A Q Methodological Investigation of the Kurdish Conflict Frames Among Parliamentarians, Experts and Lay People in Turkey

A Q Methodological Investigation of the Kurdish Conflict Frames among Parliamentarians, Experts and Lay People in Turkey

Özden Melis Uluğ

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology

Approved Dissertation Committee

Prof. Dr. J. Christopher Cohrs, Jacobs University Bremen (Chair) Dr. Özen Odağ, BIGSSS, Jacobs University Bremen Assoc. Prof. Çerağ Esra Çuhadar, Bilkent University

Date of Defense: January 26th 2016

To my family and to the people who try to dismantle hierarchies in societies

Acknowledgments

Acknowledgments First of all, I want to thank Prof. Dr. Christopher Cohrs. I think he is one of the best supervisors on earth. The most important need for a PhD student is a supportive supervisor and I was lucky enough to have him during my PhD process. He showed me what it means to be a good supervisor and how not to create hierarchies between a student and a supervisor. Therefore, he deserves the biggest thanks. Thanks, Chris! Second, I was lucky enough to have Dr. Özen Odağ as a second supervisor. She supervised me especially for my methodological concerns. She was there for me whenever I needed her. She also taught me what it means to be a woman in academia. In this regard, I could see the world from a different perspective with the help of Özen. Thanks, Özen! Third, I wish to express gratitude for Assoc. Prof. Esra Çuhadar who was my external supervisor. She helped me with her constructive comments and became a role model for me. I also want to thank Assoc. Prof. Ayşe Betül Çelik who gave feedback whenever I asked her to comment on my manuscripts. Without their expertise, I think this PhD thesis would be difficult to finish. Yasemin Acar, my friend, colleague and collaborator also helped this dissertation by proofreading every word of it. Whenever I got fed up, she was there to support me. It was great to have Yasemin during this PhD process. Thanks Yasemin! Leman Korkmaz, Ahmet Çoymak and Reşit Kışlıoğlu were also very helpful during this painful PhD process. They gave feedback for my manuscripts and asked challenging questions. In addition, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Büşra Ersanlı, Asst. Prof. Banu Cingöz-Ulu, Asst. Prof. Akın Ünver, Dr. Ali Ersen Erol and Betül Baki for their positive comments on my manuscripts. I would like to thank all the participants in this study. Through this research, I came across different people from different ethnic backgrounds, genders, sexual orientations and cultural backgrounds. All of them shaped my views, changed my ideas and contributed immensely to this PhD dissertation. I am not sure I could have achieved this PhD title without their invaluable support. Thank you! I would also like to thank my friends and family members who assisted me during my data collection process. I thank Dilhayat Barışçı, Özge Kantaş, Çetin Çelik, Sezin

Acknowledgments

Dereci, Çağlar Çalışlar, Neslihan Sevinç, Aydın Araz, Rojin Canan Akın, Nur Acar, Özlem Şeyda Uluğ, Benay Yakışır, Sacide Uluğ, Mustafa Aycan Uluğ, Ali Arda, Ahmet Saymadi, Berat Saymadı, Zeynep Sunbay, Ceylan Oymak, Koray Çalışkan, Balçiçek İlter, Mahmut Övür, İrfan Aktan, Rober Koptaş, Ayça İnoğlu, Kıvanç Özcan, Esma Arslan, Neslihan Sevinç, Arda Nazım Çağdaş, Görkem Şimşek, Sinem Şimşek, Hüseyin Çakal, Bekir Yılmaz, Işıl Karagenç, Alper Gür, Çiğdem Bozdağ, Diren Yeşil, Ferhat Sincar, Zafer Ganioğlu, Cem Çetin, Doruk Ergun, Yusuf Sahici and Osman Özdemir. I also want to thank my family. Whenever I experienced difficulties, they encouraged me to go further and achieve my aims. My mother, Sacide Uluğ, has always been a fantastic mother and I think she deserves a PhD of her own. My father, Mustafa Aycan Uluğ, participated in the data collection process and counted every participant with me until I reached my aim. My sister, Özlem Şeyda Uluğ, gave the best (psychological) support to me and tried to find participants for me as well. She hosted me in Ankara while I was collecting data and helped me all the time whenever I needed her. I am so lucky to have an amazing family like you. Thank you again! I also want to thank my other family members, Macide Gür, Cahit Çerci, Şebnem Eda Uluğ, Ali Sedat Uluğ and Muhsin Uluğ. Especially, Ali Sedat Uluğ became a role model for me as he started and finished his PhD after the age of 40. All of you were so helpful during my PhD process and helped me, especially psychologically. Also, I want to thank Nurcan Acar, as she hosted me whenever I was in İstanbul. Nurcan, thank you so much! Lastly, I would like to thank Arda Bilgen. I had to write the biggest part of my PhD thesis when I was with him in Bonn. He had to stand my every different mood and helped me during my PhD period, from the start till the end. He tried to find participants for my study, read my every manuscript, gave very helpful feedback and supported me. I think he deserves the biggest praise. Therefore, I would like express my gratitude for Arda here again. Thanks, Arda! Thank you all! (English) Hepinize teşekkürler! (Turkish) Ji we hemûyan re spas! (Kurmanci) Şima re spas keno! (Zaza)

Table of contents

Acknowledgments ...... 3

List of tables...... 8

List of figures ...... 9

Summary ...... 10

Chapter 1 General introduction ...... 12 1.1 Overview of the dissertation study ...... 16 1.2 Methodology ...... 20

Chapter 2 Theoretical background ...... 22 2.1 Approaches to conflict analysis and conflict resolution ...... 23 2.2 A need for a systematic and holistic approach ...... 26 2.3 The present research ...... 35

Chapter 3 The historical background of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey ...... 37 3.1 Kurds in the Ottoman Empire ...... 38 3.2 Kurds in the Republic of Turkey ...... 39 3.3 1980s and the PKK era ...... 40 3.4 The Kurdish conflict resolution process ...... 42 3.5 Perceptions of the Kurdish conflict in society ...... 46

Chapter 4 Exploring conflict understandings among lay people in Mersin and Diyarbakır .... 49 4.1 Introduction ...... 50 4.2 Method ...... 51 4.3 Results ...... 57 4.4 Discussion ...... 66

Chapter 5 Methodology ...... 72 5.1 Q methodology ...... 73 5.2 Q sample ...... 75 5.3 Q sort process ...... 76 5.4 Statistical analysis...... 78 5.5 Interpretation ...... 80

Table of contents

Chapter 6 “Who will resolve this conflict if the politicians don’t?”: Members’ of parliament understandings of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey...... 82 6.1 Political elites ...... 83 6.2 The Kurdish conflict ...... 86 6.3 The approaches of political parties to the Kurdish conflict in Turkey ...... 87 6.4 The present research ...... 89 6.5 Method ...... 89 6.6 Results ...... 92 6.7 Discussion ...... 101

Chapter 7 “If the experts say so, it must be true”: Exploring scholars’ and journalists’ understandings of the Kurdish conflict...... 107 7.1 The role of scholars and journalists in conflict resolution and peace building . 108 7.2 The present research ...... 114 7.3 Method ...... 114 7.4 Results ...... 118 7.5 Discussion ...... 123

Chapter 8 An exploration of lay people’s Kurdish conflict frames in Turkey ...... 130 8.1 Historical background of the Kurdish conflict ...... 131 8.2 Frames and their roles in conflict context ...... 133 8.3 The present research ...... 134 8.4 Method ...... 134 8.5 Results ...... 139 8.6 Discussion ...... 143

Chapter 9 Bringing the perspectives of politicians, scholars and journalists and lay people together: Second-order analysis of three studies ...... 149 9.1 Introduction ...... 150 9.2 Analysis ...... 151 9.3 Results ...... 152 9.4 Discussion ...... 158

Chapter 10 General discussion ...... 160 10.1 Summary of the findings ...... 162 10.2 Theoretical contributions ...... 166 10.3 Practical contributions ...... 170 10.4 Limitations and future directions ...... 175 10.5 Conclusion ...... 178

Table of contents

References ...... 180

Appendices ...... 202 Appendix A. The full list of questions in FGDs and open-ended questionnaires ... 203 Appendix B. Participant information sheet...... 204 Appendix C. Participant consent form ...... 205 Appendix D. Coding frame ...... 206 Appendix E. The complete list of statements ...... 238 Appendix F. Z-scores of the statements for each factor (Politicians) ...... 240 Appendix G. Z-scores of the statements for each factor (Experts) ...... 242 Appendix H. Z-scores of the statements for each factor (Lay people) ...... 244 Appendix I. Z-scores of the statements for each factor (Second-order analysis) .... 246

Statutory Declaration ...... 248

List of tables

Table 1. Inter-rater reliability results of six main categories ...... 57

Table 2. Frequencies for the first main category‘s subcategories among Turks and Kurds and in Mersin and Diyarbakır (frame analysis) ...... 58

Table 3. Frequencies for the second main category‘s subcategories among Turks and Kurds and in Mersin and Diyarbakır (problem definitions) ...... 59

Table 4. Frequencies for the third main category‘s subcategories among Turks and Kurds and in Mersin and Diyarbakır (sources of the problem) ...... 60

Table 5. Frequencies for the fourth main category‘s blame subcategory‘s unit of analyses among Turks and Kurds and in Mersin and Diyarbakır (moral judgments) ...... 62

Table 6. Frequencies for the fourth main category‘s praise subcategory‘s unit of analyses among Turks and Kurds and in Mersin and Diyarbakır (moral judgments) ...... 63

Table 7. Frequencies for the fifth main category‘s subcategories among Turks and Kurds and in Mersin and Diyarbakır (solutions to the problem) ...... 64

Table 8. Frequencies for the sixth main category‘s subcategories among Turks and Kurds and in Mersin and Diyarbakır (barriers to the solution of the problem) ...... 66

Table 9. Factor loadings and participant characteristics ...... 93

Table 10. Factor correlations ...... 99

Table 11. Factor loadings and participant characteristics ...... 116

Table 12. Factor loadings (intra-factor analysis) ...... 128

Table 13. Factor loadings and participant characteristics ...... 135

Table 14. Correlations between factors (idealized Q-sorts) ...... 143

Table 15. Second-order factor analysis ...... 153

Table 16. Correlations between factors (idealized Q-sorts) ...... 155

List of figures

Figure 1. Three levels of leadership ...... 34

Figure 2. Q-sort grid ...... 77

Figure 3. Schematic representation of similarities between the four viewpoints ...... 102

Summary

Summary Investigating conflict understandings or conflict frames is crucial in conflict contexts as conflict frames are the cognitive shortcuts individuals use to comprehend the conflict itself (Kaufman, Elliott, & Shmueli, 2013). Conflict frames help in the interpretation of new information and play a filter role in the conflict context (Johnston, 1995). They shape people‘s reactions, and therefore, should be understood in the first place. This PhD project focuses on the subjective understandings of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, which is an intractable armed conflict that has been going on for more than three decades. In other words, it aims to identify the understandings of the Kurdish conflict in different groups by focusing on concerns and priorities of different groups in the Kurdish conflict context as each group might have different priorities and concerns. Based on Lederach‘s (1999) pyramid approach to peace building, this PhD project aims to investigate how people understand the Kurdish conflict in Turkey in three segments of society: a) politicians, b) scholars and journalists and c) lay people. Conflict understandings were investigated systematically using Entman‘s (1993) conceptualization of frame analysis. The frame analysis has four main domains: a) problem definition, b) causal interpretation, c) moral evaluation and d) treatment recommendation. Based on the domains of frame analysis, the following studies were constructed. First, conflict understandings were explored qualitatively through focus group discussions and open-ended questionnaires among ethnically different groups, namely Turks and Kurds. In addition, conflict understandings were also investigated in two different cities, namely Mersin and Diyarbakır. According to the results of qualitative content analysis, one more domain–barriers to conflict resolution–was also added to Entman‘s (1993) conceptualization of frame analysis. In the following studies, Q methodology, which is a suitable method to identify socially shared perspectives and to identify intra- and inter-group differences (Watts & Stenner, 2005a), was used. Q studies were conducted among politicians, scholars and journalists and lay people. In the politicians study, four different conflict understandings were distinguished: 1) a Turkish nationalist viewpoint, 2) a social democratic viewpoint, 3) an Islamist viewpoint, and 4) a pro-Kurdish viewpoint. In the scholars and journalists study, two conflict understandings were distinguished: 1) a democracy and identity

Summary viewpoint and 2) a democracy and economy viewpoint. In the lay people study, four viewpoints were distinguished: 1) a terrorism and foreign power viewpoint, 2) a class, economy, and democracy viewpoint, 3) a rights, freedom, and democracy viewpoint, and 4) an independence viewpoint. After identifying the Kurdish conflict understandings across each segment, all these viewpoints were brought together in a second-order analysis to highlight similarities (and differences) among these three segments and to identify similar points across these segments and common ground through consensual points. Based on the results of the second-order analysis, five conflict understandings were distinguished among all three segments of society: 1) a Kurdish rights viewpoint, 2) a democracy, rights and freedom viewpoint, 3) an Islamist viewpoint, 4) an economic viewpoint, and 5) a terror and foreign powers viewpoint. It should be noted that both the Kurdish rights viewpoint and the democracy, rights and freedom viewpoint were shared across all segments of society. These results indicated that there are various conflict understandings among all three segments of society. The results also presented within-group differences, between- group differences such as conflictual points between groups, similarities between groups, a common ground across different groups, and some points which have potential for compromise. The results were discussed in light of how conflict understandings are related to master narratives and mirror images. The role of socio-psychological variables for how people subscribe to these conflict frames were also emphasized. All results are discussed in detail in relation to social-psychology, conflict resolution and peace-building literatures.

Chapter 1

Chapter 1 General introduction

Chapter 1

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) records armed conflicts every year. In 2006, 231 armed conflicts had been documented since the end of World War II (WWII) and 121 since the end of the Cold War (Harbom, Högbladh, & Wallensteen, 2006). The following records show that subsequent years were not exempt from active armed conflicts either. In 2010, 30 active armed conflicts; in 2012, 32 active armed conflicts were documented (Themnér & Wallensteen, 2011; 2012). These results indicate that conflicts all over the world have impacted many people for a long time. Especially intractable conflicts, which are resistant and severe conflicts, cause grim outcomes such as deaths, injuries, traumas and forced migration. They might lead to ethno-political warfare, and engender frustration and alienation to both parties in a conflict (Fisher, 2006a). Therefore, grasping the dynamics of these types of conflicts is an immediate task, but at the same time, an exceptional challenge for scholars and policy-makers (Bar-Tal, 2007; Coleman, 2003). The Kurdish conflict in Turkey is an intractable armed conflict that has caused grim outcomes such as over 40,000 deaths and three million people forcibly displaced (see Çelik & Kantowitz, 2009). The armed wing of the Kurdish national movement, PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan–Kurdistan Workers‘ Party), launched its first major attacks in 1984. Since 1984, there have been many periods of escalation and de-escalation. One of the main reasons behind the first attack in 1984 was the 1980 military coup. Especially in Diyarbakır prison after the coup, Kurdish activists were exposed to serious torture, degradation, and ―Turkification‖ practices (Zeydanlioglu, 2009). The expression of Kurdish identity was banned by the Turkish state and Kurdish cultural activities were restricted as well. One reason behind the Kurdish conflict might be the 1980 coup although some argue that the roots of the Kurdish conflict dates back to the Ottoman Empire (e.g., Tan, 2008). Even though the Kurdish conflict dates back to the time of the Ottoman Empire, arguably the conflict resolution field has not given enough attention to it. This is not only because the Kurdish conflict is a ―deep-rooted protracted conflict which is hard to transform, but also because until recently the Turkish state denied the existence of such a conflict, instead referring to it as a problem of terrorism‖ (Çelik & Blum, 2007, p. 64).

Chapter 1

This PhD research aims to elucidate the dynamics of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, which is a relatively under-researched conflict. In line with this, it aims to investigate how people from different segments of society understand the Kurdish conflict from a social-psychological perspective as well as to indicate the different viewpoints across diverse segments of society and how these viewpoints are both similar and distinct from each other. In other words, the aim is to identify subjective representations of the Kurdish conflict among different segments of society by investigating subjectively perceived incompatibilities of goals, concerns, priorities and problems of various groups. It is argued that ―[s]ince everyone has their own lens of experiences through which they see the world, every person‘s perceptions of a conflict is different, even amongst those coming from the same locale‖ (Ware, 2007, p. 17). I should note that conflict understandings are crucial not only at the individual level but also at the group level as they might shape the course of an ongoing conflict. Therefore, understanding different concerns, goals, priorities and problems become more of an issue in conflicts as tensions between groups stem from the clashes or incompatibilities of aspirations and goals. Thus, this PhD dissertation contributes to the literature by providing understandings from the perspectives of different segments and how these segments‘ priorities differ from each other in the context of the Kurdish conflict. The significance of this research lies in its contribution to the academic literature by indicating the necessity of including all segments of society in conflict resolution and peace making process (see Lederach, 1999; Saunders, 2001) and by indicating the necessity of finding common ground through the eyes of various groups (Chufrin & Saunders, 1993). Each chapter contributes to the understandings of the Kurdish conflict from different segments and presents different concerns, goals, priorities and particular problems which are psychologically more salient for each segment. In addition to the inclusion of all segments of society, it is also argued that each segment (political elites, scholars and journalists, and lay people) should be approached separately. The reason for this is that there might be qualitatively different understandings within each segment that might not be easily seen if they are not approached separately. Although many conflict resolution scholars emphasize the

Chapter 1 significance of including political elites, bureaucrats and non-governmental elites in conflict resolution, namely cooperation of Track–I (which aims to restore broken relations between nations, Mapendere, 2005) and Track–II diplomacy (non-official meetings and problem-solving activities, Nan & Strimling, 2004), including all segments of society in a conflict context is still uncommon (see for an exception Lederach, 1999). However, it should be noted that any single approach not only to conflict resolution, but also to peace-building is limited in its ability to build a long-term sustainable peace. Such an approach is inadequate, and therefore, coordination of top-down and bottom-up approaches are equally important in both conflict resolution and peacebuilding (Nan & Strimling, 2004). While approaching the sources of conflict, the focus is mainly on two dimensions: objective and subjective approaches (Reimann, 2005). Objective approaches, which are also referred to as ‗structuralist‘ paradigms, focus on the social and political character and organization of society and claims that causes of conflicts are structural (see also Çelik & Rumelili, 2006). On the other hand, subjective approaches, which are also called social- psychological approaches, deal with subjectively perceived incompatibility of goals as conflict arises from dissimilarities of perceptions, values, interests, and culture (Brigg, 2008), and it is these subjective processes that worsen conflicts (Fisher, 2006a). It could be argued that subjective processes play a key role in conflict context in terms of affecting the course of a conflict as subjective experience of conflicts affect how we behave and react in a particular situation (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994). Social psychological approaches are very useful while addressing intergroup conflict. They are ―phenomenological (stressing the subjective reality of the groups), interactive (emphasizing the behavioral interaction of the groups in expressing, maintaining, and resolving their conflict), and multilevel (realizing that understanding is necessary at multiple levels of analysis from various disciplines within a systems orientation)‖ (Fisher, 2006a, p. 178). In line with this, Fisher (2006a) also argues that ―analysis, understanding, and dialogue are necessary for reconciliation to occur, and the development of alternative solutions must be based on a diagnosis of each party‘s motivations, aspirations, and constraints‖ (p. 187). Understanding conflicts from a social- psychological approach is also necessary, as social-psychological approaches deal with

Chapter 1 subjectively perceived incompatibility of goals as conflict arises from dissimilarities of perceptions (Brigg, 2008). Similarly, termination of a conflict also requires negotiation of incompatibilities between the conflicting parties (Bar-Tal, 2000). Therefore, this PhD research aims to elucidate the subjective understandings of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey from a social-psychological perspective as they play a key role in affecting the course of the Kurdish conflict. In addition to including all segments of society and understanding their priorities from a social-psychological perspective, one has to find commonalities or common ground where all conflicting parties might agree on a long-lasting conflict resolution (Chufrin & Saunders, 1993). Identifying overlaps between perceptions of groups is a central step in conflict resolution as these overlaps might help plan transparent conflict management (Bond, 2016). Through identifying these overlaps with a transparent approach, both misunderstandings and broken relations could be restored. Although finding common ground is relatively significant in a conflict context (Ross & Ward, 1995), in some cases it might not be very easy to find shared opinions across all parties. However, there might be some viewpoints that are either common to the different parties or are of high agreement for some, but less relevant for others. Grasping these viewpoints also provides room for conflict resolution. In addition, there can also be some views which all conflicting parties might reject. Understanding these rejected views might also help resolve the conflicts. Thus, conflict researchers should not spend effort on these views if they are rejected by all conflicting parties. In this chapter, first, the overview of the dissertation will be summarized and each chapter will be approached in detail. In some chapters, theoretical and historical backgrounds of the PhD dissertation which are used in the following studies will be presented. In some chapters, the findings from each segment which indicate qualitatively different understandings of the Kurdish conflict will be presented. Second, the methodologies that are used in different chapters are briefly mentioned. 1.1 Overview of the dissertation study The approaches to conflict resolution might change depending on the aim of the research. Some conflict resolution scholars focus on Track–I diplomacy, whereas others focus more on Track–II diplomacy. As argued in the literature, various forms of diplomacy

Chapter 1 complement each other and provide insights about the conflicting parties and the nature of the conflict (e.g., Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, 2007). However, relatively little scholarly attention is given to the perspectives of people at the bottom level of society. Lederach (1999), a highly reputable scholar in conflict resolution, argues that approaching peace requires including all segments of society (see also Chufrin & Saunders, 1993). According to Lederach (1999), society can be seen as a pyramid where military or political leaders are at the top (top-level leadership), academics, intellectuals and humanitarian leaders (such as NGOs) are in the middle (mid-level leadership) and local leaders are at the bottom (grassroots leadership). This PhD project aims to understand and contribute to the understanding of the Kurdish conflict within three segments of society in Turkey. In other words, as suggested by Lederach (1999), this PhD project deals with the same question with different populations: how do people understand the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? For example, how do politicians see the Kurdish conflict? How do scholars and journalists understand the Kurdish conflict? How do lay people perceive the Kurdish conflict? The aim of every chapter is to find the answer to these questions. First of all, the second chapter starts with the theoretical background of the study. In this chapter, first, definition of conflict and approaches to conflict analysis are summarized. Following this, approaches to conflict resolutions are introduced. In light of the conflict analysis and resolution approaches, the need for a holistic approach to conflict analysis and resolution is discussed. In this section, the role of frames in conflict analysis and conflict resolutions is also elaborated. Later, the theoretical framework of the PhD dissertation is introduced. For this reason, Entman‘s (1993) frame analysis is described in detail. In this section, the role of including all segments of society in conflict resolution such as politicians, scholars and journalists, and lay people is extensively discussed. At this point, the need to include all segments of society and approach each segment separately is argued. Correspondingly, the role of finding agreements and disagreements among each segment is discussed as well. The chapter ends with a section on the present research that summarizes the research questions based on the theoretical discussion.

