan TV ences. This project is managed separately came partly from donations by the Azeri from Meydan TV and is an attempt to reach diaspora. As Meydan TV’s co-founder the Russian-language audience that con- said in the interview with the Huffington sumes the rather slender offer that Meydan Post in 2016, the station management TV has in Russian on Azerbaijan. IMS Briefing Paper / 27

CASE STUDY Several important observations stem from the case studies above. Long- term efforts to support independent broadcasting from abroad can be suc- Iran cessfully combined with the transformation of supported exile media from more traditional outlets into digital-first Radio Zamaneh was founded in Amster- Media, and is looking for alternative rev- outlets (Belarus, Iran). Severe political dam, the Netherlands, in 2006, after the enue streams. This includes providing repression in the home country may Dutch parliament passed a resolution translation services and online advertising limit exile media’s ability to efficiently supporting independent Iranian media. It mostly outside the Netherlands, allowing find and retain high-quality reporters started as a collaborative effort between it to have a limited but reliable stream of on the ground, thus making it more Press Now (currently merged into Free “no strings attached” funding that can be challenging to reach and retain audi- Press Unlimited) and a team of Iranian used for operational purposes or as a safe ences with quality and locally relevant journalists and bloggers. Radio Zam- deposit. The outlet also appeals to its read- content (Azerbaijan, Iran). In the case aneh is registered as a not-for-profit ers to support it and “other smaller inde- of mild authoritarianism and a devel- entity under Dutch law and states its pendent media”. oped digital economy, it is possible for independence from any political, eth- an exile media outlet to get significant nic or social group inside or outside Iran. On top of running the website, Zamaneh revenues by competing with non-exile It chose broadcasting on the web as a Media hosts an online learning portal, outlets for advertising. This should be way to reach a predominantly young Ira- Academy Zamaneh, and a citizen-reporting looked at as a window of opportunity, nian audience both inside and outside portal, Tribune Zamaneh. Courses at the and to survive the exile media should the country. Academy are free and dedicated to poten- be prepared for the worsening of con- tial journalists in Iran, especially young peo- ditions for independent journalism and Radio Zamaneh realised quite quickly ple who want to professionalise. Zamaneh business activities in the country of that its audience among the Iranian dias- also offers Iranians a special online appli- exile (Russia). pora was quite significant and that it cation allowing “unrestricted and secure had to decide whether they should be internet access”. regarded as one of its main target audiences. As a result, the station’s mission The website audience of Radiozamaneh. has become to provide “independent com is 2.6 million unique visitors. journalism, citizen reporting, e-learning, debate and knowledge to an audience in Iran and the Persian speaking community around the world, building bridges between Iran and the Iranian diaspora and between different Persian speaking communities, such as in Afghanistan and Central Asia.”

The station’s funding has come from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Commission, the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a range of other donors. Free Press Unlimited for many years provided committed core funding which, between 2014 and 2017, was dedicated mostly to strengthening Radio Zamaneh’s internal capacity and management in order for it to continue to operate in a fully autonomous manner.

The station has stopped broadcasting live and now concentrates solely on its website, and sometimes hosts podcasts. It has also rebranded itself as Zamaneh 28 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

Concluding remarks in exile can be considered liberating viable alternative. Donor funding is usu- and progressive in a wider sense. All of ally tailored to short-term interventions, Exile media exist by default outside the the above naturally applies only in the while professional development requires traditional nexus of state and market case of independent media in exile that a medium- to long-term funding com- forces. Although exile modus operandi declare their mission to be in accord- mitment. For most independent media in is the last modus for media to resort to ance with the ethical values of inde- exile, access to emergency funds at the — and is therefore not so much a choice pendent journalism and excludes exile beginning of their operations is easier to as the only alternative at hand when media that are set up by opposing polit- attract, but strategic planning and devel- all other avenues have been exhausted ical groups or businesses with vested opment beyond pure survival requires — it allows those media to avoid con- political interests, or groups that con- stable sources of funding. Multi-donor stant state pressure in cases where the sider media only to be an extended arm sustained support over a longer period state creates conditions in which inde- of activism engaged in promoting a nar- in time (Burmese exile media being a pendent journalism is no longer possi- row interest-based discourse. case in point) has enabled the devel- ble within the state’s territorial bound- opment of strong brands among exile aries. Consequently, exile media have Independent media in exile are usually media, as well as their impact and pro- demonstrated notable success in circum- formed by journalists (as in Zimbabwe, fessional output. Media development venting the state’s monopoly on infor- Belarus and Russia), groups of activ- related to exile media requires flexible mation. Operating outside any particu- ists (as in the case of the Burmese and donors that, apart from a handful of gov- lar country’s media market, this type Azerbaijani exile media), or by groups ernmental donors, are more likely to be of media is also not influenced by the of both (as in the Iranian case study). found among private donors. Experience market dynamics until they relocate to The experience of the Burmese and further points to reliance on one donor their homeland and merge into its exist- Azerbaijani exile media demonstrates funding as a particularly acute source ing media market. The negative effects that even when the founders originate of vulnerability for exile media.31 Donor of the market have not been identified from groups of dissident student activ- co-operation is essential, as it facilitates as a factor that drives media into exile. ists, the exile media’s development can the special needs of the exile media sec- Those reasons remain political. lead to their positioning as independent tor more successfully.32 Donors often media devoted to the ethics of profes- have different options, and while some Hypothetically, the default position sional journalism. Some quickly real- have both the mechanisms in place and outside the traditional nexus allows ise that in order to present a trustwor- the understanding of the importance of for greater freedom to exercise inde- thy alternative to hegemonic narratives, covering operating costs, others lean pendent journalism and tackle a wide independence and good-quality jour- more towards training, legal and tech- range of issues, provide diverse points nalism is the way to proceed. While the nical support. It is usually via a combi- of view, and tackle taboos. Given the journalistic tradition in the countries of nation of all inputs in a complementary fact that the countries of origin are typ- origin of the exile media may not always manner (through co-operation) that the ically those where the ruling regimes present high professional standards, various needs of exile media can be met. for their own sake attempt to monopo- most of the exile media receive train- lise public discourse — and, by doing ing and in turn train their networks of Networks of correspondents within the so, use their coercive power to limit or correspondents, thus cultivating a new countries of origin of exile media are completely close access to information, generation of journalists with a clearer both a strength and a vulnerability, too. thus impeding the right to information understanding of what adherence to pro- While the existence of such networks — exile media could be considered a fessional standards means. To become is essential to having relevant content, conduit of this right by providing an a brand that attracts local and interna- in-country correspondents are much alternative stream of information. By tional audiences requires time as well closer to violence and persecution (e.g. recruiting networks of correspondents as adherence to those standards. correspondents of the Democratic Voice in the country, they also give journal- of Burma, SW Radio Africa, etc.). Some ists who remain an opportunity to exer- Sources of strength can at the same time exile media have sophisticated ways to cise journalism that maintains profes- be sources of weakness. For instance, protect the identity of their correspond- sional standards. By exploiting avenues operating outside the traditional nexus ents and ensure the safe technical trans- of digital technologies, they also cre- of state and market forces means relying mission of content to their offices abroad. ate opportunities for their audience to on donor funding and provides very lit- Some regimes have often extended the become active contributors to the con- tle opportunity to generate income that use of coercive force against audiences tent, to comment and participate, and could lessen this reliance, which some- consuming the content of “banned” in this way nurture a culture of partic- times framed as “donor dependency”. media. In the digital age, regimes have ipation which counters efforts by the Even though in a digital age it is pos- also become more tech-savvy and had ruling regime to curtail space for an sible to set up a leaner and less costly more surveillance, blocking and filter- active and informed citizenry. These media operation, the reliance on donor ing tools at their disposal. This demands characteristics of independent media funding is still predominant and has no a high level of knowledge of and acces- IMS Briefing Paper / 29

sibility to the most up-to-date circum- When, indeed, is the right time for exile of declared openness and a commitment venting techniques, as well as digital media to return to their country of ori- to transformation sees actors from the safety on the part of exile media. gin? It is a question without a straight- former regime remain present, some- forward answer. Notwithstanding the times in power-sharing roles or in con- When the temporary modus operandi possibility that some within the exile trol of significant economic resources (exile) becomes longer than the media media community can become stuck in (often directed to the media); the win- could foresee, and their temporary state a perpetuated model of donor depend- dow can close rapidly and transfor- starts to look more permanent, donors, ency, the conditions of exile are never mation can proceed messily and une- even the most committed ones, may easy and the majority are keen to return. venly. Donors can swiftly shift their start to withdraw. As a result, highly At a minimum, there should be guar- focus towards in-country engagement, donor-dependent exile media may close antees in place that the exile media can sometimes prematurely deciding to pri- down (e.g. SW Radio Africa, VOP). In return without retribution (as in Burma/ oritise other fields rather than assist the results-driven evaluations, closure may Myanmar, but not Zimbabwe) and that media, with long-term consequences for be considered a failure. However, not there are at least minimum guarantees an independent media sector that either all donors or the community of practice of freedom of expression. These con- isn’t mature enough yet or is forced to would reach that conclusion. They would siderations are so context-specific that operate between state and state-proxy underline the impact of those media and generalisation is impossible. media and on an uneven playing field. the role they played over time as lead- However, the exile modus operandi can- ers and standard-setters in a field that The post-authoritarian or post-war period not be considered a permanent state — educated a generation of journalists and can be very complex, with a high level of a reality that independent media in exile preserved human, professional capital.33 overall insecurity. Sometimes a period should plan for well ahead of time.

Notes

1 Bill Ristow, “Independent Media in Exile: A Report to the Media Assistance, 25 April 2017, available at https://www. 21 “The New Deal”. Center for International Media Assistance”, Center for Inter- cima.ned.org/publication/slowly-shifting-field/ (accessed 22 James Putzel and Joost van der Zwan, “Why Templates for national Media Assistance, June 2011 (hereafter, Ristow, 10 October 2019); Daniel O’Maley, “Tracking Media Develop- Media Development Do Not Work in Crisis States: Defining “Independent Media in Exile”). ment Support: An Update on 2016 Funding Levels”, Center and Understanding Media Development Strategies in Post- 2 Ristow, “Independent Media in Exile”, p. 13: “Eric John- for International Media Assistance, 30 March 2018, available War and Crisis States”, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, son, who works in Shanghai as a consultant and director of at https://www.cima.ned.org/blog/tracking-media-develop- 2005, available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-devel- Internews International, has worked with exile media in a ment-donor-support-update-2016-funding-levels/ (accessed opment/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-background-papers/ number of countries, and, for the organizers of the Stock- 10 October 2019). Why-Templates-for-Media-Development-do-not-work-in-Cri- holm conference, he catalogued the countries that have jour- 13 Myers and Juma, “Defending Independent Media”. sis-States.pdf (accessed 10 October 2019) (hereafter, Putzel nalists operating from outside their borders. He estimates 14 Myers and Juma, “Defending Independent Media”. It and van der Zwan, “Why Templates for Media Development there are ‘maybe 50 serious exile media [outlets], with an revealed that new emerging bilateral donors, such as China Do Not Work in Crisis States”). average of 10 journalists each, some paid, some not.’” and the UAE, have significant involvement in media develop- 23 Putzel and van der Zwan, “Why Templates for Media Devel- 3 See, below, the case of Myanmar. ment, which may have implications for the field, going on the opment Do Not Work in Crisis States”. 4 Interview with Jane McElhone, former OSF Senior Program presumption that their involvement does not come with com- 24 Putzel and van der Zwan, “Why Templates for Media Devel- Manager, 29 January 2019; interview with Marie Struthers, mitments to democracy nor does it place aid intervention in opment Do Not Work in Crisis States”. former OSF Senior Program Manager, 29 January 2019. that context. Unlike OECD donor countries, which often sit- 25 James Deane, “Fragile states: the role of media and com- 5 Interview with Marie Struthers, former OSF Media Program, uate support to independent media within a strategy of pro- munication”, Policy Briefing #10, BBC Media Action, Octo- 29 January 2019. moting democracy and governance, China is primarily led by ber 2013, available at https://downloads.bbc.co.uk/ 6 “Independent Media in Exile: A Baseline Consultation”, Inter- soft power and economic self-interest. mediaaction/policybriefing/fragile_states_policy_briefing. media, FOJO, June 2013. 15 Myers and Juma, “Defending Independent Media”. pdf (accessed 10 October 2019) (hereafter, Deane, “Fragile 7 https://fojo.se/nyheter/281-media-in-exile-problems-and- 16 Mary Myers, Nicola Harford and Katie Bartholomew, “Media states”). solutions Assistance: Review of the Recent Literature and Other 26 Deane, “Fragile states”. 8 Interview, Johan Romare, former international director, Donors’ Approaches”, A Capitalisation Exercise (CapEx) for 27 Deane, “Fragile states”. FOJO, 18 January 2019. the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), 28 UNESCO Belgrade Declaration, “Support to Media in Vio- 9 Radio Zamaneh is an Iranian exile media platform based in September 2017, available at https://www.shareweb.ch/site/ lent Conflict and in Countries in Transition”, Belgrade, 2004, the Netherlands. DDLGN/Documents/Media_Assistance_Donor_and_Lit_ available at http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/events/ 10 Thomas Carothers and Diane de Gramont, “Aiding Govern- Review%202017.pdf (accessed 10 October 2019). prizes-and-celebrations/celebrations/international-days/ ance in Developing Countries: Progress Amid Uncertain- 17 Even in the case of the former (governance agenda in devel- world-press-freedom-day/previous-celebrations/worldpress- ties”, The Carnegie Papers, November 2011, available at oping countries), media development remains prevailingly an freedomday2009000000/belgrade-declaration/ (accessed https://carnegieendowment.org/files/aiding_governance. instrument to further governance goals, rather than a goal in 10 October 2019) (hereafter, UNESCO Belgrade Declaration). pdf (accessed 10 October 2019) (hereafter, Carothers and de itself. 29 UNESCO Belgrade Declaration. Gramont, “Aiding Governance in Developing Countries”). 18 Eduardo González Cauhapé-Cazaux and Shanthi Kalathil, 30 Interview with Joel Campagna, OSF Regional Manager, 18 11 Carothers and de Gramont, “Aiding Governance in Develop- “Official Development Assistance for Media: Figures and January 2019. ing Countries”: “In this view, the key constituent principles Findings — A Report by CIMA and the OECD”, Center for Inter- 31 For example, Radio Racja closed after several years in oper- that governance aid seeks to advance — especially accounta- national Media Assistance, March 2015, available at http:// ation when donors pulled out, and one donor (OSF) could not bility, participation, and transparency — are also fundamental www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/CIMA. sustain it on its own. democratic principles.” pdf (accessed 10 October 2019). 32 For example, DVB’s donors met regularly and co-ordinated 12 Mary Myers and Linet Angaya Juma, “Defending Independ- 19 “Fragile States 2014: Domestic Revenue Mobilization in their contributions; the annual Zimbabwe Partnership meet- ent Media: A Comprehensive Analysis of Aid Flows”, Center Fragile States”, OECD, 2014, available at http://www.oecd. ings were aimed at co-ordinating all stakeholders. for International Media Assistance, 9 June 2018, available at org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/FSR-2014.pdf 33 Interview with Jane McElhone, former OSF Senior Program https://www.cima.ned.org/publication/comprehensive-anal- (accessed 10 October 2019). Manager, 29 January 2019; interview with Marie Struthers, ysis-media-aid-flows (accessed 10 October 2019) (hereaf- 20 “The New Deal”, International Dialogue of Peacebuilding and former OSF Senior Program Manager, 29 January 2019. ter, Myers and Juma, “Defending Independent Media”); Shan- Statebuilding, available at https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/ thi Kalathil, “A Slowly Shifting Field: Understanding Donor en/new-deal/about-new-deal/ (accessed 10 October 2019) Priorities in Media Development”, Center for International (hereafter, “The New Deal”). 30 / Syrian Independent Exile Media Part II

Syrian exile media organisations and institutions

The Syrian media The role and dynamics of the media should produce in relation to relevant phenomena that took place after 2011 political topics. environment before cannot be fully comprehended with- the 2011 uprising out considering both the specific con- This system was a direct expression of text and time-frame. A brief overview the authoritarian regime imposed by the of the media environment in Syria as it Ba’ath party in 1963 and by President developed under the Ba’athist regime Hafez al-Assad in 1970. Media outlets that seized power in 1963 is therefore were supposed to reinforce the legiti- essential to understanding the magni- macy of the “revolution of the above” tude of the independent media’s devel- of the Ba’athist regime. William Rugh, opment after the 2011 uprising. for example, defines the role of media in countries such as Syria as “mobili- Indeed, the media landscape in Syria zation press”, used to curb dissent but was extremely closed off, even in com- also to support a specific political dis- parison to other Arab countries. Until course.1 In Lisa Wedeen’s view, the the beginning of 2000, only state-con- media in Syria were only an additional trolled media were allowed to operate: tool in the construction of the cult of the newspapers Tishreen, Al-Thawra Hafez and his son, Bashar al-Assad. In and Al-Ba’ath, in addition to the offi- this context, media propaganda was not cial television and radio channels. The intended to be believed, but rather to state news agency, SANA, was the main help establish rules on what could and source of news, and provided guidelines could not be said in Syria.2 on the content that individual outlets IMS Briefing Paper / 31

