DOCSLIB.ORG

The Ethics & Morality of Robotic Warfare

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Ethics & Morality of Robotic Warfare The Ethics & Morality of Robotic Warfare: Assessing the Debate over Autonomous Weapons Michael C. Horowitz Abstract: There is growing concern in some quarters that the drones used by the United States and others represent precursors to the further automation of military force through the use of lethal autonomous weap- on systems (LAWS). These weapons, though they do not generally exist today, have already been the sub- ject of multiple discussions at the United Nations. Do autonomous weapons raise unique ethical questions for warfare, with implications for just war theory? This essay describes and assesses the ongoing debate, fo- cusing on the ethical implications of whether autonomous weapons can operate effectively, whether human accountability and responsibility for autonomous weapon systems are possible, and whether delegating life and death decisions to machines inherently undermines human dignity. The concept of LAWS is extreme- ly broad and this essay considers LAWS in three categories: munition, platforms, and operational systems. The growing use of drones on today’s battlefields raises important questions about targeting and the threshold for using military force. Over ninety mili- taries and nonstate actors have drones of some kind and almost a dozen of these have armed drones. In 2015, Pakistan shot down an Indian drone in the dis- puted Kashmir region, Turkey shot down a drone near its border with Syria, and both Nigeria and Pa- MICHAEL C. HOROWITZ is As- 1 sociate Professor of Political Sci- kistan acquired armed drones. ence at the University of Penn- The use of drones by the United States and oth- sylvania and Associate Director ers has led to an array of questions about the appro- of Penn’s Perry World House. He priateness of so-called remote-controlled warfare. formerly worked for the U.S. De- Yet on the horizon is something that many fear even partment of Defense. His publi- more: the rise of lethal autonomous weapon sys- cations include Why Leaders Fight tems (laws).2 At the 2016 Convention on Certain (2015) and The Diffusion of Mili- tary Power: Causes and Consequences Conventional Weapons in Geneva, over one hun- for International Politics (2010). dred countries and nongovernmental organiza- You can follow him on Twitter tions (ngos) spent a week discussing the potential @mchorowitz. development and use of autonomous weapon sys- © 2016 by Michael C. Horowitz doi:10.1162/DAED_ a_00409 25 The Ethics tems. An ngo, The Future of Life Insti- are undoubtedly subcomponents of each & Morality tute, broke into the public consciousness issue not discussed here. Most generally, of Robotic Warfare in 2015 with a call, signed by luminaries this essay finds that the ethical challenges Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking, as well associated with autonomous weapons may as scientists around the world, to prohib- vary significantly depending on the type of it the creation of autonomous weapons.3 weapon. laws could fall into three catego- Two essential questions underlie the de- ries: munition, platforms, and operational bate about autonomous weapons: first, systems. While concerns may be overstated would autonomous weapons be more or for laws that will be most akin to next-gen- less effective than nonautonomous weapon eration munitions, when thinking about au- systems? Second, does the nature of auton- tonomous weapon platforms or operation- omous weapons raise ethical and/or moral al systems for managing wars, laws raise considerations that either recommend their more important questions. Caution and a development or justify their prohibition? realistic focus on maintaining the centrali- Ultimately, the unique facet distinguishing ty of the human in decisions about war will laws from non-laws is that the weapon be critical. system, not a person, selects and engages targets. Therefore, it’s critical to consid- Given the use of drones by the United er whether the use of laws could comply States and others against terrorists and broadly with the protection of life in war, insurgents around the world, there is a a core ethical responsibility for the use of tendency to conflate the entire category force; whether laws can be used in ways of military robotics with specific cases of that guarantee accountability and responsi- drone strikes. However, it is a mistake to bility for the use of force; and whether there focus solely on the drone strike trees and is something about machines selecting and miss the vast military robotics forest. For engaging targets that makes them ethically example, as current platforms, like the problematic. Given the centrality of these rq-4 Global Hawk, and next generation issues in debates about just war theory, it experimental technologies, like the x-47b therefore makes the issue of laws relevant (United States) and Sharp Sword (China), to just war theory as well. demonstrate, drones are potentially use- This essay examines the potentially ful for much more than simply targeted unique ethical and moral issues surround- strikes, and in the future could engage in an ing laws, as opposed to nonautonomous even larger category of military missions. weapon systems, especially as they relate Moreover, the focus on drone strikes pre- to just war theory, in an attempt to lay out sumes that military robotics are only use- some of the key topics for thinking about ful in the air. But there are a variety of mis- laws moving forward. It does not engage, sions–from uninhabited truck convoys to however, with certain legal arguments sur- the Knifefish sea mine detection system to rounding laws, such as whether interna- Israel’s unmanned surface patrol vehicle, tional humanitarian law implies that hu- the Protector–in which robotic systems