Chapter 1

Chapter three provides a comprehensive historical background of the Kurdish conflict. It starts with a discussion of Kurds in the Ottoman Empire and continues with a discussion of Kurds in the Republic of Turkey. Later, the 1980s and the PKK era are mentioned in detail. After this, the Kurdish conflict resolution process with a specific focus on conflict resolution suggestions by various scholars of the Kurdish conflict is summarized. The chapter ends with a discussion of perceptions of the Kurdish conflict in society and how historical themes reappear in today‘s conflict perceptions. Chapter four starts with the general introduction of the pilot study by arguing the reasons for conducting a pilot study with lay people in Mersin and Diyarbakır. Following this, demographic information is given about the participants, and the reasons for using focus group discussions and open-ended questionnaires are explained. Based on the results of qualitative content analysis (Schreier, 2012), the coding framework is presented thoroughly. In addition, differences between Mersin and Diyarbakır together with differences between Kurds and Turks in terms of understanding the Kurdish conflict are presented. In the last part, the importance of the results together with limitations of the pilot study is discussed briefly. Chapter five starts with the general introduction to Q methodology which was used in the empirical studies. Q methodology is briefly introduced and its advantages over other methodologies are discussed. Later, brief information is given how the Q sample is constructed. Following this, the Q sort process is mentioned in detail. After presenting the Q sort process, how the statistical analysis is conducted in Q methodology is presented. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of how to interpret the Q methodology analysis results. In each section in this chapter, first the details of Q methodology are introduced and later, how it is adapted to this PhD study is presented. Next, in chapter six, findings of conflict understandings of political elites are reported. The role of political elites, especially in the conflict resolution, transformation and peace process contexts, is discussed, and political elites in Turkey and their significance in the Kurdish conflict are briefly mentioned. After introducing the approaches of political elites–mainly of political parties in Turkey–to the Kurdish conflict, the empirical findings are presented. In this chapter, the variety of conflict frames is empirically presented. It is argued that the Kurdish conflict frames of political parties are

Chapter 1 not as monolithic as they were in the 1990s (Loizides, 2009) and, therefore, a systematic conflict frame analysis is necessary to explore further frames. After the similarities and differences between the viewpoints as well as consensual and conflictual issues among political parties are presented, the chapter ends with a discussion on implications for academic literature and policy-making. Chapter seven starts with the role of scholars and journalists in conflict resolution and peace-building in general and later in the context of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. The necessity of understanding the perspectives of scholars and journalists, in other words experts, in Turkey‘s current peace process is argued. Additionally, the Commission of Wise People (Akil İnsanlar Komisyonu), which was initiated in 2013 to pave the way for Turkey‘s Kurdish peace process, and the pro-government characteristics of most commission members are criticized (see also Gürsel, 2013). Instead, a need for a new commission of wise people that includes a more heterogeneous group of scholars and journalists, and who have been researching the Kurdish conflict, is debated. The empirical results of this study are presented together with consensus and disagreement points among these scholars and journalists. The chapter ends with a discussion on implications for unofficial diplomacy and conflict resolution. After that, chapter eight presents the findings on conflict frames of lay people. The chapter starts with the lack of empirical studies on frames that lay people use to make sense of conflict and conflict resolution in the Kurdish conflict context (see Başer & Çelik, 2014 for an exception), and it argues that relatively little scholarly attention is given to this topic. However, as lay people reflect the miniature of society (Lederach, 1999), the necessity of exploring the conflict frames of lay people is argued. In this chapter, it is also argued that not only the perspectives of Kurdish people, but also non- Kurdish people‘s perspectives should be taken into account to grasp the bigger picture of the conflict. The results of the empirical study with lay people are presented and each frame which is shared by various lay people is presented. The chapter ends with a discussion on the practical implications of the results of the lay people study for conflict resolution. The results of chapter six (political elites), chapter seven (scholars and journalists) and chapter eight (lay people) are brought together in chapter nine. Each former chapter

Chapter 1 highlights different viewpoints among different segments of society; four main viewpoints among members of parliament, two viewpoints among scholars and journalists, and four viewpoints among lay people were found. In chapter nine, a need for second-order analysis among these different viewpoints to identify commonalities across them is discussed. Based on the second-order analysis, each resulting viewpoint is presented and discussed. The results of the second-order analysis indicate that there are some overlaps between different viewpoints across different segments. The chapter ends with a discussion of the viewpoints and of how they are shared by different segments. Finally, chapter ten starts with a brief discussion on background and on the aims of the research, what has been done in the studies and why it has been done in that way. Later, all findings of the empirical studies together with the main points of these findings are summarized. Also, theoretical and practical significances of the PhD thesis are discussed. Following this, the limitations of the PhD project together with future directions are summarized. The chapter ends with a conclusion section that summarizes the significance of this PhD project. 1.2 Methodology Four methodological approaches were used in this PhD dissertation. In the first empirical study, focus group discussions (FGDs) and open-ended questionnaires were used with ethnically Turkish and Kurdish people. FGDs and open-ended questionnaires were conducted to explore the conflict understandings of the Kurds and Turks both in Mersin and Diyarbakır. These conflict understandings were used as Q statements in the subsequent Q methodology studies to represent both ethnically Turkish and Kurdish participants‘ perspectives in the Kurdish conflict. Also secondary sources such as academic articles and books, newspaper articles and party platforms of the political parties were used to collect additional perceptions of the Kurdish conflict. In this PhD research, in addition to FGDs and open-ended questionnaires which were collected from lay people, collecting different opinions from other samples such as experts and political elites in the Kurdish conflict context were aimed as well. For this aim, Q methodology was used in the second, third and fourth studies. Q methodology, better known with the name of Q-sorting technique (McKeown & Thomas, 1988), is a method that ―encompasses a distinctive set of psychometric and operational principles

Chapter 1 that and … provides researchers a systematic and rigorously quantitative means for examining human subjectivity‖ (p. 7). It is a method wherein participants reflect their own understanding of a particular issue by rank-ordering statements. Q methodology was used to investigate the conflict understandings among different segments of society as it is a very useful method to find socially shared conflict understandings even among conflicting parties (Watts & Stenner, 2005a; Wong & Sun, 1998). It is also very useful to see differences within and between different segments of society as well as to identify which particular concerns in the Kurdish conflict are psychologically more salient for each segment. It is also effective to identify in which ways individuals from different segments share the same conflict understanding and thus, to identify common ground on which different groups might agree. To sum up, in this PhD research, focus group discussions, open-ended questionnaires, secondary sources and Q methodology were used. Focus group discussions and open-ended questionnaires were only used with lay people. However, Q methodology was used with politicians, experts and lay people as well. All of these methods provided necessary information regarding the Kurdish conflict and were particularly useful to use in the context of a conflict.

Chapter 2

Chapter 2 Theoretical background

Chapter 2

In this chapter, first, different approaches to conflict analysis and conflict resolution will be briefly summarized. Second, the need for a holistic approach to approaching conflict frames will be mentioned by discussing the role of frames in conflict analysis and conflict resolution, the role of including all segments of society in conflict resolution and peace making and the role of finding agreements and disagreements among the different segments of society. Finally, the main research question and sub-questions of the PhD dissertation will be presented in the present research section. 2.1 Approaches to conflict analysis and conflict resolution Conflict analysis and conflict resolution literature focus on various types of conflicts such as conflicts between couples, co-workers, groups, societies and nations. Broadly speaking, a conflict is defined as a situation that comprises a serious incompatibility between at least two conflicting parties, and where the demands of these parties are not met simultaneously (Wallensteen, 2002). If there is incompatibility of the demands or in the general activities among the parties in terms of goals, claims, beliefs, values, wishes, actions and feelings (Coleman, 2003; Wallensteen, 2002), a conflict is likely to occur. The most stubborn conflicts in the literature are seen as intractable conflicts. Intractable conflicts could be defined as conflicts which are very intense, deadlocked, and resistant to resolution (Coleman, 2000; 2003). These types of conflicts such as the Northern Irish conflict in the United Kingdom and the Kurdish conflict in Turkey are also fueled by malignant social processes and cause considerable harm to societies. Therefore, analyzing these types of conflicts requires a systematic approach as they have very complex characteristics. 2.1.1 Conflict analysis Conflict analysis was developed mainly to tackle the East–West conflict during the Cold War era. Different theories and approaches were used in order to understand a) conflict dynamics, b) needs-based conflict origins and c) rational, strategic calculations (Wallensteen, 2002). Conflict analysis can be seen as a first and most important step for a long-term conflict management, conflict resolution and peace building process. It is also an evaluation tool and a learning process that aims to gain a deeper understanding of the conflict dynamics such as perceptions, aims, priorities, needs and desires of conflicting parties. Understanding perceptions, aims, priorities, needs and desires of conflicting

Chapter 2 parties is very central in conflict analysis as these issues affect the relationship between conflicting parties (Chufrin & Saunders, 1993). Thus, conflict analysis sheds light on interests of the parties (both within and between), understands the basis for these interests, and provides a ground for reflection for the stakeholders (Shmueli, 2003). Although every conflict has unique characteristics, such as different dynamics (Yıldız, 2014), there are similar characteristics such as similar sources among almost all conflicts (see also Aktaş, 2014a). It is argued that conflicts worldwide generally stem from disagreements on territories, natural resources, power relations, economy, self- determination, and values (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). From a systematic perspective, Katz (1965) proposed a typology for the sources of a conflict as three main drivers: a) economic drivers which can be defined as competition over scarce resources, b) value drivers which can be defined as differences over valued means and c) power-based drivers which can be defined as desires of each group to control each other. Fisher (2006a) accepts these drivers and also adds ―need drivers‖ (e.g., satisfaction) to this typology. In order to understand and tackle need drivers, Burton (1990) suggested human needs theory. According to human needs theory, a conflict situation does not only include interests, but also include human needs. Unlike Abraham Maslow‘s hierarchy of needs theory which sees needs as hierarchical, human needs theorists do not see that needs are hierarchical in nature (Burton, 1990; Kelman, 1990). Rather, they perceive needs that could be satisfied simultaneously. In the context of conflict, human needs theorists focus on psychological needs such as identity, security, recognition, participation, dignity, and justice (Kelman, 1990). Satisfying one‘s needs in a conflict context can be achieved through the functions of identities. According to Fisher (2006a, p. 180), ―[i]dentity groups are seen as the primary vehicle through which these necessities are expressed and satisfied, thus leading to intergroup conflict when one group‘s basic needs are frustrated or denied.‖ This necessity from an identity perspective is also in line with social identity theory. According to social identity theory (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), part of the self- concept drives from membership in the social groups such as being a woman or being homosexual. Social identity theory puts forward identification with the idea that group membership will highly likely result in in-group favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 1986).

Chapter 2

This can even take place where there is no any clear conflict of interest between groups or any intergroup interaction. Group dynamics based on shared identities indicate that identities play a key role in the outbreak of a conflict. In line with this argument, Fisher (2006a, p. 182) argues that ―[t]he functioning of each group, in terms of identity, cohesiveness, conformity pressures, and decision making, has a significant impact on how conflict is played out and ultimately resolved or terminated.‖ As soon as the group members recognize a specific situation as a conflict, the same members try to understand the conflict situation by trying to find answers for the sources of the conflict, responsible parties for the conflict and characteristics of the opposing conflict party (Bar-Tal, 2000). At the end of this cognitive processing, conflicting parties form conflict beliefs, but not in an objective way, rather in a biased way (Bar-Tal, 1990). This belief is shared by different groups at the societal level. Conflict increases ambiguity as one cannot identify what will happen in the near future. Due to the challenging and demanding nature of intractable conflicts, some needs, such as decreased ambiguity, should be met. Bar-Tal (2007) argues that a vast majority of members of society have these societal beliefs of conflict especially at the peak point of conflicts to meet these needs. However, the extent to which these beliefs are shared might change because of personal and societal dynamics as well. These shared conflict beliefs, or in other words conflict narratives such as historical or identity narratives, might be at the root of conflict as well as a means for its resolution (see Sanz, 2012). In conflicting societies, there might be a dominant socially shared understanding of the conflict which is called ―ethos of conflict‖ (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2007). These dominant societal beliefs might shape people‘s reactions and they can cause escalation and de-escalation of the conflicts. In addition to these dominant societal beliefs that affect the course of a conflict, alternative ―societal beliefs‖ in society might be equally significant in shaping the course of a conflict (see also Cohrs, Uluğ, Stahel & Kışlıoğlu, 2015). Investigating these alternative beliefs together with dominant conflict beliefs should be the primary task of the conflict resolution researcher to grasp the complex characteristics of the conflict situation. This brings us to the point that intervention in the conflict requires a thorough

Chapter 2 analysis of the conflict situation in the first place as the intervention strategy is dependent on the analysis of the conflict. 2.1.2 Conflict resolution As conflict is defined as incompatibilities of demands, goals or perceptions, the termination of a conflict should eliminate these perceived incompatibilities among the conflicting parties (Bar-Tal, 2000). Accordingly, conflict resolution could be defined as a condition ―where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other’s continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other‖ (Wallensteen, 2002, italics in original, p. 8). Some types of conflicts are resistant to resolution, but there are possible approaches and important steps to be implemented to resolve these stubborn conflicts. Kelman (2002) identifies four central components of the conflict resolution process as a) to identify and analyze the problem, b) to detect options and shape ideas for resolution of the conflict, c) to affect the other side of the conflict, and d) to build a supportive political atmosphere for the resolution of a conflict. During the conflict processes, conflicting parties tend to interpret the same information and/or events differently and this leads to ―divergent construal‖ (Ross & Ward, 1995). This causes more disagreement between conflicting parties. These disagreements might also be called ―barriers‖ as they hinder the successful resolution of the conflicts and peace settlement. Unfortunately, these barriers are found both among leaders as well as among the public (see Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Hameiri, Bar-Tal, & Halperin, 2014). 2.2 A need for a systematic and holistic approach The complexity of conflicts has also forced scholars to develop new and different approaches in conflict resolution literature. For example, different diplomacy approaches in conflict resolution have been identified. These include, but are not limited to, ‗Track One Diplomacy‘ or ‗official diplomacy‘, ‗Track Two Diplomacy‘ or ‗non-official diplomacy‘, ‗Track Three Diplomacy‘, ‗Multi-Track Diplomacy‘, and even ‗Track One and a Half Diplomacy‘ (e.g., Blum, 2005; Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, 2007; Diamond & McDonald, 1996; Kelman, 2008; Kraft, 2002; Mapendere, 2005; Montville, 1991a; Nan & Strimling, 2004). Below, these diplomacies are explained respectively.

Chapter 2

To begin with, Track–I diplomacy or official diplomacy is defined as an instrument of foreign policy to create contacts between the governments of various countries with the help of mediators (De Magalhaes, 1988). Track–I diplomacy was invented specifically in order to repair strained relations between nations and usually includes legal dialogues such as ceasefire, peace talks and negotiations (Mapendere, 2005; Yıldız, 2014). Track–I practitioners might be counted as the most influential practitioners among all practitioners as they generally have the political power. This is also considered one of the strengths of Track–I diplomacy (Mapendere, 2005; Miall, 2004). However, it should be noted that power can also be used as a corruptive tool against powerless parties and the demands of weak parties might be suppressed. It should be noted that this theoretical area will be elaborated in chapter six. Track–II diplomacy is complementary to Track–I diplomacy (see Çuhadar, 2009; Fisher, 1997; Jones, 2015). It includes some activities such as interactive-problem solving activities that are very challenging to implement within Track–I (Kelman, 2000). Track– II diplomacy includes non-official meetings and problem-solving activities that aim to help resolve conflicts by developing strategies for cooperation and affecting public opinion (see Chataway, 1998; Çuhadar & Dayton, 2012; Montville, 1991a; Yıldız, 2014). Compared to Track–I diplomacy where high-state officials take part, Track–II diplomacy is more open to interaction among its participants such as well-known scholars, clergy and NGO-representatives (see Lieberfeld, 2002 for Track–II application in South Africa; Yıldız, 2014 in Cambodia). Its strength lies in the flexibility of expressing opinions freely. However, their ability to influence decisions is limited compared to Track–I diplomacy (see also Lederach, 1999; Mapendere, 2005). This theoretical area will be elaborated in chapter seven. Finally, complementary to Track–I and –II, there is Track–III, citizen or unofficial diplomacy at the grassroots. Track–III diplomacy is more concerned with raising awareness than making new offerings to expertise with research and analysis (Kraft, 2002). In Track–III diplomacy, unofficial third parties bring people from different backgrounds together in order to repair broken relations among them and to promote peace in the long-run (Chigas, 2003). This level of diplomacy might be seen as the diplomacy at the bottom of society and, therefore, less significant in terms of affecting

Chapter 2 the decisions taken by government leaders. However, understanding the role of grassroots is very significant (see Lederach, 1999) as grassroots have the capacity to reproduce conflict through their socialization (Başer & Çelik, 2014). Thus, if one could understand grassroots, one can also understand the whole society as grassroots represent the society in miniature (Lederach, 1999). This theoretical area will be elaborated in chapter eight. As mentioned above, different types of diplomacies have various strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, a systematic and holistic approach is required while approaching conflicts, if the complexities of conflict dynamics are taken into account. A systematic approach is required to grasp the complexities of conflict, to get a complete picture of the conflict and to scrutinize the conflict dynamics carefully. A holistic approach in conflict analysis and resolution is required as different tracks of diplomacy are interconnected and complement each other (Mapendere, 2005). Successful conflict resolution and peace building must be constructed from both the bottom and the top (Chigas, 2003; Lederach, 1999). In this regard, a systematic and holistic conflict analysis and conflict resolution approach might be helpful due to the characteristics of interconnected nature of different segments in society. In the following, first, the role of frames in conflict analysis and conflict resolutions is discussed. Then the role of including all segments of society in conflict resolution and peace building is mentioned. Finally, the role of finding agreements and disagreements among different segments of society is explained. 2.2.1 The role of frames in conflict analysis and resolution In simplest terms, frames are a way to describe circumstances (Goffman, 1974). They function as structure classifications that help us perceive, identify and label the various occurrences that we come across in everyday life. Similarly, frames are the cognitive shortcuts people use to understand complex and complicated phenomena; thus, frames play the filter role in different contexts for what we should view about the phenomenon and how we should react to it (Kaufman et al., 2013). Broadly speaking, frames are mental constructions that help people organize perception and interpretation (Johnston, 1995). In other words, frames make the issue at hand more understandable, more coherent and simpler to digest both complex and new information, and also to shape the reaction, or particularly behavior, in response to the situation.

Chapter 2

Frames, framing and frame analysis are sometimes used interchangeably within various disciplines due to their overlaps (Kitzinger, 2007). Before going further, it is also essential to distinguish framing and frames to prevent confusion. Framing is the activity to create the frames; thus, the frames are the results of this activity and process (Gray, 2003). Framing activities can be done by politicians, media, movement organizations; however, the effects of these activities on people is contingent upon the penetration of frames into the mental life to function as determinants of how a situation is defined and how it is reacted to (Johnston, 1995). Framing has a role in helping the interpretation of the issue. At the same time, through framing, one also orients oneself toward the issue. Thus, taking a stance toward an issue also brings a stance towards why and how this issue has happened, and who is responsible for it (Gray, 2003). On the other hand, frames are in the dialogues we are in, in the news we watch, and in the speeches we hear. Framing takes place through the process of giving a new form to an issue. For example, the disputants can start with different frames in terms of defining the problem; however, these frames can change and be shaped when the disputants interact with each other (Putnam & Holmer, 1992). Gray (2003) summarizes the functions of frames as follows: a) defining the issue, b) determining what should be done and by whom, c) defending and protecting oneself, and thus justifying the behaviors done and mobilizing the group to take the action needed to actualize aims of the disputants (e.g., participation in social movements). Likewise, in the conflict situation, the conflict frames tell us what the conflict is about, why it has occurred and who bears responsibility for the conflict, who the disputants are and what the possible solutions are. To systematically analyze frames, Entman (1993) suggested frame analysis, which states that frames have four main characteristics: a) frames express problems and define them – problem definitions; b) frames identify causes of the problem – diagnosing the causes, c) frames make moral judgments about the causal agents – moral judgments, and d) frames recommend remedies for the problem – problem solutions. Thus, a frame could be analyzed systematically by indicating the problem definitions, the causes of the problem, moral judgments of the problem, and problem solutions. 2.2.2 The role of including all segments of society in conflict resolution

Chapter 2

Approaches to conflict resolution have dramatically changed since the end of the Cold War era. The globalization process and the spreading of liberal democracy have caused ethnic/cultural/religious minority groups to demand their rights. Nation states have had some difficulties in dealing with these different demands, but these demands urged them to negotiate and compromise together with mediators and peacemakers (Aktaş, 2014b). The transformation in conflict resolutions is related to pluralist paradigms in society (Aktaş, 2014b). According to the pluralist paradigm, society should not be approached as a homogenous construct, but rather as a construct that includes connections between the individual, civil society and the state. This society is also comprised of a wide-range of sub-actors whose identities and characteristics substantially differ from each other. In line with this pluralist paradigm, for long-lasting conflict resolution and peace making all these above mentioned sub-actors‘ opinions should be taken into account. In conflict resolution, scholars, journalists, opinion leaders and clergy together with civil society undertake serious responsibilities (e.g., in South Africa and Northern Ireland). If different segments of society participate and undertake serious responsibilities, it helps legitimate negotiation and peace processes in that particular society (Aktaş, 2014b; Nilsson, 2012). Accordingly, it could be argued that not only conflicting parties, but also additional actors such as civil society and political parties should participate in the conflict resolution and peace building process (Nilsson, 2012) as successful peace building has always encompassed a combination of various segments of society (Paffenholz, 2015). The approaches to peace building differ from top-down and bottom-up approaches. Irrespective of the type of approaches, Lederach (1999) argues that all subdivisions of a society should take part in peace building (see also Chufrin & Saunders, 1993; Saunders, 2001; Ware, 2007). Accordingly, not only top-level leaders who are predominantly significant people and therefore hold more power, but also mid-level leaders should participate in the peace processes. The purpose of including all segments of society in conflict resolution is to provide a chance for their voices to be heard (Ware, 2007). It is acknowledged in the conflict analysis and resolution literature that transformation of conflicts into sustainable peace requires the inclusion of a society at all levels (e.g., from grassroots to the political elites; see Fisher, 2006b).

Chapter 2

Including all segments of society in conflict resolution could also be conceptualized as a multi-level peace process (Saunders, 2001) or multi-track diplomacy (Diamond & McDonald, 1996). A multi-level peace process includes four fields: 1) the official process, 2) the quasi-official process, 3) the public peace process, and 4) civil society. Multi-track diplomacy includes nine different, yet complementary aspects in conflict: 1) government, 2) professional conflict resolution, 3) business, 4) private citizens, 5) research, training and education, 6) activism, 7) religious, 8) funding, and 9) public opinion/communication (McDonald, 2003). According to multi-track diplomacy, it is impossible to build lasting peace with only one track and transforming protracted conflicts requires addressing them on more than a few tracks simultaneously. Multi-track diplomacy allows ensuring their complementarity as well as balancing different tracks with various activities which are difficult to conduct in one track (Ropers, 2008). Including different tracks in different stages might increase chances for peacebuilding for opening novel roads for dialogue, creating leverage and building supportive peace constituencies (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 1999). Although different tracks could complement each other at achieving peace, it should be noted that multi-track or multi- level diplomacy requires a high degree of coordination among these tracks (Crocker et al., 1999; Saunders, 2001). The complementarity of tracks could be increased by various coordination efforts such as information sharing, resource sharing, collaborative strategizing, and collaboration through partnerships (Nan, 1999). Thus, not only could various tracks be incorporated into a peace process, but also their coordination could be handled successfully. In addition, broader inclusion of different actors from various segments of society enables sustainable peace and transition agreements (Paffenholz, 2015, p. 3). In line with that, Nilsson (2012) indicates that the durability of peace increases if civil society actors take part in the peace settlement. The durability of peace increases even more if both civil society actors and political parties participate together. In other words, if all parts of community take part in peace building, a peace agreement will be effective as well as lasting (McDonald, 2002). This, in turn, will increase the prospects for peace. One can question whether broader inclusion is motivated by normative considerations or not. For example, if a peace agreement is successful at the negotiation

Chapter 2 table without the involvement of civil society, why is broader inclusion of society still recommended or implemented? Studies in conflict resolution and peace building indicate that the inclusion of additional actors or groups in addition to main conflicting groups is mostly motivated by deliberate and planned considerations rather than normative considerations (Paffenholz, 2015). According to Paffenholz (2015), inclusion of additional groups is frequently proposed and implemented by the main conflicting parties in order to increase these groups‘ own legitimacy (Nilsson, 2012). In addition to increasing legitimacy, broader inclusion is also used for gaining momentum for negotiations (i.e., in Northern Ireland), testing new ideas (i.e., in Tajikistan) (see Paffenholz, 2015) or increasing the national ownership of the peace agreement (United Nations, 2012). Overall, it could be argued that all segments of society should participate in conflict resolution and peace building processes not merely because of normative considerations, but because of its potential for the success of peace building. Lederach (1999) proposes a pyramid approach to building peace. This pyramid also indicates the population affected by the conflict (see Figure 1). In this pyramid, top- level leaders with fewest people (e.g., political leaders) are at the top and their statements carry utmost importance, especially in the context of a conflict. Mid-level leaders (e.g., scholars and/or journalists) are in the middle of the pyramid and they include key actors who come from different institutions such as universities, NGOs, religious or ethnic communities. These mid-level leaders are known both by the top-level leaders and top- level leaders‘ constituencies. Grass-roots leaders are at the bottom of the pyramid and they represent society. Their position is crucial in the conflict context as they witness the worst scenes of the conflict in everyday life. All in all, different levels of leaderships are interdependent and the success of conflict resolution and peace building is also dependent on their collaboration and contribution (see also Paffenholz, 2010). According to Çelik (2014), it is vital to include all these actors in the conflict resolution and peace process, especially for answering these questions: ―who are we?‖ and ―what kind of a future do we want?‖ A peace process that includes both top-down and bottom-up elements might yield more stable outcomes (Nilsson, 2012). On the other hand, it should be noted that inclusion of different segments of society also poses a problem for increasing the tension, as the plurality of the participants makes collaboration

Chapter 2 and legitimatization more difficult. At this point, one should take both increasing the legitimacy of the peace process as well as assuring its efficacy into consideration (Nilsson, 2012). If any group or political party is excluded from the peace process, this can put a barrier to sustainable and long-lasting peace both in the short- and long-run (Yıldız, 2014). It is known from the literature that broader inclusion makes it more difficult for excluded groups to undermine the conflict resolution and peace process. Therefore, it is imperative to include all segments of society in the conflict resolution process from the beginning despite its challenges, rather than to find solutions to these barriers in the later periods as it is possible to find agreement points across different segments of society on where a conflict resolution process may start. 2.2.3 The role of finding agreements and disagreements among different segments of society To manage a conflict situation efficiently, conflict resolution practitioners need to understand a) how conflicting parties assess the conflict situation they face and what they understand about the conflict and b) what action they should take to address this situation (Furlong, 2005). The first step requires a careful diagnosis of frames, as the second step is dependent on the first step. If a poor diagnosis is being made, the result will be ineffective and will cause the conflict to escalate. To be able to grasp the conflict dynamics in a holistic way, one needs a conflict analysis model that assists in diagnosing the causes of the conflict and finding resolution for it (Furlong, 2005; Moore, 2003). Wallensteen (2002, p. 3) claims that in conflict resolution literature ―[t]here is also a need to suggest what the parties should discuss, how they may agree, how agreements can be made a reality.‖ He argues that finding agreements requires a formal understanding among the conflicting parties as finding agreements among the parties also paves the way to find intervention strategies to satisfy all conflicting parties (see also Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1999). However, he contends that a more informal, implicit and secret agreement among the conflicting parties might be found as well. Thus, in conflict resolution, one should also aim to find both formal, overt and informal, more subtle agreements among conflicting parties.

