The Case of Tunisia, Transparency International and the World Bank Murphy, Jonathan; Albu, Oana Brindusa
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University of Southern Denmark The politics of transnational accountability policies and the (re) construction of corruption The case of Tunisia, Transparency International and the World Bank Murphy, Jonathan; Albu, Oana Brindusa Published in: Accounting Forum DOI: 10.1016/j.accfor.2017.10.005 Publication date: 2018 Document version: Accepted manuscript Document license: CC BY-NC-ND Citation for pulished version (APA): Murphy, J., & Albu, O. B. (2018). The politics of transnational accountability policies and the (re) construction of corruption: The case of Tunisia, Transparency International and the World Bank. Accounting Forum, 42(1), 32- 46. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2017.10.005 Go to publication entry in University of Southern Denmark's Research Portal Terms of use This work is brought to you by the University of Southern Denmark. Unless otherwise specified it has been shared according to the terms for self-archiving. 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Sep. 2021 Title Page (including Author Details) This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Accounting Forum on 18 Feb, 2019, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1016/j.accfor.2017.10.005 The Construction and Reconstruction of Corruption: The case of Tunisia and the World Bank Jonathan Murphy, Cardiff University Oana Albu, University of Southern Denmark Corresponding author: Jonathan Murphy: [email protected] *Manuscript (with Author Details removed) Click here to view linked References RUNNING HEAD: The Construction and Reconstruction of Corruption The Construction and Reconstruction of Corruption: The case of Tunisia and the World Bank 1 2 3 4 5 6 Abstract 7 8 9 10 Corruption is a global systemic problem causing detrimental effects to both social and 11 12 economic progress. Predominant research typically offers solutions that are based on the 13 14 assumption that corruption is a problem originating in, and endemic to developing countries, 15 16 an assumption that disregards corruption‘s production within a global system of economic 17 18 power relationships and international regulatory institutions dominated by Western countries 19 20 and multinational corporations. The anti-corruption discourses and accounting measures 21 initiated by both international and local actors in their fight against corruption have not 22 23 frequently been critically investigated in developing country contexts, especially not in the 24 25 Arab region, despite the widely observed links between authoritarianism, corruption, and 26 27 political upheaval. This study illustrates the struggle over the nature of corruption and the 28 29 measures taken by multiple stakeholders to combat it in Tunisia, before and after the Jasmine 30 31 Revolution of 2011. By using ethnographic material and critical discourse analysis, the study 32 shows how Western global actors such as the World Bank and associated nongovernmental 33 34 institutions such as Transparency International, account for and discursively (re)construct 35 36 corruption in ways that defend and reconstitute postcolonial relationships of domination 37 38 embedded within the neoliberal global order. The study contributes to existing literature by 39 40 providing a conceptual framework that indicates the highly fungible character and the 41 different emergent cycles of corruption. Based on its findings, the study offers novel research 42 43 avenues that promote reflexive theoretical and methodological steps that aim to enrich anti- 44 45 corruption scholarship and practice. 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 The Construction and Reconstruction of Corruption: The case of Tunisia and the 1 World Bank 2 3 4 5 Corruption is a global phenomenon (Kaikati et al., 2000; Milton-Smith, 2002; Pacini et al., 6 7 2002). It is regarded as ―one of the great evils of our time‖ (Hough, 2013) and the ―single 8 9 greatest obstacle to economic and social development‖ especially in developing world 10 contexts where weak or non-existent barriers facilitate the direct selling and buying of 11 12 political influence (Word Bank, 2011). Global anti-corruption measures such as those 13 14 promoted by international non-governmental actors such as Transparency International (TI) 15 16 and the World Bank (WB) represent an important foundation for the campaign against 17 18 corruption which is upheld in predominant research and practice (see Wilhelm, 2002; 19 20 O‘Leary, 2006; TI, 2013). Studies typically indicate that corruption operates on complex and 21 intricate networks and thus it is important to explore the ways political and institutional 22 23 structures shape what is defined as corruption (Nielsen, 2003; Neu, 2013). Predominant 24 25 research often concludes that global anti-corruption indices (such as TI‘s corruption 26 27 perception index) provide a useful tool to deal with corruption and to attain a higher moral 28 29 and ethical ground (Lindgreen, 2004; Wilhelm, 2002; Hough, 2013; Cuvero-Cazzura, 2014). 