The emergency law active since 1963 tion of the law also coincided with the cial news websites emerged. Less con- prohibits the creation of any space for end of the so-called Damascus Spring trolled than other media, platforms like freedom of expression. The red lines of (2000—2001), when a window briefly Syria-News, Shukumaku, and DPress public discourse are clear to anyone in opened for public debate and criticism gave a younger generation of Syrian Syria, even if they have not been offi- of the political system. journalists space to start working out- cially published. The president and the side the official media. In fact, some main figures surrounding him, the gen- Despite these restrictions, private media young journalists who today work for eral political system, sectarian divisions, constituted a space in which a journal- Syrian exile media began their career sex and religion are all issues that can- ist’s professional identity could gradu- working for these platforms. However, not be discussed in public. The Ministry ally emerge. While employees of state even though these websites enjoyed of Information closely monitors media media were perceived (and often per- more freedom than the official or pri- coverage and directly contacts media ceived themselves) as civil servants, vate press, the authorities could still outlets in the case of “misbehaviour”. their counterparts in the private sector control them quite easily, channelling The Syrian Journalists Syndicate, the started to experiment with work prac- the anarchic nature of the internet into only institution of this type, is directly tices that were more similar to tradi- a limited number of outlets they could controlled by the state and serves its tional media.6 follow closely.8 interests rather than a professional one. At the same, the 2000s saw other changes Following Bashar al-Assad’s ascent to at a regional and global level that influ- In March 2011, Syria was still a “coun- power in 2000, his acceleration of eco- enced the local media landscape. The try of silence” — the expression often nomic liberalisation policies gradually advent of regional satellite television used by Syrian dissident intellectuals. affected the media field, too. Decree stations such as Al Jazeera introduced The global and technological changes 50, branded as a “modernising” reform new ways of producing and present- were contained, and absorbed by cos- of the media sector,3 was presented on ing information, sometimes forcing metic, gradual reforms. The Arab upris- 22 September 2001. It allowed private national media to modify their behav- ings erased the slow pace of change, media to operate officially for the first iour in order to compete. As in other leading to the complete transformation time. Some private newspapers, like Arab countries, Syrians increasingly of the Syrian media sector in just a mat- Al-Watan, Baladna and Syria Today, turned to these channels for informa- ter of months. television channels like Addounia, and tion. Access to the internet also began radios such as Sham FM were estab- to spread throughout Syria, albeit less lished. All of these outlets were owned rapidly than in neighbouring countries. by businessmen close to the regime, These technological changes created such as Rami Makhlouf, a cousin of conditions for Syrian journalists to try Bashar al-Assad, the owner of Syriatel to negotiate a greater degree of free- and one of the richest men in the coun- dom with the regime, albeit with lim- try. Private media did not enjoy more ited success. The Syrian government, on freedom than government media did. the other hand, took all possible meas- Quite the contrary: criticism emerged ures to contain the ongoing changes. more often in state-owned media, often For example, correspondents working as an expression of the power relations for international media had to hold Syr- between the Ba’ath party, the govern- ian nationality, in order to make it easier ment and the presidency.4 FM radio sta- for the regime to control them. tions were not even authorised to broadcast news content. The Press Law was amended in 2010 to include electronic publications. To pre- Moreover, the new law, while opening vent the emergence of a “blogosphere”, the field to private ownership, at the as had happened in Egypt and other same time imposed new restrictions on neighbouring countries, bloggers were the media. Private outlets were required fiercely persecuted.7 Access to Facebook to obtain a licence from the prime min- and other social networks was blocked. ister; they were forbidden to accept for- Syrians could still access them through eign funding; and they could be pros- proxy servers, of course, but they did ecuted on the basis of a “falsehood” or not use them for political purposes until “fabricated reports”, or for endangering after the 2011 uprising. For these reasons, the “national interest”. Furthermore, the the Syrian approach to the internet took authorities could ask them to reveal the on a very different shape to elsewhere. identity of their sources.5 The approba- In the mid-2000s, dozens of semi-offi- 32 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

The 2011 uprising: the phase of media activism

When the uprising started in March media activists started to see the Syr- Media outlets started to mushroom in 2011, it completely and suddenly changed ian social fabric being torn apart by the different regions. A few of them, such as the media dynamics. All the gradual same violent content they were produc- Enab Baladi and Souriatna, had already changes that had been underway since ing in order to denounce the crimes of started by 2011, but by mid-2012 hun- the start of the previous decade were the regime. Syrian anti-government dreds of media organisations had been abruptly wiped out, paving the way for media activists, photographers and established. a completely new media environment. videographers started to debate inter- One month earlier, on 7 February 2011, nally about the negative effects of their Initially, Syrian journalists worked on the Syrian government surprised many own content.10 a voluntary basis, seeing their editorial observers (as well as the Syrian people) work as part of the wider civil move- by lifting the ban on social media plat- From the very beginning, the Syrian gov- ment’s activities. Most of them had forms such as Facebook and YouTube. ernment banned foreign journalists from almost no experience in the field. Grad- entering the country to cover the pro- ually, the phenomenon attracted the Social media platforms immediately tests. When rebels started to seize terri- attention of a number of European and became privileged spaces for Syrian tory from the government, foreign jour- US donors, media support organisa- opposition activists to distribute and nalists began to return. However, they tions and NGOs. exchange information. All of the pre-ex- had to decide which side to be embedded isting media outlets — private, public or with, possibly exacerbating the polar- online — generally sided with the gov- isation between opposing narratives. ernment, albeit to different degrees. For Moreover, it soon became clear to Syr- Syrian opposition activists, social media ian journalists that international media became the only option to express dis- as well as regional media (such as from sent. Digital activism was primarily man- the Gulf) were exclusively interested aged by networked individuals. Some in the conflict, and later in the “battle groups, like Shaam News Network, and against terrorism” and ISIS. Other real- pages created by local media centres, ities on the ground, starting with civil were also soon established. activities born amid the uprising, were almost completely ignored. It is in this This fragmented, individualised form of context that a large number of Syrian activism played a relevant role in giving media activists realised they needed to visibility to the protests, in documenting develop their networked media activ- the armed escalation, and in connect- ism into more organised editorial work. ing people from different regions and backgrounds. Less often, social media The idea to launch media organisations were used to organise protests and other was seen by many citizen journalists civil initiatives. as the only solution to the problems described above. The grassroots media However, these forms of communica- content needed to be filtered, contex- tion soon showed their limitations. The tualised and packaged in a journalistic amount of content produced was over- way, and that could only have been done whelming and difficult to filter. It often with proper editorial processes. Moreo- lacked technical and professional qual- ver, the new media outlets, especially in ities, as well as contextualisation. Hav- the beginning, were born with the spe- ing been produced by individuals or by cific aim of shining a spotlight on civil obscure parties, their authenticity was activities at the local level, as well as easily questioned. Exaggerations and fab- on peaceful initiatives, to counter the rications occasionally took place, cast- media coverage that focused exclusively ing doubt on all of the content produced on the conflict. Other outlets began to by Syrian anti-government activists.9 focus more on cultural issues and constructive journalism, in order to fight The escalation of the conflict exacer- the dissolution of Syrian society and bated these problems. Many Syrian identity as they knew it.11 IMS Briefing Paper / 33

A short history of Syrian alternative media

The history of Syrian alternative media organisations have a considerable role Transition (MICT), International Media can be roughly divided into three main in providing initial technical and pro- Support (IMS), Internews, Free Press phases. It is difficult to draw precise fessional support, while direct funding Unlimited (FPU), European Endow- chronological lines between the phases. is quite limited.13 ment for Democracy (EED), Institute Nonetheless, we will distinguish between for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), different periods of development of the In this phase, the media act as opposi- Canal France International (CFI) and emerging field, in order to offer a clearer tional media, as a direct emanation of Coordinamento delle Organizzationi per picture of its history. the Syrian uprising and in particular of il Servizio Volontario (COSV). Funding the actors belonging to the peace move- is provided mainly by USAID (United ments. The belief that the regime will States Agency for International Devel- The beginning (2011—2012) rapidly fall and usher in a transition to opment) and the US Department of democracy is still widespread among State Bureau of Conflict and Stabiliza- In this phase, Syrian media start flour- activists and new journalists. All efforts tion Operations, the European Commis- ishing in a disordered but lively manner. focus mainly on content production; the sion, the Swedish International Devel- Most of the media outlets are created objective is primarily to counter gov- opment Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and operate inside Syria. The govern- ernment narratives and mobilise peo- and the Danish International Develop- ment does not lose full control of any ple in the name of the Syrian revolution. ment Agency (Danida). The French and region, and journalists have to operate British governments, according to some in secret. Most media outlets operate Attention in this phase is more on content journalists, also provide some funding. on a voluntary basis. production than on institution building, Other relevant donors include Open Soci- as the uprising is in its initial phase and ety Foundations (OSF) and UNESCO. This period is characterised by the first hope still exists for rapid regime change. The funding is used by media develop- efforts to shift from media activism to Within Syria, many Syrian journalists ment organisations and NGOs both to a more professionalised style of media must remain hidden. Most initiatives are directly assist media organisations and production. Some of the few media managed on a voluntary basis and by to provide training and coaching pro- support organisations that had activi- journalists aged 18 to 30. Only a slight grammes on editorial practices, techni- ties inside Syria before 2011, such as minority have prior journalistic expe- cal skills and institutionalisation. Deutsche Welle, BBC Media Action and rience or studied journalism at univer- the Institute for War and Peace Report- sity. The majority, however, started to As a result, Syrian independent media ing (IWPR), decide to freeze their oper- produce content only after March 2011. start to flourish. A study commissioned ations or to relocate them abroad after by IMS in May 2014 identified around the uprising erupts.12 94 media outlets.15 According to another The boom: donors, institution- study, 268 newspapers and magazines International media development organ- alisation and exile (2013—2015) had been launched since March 2011, isations and donors do not yet play a only to be reduced to 61 in early 2015.16 relevant role. Two organisations step After their initial hesitation, interna- A third study, published in 2016, identi- in first: Syrian Media Action Revolu- tional donors decide to support the fied 38 independent media, 71 pro-oppo- tionary Team (SMART)/Association emerging media sector more exten- sition media and 14 independent Kurd- de Soutiens aux Médias Libres (ASML) sively. While before the uprising for- ish media.17 A fourth, published in late and Basma Syria. SMART/ASML is a eign support mainly targeted journal- 2016, refers to 600 outlets created since French-based Syrian NGO, funded by ists working for official media and took 2011, among them 42 radio stations.18 the French government, among others. place with the mediation of the state,14 The organisation provides technical and, now it is channelled directly to dissent- Until 2016, while some outlets were clos- less often, financial support to a num- ing outlets born after 2011. ing, others were being created, leaving ber of grassroots media. Basma Syria the number of active outlets quite high. is a Syrian NGO launched in early 2012 A wide array of actors begin operating and funded by Access Research Knowl- in the field of media support, with dif- Between 2012 and 2013, Syrian media edge (see below). The organisation spe- ferent approaches and scales of interven- organisations that are based in Syria cialises in awareness campaigns and, in tion: Creative Associates International, start to move their main offices and exchange for coverage on certain issues, International Research and Exchanges core operations abroad. Those that do it provides a small amount of funding Board (IREX), Access Research Knowl- so in this period are generally funded to a series of media organisations. Both edge (ARK), Media in Cooperation and directly abroad, too. This trend is pri- 34 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

marily a consequence of the escalating less success in developing institution- The troublesome years of SEM conflict. Syria is rapidly becoming one ally strong organisations. (2016—2018): changing war of the world’s most dangerous places to dynamics, changing donor be a journalist. In 2012 alone, 87 jour- In the beginning, Syrian emerging media approaches and SEM’s struggle nalists, 48 citizen journalists and eight are mainly online newspapers and mag- for survival media assistants are killed.19 In the azines. A few print copies and distribute following years it does not improve. them locally. Funding from the United In this period, a series of factors appear Enab Baladi has three editors killed in States begins in late 2012; it represents to endanger the Syrian independent Daraya: Ahmed Shehadi, Mohammed a turning point, as it enables the crea- media sector that emerged after 2011. Qoreitam, and Mohammed Shehadi.20 tion of a large number of radio stations. Most of the journalists interviewed for More than 20 stations will be created: The intensification of the conflict and the this study identify the escalation of vio- Alkul, Alwan, ANA Press, ARTA, emergence of extremist groups present lence as their main reason for moving Fresh, Nasaem Syria, Sout Raya and a particular challenge to the efforts of abroad, to a safer environment in which Al-Watan are among the most impor- outlets to reach people inside Syria, let they could build more sustainable and tant. Radio Rozana, funded by IMS, alone to grow their audience. The distri- organised structures. and Hawa Smart, funded by SMART/ bution of printed newspapers in opposi- ASML, also begin in this phase. tion-held areas is particularly hindered Moving abroad does not particularly by Islamist armed groups. Installing a affect journalistic activity in this phase, Many Syrian activists and media-sup- transmitter and maintaining an FM sig- however. The establishment of areas port organisations see radio as a particu- nal also becomes increasingly danger- under the control of opposition forces, larly suitable medium for more easily ous and costly. The internet is not always especially in the north, enables Syrian reaching a wider audience at a reason- available, given the lack of electricity media to maintain a presence within able cost. Most of the radio stations in several areas. Syrian borders. Networks of report- immediately establish their main office ers and citizen journalists are rapidly in Turkey, but have smaller offices and Moreover, since 2016, the Syrian gov- established, as are small offices. None- staff inside Syria to operate the transmit- ernment has gradually taken back the theless, reporters inside Syria continue ters. The FM signal is at times operated majority of the areas lost to rebel forces. to face difficulties and pressure from by a single radio station, though more At the end of 2016, the city of Aleppo the Syrian government and extremist often through organisations that pro- returns completely to government hands. groups alike.21 vide these resources to more than one Media outlets operating in these areas, station. Between September 2013 and like the Aleppo Media Center, are forced Most of the outlets move to Turkey — December 2017, MICT—Syrnet offers to leave and often stop completely. The to Gaziantep and Istanbul, in particu- a shared FM signal to several stations. situation in rebel-held areas is little bet- lar. Gaziantep, given its proximity to the In March 2013, SMART makes another ter. Raed Fares, the founder of Radio Syrian border, becomes a sort of media FM frequency available to different out- Fresh, is killed on 23 November 2018 city for independent outlets. Journalists lets, but in early 2014 decides to dedi- (along with his colleague Hamoud Jnaid) reporting from inside Syria receive reg- cate it entirely to Hawa Smart. after multiple threats to his life and ular training in Turkey, Lebanon and, other pressure. less often, Europe. This phase also sees efforts to establish media institutions and stable col- Maintaining stable and widespread net- Moving to safer locations abroad means laborations: the Ethical Charter for Syr- works of reporters inside Syria becomes procedures and exchanges between ian Media (ECSM), the Association much harder, too. Most of the more media development organisations and of Independent Syrian Radio Stations experienced journalists decide, or are outlets are easier. Training, bank trans- (ABRAJ),22 the Syrian Network for forced, to leave the country. Others fers and meetings are all much easier Print Media (SNP),23 the Syrian Jour- are displaced internally, leaving some to arrange, too. The move also ena- nalists Association (SJA) and the Syr- areas with little or no coverage. Local bles outlets and donors to work on the ian Female Journalist Network (SFJN).24 media centres in places such as Daraa shared aim of creating stronger organ- and Eastern Ghouta close and often have isations. Syrian media are “pushed” to leave their content archives behind. towards better institutionalisation processes, in terms of legal registration, The change of context in the wider war division of work, internal workflows, also appears to have a direct impact on financial plans and sustainability. How- the donors’ willingness to keep fund- ever, organisation-building emerges ing the sector as they did before. For as one of the most challenging aspects example, the US funding, which was that Syrian journalists have to man- aimed mainly at strengthening moder- age. With few exceptions, they have ate voices against extremism, starts to IMS Briefing Paper / 35

decline as soon as the battle against ISIS Syrian exile media: appears to end. At the end of 2018, fund- general considerations ing for Syrian radio stations operating in western Syria is almost completely cut.25 Many stations are forced to close, as well as newspapers and other media Why “Syrian exile media”? “Alternative media” is probably the most projects. The number of operating out- common and widespread definition. lets shrinks by the day.26 The excep- In this study we refer to the considered However, it is too broad and vague to be tions are in areas ruled by the Dem- media outlets as “Syrian exile media” useful. As John D. H. Downing writes: ocratic Federation of Northern Syria, (SEM). We decided to use this phrase “To speak simply of alternative media the so-called Rojava, and the region of because, more than any other, it illumi- is almost oxymoronic… Everything, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor after the expul- nates the radical changes the sector has at some point, is alternative to some- sion of ISIS. In these regions, US fund- gone through in the last two years. Most thing else”.27 The same logic applies ing and, to a lesser extent, funding from Syrian alternative media were not only to the attribution of “independent”: some European countries is maintained forced to shift their operations abroad, from which forces (economic, politi- because of their strategic relevance. they also had to accept the probability cal, social and cultural) should always that this was not temporary, given the be precisely described or the term risks political context. Understanding this being deprived of precise meaning. In reality implies a transitional approach fact, many Syrians refuse to be labeled and requires the independent media that way, as they recognise the limits of sector to rethink its role in the future of the concept. At the same time, the term Syria. At the same time, using the term “independent’’ can serve to distinguish “exile media” means also distinguish- a group of media from other groups that ing them from “diaspora media”. Even if are directly funded and controlled by the considered outlets increasingly pay clear political or economic interests. On attention to Syrian communities abroad, this basis, for example, we exclude from Syrian journalists are all very clear on this study outlets such as Orient News, one point: their main focus is still Syria which is owned by Ghassan Aboud, a and their target audience is the popula- Syrian businessman, or Syria Televi- tion that still lives inside the country. sion, which is funded by Qatar. For the same reason, we exclude media platforms that are directly affiliated with armed Contextualising Syrian exile groups such as ISIS or Jabhat al-Nusra. media as tactical and critical media A term such as “emerging”, while often used by Syrian journalists, does not seem Many other labels are used in academic appropriate for a generation of outlets or journalistic articles to refer to the type that are in some cases eight-years-old of media outlets we consider here: “alter- and have reached certain levels of jour- native”, “grassroots”, “tactical”, “criti- nalistic production. cal”, “oppositional”, “emerging”, “radical”, “independent” and “community”. One term that helps us understand the Some of these definitions refer primar- nature of SEM is “tactical media”. Fol- ily to the media positioning vis-à-vis the lowing Michel de Certeau’s interpre- related political system or society (“crit- tation of “tactical”,28 we can highlight ical media”, “oppositional media”); oth- the fact that Syrian media are forced ers to their form of organisation and rela- to adapt to strategic decisions taken by tion to the broader media environment other, heteronymous spheres: political (“grassroots media”, “tactical media”, and armed actors in Syria, of course, “emerging media”, “community”); oth- but also political actors in host coun- ers to the geographic conditions (“exile tries (i.e. Turkey, Germany, France, Leb- media”, “diaspora media”). It is useful anon, Egypt), and, to a different degree, to discuss briefly some of these defi- donors and international media devel- nitions and how they apply (or not) to opment organisations on which they the sector at the heart of this study, in depend for their survival. Syrian media order to have a better understanding of organisations cannot act on a strategic the phenomenon. level, but rather have to elaborate their 36 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