Chapter 2

Level 1: Top Leadership

Level 2: Middle-Range Leadership

Level 3: Grassroots Leadership

Figure 1. Three levels of leadership (Lederach, 1999, p. 39). In addition, Çelik (2014) also puts forward that the conflicting parties are not homogenous and include various actors who are affected by the conflict differently. As mentioned above, although challenging, long-lasting peace requires defining these several actors and their inclusion in the peace process. Due to the diversity of the different actors, it is likely that there will be disagreements both within and between different actors, groups and parties. Therefore, in addition to agreed points, the disagreement points of parties should be determined since these points obstruct the resolution of the conflict (see also Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011). Social-psychological approaches to conflict resolution also indicate that it is these perceived incompatibilities or subjective factors that play a significant role in different interpretations of the same event (see Deutsch, 2003). Kelman (2007) argues that ―[i]n a conflict relationship, such subjective elements may exacerbate the conflict by generating

Chapter 2 the differences in the way the parties perceive reality and by imposing constraints on the rational pursuit of their interests‖ (p. 61). These points of disagreement are as important as the shared points, since conflict resolution requires addressing both shared and unshared viewpoints. Highlighting disagreements among the parties indicates which issues carry the greatest conflict potential and/or disagreement among these parties. Consequently, not only agreed points, but also disagreed points across different parties should be focused on in the conflict resolution processes. Differences between different segments of society come to the fore in a conflict context as they need to work together in conflict resolution and peace building. It is the main task of researchers to understand the perceived incompatibilities between various tracks in a conflict situation. In this context, social-psychological approaches to conflict resolution are specifically helpful to explain perceptual processes that cause a conflict to escalate or intensify barriers to conflict resolution (see Kelman, 2008). From a social-psychological perspective, identifying differences among various segments is crucial for two reasons. First, these differences have the potential to exacerbate the conflict. According to Kelman (2009), it is these internal divisions within societies that impose constraints on political leaders who try to find a way for conflict resolution. Second, these differences within society might also mitigate the conflict and start a change in the conflicting relationships (Kelman, 2009). Finally, the significance of finding similarities across groups is also emphasized in various approaches to conflict resolution (e.g., see, Blake & Mouton, 1964 for a ―smoothing‖ conflict management strategy). In this context, the significance of finding similarities across segments forces conflict resolution practitioners to explore ways of bringing (the perspectives of) various tracks together to be able to address their overlaps as well as their differences. 2.3 The present research The aim of the present research is to explore understandings of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. To put it differently, it is aimed at identifying the conflict understandings (or frames) that indicate what the Kurdish conflict is about, why it has occurred and who bears responsibility for the conflict, who the disputants are and what the possible solutions are in society‘s eyes. These conflict understandings will be investigated

Chapter 2 systematically based on Entman‘s (1993) conceptualization of frame analysis: a) problem definition, b) causal interpretation, c) moral evaluation and d) treatment recommendation. The second aim of the present research is to explore the conflict understandings among political elites (members of parliament), experts (scholars and journalists) and lay people independently. In other words, it is aimed to identify various conflict understandings among Track–I, Track–II and Track–III. As Lederach (1999) suggested including the population affected by the conflict in his pyramid for approaching peace, this research integrated all three segments affected by the Kurdish conflict and included in the study as well. In addition to identifying understandings of the Kurdish conflict, it is also aimed to identify both similarities and differences between these segments. To be more specific, the aim is to investigate priorities and concerns of each segment in the Kurdish conflict context as each segment might have different priorities and concerns. Thus, the differences between different segments such as particular issues which are psychologically more salient for each segment will become more apparent. Also, identifying similarities between segments and finding commonalities across these segments might help conflict resolution attempts to build a long-lasting peace. To summarize, this PhD research deals with this question with different segments from a social psychological perspective: how do people frame the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? To be more specific, how do parliamentarians frame the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? How do scholars and journalists frame the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? How do lay people frame the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? It also deals with this question: what are the similarities and differences between these segments? On which issues are there perceived incompatibilities between these groups? In the following chapters, the answers to each question will be presented through the eyes of different segments of society.

Chapter 3

Chapter 3 The historical background of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey

Chapter 3

In this chapter, the historical background of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey will be presented in detail to contextualize the following studies. First, the situation of Kurds in the Ottoman Empire will be discussed. Second, the situation in the early period of the Republic of Turkey will be mentioned. Third, the situation of Kurds in the 1980s and the PKK era will be summarized. Fourth, the Kurdish conflict resolution process with a specific focus on conflict resolution suggestions by various scholars for the Kurdish conflict will be discussed. Finally, perceptions of the Kurdish conflict in society will be mentioned. 3.1 Kurds in the Ottoman Empire The Ottoman Empire had a different characteristic compared to other pre-modern empires. This empire did not attempt to integrate the different halk (peoples) culturally, since it had a different system in which people were counted as different peoples based on their religion (Ahmad, 1996). This system is called “millet” system. In this system, for example, Rums (Greek Orthodox), Armenians and Jews who had religious beliefs other than Islam were ―millet‖ (communities), and they were allowed to rule themselves. These were generally called non-Muslim communities. On the other hand, Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Albanians and Circassians were Muslim communities and became the basis of ―Islam milleti‖ (Islamic communities) (Akyol, 2006, p. 29). This millet system affected the politics of the new Republic, which was founded in 1923, and has shaped the course of the Kurdish conflict in the long run, even today. Kurds lived under the Ottoman Empire mostly in a peaceful environment. One of the reasons behind this peaceful atmosphere was the autonomy Kurds had, such as using the Kurdish language in their own places of education (see Ekinci, 2011). Another reason was the religious bond between the Kurds and the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the Ottoman Empire had kept an eye on the Kurds via tribes in the region, Hamidiye Alayları (Hamidiye corps, cf. Tekdemir, 2014) and the Kurdish tribes usually supported the Ottoman Empire in different wars. However, there were some uprisings against the Ottoman Empire which were initiated by the Kurdish tribes. The first Kurdish uprising under the Ottoman Empire in 1806 (Ergil, 2010, p. 399) was due to economic, rather than ethnic reasons (Akyol, 2006, p. 34), as the ethnic consciousness of the Kurds did not rise for a long period of time.

Chapter 3

The Ottoman Empire lost a great deal of territory both because of the ethnic uprisings of different nations and various wars, such as the Balkan War and World War I (WWI). At the end of WWI, a peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the allies of WWI, known as the Treaty of Sevres, was signed on 10 August 1920. The aim was to create an independent Kurdistan (today‘s southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq), a homeland for the ethnic Kurds (Olson, 1996; Yavuz & Özcan, 2006) and to create an independent Armenia together with other political changes in the country (e.g., changes in control over the Turkish Straits). This treaty, however, was never implemented; rather it became a basis for Turkey‘s paranoia, called ―Sevres Paranoia‖ or ―Sevres Syndrome,‖ that ―foreign powers‖ might challenge the integrity of Turkey again in the future as they did in the past by aiming to create an independent Kurdistan (Çelik & Blum, 2007). As a result, the treaty caused Turkey to engage in a war of independence. 3.2 Kurds in the Republic of Turkey Turks and Kurds fought together during the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922) and won against the Greek occupation of Western Turkey, Armenian occupation of Eastern Turkey, French and Italian occupation of Southern Turkey and British and Italian occupation of İstanbul. One reason behind this collaboration was the Muslim bond between Turks and Kurds, as the War of Independence was seen as a war of ―Muslims‖ against ―non-Muslims‖ (van Bruinessen, 1992, p. 46). The Lausanne Treaty, a peace treaty between the allies of WWI and the new Republic of Turkey, was signed in 1923 as a consequence of the Turkish Independence War. The Lausanne Treaty, which accepted solely non-Muslims as minorities (Ersanlı & Özdoğan, 2011), also guaranteed the mother tongues, religious rituals and cultures of different cultural groups of the Muslim community (Somer, 2010). According to the 39th clause of this treaty, the languages of different people both in public places and private places could not be restricted (together with an official language). However, after the foundation of the modern Republic of Turkey in 1923, the main doctrine of the Turkish state, Kemalism, was built on Turkish nationalism, and left no room for other ethnic minorities other than non-Muslim minorities such as Armenians, Rums and Jews (Cerrah, 1999). Ekinci (2011, p. 18) argues that at this point, the Republic of Turkey was founded in an atmosphere where homogeneous nation-state

Chapter 3 building and authoritarian dictatorship in Europe were highly common. Modern Turkey implemented the Turkish ―ethnic identity‖ as a common identity and new reforms accompanied the foundation of the republic, such as abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate in 1922 and the caliphate in 1924. These new reforms weakened the religious bond between the Kurds and the newly founded republic. In addition to weak religious bonds, Kurds were also dissatisfied with modern Turkey, as they did not have an autonomous region in the new state. Their identity was denied and their cultural expressions were also banned (Yeğen, 2007). The Turkish language became the official language of Turkey. A substantial proportion of Kurds were expelled to the western regions of Turkey in order to be assimilated within the Turkish population (Ekinci, 2011). It should be noted that there are also views, such as Heper‘s (2008) that oppose this argument by underlining that the aim was not to assimilate Kurds, but rather to integrate them into the society. As a result, Kurds revolted against the Turkish state 18 times between 1923 and 1938 (see Ersanlı & Özdoğan, 2011); however, all the uprisings of the Kurdish movements were harshly suppressed by the Turkish state (Olson, 1996). After these uprisings, the Kurds and their aspirations were perceived as very dangerous to the territorial integrity of Turkey. However, almost no uprisings were seen between 1938 and 1984 (Heper, 2008). 3.3 1980s and the PKK era The worst period, in terms of torture and human rights violations against the Kurds, started after the 1980 military coup. The junta regime banned all political parties. It also left no other room for expressing opinion, especially if these opinions were perceived as harmful to the Turkish state (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). When the junta regime oppressed the people in the Kurdish region more and more through assimilation policies (Ersanlı & Özdoğan, 2011), the PKK gained more adherents for its own group (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). After the 1980 military coup, particularly in Diyarbakır prison, Kurdish activists were exposed to serious torture, degradation, and ―Turkification‖ practices (Zeydanlioglu, 2009). In 1984, after four years of military rule, the PKK started its violent activities under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan in order to challenge these bans and humiliating practices against the Kurds. This first attack launched a new era in the evolution of the

Chapter 3

Kurdish conflict. Unfortunately, it caused the death of as many as 45,000 people since 1984 and thousands of murders by unknown assailants (see Çelik, 2005; Çelik & Kantowitz, 2009). In the long run, the conflict between the PKK and the TSK (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri–Turkish Armed Forces) in the eastern and south-eastern parts of Turkey created an insecure environment for its citizens, and in turn led to forced migration. This forced migration from the region to the other cities in Turkey such as Mersin, Adana, İstanbul and İzmir was the result of three main problems: a) the evacuation of villages in the region by the TSK based on the 1987 emergency rule, b) pressure of the PKK on villagers who did not support the organization, and c) an insecure environment arising from high intensity armed conflict between the PKK and the TSK (Çelik, 2005). This environment affected people living in the region very adversely since it led to a great dilemma about whether to support the PKK or the state (Ergil, 2010, p. 112). At the same time, the Turkish state has taken some other steps in addition to military measures to address the Kurdish problem. Arguably, one measure was the initiation of the huge and ambitious regional development project known as the GAP (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi–Southeastern Anatolia Project) in the 1970s. The project was planned and implemented in order to radically transform the socio-economic environment of the region, where the Kurdish population is relatively higher compared to the other regions with possible exception of the Eastern Anatolia Region, and end the insurgency and banditry that were fuelled by the underdevelopment and ―backwardness‖ of the region (Bilgen, 2014; Scalbert-Yücel & Ray, 2006). However, it can be argued that this project ignored the political aspect of the problem, and left the rights and freedom aspect of the problem untouched. The Turkish state also decided to form a ―village guard system‖ in the 1980s in order to protect its citizens from the PKK. This is a paramilitary system similar to an extension of the ―Hamidiye Alayları‖ in the Ottoman Empire (cf. Scalbert-Yücel & Ray, 2006). Village guards are generally Kurdish citizens living in the region, who either volunteered or were forced by the Turkish military to arm against the PKK. However, some Kurds in the region did not want to become village guards because it made these people take a side (of the Turkish state) in the conflict and would be seen as traitors

Chapter 3 within their community for working with the state, rather than with the PKK (Balta, Yüksel, & Acar, 2015). In the 1980s, the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, left Turkey and fled to Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon (Varouhakis, 2009). Due to international pressure, he had to leave Syria and afterwards he had to take refuge in many countries including Italy, Russia, and Greece. While the Kurdish conflict in Turkey was continuing, Abdullah Öcalan, was arrested in Kenya in 1999 and has been kept in İmralı Prison in Turkey ever since. After Öcalan‘s capture, the Kurdish conflict entered into a calm phase that lasted until 2004 due to PKK‘s unilateral ceasefire declaration. In 2004, PKK ended the ceasefire. Between 2004 and 2009, casualties rose again among the PKK, the security forces (e.g., soldiers in the TSK) and civilians (Tezcür, 2013; 2014). The rise of both military and civilian deaths also led the AKP government (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi– Justice and Development Party), who has been ruling the country since 2002, to address the Kurdish conflict with a different road-map (e.g., starting negotiations with a political solution rather than a military/security oriented one). 3.4 The Kurdish conflict resolution process The Turkish state and the PKK started talks confidentially in Oslo in 2008 (Oslo negotiations) and the current AKP government decided to introduce a ―Kurdish Initiative‖ in 2009 to end the Kurdish insurgency (Çandar, 2009; Tezcür, 2014). Although the main aim of the Kurdish Initiative, which was to end the insurgency, was clear, it was not clear how and when this would be implemented. The only noteworthy development was the opening of a state–led TV channel in the Kurdish language, TRT Kurdî. Also, after the introduction of the Kurdish Initiative, there was much criticism from political parties (e.g., pro-Turkish MHP–Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi–Nationalist Movement Party) as well as the public. These developments forced the AKP government to change the name of the ―Kurdish‖ initiative to, first, the ―democratic‖ initiative and later to the ―national unity project‖ to indicate that this initiative was not harmful to Turkey or its territorial integrity (see also Gürsel, 2013). In 2012, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that his government was holding talks with Abdullah Öcalan. In January 2013, two members of parliament from the pro-Kurdish BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi–Peace and Democracy

Chapter 3

Party) visited Öcalan in İmralı Prison and thus the peace process officially started1 (see also Tezcür, 2013). In September 2013, the AKP government also introduced a ―democracy package‖ which included reforms such as the right to have political campaigns in other languages, freedom to use the Kurdish alphabet by terminating the ban on the use of the letters X, Q and W, and the right to teach Kurdish as a mother tongue in private schools (see also Cengiz, 2013). However, these developments were far from satisfying the demands of the PKK (Tezcür, 2014). The PKK‘s demands could be summarized under four headings: a) recognizing the Kurdish identity in the constitution; b) granting more autonomy to local governments (e.g., self-governance) and constructing decentralization, c) amnesty for Abdullah Öcalan and integration of PKK members into the political arena, and d) education in Kurdish in public schools (Tezcür, 2014). On the other hand, from the perspective of the Turkish government, the peace process entails three main steps: 1) the termination of all violence, 2) the relocation of all active PKK fighters from Turkish soil and 3) disarmament (see Eralp, 2014). As of 2014, even though the parliamentarians from the BDP2 continued to hold talks with Abdullah Öcalan to address the Kurdish conflict, it is still unknown how the conflict will be resolved. This is mainly due to two significant points. First, it is unclear what the AKP government is eager to provide and what the PKK is willing to consent to in order to disarm (Tezcür, 2013). Second, the lack of transparency and participation and the legal ambiguity regarding the process also hinders the peace process in 2014 (Üstündağ, 2014a). Conflict resolution suggestions for the Kurdish conflict Barkey and Fuller (1998) contend that the multi-dimensional nature of the Kurdish problem requires a multi-dimensional solution approach (see also Çelik, 2014). Therefore, while the advancements in both economy and democracy might improve the situation in the region, the identity aspect of the problem should not be ignored. This would entail

1 It was not clear why the peace process started in 2013. There were conditions which initiated the peace process between the PKK and the Turkish state, including the intensity of the conflict in 2012, and causalities from both sides, changing circumstances in the Middle East and developing trade connections with South Kurdistan, and efforts of the Kurdish Political Movement and NGOs that give importance to human rights and democratization (Üstündağ, 2014a). 2 The name of this political party is not BDP anymore. In 2014, they changed their name to HDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi–Peoples‘ Democratic Party). 43

Chapter 3 accepting the existence of Kurds, granting their cultural rights and granting more freedom to local authorities. As the Kurdish conflict has caused trauma in society, including mass killings, injuries, disablement, tortures, marginalization, violence, unidentified murders, hate speech, economic loss, unemployment, and polarization among groups (Keyman, 2014), the resolution of the conflict requires various solutions to address different dimensions of the conflict. These might be considered as repairing traumas, mutual understanding, general amnesty, empathy, expanding freedom, and institutionalization of democracy (Tekdemir, 2014) and even more radical changes such as the legalization of the PKK and decentralization, which may satisfy the Kurds (Bozarslan, 2014). On the other hand, Yaşar (2011, p. 322-323) argues another solution for the Kurdish problem. He argues that Kurds are a separate nation; therefore, a solution which gives the full rights of a nation could be the only ‗real‘ solution for this problem. This clearly means that the right to establish an independent Kurdistan should be recognized for Kurds. Then, the Kurds could decide whether they prefer being a part of Turkey or establishing an independent state. However, Ekinci (2011) opposes this idea and states that Kurds do not demand an independent Kurdistan; rather, they demand to have the same rights as Turks and become equal citizens within the territory of Turkey. Therefore, according to Ekinci (2011), the only solution for the conflict lies in the democratization of Turkey. Yaşar (2011) also suggests that the Kurdish language should be the second language for education language in Turkey. At the same time, the Kurdish language should be able to be used in the public space freely and equally without facing any restrictions towards the cultural rights of Kurds. Therefore, the new constitution should guarantee the right to express one‘s ethnic identity with these new arrangements. Only after these significant and also necessary changes have been implemented, for example, one can define oneself as ―Türkiyeliyim–I am from Turkey‖ or ―Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşıyım–I am a citizen of the Republic of Turkey‖ instead of ―Türk’üm–I am Turkish‖ without any problem. Different from being united under a common ethnic identity (Turkish identity), some religious groups suggest the reunification under the umbrella of Islam (Muslim

Chapter 3 identity) as in the Ottoman Empire era. This solution strategy is also used by the AKP government in their mass party gatherings. Even though the majority of Turks are Hanafi3 and the majority of Kurds are Shafi, this doesn‘t necessarily mean that Kurds and Turks are separate in terms of religion; rather they differ in terms of religious practices (Cerrah, 1999). Therefore, it is proposed that rather than emphasizing the ethnic identity, the common Muslim identity might bring peace to the Kurdish conflict (see Sarigil & Fazlioglu, 2013 for a counter-argument). It is also vital to include the suggestions of Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned PKK leader, for the resolution of the conflict. Öcalan (2012) offers a ―road map‖ for the resolution of the Kurdish problem in his book called ―Prison Writings III: The Road Map to Negotiations.‖ He mainly argues that this resolution model should include three main phases. The first phase includes no activity of the PKK; thus, a ceasefire will be the core of this phase. In the second phase, a ―Truth and Reconciliation Commission‖ will be established in order to address the wrongdoings of the conflict process and later on, amnesty will be proposed for former PKK members and any person who is linked with the activity of the PKK. After consolidating the legal structure for the peace process, the PKK can also terminate its illegal activities outside Turkey. However, the only condition for this is that it should be under the observation of related parties such as the United States (US), the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Republic of Turkey (Öcalan, 2012). The third and last phase is terminating the total function of the PKK since the KCK (Koma Civakên Kurdistan, known as the urban branch of the PKK) will have a legal position at the end of this process. Then, the amnesty of Abdullah Öcalan will be actualized after he defends himself at the ―Truth and Reconciliation Commission.‖ To sum up, there are various suggestions for how to resolve the Kurdish conflict although it is not clear how the conflict will be resolved. From a democratization and human rights perspective, it could be argued that the resolution of the Kurdish conflict requires not only the democratic negotiation that has societal support behind it, but also the political will that actualizes this democratic negotiation (see also Keyman, 2014). It should also be noted that a sustainable and long-lasting peace for the Kurdish conflict

3 Hanafi and Shafi are different schools of thought in Sunni Islam. 45

Chapter 3 requires not only national, but also international support, as this conflict also affects the democratization processes of the broader region adversely (Yıldız, 2014). This argument indicates the significance of including all segments of society in conflict resolution and peace-building. This can be applied to different conflicts around the world, as conflict resolution and peace-building need societal support behind them. A permanent peace in Turkey can only be achieved again with the agency of conflicting parties (Üstündağ, 2014a; Yıldız, 2014). Therefore, to create sustainable peace, different segments of society should be part of the peace process and they should ally with each other for a free societal imagination. This process, first and foremost, requires understanding different groups‘ perceptions of the Kurdish conflict in society. 3.5 Perceptions of the Kurdish conflict in society In order to analyze a conflict, one should examine its history and specific events which triggered the outbreak of violence (Seymour, 2003). According to Seymour (2003), both history and perceptions play a crucial role in the escalation of conflict, managing it and building a sustainable peace. In the previous sections, it was shown that understandings and interpretations of the Kurdish conflict are mainly discussed by scholars in the literature; however, a lack of empirical studies on the conflict understandings in relation to the Kurdish conflict presents a barrier to a deeper understanding of different segments‘ (e.g., lay people, politicians) priorities and concerns. Empirical studies might provide additional insights about the Kurdish conflict understandings and there might be more conflict understandings than argued in the literature as well. Studying conflict understandings empirically might also make it possible to explore ―alternative conflict understandings‖ in society which are not easily seen in historical themes unless they are approached empirically. As presented in the previous sections, there have been various understandings of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. In this section, both some studies which brought these understandings together and some studies which investigated them empirically are mentioned. To start with, Çelik and Blum (2007) define three levels of the Kurdish conflict. The first level is seen as a conflict between the Turkish state and an ethnic minority, namely Kurds in Turkey. The second level is seen as a conflict between the Turkish state and a rebel group, the PKK. The third level is seen as a conflict between

Chapter 3

Turks and Kurds in the form of social tension which is visible especially in the larger cities in western Turkey such as İzmir, Mersin, İstanbul (see also Saraçoğlu, 2011). In addition, Ozcelik (2006) summarizes the definitions of the Kurdish conflict under three dimensions: a) external and internal terrorism, b) economic inequality, underdevelopment, and unemployment issue, and c) an ethnic and identity conflict. In accordance with Ozcelik (2006), Beriker-Atiyas (1997) also argues that there are three dimensions of the Kurdish conflict: a) an economic dimension (e.g., unemployment, budget for the conflict, refugee problem), b) a democracy dimension (e.g., tortures, forced migration, illegal groups in politics, EU), and c) an international dimension (e.g., Turkish foreign policy, anti-PKK lobbying). In addition to Ozcelik (2006) and Beriker- Atiyas (1997), Tan (2008) discusses five definitions of the Kurdish conflict: a) denial of conflict, b) terrorism definition, c) economy definition, d) identity definition, and e) nation state definition. Apart from these conceptualizations in the literature, there are a few studies such as public opinion polls on how people in different parts of Turkey perceive the Kurdish conflict. For example, according to the results of the survey conducted by SETA & POLLMARK (2009) with 10,577 participants on perceptions of the Kurdish problem, 23.1% of the participants see the causes of the Kurdish problem stemming from socio- economic problems, 16.4% think there is no problem at all, 14.1% from foreign powers, 13% from discrimination, 12.3% from the PKK/terror, 11.6% from the politics of the Turkish state, 8.1% from Kurdish nationalism, and 1.4% from other causes. These results are somewhat similar to the various definitions in the literature. However, these results also provide additional insight through the eyes of lay people. An empirical study by Uluğ and Cohrs (2016a) indicates how laypersons from different ethnic backgrounds, such as Turks, Kurds, and Arabs in Mersin (an ethnically diverse region in the south of Turkey) view the Kurdish conflict. In the study, five conflict understandings were distinguished among lay people: a) a terrorism perspective, b) a foreign powers and economy perspective, c) an ambivalent perspective, d) a democratization problem, and e) the oppression of Kurds. These results highlight qualitatively distinct viewpoints among lay people toward the Kurdish conflict. However, to be able to understand the Kurdish conflict from the eyes not only of lay people, but

Chapter 3 also of different groups such as scholars, journalists and politicians, empirical studies with these groups have to be conducted as well. Also, not only perspectives of Turks, Kurds or Arabs in one city, but also other ethnic minority groups (e.g., Circassians) from different cities in Turkey (e.g., İstanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakır) should be taken into consideration to see the bigger picture of the Kurdish conflict in society. To summarize, the historical background of the Kurdish conflict and the perceptions of the Kurdish conflict in society highlight two important points. First, the discussion on the conflict understandings in the literature indicate that some historical themes reappear in today‘s conflict understandings as well. For example, foreign powers and the international dimension of the Kurdish conflict have always been a significant component of the Kurdish conflict and shaped people‘s conflict understandings in the Kurdish conflict since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, exploring the historical themes in the literature is an essential task for conflict resolution scholars in order to understand the conflict context all the better. Second, there might be some newly emerging themes which might not be visible in the historical themes depending on the changing political context of the Kurdish conflict. For example, democracy, rights and freedom topics have become more central in 2000s, especially after the EU negotiations and it seems highly likely that it will become even more prominent in the next decades. In line with this, Özhan (2009) argues that using the rhetoric that was used in the last two decades in the context of the Kurdish problem is not possible anymore as the Kurdish problem is considered as a political problem rather than as a security problem as of today. For this reason, scholars have to examine the historical background of the Kurdish conflict and also explore newly emerging themes to see reappearing historical themes together with newly emerging themes. This will help in grasping the deep-rooted priorities and concerns that were significant and still are significant, and the new priorities and concerns which have emerged due to the changing context of the conflict.

