Glaucon's Theory of the Origin of Justice
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Glaucon’s Theory of the Origin of Justice Introduction In a famous scene in Plato’s Republic, we are told the story of the ring of Gyges. The story is a kind of thought experiment intended to test whether or not we would behave justly if we could get away with behaving unjustly. In fact, it goes further than that. For Glaucon contends that “[t]he man who did not wish to do wrong [when he could do so with impunity] … would be thought by those who knew it to be very foolish and miserable.” This suggests that it would be rational to behave unjustly if we could get away with it. Glaucon presents the idea that, in actual practice, people behave justly because there are enforceable laws and covenants in place. If the risk and severity of punishment for unjust action is sufficiently high, people will behave unjustly. However, if one could act unjustly with impunity, this view contends, it would be rational to act unjustly. Why, then, are laws put in place—particularly when democratically enacted through the will of the majority—when one would be better off if one behaved unjustly? Glaucon offers a possible solution to this puzzle—one which we will examine in more detail below. Before turning to Glaucon’s proposed solution to the conundrum as to why people enact laws whereby they restrain themselves, it is worth noting that Glaucon’s solution is not Socrates’. Rather, the hero of the Republic goes on to argue at length that, in a certain sense, that the just life is intrinsically desirable for its own sake. That argument and its ultimate prospects of success are not our concern here. Rather, we are going to take a closer look at Glaucon’s account of the origin of justice as enacted through laws, where living under such laws is a burden—but a burden worth bearing from considerations of naked—if farsighted—self-interest. Glaucon’s Argument In “The Ring of Gyges,” Glaucon explains that some people believe that we can explain why people do, as a matter of fact, act justly (or, at least, strive to appear to be doing so) based upon their own self-interest. Although his explanation in this regard is not the main point of the text, I will explain it in some detail to make sure that you understand it. In addition to the role that Glaucon’s explanation for actual just action plays in the text, it is also historically important. Many philosophers have argued, over the course of the centuries, that justice just is the result of the kind of social contract that Glaucon envisions. In more recent times, this theory has been more rigorously articulated in terms of Game Theory—a formal theory of rational action first created by economists in the mid-twentieth century. We may have occasion to discuss such theories further at a later point in the course. Going back to the text, then, Glaucon presents the idea that, in actual practice, people behave justly because there are enforceable laws and covenants in place. If the risk and severity of punishment for unjust action is sufficiently high, people will behave justly. However, if one could act unjustly with impunity, this view contends, it would be rational to act unjustly. Why, then, are laws put in place— particularly when democratically enacted through the will of the majority—when one would be better off if one behaved unjustly? To answer this question, we need to consider the structure of the situation in which an individual is likely to find himself. More specifically, in keeping with the terms of Glaucon’s analysis, we have to analyze the situation in terms of the self-interest of the individual deciding whether or not to be just. Glaucon tells us that, generally speaking, when one can get away with it, one gains by doing injustice (rather than justice) to others. Of course, one faces costs, losses, or harms in being the victim of an act of injustice. Page 1 of 3 Glaucon's Theory of the Origin of Justice v8b.0 Interestingly, Glaucon tells us that the harm done to the victims of injustice is greater than the gains obtained by those who perpetrate injustice. Glaucon does not say why this is so, but I think we can find plausible reasons why this might generally be the case. Consider, for example, the constant fear of being preyed upon, the costs of self-protection, the damage, destruction, or injury often incident to theft (which does harm but brings no benefit), and the inefficiency of taking items with high “sentimental” or personal value merely to convert them to their cash value through selling such items in the marketplace. Thus, it seems that Glaucon has given us a plausible empirical hypothesis. Of course we should keep in mind that any one person may be the perpetrator of injustice one day and the victim of injustice the next. Indeed, as we will see, this assumption is needed to make sense of Glaucon’s explanation of justice. To help make the relevant point, suppose there are two unjust actions of essentially the same type, e.g. two acts of robbery with items stolen having a market value of $100. In each case, the perpetrator gains $100. However, given what we have already said is typically the case, let us assume that the victim has, in each instance, lost something in addition to the value of $100 (e.g. property damage, emotional distress, etc.). Suppose, also, that the same two people were involved in both of these acts of injustice—once as perpetrator and once as victim. Now we can also consider what the possible outcomes would be if one or both of these individuals refrained from committing the relevant robbery. This yields four possible outcomes as shown in Figure 1. Remember that: (1) the victim suffers losses greater than the gains made by the perpetrator; (2) the two robberies involve the taking of goods with equivalent dollar value; and (3) each of the persons involved would be robbing the other in these two separate incidents. With that in mind, we can see that potential costs and benefits to Person 1 are shown in Figure 1. Of course, Person 2 is in the mirror image situation of Person 1—i.e. the same situations are being considered, but the roles are reversed. Thus, we can represent the outcomes for both persons as shown in Figure 2. Note that Figure 2 puts each person in the following position: regardless of what the other person does, one is better off committing the robbery. Whether one is oneself robbed or not, one is better off robbing the other person. Each person is in this situation, so each will commit the robbery. Thus, the actual outcome will be that reflected in Cell iv. Such being the case, it would have been better for both Person 1 and Person 2 if they had been able to reach some kind of binding agreement not to rob each other. In that case, the actual outcome would have been that shown in Cell i. Such an agreement is precisely what Glaucon proposes as the origin of the laws and principles of justice. The difference is that we each may be victim or victimizer with respect to the many different people in our community. Therefore we need community laws rather than individual agreements. Given that, without such restraints, each person will be both villain and victim in this sort of horrible “war of all against all”, it is better for one to submit to laws restraining one if others are willing to do the same. Thus, concludes Glaucon, justice just amounts to enlightened self- interest. Page 2 of 3 Glaucon's Theory of the Origin of Justice v8b.0 Figure 1 Person 2 Refrain from Robbing Rob Person 1 Person 1 Refrain from (i) (ii) Robbing Second Best Worst for Person 2 For Person 1 Person 1 Person 1 (iii) (iv) Rob Person 2 Best for Third Best for Person 1 Person 1 Figure 2 Person 2 Refrain from Rob Person 1 Robbing Person 1 (i) (ii) Refrain from Worst for Person 1 Robbing Person 2 Second Best for Each Best for Person 2 Person 1 (iv) (iii) Best for Person 1 Rob Person 2 Third Best for Each Worst for Person 2 Page 3 of 3 Glaucon's Theory of the Origin of Justice v8b.0 .