tactics in order to adapt to a strategic tions included in this study, as a model ber of MICT points out, these radio sta- universe they cannot influence.29 they aim for. We think this label is more tions often did not offer comprehensive appropriate than, for example, “oppo- coverage, and it made sense to com- In another interpretation, “tactical sitional media”, which includes media bine their programmes.36 Radio sta- media” is used by Geert Lovink to iden- outlets that base their main raison d’être tions sometimes tried to manage their tify media productions that are non-ide- on their opposition to the Syrian regime. transmitters inside Syria autonomously, ological and yet have a clear political but in the long run it was prohibitive. orientation and use tactics such as aes- Transmitters were often the target of air thetics, humour and the medium itself Media formats and typologies strikes. Rebel armed groups also began as a message.30 This can be useful to to exert considerable pressure, stealing identify outlets such as the Creative SEM covers a wide array of media and technical material and forcing organisa- Memory of the Syrian Revolution, Syr- forms of communication: printed and tions to pay for their presence. Moreo- iaUntold and other platforms that use online newspapers, printed and online ver, the FM signal was often too weak, non-traditional ways of communicat- magazines, online news agencies, FM because of the transmitters’ quality or ing and storytelling. radio stations, online and satellite radio location. When the regime began tak- stations, and a few television channels. ing over most of the opposition-held Less useful are definitions such as “grass- Most of these outlets rely only on online territory, the FM signal was generally roots” or “community media”, which platforms and base their outreach mainly abandoned. The only radio station still could have applied to the first phase of on social media (i.e. Facebook, You- transmitting in opposition-held terri- SEM development but do not today when Tube, Twitter). tory today is Radio Fresh. these outlets tend to lose their hyper-local and civil, grassroots character in Several organisations have managed favour of more traditional journalis- almost since the beginning of the conflict The geography of SEM tic practices. However, outlets such as to print autonomously a limited num- Radio Fresh and ARTA FM can still be ber of copies to be distributed in local As mentioned above, many Syrian out- considered (and indeed consider them- areas. This happened for a limited period, lets began as community media, with selves) “community media”. however, given the operational costs and a specific local focus: Enab Baladi in dependency on specific funding. More- Daraya, Ayn Al-Madina in Deir ez-Zor, Approaches based on the political posi- over, when the outlets moved outside Radio Fresh in Kafr Nabel, Oxygen tioning of the media can be useful, too. Syria, dealing with printing and distri- in Zabadani, Souriatna in Damascus. Downing defines “radical media” as bution became too difficult. More effec- All of these outlets produced content “typically small-scale, generally under- tive were initiatives to put together dif- about their respective communities and funded, sometimes largely unnoticed at ferent outlets. SMART/ASML provided focused on them. This is inherent to least initially” and serving two over- a printing service for different organi- the media organisations that emerged riding purposes: “to express opposi- sations until January 2015. In 2014, the in different Syrian regions, but espe- tion vertically from subordinate quar- Syrian Network for Print Media (SNP) cially in the regions around Damascus ters directly at the power structure and began to print thousands of copies to be and in the north.37 Coastal and south- against its behavior” and “to build sup- distributed in northern areas under rebel ern areas, which witnessed less mobi- port, solidarity, and networking later- control.33 However, because of the dif- lisation, were less concerned by the ally against policies or even against the ficult conditions on the ground and the phenomenon. very survival of the power structure”.31 lack of funding, the SNP stopped printing in July 2018. Enab Baladi stopped Later, their exile conditions, profession- Even more interesting is the definition of distributing its copies in Syria in August alisation and technological changes all “critical media” as described by Christian 2018, and today it only distributes 500 pushed most of the outlets to produce Fuchs. He dismisses a structure-based copies a week in Istanbul.34 more national coverage. At the same approach in favour of a product-based time, SEM clearly tended to focus their one. He maintains that the former would FM radio transmission followed more coverage on opposition-held areas, exclude those media outlets that aim to or less the same fate. As mentioned identifying their audience as mainly produce “radical” content while replicat- above, independent radio stations relied living there. In addition, their reporting the professional values and practices mainly on other organisations (MICT/ ers were for the most part also based of more established media. Adopting the Syrnet and SMART/ASML) in order to in those regions.38 organisational structures and practices transmit. However, Syrian journalists of mainstream media can in fact help always saw this option as temporary. The media landscape in areas con- radical media reach a larger audience, Sharing the frequency with others was trolled by the Democratic Federation and thus have more impact.32 This defi- seen as a limitation on their ability to of Northern Syria and by the Syrian nition can indeed serve as a reference to build a separate and specific editorial Democratic Forces is different. As in describe many of the media organisa- identity. 35 At the same time, as a mem- the rest of Syria, after 2011, Rojava saw IMS Briefing Paper / 37

the emergence of a new generation of Audience outreach is primarily a techni- of time, SyriaUntold collaborated with media outlets: ARTA FM, Welat, Shar cal issue and, to a degree, reflects strong the international platform Global Voices and Buyer are among the most impor- audience habits formed before 2011. In a and today provides coverage of Syria to tant. As Kurdish forces led by the Dem- study commissioned by MICT in 2014, the international platform Open Democ- ocratic Union Party (PYD) managed to it emerged that among Syrians, national racy, which is based in London. And keep the region relatively untouched by and international TV channels were by the list goes on. the conflict, media outlets could thrive far the most relevant source of news.41 with less difficulties there than in other Another study funded by several media Moreover, according to new audience regions. Even if the political situation support organisations in 2016 arrived at research commissioned by FPU and is far from being fully democratic, the more or less the same conclusion.42 This based on in-depth interviews inside authorities give independent media is hardly surprising. Some international Syria, some interesting elements are some space for criticism and freedom TV channels are very popular all over emerging. First, social media often repre- of expression.39 the MENA region. Syrian exile media sents, more so than television, an impor- are small organisations and cannot com- tant source of information. Second, as In Raqqa, a similar situation has emerged pete with mainstream media in terms a forthcoming study commissioned by since the expulsion of ISIS in the sum- of audience. Moreover, it takes time for FPU indicates, Syrians tend to have a mer of 2017. A new generation of media any media outlet to reinforce its brand critical stance towards the media in gen- outlets, mainly funded by the US State and expand its audience. eral, and demand more “independent” Department, has started to flourish: Bis- and well-sourced content.44 san FM, Shufi Mafi, Amal FM and Sawt However, some positive elements should Al-Raqqa (a project affiliated with ARTA be highlighted. First, some media out- In other words, it can be misleading to FM) are among the most relevant.40 lets, such as Enab Baladi and ARTA measure the relevance of SEM on the FM, managed to reach a considera- basis of the size of the audience they In both regions, these outlets have the ble audience despite their difficulties. reach directly, especially in light of the advantage that they can operate in a Enab Baladi boasts more than one mil- current state of the conflict. These outlets relatively safe environment, in terms lion Facebook followers. According to are able, albeit not constantly, to reach of both the absence of violence and the one study, ARTA FM is one of the most a much wider audience through collab- legal background. Moreover, they can popular radio stations in the cities of orations with Arab and international build a stronger relationship with their Amouda and al-Qamishli.43 mainstream media. Increasingly, their target audience. content is quoted and redistributed by Another factor is the relevance of these local, regional and international media outlets in relation to specific Syrian audi- using these outlets as a source. The list The audience ences both inside and outside the coun- is very long and seems to be growing. try: opposition activists and people who It would also be misleading to evaluate Measuring the audience for Arab media, generally do not trust regime media; art- their impact by comparing their audi- independent or not, is a particularly dif- ists and intellectuals; and civil society ence to that of international media that ficult task, and it became even more actors that operate outside the sphere of have existed for a long time. challenging because of the conflict. As government control. Despite their diffi- such, this is a field that is particularly culties, SEM appears capable of giving SEM should be considered “alternative” tricky to investigate, and the available a voice to these actors and of spreading in relation to their audience too. They data is quite scarce. We will try to iden- information in these social environments. often tend to target audiences (Syrian, tify the main issues and trends, relying Arab and international) that, while on data that has been produced in the Finally, the collaborations set up by sev- small, have specific relevance. Within last few years. eral independent media with transna- the Syrian public, they target primarily tional and international media cannot opposition groups, refugees and inter- The audience is one of the most chal- be underestimated. Sada al-Sham was nally displaced persons (IDPs), people lenging issues for SEM. Their scarce for a long period of time the primary who recognise themselves neither in resources, coupled with their exile con- source of content about Syria for the Islamic ideologies nor in the regime’s ditions and the difficulty of accessing pan-Arab newspaper al-Araby al-Ja- narratives, people with a certain level the public inside Syria, have limited did. Al-Jumhuriya recently began to of education, and journalists. Moreover, their capability to reach large num- share the production and distribution all media outlets tend to consider young ber of readers, listeners and viewers. of articles with a network of independ- people to be their main target audience, Indeed, their supposed “limited impact”, ent media in other Arab countries, like especially since they rely almost exclu- if only measured by available audience Mada Masr in Egypt and 7iber in Jor- sively on online platforms. data could be, according to some, one dan. Another international collabora- of the reasons behind recent cuts to tion was set with the French online pub- In general, SEM appear to target more their funding. lication Orient XXI. For a long period Syrians in areas that are or were under 38 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

the control of rebel forces, while less ered a community/local radio station, sisters) can provide. Malek Haddad of attention is given to the coast and other focusing its activities in the Idlib gover- SMART says that from the very begin- regions firmly dominated by the gov- norate and, in particular, the surround- ning its ambition was to create a Syr- ernment. Some outlets, like Rozana ings of Kafr Nabel. Platforms such as ian news agency capable of providing or Enab Baladi, aim to produce con- Al-Jumhuriya, SyriaUntold and Souri- “reliable and credible” information.48 tent that addresses a larger audience, aLi tend to target a well-educated pub- one that is less educated and has a less lic, and one that is not only Syrian. One Syrian journalist said in an inter- defined political orientation. Others, like view: “There was a need for people Al-Jumhuriya or SyriaUntold, tend to Some outlets have tended to focus more outside to know what was going on in target a more niche audience, one that on civil society and culture, others on Syria. Before the revolution, journalis well educated and politically oriented. political opinion, and others still on ism was trapped in the regime, nothing news about the conflict. Politically, all would come out of Syria other than from At the international level, SEM tend of the media outlets assume an anti-gov- the government. After a while, people to focus on NGOs, journalists, deci- ernment stance, albeit with different came, like me, who don’t have journal- sion-makers and well-educated peo- nuances and positions. Moreover, their istic experience, and they started say- ple with an interest in foreign affairs. stance towards Islamist groups and iden- ing, ‘No, there needs to be more: a jour- Indeed, for some outlets, the interna- tities can be quite different, with some nalism that portrays the reality, not just tional or regional audience does not play outlets opposing them more than others. the government’s media.’”49 a secondary role. While the prospect of returning to Syria is seen as increasingly At the same time, all of the media out- Professionalisation is seen as the solu- unrealistic in the short term, many outlets consider themselves to be independ- tion to two different but interrelated lets consider it particularly relevant to ent from any specific political actors, problems. One is the recognition that act as mediators between events on the including the Syrian political opposition fragmented media activism had failed ground and the international community. bodies. In the monitoring content pro- to garner enough credibility among the duced by FPU, for example, it emerges Syrian population. Indeed, many cases Finally, the fact that these media out- quite clearly that SEM tend to perceive of disinformation and exaggeration had lets have been under constant threat themselves as watchdogs of the Syrian affected the credibility of opposition and attack by various forces involved people against any armed or political media activists.50 Another was the chal- in the war indirectly confirms their rel- actors involved in the conflict.45 lenge of creating a media system in line evance. Neither side in the war demon- with the idea of a democratic, post-Assad strates tolerance for media content that In this sense, SEM perceive themselves Syria. The launch of media institutions is not under their control, and therefore and tend to act as “critical media”, as such as the Syrian Journalists Associ- uses all means at their disposal to pre- Fuchs defines them, i.e. as outlets that ation (SJA) and the Ethical Charter for vent SEM’s content from reaching their produce “oppositional content that pro- Syrian Media (ECSM) has to be con- intended audience. vides alternatives to dominant repres- sidered in this context (see the section sive heteronymous perspectives that below on media institutions). reflect the rule of capital, patriarchy, The editorial identity racism, sexism, nationalism, etc. Such Other outlets present themselves as a content expresses opposition stand- voice of civil society movements and It is difficult to pin a specific identity points that question all forms of het- Syrian people unrepresented in other to the post-2011 wave of Syrian media. eronomy and domination. So there is media. Many journalists saw the crea- They communicate through different counter-information and counter-he- tion of media organisations as an anti- forms of media and target different audi- gemony that includes the voices of the dote to the polarisation and extremism ences: local and national, women, chil- excluded, the oppressed, the domi- of Syria’s fragmented and too-politicised dren, youth, and so on. Gradually, all of nated, the enslaved, the estranged, the media activism.51 With the escalation of the outlets have lost their initial local fea- exploited, and the dominated.”46 Also, the conflict, international media increas- tures and instead aspire to national cov- these outlets tend to refuse an explicit ingly focused on the conflict, and on erage. The fact of being online, but also sectarian discourse, even if with differ- actors such as ISIS, leaving many other their efforts to distribute printed copies ent nuances.47 issues uncovered. Many Syrian media in different areas, increasingly meant that were established with the idea of shed- outlets lost their initial hyper-local fea- When asked about their decision to set ding light on Syrian society and local tures. Later, this tendency was further up media organisations, Syrian jour- actors that lost their voice in the inter- reinforced by the condition of exile and nalists typically have different answers. national media. developments in the war, which made Syria needs professional and independ- it increasingly difficult to operate on a ent journalism, which neither the govern- local level. Few exceptions exist: Radio ment nor transnational, pan-Arab media Fresh, for example, can still be consid- (i.e. Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya and their IMS Briefing Paper / 39

Syrian exile media organisations: the main issues today

Of the dozens of SEM created in the last Funding context and strategies sations. Their core staff typically ranges few years, a significantly smaller num- from five to ten people. Moreover, many ber exist today. Several media outlets At the time of writing, some of the media outlets do not have offices and operate in exile: Aleppo Today, Rozana, media outlets mentioned above face can avoid fixed costs like rent and other SyriaUntold, Al-Jumhuriya, The Syr- an existential threat. Souriatna, Sou- overheads. Some tend to keep their core ian Observer, Syria Direct, Al-Ayyam, riaLi, Sada al-Sham and Radio Alwan staff quite small, in order to remain flex- ANA Press, Enab Baladi, Souriatna, currently lack a source of funding and ible and adaptable to circumstances. Sada al-Sham, the Creative Memory of are struggling to survive. Radio Fresh They use small grants to produce more the Syrian Revolution, Ayn Al-Madina, had its funding renewed after its edi- content, always avoiding burdening the SMART News Agency, Radio Watan, tor-in-chief, Raed Fares, was killed in core organisation with excessive costs. Radio Alwan, and Radio Alkul. The fol- an ambush by unknown armed men on lowing outlets operate in the Democratic 23 November 2018, along with his col- Diversification of funding sources: A Federation of Northern Syria: ARTA FM, league Hamoud Jnaid. particularly relevant factor concerning Welat (magazine and radio), ASO Net- survival is the capacity to secure fund- work, Shar, Buyer, One FM and Jad FM. The closure of dozens of media out- ing, especially core funding, from more The following outlets operate in Raqqa lets during the past few years was due than one donor. This gives the organi- and parts of Deir ez-Zor: Jorf News, Sawt mainly to a lack of funding. This was sation room to manoeuvre if one donor Al-Raqqa, Amal FM, Shufi Mafi and specifically the case of radio stations, decides to withdraw, and at the same Bissan FM. Finally, Radio Fresh is the which were previously funded mainly by allows it to build stronger structures at only outlet whose main offices are cur- Creative Associates and IREX through the administrative and financial levels. rently located in opposition-held areas, a programme financed by the US State in particular in Kafr Nabel. Department. In the case of the Aleppo Many media outlets have tried, with lim- Media Center, developments in the war ited success, to experiment with other While our study relies on literature and directly affected its survival odds, since sources of income, such as content mar- previous interviews with a wider array its activities were strictly linked to the keting and audience donations. Other, of media outlets, we focus in particular possibility of operating on the ground. more elaborate strategies are being on several outlets from the first group: planned, but have not yet been put in Rozana, SyriaUntold, Al-Jumhurirya, To survive, all SEM rely almost exclu- place. Even if these efforts generally ANA Press, Enab Baladi, Souriatna, sively on donor funding and grants. fail and are intended to cover a small Ayn Al-Madina, Aleppo Today, Sada In the context of the ongoing conflict, percentage of the budget, many Syr- al-Sham and SMART News Agency. advertisements or content marketing do ian journalists consider them a way to Our selection was based on their rel- not constitute available options. Some become less dependent on donors and to evance in terms of audience, quality efforts have been made to explore other strengthen their entrepreneurial efforts, of journalistic output, or focus on spe- forms of funding (e.g. content market- as opposed to being only passive recip- cific issues and regions. The selection ing, crowdfunding, donations), but more ients of external funding. includes the most relevant exile media in view of future perspectives than as a still in operation, but we also added some viable strategy of survival today. Donors’ Public relations capacities: SEM oper- which, even while not fully function- shifting priorities during the course of ate in a global environment in which ing, we considered relevant in terms of the conflict and subsequent decisions specific competencies are pivotal: com- their experience, the content they pro- by some of the biggest donors to prior- munication with donors and support duced, and the audience they reached. itise other areas have had a significant organisations, writing proposals, audit- Moreover, we decided to include ARTA impact on the survival of SEM. ing processes, promoting the platform’s FM not only because it plays a par- image, building collaborations, etc. ticularly relevant role in its region but At the same time, some outlets remain Media organisations that did not start also because its activities are to a large fully operational and others are trying with or could not provide the resources extent managed in exile. The media out- to survive. We have identified four main to manage these activities effectively lets operating in the so-called region of elements that have played a role in the had less chance of survival. If a pro- Rojava and in Raqqa are not considered, survival of media outlets. ject leader does not speak fluent Eng- because they cannot be deemed media lish, for example, and cannot hire com- in exile and their situation is incompa- Size of the organisation: some of the petent staff, it takes more effort to deal rable with the others. media outlets that have survived, with with NGOs, donors and stakeholders. very few exceptions, are small organi- 40 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