Chapter 4

Chapter 4 Exploring conflict understandings among lay people in Mersin and Diyarbakır

Chapter 4

In this chapter, the results of a pilot study that explores Kurdish conflict understandings among lay people in Mersin and Diyarbakır are presented. First, in the introduction section, the reasons why a pilot study with lay people was conducted are briefly explained. Second, in the method section, the participants and procedure are explained in detail. Following this, the results of the qualitative content analysis are presented and briefly discussed. 4.1 Introduction The rationale behind the current research is, first, that lay people (grassroots) and their conflict understanding should not be ignored in a conflict context (see Lederach, 1999), as lay people are social actors who reproduce the conflict through their socialization processes (see also Başer & Çelik, 2014). There may be qualitatively distinct and alternative viewpoints among lay people towards the conflict. However, these viewpoints might not be easily visible, as they are not discussed in the literature. Also, there might be newly emerging themes in a new political context. Therefore, one needs to explore these conflict understandings among lay people with qualitative approaches. Exploring these multiple conflict understandings among lay people in the first place may capture the complexity of the conflict better than searching for them in the literature. In the Kurdish conflict, the voices of lay people are generally unheard and their positions are overlooked, though some studies on perceptions of the Kurdish conflict in different regions of Turkey have been conducted (e.g., Başer & Çelik, 2014; Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016a). For example, one study, by Ergil (2010), only focused on two specific aspects of the conflict (i.e., causes and solutions) and included unsystematic yes/no questions such as whether Turkish and Kurdish are different languages, whether the PKK and the pro-Kurdish BDP are separatists and linked…etc. Another study investigated whether Kurds have internalized a ―Turkish‖ identity, and how they relate to the ―terrorist‖ organization PKK from a ―one-sided‖ perspective with emphasis on ―terrorism‖ and ―Turkishness‖ (Özdağ, Vurucu, & Akbaş, 2011). In addition, two studies conducted by research companies examined socio-demographic characteristics of the region rather than participants‘ perspectives (KONDA, 2011), or precluded participants‘ reflection on their views on the Kurdish conflict by only allowing forced-choice responses (yes, no, or no idea; SETA & POLLMARK, 2009). In short, these studies do

Chapter 4 not approach the Kurdish conflict from a systematic perspective and do not provide lay people‘s understandings on the Kurdish conflict, especially qualitatively (see Flick, 2015 for a discussion on limitations of quantitative methods). Through a qualitative approach, participants‘ specific experiences of the Kurdish conflict might be better understood and this provides a rich analysis on subjective views of the participants. In this pilot study, lay people‘s understandings of the Kurdish conflict in Mersin and Diyarbakır were investigated with qualitative approaches such as focus group discussions (FGDs) and open-ended questionnaires in order to utilize those understandings in subsequent Q methodology studies with politicians, experts and lay people (see Kanra, 2004 for a similar application of FGDs to use in Q methodology). This pilot study was unique in exploring understandings of the Kurdish conflict among lay people both from Turkish and Kurdish ethnic groups and from two cities, namely Mersin (an ethnically diverse region in the south of Turkey) and Diyarbakır (the de facto Kurdish capital) by using a systematic approach based on Entman‘s (1993) frame analysis: a) problem definition, b) causal interpretation, c) moral evaluation, and d) treatment recommendation. This approach allowed identifying the priorities and concerns of lay people together with how frequently these issues come to the fore in the discussions both in different ethnic groups and in different cities. 4.2 Method Focus group discussions (see Krueger, 1988; Morgan, 1996) were held in January 2012 and June 2012 to collect the conflict understandings through the eyes of lay people from a first-hand source. In the study, the FGDs were used for maximization of perspectives in order to see a broader picture of the conflict (see Bauer & Aarts, 2000). The discussion groups were formed homogeneously in Turkish and Kurdish groups to prevent heated discussions so that participants from each group could express their opinions more freely rather than in a more defensive way (see Kanra, 2004). In addition to the FGDs, open- ended questionnaires, which included the same questions (see Appendix A for the full list of questions), were also implemented. In both FGDs and open-ended questionnaires, it was asked how the participants define the problem, what the outcomes are, what the causes of the problem are, what kind of moral issues are involved in this problem (e.g., being victim, prideful, responsible), and what the possible solutions are from their point

Chapter 4 of view. Open-ended questionnaires were used to gather perspectives from the participants who do not like to share their opinions within a discussion group and rather prefer sharing their views individually on a piece of paper. Thus, I aimed to triangulate the focus group data with the open-ended questionnaires (see Flick, 2015 for a discussion on data triangulation). Participants For participants, a top-down qualitative sampling strategy was implemented (see Schreier, 2009). According to this strategy, the researcher has prior knowledge about which factors might affect the subject at hand. I used purposive sampling on two levels: a) cities (Mersin and Diyarbakır), b) individuals of different ethnicities (Turks and Kurds). For heterogeneity on the second level, several other criteria such as gender, education level and age were also considered. In total, 64 participants participated in this pilot study. Thirty-two participants were recruited for four FGDs (eight participants for each FGD), and 32 participants filled out the open-ended questionnaires. The participants were chosen based on their ethnic identity. Two FGDs were conducted in Mersin (one for Kurdish and one for Turkish participants). Two additional FGDs were conducted in Diyarbakır (one for Kurdish and one for Turkish participants). Thus, the aim was to guarantee the diversity of the perspectives from different cities in Turkey. Also, the diversity of participants was assured in terms of gender, age and educational level (see Bauer & Aarts, 2000). Participants were recruited through word of mouth, with the help of contacts, and gave their informed consent orally4 to participate in the study (see Appendix B for participant

4 Although I aimed to obtain the participants‘ written consents to participate in my study, the Kurdish participants declined to do so and rather gave their consent verbally. Therefore, in the following studies, I continued to obtain the participants‘ consents verbally. I have taken a few steps to safeguard against issues of confidentiality, safety of participants and data. First, I explained to the participants that they can withdraw from the study at any time they wish and they are not required to explain the reason for their withdrawal. Second, I added that any information they share will be kept confidential, the data will not be shared with third parties and will be used only for scientific purposes. Third, I separated the focus groups by ethnicity to prevent heated discussions and enable each participant to express their genuine opinions (Kanra, 2004) as they expressed their opinions in a semi-public space (e.g., a participant‘s home, an NGO office, etc.). In order to create a safe space for participants, I did not let people other than participants join the focus groups. Last, I store this data in a written and anonymized format in my portable medium in order to protect it. 52

Chapter 4 information sheet and Appendix C for participant consent form).5 The details of the participants will be mentioned in two sections: a) Mersin and b) Diyarbakır. a) FGDs and open-ended questionnaires in Mersin: There were two focus group discussions, including 16 participants. One group was composed of eight ethnically Kurdish participants and the other group was composed of eight ethnically Turkish participants. Four of the Turkish participants were women and four were men. Five of the Kurdish participants were men and three of them were women. In addition to the FGDs, 16 questionnaires in Mersin were given to the participants from two ethnic groups (eight Turks and eight Kurds) who didn‘t want to participate in the FGDs. Four Turkish participants were women and four were men. On the other hand, one of the Kurdish participants was a woman and seven out of eight were men. The age range of the participants was between 19 and 62 (M = 43) years. b) FGDs and open-ended questionnaires in Diyarbakır: Two focus group discussions were conducted in Diyarbakır. The first group was composed of eight Kurds and the second group was composed of eight Turks. Four of the Kurdish participants were men and the remaining four were women. However, in the Turkish group, there was only one woman and seven out of eight participants were men. In addition to the FGDs, 16 questionnaires were given to the participants, namely to eight Kurdish and eight Turkish participants. Three of the Turkish participants were women and five of them were men. For the Kurdish participants, seven of them were men and one was a woman. The age range of the participants was between 18 and 71 (M = 35.75) years. Procedure Quiet rooms were arranged in which to conduct the FGDs in the two different cities. The participants were asked whether they prefer participating in focus group discussions or filling out the questionnaires. After indicating their preferences for either FGD or open- ended questionnaire, they participated in the study.

5 I should note that I started my PhD at Queen‘s University Belfast in 2011 and this study has been approved at that time by the School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee at Queen‘s University Belfast in Northern Ireland. 53

Chapter 4

At the beginning of each FGD, the aim of the study was introduced as examining perspectives of the participants toward the issue, which is variously defined as the Kurdish problem, or the Kurdish conflict, or Southeastern problem (to prevent any possible prejudice toward the research/er). Then, as a part of the FGD procedure, the participants were asked to introduce themselves to the group. All focus group discussions were recorded and transcribed verbatim.6 The length of the focus group discussions ranged from 60 minutes to 115 minutes, with an average of approximately 75 minutes. The participants filled out the open-ended questionnaires in different places such as their homes or a café. For the open-ended questionnaires, participants needed 30 to 55 minutes to complete them. Participants were asked six main questions in FGDs and open-ended questionnaires. The first question was about how they defined this problem. Second question focused on why they would think it is a problem. As sub-questions, the effects such as costs and benefits of this problem on the individuals, groups, society, country and political position of Turkey in the international arena were also asked. In the third question, the reasons behind this problem were asked and more specifically, it was asked that whether there are any particular groups or actors causing this problem. In the fourth question, it was asked what kind of moral issues are involved in this problem. Sub- questions were asked such as who the victims of the problem are, whether these victims are innocent, who is responsible for the problem and who should feel pride or shame. In the fifth question, solution strategies for the solution of this problem were asked. Lastly, it was asked that what they think other people think about this problem. At the end, it was asked whether the participants would like to add a few things about this problem and later, the data collection process was finished. Analysis Qualitative content analysis (QCA) was used to analyze the data. QCA is a method used to help researchers reduce data, focus on selected parts of the data and describe it systematically (Schreier, 2012). According to Schreier (2012), there are eight main steps in QCA: 1) deciding on the research question, 2) selecting the material, 3) building a coding frame, 4) dividing the material into units of coding, 5) trying out the coding frame

6 As I was not interested in narrative analysis, I did not record interruptions and breaks. 54

Chapter 4 with double-coding, 6) evaluating and modifying the coding frame, 7) carrying out main analysis and 8) interpreting and presenting the findings. In this study, the research question was how lay people understand the Kurdish conflict and the materials were the transcriptions of the FGDs and open-ended questionnaires. First, the material from both the transcriptions and the open-ended questionnaires were brought together. The questions, which were developed based on Entman‘s (1993) frame analysis, became the basis of the coding frame: a) problem definition, b) causal interpretation, c) moral evaluation, and d) treatment recommendation. These four domains became the basis of the four main categories. However, material from the FGDs and open-ended questionnaires also shaped the coding frame. One more domain–barriers to the solution of the problem–was also added as another main category in the coding frame. So, it can be argued that the main categories are developed through both data-driven strategies and concept-driven strategies. This resulted in six main categories in the coding frame: 1) frame analysis, 2) problem definitions, 3) sources of the problem, 4) moral judgments, 5) solutions to the problem, and 6) barriers to the solution of the problem. After specifying the main categories, the next step was to identify subcategories, in other words, what is said in the material in relation to these main categories (Schreier, 2012). The subcategories included relevant meanings for each main category. In the analysis, subcategories were developed inductively or in other words, in a data-driven way. First, subcategories were defined. Second, they were labeled and a definition of the meaning of that particular label was provided. Third, examples (indicators) were provided to help the other coder and decision rules were included for a few categories to create mutually exclusive subcategories. Later, the material was divided into the units of coding based on the thematic criterion suggested by Schreier (2012). The conceptualization of the theme in the material was decided whenever a new topic or an idea was introduced. For example, when a participant defined the Kurdish problem as a historical problem, that part of the document was considered as a new segment. When the same participant mentioned the economic characteristics of the Kurdish conflict, this part was considered as a new segment as well.

Chapter 4

The coding frame (see Appendix D for the coding frame) was developed based on this segmentation process. At the end, the coding frame included six main categories: 1) frame analysis, 2) problem definitions, 3) sources of the problem, 4) moral judgments with two subcategories (praise and blame), 5) solutions to the problem, and 6) barriers to the solution of the problem. The frame analysis main category included six subcategories: 1) problem definitions, 2) sources of the problem, 3) outcomes of the problem,7 4) moral judgments, 5) solutions to the problem, and 6) barriers to the solution of the problem. At this point, it is very important to note that all units of coding were assigned to the subcategories of the first main category (frame analysis). For the following main categories (main category 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6), however, only the units of coding that were assigned to the respective subcategory of main category 1 were used. After the coding frame was developed, the next step was to try the coding frame with a trial coding. For trial coding, 10% of the overall data (18 out of 180 pages) were chosen by getting segments from both different questions and from different FGDs and open-ended questionnaires to represent different perspectives in this trial phase. One of my colleagues and I coded the material independently to check inter-rater reliability after the trial coding. The obtained Kappa of the first main category (frame analysis) was .94, the second main category (problem definitions) .87, the third main category (sources of the problem) .80, the fourth main category (moral evaluations) .94, the fifth main category (solutions to the problem) 1.00, and the sixth main category (barriers to the solution of the problem) 1.00 (see Table 1 for inter-rater reliability). All main categories, except the sources of the problem, are considered almost perfect (see Landis & Koch, 1977, p. 165; Rustemeyer, 1992, p. 115).8 After the trial phase ended, my colleague and I looked closely at the categories which were assigned differently. We discussed these differences and identified the controversial units of coding. After this discussion, I redefined these categories and

7 I should note that although I used outcomes of the problem as one the subcategories of the frame analysis, I did not analyze this subcategory later in a main category. I asked the outcomes of the problem as a question during FGDs and open-ended questionnaires to gather additional perspectives (e.g., problem definition). 8 If the obtained Kappa is between .61 and .80, it is considered substantial (Landis & Koch, 1977, p. 165; Rustemeyer, 1992, p. 115). 56

Chapter 4 modified the coding frame accordingly. As the obtained Kappa scores were very good, I continued to analyze all segments that I identified before.

Table 1. Inter-rater reliability results of six main categories

# Main categories Kappa Interpretation

D1 Frame analysis .94 Almost perfect agreement D2 Problem definitions .87 Almost perfect agreement D3 Sources of the problem .80 Substantial agreement D4 Moral evaluations .94 Almost perfect agreement D5 Solutions to the problem 1.00 Almost perfect agreement Barriers to the solution of D6 1.00 Almost perfect agreement the problem Notes. Kappa < 0, Poor agreement; 0.0-0.20, Slight agreement; 0.21-0.40, Fair agreement; 0.41-0.60, Moderate agreement; 0.61-0.80, Substantial agreement; 0.81-1.00, Almost perfect agreement; see also Landis & Koch, 1977, p. 165; Rustemeyer, 1992, p. 115.

4.3 Results The coding frame (see Appendix D for a more complete description of coding frame and subcategories) included six main categories mainly based on the domains of frame analysis of Entman (1993) together with an additional main category (barriers to the solution of the problem) coming from the data. The six main categories were a) frame analysis, b) problem definitions, c) sources of the problem, d) moral judgments with two subcategories (praise and blame), e) solutions to the problem, and f) barriers to the solution of the problem. In the following, all main categories and subcategories within each main category are presented. Main category 1 - Frame analysis Segments were coded in this main category if a participant 1) tried to frame the Kurdish problem by defining it, 2) indicated the sources of the Kurdish problem, 3) mentioned the effects or outcomes of the Kurdish problem, 4) made a moral judgment about the actors involved in the Kurdish problem, 5) suggested a solution to the Kurdish problem, or 6) mentioned barriers to the solution of the Kurdish problem. Thus, this main category included six subcategories: 1) problem definitions, 2) sources of the problem, 3) outcomes of the problem, 4) moral judgments, 5) solutions to the problem, and 6) barriers to the solution of the problem.

Chapter 4

The frequencies were higher among Kurds than among Turks in mentioning problem definitions, sources of the problem, moral judgments and solutions to the problem (see Table 2). On the other hand, the frequencies were slightly higher among Turks than Kurds in mentioning outcomes of the problem and barriers to the solution of the problem. The frequencies were higher in Diyarbakır than in Mersin in mentioning sources of the problem, outcomes of the problem, and barriers to the solution of the problem; and slightly lower in Diyarbakır than in Mersin in mentioning problem definition, moral judgments, and solutions to the problem.

Table 2. Frequencies for the first main category‘s subcategories among Turks and Kurds and in Mersin and Diyarbakır (frame analysis) Diyarba Freque Valid Frame analysis Kurds Turks Mersin kır ncy percent Problem definitions 50 38 41 47 88 6.2 Sources of the problem 155 118 145 128 273 19.3 Outcomes of the problem 130 133 138 125 263 18.6 Moral judgments 271 196 232 235 467 33.1 Solutions to the problem 145 90 116 119 236 16.7 Barriers to the solution of 36 49 43 42 85 6.0 the problem Total 787 624 715 696 1412 100.0

Main category 2 - Problem definition Segments were coded in this main category if a participant expressed 1) any opinion about naming and conceptualizing the problem or 2) anything related to what the problem is and what the problem is not. This main category included eight subcategories. These subcategories were 1) basic, historical and multifaceted problem, 2) social and economic problem, 3) rights, identity and democracy problem, 4) independence and exploitation problem, 5) terrorism and PKK problem, 6) ―there is no Kurdish problem‖, 7) Kurdism problem which is a problem caused by the Kurdish nationalists and their emphasis on the Kurdish identity, and 8) miscellaneous (see Appendix D for examples of each subcategory). The frequencies were higher among Kurds than among Turks in defining the problem as a basic, historical and multifaceted problem, and as a rights, identity and

Chapter 4 democracy problem (see Table 3). As a problem definition, an independence and exploitation problem and a social and economic problem were mentioned only by Kurds. On the other hand, the frequencies were higher among Turks than among Kurds in mentioning the problem as a PKK and terror problem and in not accepting the existence of a Kurdish problem at all. As a problem definition, a Kurdism problem was mentioned only by Turks. The frequencies were higher in Diyarbakır than Mersin in defining the problem as a basic, historical and multifaceted problem, and a PKK and terror problem, but lower in mentioning the problem as a rights, identity and democracy problem, and an independence and exploitation problem. Lastly, as a problem definition, a social and economic problem was mentioned only in Diyarbakır whereas a Kurdism problem was only mentioned in Mersin.

Table 3. Frequencies for the second main category‘s subcategories among Turks and Kurds and in Mersin and Diyarbakır (problem definitions) Diyarba Freque Valid Problem definitions Kurds Turks Mersin kır ncy percent Basic, historical and multifaceted problem 16 6 12 10 22 25.0 Social and economic problem 4 - 4 - 4 4.5 Rights, identity and democracy problem 17 2 7 12 19 21.6 An independence and exploitation problem 5 - 1 4 5 5.7 Terrorism and PKK problem 3 5 6 2 8 9.1 ―There is no Kurdish problem‖ 2 18 10 10 20 22.7 Kurdism problem - 3 - 3 3 3.4 Miscellaneous 3 4 1 6 7 8.0 Total 50 38 41 47 88 100.0

Main category 3 - Sources of the problem Segments were coded under one of the codes below if a participant expressed any forces, actions, or situations creating the Kurdish problem. The category applied regardless of the time that causes of the problem have emerged (e.g., before the Republic of Turkey or after the Republic of Turkey). This main category included 11 subcategories. These were 1) suppression of Kurds and Kurds‘ not having freedom, 2) denial of Kurds‘ existence

Chapter 4 and their cultural rights, 3) economic reasons and feudalism, 4) humiliation of and discrimination against Kurds, 5) existence of Kurds, 6) Turkish Republic‘s founding philosophy, 7) parties, 8) Kurds‘ being deceived, 9) Turkish state‘s wrongdoings, 10) imperialism, and 11) miscellaneous. The frequencies were higher among Kurds than among Turks in seeing the sources of the problem in suppression of Kurds, Kurds‘ not having freedom, denial of Kurds‘ existence and their cultural rights, humiliation of and discrimination against Kurds, and Turkish Republic‘s founding philosophy (see Table 4). As a source of the Kurdish problem, existence of Kurds was mentioned only by Kurds. On the other hand, the frequencies were higher among Turks than among Kurds in seeing the sources of the problem in economic reasons and feudalism, various parties, Kurds‘ being deceived and wrongdoings of the Turkish state. Lastly, imperialism as a source of the problem was mentioned only by Turks. The frequencies were higher in Diyarbakır than Mersin in mentioning the sources of the problem in suppression of Kurds, Kurds‘ not having freedom, denial of Kurds‘ existence and their cultural rights, humiliation of and discrimination against Kurds, existence of Kurds and Turkish state‘s wrongdoings. On the other hand, the frequencies were higher in Mersin than Diyarbakır in mentioning the sources of the problem in economic reasons and feudalism and Kurds‘ being deceived. Lastly, imperialism as a source of the problem was mentioned only in Mersin. Table 4. Frequencies for the third main category‘s subcategories among Turks and Kurds and in Mersin and Diyarbakır (sources of the problem) Diyarba Freque Valid Sources of the problem Kurds Turks Mersin kır ncy percent Suppression of Kurds and 15 10 15 10 25 9.2 Kurds‘ not having freedom Denial of Kurds‘ existence and 41 15 29 27 56 20.5 their cultural rights Economic reasons and feudalism 2 15 2 15 17 6.2 Humiliation of and 27 6 26 7 33 12.1 discrimination against Kurds Existence of Kurds 9 - 8 1 9 3.3 Turkish Republic‘s founding 8 2 5 5 10 3.7 philosophy Parties 37 39 38 38 76 27.8 Kurds‘ being deceived 3 8 5 6 11 4.0

Chapter 4

Turkish state‘s wrongdoings 1 7 5 3 8 2.9 Imperialism - 11 - 11 11 4.0 Miscellaneous 12 5 12 5 17 6.2 Total 155 118 145 128 273 100.0

Main category 4 - Moral judgments Segments were coded in this main category if a participant evaluated causal agents and their effects, or expressed any kind of moral judgment related to the parties in the Kurdish problem. This main category included two subcategories: moral judgments related to a) blame and b) praise. Blame. Segments were coded in this subcategory if a participant evaluated causal agents and their effects negatively in terms of 1) blaming and holding responsible for the Kurdish problem, or 2) thinking they should feel shame, guilt and embarrassment because of the Kurdish problem. The blame subcategory comprises 11 units of coding. These were 1) Turks, 2) AKP, Erdoğan and his voter base, 3) the Turkish state and its system, 4) media, 5) Kurds, 6) people who deny the problem, 7) landowners, 8) everybody, 9) foreign powers, 10) the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan, and 11) miscellaneous. Segments were coded in this subcategory if a participant evaluated causal agents and their effects negatively in terms of 1) blaming and holding responsible for the Kurdish problem, or 2) thinking they should feel shame, guilt and embarrassment because of the Kurdish problem. The blame subcategory comprises 11 units of coding. These were 1) Turks, 2) AKP, Erdoğan and his voter base, 3) the Turkish state and its system, 4) media, 5) Kurds, 6) people who deny the problem, 7) landowners, 8) everybody, 9) foreign powers, 10) the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan, and 11) miscellaneous. The frequencies were higher among Kurds than among Turks in blaming Turks, AKP, Erdoğan and his voter base, the Turkish state and its system, media, people who deny the Kurdish problem, and everybody (see Table 5). On the other hand, the frequencies were higher among Turks than among Kurds in blaming Kurds, foreign powers and PKK and Öcalan. Lastly, landowners were blamed only in Turkish groups. The frequencies were higher in Diyarbakır than Mersin in blaming Turks, Turkish state and its system, media, and Kurds. On the other hand, the frequencies were higher in

Chapter 4

Mersin than Diyarbakır in blaming AKP, Erdoğan and his voter base, people who deny the Kurdish problem, landowners, everybody, foreign powers, and PKK and Öcalan. Table 5. Frequencies for the fourth main category‘s blame subcategory‘s unit of analyses among Turks and Kurds and in Mersin and Diyarbakır (moral judgments) Diyarba Freque Valid Moral judgments (Blame) Kurds Turks Mersin kır ncy percent Turks 40 3 30 13 43 13.5 AKP, Erdoğan and his voter 57 15 31 41 72 22.6 base The Turkish state and its system 31 7 22 16 38 11.9 Media 8 3 7 4 11 3.5 Kurds 12 49 42 19 61 19.2 People who deny the problem 5 4 2 7 9 2.8 Landowners - 5 1 4 5 1.6 Everybody 8 6 4 10 14 4.4 Foreign powers 3 12 1 14 15 4.7 PKK and Abdullah Öcalan 2 13 7 8 15 4.7 Miscellaneous 16 19 14 21 35 11.0 Total 182 136 161 157 318 100.0

Praise. Segments were coded in this subcategory if a participant evaluated causal agents and their effects positively in terms of 1) evaluating actors/groups in the Kurdish problem as victims of the problem, 2) evaluating actors/groups as innocent in this problem, 3) evaluating actors/groups that should feel pride in this problem, or 4) praising actors/groups in general. The praise subcategory comprises 11 units of coding. These were 1) Kurds and people who support their cause, 2) everybody, 3) PKK, 4) people who live in the region, 5) mothers, 6) low SES groups, 7) people who work for conflict resolution, 8) Turks, 9) casualties and their relatives, 10) the Turkish state and its army, and 11) miscellaneous. The frequencies were higher among Kurds than among Turks in praising Kurds and people who support their cause, everybody, low SES groups, people who work for conflict resolution, and casualties and their relatives (see Table 6). On the other hand, the frequencies were higher among Turks than among Kurds in praising people who live in the region, mothers, and Turks. Lastly, PKK was praised only by Kurds whereas Turkish Republic and its army were praised only by Turks.

Chapter 4

The frequencies were higher in Diyarbakır than Mersin in praising Kurds and people who support their cause, and people who live in the region. On the other hand, the frequencies were slightly higher in Mersin than Diyarbakır in praising everybody, mothers, low SES groups, people who work for conflict resolution, Turks, and casualties and their relatives. PKK was praised equally in Mersin and Diyarbakır, but Turkish Republic and its army were only praised in Mersin.

Table 6. Frequencies for the fourth main category‘s praise subcategory‘s unit of analyses among Turks and Kurds and in Mersin and Diyarbakır (moral judgments) Diyarba Freque Valid Moral judgments (Praise) Kurds Turks Mersin kır ncy percent Kurds and people who support 32 5 22 15 37 24.8 their cause Everybody 17 10 13 14 27 18.1 PKK 6 - 3 3 6 4.0 People who live in the region 7 8 8 7 15 10.1 Mothers 3 6 4 5 9 6.0 Low SES groups 8 6 5 9 14 9.4 People who work for conflict 5 2 3 4 7 4.7 resolution Turks 1 5 2 4 6 4.0 Casualties and their relatives 6 5 5 6 11 7.4 The Turkish state and its army - 7 - 7 7 4.7 Miscellaneous 4 6 6 4 10 6.7 Total 89 60 71 78 149 100.0

Main category 5 - Solutions to the problem Segments were coded in this main category if a participant expressed any offer, any treatment or any recommendation for the resolution of the Kurdish problem, or suggested any idea for the improvement of the problem. This main category included 12 subcategories. These were 1) general amnesty and decarceration of PKK members, 2) restoration of rights and changes in the constitution, 3) to live equally with equal rights, 4) dialogue between parties, 5) to stop deaths and lay down arms, 6) economic development, 7) to form a commission and discuss in a public forum, 8) to meet with the concerned party, 9) education, 10) awakening, 11) Islam, and 12) miscellaneous.