can mans must make every individual life-or- play a significant role outside the context death decision, or whether laws violate the of airborne-targeted killings.5 Martens Clause of the Hague Convention Within the realm of military robotics, au- by violating the dictates of the human con- tonomy is already extensively used, includ- science.4 Moreover, different opponents of ing in autopilot, identifying and tracking laws make different arguments, as do dif- potential targets, guidance, and weapons ferent critics of those opponents, so there detonation.6 Though simple autonomous 26 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences weapons are already possible, there is vast ing decisions about who to target and when Michael C. uncertainty about the state of the possible to fire weapons via algorithm clearly is. In Horowitz when it comes to artificial intelligence and between these extremes, however, is a vast its application to militaries. While robots and murky gulf–from incremental ad- that could discriminate between a person vances on the precision guided weapons holding a rifle and a person holding a stick of today to humanoid robots stalking the still seem to be on the horizon, technology earth–that complicates our thinking about is advancing quickly. How quickly and how the ethical and moral challenges associat- prepared society will be for it, though, are ed with laws and the implications for just open questions.7 A small number of weap- war theory. on systems currently have human-super- In 2012, the U.S. Department of Defense vised autonomy. Many variants of the close- (dod) defined an autonomous weapon in weapon systems (ciws) deployed by the as “A weapon system that, once activat- U.S. military and more than two dozen mil- ed, can select and engage targets without itaries around the world, for example, have further intervention by a human opera- an automatic mode.8 Normally, the system tor.”11 The dod further distinguished be- works by having a human operator identi- tween autonomous weapons, human-su- fy and target enemy missiles or planes and pervised autonomous weapons (that is, au- fire at them. However, if the number of in- tonomous weapons that feature a human coming threats is so large that a human op- “on the loop” who possesses an override erator cannot target and fire against them switch), and semiautonomous weapons, or effectively, the operator can activate an au- “a weapon system that, once activated, is tomatic mode whereby the computer tar- intended to only engage individual targets gets and fires against the incoming threats. or specific target groups that have been se- There is also an override switch the human lected by a human operator.”12 ngo groups, can use to stop the system. such as Human Rights Watch, have gener- Nearly all those discussing autonomous ally adopted similar definitions.13 This es- weapons–from international organiza- say does as well, considering lethal auton- tions to governments to the Campaign to omous weapon systems as weapon systems Stop Killer Robots–agree that laws differ that, once activated, are designed to select fundamentally from the weapons that mil- and engage targets not previously designat- itaries employ today.9 While simple at first ed by a human.14 Defining what it means glance, this point is critical: when consid- to select and engage targets is complicat- ering the ethical and moral challenges asso- ed, however. For example, if homing muni- ciated with autonomous weapons, the cate- tions are considered to “select and engage” gory only includes weapons that operate in targets, then autonomous weapons have ex- ways appreciably different from the weap- isted since World War II. ons of today.10 Resolving the definitional debate is be- From a common sense perspective, de- yond the scope of this essay. But even if fining an autonomous weapon as a weap- there is not a clear agreement on exactly on system that selects and engages targets what constitutes an autonomous weapon, on its own makes intuitive sense. More- breaking down laws into three “types” over, it is easy to describe, at the extremes, of potential autonomous weapons–muni- what constitutes an autonomous weap- tion, platforms, and operational systems– on.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Third Battle
    NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT PAPERS 16 The Third Battle Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines N ES AV T A A L T W S A D R E C T I O N L L U E E G H E T R I VI IBU OR A S CT MARI VI Owen R. Cote, Jr. Associate Director, MIT Security Studies Program The Third Battle Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines Owen R. Cote, Jr. Associate Director, MIT Security Studies Program NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, Rhode Island Naval War College The Newport Papers are extended research projects that the Newport, Rhode Island Editor, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the Center for Naval Warfare Studies President of the Naval War College consider of particular Newport Paper Number Sixteen interest to policy makers, scholars, and analysts. Candidates 2003 for publication are considered by an editorial board under the auspices of the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies. President, Naval War College Rear Admiral Rodney P. Rempt, U.S. Navy Published papers are those approved by the Editor of the Press, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the President Provost, Naval War College Professor James F. Giblin of the Naval War College. Dean of Naval Warfare Studies The views expressed in The Newport Papers are those of the Professor Alberto R. Coll authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy. Naval War College Press Editor: Professor Catherine McArdle Kelleher Correspondence concerning The Newport Papers may be Managing Editor: Pelham G.