Some organisations were apparently able senting donors and other stakeholders when it comes to meetings and train- to tackle this issue through effective with a more stable image of the outlet. ing sessions with journalists living in administrative and financial structures, Finally, it is a way to adapt to condi- other countries. Moreover, movement but not all of them had the resources or tions in host countries, and to operate between Syria and Turkey has been sig- capability to do so successfully. in a more transparent and stable way. In nificantly restricted by securitisation of particular, registration is often the only the border since October 2015. In 2017, Editorial identity: How outlets design way to grant work permits to Syrian more pressure was put on international their editorial identity and develop their journalists, who as refugees are other- and Syrian NGOs. In this light, some brand also appears to play a relevant wise subject to expulsion or other per- media organisations, like Al-Jumhuriya, role. Since SEM cannot compete with sonal limitations. decided to leave the country. Others, mainstream media in terms of their audi- like Enab Baladi, registered in Europe ence and the amount of content they In Europe, they are usually legally reg- as a precaution and in order to ease their produce, their capacity to build a rec- istered as non-profit organisations and financial operations. ognisable brand and offer specific ser- associations. Media outlets operating in vices often helps them to attract funds Europe have little choice in this regard, Registering in Europe also enables an and establish a loyal, if limited, audi- as they need a legal background in order organisation to open a bank account. ence. Indeed, SEM appear to have suf- to carry out bank transfers and other In Turkey, many journalists still have fered from a homogenisation of con- forms of economic activity. The Turk- to use personal accounts, as opening tent production (which wasn’t helped by ish context is more complicated. SEM one for an organisation would require their large numbers at certain points).52 started to register legally from 2014, it to officially employ staff and thus pay Moreover, many of them sought to mir- in response to the feeling that Turk- taxes on their salaries. For these reasons, ror the mainstream media in terms of ish authorities were putting more pres- some media organisations have decided topic and type of coverage. Those that sure on them. Until then, the govern- to keep operating without legal status, managed to differentiate themselves and ment had turned a blind eye, not only and to avoid any official interaction with carve out a specific place in the emerg- letting SEM operate, apparently with- the Turkish authorities. ing media environment showed more out any restraint, but also keeping the resilience in the long term. borders with Syria open. This enabled However, some journalists point out media organisations based in Gaziantep that operating without a licence means or Istanbul to operate in Syria almost as that employees cannot get work permits. Exile and the legal context if they were based there. Today, almost Many Syrians living in Turkey possess all forms of SEM are legally registered, only temporary visas and need a per- All of the media outlets considered in this mostly as NGOs or, less often, as pro- mit each time they want to travel from study have their core activities in exile. duction companies. one city to another. In some cases (Enab Currently, they mostly reside in three Baladi, Aleppo TV), media organisations countries: Turkey (Enab Baladi, ANA However, registration still leaves them decided to register as a production com- Press, Ayn Al-Madina, Aleppo Today, in a kind of limbo. Their NGO status pany as well, in order to get work per- Sada al-Sham, Souriatna, Radio Watan, does not allow them to produce media mits for members who need them, even Radio Alkul), Germany (Al-Jumhuriya, content. According to Syrian journal- if this means paying taxes on salaries. SyriaUntold) and France (Rozana, Sou- ists, a media outlet can be registered in riaLi, SMART/ASML). Turkey only if it produces content in In Europe, it is little different. Syrian Turkish and if the editor-in-chief holds journalists there are formally employed The higher concentration of SEM in Tur- Turkish nationality. As such, Syrian by their organisations as freelancers, key is because of its proximity to Syria journalists describe their legal situation and as a consequence have to pay taxes. and the high number of Syrian refugees as extremely fragile, since the Turkish This makes SEM salaries even less com- there. France, and more recently Ger- government could decide to end their petitive in the media market, making it many, also host Syrian media mainly activities at any time. They say they more difficult to hold on to more expe- because of their relatively high num- are tolerated, with the Turkish authori- rienced journalists. ber of refugees. ties allowing them to operate as long as they do not present a problem. Most of the SEM considered in the study Editorial strategies now have some form of legal registration At the same time, Syrian journalists and professionalisation in their host country. Legal registration maintain that the atmosphere in Tur- responds to different needs. It is a way, key has recently changed and that they Thanks to training and coaching pro- often encouraged by support organisa- feel more insecure about their situa- grammes, as well as the constant pro- tions, to ease financial and administra- tion. Since January 2016, it has been duction of content throughout the last tive procedures. It is also seen as part much more difficult for Syrians to get eight years, the SEM’s level of journal- of the institutionalisation process, pre- a visa to Turkey, creating an obstacle istic production, albeit with discontinui- IMS Briefing Paper / 41

ties, has generally substantially improved situation. As Soazig Dollet points out: as many Syrian journalists emphasise, on several fronts: the use of sources, the “It is absolutely essential that editors- it is necessary in order to have a greater packaging of content, and language. In in-chief and their teams should exam- impact. As Fuchs points out, adopting this sense, the emerging Syrian media ine their current role, not only vis-à- the organisational structures and prac- sector has constituted a relevant labo- vis Syria, but also vis-à-vis the Syrians tices of mainstream media can in fact ratory that enabled the emergence of a themselves.”55 Today, broader editorial help radical media reach a larger num- new generation of journalists coming strategies still appear to be underdevel- ber of people and have more impact.60 from media activism and often lack- oped and often depend on the single edi- ing any experience in the field. New tor, the writers who are available, and SEM do not perceive themselves to be Syrian journalism cannot yet compete funding for specific themes.56 Investi- “alternative” outlets in the sense of elit- with international standards, but it can gative reporting still seems somewhat ist, niche outlets. Rather, their ambi- produce good content that is often used weak, even if some valuable pieces are tion is to create stable organisations by international media organisations increasingly being produced, and most of that can compete with traditional and and that appears more transparent and the content still comprises news reports corporate media in the future. As one impartial than most of the regional media and feature articles.57 Video produc- journalist puts it: “It is not that we do focusing on Syria.53 There is no doubt tion often appears to be perceived as a not want to reach a broader public. We that most of the journalists working for means of increasing viewership/audi- want to arrive there. It is only that it is these organisations perceive themselves ence, rather than as an integral part of not easy.”61 primarily as journalists, not as media the outlet’s editorial strategy. activists associated with a specific side However, the process of institutionalis- of the conflict. In this context, the strug- Moreover, SEM tend to focus today ing SEM was probably the most prob- gle against the government is seen as a mainly on the conflict, without pay- lematic one. While it may be easier to necessary step in order to exercise pro- ing enough attention to other issues.58 transfer knowledge in other aspects of fessional and independent journalism. The intensification of the war, in par- journalism, how to build an effective As one journalist noted: “Our struggle allel with diminishing civil activities media organisation at the administra- today is not against the regime alone; on the ground, has affected their role tive and organisational level appears it is against any actor, including oppo- as “grassroots” media and as the voice to be much more complicated. More- sition armed groups that endanger the of the emerging Syrian civil society. over, while the practices of producing creation of a pluralistic and democratic However, in the future, this can easily journalism can be more easily imitated society. This is our role.”54 change, along with the de-escalation of and experimented with, this approach the conflict. is more difficult at the level of internal Moreover, many problems of quality organisation, given the limitations of coverage seem to depend more on struc- human and material resources. tural limitations and the difficulty of Institutionalisation processes covering the Syrian conflict than from SEM have always had to improvise in a lack of professionalism. One of the most relevant battlegrounds terms of organisation. The difficult con- for SEM has been institutionalisation ditions of workflow and exile are cer- Particularly important is the fact that processes. Indeed, many Syrian jour- tainly key factors in their improvisation. many of these outlets gradually shifted nalists see this process as one of the Another has been the lack of funding to from having an oppositional identity most fragile.59 fill relevant positions. Executive direc- to possessing a critical media identity. tors, financial and marketing experts, Whereas before the aim was mainly to The decision of Syrian journalists to and funding managers generally cost counter the propaganda of the regime invest in structure-building depends more than journalists and have to be and offer media support to revolution- on different factors. The intention to covered by core funding. According to ary activities, today’s SEM are trying imitate and take inspiration from tra- journalists, it is also more difficult to to carve out a role that goes beyond the ditional media structures is first of all find experienced figures available for current conflict and to establish a media a consequence of donor policies that these positions among Syrians. sector that is capable of offering relia- geared SEM towards taking this path. ble and independent content. This in turn is about easing the pro- Another problem is that the media organ- cedures between the support organi- isations were usually built vertically At the same time, the rapid pace of sations and the organisations they are around one or two main founders. In change in the Syrian context, coupled supporting (i.e. in reporting, auditing, the beginning they were reticent to give with concerns about sustainability, dif- financial issues, etc.). More importantly, away responsibility, partly out of fear of ficult work conditions and their lack of this development is based on the real- losing control of the project. However, experience, prevents Syrian journalists isation that institutionalisation is the this led to an accumulation of knowl- from engaging in more radical self-re- only way to build viable and sustainable edge in the same people over a long flection about their role in the current media organisations for the future and, period of time, making it increasingly 42 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

difficult to transfer responsibilities, even Another problem is that, while SEM’s taneous convergence, but from early when there was a willingness to do so. objectives are to create long-term, sus- 2014 in particular, media development tainable organisations, the demands that organisations themselves pushed media The policies of some donors also played come with the funds are often tailored outlets in that direction. This stemmed a role in the current phase. Organisa- to short-term results. This contradic- from consideration that these organi- tions that received more funding often tion has always forced SEM to invest in sations were generally small and frag- became over-sized, and did not usually increasing production, and possibly out- mented, and that better co-ordination develop alternative and effective plans reach, sometimes at the expense of qual- would contribute to the more effective that involved downsizing their inter- ity, especially of institutionalisation.65 use of funding, especially to increased nal structure. impact on the ground. Moreover, many journalists lament the At the same time, there have been some excessive bulk of documentation and Media institutions like ECSM and the steps forward. All of the journalists we reporting that comes with NGO grants SJA can also be considered part of this interviewed realised that investing more and assistance.66 Some journalists point effort. However, given their specific role in aspects indirectly related to their jour- out that the number of administrative and relevance, we examine them in more nalistic work is a priority. In fact, all of staff in their organisation has gradually detail below. We focus mainly on two the media organisations that still oper- exceeded the number of editorial staff. short-lived experiences that were nev- ate today managed to build up, in differ- ertheless quite important “laboratories” ent and often creative ways, an internal Turnover represents another challenge to in which to experiment with collabora- work division that covers properly cru- institutionalisation processes. SEM can- tions between different SEM. cial administrative positions. not afford to offer salaries that compete with those of regional and international The Syrian Network for Print Media media. Many journalists have left Syrian (SNP), founded in July 2014, was the first In a constant state of emergency emerging media to take more remuner- initiative of this kind. It differs from pre- ative and secure jobs within more sta- vious collaborations that were anchored in Syrian journalists lament that they can- ble organisations. Other journalists have collaboration between two organisations not build up long-term editorial strat- moved from one SEM outlet to another, in temporary forms of interaction. The egies, as donors’ funds mostly cover because of better work conditions, per- SNP gathered multiple organisations and a one-year period, and contracts keep sonal reasons or other issues. When the was conceived as a separate entity. At the having to be renewed. As Badran points SNP was established, it included a stip- beginning, five newspapers were part of out, this makes them “tactical media” ulation to hire journalists from other it: Enab Baladi, Kulna Suriyoun, Tama- in the sense that they have to constantly SNP members only after reaching an ddon, Sada al-Sham, and Souriatna. Ayn adapt to a strategic universe that is set agreement with their previous outlet. Al-Madina and Zaytoun joined in 2016. by more powerful actors, and in par- The escalation of the conflict also had The project was supported and funded ticular by host countries, donors and an impact, as many of the most experi- by IMS from the beginning, and CFI implementers.62 enced reporters inside Syria gradually joined after several months. The main left or were arrested or killed. aim of the organisation was to combine The need to secure funding year after the activities of printing and distribut- year, or even for shorter periods, also In each of these cases, all of the investing newspapers in Syria and Turkey. puts a lot of pressure on outlets, forc- ment in terms of training and experi- This enabled the organisations to opti- ing them to act as “constant funding ence cannot always be effectively cap- mise their costs and increase distribu- seekers”. This sometimes forces them italised. This also affects long-term tional outreach. For a period of time, they to follow their funders’ priorities rather strategies and performance continuity, printed 7,000 copies per outlet. In June than their own editorial strategies. If and creates an atmosphere of being in 2017, funding started to decline, however. there is funding available for specific a constant state of emergency. Some 70 percent of copies were distrib- issues and topics, the outlets have to uted in Syria, the rest between Istanbul tailor their content strategies to pri- and Gaziantep. The distribution relied orities outside their editorial line, i.e. Collaborations on hundreds of locations, mainly shops adjust to donors’ thematic priorities. and markets, in northern Syria. For example, US media funding is In the last few years, SEM have tried often related to themes such as recon- to establish different types of collabo- The SNP also sought, albeit only par- struction, especially in regions like ration between themselves as well as tially successfully, to organise train- Raqqa or Rojava,63 and the war against with external partners. These collab- ing and to reinforce the collaboration extremism and terrorism,64 while other orations took different forms: shared between the organisations involved. donors focus on issues such as gender production, exchange of content, tech- However, the funding ended and print- or formats like investigative journal- nical support, etc. At times, the idea of ing stopped in June 2018. Moreover, ism and podcasts. collaboration came as a result of spon- most of the founder organisations have IMS Briefing Paper / 43

either closed or are considering doing so because of a lack of funding. Dis- tributing copies inside Syria is almost impossible today.

Another significant initiative was the Association of Independent Syrian Radio Stations (ABRAJ), founded in Novem- ber 2014 by six organisations: Alwan, ANA Press, ARTA FM, Hara, Nasaem Syria and Sout Raya. The aim of the network was to increase collaboration between radio stations and exchange technical information and editorial content.67 Moreover, the initiative came as a response to what these stations saw as strong competitors in the field, in particular Rozana and Hawa SMART.68 However, difficulties soon emerged, especially in relation to internal co-ordination and the identification of areas of collaboration and funding sources, and the project was short-lived.

Both the SNP and the ABRAJ showed the limitations of grassroots collaborations between independent media outlets. Apart from the lack of support, neither organisation quite managed to become an entity in its own right. Nasaem Syria abandoned the ABRAJ fairly early on and Radio SouriaLi, having been invited to join, decided not to, because it considered that it was not a profitable investment of its time.

Something similar happened to the SNP. “We understood only later that we needed at least an executive director, and to try to reinforce a separate identity for the organisation”, says one of the founders.69

In both cases, the organisation managed these initiatives individually, without delivering enough responsibility to smooth out internal flows. Often, personal problems and misunderstandings emerged. Moreover, the difficulty in administrating these initiatives reveals the internal administrative problems of the single outlets and often overbur- dened individuals who lack the time and resources to invest in collaborative efforts. Both the SNP and the ABRAJ gave the impression to many journalists that they were not a priority. 44 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

Syrian exile media: the institutions

Starting in 2012, Syrian journalists began elaborating a charter of common ethical sations, individual journalists and ordi- to establish media institutions, too: in principles for Syrian journalism. From nary citizens. In the end, a decision is pro- other words, organisations that are not 2014, FPU and Internews jointly sup- duced and published, and the ECSM can media outlets aiming to produce content, ported the initiative,70 increasing the use it to mediate between the two parties. but rather entities seeking to provide pro- number of outlets to 13 and inviting fessional and technical support to media the participants to discuss and agree on In October 2019, a new board was set producers. The establishment of media the values of the charter and their appli- to be elected and a secretary general institutions also came as a response to cation. The Ethical Charter for Syr- appointed. Future strategies will focus the absence of proper ethical and legal ian Media was launched in September on ameliorating internal workflows; frameworks for Syrian media, especially 2015 by 23 media outlets.71 They consti- increasing the visibility of the organi- emerging ones. Particularly within the tuted the first signatories of the ECSM. sation’s activities and role; establishing context of military escalation and the According to Akram al-Ahmad, the cur- new partnerships; and diversifying the resulting polarisation and extremism, rent head of the Board Committee, the pool of donors. Syrian journalists and support organ- three main aims of the charter are: first, isations saw the necessity of provid- to promote the values of the founding The Syrian Journalists Association ing platforms to design common rules document and invite new members to (SJA) as a point of reference, as well as pro- sign it; second, to push Syrian media The SJA (or Rabta, in Arabic) was fessional and technical assistance. The to abide by its principles; and third, to founded on 20 February 2012. A group activities of these institutions fall into mediate between Syrian journalists and of journalists started by discussing the three main camps: support for and pro- Syrian media organisations when dis- idea of communicating at first remotely tection of journalists; elaborating and putes arise.72 The charter is conceived and later at a meeting in Gaziantep. A monitoring common ethical guidelines as a collective tool to help journalists hundred journalists signed the founding for content production; promoting free- avoid stereotypes, warmongering and document and elected the first board. dom of expression and enhancing jour- propaganda. Moreover, it is aimed at The journalists worked mainly for nalistic professional standards. pushing SEM to abide by principles of regional, international and national accuracy, independence, fairness and media, and were based in different loca- We focus here on four institutions that responsibility. It includes eight main arti- tions, but they all saw the need for an play a particularly relevant role today: cles that cover media definitions, jour- independent institution that was also the Ethical Charter for Syrian Media nalistic values and ethical obligations. an alternative to the Syrian Journal- (ECSM), the Syrian Journalists Associ- ists Syndicate. Today, most of its mem- ation (SJA), the Syrian Center for Media The Board Committee has also organ- bers work for Syrian exile media, how- and Freedom of Expression (SCM), and ised forums and training in Turkey and, ever. There are still a few journalists the Syrian Female Journalists Network previously, in Syria.73 inside Syria, but most use fake names (SFJN). The first two were created by because of security problems. The individual Syrian journalists or media To date, 51 media outlets have joined the SJA accepts as a member any Syrian organisations that came together to nego- charter, but many have since closed, and journalist who can provide documen- tiate common professional grounds and today there are only 33 active members. tary evidence that s/he is still active. defend common interests. They aim to The charter does not include media out- However, given the current situation, build a self-regulatory system for a plu- lets licensed by the Syrian government, a more flexible approach has had to be ralistic and democratic media system. even if contacts have been established. adopted, offering more time to those The SCM and the SFJN, created in 2004 journalists who, for different reasons, and 2013 respectively, follow a differ- Membership is subject to four main con- have had to stop working.75 ent mechanism, as they are independ- ditions: being active for at least one year; ent organisations. However, their main producing news content; being Syrian; and On 6 July 2013, the SJA was registered activities and objectives can be assim- being “independent”.74 A specific com- as a non-profit organisation in France, ilated to the other two. mittee examines candidates and decides but its main office is in Gaziantep, given whether to include them or not. In Febru- the number of Syrian journalists there. The Ethical Charter for ary 2019, the board approved new bylaws, FPU and Internews supported the ini- Syrian Media (ECSM) including membership policies. This tiative following the first conference, In 2015, six media outlets, with the facil- involved the creation of a system capa- with FPU later becoming the associa- itation of FPU, started a series of round- ble of receiving, filtering and examining tion’s only supporter. table discussions about the possibility of complaints submitted by media organi- IMS Briefing Paper / 45