Chapter 4

The frequencies were higher among Kurds than among Turks in suggesting restoration of rights and changes to the constitution, living equally with equal rights, dialogue between parties, stopping deaths and laying down arms, and Islam (see Table 7). General amnesty and meeting with the concerned party were mentioned only by Kurdish participants. On the other hand, the frequencies were higher among Turks than among Kurds in suggesting economic development, forming a commission and discussing in a public forum, education, and awakening. The frequencies were higher in Diyarbakır than Mersin in suggesting general amnesty, restoration of rights and changes to the constitution, living equally with equal rights, and forming a commission and discussing in a public forum as solutions to the problem. Islam as a solution strategy was mentioned only in Diyarbakır. On the other hand, the frequencies were higher in Mersin than Diyarbakır in suggesting stopping deaths and laying down arms, economic development, meeting with the concerned party, education, and awakening. Lastly, dialogue between parties as a solution was mentioned equally in Mersin and Diyarbakır. Table 7. Frequencies for the fifth main category‘s subcategories among Turks and Kurds and in Mersin and Diyarbakır (solutions to the problem) Diyarba Freque Valid Solutions to the problem Kurds Turks Mersin kır ncy percent General amnesty and 12 - 11 1 12 5.1 decarceration of PKK members Restoration of rights and 28 6 22 12 34 14.4 changes in the constitution To live equally with equal rights 21 4 14 11 25 10.6 Dialogue between parties 7 3 5 5 10 4.2 To stop deaths and lay down 12 10 7 15 22 9.3 arms Economic development 3 7 2 8 10 4.2 To form a commission and 5 10 9 6 15 6.4 discuss in a public forum To meet with the concerned 15 - 2 13 15 6.4 party Education 2 14 5 11 16 6.8 Awakening 3 22 8 17 25 10.6 Islam 7 1 8 - 8 3.4 Miscellaneous 30 14 23 21 44 18.6 Total 145 90 116 119 236 100.0

Chapter 4

Main category 6 - Barriers to the solution of the problem Segments were coded in this main category below if a participant expressed 1) any obstacles to the resolution of the Kurdish problem, 2) any reason why this problem will not be solved, or 3) any opinion why this problem continues to exist. This main category included 10 subcategories. These were 1) profiteers, 2) lack of empathy, 3) not accepting the existence of the problem, 4) trying to silence the Kurds, 5) trying to solve the problem with non-parties, 6) foreign powers and their political interest, imperialism, 7) incompetent government officials and administrators, 8) Kurds‘ always demanding more, 9) Turkey‘s domestic politics, and 10) miscellaneous. The frequencies were higher among Kurds than among Turks in suggesting lack of empathy, not accepting the existence of the problem, trying to silence the Kurds, and trying to solve the problem with non-parties as barriers to the solution of the problem (see Table 8). On the other hand, the frequencies were higher among Turks than among Kurds in suggesting profiteers, foreign powers and their political interest, imperialism, and incompetent government officials and administrators as barriers to the solution of the problem. Lastly, Kurds‘ always demanding more and Turkey‘s domestic politics were only mentioned by Turks as barriers to the solution of the problem. The frequencies were slightly higher in Diyarbakır than Mersin in suggesting profiteers, lack of empathy, not accepting the existence of the problem, trying to silence the Kurds, incompetent government officials and administrators, and Kurds‘ always demanding more as barriers to the solution of the problem. On the other hand, the frequencies were higher in Mersin than in Diyarbakır in suggesting trying to solve the problem with non-parties, foreign powers, their political interest, and imperialism, and Turkey‘s domestic politics as barriers to the solution of the problem.

Chapter 4

Table 8. Frequencies for the sixth main category‘s subcategories among Turks and Kurds and in Mersin and Diyarbakır (barriers to the solution of the problem) Barriers to the solution of the Diyarba Freque Valid Kurds Turks Mersin problem kır ncy percent Profiteers 3 6 8 1 9 10.6 Lack of empathy 4 1 3 2 5 5.9 Not accepting the existence of 5 1 4 2 6 7.1 the problem Trying to silence the Kurds 4 1 3 2 5 5.9 Trying to solve the problem with 6 4 3 7 10 11.8 non-parties Foreign powers and their 6 9 5 10 15 17.6 political interest, imperialism Incompetent government 3 4 4 3 7 8.2 officials and administrators Kurds‘ always demanding more - 11 8 3 11 12.9 Turkey‘s domestic politics - 7 3 4 7 8.2 Miscellaneous 5 5 2 8 10 11.8 Total 36 49 43 42 85 100.0

4.4 Discussion The results of this pilot study indicate that there are qualitatively distinct conflict understandings among lay people. Compared to the literature (Chapter 3), it seems that there are more alternative conflict understandings among lay people that might shape the understandings of the Kurdish conflict. To start with, for example, the exploitation problem was mentioned by Kurds and it was surprising to see this perspective among lay people as this perspective is not as popular as in the 1990s in the literature (see Beşikçi, 1991 for an exception). On the other hand, Turks‘ mentioning the Kurdish problem as a Kurdism problem which emphasizes the ethnic nationalism characteristic of the Kurdish nationalist movement or the separatist characteristic of the Kurdish nationalist movement was an additional result to the literature (see Kuru, 2012 for an exception), but at the same time, it was a noteworthy point to understand the Kurdish problem from the eyes of ethnically Turkish people. Through the moral evaluations questions, the results also indicated who has been affected by the conflict, who the responsible parties were, who should be blamed and praised through the eyes of lay people. For example, people from low socio-economic backgrounds are generally ignored and their voices are rarely heard in conflict situations.

Chapter 4

However, they are one of the most adversely affected groups in conflict contexts (see Sollis, 1994). In this study, people from low socio-economic backgrounds were also mentioned both by Kurds and Turks and in Mersin and Diyarbakır as one of the most severely affected groups in the Kurdish conflict. In addition, the results also indicated both Turks and Kurds tend to see their group as the victims of the Kurdish problem and think that their group should be proud of themselves, not the ―other‖ group. Similarly, Kelman (2010) argues that both sides (parties) in a conflict see themselves as victims of the conflict. They can also emphasize that their own group suffered more due to the conflict (see also Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008 for a discussion on competitive victimhood). This, in turn, might present a barrier to conflict resolution and reconciliation. For this reason, this subject carries utmost importance in conflict resolution and reconciliation processes. As a resolution strategy, forming a commission and discussing the problem in a public forum was suggested by both Turks and Kurds. This is a vital part of the conflict resolution process that is generally ignored (see Saunders, 2001). However, these results indicate that lay people would like their voices to be heard in the conflict resolution and peace building processes. Other substantial solution strategies that came to the fore among Turks were education of people and awakening in general. Although education was mentioned by Turks for everyone, they generally meant education of Kurds. This also indicates how Kurds are perceived hierarchically by the Turks and how the Kurdish problem might be resolved in line with this perspective. Lastly, Islam as a solution to the Kurdish problem is often ignored in the literature (see Sarigil & Fazlioglu, 2013 for an exception), but the results indicated that it might be very important among lay people, especially for people in Diyarbakır. It was the case in this pilot study that Islam was mentioned many times by the participants in Diyarbakır. Lack of empathy was also suggested as a main barrier to the resolution of the problem which is not relatively visible in the literature. In brief, the results indicate that these perspectives might have been lost unless the participants‘ conflict understandings were approached qualitatively. Differences between Turks and Kurds

Chapter 4

The results indicate that exploring conflict understandings among lay people is quite useful to indicate the varieties of the Kurdish conflict understandings between Kurds and Turks. For example, the Kurdish problem as a rights and identity problem or as an independence and exploitation problem was mentioned mostly by Kurds. On the other hand, the Kurdish problem was often denied by Turks by saying that ―there is no Kurdish problem at all.‖ Even when the existence of the problem was accepted by Turks, it was either as a Kurdism problem which stems from the Kurdish nationalists or as a historical and multifaceted problem rather than as a rights and freedom problem. The political dimension of the problem was mostly ignored among Turks. Sources of the Kurdish problem were mainly seen due to the denial, suppression and humiliation of Kurds by Kurds whereas sources such as economic reasons, feudalism, Kurds‘ being deceived and imperialism were at the heart of the Kurdish problem discussions among Turks. In particular, imperialism as an ideology which also refers to the foreign powers was mentioned only by Turks. It is clear that the Kurdish conflict has an international dimension as well (see Beriker-Atiyas, 1997). However, the emphasis of ethnically Turkish people on imperialism as a source of the Kurdish problem seems in line with the problem definition ―there is no Kurdish problem‖ or in other words in line with the denial of the conflict itself. For this reason, it was not surprising that foreign powers were blamed more by Turks whereas Turkish state and Turks were blamed more by Kurds. Similarly, PKK was praised only by Kurds whereas the Turkish state and its army were praised only by Turks. Solution strategies such as general amnesty for Abdullah Öcalan and PKK members and decarceration of PKK members, restoration of rights, changes in constitution and living equally with equal rights were generally mentioned by Kurds whereas economic development, education and awakening were mentioned mostly by Turks. Lastly, Kurds mentioned lack of empathy, not accepting the existence of the problem and trying to silence Kurds whereas Kurds‘ always demanding more and the current situation of Turkey‘s domestic politics were mentioned only by Turks as barriers to the solution of the problem. Based on these results, it can be argued that Turks are reluctant to accept the rights and freedom aspect of the Kurdish problem, and would rather to make references to the economic and underdevelopment aspects of the Kurdish

Chapter 4 problem (see also Özhan, 2009). It seems that they see the problem from a privileged majority position whereas Kurds see the problem from a disadvantaged position in Turkey. Although Kurds and Turks mainly differ in defining the Kurdish problem, indicating different sources and solution strategies, this does not necessarily mean that they do not share some similarities. There are some conflict understandings that are shared both by Turks and Kurds. For example, although suppression of Kurds and Kurds‘ not having freedom are mentioned more by Kurds, there are some Turkish participants who voice this argument as a source of the problem. People who live in the region, low SES groups, and casualties and their relatives were seen as victims of the Kurdish problem in both groups. Additionally, incompetent government officials and administrators and trying to solve the problem with non-parties were mentioned as barriers to the solution of the problem in both groups. The results highlight differences between Turks and Kurds in defining the Kurdish problem, determining the causes, suggesting solution strategies for the problem and mentioning the possible barriers. However, these differences in the ethnic groups can only be used cautiously to contextualize the different conflict viewpoints and should not be generalized. Also, there are some perspectives which are shared by both Turks and Kurds irrespective of ethnic identity. In brief, together with differences between groups, the results indicate there are also variations within each ethnic group in terms of understanding the Kurdish conflict as well as similarities between Turks and Kurds. Differences between Mersin and Diyarbakır Exploring the Kurdish conflict understandings highlighted different priorities and concerns in Mersin and Diyarbakır. To start with, economic reasons and feudalism as a source of the Kurdish problem were mentioned more in Mersin than in Diyarbakır. Although Diyarbakır is in the region and feudalism and underdevelopment characteristics of the region might be felt more in this city, it is surprising that this issue did not come up in Diyarbakır. In addition, imperialism did not come to surface in Diyarbakır; however, it was mentioned many times in Mersin. In parallel, the foreign powers were blamed more in Mersin and, the Turkish state and the army were praised only in Mersin. One possible explanation might be that the people who live in the region (in Diyarbakır) might witness

Chapter 4 the wrongdoings of the Turkish army in the region whereas this is not the case for people living in Mersin. Therefore, people who live in Mersin might not focus on the responsibilities of the Turks and/or the Turkish state; rather, they attribute the problems to the foreign powers. As mentioned above, Islam as a resolution strategy was mentioned only in Diyarbakır. This might be because of the influence of conservative groups in Diyarbakır (see also Sarigil & Fazlioglu, 2013). Another important distinction of Diyarbakır was the profiteers‘ being seen as a barrier to the resolution of the Kurdish problem. Participants mentioned various profiteers from the Kurdish problem such as arms traders, politicians, and security forces and they indicated ―these groups might lose their jobs if the conflict ends, therefore, they do not let the conflict end.‖ This was another aspect of the conflict in the region which should be taken into account in the conflict resolution process. The results might be different in the two cities due to the fact that the participants in Diyarbakır might feel the effects of the Kurdish conflict in their lives relatively more adversely compared to the participants in Mersin. Unlike Diyarbakır, participants in Mersin are far from experiencing the Kurdish conflict in their city. This does not necessarily mean that there is no tension between Kurds and Turks in Mersin and people do not experience the outcomes of conflict in their lives. It means rather that Diyarbakır is a more politically active city compared to Mersin and people living in this city experience the Kurdish conflict differently. In brief, participants from the two cities provide additional insights in terms of various concerns and priorities on the Kurdish conflict. In general, these results highlighted issues that are either disregarded or not given enough attention in the literature in the context of the Kurdish conflict such as Islam, empathy, imperialism and exploitation issues. These results would be used as Q statements in the subsequent Q methodology studies to represent both ethnically Turkish and Kurdish participants‘ perspectives in the Kurdish conflict. It could be argued that the results of chapter four played a complementary role to chapter three in terms of highlighting the possible definitions, sources, solutions and barriers to the solution of the Kurdish problem from the eyes of lay people. These various conflict understandings may

Chapter 4 help capture the complexity of the Kurdish conflict through the eyes of lay people together with the discussions in the literature. Limitations There are some limitations of this study. First of all, this study was conducted with 64 participants and does not have a representative sample. The participants were from only ethnically Kurdish and Turkish groups. Also, the study was conducted only in Mersin and Diyarbakır. Therefore, the results cannot be generalized and these differences in the ethnic groups and cities can only be used cautiously to contextualize the different conflict viewpoints. However, it should be noted that these results are very revealing in terms of understanding Turks‘ and Kurds‘ perspectives in the Kurdish conflict (see Boehnke, Lietz, Schreier, & Wilhelm, 2011 for a discussion on generalization to a theory). Second, there were some problems in the FGDs which are unique to the FGD- related problems. For example, some participants dominated the discussions despite my attempts to give the floor to other participants. Especially, this was the case among male participants and it was very difficult for female participants to express their views on that particular occasion. For example, among the Turkish participants in Diyarbakır, there was only one woman out of eight participants and she was reluctant to give her views on the Kurdish problem. Whenever I asked her opinion, other males were speaking on her behalf. Due to this problem, I believe this study lacks the representation of women‘s perspectives in the Kurdish conflict. Third, my ethnic identity might have posed a barrier to the free expression of the Kurdish participants own views. Although I tried my best as a researcher to be as transparent as possible, some Kurdish participants, especially in Diyarbakır, were suspicious about me and my research. They asked whether I was working for the National Intelligence Agency in Turkey (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı–MİT) or not. I explained my aim, what I was doing in Diyarbakır as a researcher and added that they could withdraw from the study anytime they wanted. Thus, Kurdish participants felt more comfortable in the discussion. However, one can still question whether my own identity as a researcher posed a barrier between me and the Kurdish participants in terms of revealing their own views on the Kurdish conflict without hesitation.

Chapter 5

Chapter 5 Methodology

Chapter 5

In this chapter, Q methodology, which is used in the following empirical studies involving members of parliament (Chapter 6), scholars and journalists (Chapter 7) and lay people (Chapter 8), is explained briefly. It will be briefly explained first what Q methodology is and how a Q methodological study is constructed, second, the overall procedure implemented in Q methodology (Q sort process), third, how the data in Q methodology is analyzed, and fourth how the results are interpreted in Q methodology. 5.1 Q methodology Q methodology was invented by William Stephenson in 1935. It is a suitable methodology to uncover systematic subjective viewpoints. It can be applied in many areas such as studies of health (e.g., Stainton Rogers, 1991), social psychology (e.g., Watts & Stenner, 2005b) and political science (e.g., Sullivan, Fried, & Dietz, 1992). As it helps uncover subjective viewpoints which are relatively central in the outbreak of a conflict, it is also used in conflict contexts (e.g., Bond, 2016). In McKeown and Thomas‘s (1988) own words, ―Q methodology encompasses a distinctive set of psychometric and operational principles that, when conjoined with specialized statistical applications of correlational and factor-analytical techniques, provides researchers a systematic and rigorously quantitative means for examining human subjectivity‖ (p. 7). At this point, subjectivity means reflecting a participant‘s point of view on any issue at hand. It could be argued that Q methodology helps researchers examine the subjectivity of individuals systematically in a particular issue. Q methodology has some advantages over other methodologies. First, Q methodology allows participants to reflect their own perspectives on any issue and thus allows researchers to examine human subjectivity. For an issue at hand, participants often say that ―according to me‖ or ―in my opinion‖ and thus, represent their own experiences (McKeown & Thomas, 1988). As opposed to cluster analysis, Q methodology allows examining these personal experiences systematically (Brown, 1993) and is a useful method for obtaining insights on the richness of human subjectivity (Dennis, 1986). Second, in Q methodology both qualitative and quantitative techniques are combined (Brown, 2004), allowing human subjectivity to be measured through the strengths of both techniques (Akhtar-Danesh, Baumann, & Cordingley, 2008). The qualitative strength lies in the capacity to examine how people think in that way and why

Chapter 5 they do so regarding that particular issue whereas the quantitative strength lies in the capacity to use factor analysis to identify like-minded individuals regarding that particular issue (Brown, 2004). Unlike R methodology, which makes it possible to identify associations and differences between variables, Q methodology can identify in a holistic way specific individuals who share similar perspectives regarding that particular issue (Watts & Stenner, 2012). Third, Q methodology highlights both agreements and disagreements between individuals or groups regarding an issue (Brown, 1980; Brown, 2004; Shinebourne, 2009; Watts & Stenner, 2005a). Hence, it highlights the between-group agreements and differences by indicating the overlapping and conflictual points between these groups together, respectively. In addition, priorities and concerns of groups are also illuminated in Q methodology (see also Newman & Ramlo, 2010). Therefore, Q methodology is relatively useful for identifying points that carry the greatest conflict potential between groups. Fourth, Q methodology also allows finding common ground between different groups. It helps identify a common ground where all groups might agree about a particular issue. Identifying common ground through consensual points helps contribute to solution of a problem (see Shemmings, 2006). In addition, Q methodology also provides some points for compromise such as points that are highly agreed by some but not highly disagreed by others. This is one of the most significant strengths of Q methodology for use in a conflict context to identify a solution strategy for a particular problem. In this PhD research, Q methodology was ideally suited for my purpose for use in a conflict context. It was used to reveal socially shared understandings of the Kurdish conflict across different segments of society. As mentioned above in detail, Q methodology was used in my research for four main reasons: 1) to understand how parliamentarians, scholars and journalists and lay people interpreted and evaluated the Kurdish conflict, and in this manner to examine the subjectivity of participants in the Kurdish conflict context, 2) to uncover between- and within-group differences across three segments of society, 3) to find commonalities across the different perspectives or at least some points for compromise in order to help the resolution of the Kurdish conflict,

Chapter 5 and 4) to identify particular issues in the Kurdish conflict together with priorities and concerns of each segment of the society. 5.2 Q sample In Q methodology, researchers have to collect a topic-related set of statements or generate a ―topical corpus‖ (Bauer & Aarts, 2000, p. 30) to construct the basis of following Q-sorts. Bauer and Aarts (2000) suggest that constructing a data corpus requires a) choosing preliminarily, b) examining the variety within this preliminary choice, and c) encompassing the corpus of data until no further variation can be identified. All statements that are collected to be used in Q studies are defined as the ―Q sample‖ (McKeown & Thomas, 1988, p. 25) and they are presented to the participants during data collection. To prevent confusion, the term ―statements‖ will be used to refer to the Q sample in this PhD dissertation. The same procedure was applied in this body of research. To collect the Kurdish conflict-related set of statements and generate a ―topical corpus‖, first, focus group discussions and open-ended questionnaires were used in Mersin and Diyarbakır. To explore opinions in the texts of transcriptions, qualitative content analysis was used (see Schreier, 2012). In addition to the results from the qualitative content analysis of focus-group discussions and open-ended questionnaires (Chapter 4), secondary sources were also investigated for additional perspectives. For example, academic articles and books on the Kurdish conflict written in English and Turkish, articles from mainstream newspapers (e.g., Hürriyet, Milliyet), pro-Kurdish newspapers (e.g., Özgür Gündem) and pro-Turkish newspapers (e.g., Yeni Çağ) were searched to collect additional views on the Kurdish conflict. In addition, party platforms of the four main political parties (AKP; BDP; MHP and CHP–Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi–Republican‘s People Party) represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi–TBMM) and transcriptions of speeches by political party leaders were searched as well. Also, results of public opinion polls (e.g., KONDA and SETA) and materials of another Q methodological study on the Kurdish conflict (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016a) were searched to collect further views on the Kurdish conflict.

Chapter 5

As mentioned in previous chapters, to systematically identify conflict understandings of the Kurdish conflicts, a systematic and comprehensive frame analysis was needed (Gray, 2003). For this reason, Entman‘s (1993) frame analysis which comprises four domains–a) problem definition, b) causal interpretation, c) moral evaluation, and d) treatment recommendation–was used. In addition to these four domains, one more domain–barriers to the solution of the problem–was also added as this domain was found to be a significant dimension of the conflict based on the results of qualitative content analysis in the previous chapter. In total, 106 statements were chosen from these different sources. Then, seven academics from different disciplines, all knowledgeable about the Kurdish conflict, evaluated whether these statements were comprehensive and clear, whether there were any repetitions, overlaps or any missing content, whether any of the statements were redundant, and whether the perspectives of different groups were represented more or less equally (see also Stellefson, Hanik, Chaney, & Tennant, 2012 for a more detailed discussion on statement evaluation). The suggested number of statements in Q methodology is between 40 and 80 to be comprehensive enough and, at the same time, well manageable for participants (Stainton Rogers, 1995). Therefore, the statement number was reduced to a manageable size. Fifty- four statements–problem definitions (11 statements), causes of the problem (7 statements), moral judgments (13 statements), solutions to the problem (16 statements), and barriers to the solution of the problem (7 statements)–were used (see Appendix E for the complete list of statements). 5.3 Q sort process In Q methodology, participants rank the statements along a continuum (Akhtar-Danesh et al., 2008; Watts & Stenner, 2012). To be more specific, Q sorting requires rank-ordering the written cards, according to pairs of opposites such as ―most agreed/most disagreed‖, ―most like me/least like me‖ or ―most important/least important‖ (Shemmings, 2006). After the sorting procedure, participants are given the chance to move the cards until they are entirely content with their final Q sorting. Later, the number of the statements is recorded on a separate paper. Additionally, the participants‘ comments both during and after Q sorting are noted down. These notes become very helpful for the interpretation of

Chapter 5 the results. As a final point, it is also very useful to ask the participants why they have sorted the specific statements at the most opposite ends (e.g., at +5, -5). In this PhD research, participants were asked to sort the statements according to their degree of relative agreement and disagreement with the statements in terms of understanding the Kurdish conflict. In a first step, participants were asked to read all 54 statements carefully and sort them into three piles: one for those they agreed with, one for those they disagreed with, and one for those they neither agreed nor disagreed with, felt neutral about or ―had no idea‖ about. In a second step, participants were told to place the agreed cards into a fixed quasi-normal distribution (see Figure 2). Specifically, they were asked to start with the ―most agreed‖ part (+5) until all the agreed cards were placed on the cardboard, followed by placing the disagreed cards starting from the ―most disagreed‖ part (-5) until all the disagreed cards were placed on the cardboard. Next, the participants were asked to sort the remaining cards (from the third, ―neutral‖ pile) into the grid, around ―0‖.