    [Show full text]
  • Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Industry: Centralized Control of Abundant
    Taiwan’s Indigenous Defense Industry: Centralized Control of Abundant Suppliers David An, Matt Schrader, Ned Collins-Chase May 2018 About the Global Taiwan Institute GTI is a 501(c)(3) non-profit policy incubator dedicated to insightful, cutting-edge, and inclusive research on policy issues regarding Taiwan and the world. Our mission is to enhance the relationship between Taiwan and other countries, especially the United States, through policy research and programs that promote better public understanding about Taiwan and its people. www.globaltaiwan.org About the Authors David An is a senior research fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute. David was a political-military affairs officer covering the East Asia region at the U.S. State Department from 2009 to 2014. Mr. An received a State Department Superior Honor Award for initiating this series of political-military visits from senior Taiwan officials, and also for taking the lead on congressional notification of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. He received his M.A. from UCSD Graduate School of Global Policy and Strategy and his B.A. from UC Berkeley. Matt Schrader is the Editor-in-Chief of the China Brief at the Jamestown Foundation, MA candidate at Georgetown University, and previously an intern at GTI. Mr. Schrader has over six years of professional work experience in China. He received his BA from the George Washington University. Ned Collins-Chase is an MA candidate at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and previously an intern at GTI. He has worked in China, been a Peace Corps volunteer in Mo- zambique, and was also an intern at the US State Department.
    [Show full text]
  • The Army's Mobility Solution to the Joint Forcible Entry Problem
    R M Y A P R E E S H S T F S O A R S APOJ 16-9 T N L A E K A , V H 19 February 2016 ENWORT The Army’s Mobility Solution to the Joint Forcible Entry Problem By Capt. Kyle Wolfley To obtain the advantage of an enemy who cannot react because he is surprised and unready, or at least of an enemy who cannot react promptly and in full force, all sorts of paradoxical choices may be justified. Violating commonsense criteria of what is best and most efficient—as the shorter route is preferable to the longer…the bad option may deliberately be chosen in the hope that the unfolding action will not be expected by the enemy… -Edward Luttwak, Strategy1 Military innovation during long periods of peace has often determined the victors of the next war. Throughout the interwar period of 1919-1939, the major powers experienced mixed results with developing the technology, doctrine, and organization to overcome the attritional style of warfare that defined World War I. The strategic, political, and organizational climate of each country either provided the breeding ground for revolution- ary ideas or established enough obstacles to inhibit innovation.2 The United States today is faced with a similar task to develop the strategy and technology to address challenging future threats. The US Air Force and Navy, through their joint Air-Sea Battle Operational Concept, have developed a framework for defeating the Anti-Ac- cess/Area Denial threat posed by potential adversaries. Although this concept provides a solution to ensure access to the global commons, the US also needs to retain the ability to seize terrain to achieve decisive results in war.
    [Show full text]
  • Naval Surface Ship Weapon Systems Reliabilityreliability in Challenging Sea Environments
    Courtesy of Indian Navy Royal Navy, MoD/Crown copyright 2014 Courtesy of U.S. Navy, Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Joe Bishop Naval Surface Ship Weapon Systems ReliabilityReliability In Challenging Sea Environments Moog is a leading supplier delivering high-precision motion control and electronic solutions to many of the world's naval forces. With a defence heritage dating back to the early 1950’s, Moog provides the reliability and performance required in variable sea states to support vital mission success. Moog’s comprehensive systems are engineered to perform reliably in the harshest of marine environments, providing the long-life and dependability our customers require. Extending our customers’ investments even further is the scalability and upgradeability designed into every component and system along with through life support. To ensure reliability, Moog meets a variety of critical Military Standards (MIL-STD) required for the toughest marine requirements. Courtesy of U.S. Navy, Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Anthony Harding High Performance Weapon Systems for Fast Patrol Boats Courtesy of Rheinmetall “Hit First” Aiming, Stabilisation and Tracking Systems for Remote Weapon Systems 2 Reliability Components,Components Sub-systems and and Systems Full Systems From new system design to obsolescence management and platform upgrades, Moog supports the complete life cycle of today’s modern naval forces. Moog naval capabilities encompass: design engineering expertise, simulation, complex integration, manufacturing, rapid prototyping, and modeling – all aligned to meet current and expected future needs of naval forces. Moog’s 30+ year naval heritage delivers affordability, logistics support, high end use reliability and lasting performance to meet the most demanding specifications.