The general objective of the association SJA signed a Memorandum of Under- and human rights, civil society and cit- is to promote free, responsible and moral standing with the Syndicate of French izenship. Each field includes different journalism in Syria. As such, the SJA is Journalists.76 programmes. Every programme (eight one of the promoters and initial signato- in total) has a project manager respon- ries of the ECSM. As with the ECSM, Its members being scattered through- sible for planning and implementation. it acts as a mediator between different out different countries presents several A supporting department provides all actors when disputes arise. challenges. It is very difficult to organ- of the programmes with whatever they ise meetings that everyone can attend. need for aspects related to administra- The association’s activities mainly cover Moreover, journalists today work under tion, financial management, IT, digi- two aspects: empowering and protecting different political and legal frameworks. tal security, fundraising, development journalists; and contributing to develop- Less problematic is the administrative and logistics. The Department for Com- ing the professional skills of the associa- level, as it is enough to have a board munication and Advocacy connects the tion’s members and the sector in general. meeting every six months; and an exec- programmes, designing general strate- The first aspect is managed primarily by utive director and a team manage all gies and using the outputs produced by the Syrian Center for Press Freedoms, daily activities. individual programmes to promote cam- a department of the association tasked paigns and transitional justice processes. with recording and archiving violations The Syrian Center for Media and against Syrian journalists committed by Freedom of Expression (SCM) Though the organisation is still going all political and armed actors inside and The history of the SCM predates the through a reconstruction process, sev- outside Syria. Its reports are distributed Syrian uprising. It was founded in 2004 eral programmes are already active. The to hundreds of human rights organisa- by Mazen Darwish, a lawyer and free- Hate Speech Observatory, which started tions, media organisations and NGOs. dom-of-expression activist. The SCM as an individual project in late 2017, will In addition, they promote these issues in is registered in France as a non-profit become a permanent observatory mon- other media through articles and inter- organisation. Darwish was arrested itoring Syrian and regional media. The views, and the institution advocates for on 16 February 2012, along with sev- Journalist House aims to help Syrian Syrian journalists’ rights with different eral members of the SCM, and only media organisations become sustain- international organisations, including the released on 10 August 2015. Between able and more professional. The pro- UN. Moreover, they recently launched 2012 and 2015, the SCM continued to gramme offers support to Syrian jour- a study of legal aspects of Syrian jour- exist, albeit with less activity until it nalists, examining individual cases and nalism, demonstrating the stark con- was relaunched in 2016. submitting them to organisations such as trast between the laws regulating the RSF, Freedom House, the CPJ and IMS. press in Syria and those in other coun- The aim of the SCM is to support the Moreover, in 2016 it started to monitor tries. The aim is to identify recommen- creation of a united voice of Syrian civil violations against journalists, and to build dations in relation to improvements to society and media organisations, and to an archive relying on material produced future laws and the legal background empower them to put pressure on the by organisations such as the SJA and of Syrian journalism. main power-holders. In this context, the the Syrian Network for Human Rights SCM wants to become a hub for these (SNHR) related to violations since 2011. Finally, through a specific committee, actors and reinforce their voices in order Further activities will focus on digital the association identifies journalists in to influence international decision-mak- security and a study of the legal frame- need of material and legal help. Given ers. In the short term, for example, this work of Syrian journalism.78 the limited internal resources, they pro- means pushing them to consider not only mote the journalist’s case to their inter- reconstruction but also transitional jus- For the Documentation programme, the national and Syrian partners in order to tice as a key aspect.77 This role is rein- SCM integrated the Violations Docu- try to cover the financial costs. forced by the fact that, since 2010, the mentation Center in Syria (VDC).79 SCM has had a consultative status at It gave the VDC training to improve The second field of activities takes the the Economic and Social Council of its methodology and analytical tools. form of training on different levels and the United Nations (ECOSOC), which Moreover, a new database is under issues, in order to increase the profes- grants it access to several UN meetings. construction, in co-ordination with sionalism of the entire emerging sector. HURIDOCS.80 Today, the SCM has several diverse In all of its activities, the SJA collabo- activities. After it relaunched its pro- The Documentation team also serves as rates with several international organ- gramme, the SCM was able to gradu- a primary source to the Litigation pro- isations such as the Committee to Pro- ally secure different sources of fund- gramme, which specialises in gathering tect Journalists (CPJ), Reporters Without ing and cover a wide range of activities. evidence about human rights violations Borders (RSF), the International Fed- in Syria. After selecting a file, the Liti- eration of Journalists (IFJ) and, more The SCM focuses on three fields of gation programme has recourse to dif- recently, IMS. In January 2018, the activities: media and freedom, justice ferent sources and, in collaboration with 46 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

European organisations, brings cases The SFJN has also managed to signifi- Media institutions: to European or international courts.81 cantly diversify its sources of funding. some general It has access to funding related not only The SCM is dispersed across several to media but also to human rights and considerations countries, including Syria. Within that women’s rights. Though its main office is country it relies on a network of volun- in the Netherlands, it has staff members The development of media institutions teers that it has built up over the years. Its in Jordan, Syria, Turkey and the UK. is a relevant achievement in the con- only office is in Berlin, but no programme text of shaping an independent and via- or department has all of its members in The dispersion of its staff, along with ble Syrian media system, even if they one place. The organisation is trying to their condition of exile, are considered are today forced to operate mostly in improve its work flows on a general level. the main challenges the group faces exile. As elsewhere, the media insti- IFEX is supporting the SCM to become today. Co-ordinating activities in dif- tutions constitute a vital element of an more sustainable and less dependent on ferent countries, adapting to different ideal enabling environment. The Syr- donors.82 They are studying solutions to contexts, and not losing contact with ian independent media sector that now improve the legal status of employees Syria are main issues.85 prevailingly works in exile has two of in Europe and the Arab world. Moreo- the building blocks of the enabling envi- ver, the board, which consists mainly of ronment. Indeed, it is a sector not just representatives of international NGOs, because it represents the sum of inde- helps the organisation in terms of visi- pendent media outlets but because media bility and fundraising. supporting institutions are an integral part of it. The Syrian Female Journalists Network (SFJN) The creation of media institutions is a The SFJN was founded in 2013 by two response to an effort to adopt a strate- Syrian female journalists and activists. gic view of media development, and It is registered in the Netherlands as a acknowledges that operating only at the not-for-profit association, and aims to production level means being stuck with provide a bridge between media and a tactical approach. Media institutions women, empowering them within media strive to provide a wider cultural, pro- structures and at the coverage level. fessional and social environment that individual media organisations need in According to one of its founders, the order to operate more effectively, and initial idea was to create a network for not only as “alternative” outlets. individual Syrian journalists. The emergence of Syrian independent outlets, These efforts have had some success: however, convinced them to address all three organisations analysed above these organisations in the first instance. are still going and have managed to A report that the SFJN produced in 2015 govern themselves amid very difficult showed that women were under-repre- conditions. sented in the independent media sector and almost absent in leading positions.83 Signs of increasing collaboration between them are increasing too, espe- The SFJN does not produce content cially between the SJA and the ECSM. directly, but operates in collaboration The SFJN was also able to establish con- with several Syrian independent media, solidated relations with several actors, providing training and workshops, pro- and recently applied to be a member moting content with a gender perspec- of the ECSM. At the same time, media tive, and analysing media coverage. One institutions are exposed to many chal- of its main achievements has been the lenges, and their situation should be production of a code of conduct aimed considered quite fragile. at improving the image of women in the media.84 In parallel, it has established a One element of weakness derives from specific network of Syrian journalists, difficulties in the institutionalisation pro- including men, living in different coun- cesses. The ECSM, for example, suffered tries. In the last year, the organisation from a lack of managed executive pro- has launched Qalat, an open-source data- cesses, i.e. a general secretary in charge base of Syrian female experts. of all the executive processes (as did the IMS Briefing Paper / 47

SNP; see above). The absence of man- institutions also have to defend their of competition rather than collabora- aged executive processes has not only independence against powerful inter- tion. It can also affect their credibility affected internal workflows. In the pro- ests and influences. So far, they have with donors, NGOs and media partners. cess of institution building from below, managed to resist them, but they will Engaging separately with similar pro- a general secretary is a “political figure” need all the support possible, including jects should be avoided; instead, they or a person that needs to provide leader- by donors and international partners, should explore collaborative ways to ship. It is necessary to make the institu- against similar attacks in the future. merge their efforts or design projects in tion less vulnerable to the actions of its a more complementary way that would members, and to avoid conflicts among However, competition between institu- be beneficial for all actors. them.86 Syrian media organisations, on tions and the overlapping of their activ- the other hand, have to understand that ities can present another problem for they must give more autonomy to these their future development and credibil- International donors and media institutions, with the boards taking a ity. The latter, in particular, derives from development organisations step back in terms of executive duties. very weak overall collaboration in the sector, where various actors are often The involvement of donors and media Media institutions also need to keep rein- unaware of what others are doing. The development organisations in Syria forcing their legitimacy. Since they are very uneven attention of donors creates precedes the 2011 uprising. In fact, it called to act as actors supra partes, they the impression of preferential treatment started with the limited opening of the need to develop transparent and impar- being given by one institution, which Assad regime. However, media devel- tial internal procedures. In other words, may exacerbate competition and lead to opment represented only a marginal they need to invest in internal workflows the asymmetrical development of insti- part of the overall development aid pro- and organisations in order to enhance tutions, instead of strengthening the sec- grammes carried out at that time, which their credibility among their partners. tor, and have unintended consequences. was characterised by the prevalence of The SJA, for example, developed quite Each institution has a unique place and less controversial programmes. In fact, complex procedures to elect the board, one should not replace or absorb the role all of the in-country programmes had with an appointed election committee of the other. Since 2016, when the SCM to be agreed and authorised by the min- entitled to supervise all the procedures. was relaunched, significant support has istries in charge. Until the security sit- The ECSM was not fully operational been given to this institution, which has uation worsened, many donors worked for a long period, mainly because of an undisputed history of defending free- directly with the Ministry of Information the absence of a general secretary, but dom of expression pre- and post-2011. It on media reform. A few donors opened the demand for its role, among Syrian paid a heavy price as an institution and up to supporting programmes in a way journalists and media workers, stays through the personal fate of its leaders. that bypassed official endorsement by intact.87 It is an achievement that the It is understandable that the specific his- the authorities. The main features of media sector is guided by the ethical tory of this institution and its reputa- donor-supported programmes before values voluntarily supported by a sig- tion has attracted funding and attention. 2011 and in the immediate post-2011 nificant number of media organisations However, the fact that both attention and period was that they lacked long-term (i.e. outlets) and members of the ECSM, funding have not been spread evenly has objectives and were mainly focused on and that the ECSM acts as a kind of a led to uneasiness among media organi- training individuals, with no associated self-regulatory body (mediating some- sations and institutions launched after vision on building local institutions.88 times in cases of complaints). The SJA 2011. Moreover, the SMC is in fact an Moreover, the media development organ- has also acted as a mediator in the case independent organisation, not an insti- isations that started supporting online of an internal dispute within a media tution created from below by journalists. initiatives in the immediate post-2011 organisation. However, more needs to Communication between the SCM and period kept their programmes confi- be done to connect the two institutions other actors sometimes appears weak, dential because of the risks to those with similar institutions internationally, and some projects overlap. involved. Co-operation efforts were whereby exposure to best practices can only launched in 2013 with the Global serve the goal of continuing the devel- Syrian media actors, as well as donors Forum for Media Development (GFM- opment of these institutions. and NGOs, often tend to initiate simi- D)-led Syria co-ordination.89 lar projects and initiatives, without sub- In a context like Syria, in which differ- stantial co-operation. In the long run, Between 2011 and 2016, a wide range of ent regional and international actors are this can have a negative effect on their media development efforts by interna- trying to influence developments, these relationship, reinforcing an atmosphere tional media development organisations 48 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

has taken place focusing on the profes- holistic manner by providing targeted IREX, UNESCO and IMS maintain a sional capacity-building of individual training, audience research, etc. More certain level of co-operation. journalists and media outlets, media recently, the programme also assists content production, and reactive physi- one online platform and a TV station. According to one 2016 study, “the State cal and online safety measures. The only Department has acknowledged that sup- examples of media development inter- European NGOs with funding from port for Syrian media is now a long-term ventions that have taken a view of the European governments have similarly matter, and adjusted its bureaucracy sector’s development are programmes supported Syrian media development accordingly”.93 Evidence of a policy by IMS and FPU. These programmes projects that they have initiated, but their shift has yet to be seen, as the flagship include a diverse spectrum of actors short-term approaches have allowed sup- project has no guarantee of continued encompassing institutional support to port to lapse, resulting in a sudden halt funding beyond summer 2019.94 media organisations and the develop- to certain projects. However, Scandina- ment of media institutions (i.e. the SNP, vian donor countries present an excep- The European Council adopted the EU SJA, ECSM). tion in this respect by supporting pro- Strategy on Syria in 2017;95 it aims to grammes aimed at the development of “promote democracy, human rights and International media development organ- the independent media sector from the freedom of speech by strengthening Syr- isations indicate that far fewer resources beginning of the conflict until today. ian civil society organizations”. Within have been available for Syria since 2016. this framework, the council “agreed While only a few years ago 14 inter- Among the leading training programmes to increase EU efforts to promote free national media development organisa- that have run at different times over speech, including through supporting tions had Syria-related programmes, the past few years, examples include free and independent media”.96 However, today only a handful of them are still those conducted by Free Press Unlim- neither the international and European active. Some donors share the obser- ited (FPU), BBC Media Action, Canal media development organisations nor vation that the priorities have changed France International (CFI), SMART, the Syrian independent media organi- in the region as a whole and in Syria in the German-based Media in Coopera- sations have confirmed that funds are particular. Some define this shift, where tion & Transition (MICT), and the Ital- available for media development as a it exists within a donor, as a “securiti- ian-based Coordinamento delle Organ- result of this strategic framework. Prior sation” of the agenda, whereby in the izzazioni per il Servizio Volontario to 2017, the EU was a significant donor case of Syria the fight against ISIS and (COSV). Some of those organisations and its absence since then has had quite associated counter-terrorist narratives are no longer active in Syria because of a disruptive effect on media develop- in the wider framework of “counter- a lack of donor funds, while others have ment efforts. It has left international and ing violent extremism” has taken pri- maintained a very low level of involve- Syrian organisations that took part in a ority over independent media-sector ment for the same reason. In general, consultative process before the endorse- development. It is a paradox that, at a one can see the clear reluctance of some ment of the 2017 strategy confused as time when actors within the independ- European governments to fund Syria-re- to why support for free and independent media sector in Syria made signifi- lated media projects at the moment, at ent media did not figure more prom- cant professional improvement in terms least until the situation becomes more inently in the EU Strategy on Syria. of both content and organisation (i.e. predictable.91 There are, however, signs The lack of clarity about how this strat- management, sustainability consider- that some may expand the programmes egy is being made operational feeds ations), the sector has had to reverse or potentially start new programmes in into widespread concerns that, despite its developmental objectives and focus areas of Syria that have recently been modest mentions of the free and inde- purely on survival once again because liberated from ISIS, as some govern- pendent media, implementation is more of declining donor funding.90 mental donors prioritise those areas.92 than a step away from “promoting free speech, including through supporting Examples of active donor support are Several European media development free and independent media”. Accord- few and far between. Among others, organisations, like FPU and IMS, have ing to the available information, the EU the US State Department’s Near East- maintained relatively stable Syria port- is involved in the creation and support ern Affairs programme — Support for folios. Funded by the Danish, Norwe- of a platform to give Syrian civil soci- Independent Media in Syria — was gian, Swedish and British governments, ety organisations an unmediated voice, launched towards the end of 2012 and IMS has since 2011 established a full- which is thus intended to provide a mid- is currently implemented by IREX. The scale Syria portfolio within its MENA dle ground and appeal to Syrians across programme initially focused much of programme which provides institu- the board. its assistance on providing equipment tional support to a chosen number of to radio networks, while it now assists Syrian media; content production sup- Syrian media actors echo the growing several FM radio stations that broadcast port; organisational development with dissatisfaction with the approaches of into Syria (some with headquarters in an emphasis on sustainability; network- the international donors that are felt Turkey; some based in Syria) in a more ing and dissemination; and safety. FPU, to be in constant dissonance with the IMS Briefing Paper / 49