Figure 2. Q-sort grid In a third step, participants were allowed to change the places of cards until they were satisfied that the sorting pattern produced on the cardboard reflected their viewpoint on the Kurdish conflict well enough. Once they were done with the Q sorting, the sorting pattern was recorded on a sheet of paper as in Figure 2. Also, participants were asked to comment on the statements they agreed with most (+5) and disagreed with most (-5), and asked on a five-point scale how well their sorting pattern reflected their views on the Kurdish problem (1 = not at all, 5 = very much). Additional demographic questions were

Chapter 5 asked of participants, such as their age, gender, city of residence, education level, ethnic identity, religious identity and sect, political view, and contact with out-group members (e.g., if a participant is Kurdish/Turkish, contact with the Turkish/Kurdish people was asked), and whether they have been affected by the Kurdish conflict (e.g., harm, trauma). In the end, participants were also asked to provide any missing statements to give a more complete picture of their viewpoint on the Kurdish conflict. In addition, some participants (six experts and 34 lay people, but no members of parliament) participated in the study online via Flash Q program, developed by Hackert and Braehler (2007). There were three reasons for conducting these studies online. First, during data collection, I could travel to Mersin, Ankara and İstanbul. However, through online data collection, I could collect more data from participants living in other cities in Turkey. Second, there were some participants who were reluctant to participate in this research as the Kurdish problem is a sensitive topic in Turkey. Online data collection provided a platform for these participants to reflect their opinions anonymously. Third, some scholars and journalists did not have enough time to meet with me and they preferred participating in the study online. A similar procedure was applied for those who participated online. On the first screen, those participants were first asked to sort the 54 items into three piles. On the second screen, the participants were asked to place these cards into a fixed quasi-normal distribution. On the third screen, first, they commented on the items they sorted at +5 and -5, and later, they answered the demographic questions and commented on any missing statements. It should be noted that collecting data either online or offline does not create any problem as there is no difference in the factors obtained whether the Q sort is conducted offline or online (see Hogan, 2010). 5.4 Statistical analysis In Q methodology, each completed Q sort is counted as data. To analyze the data, a specific program such as PQMethod 2.35 (Schmolck, 2014) and PCQ (Stricklin & Almeida, 2001) is used. These programs provide researchers clear instructions to help the data analysis process and interpretation of the results (Akhtar-Danesh et al., 2008). The data analysis in Q methodology includes a by-person factor analysis (Watts & Stenner, 2005a). These specific programs require entering the statements and data (Q

Chapter 5 sorts), and for example, PQMethod also checks for any duplication or missing statement numbers. Later, these programs provide options to extract and rotate factors, and create factor arrays (Watts & Stenner, 2005a). In brief, these programs ―facilitate data input, automatically generate the initial by-person correlation matrix, and make processes of factor extraction, rotation and estimation very straightforward‖ (p. 80). There are numerous techniques of factor extraction (e.g., centroid factor analysis, principal component factor analysis) and factor rotation (e.g., Varimax rotation, manual rotation). For factor extraction, principal component analysis might be better than centroid analysis as principal component analysis does not assume that the factors represent underlying constructs. For factor rotation, the Varimax criterion rotation is also very useful for identifying the most informative solution (mathematically). On the other hand, manual rotation helps accentuate the differences between factors as much as possible (Watts & Stenner, 2005a). In the analysis, the following two requirements are generally taken into account for a factor to be counted as ―interpretable‖: a) an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 (Watts & Stenner, 2005a), and b) at least two sorts should load significantly on that factor (Shinebourne, 2009). There are some criteria to find the most useful factor solution in the analysis. According to Watts and Stenner (2012), a useful factor solution a) is sensitive and responsive to your data set and thus to the feelings and viewpoints of your participants; b) is satisfactory in relation to your own aims and purposes; c) is methodologically and statistically, as well as theoretically, acceptable; and that d) makes good sense of the data you have gathered, ultimately for the benefit of your readers/audience (italics in original, p. 96). In addition to Watts and Stenner (2012), there is also a combination of criteria by Webler, Danielson and Tuler (2009): simplicity (i.e., all else equal, a solution with fewer factors is better than a solution with more factors), clarity (i.e., the more Q sorts load highly and uniquely on one factor, the better), distinctness (i.e., the lower the correlations between the idealized Q-sorts representing the factors, the better), and stability (i.e., certain subsets of participants load together across different solutions). After deciding for factor solutions, the PQMethod program provides (among others) five main results: a) correlation matrix between sorts, b) correlations between factor scores, c) z-scores of the

Chapter 5 statements for each factor, d) distinguishing statements for each factor, and e) consensus statements (see also Shemming, 2006; Webler et al., 2009). In this PhD research, PQMethod (Schmolck, 2014) was used to analyze the data. Factors were extracted using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) instead of Centroid Factor Analysis. The reason behind this choice was that PCA does not assume that the factors represent underlying constructs and it is purely descriptive. Factors were rotated using the Varimax criterion to identify the most informative solution (mathematically), and then using manual rotation (see Brown, 2006). For factors to be counted as an interpretable factor, these two requirements (an eigenvalue greater than 1.0, and at least two sorts‘ loading significantly on that factor) were taken into account. Webler et al.‘s (2009) four criteria (simplicity, clarity, distinctness and stability) were also taken into account to decide for optimal factor solutions. 5.5 Interpretation In Q methodology, the interpretation requires examining the ranking of each statement. At this point, participants‘ comments, which are noted both during and after Q sorting, are very helpful to integrate in interpretation of each factor (Shinebourne, 2009). Generally, it is useful to start interpretation from the statements which are highly and lowly ranked of the first factor. These statements should be approached together rather than individually as ―it is the particular configuration of statements together that create the nuanced ‗meaning‘ for each factor‖ (Shemmings, 2006, p. 7; italic in original). Examining the opposite poles does not necessarily mean ignoring the neutral areas (e.g., -1, 0, and 1). On the contrary, examining neutral areas indicates how that particular factor is unique in terms of its statements in neutral areas. In addition, the interpretation also requires examining the distinguishing statements for each factor. A distinguishing statement in each factor indicates ―a statement that its score on that factor is significantly different from its score on any other factor‖ (Akhtar-Danesh et al., 2008, p. 767; see also Shemmings, 2006). As mentioned above, the interpretation phase also benefits from the comments of the participants during the Q sort. The comments of the participants, such as why they sorted those particular statements at a specific point or why they agree/disagree with a

Chapter 5 particular statement, support the interpretation phase. In addition, any relevant demographic information may be helpful to understand that specific factor (Watts & Stenner, 2012). In this PhD research, to interpret the results of PQMethod, I started examining the correlation matrix between sorts and correlations between factor scores, z-scores of the statements for each factor, distinguishing statements for each factor and consensus statements. I scrutinized the statements which were sorted at the opposite poles (e.g., +5, +4 and -4, -5) together with the comments of the participants that I noted down during data collection. I also checked demographic information of the participants while examining these results. In order to understand how these final factors are different from each other, I scrutinized the distinguishing statements for each factor and took them into consideration to interpret each factor. Later, I also checked consensus statements in order to identify common ground where all groups agree. To sum up, I adapted these particular suggestions from various sources in Q methodology into my own PhD research and also reported specific details of each study in the method and results sections of the following chapters 6, 7 and 8.

Chapter 6

Chapter 6 “Who will resolve this conflict if the politicians don’t?”: Members’ of parliament understandings of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey9

9 A modified version of this chapter has been submitted for publication as: Uluğ, Ö. M., & Cohrs, J. C. (2016). ―Who will resolve this conflict if the politicians don‘t?‖: Members‘ of parliament understandings of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. 82

Chapter 6

In most societies there are ‗few‘ who hold power in their hands and rule, and ‗many‘ who are ruled by these ‗few‘ (Etzioni-Halevy, 1990; Parry, 2005). Although elites vary in type and power (see Reed, 2012), political elites are considered to be influential in directing the public in almost all societies and public opinion is often dependent on the political elites‘ choice (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Therefore, political elites can cause social changes both in the short and in the long run. This means that in conflict-ridden societies political elites can affect the course of an on-going conflict. The present research explores the understandings of political elites (i.e., members of parliament, MPs) in Turkey in relation to the Kurdish conflict. Exploring these understandings among MPs gives a broader picture of the conflict by elucidating what positions of political parties regarding the Kurdish conflict are most conflictual, and what value each party gives to the different issues in the conflict. In turn, exploring the understandings in a conflict context by identifying the consensus among political parties can contribute to understanding the conflict dynamics and to conflict resolution in the long run. From this exploration, I aim to see both intra-party and inter-party differences as well as consensus points across all parties. Below I first describe the roles of conflict understandings and of political elites in conflict. Second, to contextualize this study, I discuss the background of the Kurdish conflict and the approaches to the conflict taken by the four main political parties (AKP, BDP, CHP and MHP). In the empirical section, I present findings of a Q-methodological study with 23 MPs from these four political parties. 6.1 Political elites Elites can be divided into governing elites and non-governing elites (cf. Zannoni, 1978). Among governing elites, there are individuals who play important roles in government (Zuckerman, 1997). Similarly, Lederach (1999) discusses different types of actors at three different levels that are central for understanding conflict and achieving peace: top- level leadership, mid-level leadership and grassroots leadership. The first level includes military, religious and political leaders with high visibility. Leaders at this top level have an influence on spreading new ideas, producing new perspectives, controlling state and media resources (Loizides, 2009) and resolving conflicts through, for instance, ceasefire(s) or official negotiations. Their actions, speeches and positions attract a great

Chapter 6 deal of media attention (e.g., press coverage and air time) (Lederach, 1999). The importance of these political elites lies in their visibility; they are well known by the public. Since they are few, distinct from the rest of society, and have political power (Zannoni, 1978); they can change the political situation in a short period of time. In this study, I focus on members of parliament in Turkey as I consider them as both governing (top-level leaders) and politically powerful elites as well. The perspectives taken by top-level political elites on conflict determines actions such as advocating the introduction of institutional or constitutional changes such as more soldiers, more factories or a charter of human rights (Darby, 1976). If a conflict situation is perceived as a crisis, the roles of political elites are crucial since ―elites are said to have particular room for maneuver and are able to take initiatives that can shape political history‖ (Parry, 2005, p. 3). According to Reilly (2006), the role of political elites is relatively central: ―[b]ecause they channel, aggregate, and express political demands, these politically powerful elites (e.g., political parties) play an important role in the management of conflict in societies divided along cultural, linguistic, religious, regional, or other lines‖ (p. 811). In a conflict context, ethnic political parties in particular might have a tremendous effect because they can manipulate their voter base by aiding extremists and heightening ethnic tensions (Reilly, 2006) as well as reducing ethnic tensions by calming their voter base. The role of political elites affects not only the conflict itself, but also reconciliation and peace processes. According to Bar-Tal (2000), especially strong opposition from political parties with a strong voter base may pose a barrier to the reconciliation process as opposition parties will continue to delegitimize the other side in the conflict, which, in turn, leads to increasing intractability of the conflict. Therefore, a reconciliation process needs to be strongly accepted by different political parties in that society (see also Pruitt, 2007). Because the potential influence of political elites‘ positions on public opinion and the course of events extend to the resolution of conflict in the long run, political elites‘ perspectives are a focal topic. Therefore, understanding political elites‘ perspectives in a conflict should be a prominent concern within both academia and policy-making circles in conflict resolution and peace building processes.

Chapter 6

Political elites in Turkey Political elites and their position on the conflict have had a central role in Turkey‘s long- lasting Kurdish conflict. Especially after AKP was elected in 2002, the role of political elites, governing elites in general, started to change. MPs from AKP in particular have become more central in the current political situation as they are the majority in the Turkish Parliament and, thus, hold political power in their hands. Political elites‘ disagreement about some problems poses a barrier to the resolution of these problems in Turkey since a lack of consensus both impedes and postpones addressing the immediate problems. Therefore, understanding the causes of these tensions, especially in the context of the Kurdish conflict, is an important task for conflict transformation and resolution. For example, Loizides (2009) researched debates from TBMM to understand the effects of elite framing on conflict transformation in the 1990s. He suggested that the Kurdish conflict frames used by the elites were monolithic, and were adversarial towards ―Kurds‖. On the contrary, I argue that the political elites‘ conflict understandings are no longer as monolithic as they were in the 1990s. After the EU accession process for Turkey that began in 2004 and the Kurdish Initiative in 2009, many developments occurred regarding the Kurdish conflict. These changes have affected the political elites‘ understandings as well as their parties‘ positions. In addition, with the presence of a pro-Kurdish party in TBMM, more than one position on the Kurdish conflict is visible. Thus, I argue that there might be both diverse and alternative conflict understandings among political elites that should be explored. This might be the case even within a political party. Ideological and political differences may not be so apparent from the media or a political party‘s platform. As Loizides‘s (2009) analysis of official party discourses was not at the individual level, but at a political party level, this might also have caused political parties to be seen as monolithic. However, this does not necessarily mean that members of the same political party all have the same position on an issue. Rather, there might be various perspectives that may be important for conflict resolution. Therefore, the understandings of political parties should be explored to grasp the current situation regarding the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. Since I argue that the political parties‘ understandings are no longer as monolithic as they were in the 1990s, this also brings another issue to the fore: alternative perspectives for conflict resolution.

Chapter 6

To systematically get the picture of political elites‘ understandings, a comprehensive frame analysis is useful (Gray, 2003). In this study, I used Entman‘s (1993) frame analysis approach, according to which a frame has four main characteristics. First, it defines the problem, together with its costs and benefits (problem definition). Second, it includes a causal diagnosis that defines the forces that cause the problem (causal interpretation). Third, it includes judgments; it evaluates the forces that create the problem and their (possible) effects (moral evaluation). Last, a frame proposes solutions to the causes and forecasts the likely effects of proposed treatments (treatment recommendation). One additional domain–barriers to conflict resolution–was included (see chapter 4) because another qualitative study with focus group discussions conducted by me in Mersin and Diyarbakır provinces of Turkey indicated that barriers to conflict resolution is another key element of conflict understanding and resolution (see also Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011; Ross & Ward, 1995). In the following, the background of the Kurdish conflict and the approaches of four main political parties to the Kurdish conflict will be presented. 6.2 The Kurdish conflict The history of the modern Republic of Turkey‘s approach to the Kurdish conflict can be characterized by three main periods: a pre-denial period (1923-1925) that recognized the separate Kurdish identity and their rights, a denial period (between mid-1920s and 1990) that denies any rights of Kurds, and a post-denial period (since 1990) that accepts the ethnic aspect of the problem (Yeğen, 2011). The Turkish state acknowledged the rights of the ethnic Kurds and granted autonomy for them in the first period, whereas in the second period the existence of Kurds was denied completely. At that time this problem was seen as a social clash between the past and the present (Yeğen, 2011). Saraçoğlu (2011) also defines the third period as an ―exclusive recognition‖ period which means Kurds as an ethnic group are recognized, but still discriminated and excluded (e.g., in big cities such as İzmir). Since 2013, another period has also started with the official meetings of the Turkish state with the PKK and its imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan. The conflict has caused the deaths of as many as 40,000 persons from both sides since 1984 and thousands of murders by unknown assailants (Çelik & Kantowitz, 2009). In 1999, the leader of PKK was captured in Kenya; and he has been imprisoned in İmralı

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Prison since then. The year 1999 was a turning point in the history of the Kurdish conflict because the PKK declared a ceasefire that lasted until 2004. PKK attacks resumed after 2004 and later, the current governing party, AKP, introduced some reforms regarding the cultural rights such as launching of a state-run TV channel (TRT Kurdî) in connection with Turkey‘s EU process. 6.3 The approaches of political parties to the Kurdish conflict in Turkey The party system in Turkey is a parliamentary system in which MPs are elected for a fixed four-year term from each of the 81 provinces. In addition to these rules, there is a national threshold system. In order to be represented in parliament, political parties have to win a minimum 10% share of the national votes. Overall, in the 2011 national elections, three parties overcame this threshold and members of one party, the pro-Kurdish BDP, ran as independent candidates to have seats in the parliament. These three parties were MHP with 52 deputies, AKP with 327 deputies and CHP with 134 deputies.10 The BDP had 29 independent deputies who formed their group in the parliament after the elections. MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) MHP is a nationalist right-wing party that represents Turkish ultra-nationalism. Even though the Turkish and Muslim identities have become very important for MHP, the Turkish identity is more dominant than the Muslim one (Celep, 2010). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the party‘s ideology changed. Later, MHP became a ―secular‖ party even though Islam remained important. It was also an ―ethnic‖ party, and the enemy was no longer communists, but Kurds and the PKK in Turkey (Yavuz, 2002). MHP have used the discourse of ―Kurds are descendants of Turkish tribes‖ for a long time and therefore they denied the Kurdish identity as a separate identity (Yavuz, 2002). Even though the party‘s stance towards the Kurdish problem has become softer as the Kurdish reality is recognized now by Devlet Bahçeli, the current leader of the MHP, the party still opposes broadcasting and education in Kurdish language and the concept of a multicultural society (Arikan, 1998; Celep, 2010). AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) According to their own definition, AKP is a ―center-right or conservative-democrat‖ political party or ―a political party with clear Islamic roots‖ (Taşpınar, 2012). Unlike

10 These numbers changed slightly in the following years. 87

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MHP, the emphasis of AKP has been on the Muslim fellowship, not on Turkish ethnic identity (Yavuz & Özcan, 2006) since AKP opposes the state ideology, Kemalism, which excluded Kurdish citizens who had been included during the Ottoman Empire time under the umbrella of Islam (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). At that time, this emphasis might have provided AKP a great victory with an enormous support from the Kurdish population although the results of 2015 general elections were relatively different. AKP‘s approach to the Kurdish problem seriously changed in 2013. While Erdoğan was not even shaking hands with MPs from BDP until that time, his party negotiated with the BDP and Öcalan as of 2013-2014. However, the future of the party‘s attitude towards the BDP and the Kurdish conflict is still unclear. CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) CHP is a left-wing party that is a member of ‗Socialist International‘. CHP was the first party in the history of the Turkish Republic and was the only party during Turkey‘s single party period (1925-1945). Even though it held the state ideology, Kemalism, during the single party period, it was influenced by leftist ideology in the 1970s. Later, in the 1990s, CHP defended the rights of Kurds and the recognition of cultural and human rights (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). Regarding the Kurdish problem, it has been quite difficult for CHP to get votes from Kurdish citizens primarily due to a lack of trust, solidarity and mutual understanding between Kurds and CHP. Also, CHP‘s emphasis on a unitary state has not attracted the nationalist Kurds who have claims to an autonomous or independent Kurdistan (Ayata & Güneş-Ayata, 2007). According to CHP, the main key issues have been to keep both the unitary structure of the Turkish state and its official language, Turkish (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997). Now, CHP supports the recognition of cultural rights of Kurds at an individual level such as having a right to go to Kurdish language centers instead of a collective level such as education in Kurdish, and opposes Kurdish political autonomy (Ayata & Güneş-Ayata, 2007). BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi) As a pro-Kurdish political party, BDP has a different position on the Kurdish problem compared to the above-mentioned parties and includes hard and soft liners within the party (Efegil, 2011). BDP‘s (and previous pro-Kurdish parties‘) connections with PKK

Chapter 6 caused them to be marginalized by all governments and the TSK (Güneş, 2013). In general, BDP voices demands such as ending TSK operations against PKK camps, accepting Öcalan as the Kurds‘ sole representative, giving access to politics to PKK members, and changing the constitution based on democracy (Efegil, 2011). If these steps are taken, PKK would disarm and the first step to solving the problem would be completed. Later, the issues concerning PKK‘s integration into society and Öcalan‘s amnesty would be proposed by BDP. 6.4 The present research The aim of the present research was to explore the understandings of political elites, which may not be monolithic after approximately two decades as seen at the party level in Loizides‘s (2009) study. There may be both diverse and alternative conflict understandings of political elites that should be explored to grasp the current situation of the Kurdish conflict. Therefore, I aimed to systematically research the understandings of the Kurdish conflict among MPs in Turkey based on Entman‘s (1993) conceptualization of frame analysis, which I modified to comprise five domains: a) problem definition, b) causal interpretation, c) moral evaluation, d) treatment recommendation and e) barrier to conflict resolution. This systematic framework allowed me to understand the Kurdish conflict from a broader perspective. The present research approached the Kurdish conflict with Q methodology, which is a suitable method to uncover socially shared perspectives and inter-group and intra-group differences (Brown, 1980; Watts & Stenner, 2005a) as well as finding commonalities across the different perspectives. This approach allowed first to explore how parliamentarians interpreted and evaluated the Kurdish conflict; second, to uncover both intra-party and inter-party differences; third, to see commonalities across political parties in the parliament; and fourth, to identify which particular issues in the Kurdish conflict matter more or are psychologically more salient for each party as well as across the parties. 6.5 Method Participants Q methodology requires purposive sampling of participants to identify socially shared perspectives from different backgrounds (Brown, 1980). Participants were selected from the political parties represented in the Turkish Parliament: AKP, BDP, CHP and MHP.

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Participants were chosen according to their party affiliation and their visibility on the Kurdish problem in terms of speeches, comments and parliamentary questions. In other words, the most vocal politicians on the Kurdish problem were approached. I had an initial list of 37 MPs and I asked the political advisors of the MPs whether my list has the heterogeneity of the MPs regarding the different perspectives on the Kurdish conflict. The advisors also suggested a few additional names and dropping a few names as well. I updated my list based on their feedback and initially, 31 MPs were approached at TBMM in January 2013. Most meetings with MPs were negotiated after the consent of their political advisors.11 However, some MPs declined the invitation to participate in the study and some accepted initially but refused later. In total, 23 MPs participated in the study: five from AKP and six each from BDP, CHP and MHP. Unfortunately, this included only three women. The age range of the deputies was between 38 and 66 years (M = 50.47). The political views of the participants ranged from 0 to 10 (M = 4.33; 0 = left, 10 = right) although eight MPs did not answer this question. Procedure and materials Data collection in Q methodology involves Q sorting, ―a modified rank-ordering procedure in which stimuli are placed in an order that is significant from the standpoint of a person operating under specified conditions‖ (Brown, 1980, p. 195). Participants receive a set of statements, with each statement printed on a separate card (Brown, 1993; Watts & Stenner, 2005a), and are asked to sort the statements under a particular condition of instruction (McKeown & Thomas, 1988; Watts & Stenner, 2012). The statements were constructed on the basis of (a) open-ended questionnaires and focus group discussions conducted by me in Mersin and Diyarbakır, (b) academic articles and books on the Kurdish conflict written in Turkish and English, (c) newspaper articles (e.g., mainstream, pro-Kurdish and pro-Turkish), (d) party platforms of the four main political parties, (e) transcripts of speeches by political party leaders, (f) survey results of NGOs, and (g) materials of an earlier Q methodological study on the Kurdish conflict (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016a). Initially, 106 statements were chosen from these different sources. Then, seven academics from different disciplines, all knowledgeable in the Kurdish conflict, evaluated

11 Every MP at TBMM has at least one (up to three) political advisor(s). 90

Chapter 6 whether these statements were comprehensive and clear, whether there were any repetitions, overlaps or any missing content, whether any of the statements were redundant, and whether the perspectives of different groups were represented more or less equally. Then, the number of statements was reduced to 54, which was a manageable size. This number is in the suggested range (between 40 and 80) to be comprehensive enough and, at the same time, well manageable (Stainton Rogers, 1995). These statements belong to the frame analysis domains: problem definitions (11 statements), causes of the problem (7 statements), moral judgments (13 statements), solutions (16 statements), and barriers to the solution of the problem (7 statements). 54 statements in total were presented to the participants on a cardboard. In this study, participants were asked to sort the items according to their degree of relative agreement and disagreement with the statements in terms of understanding the conflict, one on one in their offices. In a first step, participants were asked to read all the statements carefully and sort them into three piles: one for those they agreed with, one for those they disagreed with, and one for those they neither agreed nor disagreed with, felt neutral about or ―had no idea‖ about. In a second step, participants were told to place the agreed cards into a fixed quasi-normal distribution. Specifically, they were asked to start with the ―most agreed‖ part (+5) until all the agreed cards were placed on the cardboard, followed by placing the disagreed cards starting from the ―most disagreed‖ part (-5) until all the disagreed cards were placed on the cardboard. Next, the participants were asked to sort the remaining cards (from the third, ―neutral‖ pile) into the grid, around ―0‖. In a third step, participants were allowed to change the places of cards until they were satisfied that the sorting pattern produced on the cardboard reflected their viewpoint well enough. Once they were done with the Q sorting, the sorting pattern was recorded on a sheet of paper. Also, participants were asked to comment on the statements they agreed with most (+5) and disagreed with most (-5), and asked on a five-point scale how well their sorting pattern reflected their views on the Kurdish problem (1 = not at all, 5 = very well, M = 3.35).12 Participants were also asked to provide any missing statements to give a more complete picture of their viewpoint on the Kurdish conflict; only one MP from

12 Of the 23 MPs, 20 MPs represented their views moderately well (3), rather well (4) or very well (5). The remaining 3 MPs did not answer this question. 91

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BDP added one statement regarding the role of women in the Kurdish movement.13 Finally, participants provided demographic information. Analysis In Q methodology, data analysis involves a factor (or principal component) analysis across the participants‘ Q sorts. Each resulting factor14 represents a viewpoint on the phenomenon in question that is shared by the participants whose Q sorts load on the factor. After ‗flagging‘ individual Q sorts that define the factors, ‗idealized‘ Q sorts are generated by aggregating across the flagged Q sorts, weighted by their loadings, for each factor. The meanings of these aggregated Q sorts are then inspected and interpreted through comparison and contrast, with the additional help of participants‘ comments on statements during and after sorting (Brown, 1993; Watts & Stenner, 2005a). I explored solutions with different numbers of factors and decided on the final number using a combination of criteria (Webler et al., 2009): simplicity, clarity, distinctness, and stability. In addition, each factor should have at least two or three defining Q sorts (Webler et al., 2009) to qualify as a socially shared viewpoint. 6.6 Results Factors were extracted using Principal Component Analysis 15 and rotated using the Varimax criterion, with subsequent manual rotation to accentuate the differences between factors as much as possible (Watts & Stenner, 2005a). A four-factor solution seemed optimal in terms of the criteria mentioned above. It explained 73% of the total amount of variance. All but one of the 23 Q sorts loaded uniquely on one of the four factors (see Table 9). The remaining parliamentarian‘s Q sort had multiple loadings on more than one factor and thus was not used to define any factor. In the following, I explain the meaning of the four factors by examining the statements that ranked highly positively and highly negatively and the statements that distinguished most between the different factors (see

13 I believe this possible statement regarding the role of women in the Kurdish movement is not central to the focus of this study although it is an important subject on its own. Therefore, this issue does not threaten the validity of my statements. 14 In the Q-methodological literature the term ―factor‖ is generally used, even when principal components have been extracted and rotated. I follow this terminological convention here, but talk about ―viewpoints‖ or ―perspectives‖ when referring to the interpretation. 15 I opted for Principal Component extraction because unlike Centroid extraction (which is also commonly used in Q methodology) this method is purely descriptive, without assuming that the factors represent underlying constructs. 92

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Appendix F for the complete list of statements and their z-scores, which indicate how extreme [positive or negative] a statement would be sorted by a hypothetical person that perfectly reflects the respective factor), as well as the participants‘ open comments. Table 9. Factor loadings and participant characteristics

Pol. F1 F2 F3 F4 Ethni Gend Pol Party city er View CHP .77 .01 .11 -.10 Other F 0 CHP .18 .72 .30 .28 T M 3 CHP .74 .33 .24 -.01 Other M ? CHP -.08 .60 .28 .56 K M 0 CHP .37 .77 .04 -.16 ? M 2 CHP .31 .69 .17 .36 ? M 5 BDP -.24 .23 .03 .82 K M ? BDP -.29 .04 .18 .82 K F 1 BDP -.14 .19 .00 .79 K M ? BDP -.07 .15 .07 .85 K M 5 BDP -.36 .17 .16 .82 K M 3 BDP -.32 .15 .27 .80 K F 0 MHP .82 -.01 .10 -.06 T M ? MHP .67 .25 .05 -.51 T M 8 MHP .73 .08 .08 -.48 T M 10 MHP .77 .29 .12 -.20 T M 7 MHP .60 .10 .00 -.47 T M ? MHP .71 .12 .02 -.46 T M ? AKP -.01 .41 .68 .26 K M 5 AKP .03 .14 .73 .34 K M 5 AKP .05 .70 .29 .07 T M 10 AKP .06 .64 .40 .43 K M 0 AKP .37 .25 .73 .23 ? M 3 Notes. F1 to F4: Loadings on Factors 1 to 4; Loadings in bold indicate that the respective sort was used as a defining sort. T = Turkish, K = Kurdish; M = Male, F = Female; Political view: 0 = left, 10 = right.