    [Show full text]
  • (Riwp®) Award for US Army M-SHORAD Increment 1 Program
    Moog Moog Inc. ▪ East Aurora, New York ▪ 14052 ▪ 716-652-2000 Press Information Release Date: IMMEDIATE Contact: Ann Marie Luhr May 19, 2021 716-687-4225 MOOG ANNOUNCES RECONFIGURABLE INTEGRATED-WEAPONS PLATFORM (RIwP®) AWARD FOR U.S. ARMY M-SHORAD INCREMENT 1 PROGRAM EAST AURORA, NY, Moog Inc. (NYSE: MOG.A and MOG.B) announced today that its Space and Defense Segment was selected by Leonardo DRS to supply 28 Reconfigurable Integrated- weapons Platform (RIwP) turrets for the U.S. Army’s Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense Increment 1 (M-SHORAD Inc. 1) program. M-SHORAD Inc. 1 is designed around the U.S. Army Stryker A1 platform, with Moog’s innovative RIwP being the centerpiece of Leonardo DRS’ Mission Equipment Package. The modularity of RIwP allowed Moog to provide nine prototypes in record time for the Army’s evaluation, leading to this significant award. The initial contract award is for 30 RIwP turrets, 28 to directly support the M- SHORAD Inc. 1 program, one demo unit, and one spare. The RIwP M-SHORAD Inc. 1 configuration integrates multiple kinetic effectors including the XM914 30mm cannon and M240 7.62mm machine gun, along with Stinger and Longbow HELLFIRE® missiles. Additionally, this configuration includes MXTM-GCS sighting systems, and Moog’s own HELLFIRE Missile Launcher. “The field-proven RIwP is the result of commitment to unmatched capability from a dedicated team that leverages the best of our company’s diverse and advanced technologies,” said Jim Riedel, Group Vice President. “Moog’s defense business is committed to Equipping Those Who Defend Freedom and based on the positive feedback shared so far from the trained soldiers, RIwP is rapidly building a solid reputation to fulfill all current and future mission objectives.” "We were delighted to hear of our selection as a key supplier on the M-SHORAD Inc.
    [Show full text]
  • The BTR Handbook- the Universal APC
    SEP 2013 The BTR Handbook- The Universal APC TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) [Type the author name] United States Army 6/1/2012 OEA Team Handbook Purpose To inform the Army training community of the large number of Soviet styled BTR (Bronetransporter) Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) found in over 70 countries. To describe the improvements made in the BTRs from the post-World War II period to the latest versions. To provide a distribution summary for each major BTR type by country. To discuss the capabilities of each group of BTRs. To enumerate each BTR version with a short description of the vehicle’s purpose. To present photographs of many of the BTR variants. Executive Summary Demonstrates the spread of the BTR to over 70 countries around the world, including much of Africa, Eastern Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East. Makes obvious that both American allies and potential foes use the BTR as a standard APC for their infantry or a support vehicle. Provides a historical perspective of the BTR and each subsequent APC generation. Lists each generation of BTR and its variants. Includes photographs of many BTR versions. Cover photos: Top photo: BTR-40 at the Batey ha-Osef museum in Tel Aviv, Israel; Wikimedia Commons; 2005. Bottom photo: BTR-80A, Wikimedia Commons, 13 September 2008. 2 UNCLASSIFIED OEA Team Handbook Map Figure 1. Countries with BTR Variants. The red stars indicate the countries where BTR variants can be found. Introduction Even though the first Soviet Bronetransporter (BTR) made its first appearance not long after the end of World War II, the BTR is still a major armored personnel carrier (APC) and weapons platform in over 70 countries around the world.