needs of the sector, and fail to recog- the UNESCO conference taking place international media assistance groups nise its importance throughout the con- in the French capital).97 The reasons and Syrian media actors to formulate flict and post-conflict period. Shifting were manifold and included: a strategic approach towards overall donor priorities, short-term approaches media assistance to Syrian media and and an overall lack of donor alignment The Syrian civic protest and peaceful make a case for media development in as to the role of media development in movement, which coincided with similar Syria as an integral part of international Syria all pose a challenge for Syrian movements and upheavals in the Arab development strategies for Syria; and media organisations seeking to shape world in 2011, began to rapidly evolve inform and influence donors’ policies their mid- to long-term development into a conflict/war of unprecedented towards assistance programmes in Syria. strategies. Paradoxically, they also force scope and complexity. The fast-chang- them to focus on survival issues again ing situation on the ground was certainly Most participants of the Syria co-or- and again, with many being forced to too big a task for any individual media dination see its “peak” years as 2014 close or significantly downsize their assistance actor to follow and assess. and 2015, which coincides with the rel- operations. atively steady inflow of donor funding The media landscape was changing at an and the hope that “pure survival issues” Several private and foundation-based equally rapid pace, triggering a “media could be replaced by “the view to long- donors (e.g. Open Society Founda- earthquake”. No individual media devel- term development”. With 2016 repre- tions, the European Endowment for opment organisation could keep up with senting a turning point, in as much as Democracy, the National Endowment for the speed of these developments and the Syrian independent media development Democracy) remain flexible donors to magnitude of the needs, nor could any as well as international media develop- a certain number of independent media organisation acting on its own build ment organisations faced a significant organisations. However, they alone can- credible knowledge of the entire emerg- lapse in donor funding, co-ordination not fill the funding gap and meet the ing media scene. has since waned. Several consultative needs of the entire sector, nor do they meetings took place in 2017 and 2018, have projected comprehensive strate- Syrian media actors often acted in isola- but they failed to revamp the process. gies for sector-wide support. tion from one another, while some net- Looking back, however, there were works established before 2011 found several acknowledged achievements: themselves under extreme pressure from in spite of initial reluctance on the side GFMD Syria co-ordination the regime (e.g. the SCM), which sig- of some international media develop- nificantly reduced their ability to con- ment organisations — members of the Syria co-ordination under the GFMD’s tinue acting as focal points. GFMD — the process was given a try framework was launched in 2013. and launched in early 2013; it increased Between 2013 and 2016, a number of The nascent Syrian media scene was as the level of information-sharing and the meetings took place, starting with the fragmented as it could be; so were the collective effort to deepen knowledge international media development organ- interventions by international media about the media environment as well as isations, who were joined by the Syr- development organisations that basi- about what could or could not work in ian media representatives as early as cally took place without their having a given environment; it brought a sig- 2014. During 2014 and 2015, meetings any idea about the extent to which their nificant number of Syrian stakehold- in Istanbul were attended by as many as efforts met needs on the ground and ers into the process; the process tried 60 participants representing three groups how they would play into a fast-chang- to promote the need for a strategy; it of stakeholders. In 2015, a White Paper ing local situation. provided space for Syrian actors to called “A Call for Effective Support to meet and network with international Syrian Independent Media as a Key In such conditions, the GFMD’s Syria counterparts and among themselves; Component in Mitigating and Resolving co-ordination presented a real opportu- and it generated research (e.g. several the Syrian Conflict” was completed and nity to become a mechanism for infor- media-mapping studies; an audience served as the basis for advocacy meet- mation-sharing and lessons learnt among survey), while the White Paper pro- ings in Washington, D.C. and Brussels international media assistance groups; vided a basis for advocacy.98 — the first steps in joint advocacy. Since create more comprehensive understand- the second quarter of 2016, co-ordina- ing of the changing Syrian media sector; tion in its full scope has been stagnant. provide a venue for international media assistance groups and local organisations The idea of closer Syria co-ordination to meet and develop a better understand- among international media developing; provide a venue for Syrian media ment organisations within the frame- to get to know one another better and work of the GFMD was proposed by start perceiving itself as a sector; pro- IMS in early 2013 at the GFMD meet- vide a venue for Syrian media to for- ing in Paris (organised in parallel with mulate their needs; provide a venue for 50 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

Beyond the war — trends presenting obstacles and opportunities for Syrian independent media organisations

Neither the conflict nor post-conflict from political leaders is no longer lim- drivers of the trend in the MENA region frameworks can be generalised. Under- ited to authoritarian countries such as are only partly externally driven by the standing the context is crucially impor- Turkey (down two at 157th) and Egypt region’s conflicts; however, the major tant, as the drivers of conflict differ. The (161st), where ‘media-phobia’ is now drivers originate from the re-consol- post-conflict context can encompass so pronounced that journalists are rou- idation of authoritarianism that var- many features with differing intensity tinely accused of terrorism and all those ies in intensity from one country to in different places like prolonged vio- who don’t offer loyalty are arbitrarily another — and helps explain why the lence and fragility. Moreover, it can be imprisoned. More and more democrat- chances for this trend to be reversed marked either by heightened author- ically-elected leaders no longer see the in the short- to medium-term are very itarian tendencies or by the ambition media as part of democracy’s essential slim. Dissenting voices in the media are to create conditions for lasting peace underpinning, but as an adversary to increasingly silenced through the use of through the strengthening of democ- which they openly display their aver- legal and extra-legal means under ter- racy — depending on wider trends per- sion.”101 The V-Dem report, which exam- rorism charges, “deeds against national taining to the region, the pre-war situ- ines the state of democracy worldwide, interest” and so on. Smear campaigns ation in the country and the dynamics shows a downward trend in democratic and false information about promi- brought about by the conflict itself. An progress especially since 2010.102 The nent professionals are orchestrated by emphasis on context-sensitive approaches same report notes that media freedom a number of media aligned with the can help avoid generalisation and donor is at its lowest level since the turn of government in an effort to alienate and interventions based on templates that the century. Indicators on government defame them. Non-state actors of vari- are hardly replicable in different con- censorship of the media, media cor- ous provenance aim to mobilise more flict and post-conflict environments. ruption and bias, lack of media plural- conservative social strata, which can ism and self-censorship show alarming incite violence against journalists and declines around the world, with a nota- freedom of expression/human rights Global and regional trends ble increase in government censorship defenders. Even when a direct link with in freedom of expression of the media.103 the regime cannot be established, this kind of “public lynching” and the use These trends are relevant for the future of of fake information goes unchallenged independent Syrian media, because once Regional trends by the authorities. the country emerges from its long and brutal war, the post-war developments a) Regional trends presenting obsta- Independent media across the region will take place against a backdrop of cles to independent media development are caught in the middle of these nega- increasing hostility towards independ- tive trends while trying to provide qual- ent media, journalists and civil society, The Middle East and North Africa ity journalism and diverse and pluralis- both globally and regionally. (MENA) region is the second-worst tic coverage of a wide range of topics. region for press freedom, where out of Most of the already established media, The global trend of diminishing free- the region’s 20 countries, 16 are classi- as well as emerging initiatives, have to dom of expression has been documented fied as “not free”.104 The Middle East’s compete on unequal ground with the in the latest reports by several promi- countries are yet again at the bottom massive state-owned media sector on nent organisations. According to Free- of RSF’s World Press Freedom Index, the one hand and a significant private dom House, press freedom is in its worst too. In its 2018 index, RSF notes that: sector media on the other hand (with the health in 13 years.99 The Committee to “According to the indicators used to latter abiding by the state’s “red lines”). Protect Journalists (CPJ) reveals that measure the year-by-year changes, it is In other words, both the state and pri- the number of journalists jailed for the Middle East/North Africa region vate media sectors are heavily subsi- their work is at its highest level since that has registered the biggest decline dised and enjoy preferential status in a the 1990s.100 Reporters Without Bor- in media freedom.”105 politically controlled advertising mar- ders (RSF) reiterates this finding: “The ket. A handful of independent media in climate of hatred is steadily more vis- While the negative trend in the MENA the region struggle to find a model of ible in the Index, which evaluates the region is consistent with a globally neg- sustainability, as their counterparts in level of press freedom in 180 countries ative trend, it is not merely a conse- the developed world attempt to do, but each year. Hostility towards the media quence of the global trend. The major in a radically different environment. IMS Briefing Paper / 51

Thus, the most persistent challenges Furthermore, the increasing trend of increase in the number of users above posed to independent media in the media consumption on social networks 30 in the past six years. MENA region include: hostile politi- and the growing popularity of short- cal environments with state and non- form video content are driving a cul- The trends above are relevant for Syrian state actors presenting threats; unre- ture of “media snacking” across the media, regardless of whether they are formed media systems and a general region. With the majority of time spent digital-only or use multiple platforms. lack of legislation enabling media devel- on social networks and mobile videos, In that regard, they are well positioned opment; dysfunctional media markets digital constitutes 40 percent of their as to regional trends, as they are mostly and associated advertising, coupled with attention span with 80 minutes and 28 part of the same generation as their tar- an economy in dire straits; constrain- minutes of time being spent on social get audience and are tech-savvy, so have ing investment regulations; and wars networks and video respectively.108 the potential to tap into their audience’s and large-scale conflicts. changing preferences and habits. To turn A comparative analysis of the penetration these potential advantages into certain b) Regional trends presenting rates of different social media networks benefits, the media in question need to opportunities in the Arab region shows that Facebook be well connected with their natural pro- remains the most popular social media fessional community around the world A trend with long-term transformational platform. Collectively, the number of in order to share with or benefit from potential, particularly affecting younger Facebook users in the Arab region has innovation and good examples of efforts populations, is “digital disruption”. The steadily increased over the past six years, in the search for viable business models. Middle East has one of the world’s fast- as per the findings of the Arab Social est rates of digital technology adoption. Media Report series,109 reaching more People in the MENA region spend on than 156 million in 2017. In seven out of Developments in Syria, average more than five hours per day 22 Arab countries, the number of Face- 2011—2018 online, mostly on various social media book accounts exceeds the regional aver- platforms. Given the region’s large pro- age: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Iraq, Pre-war Syria, as discussed in previ- portion of young people, its populations Morocco, the UAE and Syria. ous chapters, had all of the character- are forecast to continue favouring digital istics of authoritarian rule, and con- platforms. One of the main conclusions The Arab Social Media Report 2017 stituted an environment that was not of the Arab Media Outlook 2016—2018 also describes some other trends across conducive to media freedom and free- is that the region’s media landscape is different social media (relevant to con- dom of expression. While it is difficult undergoing a paradigm shift driven by tent producers): to predict post-conflict developments, its developing infrastructure and con- one can safely argue that neither the sumer behaviour.106 It points to two fac- The Arabic language is increasingly nature of the processes preceding the tors as providing an impetus for growth: dominating social interactions online, war nor the nature of those that have youth demographics and the increasing as these channels are becoming the evolved throughout the war provide level of digitisation. de facto form of interaction for most grounds for optimism. It is highly likely people in the region. This is a depar- that independent media and institutions The rapid evolution of access or con- ture from the earlier stage of growth, will face extreme challenges emanating nectivity — thanks to smartphones, where this was merely the interaction not only from political circumstances tablets, apps and infrastructure — is medium of the “elites” in most socie- but from economic circumstances on driving digitisation. Smartphone pen- ties. On average, the rate of using Ara- the ground, too. etration is rising rapidly and is not only bic in social media activities is 55 per- limited to the more developed countries cent, up from 43 percent two years ago In regime-controlled areas, the govern- in the region. Internet and broadband (on Facebook), while 72 percent of all ment continued its crackdown on dis- penetration has increased and, like most tweets in the region are now posted sidents but also demonstrated brutal emerging markets, it is mobile-cen- in Arabic. force against civilians. In areas outside tric. The number of mobile broadband government control, it has been possi- (3G/4G) users exceeds fixed broad- Access and use of social media are no ble to observe a political process with band, which is why analysts forecast more limited to the youth in Arab soci- the characteristics of democratic struc- MENA countries to become “mobile- eties. Users are increasingly maturing tures in Kurdish areas only; however, first” markets.107 This is evident in the in age. On average, 64 percent of social the Democratic Union Party (PYD), growth of website views on mobile media users in the region are under 30. with its military arm, the People’s Pro- phones, which jumped from 11 percent However, this percentage has slightly tection Units (YPG), has also shown in 2011 to almost 70 percent in 2015. but consistently decreased over the authoritarian tendencies. In rebel-held Such access is creating new consumer past six years, where early adopters of areas, citizens are subject to violations behaviour, which in turn presents new social media in the region are matur- of their rights by those who are in con- opportunities and challenges. ing. There is a noticeable and steady trol locally. It seems that neither side 52 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

in the war has managed to deliver bet- Being in exile will offer SEM more sta- ducers, reporters, writers and photogra- ter political or economic conditions bility and the chance to develop sus- phers often manage to redistribute them- for civilians. tainable models of survival. If it is true selves among surviving outlets. Others that presence on the ground provides a are hired by prestigious regional or inter- The Syrian economy is widely destroyed media organisation with the advantage national media. Some pursue individual and fragmented. “By the end of 2015, of proximity to its audience, it is also paths as artists, film directors or nov- the Syrian Centre for Policy Research true that today new technologies ena- elists, sometimes acquiring consider- (SCPR) calculated a total economic loss ble exiled organisations to easily reach able regional and international recog- amounting to 468% of the Syrian GDP in their audience inside Syria. This fac- nition. All these human resources are 2010. The GDP has lost around 64.1%.... tor was until now undermined by the still available to SEM, as they are still UNDP further estimates a poverty rate conflict. Electricity cuts, armed clashes part of the same networks. In the future, of 85.2% of the population, 69% thereof and forced displacements weakened the more stability and resources could ena- in extreme poverty.”110 Corruption and internet as a primary source of commu- ble them to reabsorb part of the human patronage networks have become even nication. De-escalation of the war can resources that, for the moment, had to more widespread than they were before significantly change media consumption go elsewhere, often against their will. 2011. According to the SCPR’s report, in the future, giving SEM more oppor- the structures of crony capitalism and tunity to compete for a larger audience. Finally, a strong SEM network combined nepotism that dominated the country Moreover, a post-conflict situation will with the elements listed above will ena- before the crisis have deepened, and sub- enable Syrians to further stabilise their ble Syrian journalists, media develop- sequently the actors dominating the econ- sources’ networks inside the country, ment organisations and donors to let omy have partially shifted loyalties. It is which is already happening. Even if go, at least for the next few years, of a estimated that nine Syrian businessmen these sources have to move in an unoffi- “transitional approach” to the role of the control about 90 percent of the domes- cial way and undercover, and thus some- media. Until now, media development tic economy.111 Finally, external politi- times have limited access to informa- strategies and tactics have been tailored cal actors, particularly Russia and Iran, tion, they will probably be more able to to the idea that these outlets had to be have become more influential. The scope provide regular content than they did prepared for their more or less immi- of the Syrian regime’s dependency on during the conflict. nent return to Syria. We have to recog- external political actors assures consid- nise that this idea relied on assumptions erable space for their influence in shap- It is highly possible that political polari- that would not survive a reality check ing Syrian policy. sation will leave room for a more nuanced today, given the likely situation in the and grey-scaled political atmosphere. immediate post-conflict period. Even All these trends considered, it will be a There are already strong signs of dis- if they could go back to Syria, the sus- huge challenge for the independent media sent among constituencies that, dur- tainability of independent media would sector to survive and reach a sustaina- ing the war, lined up strongly with the be a very difficult outcome to achieve. bility breakeven point in the face of both regime. Regime media began hosting political and economic circumstances. more critical content from the begin- In this context, SEM can be a stable ning of 2011 and, according to many actor that develops independently from Syrian journalists, this tendency seems the political instability and setbacks that SEM in the future; post-conflict to be reinforced. will probably characterise the future Syria. Rethinking their role, impact It is extremely difficult to predict how the In this context, SEM can play a differ- and strategies in this context, they can Syrian political context will develop dur- ent role and address audiences that were offer all of the involved players, from ing the next few years. It is improbable previously inaccessible, either for tech- journalists to donors, a more realistic, that the conditions for SEM to go back nical reasons, because of their politi- controllable and effective framework. on their own terms — i.e. guarantees cal orientation, or simply because of of journalists’ well-being and a certain the conflict. level of freedom of expression — will be met in the short- or even medium-term. The closure of a large number of media Similarly, it is difficult to believe that outlets, often without an exit strategy, the country will soon enjoy a certain represents a major loss if we see it level of stability. Terrorism, social ten- through the eyes of those journalists sion and repression will probably char- who struggled for years to keep them acterise the country for years to come. alive. At the same time, a drop in the number of active media organisations In this context, being in exile presents was predicted. Moreover, the experi- some challenges, but also some oppor- ence accumulated by individuals is not tunities. being wasted. Syrian editors, video pro- IMS Briefing Paper / 53