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Viewpoint 1: Turkish Nationalist View (MHP and CHP) Factor 1 represents a Turkish Nationalist View. Factor 1 had eight defining sorts, with factor loadings ranging from .60 to .82. Two participants were from CHP and six were from MHP. All six MPs from MHP loaded on Factor 1 and they indicated that they were ethnically Turkish. The two MPs from CHP were from other ethnic backgrounds (e.g., Pomak). Seven participants were men and one was a woman. The MPs differed substantially in their political views, with a range between 0 and 10 (M = 6.25; 0 = left, 5 = center, 10 = right). In general, this perspective is similar to the terrorism perspective of the Turkish state (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997; Tan, 2008) as it emphasizes the unity of the Turkish state and opposes challenging the unity of Turkey (statement no. 45). The Kurdish problem is defined as a terrorism problem rather than a Kurdish problem (no. 1), which stems from instigation of foreign powers such as the US, UK or Israel (no. 14). According to this perspective, if the terrorism is eliminated, there won‘t be any problem regarding this issue, because this is only a terrorism issue, not a ―Kurdish issue‖ or Kurds‘ independence problem (no. 8). Since the problem is as a terrorism problem, causes such as the nation-state ideology of Turkey, the assimilation policies aimed at Kurds and withholding Kurds‘ cultural rights are also disagreed (nos. 16 and 17). PKK is considered as a terrorist organization that is an actor for the Greater Middle East Project (nos. 23 and 26), a political term used for changing the Middle East‘s structure in line with US interests. While PKK is criticized for being an actor for foreign powers, it is disagreed that most Turks are prejudiced towards Kurds (no. 30). It seems that according to this perspective, ―bad Kurds‖ who support PKK and ―good Kurds‖ who do not support the PKK are differentiated by Turks. Therefore, Turks are not prejudiced towards Kurds who do not support PKK. Due to seeing the problem mostly as a terrorism problem, the resolution of the problem lies in PKK‘s laying down weapons and TSK‘s active counter- terrorism policies. In addition to these solution strategies, economic development and increased job opportunities are also agreed on (no. 34). The US‘s interests in the region and those who profit from this problem are seen as important obstacles to the resolution of the problem (nos. 48 and 53) as these profiteers prevent the resolution of the conflict, even prolong it. Since the problem has nothing to do with the rights and identity of the

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Kurds, even small changes such as the recognition of rights to education and broadcasting in Kurds‘ own language and the constitutional recognition of the existence of the Kurdish identity are rejected (nos. 36 and 37). Therefore, it is not surprising that far-reaching changes such as the continuation of (Oslo) negotiations with PKK representatives such as Öcalan and amnesty for him as well as establishing an independent Kurdistan are also strongly rejected (nos. 35, 43 and 47). Viewpoint 2: Social Democratic View (CHP and AKP) Factor 2 represents a democracy and rights-based view. Factor 2 had five defining Q sorts, with factor loadings ranging from .63 to .76. Three out of five were from CHP and two from AKP. Two MPs were Kurdish, one Turkish, and two did not reveal their ethnic identities. All five participants were men. In terms of political views, the range was between 2 and 10 (M = 5.00). According to this viewpoint, the problem is defined in line with democracy, identity, and rights and freedoms (nos. 2, 7 and 9). All other problem definitions such as seeing the problem as a terrorism problem, a Kurdish invasion problem, a colonialism problem and Kurds‘ independence problem are rejected (nos. 1, 11, 3 and 8). In addition, the viewpoint of rejecting the Kurdish problem, but accepting it as a problem of the Kurdish people (e.g., Kurds‘ having some economic and social problems) is also rejected (no. 10) because this view is perceived as a ―denial‖ of the deep causes of the problem. In line with seeing the problem as an identity problem for Kurds, the causes of the problem are seen in the denial of the Kurds for many years, the assimilation policies over Kurds and withholding of their cultural rights (nos. 13 and 16). According to this viewpoint, the denial of the Kurds and assimilation policies towards them caused this Kurdish problem, not the terrorism itself. Similar to Viewpoint 1, PKK is seen as a terrorist group and, therefore, should lay down its arms (nos. 23 and 39) for the resolution of the conflict. However, seeing the solution of the problem in TSK‘s active counter-terrorism policies is rejected (no. 46) because this solution does not address the identity and rights dynamics of the problem. Therefore, using only harsh security measures to deal with the problem is seen as a barrier to the solution of the problem (no. 49). Solutions should focus on identity, freedom and democracy elements of the problem, rather than focusing only on the ―security‖ aspect of the problem.

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Also, the unity of Turks and Kurds under the umbrella of Islam as a resolution strategy is rejected (no. 33) since democracy itself can provide a solution to the problem. In line with seeing the problem as one of Turkey‘s democracy problems, the solution to the problem is seen in deep-rooted democratization and implementation of human rights and strengthening of local administrations (nos. 32 and 38). Similar to Viewpoint 1, the foundation of an independent Kurdistan and amnesty for Öcalan are strongly rejected (nos. 35 and 43). This means that rather than founding an independent Kurdistan, the problem could be solved within the borders of Turkey with a more advanced democracy and more rights and freedom for Kurds. A last point to note about this viewpoint is that accusing CHP for not working enough for the solution of the problem is rejected (no. 31), even though both CHP and AKP members (who share this viewpoint) are frequently in conflict in the parliament. Viewpoint 3: Islamist View (AKP) Factor 3 represents the Islamist view which sees the problem in Turkey‘s nation-state ideology and suggests the Islamic fellowship to solve the problem. Factor 3 had three defining Q sorts, with factor loadings ranging from .68 to .72 and. All participants of this factor are from AKP and men. Two of them were Kurdish and one didn‘t answer this question. In terms of political views, the range was between 3 and 5 (M = 4.33). In this viewpoint, the problem is seen as a democracy problem (no. 2), but not a colonial problem (no. 3) or a Kurdish invasion problem (no. 11). Similar to the first two viewpoints, PKK is seen as a terrorist organization (no. 23). Different from the first viewpoint and similar to the second viewpoint, despite this, the problem is not seen as a terrorism problem (no. 5). Rather, the problem stems from Turkey‘s nation-state ideology which was based on Turkishness (no. 17). Turkey‘s nation-state ideology excluded Kurds and accepted them only if they were assimilated. Therefore, a form of denial perspective that sees Kurds and Turks as two groups having the same rights is rejected (no. 25) since Kurds could not even express their identity in modern Turkey. According to this viewpoint, it is not difficult to understand the demands of Kurds because they do not have everything compared to Turks as claimed because Kurds and their identities have been denied for many years (no. 13). In line with seeing the problem as a democracy problem, the solution to the problem is seen in deep-rooted democratization and implementation of

Chapter 6 human rights (no. 32). Only in this viewpoint, uniting of Turks and Kurds again under the umbrella of Islam is most agreed for the solution of the problem (no. 33) since the nation- state ideology with much emphasis on Turkishness divided the Kurds and Turks as two ethnic entities and alienated them from their ―Muslim‖ identity. In line with this solution strategy, the nationalist movement party, MHP, is seen as a barrier to the resolution because this party puts an emphasis on the ‗Turkishness‘ of the issue and rejects the idea that Turks are prejudiced towards Kurds (no. 30). Also, solution strategies such as strengthening local administrations, PKK‘s laying down its arms, and economic development and increased job opportunities (nos. 38, 39 and 34) are agreed on. On the other hand, similar to the first two factors, Öcalan‘s amnesty and foundation of an independent Kurdistan are also rejected (nos. 43 and 35). Not surprisingly, AKP‘s efforts to dominate the region by inciting religious movements to create its own Kurds (nos. 51 and 21) is not seen as a barrier to the resolution of the conflict as this will help bringing Kurds and Turks together again under the umbrella of Islam. Viewpoint 4: Pro-Kurdish View (BDP) Factor 4 represents the pro-Kurdish view which sees the problem as an identity problem and supports the amnesty for Abdullah Öcalan. Factor 4 had six defining Q sorts, with factor loadings ranging from .79 to .85. All MPs of BDP loaded on this factor, and they indicated they were Kurdish. Two of them were women and four were men. In terms of political views, the range was between 0 and 5 (M = 2.25). In this viewpoint, the problem is seen as an identity problem as well as a rights and freedom problem (nos. 7 and 9). The problem definitions such as a terrorism problem, an underdevelopment and/or unemployment problem, Kurds‘ having some problems (e.g., social and economic) rather than a Kurdish problem (e.g., identity), and a Kurdish invasion problem are strongly rejected (nos. 1, 6, 10 and 11). The causes of the problem are seen in the denial of the Kurds for many years, the assimilation policies over Kurds and withholding of their cultural rights and the nation-state ideology of Turkey (nos. 13, 16 and 17). According to this viewpoint, the nation-state ideology was the origin of the problem and the outcomes were denial, assimilation and withholding the cultural rights of Kurds. Therefore, the solution to the problem is seen in the constitutional recognition of

Chapter 6 the existence of the Kurdish identity and the recognition of rights to education and broadcasting in Kurdish language (nos. 36 and 37) in order to reinstate these rights. In addition, the (Oslo) negotiations should also continue (no. 47) for the resolution of the problem. In this viewpoint, PKK is not seen as a terrorist organization (no. 23) and it is also agreed that if people don‘t cry for the ―terrorists‖ who died in the mountains, they are not human beings (no. 22). One of the MPs commented on this issue ―PKK is not a cause of the problem; it was a natural outcome of the problem‖. For this reason, causes such as PKK and terrorism are strongly rejected (nos. 5 and 18). As a result, the solution that TSK should end terror by active counter-terrorism policies is also rejected (no. 46). According to this viewpoint, PKK is only the outcome of the problem and if other issues are addressed, PKK will not be a problem. Views such as not understanding what Kurds want because of Kurds and Turks‘ having the same rights and seeing Kurds as pawns that are used by foreign powers are rejected (nos. 25 and 29). Different from the other three factors, it is only in this viewpoint that an amnesty for Öcalan is supported (no. 43). Conflict and consensus a. Similarities and differences between viewpoints As can be seen in Table 10, which reports the correlations between the idealized, prototypical Q sorts for each factor, the first three factors are positively correlated. Nevertheless, Viewpoints 1 and 2 differ in terms of defining the problem and suggesting solutions for it. In Viewpoint 1 the problem is defined as a terrorism problem, whereas in Viewpoint 2 it is defined as an identity, democracy, rights and freedom problem. Even though these two viewpoints diverge in the definitions, causes and solutions to the problem, they see PKK as a terrorist organization. Therefore, they suggest PKK‘s laying down arms. Viewpoints 1 and 3 are also similar in terms of seeing PKK as a terrorist organization. However, their understandings of the conflict are quite different. In Viewpoint 3, there is a critical position on Turkey‘s founding philosophy based on Turkishness which separates Turks and Kurds on ethnic grounds. As a result, the solution lies in Muslim fellowship which can bring together these two ethnic groups at a super- ordinate level. Viewpoints 1 and 4 are negatively correlated, suggesting that they represent opposite understandings of the conflict on most of the issues. In Viewpoint 1

Chapter 6 the problem is seen as a terrorism problem, whereas in Viewpoint 4 PKK is not seen as a terrorist organization.

Table 10. Factor correlations

F1 F2 F3 F4

Factor 1 -- .35 .23 -.49

Factor 2 -- .59 .30

Factor 3 -- .27

Factor 4 --

Even though the correlation between Factors 2 and 3 is higher than all other correlations, this does not mean that these two viewpoints have the same understanding of conflict. The correlation is high due to both factors sharing the democracy perspective, seeing the causes of the Kurdish conflict in denial of Kurds for many years and suggesting democratic solutions to the resolution of the conflict. However, rather, in Viewpoint 3 Islamic issues are emphasized, whereas in Viewpoint 2 identity, rights and freedom are at the forefront. Only Viewpoint 3 emphasizes the Muslim fellowship for Turks and Kurds to resolve the conflict and sees MHP as a barrier to the solution. On the other hand, in Viewpoint 2 lack of empathy between groups is seen as a barrier to the solution of the conflict. Thus, Viewpoint 3 represents the Islamist view of the Kurdish problem whereas Viewpoint 2 is more open to changes regarding the rights compared to Viewpoint 3 and therefore focuses more on the rights, freedom and democracy issues of Turkey. Factors 2 and 4 are positively correlated. Both viewpoints see the conflict from an identity, rights and freedom perspective. However, they disagree on the definition of PKK and the solution strategy with respect to Abdullah Öcalan. Lastly, the correlation between Factors 3 and 4 is positive, indicating some similarity between these two viewpoints. For example, in both viewpoints the cause of the conflict is seen in the denial of the Kurds (and their identities) for many years. However, they differ in how the

Chapter 6 conflict should be resolved. There are two other statements that make Viewpoint 4 different from the other factors. These statements are not accepting PKK as a terrorist organization and saying that if people don‘t cry for terrorists who died on the mountains, they are not human beings. b. Consensual and conflictual issues There are some statements on which all four viewpoints diverged. For example, the four viewpoints have different positions on defining the problem as a terrorism problem, as an underdevelopment and unemployment problem and as an identity problem. In addition, causes of the problem such as denial of Kurdish identity, assimilation policies towards Kurds, Turkey‘s nation-state ideology, and instigation of foreign powers also divide the different viewpoints. In terms of solution to the conflict, the viewpoints also diverge on whether the constitutional recognition of the existence of the Kurdish identity and recognition of rights to education and broadcasting in Kurdish is required or not. In addition to these differences, the most pronounced difference lies in the amnesty for Öcalan. The analysis also produced one (and only one) consensus statement among all four viewpoints: the statement proposing deep-rooted democratization and implementation of human rights in order to resolve this conflict (no. 32). Also, all viewpoints reject the view that there is a Kurdish invasion rather than a Kurdish problem. They also disagree with the foundation of an independent Kurdistan, albeit to different degrees. In addition to these consensual views, the results also indicated some statements that are either common to the different viewpoints or are of high agreement for some viewpoints, but less relevant for others. This includes seeing the problem as a democracy problem, not as an independence problem for Kurds, rejecting the direct cause of the problem as PKK, seeing the solution of the conflict in economic development and increased job opportunities, agreeing with barriers such as those who profit from this problem and only using harsh security measures, and not agreeing with blaming TSK as an institution that doesn‘t want the conflict to end. This means that all viewpoints, albeit to various degrees, see the problem as a democracy problem that can be solvable within the borders of Turkey without needing an independent Kurdistan. It also means that even though PKK might be blamed as a ―terrorist‖ organization, almost all viewpoints also

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Chapter 6 disagree on seeing the PKK as a direct cause of the conflict. Therefore, the focus to resolve the conflict should not be only on ―security‖ dimensions, it should rather be on more democratization and economic development. 6.7 Discussion The analysis distinguished four different viewpoints on the Kurdish conflict across the four political parties in parliament. These different viewpoints are significant as first, they indicate both different and important positions of the parliamentarians on the Kurdish conflict; second, they represent both intra-party and inter-party differences; and third, the commonalities across political parties in the parliament are revealed in these viewpoints. To sum up, these four different viewpoints also indicate that the conflict understandings of the MPs on the Kurdish conflict are no longer as monolithic as they were in the 1990s (Loizides, 2009), and not all of them are adversarial towards Kurds; rather there are diverse perspectives across the parties. The first viewpoint (Factor 1) could be identified as a pro-Turkish and nationalist perspective that emphasizes terrorism and perceives the conflict as a big threat to the unitary structure of Turkey. It is shared by all MHP and some CHP members in this study. The second viewpoint (Factor 2) could be identified as a social democratic perspective because its emphasis is more on identity, rights, and freedom as well as the democracy aspect of the problem. Even though this perspective might be similar to Saraçoğlu‘s (2011) ―exclusive recognition‖ definition of the conflict, I can also argue that it is more open to the ―identity‖ aspect of the conflict. It is shared by some CHP and some AKP members. In the second perspective, an Islamic solution to the Kurdish conflict is rejected even though AKP is known as a conservative or ―Islamist‖ party. Another belief that has been introduced by AKP‘s leader, namely that there is no Kurdish problem but there are problems of the Kurds (e.g., social and economic problems), is also rejected in this viewpoint. The third viewpoint (Factor 3) is only shared by AKP members and could be defined as an Islamist perspective. The conflict is seen as a democratization problem as well as a nation-state problem that can be solved with an Islamic solution by coming together under a super-ordinate Muslim identity. The last viewpoint (Factor 4) could be identified as a pro-Kurdish view that is only shared by BDP members, in other words

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Kurdish parliamentarians (all participants were Kurdish). The degree of similarities and differences between each pair of viewpoints is summarized visually in Figure 3.

Turkish Islamist view Pro-Kurdish nationalist (Factor 3) view view (Factor 4) (Factor 1)

Social democratic

view (Factor 2)

Figure 3. Schematic representation of similarities between the four viewpoints

In addition to MPs‘ understandings not being monolithic under the roof of TBMM, the results indicate that there are also some intra-party differences within CHP and AKP. In other words, individual opinions of MPs might be different from ―official‖ party opinions within the same party. However, this was not the case in this study for MHP and BDP. One can argue that ―ethnic‖ political parties might be more homogenous compared to ―catch-all‖ parties in terms of ―ethnic‖ issues. This also indicates that even though MHP and AKP are right-wing parties and share similar traditional and moral values, their stances toward the Kurdish problem differ substantially (Celep, 2010). Different from the secular CHP, MHP emphasizes ―Turkishness‖ and ―Muslimness‖ together, echoing in their motto: ―Turkishness is our body; Islam is our soul (Türklük bedenimiz; İslamiyet ruhumuzdur)‖ (Uslu, 2008). Consequently, by MHP, the Kurdish problem is seen as a terrorism and security problem (Celep, 2010), which these results also indicated. However, one could also have expected to see Islam as another important solution strategy agreed by MHP. In this study, the participants from MHP did not agree on Islam as a solution to the Kurdish conflict. This might indicate two important issues. First, Islam as a unifying element might be less important for MHP today than it was in the past. Second, due to the Kurdish conflict‘s making ethnic issues

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Chapter 6 salient, MPs from MHP may have put more emphasis on their Turkish rather than their Muslim identity. Implications for academic literature and policy making These results are significant in several ways. First of all, my study takes a less used, but very useful approach, especially in the context of political parties (see also Peritore, 1989). Q methodology proves to be useful in the conflict context as it allows us to see inter-party differences clearly. It also shows us what kinds of actions are (more) important for each party in order to resolve the conflict. Understanding these differences together with the priorities of the each party on the conflict is an important first step in conflict assessment (Shmueli, 2003). By highlighting the inter-party differences, the results also suggest which issues carry the greatest conflict potential and/or disagreement among the political parties. Secondly, these results are promising in terms of identifying intra-party differences. One should not conclude that political parties are homogenous and there are no ideological differences within these parties, even in authoritarian ones. This is especially the case for AKP as this party‘s ex-leader, Erdoğan, is highly authoritarian and does not allow his party members to talk freely (Ayan, 2010). In line with the conflict resolution literature that suggests that there often are different perspectives about the conflict within each conflicting party (e.g., Cheldelin, Druckman, & Fast, 2003; Kelman & Fisher, 2003), this might also be the case within a single political party. Q methodology offered the possibility to detect more differences within the political parties than are apparent from the media or political parties‘ programs. Thus, the results indicate that some members of different political parties (e.g., AKP and CHP) have similar views on the Kurdish conflict even though they are frequently in conflict in parliament. This also indicates that approaching the MPs and asking them their ―personal‖ opinions rather than their ―party‖ opinion might be a starting point together with using Q methodology for finding both intra-party differences as well as commonalities among the political parties. Furthermore, Gargan and Brown (1993) argue that Q methodology is useful in decision making processes as it helps ―locate elements of consensus (if they exist) that might otherwise go unnoticed in the emotional turmoil of political debate.‖ (p. 348). As

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Chapter 6 such, this study is useful in terms of indicating the convergences of political parties on different areas of the Kurdish conflict. It produced several consensual statements on which policymakers and political parties could focus. For example, the pro-Kurdish political party, BDP, is always accused and framed as a separatist political party (see Noi, 2012) that tries to divide Turkey. However, this party‘s members also disagreed with the idea of an independent Kurdistan. In addition to consensual points, the results also indicated some statements that are highly agreed by some political parties, but not strongly rejected by other parties. These statements also carry potential for compromise and promising interventions in the conflict resolution and peace process (Shmueli, 2003; Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016a). For example, rather than focusing on whether Kurdish MPs desire an independent Kurdistan or not, the focus should be on implementing human rights and deep-rooted democratization to resolve the conflict. Consensus of political elites on democratization will enable the public to support the ―democratic‖ changes regarding the Kurdish conflict. In addition, economic solutions, such as increasing job opportunities and economic development, especially for the region, should be taken into account. Another important point that should be focused on is that using only harsh security measures to deal with the Kurdish conflict is not seen as effective but rather as a barrier that plays an important role in the continuation of conflict by almost all MPs. In light of the above consensus statements, emphasis for the resolution should be more on democracy aspects, not on security aspects. In brief, these views might be particularly useful for conflict resolution of the Kurdish problem as the understandings of political parties also determine agenda setting and policy making (Maslog, Lee, & Kim, 2006). Limitations and future directions My study has some limitations. First of all, a few participants indicated that they found the process of sorting the statements difficult. They added that they felt like choosing from a menu that has only limited statements available and asked whether they should sort all the statements according to their personal viewpoint or their party‘s stance. In the last case, participants were told to sort according to their personal viewpoint because I aimed, first, to prevent social desirability in terms of being seen as a good MP for their party and second, to see if there were discrepancies from their parties‘ programs. However, it is difficult to answer whether all of the respondents did so or not. In this

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Chapter 6 study, social desirability might be important as these MPs might desire to present a positive image both for themselves and their party even though they do not think so. In addition, the participants also had some difficulty in comparing the problem definitions with the problem solving strategies while sorting the statements. Moreover, one can also question the representativeness of the MPs for the respective party since there were only five or six parliamentarians from each party. In order to get as many perspectives as possible, the political advisors from each party were asked to assure the ideological diversity (if any) within each party before the data collection even though the main criteria was the visibility of the MPs on the Kurdish problem in terms of their institutional roles and/or public speeches. During the data collection, some AKP members suggested me contact some parliamentarians whose constituency is the Western provinces of Turkey and who might be more nationalistic and more prejudiced towards Kurds and the Kurdish conflict; therefore, it would be important to take their perspectives into account. A similar case could be made for MPs from Central Anatolia. It should also be noted that meeting with MPs for research purposes is very difficult; therefore, their availability played a determining role in selecting MPs for this study. Further research might also focus on other political parties together with the political parties in the parliament, as there are in total 78 political parties in Turkey. Although only four of them are represented in TBMM due to the national threshold system, this does not necessarily mean that other political parties and their voter base do not play an important role in the Kurdish conflict. For example, there is a Great Union Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi–BBP) that could be defined as a far right Islamist political party that synthesizes both Islamic and nationalistic ideologies (Yavuz, 1997). This party sometimes plays its Islamic and/or (Turkish) nationalistic card and affects public opinion with their discourses and actions, which might harm Kurdish people in the public view. In addition, future studies might also focus on what ―democratization‖ means for these four political parties. Even though democracy, democratization and human rights are deemed as universal, people‘s understandings of them might differ. In other words, what MHP means by democratization might be quite different from what BDP means. Therefore, another Q methodology study on democratization that aims to find similarities

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Chapter 6 between political parties might be useful. In this regard, if the Kurdish conflict is resolved in the following years, this will also help the development of human rights and democratization of Turkey as both conflict resolution and human rights complement each other (see Bartoli & Psimopoulos, 2006). It is known from conflict resolution literature that it is more difficult to keep democratic stability in those divided societies where ethnic political parties mobilize their voter base (Mitchell, Evans, & O‘Leary, 2009). Therefore, a sustainable democratic society requires an understanding of how ethnic political parties see the conflict and democratization in that conflict context. Conclusion Political elites have a significant place in an on-going conflict. Their perspectives, decisions and actions might affect millions of lives. This study contributes to the understanding of political parties‘ perspectives on the Kurdish conflict by representing each party‘s priorities and concerns. Although Loizides (2009) indicated the frames of political parties were monolithic in the 1990s, these results indicate that this is not the case after approximately two decades. Exploring these perspectives using Q methodology gives a broader picture on the conflict as there are both inter-party and intra-party differences as well as consensual views across the four main political parties. This is an important step for understanding conflict, conflict resolution as well as a long-lasting peace.