    [Show full text]
  • Autonomous Weapon Systems: Technical, Military, Legal and Humanitarian Aspects
    EXPERT MEETING AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS TECHNICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS GENEVA, SWITZERLAND 26 TO 28 MARCH 2014 International Committee of the Red Cross 19, avenue de la Paix 1202 Geneva, Switzerland T +41 22 734 60 01 F +41 22 733 20 57 E-mail: [email protected] www.icrc.org © ICRC, November 2014 AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: TECHNICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS EXPERT MEETING GENEVA, SWITZERLAND 26 to 28 MARCH 2014 Autonomous weapon systems: Technical, military, legal and humanitarian aspects. 2 Expert meeting, Geneva, Switzerland, 26-28 March 2014. CONTENTS Introduction and structure of the report 5 Part I: Summary report by the International Committee of the Red Cross 7 Meeting highlights 7 Background 11 Summary of presentations and discussions 12 Part II: Selected presentations 25 Civilian robotics and developments in autonomous systems 25 – Ludovic Righetti Autonomous weapons and human supervisory control 29 – Noel Sharkey Ethical restraint of lethal autonomous robotic systems: Requirements, 33 research, and implications – Ronald Arkin Research and development of autonomous ‘decision-making’ systems 39 – Darren Ansell Can autonomous weapon systems respect the principles of distinction, 41 proportionality and precaution? – Marco Sassòli Increasingly autonomous weapon systems: Accountability and responsibility 45 – Christof Heyns Ethical issues raised by autonomous weapon systems 49 – Peter Asaro Autonomous weapon systems and ethics 53 – Peter Lee Part III: Background paper by the International Committee of the Red Cross 57 Executive summary 57 Introduction 59 Part A: Autonomy in weapon systems 59 Part B: Applying international humanitarian law 74 Part C: Ethical and societal concerns, and the dictates of public conscience 91 Annex 1: Expert meeting agenda 95 Annex 2: List of participants 99 Autonomous weapon systems: Technical, military, legal and humanitarian aspects.
    [Show full text]
  • Envisioning the Deep Future of Small Arms 2022-2042
    Deputy Assistance Secretary of the Army for Research & Technology Technology Wargaming Implementation Office (SAAL-ZT) Envisioning the Deep Future of Small Arms 2022-2042 Contributors Jason Augustyn, US Army Natick Soldier RD&E Center SAALZT-TR-2013-03 Nathan Burkholder, SAAL-ZT Dan Evans, Network Science Center, United States Military Academy Brian Freeman, Department of History, United States Military Academy John Graham, Network Science Center, United States Military Academy Nicholas Sambaluk, Department of History, United States Military Academy David Siry, Department of History, United States Military Academy Charles Thomas, Department of History, United States Military Academy John Willis, Institute for Innovation and Development, United States Military Academy Peter A. Wilson, RAND Corporation UNCLASSIFIED Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. Mary J. Miller Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research & Technology Developing Future Technology Concepts for Small Arms ii Table of Contents Executive Summary iv List of Figures and Tables vii Figures vii Tables vii List of Acronyms viii Introduction 1 Lessons for the Future from the History of US Army Small Arms 3 Insights into the Strategic and Tactical Environment of 2022-2042 7 Insights into Future Technologies for Small Arms 10 Insights into the Nature of Innovation in Army S&T 15 Conclusions 17 References 19 Appendix A: Historical Perspectives on Small Arms 21 The Parallel Evolution of Small Arms and Small Unit Doctrine 21 Small Units in the Muzzle Loading
    [Show full text]
  • Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies
    Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies John Yoo* Dramatic advances in weapons technology over the past two decades have led to a revolution in military affairs. Robotics and cyber weapons have used real-time information and communications to produce precision that has reduced casualties and blurred the line between war and peace. Critics fear that these developments will encourage nations to resort to force more often; they call for international agreements to ban the new technologies. This Essay argues that efforts to limit the use of such weapons are both misguided and counterproductive. New military technologies will advance humanitarian aims by reducing civilian casualties and the overall destructiveness of war. A rationalist approach to war even suggests that these weapons will create more opportunities for the settlement of international disputes with less use of force. Introduction .................................................................................................... 444 I. New Military Technology and the Laws of War ......................................... 449 A. New Military Technology ............................................................ 449 1. Air ........................................................................................ 450 2. Land ....................................................................................... 452 3. Sea ........................................................................................ 454 4. Cyber ....................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Strategic Contours of China's Arms Transfers
    STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY - PERSPECTIVE Strategic Contours of China’s Arms Transfers MICHAEL RASKA RICHARD A. BITZINGER Abstract Over the past two decades, China has gone from being a significant importer of conventional arms to being an increasingly competitive ex- porter of major weapons systems. Its increasing presence on global arms markets reflects the relative progress of Chinese defense, science, tech- nology, innovation, and industry in terms of developing and manufactur- ing relatively advanced military platforms and technologies. China aims for relative parity with the global military-technological state- of- the- art base by fostering indigenous innovation—mitigating foreign dependen- cies on technological transfers and arms imports—while leveraging civil- military integration to overcome entrenched barriers to innovation. At the same time, China’s current arms export strategy reflects varying “competi- tive” paths. In the developing countries of Latin America, Africa, and even Central Asia, China is trying to position itself as an alternative to Russian arms exports while also counterbalancing the influence of Western pow- ers. Consequently, China has a growing capability to shape the direction and character of the varying regional arms competitions—not only through its military- technological development and diffusion of arms ex- ports but, more importantly, through its strategic choices that influence the development of strategic alliances and balance of power in different geographic areas. ***** hina’s rising global geopolitical aspirations—backed up by grow- ing economic clout—shape the direction and character of its military- technological choices, including its strategic interests to Cstrengthen its position on global arms markets. Since 2010, China has been able to accelerate its transition from a large arms importer into a net exporter, with the potential to become one of the world’s leading arms exporters.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Progress with Directed Energy Weapons by Richard D. Fisher, Jr
    China’s Progress with Directed Energy Weapons By Richard D. Fisher, Jr. Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing, “China’s Advanced Weapons,” Washington, D.C, February 23, 2017 Introduction For the United States, decades of technology investments in directed energy weapons—lasers, railguns and high power microwave—are finally nearing the point of providing “next generation” capabilities over potential enemies. Effective early defensive laser weapons plus defensive-offensive railguns could be deployed in the early 2020s, while multi-platform high power but compact laser weapons could be realized in the 2030s. However, it appears increasingly likely that any period of advantage from these weapons could be shorter than expected due to China’s large investments in energy weapons development. As in many areas of advanced military technology development, it is difficult to assess precisely China’s successes or progress toward the fielding of energy weapons. While Chinese military transparency has improved gradually in some areas, with few exceptions, it does not approach that of the U.S. in energy weapons.1 “Grey Sources” can provide some insights but they do not allow for a full understanding of potential threats. That said, China’s development of laser technology dates back to the early 1960s, aided by an early and enduring commitment by top Chinese political and military leaders. Today, early Chinese low-power electric Solid State Laser (SSL) “kill” weapons are being marketed as there are indications China is also developing more powerful laser weapons, showing interest in using them on land, naval, air and space platforms.
    [Show full text]
  • FORCES of the ASTRA MILITARUM Official Update Version 1.6
    WARHAMMER 40,000 – IMPERIAL ARMOUR INDEX: FORCES OF THE ASTRA MILITARUM Official Update Version 1.6 Although we strive to ensure that our rules are perfect, Pages 19, 20, 21 and 69 – Leman Russ Annihilator, sometimes mistakes do creep in, or the intent of a rule Leman Russ Conqueror, Leman Russ Stygies and Death isn’t as clear as it might be. These documents collect Korps Leman Russ Mars-Alpha Battle Tanks amendments to the rules and present our responses to Change Grinding Advance to read: players’ frequently asked questions. As they’re updated ‘Grinding Advance: If this model remains stationary or regularly, each has a version number; when changes moves under half speed in its Movement phase (i.e. it are made, the version number will be updated, and any moves a distance in inches less than half of its current changes from the previous version will be highlighted Move characteristic) it can shoot its turret weapon twice in magenta. Where a version number has a letter, in the following Shooting phase (the turret weapon e.g. 1.1a, this means it has had a local update, only in must target the same unit both times). Furthermore, that language, to clarify a translation issue or other hit rolls for this model’s turret weapon do not suffer minor correction. the penalty for moving and shooting a Heavy weapon. The following weapons are turret weapons: battle ERRATA cannon, Conqueror battle cannon, Demolisher cannon, Pages 9, 114 and 120 – Plasma gun, Eradicator nova cannon, Executioner plasma cannon, Supercharged profile Exterminator autocannon, Punisher gatling cannon, Change the Damage characteristic to read ‘2’.
    [Show full text]