Concluding remarks

Between 2011, when the Syrian alter- ber of media organisations have tried tions would require minimum condi- native media organisations began to to adjust their strategies to survive the tions to be in place, encompassing guar- emerge at a sudden and chaotic pace crisis, while maintaining their profes- antees of being able to operate on the as a form of media activism, and 2019, sional achievements. The independent ground with a certain level of safety and a remarkable effort has been made to media sector is at a crossroads. If the a level of respect for freedom of expres- shift from media activism to more pro- situation continues, the potential loss sion. While those conditions constitute fessional media production. Today, Syr- will have farfetched consequences. Not a reasonable minimum, overall devel- ian alternative media organisations cover only will their audiences be deprived of opments on the ground are volatile to a diverse spectrum of media: newspa- alternative sources of information right the extent to which any projected time- pers, radio, online and TV. Some define now, but in the medium-term post-war line would be unrealistic. Syrian alter- themselves as niche media (as per their Syria will lack a media sector capable native media organisations should not target audience), while others attempt of playing its watchdog role as well as rush to make a decision to fully relo- to reach a nationwide audience. The its role in peace-building. cate to Syria before minimum condi- media institutions range from free- tions are in place. It is realistic that the dom of expression organisations, to Given the fact that the future of the sec- timeframe be medium-term, not short- professional associations, to organisa- tor is at stake, Syrian alternative media term, due to the nature of developments tions targeting specific issues and audi- organisations and institutions should find on the ground. A medium-term time- ences. Though some among them were ways to act and express themselves as frame would allow the organisations in launched in exile in the early days fol- a sector more coherently and in jointly question to carefully assess opportuni- lowing the 2011 uprising, the situation advocating their needs, so that hope- ties and prepare for their return. on the ground continually forced many fully this effort leads to the wider rec- into exile, reaching a peak in 2016 when ognition of the sector’s importance by Syrian alternative media organisations it became almost impossible to fully donors. Donors’ shift in priorities would are well positioned to turn the regional operate from within Syria. undermine the transformative potential trend of “digital disruption” to their of the sector and its “democratic cap- benefit. The region’s media landscape The Syrian alternative media organisa- ital”, and would waste the significant is undergoing a paradigm shift driven tions represent a distinct sector compris- efforts invested so far by Syrians, inter- by the region’s developing infrastruc- ing diverse media outlets and professional national media development organisa- ture and consumer behaviour. Younger and freedom of expression organisations tions and donors. demographics region-wide, the increas- that are founded by individuals with no ing level of digitisation and the demand links to political or other interest-based Internally, Syrian media organisations for Arabic-language content and specific groups. Furthermore, these media out- should continue to work on organisa- formats are relevant for Syrian alterna- lets and institutions formulate their mis- tional streamlining; improve further tive media, regardless of whether they sion on professional values and favour their audience outreach (at home and are digital-only or use multiple plat- an output of quality journalism. Most among the huge proportion of the Syr- forms. Constant technological upgrad- of the media organisations in question ian refugee population) while in exile. ing should be seen as a key factor for the have embraced the importance of insti- This modus operandi will most prob- considered media to grow their audience tutional/organisational development, but ably continue to present itself as the and compete with other media sectors. they vary in their degree of organisa- only solution for the time being, as the tional development. In terms of own- high risk and low level of security can The donors should acknowledge the rel- ership and content, they represent an be found in all given contexts — from evance of the Syrian independent media independent sector. government-controlled to rebel-held to sector and its role in the formation of Kurdish-controlled areas. All alterna- an alternative discourse in the Syrian The development and professional tive media organisations in exile have public sphere. They should acknowl- growth of these organisations has been as their ultimate goal the ability to oper- edge the almost unique development of supported by donors and media develop- ate fully in the country. All have a level the type of media and institutions that, ment organisations with varying inten- of presence in the country through a in a relatively short timeframe, have sity throughout the past eight years. network of reporters and watch closely made significant progress from activ- Paradoxically, at a time when strong in-country developments to assess the ism to professionalism; present the only professional and institutional consol- possibility of increasing their presence alternative to state- and factions-influ- idation requires further support, it is on the ground with at least a small office. enced media; and have the potential (if significantly less available and, as a The prevailing assessment is that condi- they survive) to play the role of profes- result, many media organisations have tions do not present an opportunity yet. sional media in processes succeeding the closed or considered doing so. A num- A full transition to in-country opera- armed conflict (i.e. during the post-con- 54 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

flict period). This requires donors to prioritise the survival and further pro- Notes fessional and institutional development 1 See: http://beta.arabmediasociety.com.preview.sqgd.net/ articles/downloads/20070523081944_AMS2_William_A_ of the media in question, which mostly Rugh.pdf operate in exile. These media are led by 2 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria, The University of Chi- their mission and because of their inde- cago Press, Chicago, 1999. 3 See, for example, Leah Caldwell, “Privileging the Private: pendent position have the potential to Media and Development in Syria”, Arab Media & Society, 11 December 2010, available at https://www.arabmedi- contribute to peace and reconciliation, asociety.com/privileging-the-private-media-and-development-in-syria/ (accessed 10 October 2019). accountability and transparency. The 4 On the power organisation of the Syrian regime, see Joshua donors should formulate approaches to Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats. Regime Power in Egypt and Syria, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2012. media development that are informed by 5 See Trombetta (2016). 6 See Maha Taki, “Country Case Study: Syria”, BBC Media and anchored in the longer-term vision, Action, August 2012, p. 7, available at http://downloads. bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/pdf/syria.pdf (accessed 10 October but act quickly to preempt the regres- 2019) (hereafter, Taki, “Syria”). 7 See, for example, Joseph Daher, “Syria, the uprising and the sion and potential loss of the existing media scene”, Open Democracy, 26 October 2017, availa- media sector. ble at https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west- asia/joseph-daher/syria-uprising-and-media-scene#_ftn1 (accessed 10 October 2019). 8 De Angelis (2011) 9 See De Angelis (2011a) and Della Ratta (2018) 10 De Angelis, “The Controversial Archive”, forthcoming. 11 See De Angelis (2012). 12 Interview, NGO3. See also, Billie Jeanne Brownlee, “Media development in Syria: The Janus-faced nature of foreign aid assistance”, Third World Quarterly, 2017, pp. 1-18 (hereafter, Brownlee, “Media development in Syria”). 13 See Soazig, 2016. 14 For the nature of foreign media support in Syria before 2011, see Taki, “Syria” and Brownlee, “Media development in Syria”. 15 Yazan Badran, Enrico De Angelis, Donatella della Ratta: “Syr- ian Emerging Media, Mapping and analyzing the emerging media sphere in Syria following the uprising of March 2011” 16 Soazig, September 2015, p. 4. 17 Issa, 2016. 18 “Holding on to Seafoam: Insights on the Reality of Radio and Web Publishing in Syria”, Wedoo.tech, 14 November 2016, available at https://weedoo.tech/our-studies-en/holding-on- to-seafoam-insights-on-the-reality-of-radio-and-web-publishing-in-syria/ (accessed 10 October 2019). 19 See Reporters Without Borders, “Violations of press freedoms barometer — The figures in 2012”, available athttps:// rsf.org/en/barometer?year=2012 (accessed 10 October 2019); in addition, the SJA publishes monthly reports on violations against Syrian journalists in all Syrian regions, available at https://www.syja.org/en/home/categories/36/period- ic-reports (accessed 10 October 2019) 20 Interview with SJOU1, January 2019. 21 See, for example, Maher Saman and Ayman Mohammad, “In Syria’s rebel areas, journalists complain of new censorship”, UPI, 9 May 2016, available at http://syriauntold. com/2016/05/12/in-syrias-rebel-areas-journalists-complain-of-new-censorship/ (accessed 10 October 2019). 22 SyriaUntold, “ABRAJ: Towards a Cooperative Media Sphere in Syria”, 7 January 2015, available at http://syriauntold.com/2015/01/07/abraj-towards-cooperative-media-sphere-syria/ (accessed 10 October 2019) (hereafter, SyriaUntold, “ABRAJ”). 23 SNP homepage, available at https://snpsyria.org/ (accessed 10 October 2019). 24 Syrian Female Journalists Network homepage, available at http://media.sfjn.org/en/ (accessed 10 October 2019). 25 This is the case of Radio Alwan and Radio Fresh, in particular. However, after the killing the Raed Fares and Hamoud Jnaid, funding to the latter was renewed at the beginning of 2019 (Interview with NGO2, 24 February 2019). 26 See, for example, the graphs produced by the SNP on the rapid closure of Syrian newspapers, available at https://syri- anprints.org/en/chart (accessed 10 October 2019). 27 John D.H. Downing, Radical Media: Rebellious Communi- cation and Social Movements, Sage Publications, London, 2001, p. ix (hereafter, Downing, Radical Media). 28 Michel de Certeau, Frederic Jameson and Carl Lovitt, “On the Oppositional Practices of Everyday Life”, Social Text, (3), 1980, pp. 3—43, Duke University Press, available at https:// thefloppylives.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/certeau.pdf (accessed 10 October 2019). 29 Yazan Badran, “Strategies and (Survival) Tactics: The Case of Syrian Oppositional Media in Turkey”, Journal of Alternative and Community Media, forthcoming. 30 Sandra Braman, “Defining tactical media: An historical overview”, in Barbara Abrash and Faye Ginsburg (eds), Tactical media: The virtual casebook, New York University, New York, 2002. 31 Downing, Radical Media, p. xi. 32 Christian Fuchs, “Alternative Media as Critical Media”, Euro- pean Journal of Social Theory, 13 (2), 2010, pp. 173—192, available at http://www.fuchs.uti.at/wp-content/uploads/ altmedia.pdf (accessed 10 October 2019) (hereafter, Fuchs, “Alternative Media as Critical Media”). IMS Briefing Paper / 55

33 For a more detailed description of press distribution in Syria, 72 Interview with SJOU2, 23 January 2019. 105 “RSF Index 2018”: “The continuing wars in Syria (117th) see Soazig Dollet, “The New Syrian Press: Appraisal, Chal- 73 “The ‘Ethical Charter for Syrian Media’ Conducts Its First and Yemen (down one at 167th) and the terrorism charges lenges and Outlook”, CFI, September 2015, available at Seminars inside Syria”, Enab Baladi, 20 August 2018, availa- still being used in Egypt (161st), Saudi Arabia (down one at https://www.cfi.fr/sites/default/files/etude_presse_syri- ble at https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2018/08/the- 169th) and Bahrain (down two at 166th) continue to make enne_EN.pdf (accessed 10 October 2019) (hereafter, Dollet, ethical-charter-for-syrian-media-conducts-its-first-semi- this the most difficult and dangerous region for journalists “The New Syrian Press”). nars-inside-syria/ (accessed 10 October 2019). to operate.” 34 Personal communication, SJOU1, 15 February 2019. 74 Interview with SJOU3, 23 January 2019. 106 http://www.dmc.ae/events/arab-media-outlook-2016/ 35 Based on interviews in Yazan Badran and Enrico De Angelis, 75 Interview with SJOU7 on 22 January 2019. 107 “Leapfrogging” is a phenomenon whereby consumers (or Syrian Media — Interim Report, 2015. 76 “MoU signed with Syndicate of French Journalists”, Syr- countries) forego or “skip” the previous version of a technol- 36 Interview with NGO1, 23 February 2019. ian Journalists Association, 28 January 2018, available at ogy and adopt a newer one, bypassing the route that mature 37 See, for example, the graph produced by the SNP on the geo- https://www.syja.org/en/home/news/32/advance-con- markets had to take. graphical origin of newspapers, available at https://syrian- tents/31022/mou-signed-with-syndicate-of-french-journal- 108 Arab Social Media Report, 2017, available at http://www. prints.org/en/chart (accessed 10 October 2019). ists (accessed 10 October 2019). arabsocialmediareport.com/home/index.aspx (accessed 10 38 On the geographical focus of Syrian emerging media, see 77 Interview with SJOU8, 5 February 2019. October 2019). also “Syria media monitoring — Journalism in the mak- 78 Interview with SJOU9, 23 January 2019. 109 Arab Social Media Report, 2017, available at http://www. ing”, Free Press Unlimited, available at https://www.free- 79 The Violation Documentation Center in Syria homepage, arabsocialmediareport.com/home/index.aspx (accessed 10 pressunlimited.org/en/syrian-media-monitoring-journal- available at https://vdc-sy.net/en/ (accessed 10 October October 2019). ism-in-the-making (accessed 10 October 2019) (hereafter, 2019). 110 Bertelsmann Stiftung, “BTI 2018 Country Report — Syria”, FPU, “Syria media monitoring”). 80 HURIDOCS homepage, available at https://www.huridocs. available at https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/coun- 39 Yazan Badran and Enrico De Angelis, “‘Independent’ Kurdish org/ (accessed 10 October 2019). try-reports/detail/itc/SYR/ (accessed 10 October 2019) Media in Syria: Conflicting Identities in the Transition”, Mid- 81 For results of the CSM transitional justice procedures, (hereafter, “BTI 2018 Country Report — Syria”). dle East Journal of Culture and Communication, (9) 3, 2016, see, for example, “Lawsuits Filed Against 25 Security Offi- 111 “BTI 2018 Country Report — Syria”. pp. 1-16. cials From the Assad Regime”, the Syrian Observer, 25 Feb- 40 See Yazan Badran and Enrico De Angelis, “Journalism in ruary 2019, available at https://syrianobserver.com/EN/ Rojava (II): Independent Media Between Freedom and Con- news/48784/lawsuits-filed-against-25-security-officials- trol”, SyriaUntold, 5 April 2019, available at https://syriaun- from-the-assad-regime.html (accessed 10 October 2019). told.com/2019/04/05/journalism-in-rojava-ii-independ- 82 IFEX homepage, available at https://www.ifex.org/ ent-media-between-freedom-and-control/ (accessed 10 (accessed 10 October 2019). October 2019); and “Journalism in Rojava (III): The Conflict- 83 “Women in Emerging Syrian Media: A Critical Discourse Anal- ing Identities of Independent Media”, SyriaUntold, 13 April ysis (2011—2016)”, Stichting Female Journalists Network, 2019, available at https://syriauntold.com/2019/04/13/jour- available at http://www.sfjn.org/research-en.pdf (accessed nalism-in-rojava-iii-the-conflicting-identities-of-independ- 10 October 2019). ent-media/(accessed 10 October 2019). 84 “Code of Conduct to Improve the Image of Women in Media”, 41 MICT, Syria Audience Research, August 2014, available at Syrian Female Journalists Network, available at http:// https://mict-international.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/ media.sfjn.org/en/code-of-conduct/ (accessed 10 October syrienstudie_20140814.pdf (accessed 10 October 2019). 2019). 42 MICT, Syria Audience Research 2016, available at https:// 85 Interview with SJOU12, 31 January 2019, Arnhem. mict-international.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/FPU_ 86 Interview with NGO4, 25 February 2019. GMDF_MiCT_audience_research_syria_2016.pdf (accessed 87 Interview with NGO4, 25 February 2019. 10 October 2019). 88 See more at Maha Taki, “SYRIA: Support to media where 43 Interview with SJOU4, 7 March 2018. media freedoms and rights are constrained”, BBC Media 44 Audience Research Draft, FPU, document received by email Action, 2012. on 20 February 2019. 89 See the next chapter. 45 FPU, “Syria media monitoring”. 90 Biljana Tatomir, “Syria Coordination — Status and Ways For- 46 Fuchs, “Alternative Media as Critical Media”, p. 179. ward: an assessment,” IMS, 2017 (hereafter, Tatomir, “Syria 47 Badran and Smets, 2018. Coordination”). 48 Interview with Malek Haddad, SMART, 12 February 2019. 91 Interview with NGO1, 13 February 2019; interview with NGO3, 49 In Issa (2016), p. 3. 6 February 2019. 50 See, for example, De Angelis, 2011; Della Ratta, 2018. 92 Interview with David Hivet, CFI, 5 February 2019. 51 De Angelis, 2012. 93 Antoun Issa, “Syria’s New Media Landscape: Independent 52 On the troubled relationship between SEM and their audi- Media Born Out of War”, MEI Policy Paper 2016-9, Middle ence, see, for example, Ali Bahlol, “Syrian Alternative Media: East Institute, December 2016, available at https://www.mei. In Search of an Audience”, Al-Jumhuriya, 30 May 2017, availa- edu/sites/default/files/publications/PP9_Issa_Syrianme- ble at https://www.aljumhuriya.net/en/content/syrian-alter- dia_web_0.pdf (accessed 10 October 2019). native-media-search-audience (accessed 10 October 2019). 94 Interview with NGOs, 23 January 2019. 53 For example, see Amira Galal, Event Based Media Report, 95 “Council adopts EU strategy on Syria”, Council of the EU, FPU, forthcoming. Press Release, 180/17, 3 April 2017, available at https://www. 54 Interview with SJOU5, 23 February 2019. consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/03/ 55 Dollet, “The New Syrian Press”, p. 14. fac-conclusions-syria/pdf (accessed 10 October 2019) (here- 56 Yazan Badran and Enrico De Angelis, IMS interim report, after, “Council adopts EU strategy on Syria”). 2015. 96 “Council adopts EU strategy on Syria”. 57 See Jaber Bakr and Abdullah Amin Al-Hallak, “Journalism in 97 In early 2013, GFMD — an international membership network Crisis. A Content Analysis of the Emerging Media Sector in of media assistance groups, founded in 2005 with the overall Syria”, the Samir Kassir Foundation and the Friedrich Nau- goal “to promote the importance of independent, pluralistic mann Foundation for Freedom, 2018, available at https://bei- and sustainable media in social and economic development” rut.fnst.org/content/journalism-crisis (accessed 10 October and “make media development an integral part of interna- 2019) (hereafter, Bakr and Al-Hallak, “Journalism in Crisis”). tional development strategies” — was at a crossroads. New 58 Bakr and Al-Hallak, “Journalism in Crisis”; FPU, “Syria media leadership, supported by active members of its Steering monitoring”. Committee, decided to explore new avenues and formats of 59 See, for example, “Syrian Alternative Media after eight collaborative activities that would re-enforce GFMD’s goals years: Polarization dominating the scene”, Enab Baladi, and revive its role. Yet the idea of Syria co-ordination was ini- 31 January 2019, available at https://english.enabba- tially met with scepticism formulated as safety and security ladi.net/archives/2019/01/syrian-alternative-media-af- concerns. ter-eight-years-polarization-dominating-the-scene/ 98 Tatomir, “Syria Coordination”. (accessed 10 October 2019). 99 “Democracy in Retreat: Freedom In The World 2019”, Free- 60 Fuchs, “Alternative Media as Critical Media”, p. 183. dom House, available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/ 61 Interview with SJOU11, 17 January 2019. freedom-world/freedom-world-2019 (accessed 10 October 62 Badran, forthcoming. 2019). 63 Yazan Badran and Enrico De Angelis, “Journalism in Raqqa 100 Committee to Protect Journalists’ Annual Report, 2018, avail- (IV): War, Reconstruction and Power Struggles”, Syr- able at https://cpj.org/about/CPJ.2018.Annual.Report.pdf iaUntold, 26 April 2019, available at https://syriauntold. (accessed 10 October 2019). com/2019/04/26/journalism-in-raqqa-iv-war-reconstruc- 101 “RSF Index 2018: Hatred of journalism threatens democra- tion-and-power-struggles/ (accessed 10 October 2019). cies”, Reporters Without Borders, available at https://rsf.org/ 64 Interview with NGO2. en/rsf-index-2018-hatred-journalism-threatens-democracies 65 Interview with an NGO representative, in Badran (forthcom- (accessed 10 October 2019) (hereafter, “RSF Index 2018”). ing). 102 “Democracy for All? V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 66 Interview with NGO1. 2018”, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), available at https:// 67 SyriaUntold, “ABRAJ”. www.v-dem.net/en/news-publications/democracy-reports/ 68 Yazan Badran and Enrico De Angelis, IMS interim report, (accessed 10 October 2019). 2015. 103 “The Expression Agenda Report 2016-2017”, Article 19, avail- 69 Interview with SJOU6,19 February 2019. able at https://www.article19.org/xpa-17/ (accessed 10 70 Internews joined the initiative in 2014 and 2015. October 2019). 71 Aidan White, “Hope in the Headlines as Syrian Media Launch 104 The Economist, “The global slump in press freedom”. a Journalists’ Charter”, Ethical Journalism Network, 21 Sep- tember 2015, available at https://ethicaljournalismnetwork. org/hope-in-the-headlines-as-syrian-media-launch-a-journalists-charter (accessed 10 October 2019). 56 / Syrian Independent Exile Media Annex IMS Briefing Paper / 57