30 31 Despite – and partly because of - its global application, the definition of corruption is 32 33 equivocal. In predominant research corruption is sometimes defined ex negativo, as the 34 35 opposite of transparency (Florini, 2007), or involving everything from private-to-public, from 36 37 ‗bribery‘ to, simply, ‗ingenuous acts‘ (Argandona, 2003, p. 257). Studies often conclude that 38 39 corruption is ―the illegitimate selling of government authority for private gain‖ (Bukovansky, 40 41 2006, p. 181; Thomas & Meagher, 2004, p. 2). Institutional actors such as the Organisation 42 for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) define corruption in similar ways such 43 44 as ―the active or passive misuse of the powers of public officials (appointed or elected) for 45 46 private financial or other benefits‖. Nonetheless, definitions are still ambiguous and broad, for 47 48 instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines corruption as ―the abuse of authority 49 50 or trust for private benefit‖ (Schiller, 2000) and the WB defines it as ―the abuse of public 51 52 office for private gain‖ (World Bank, 2011). The Council of Europe specifically indicates the 53 equivocality surrounding corruption, stating that ―no precise definition can be found which 54 55 applies to all forms, types and degrees of corruption or which would be acceptable 56 57 universally‖ (Council of Europe, GMC 9695). 58 59 60 61 62 2 63 64 65 The elusive conceptualizations of corruption have paradoxical consequences as they 1 2 permit the development of Procrustean and politically infused accounting of corruption 3 4 through measures such as the Corruption Perception Index developed by Transparency 5 International and widely used by institutions such as the World Bank (Everett et al., 2007, 6 7 Murphy, 2011). Critical studies argue that global indices of corruption are biased in 8 9 representing the perceptions of specific actors with their own subject positions and economic 10 11 interests rather than any objective measure of corruption, categorize developing countries as 12 13 the origin of corruption whereas copious evidence suggests otherwise (Whyte, ed., 2015), are 14 15 often used to enforce economic management conformity and political agendas based on 16 dominant interests within a global neoliberal order, disregarding the economic, social, ethical, 17 18 and cultural interests and beliefs of the regulated subjects (see Everett et al., 2006). 19 20 Subsequently, the struggles and negotiations of local actors in their fight against corruption 21 22 especially in developing countries where Western actors impose their own logics and agendas 23 24 are underexplored. The objective of this study is to provide a richer understanding of the 25 discursive techniques employed by international actors in the construction and reconstruction 26 27 of corruption in the context of Tunisia, the outcomes of which can be described as a form of 28 29 ―epistemic violence‖ (Foucault, 1980) particularly consonant in the postcolonial context 30 31 (Spivak, 1988). The case is important because it is revelatory and representative (Yin, 1994) 32 33 of the implications of Western discourses of corruption in non-Western societies. 34 35 The contribution of this study is twofold. Firstly, we integrate different streams of 36 37 research on corruption and challenge taken-for-granted definitions by providing a critical 38 39 analysis of the standard typologies of corruption in predominant literature, which are also 40 41 represented by the WB and TI. Secondly, our findings are important as they extend beyond 42 43 indicating that TI‘s notion of corruption acts to underpin the neoliberal extension of business- 44 45 friendly market capitalism throughout the world (see Hindess, 2005). Through an analysis of 46 the local conceptualizations of corruption and the anti-corruption measures proposed by 47 48 Tunisian representatives vis-à-vis the WB and TI ones, we provide a novel perspective. Our 49 50 conceptual framework shows the different emergent cycles of corruption discourse and its 51 52 highly fungible character amenable to incorporation within a hegemonic narrative justifying 53 54 particular predetermined policy tropes. Specifically, we indicate that corruption can be 55 56 (re)constructed as: I. Corruption as an accepted taboo; II. Corruption as malady; III. 57 Corruption as vexing problem IV. Corruption as unravelled by neo-liberal solutions. (see 58 59 Figure 1) 60 61 62 3 63 64 65 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 The paper begins by exploring the extant literature and highlights certain limitations 39 40 in anti-corruption research when discussing corruption solutions across developed and 41 developing countries.