Annex I Methodology

a) General considerations integrated into the methodological approach

The Syrian war — one of unprecedented lenges they have faced throughout”, as One might ask why the central topic of scope and complexity — is in its ninth IMS notes in its Call for Proposals. The this study is independent Syrian media year. The war has taken a heavy toll on development of the Syrian independent organisations in exile. As IMS has noted, civilians and displaced a huge portion media sector has many different paths. these organisations “are increasingly of Syria’s population. It has also trig- Some media organisations were set up trying to comprehend a future in exile, gered profound change in the Syrian in exile early on, while maintaining raising profound strategic and existen- media landscape. The highly controlled broad networks of correspondents and tial challenges to the future objective, vertical structure of the pre-war land- reporters in Syria; others were operat- relevance and role of Syrian independ- scape has been deeply shaken. Through ing fully in the country with various ent media in long-term exile with closing 2011 and 2012, new actors and groups levels of territorial outreach. spaces inside the country, and in turn, emerged, producing media content to its operational implications.” Acknowl- contest the regime’s narrative. A sort The short but rich recent history of Syr- edging that no part of the independent of bottom-up “media revolution” gave ian independent media organisations has media sector should be judged by its birth to hundreds of informational ini- already seen a discussion about which location, there are legitimate reasons tiatives with alternative narratives. It organisations should be given priority — for taking into consideration the pro- was soon succeeded by efforts to cre- a question usually posed by international longed exile modus operandi of Syr- ate media outlets. In many aspects, donors and less so by the sector itself. ian independent media organisations. these efforts are directly linked to the The dichotomy of “exile” vs. “country Syrian civic and peace movement and based” has been somewhat superficial According to the Reporters Without Bor- its demands for democracy, including from the outset, as it suggests conflict- ders index of global press freedom, Syria freedom of expression. ing approaches. In reality, the situation ranks third to last. It is also deemed “not on the ground has increasingly forced free” by Freedom House’s Freedom of In the years after 2011, the nascent inde- media organisations into exile — to the Press index. Syrian journalists are pendent media sector began to gradually neighbouring countries, with the big- persecuted by both state and non-state move on from its predominant feature gest concentration in Turkey, and more actors. The regime’s brutality in trying — activism — and towards considera- recently to Europe, due to the changing to silence independent voices is just one tion of media as its primary professional environment in Turkey and other neigh- source of extreme insecurity and threat engagement. Unlike regime-controlled, bouring countries. What is often over- to the safety of those trying to practise opposition or extremist media, whose looked in discussions fuelling the either/ independent journalism in Syria. The common feature was the promotion of or approach is that going into exile has recent killing of Raed Fares and Ham- an ideology, a distinct group of media never been a choice of convenience; it oud Jnaid from Radio Fresh is a painful outlets and media organisations opted was always a question of necessity that reminder of the level of hostility that all for independence and professionalism. drove decisions to move all or part of sides involved in the war pose to inde- As they developed, the “contours of a the organisation abroad. In addition, it pendent media and journalists. Accord- proper media sector has emerged, com- is very important to reconsider the term ing to Reporters Without Borders’ 2017 prising consolidated, reliable and pro- “exile media” in the context of new com- report, 211 journalists and citizen jour- fessional independent media outlets of munication technologies, and to take a nalists have been killed in the course increasing ethical standard and journal- closer look at what exactly defines media of Syria’s civil war and “Syria has for istic capabilities and legitimate media as “exile media”. years been the world’s deadliest coun- organisations, despite the enormous chal- try for journalists and citizen journal- 58 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

ists, who are caught between the Assad laws supportive of free speech or guar- level of approaches and recommenda- regime and its allies, Islamic State and antees that journalists can work in a safe tions that it produced, and b) to contex- many other radical Jihadi groups, and environment, independent Syrian media tualise the case of Syrian exile media the Kurdish forces.”1 organisations face extreme challenges in within this sector of media develop- assessing their future and are at critical ment globally. We specifically tried to The end of the war in Syria is not yet junction of their development. identify whether there was a consist- clearly on the horizon. Nevertheless, ency in approach to exile media and what kind of peace and post-war arrange- Their role in informing both Syrian and to what extent the lessons learned from ments will be reached matters even more international audiences about develop- the past were integrated into more cur- for Syrian independent media organisa- ments in Syria is critical. Moreover, they rent approaches. tions. Guarantees of freedom of expres- should be viewed as having “democratic sion and that independent media can capital” without which any post-war pro- We also considered it important to ana- operate freely in the country have so cess in Syria, no matter how remote in lyse past and current cases of exile media far not been part of any talks. Some of the future it seems, cannot take place. to present the factors driving media the countries involved in the war and into exile and their development strat- attempting to take more prominent roles The case of independent Syrian media egies, role and transition to in-country as “brokers of peace” are known for organisations proves that developmen- modus operandi where relevant. This their own dismal records vis-à-vis free- tal and professional progress is possi- also included the experience of exile dom of expression and media freedom. ble even in extreme situations. How- media in setting themselves up outside ever, the donor community (with very the country, in terms of internal organ- There is no evidence that this negative few exceptions) falls short in recogni- isation, news-gathering, management, trend will be reversed in the short- to tion of the role of independent media content dissemination and audience medium-term, as its major drivers stem outlets and organisations. Such a stra- surveys (where they existed), etc. We from the re-consolidation of authori- tegic approach would include adequate intended to present the methodology tarianism that varies in intensity from financial commitments, and co-ordinated used by those media and their donors in one country to another. Finally, global and sustained efforts to support the inde- defining the role as well as the impact trends are negative, too. The human pendent media sector with a medium- of the exile media. rights agenda in international relations to long-term vision. Notwithstanding — dominant in the 1990s — has fallen the benefits of training and technical Analysis of past cases of exile media in priority since the 2000s. Taking the and institutional support received by (Zimbabwe, Burma) and current cases MENA region into consideration, sta- various international media assistance (Belarus, Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran) bility, counter-terrorism and migration organisations so far, the overall lack was intended to present several differ- have once again been at the forefront of of long-term approaches on the donor ent contexts and models such as: hybrid bilateral relationships — an approach side has translated into a number of cases of “co-existence” of exile media that perpetuates pre-revolution strategies interventions with a short time-frame alongside independent media operating that were seen as stabilising the position and, moreover, to prioritising strategic in the country, as well as “pure” cases of the region’s authoritarian strongholds communications over media develop- where exile media are the only source rather than challenging them. These are ment. Changes in donor priorities have of independent content. Along the same the elements of the broader context that already been felt among independent lines, we highlighted cases of exile must be taken into account in strategic Syrian media organisations. Develop- media making the transition to in-coun- considerations related to Syrian media mental progress could be short-lived if try operations by looking at the internal organisations in exile. pure survival becomes uncertain. and external preconditions and the role those media played in their countries’ It is commonplace that independent media landscape in exile and post-ex- media rely on a complex system that ile life. It was highly relevant to high- includes professional journalism, sound b) Approach light cases of exile media that existed management of media enterprises, sta- for a while but eventually closed after ble sources of funding, the proper means several or more years and to analyse the to gather and distribute news, modern b1) Contextualising Syrian reasons for their closure. equipment, media laws supportive of free exile media organisations and speech, and the ability of journalists to institutions in the broader While recognising the unique nature of work in a safe environment. With their framework the Syrian media landscape, we aimed country’s infrastructure having been to look at examples that were trans-bor- severely destroyed, no forecast of how We considered it important to create der, less related to the context of the rel- soon and with what funding it will be a broader framework for analysis for evant countries and regions, and more reconstructed, no evidence that peace at least two reasons: a) to systematise related to the exile status, chosen strat- talks include any discussion of media the existing body of knowledge on the egies and use of new technologies. IMS Briefing Paper / 59

b2) Analysing the historical In order to have as precise a picture as A second round of interviews took place background, the advent of possible, we relied on a combination of in the following months, mainly via Syrian independent media, and extensive literature analysis and in-depth Skype, in order to confirm or com- their current issues and future interviews with Syrian journalists, media plete some of the information previ- scenarios development workers, and donors’ rep- ously collected. resentatives. A particular effort was The central section of the report analyses made to highlight the challenges the the state of Syrian exile media organi- actors currently face, as well as their sations and institutions today and in the strategies to overcome them, and their d) Field visits recent past. The first part is dedicated to achievements. a brief historical analysis of the media Field visits took place to cities with landscape in Syria before the uprising, In the final paragraph, we outlined pos- the greatest concentration of Syrian the emergence of media activism after sible future developments in the field, exiled media actors: Istanbul, Gazian- 2011, and the emergence of alternative in terms of both obstacles and oppor- tep, Berlin and Paris. The visits ena- media during the war. This derived from tunities. bled the team to interview a variety of a belief that a real attempt to provide a stakeholders in newsrooms, as well as more complete history of Syrian alter- have in-depth interviews with individ- native media was lacking. Moreover, we uals who work without a fixed office are convinced that it was necessary in c) Research methods space. Two researchers were present at order to better grasp different aspects most meetings in order to corroborate of the current situation, and to better the stories; where needed, recordings assess the value of the phenomenon. c1) Desk study were made to ensure proper attribution.

The evolution of media organisations We collected, systematised and stud- and institutions was divided into three ied available academic and semi-aca- phases: “the beginning” (2011—2012)”, demic research, publications and other “the boom” (2013—2015), and “the relevant documents on exile media to Editorial work was finalized December troublesome years” (2016—2018). For extract lessons learned in this field of 2019 each phase, we tried to highlight the media development (see Annex II a). main elements in terms of active out- This entailed: lets, geographical focus, institutionali- • relevant literature on media devel- sation processes, funding sources, out- opment in conflict, post-conflict reach and audience, media typologies, and fragile states to identify com- professionalisation, and journalistic pro- mon and divergent points in vari- duction. Throughout the analysis, our ous approaches aim was to clarify the processes that • relevant literature on exile media brought most of the considered outlets • existing literature on donors’ into a state of exile, and their different approaches to exile media approaches to it. • existing literature on Syrian media organisations and institutions The second part is dedicated to a critical analysis of the current situation. We decided to contextualise this part c2) Interviews with different with an introduction to the terminolo- groups of stakeholders gies used to define media organisations and institutions like those at the core of We considered the following groups of this study, considering that this termi- stakeholders relevant to our research: nology inevitably shapes how the field donors, media development and free- is perceived and approached. dom of expression organisations, the community of practice and, most impor- We then analysed the main issues that tantly, the Syrian media organisations currently characterise the field: media for- and institutions. Between January and mats and typologies, geographic distribu- February 2019, we conducted a num- tion, audience, editorial identity, funding ber of interviews (see Annex II b) in context and strategies, the legal context, an open interview format with guiding Note institutionalisation and professionalisa- questions (see Annex II c). 1 RSF, “In Syria, 211 journalists killed in conflict that began six tion processes, and collaborations. years ago”. 60 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

Donors:

Annex II b): Joel Campagna Regional Manager, Open Society Foundations (OSF), List of interviews 18 January 2019 Meg Gaydosik Former Senior Media Development Advisor, USAID Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, 15 January 2019

Ivar Evensmo Senior Adviser, Department for Economic Development, Gender and Governance, Section for Human Rights, Governance and Fragility, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), 16 January 2019

Elisabeth Salvesen Senior Adviser, Section for Human Rights and Democracy, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 January 2019 IMS Briefing Paper / 61

Media Development and Community of Practice: Syrian Media Organisations Freedom of Expression and Institutions: Organisations: Jane McElhone former Senior Manager, OSF, 29 January 2019 Koumay al-Mulhem Jesper Højberg Marie Struthers Editor-in-Chief, MICT, 13 February 2019 Executive Director, International Media Support, 7 February 2019 former Senior Manager, OSF, 29 January 2019 Jawad Shorbaji Michael de Villiers Wilf Mbanga Editor-in-Chief, Enab Baladi, 24 January 2019 Director, IREX Europe, 16 January 2019 founder of The Zimbabwean, 15 January 2019 Akram al-Ahmad Martin Landi John Masuku Head of the Board Committee, ECSM, 23 January 2019 Senior Technical Advisor, IREX US, 17 January 2019 founder of the Voice of the People, 18 January 2019 Khalil Agha Serena Hamilton member of the Board Committee, ECSM, 23 January 2019 Chief of the Party, IREX Istanbul, 5 February 2019 Deiaa Duchmoch Leon Willems Managing Director, ANA Press, 23 January 2019 Director of Policy and Programmes, Free Press Unlimited, Hussein Berro 10 February 2019 Board Director, SNP, 19 February 2019 Jens-Uwe Rahe Ibrahim Hussein Head of Middle East/North Africa, DW Akademie, 26 February 2019 Managing Director, SJA, 22 January 2019 Johan Romare Youssef Wahbe former Director, FOJO, 31 January 2019 General Project Manager, SCM, 5 February 2019 James Deane Mohammed Haddad Director of Policy and Learning, BBC Media Action, 8 February 2019 Manager of Journalist’s House, SCM, 23 January 2019 David Hivet Rula Asad Director for Mediterranean Region and Asia, Canal France Executive Director, SFJN, 31 January 2019 International, 5 February 2019 Roberta Pasini Martial Tourneur Executive Director, SyriaUntold, 16 January 2019 Head of Assistance Desk, Reporters Without Borders, Mohamed Dibo 12 February 2019 Editor-in-Chief, SyriaUntold, 16 January 2019 Mira Milosevic Yassin Swehat Executive Director, Global Forum for Media Development, 5 Editor-in-Chief, Al-Jumhuriya, 17 January 2019 February 2019 Karam Nachar Elisabetta Plebani Executive Director, Al-Jumhuriya, 25 January 2019 Syria Program Coordinator, Free Press Unlimited, 25 February 2019 Absi Smeisem Henrik Grunet Managing Director, Sada al-Sham, 25 January 2019 former Programme Manager, International Media Support, Jawad Abou Almuna 21 February 2019 Managing Director, Souriatna, 25 January 2019 Malek Haddad Editor-in-Chief, SMART News Agency, 12 February 2019 Lina Chawaf Director (Paris), Radio Rozana, 22 January 2019 Munir Alayoubi and Tammam Alboumayed project managers (Gaziantep), Radio Rozana, 23 January 201 62 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

Guiding questions for donors, media development Annex II c) organisations and the community of practice:

Based on your insight and professional experience, were donor policies and the practice of media development in conflict and closed societies changing? If so, how?

What were the premises for such policies?

What were the broader frameworks under which media development/ assistance in conflict-affected and closed societies were typically hosted (human rights angle, good governance, etc.)?

How was the role of the media defined in such contexts?

Were exile media integral to those approaches?

In practice, what justification was employed for the exile media to become a part of the assistance programmes?

How were they supported?

What are the key lessons learned from such programmes?

According to your observations, what has been happening lately with donor community policies/approach to exiled media and media in conflict/ post-conflict areas? What, in your opinion, could and should change in that approach?

Should the term “exile media” prompt a definition change in the digital age?

What has been/is your organisation’s approach to Syria/Syrian media? IMS Briefing Paper / 63

Guiding questions for Syrian Organisation Training organisations and institutions: How is the organisation internally What type of training does the Was the organisation first set up in organised? organisation need, and in which exile? areas? How many people reside at your HQ, Was the organisation first set up in and in what organisational capacity? What type of training has the Syria? organisation received? Does the organisation have an What reasons drove the associated network of contributors in Who were the main training organisation’s decision to leave Syria? providers? Syria? What are the main organisational What type of training has the What reasons drove the issues related to having staff in organisation received that it organisation’s decision to move from multiple locations? considers beneficial? one country of exile to another? Does the organisation have a strategy Which training programmes were less Is the organisation planning to and, if so, for what period? successful? move to Syria and, if so, what is the organisation’s perceived period of operation from exile? Content Finance

What pre-conditions have to be in What are the main features of the What is the organisation’s main place for the organisation to consider organisation’s editorial profile? source of funding? moving to Syria? Does the organisation have an Who are the main donors? internal code of ethics? Legal set up: Where are the perceived changes in How does the organisation ensure the donors’ readiness to provide support? Where is the organisation legally output of professional content? registered? Are the donors’ approaches affecting What is the organisation’s perceived the organisation’s situation and, if so, What were the reasons for that legal niche compared to other Syrian in what ways? set-up? media? Are there any other sources of What is the advantage of that legal Does the organisation collaborate income? set-up? with other Syrian media on content production (and/or foreign media)? Are there potentially other sources of What is the disadvantage of that legal income? set-up? Audience and impact How is the legal status of staff residing in the country of exile Does the organisation target a resolved? specific audience?

How does the organisation track and measure its audience?

How does the organisation engage with its audience?

What does the organisation consider to be its impact? 64 / Syrian Independent Exile Media

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