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Chapter 7 “If the experts say so, it must be true”: Exploring scholars’ and journalists’ understandings of the Kurdish conflict16

16 A modified version of this chapter has been submitted for publication as: Uluğ, Ö. M., & Cohrs, J. C. (2016). ―If the experts say so, it must be true‖: Exploring scholars‘ and journalists‘ understandings of the Kurdish conflict. 107

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The Kurdish conflict in Turkey has caused more than 40,000 deaths and had an impact on millions of lives due to forced immigration, traumas and injuries (see Çelik & Kantowitz, 2009; Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997). Even though for a long time it was a taboo for scholars and to some extent journalists to focus and comment on this conflict, especially after the 1980 coup era (see Scalbert-Yücel & Ray, 2006), there have still been a limited number of scholars and journalists conducting research on the Kurdish conflict (e.g., Beşikçi, 1991; Cemal, 2003). In the last decade, scholars and journalists have started to focus more on the Kurdish conflict. The current AKP government has begun to pay special attention to scholars, journalists and their ideas in the context of the Kurdish conflict. The role of ‗experts‘ in the peace process in relation to the Kurdish conflict has come to the fore as experts can influence both political leaders in terms of suggesting new policies (upward) and causing lay people (downward) to form new opinions (see Lederach, 1999). Scholars and journalists have also started to participate in the Kurdish conflict resolution process with the Commission of Wise People in 2013, making their understandings of the Kurdish conflict more significant. The present research explores the viewpoints of scholars and journalists who are conducting research on the Kurdish conflict and who are highly visible in the media and well-known by the public. The viewpoints were approached by using the frame analysis of Entman (1993) to systematically cover the different dimensions of the conflict. In the following sections, first the role of scholars and journalists is discussed. Second, in the main section, the findings of a Q-methodological study with 41 participants consisting of journalists from different media establishments and scholars from various universities is presented, and subsequently discussed. 7.1 The role of scholars and journalists in conflict resolution and peace building As mentioned in the previous chapters, according to Lederach (1999), there are three levels of leadership in peace building. These three levels of leadership might be seen as a pyramid. The first level is top-level leadership (e.g., military or political leaders); the second one is mid-level leadership (e.g., academics or intellectuals); and the third one is grassroots leadership (e.g., local leaders). Every level of leadership is significant in conflict resolution and peace building as their decisions might influence different

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Chapter 7 segments of the society. However, the importance of mid-level leaders stems from their central position in the pyramid with connections to both top-level leaders and grassroots leaders. Thus, mid-level leaders could form a bridge between these two layers of society. Lederach (1999) defines mid-level leaders as ―persons who function in leadership positions within a setting of protracted conflict, but whose position is defined in ways not necessarily connected to or controlled by the authority or structures of the formal government or major opposition movements‖ (p. 41). Indeed, these people might be members of different sectors such as education, business or media and could be ethnic or religious leaders, academics or intellectuals, and humanitarian leaders of NGOs. Mid-level leaders play a key role in peace processes in terms of understanding the concerns of society (Lederach, 1999). Thus, they can transmit important messages, ideas and suggestions from the grassroots to the top-level leaders. In addition, the significance of mid-level leaders derives from their role for diplomacy in intractable conflicts since for various reasons they might capture the dynamics of the conflict better than politicians. Mid-level leaders, unlike politicians, do not have concerns such as keeping their voter base. It is obvious that in some intractable conflicts, official diplomacy or Track–I diplomacy is not successful. When this is the case, unofficial diplomacy, or Track–II diplomacy, might help resolve these intractable conflicts (Montville, 1991b). According to Montville (1991b), Track–II diplomacy is ―unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinions and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict‖ (p. 262; see also Kelman, 2000). As Montville (1991b) argues, mid-level leaders might produce strategies that are beneficial to conflict resolution and peace building, and also impact public opinions as well as political leaders who might engender structural changes regarding the conflict. The role of these mid-level leaders in conflict resolution is indispensable, as they know the context of the conflict and people who experience this context better than top- level leaders (Lederach, 1999). As they can also be more flexible due to not having a high-pressure agenda, they can travel more easily especially in conflict-ridden areas. In addition, these leaders might also have connections to the leaders of conflicting parties due to connections with different NGOs and other organizations.

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Although mid-level leaders in conflict resolution process are seen as very positive in the literature, there might be some powerful leaders who might be against the peace process and therefore affect the peace process adversely. From a civil society perspective, there might be some actors whose behaviors might be considered to be ‗uncivil‘ and these actors might behave along ethnic lines. This might cause ―fostering clientelism, reinforcing societal cleavages, and hindering democratization‖ (Spurk, 2010, p. 19). Therefore, rather than excluding these actors from the peace process who might put a barrier to sustainable and long-lasting peace in both the short- and long-run (Yıldız, 2014), their concerns should be understood in the first place. Therefore, it is vital to understand the perspectives of pro-and-anti peace scholars and journalists on the conflict in the first place because, first, these people suggest or decide directly how to organize various meetings, dialogue groups or workshops to resolve conflicts and build peace; second, they have the capability to provide input such as new ideas, new alternatives and priorities as well as the main concerns of each conflicting side; and third, with their expertise they might create an atmosphere for negotiation of the conflicting parties and peace building (Kelman, 2000). Lastly, these people have the capability to affect political elites, decision- and policy-making processes as well as grassroots. In the following section, the role of scholars and journalists in the context of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey will be discussed. The role of scholars and journalists in the Kurdish conflict in Turkey As in other conflict-ridden societies in the Middle East (Kaye, 2001) and in South Asia (Kraft, 2000), the Turkish government has also started to grasp the significance of mid- level leaders in the conflict. The AKP government has two strategies to deal with the Kurdish conflict. The first is related to PKK ‗terrorism‘ (to disarm PKK) and the second to the Kurdish problem (democratization). In addition, the AKP government also emphasizes Muslim fellowship, not Turkish ethnic identity, while approaching the Kurdish problem (Yavuz & Özcan, 2006) since AKP opposes the state ideology, Kemalism, which excluded Kurdish citizens (see also Barkey & Fuller, 1998). However, AKP‘s approach to the Kurdish conflict is problematic as sometimes it emphasizes Muslim fellowship and ignores the ethnic dimension of the conflict, and sometimes it

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Chapter 7 plays its ethnic card during election periods to get support from the nationalistic Turks in Turkey. The AKP government also initiated the Kurdish Opening in 2009 to halt the Kurdish insurgency (Çandar, 2009). The government then invited 12 scholars and journalists from different newspapers (e.g., Deniz Ülke Arıboğan from Akşam, Hasan Cemal from Milliyet, Oral Çalışlar and Cengiz Çandar from Radikal, Muharrem Sarıkaya from HaberTürk, Ruşen Çakır from Vatan) to exchange views on the Kurdish Opening workshop at the Police Academy. These people are mostly known as ‗experts‘ in the eyes of those in the public who do not object to the peace process in Turkey. However, some groups such as Turkish nationalists and Kemalists reacted very fiercely to this opening as they perceived it as a ‗division plan‘ of Turkey. In addition to the criticisms in the public, criticisms were also voiced by the main opposition parties such as MHP and CHP. For example, Devlet Bahçeli accused these 12 ‗wise people‘ of being ‗traitors‘ and called them ‗12 bad men‘. The public‘s reaction to the Kurdish Opening has pressured the government to change the name of the initiative. To calm the public, the name was first changed to ‗democratic opening‘ and later to ‗national unity project‘ (Çandar, 2009). The government decided to terminate the Kurdish Opening, but the Turkish National Intelligence Agency has continued to conduct secret peace talks with members of the PKK in Oslo since 2009. In 2013, four years after introducing the Kurdish Opening, the government openly launched a peace process which continues with the meetings with Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of PKK. However, these meetings were announced suddenly and one public opinion indicated that even half of the AKP‘s voter base was opposed to direct talks with Öcalan (Metropoll, 2013). In the same public opinion poll, it is argued that one reason behind this public opposition might stem from the fact that these meetings were suddenly explained to the public without preparing them. Abdullah Öcalan as a public figure was demonized over the years and that preparation was necessary due to this image. In addition to the peace talks between the AKP government and Abdullah Öcalan, the AKP government has also initiated the Commission of Wise People in April 2013. This included 63 people (12 women and 51 men) and consisted of writers, journalists,

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Chapter 7 lawyers, trade unionists, businesspeople, movie stars, and singers to be appointed to seven administrative regions of Turkey, with nine wise people per region. The role of these nine wise people was to organize meetings and discussion platforms with the public in order to explain the peace process and promote the ongoing peace and negotiation process. The meetings of the wise people with the public were important in terms of the transparency of the peace process. According to Gülerce (2013), these meetings were also significant as they would influence the public to believe that the peace process was between AKP and the pro-Kurdish BDP rather than between AKP and the PKK. However, there were already a lot of criticisms of the list of wise people, since most were known as pro-government and pro-Islamist (Gürsel, 2013) and their inclusion on the list depended on the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan‘s approval. Therefore, most of them represent the ideals of the AKP government or the Turkish state in this respect. However, it would be better for experts if their perspectives and behaviors are not restricted or controlled by the government (see also Lederach, 1999). Second, there were other criticisms as well as protests to these wise people, or the peace process in general, in these meetings in various cities from different regions (e.g., Malatya, Denizli, Elazığ, Zonguldak, Mersin, and Nevşehir). People from different political parties, platforms or NGOs gathered and protested in front of the places where these meetings were held. Later, some prominent wise people such as Baskın Oran, Murat Belge, Deniz Ülke Arıboğan and Kürşat Bumin resigned from the Commission of Wise People after one year as they thought that the AKP government had used them (wise people in general) to gain time and to stall Kurds and the public (see Özgür, 2014). However, in addition to the criticisms made above, I argue that the key concerns regarding the wise people were that they were not representative of all the population. For example, there was an absence of Kemalists‘ and Turkish nationalists‘ representatives (e.g., Emin Çölaşan, Ümit Özdağ). From the literature, it is known that some groups should not be excluded from the peace process for a sustainable peace and their concerns should be taken into account as well (see Yıldız, 2014). Also, the wise people, except for a few, did not have close contacts with, and were therefore approached skeptically by, the Kurdish movement.

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Therefore, I argue that rather than including these wise people who were selected by the government, I should include competent people from academia, NGOs and media settings in this study. For the sake of ongoing conflict resolution and the peace process, these people should have been selected from experts who have conducted research on the Kurdish conflict and who have expended effort on this conflict by exploring writing, discussing on different platforms and thus, who might know more on the Kurdish conflict. It is also recommended in the literature that mid-level leaders should not run for government office, but should rather be independent from the government or state (Spurk, 2010) as close interaction of these leaders with government might harm the impartiality and legitimacy of these leaders in the eyes of public. As a vast majority of scholars and journalists who do not participate in the Commission of Wise People are not concerned about getting the government‘s approval, they might be perceived as more neutral by the public. Therefore, in this study, I explored these people‘s understanding of the Kurdish conflict. In the literature, different understandings of the Kurdish conflict have been highlighted. Ozcelik (2006) summarizes the definitions of the Kurdish conflict under three dimensions: external and internal terrorism, economic underdevelopment of the region, and ethnic and identity problems. Similarly, Çelik and Blum (2007) indicate that there are three common conflict frames in the Kurdish conflict: a) a terrorism frame which defines the conflict as a conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK, b) a minority rights frame that sees the conflict as a conflict between the Turkish state and an ethnic minority group, Kurds, and c) an ethnic tension frame that sees the conflict as a conflict between two ethnic groups, namely Turks and Kurds. Additionally, Tan (2008) discusses the problem definitions of the conflict under five headings by enlarging upon: a) denial of the conflict, b) terrorism, c) economy, d) identity, and e) nation state. The first group believes that ‗there is no Kurdish problem‘. The second group sees the problem as a terrorism and separatism problem initiated by the PKK. The third group views the problem as an underdevelopment problem because of the feudal structure of the east and southeast parts of Turkey and deliberate neglect of the economic development of the region by the governments to date since the foundation of Republic of Turkey in 1923. This group supports their claim by indicating the results from the region that 65% of the

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Chapter 7 people see the most urgent problem as unemployment (Özdağ, 1995, p. 432). The fourth common view is that ‗the Kurdish problem is an ethnic identity problem‘ and a democratization problem. The last view suggested by Tan (2008) is that the Kurdish problem is a national problem; therefore, there should be an independent Kurdistan, in line with the nation state perspective. In the following, I explore the understandings of conflict in terms of what the conflict is about, where it stems from, and how it should be tackled through the eyes of scholars and journalists within middle range leaders in Turkey. 7.2 The present research The aim of the present research is to explore the different perspectives among mid-level leaders in Turkey, who are ‗knowledge producers‘ (opinion makers) rather than ‗knowledge consumers‘. There may be different perspectives as well as some commonalities among these scholars and journalists which might be very useful for conflict resolution and peace building. The commonalities across all participants might provide a starting point for conflict resolution as their perspectives are taken seriously by both political leaders and the public. I aimed to explore understandings of the Kurdish conflict among mid-level leaders who are known as ‗experts‘ in Turkey rather than the wise people the AKP government chose. I explored these perspectives based on Entman‘s (1993) frame analysis which includes four dimensions: a) problem definitions, b) causes of the problem, c) moral evaluations, and d) solutions to the problem. In addition, I included one more dimension, barriers to the solution of the problem, in order to complement the frame analysis and approach the Kurdish conflict from a broader perspective (see Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011). I used Q methodology to explore these perspectives as Q methodology is a suitable method to find socially shared perspectives across different groups, as well as points of conflict and consensus. This methodology allowed us to see commonalities among mid-level leaders who can shape the conflict resolution and peace building process in Turkey. 7.3 Method Participants In Q methodology, participants from different backgrounds are selected based on purposive sampling to identify socially shared perspectives (Brown, 1980). In this study,

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Chapter 7 participants were selected based on their expertise on the Kurdish conflict as well as their visibility in the media such as TV channels, newspapers and journals; the journalists and scholars, best known as ‗experts‘ on the Kurdish conflict, were chosen for this purpose. At the beginning, I had an initial list of 76 experts. In this list, there were some members of Wise People Commission as well as other experts that I noted down during literature review. However, during data collection, I updated this list and included new names as I asked each expert to have a look on my list and nominate (at least) one additional participant whose conflict understanding may be very different from her/his own perspective or whose conflict understanding may be very useful to include in the study. In total, twenty-one scholars17 from universities in Ankara and İstanbul18 and 20 journalists with diverse backgrounds from newspapers and journals19 participated in the study between January 2013 and June 2013. Fourteen out of 41 participants were women and 27 were men (see Table 11 for participants‘ demographic characteristics). The ages of participants ranged from 28 to 71 (M = 46.56). The political views of the participants ranged from 0 to 7 (M = 2.50; 0 = left, 5 = center, 10 = right), though seven participants did not answer this question. Twenty-two out of 41 participants held a PhD, 5 a Master‘s, 13 a Bachelor‘s degree and 1 high school degree. Twenty-one of the participants identify as Turks, six as Kurds and the remaining indicated having different ethnic backgrounds.20 Procedure and materials The data collection in Q methodology starts with giving participants a set of statements, with each statement printed on a separate card (Brown, 1993; Watts & Stenner, 2005a). Participants are then asked to sort these cards under a specific condition of instruction (Watts & Stenner, 2012). In this study, all statements were formulated in Turkish, as all participants can speak, read and write in Turkish. They were constructed on the basis of (a) focus group discussions conducted by me in Mersin and Diyarbakır, (b) academic articles and books on the Kurdish conflict written in Turkish and English, (c) newspaper articles (e.g.,

17 I also thank four of the expert participants for their valuable feedback on the manuscript. 18 Bilkent University, Boğaziçi University, Kadir Has University, Koç University, İstanbul University, İstanbul Şehir University, Bilgi University, Marmara University, Ankara University, Gazi University, Sabancı University, Middle East Technical University and Başkent University 19 Bugün, Zaman, Agos, Bianet, Haber Türk, Sabah, Radikal, Akşam, Yeni Şafak, Sözcü and Cumhuriyet 20 Some participants added that the ethnic identity was not important for them; therefore, they did not define themselves in ethnic terms. 115

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Table 11. Factor loadings and participant characteristics

Expert F1 F2 Ethnici Gend Pol. Education # ty er View E1 .76X .43 T F 2 PhD E2 .44 .63 O F 0 BA E3 .19 .71X K M 5 MSc E4 .53 .46 T M 4 PhD E5 .74X .34 T F 3 MSc E6 .77X .36 T F 4 PhD E7 .88X .01 O F 3 PhD E8 .27 .65X T M 6 PhD E9 .82X .06 O F 3 PhD E10 .79X .21 T M 2 PhD E11 .84X .01 O F 3 PhD E12 .75X .38 O M 3 BA E13 .85X .31 O M 3 MSc E14 .63 .53 O M 2 BA E15 .73X .39 T F 2 BA E16 .67 .51 T M 3 PhD E17 .82X .20 ? F ? PhD E18 .84X .05 O M 0 PhD E19 .30 .55X O M 5 BA E20 .87X .29 K M 4 BA E21 .76X .38 K M 4 BA E22 .54 .59 T M ? High E23 .79X .24 K M 2 PhD E24 .53 .45 T M ? PhD E25 .80X .05 O F 1 BA E26 .93X -.07 K F 3 BA E27 .65X .38 O F ? BA E28 .65X .41 T M ? PhD E29 .83X .36 O M 0 PhD E30 .79X .34 T F 0 PhD E31 .56 .48 T M ? PhD E32 .92X .18 T M 1 BA E33 -.74 .29 T M 2 BA E34 .51 .56 T M ? PhD E35 .87X -.10 K M 0 MSc E36 .14 .79X T M 7 MSc E37 -.21 .59X T M 3 BA E38 .88X -.22 T M 2 PhD E39 .86X .26 T F 1 PhD E40 .77X .11 O M 1 PhD E41 .77X .10 T M 1 PhD

Notes. F1 to F2: Loadings on Factors 1 to 2; Loadings in bold indicate that the respective sort was used as a defining sort. Ethnicity: T = Turkish, K = Kurdish; O = Other; Gender: M = Male, F = Female; Political view: 0 = left, 10 = right; Education: High = High school, BA = University, MSc = Master of Science, PhD = Doctor of Philosophy. mainstream, pro-Kurdish and pro-Turkish), (d) party platforms of the four main political parties represented at TBMM, (e) transcriptions of speeches by political party leaders, (f)

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Chapter 7 survey results of NGOs, and (g) materials of an earlier Q methodological study on the Kurdish conflict (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016a). In this study, all statements were formulated in Turkish, as all participants can speak, read and write in Turkish. They were constructed on the basis of (a) focus group discussions conducted by me in Mersin and Diyarbakır, (b) academic articles and books on the Kurdish conflict written in Turkish and English, (c) newspaper articles (e.g., mainstream, pro-Kurdish and pro-Turkish), (d) party platforms of the four main political parties represented at TBMM, (e) transcriptions of speeches by political party leaders, (f) survey results of NGOs, and (g) materials of an earlier Q methodological study on the Kurdish conflict (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016a). Initially, a list of 106 statements was generated, which was then reduced to 54 statements to make the study more manageable for the participants. To avoid researcher bias in deciding which statements to keep, seven academics from different disciplines, all knowledgeable in the Kurdish conflict, were asked to evaluate the comprehensiveness of the statements. The full statements can be seen in Appendix G. These statements were based on Entman‘s (1993) frame analysis domains: problem definitions (11 statements), causes of the problem (7 statements), moral judgments (13 statements) and solutions (16 statements). In addition to these four domains, one more domain–barriers to the solution of the problem–was included (7 statements). The number 54 is in the suggested range for Q studies (between 40 and 80) to be comprehensive enough and, at the same time, well manageable for the participants (Stainton Rogers, 1995). Before starting the data collection, two participants participated in a pilot study to check data collection with these statements and to see whether all the statements were clear enough for participants. Participants were asked to sort the statements according to their degree of relative agreement and disagreement in terms of understanding the conflict. In a first step, participants were asked to read all the statements carefully and sort them into three piles: one for those they agreed with, one for those they disagreed with, and one for those they neither agreed nor disagreed with, felt neutral about or ‗had no idea‘ about. In a second step, participants were told to place the agreed cards into a fixed quasi-normal distribution. Specifically, they were asked to start with the ‗most agreed‘ part (+5) until

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Chapter 7 all the agreed cards were placed on the cardboard, followed by placing the disagreed cards starting from the ‗most disagreed‘ part (-5) until all the disagreed cards were placed on the cardboard. Next, the participants were asked to sort the remaining cards (from the third, ‗neutral‘ pile) into the grid, around ‗0‘. In a third step, participants were allowed to change the places of cards until they were satisfied that the sorting pattern they produced on the cardboard reflected their viewpoint well enough. Once they were done with the Q sorting, the sorting pattern was recorded on a separate sheet of paper. Also, participants were asked to comment on the statements they agreed with most (+5) and disagreed with most (-5), and asked on a five-point scale how well their sorting pattern reflected their views on the Kurdish problem (1 = not at all, 5 = very well; M = 3.41). Participants were also asked to provide any missing statements to give a more complete picture of their viewpoint on the Kurdish conflict, though not many missing statements were added by the participants. Finally, participants provided their demographic information. The data collection setting, such as offices in the universities, in the media buildings, and cafes, was determined by the participants. The data were collected from 35 participants in personal interaction while six participants participated in the study online via Flash Q program, developed by Hackert and Braehler (2007). Analysis In Q methodology, analyzing the data usually involves a factor analysis across the participant‘s Q sorts (not the statements). The resulting factors indicate different viewpoints for the issue at hand (in my case, conflict viewpoints). Individual Q sorts that define the factors are flagged and ‗idealized‘ Q sorts are generated by aggregating across the flagged Q sorts, weighted by their loadings, for each factor. The meaning of these idealized Q sorts are examined and interpreted together with the help of participants‘ comments on statements and their individual Q sort (Watts & Stenner, 2005a; 2012). As mentioned in the previous chapter, I explored factor solutions with different numbers ranging from two to eight and decided on the two factor solution by taking into account four criteria (Webler et al., 2009): 1) simplicity, 2) clarity, 3) distinctness, and 4) stability. 7.4 Results Factors were extracted using Principal Component Analysis and rotated using the Varimax criterion, with subsequent manual rotation to accentuate the differences between

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Chapter 7 factors as much as possible (Watts & Stenner, 2005a). The two-factor solution explained 67% of the total variance. Thirty-two out of 41 Q sorts loaded on one of the two factors. The other nine participants‘ Q sorts had multiple loadings and therefore were not used to define any of the two factors. 21 In the following, the factors are interpreted by scrutinizing, first, the statements that ranked highly positively and highly negatively, and second, the statements that distinguish each factor from the other factor (see Appendix G for the complete list of statements and their z-scores, which indicate how extreme [positive or negative] a statement would be ranked by a hypothetical person that perfectly reflects the respective factor). These two factors represent scholars‘ and journalists‘ understandings of the Kurdish conflict. In addition, the results below highlight the common ground on which most scholars and journalists agree in terms of defining the Kurdish problem and finding resolution strategies. Viewpoint 1: Democracy and identity problem Factor 1 represents the identity and democracy view of the Kurdish conflict. Factor 1 had 27 defining Q sorts, with factor loadings ranging from .65 to .93. Thirteen participants were women and 14 were men. Five of them were Kurdish, 11 Turkish, 10 from other ethnic groups and one did not answer. Eight participants held a Bachelor‘s degree, three a Master‘s degree, and 16 a PhD. In terms of political views, the range was between 0 and 4, on the left side of the scale (M = 2.00). According to Viewpoint 1, the problem is seen as an identity problem and as a rights and freedom problem for Kurds (statement nos. 7 and 9). The problem stems mainly from the nation-state ideology of Turkey (no. 17), which has created assimilation policies for Kurds and withheld their cultural rights (no. 16). In other words, the nation- state ideology of modern Turkey denied the existence of the Kurds for many years (no. 13), which later became an identity problem. Therefore, the problem is not seen as a problem created by the PKK or an instigation of foreign powers (nos. 5, 14 and 18), but rather as a problem of rights, freedom and identity of Kurds. Also, seeing PKK as a terrorist organization and seeing Kurds as pawns who are used by foreign powers are strongly rejected (nos. 23 and 29), as these views obstruct seeing the actual causes of the problem. Not surprisingly, a form of denial view that sees Kurds and Turks as two groups

21 Except for one participant (Expert 33) who had a negative loading on Factor 1. 119

Chapter 7 having the same rights, but does not accept the existence of the Kurdish problem is also rejected in this viewpoint (no. 25). Therefore, the views of rejecting the Kurdish problem, but accepting a terrorism problem or a Kurdish invasion problem which sees Kurds as invaders who immigrated to the Western parts of Turkey and took jobs22 are rejected as well (nos. 1 and 11). Viewpoint 1 also sees the problem as a democracy problem of Turkey (no. 2) in addition to the identity, rights and freedom problem. Consequently, addressing the democracy problem requires deep-rooted democratization and implementation of human rights such as strengthening the local administrations in the east and southeast parts of Turkey (nos. 32 and 38) together with addressing other specific problems regarding the Kurds‘ rights and identity. These specific problems could be solved by recognizing rights such as constitutional recognition of the existence of the Kurdish identity and the recognition of rights to education and broadcasting in the Kurds‘ own language (nos. 36 and 37). On the other hand, in line with rejecting the terrorism perspective, the solution strategies such as the necessity of TSK fight against terror through active counter-terrorism policies and the necessity for the unitary state structure of Turkey are strongly rejected as well (nos. 45 and 46). Viewpoint 2: Democracy and economy problem, but the PKK is a terrorist group! Factor 2 represents the democracy and economy aspect of the conflict. Factor 2 had five defining Q sorts, with factor loadings ranging from .55 to .71. All of the five participants were men. One participant was Kurdish, three Turkish and one from another ethnic group. Two of them held a Bachelor‘s degree, two a Master‘s degree, and one a PhD. In terms of political views, the range was between 3 and 7, around the center (M = 5.20). According to Viewpoint 2, the problem is seen as a democracy problem of Turkey (no. 2). Due to the lack of fully implemented democracy, denial of the Kurds for many years caused the Kurdish problem (no. 13). In addition to the democracy problem, the problem is also seen as an underdevelopment and unemployment problem (no. 6), especially as the East and Southeast regions are underdeveloped compared to the other

22 ―There is no Kurdish problem, but a Kurdish invasion problem‖ is a very racist view which is argued by Gökçe Fırat who defines himself as a radical leftist. It is argued by him that Kurds invaded the big cities of Turkey such as Mersin and Antalya and took the jobs of Turks. 120

Chapter 7 regions of Turkey. Therefore, according to Viewpoint 2, the victims of this problem are mainly the people who are living in these regions (no. 28). In order to solve the problem, deep-rooted democratization and implementation of human rights as well as strengthening the local administrations are needed (no. 32 and 38). Another important solution to the conflict is seen in economic development and increased job opportunities, as part of the problem is unemployment and underdevelopment (no. 34). However, radical changes such as amnesty for Abdullah Öcalan and an independent Kurdistan are strongly rejected (nos. 35 and 43). In Viewpoint 2, there is no denial of conflict or the problem (no. 25), but the definition of the problem, the problem solving strategies and the way Abdullah Öcalan is perceived are highly different from Viewpoint 1. The distinction of Viewpoint 2 from Viewpoint 1 is that the PKK is accepted as a terrorist organization, and therefore, should lay down their weapons to resolve this conflict (nos. 23 and 39). Also, in Viewpoint 2, problem definitions such as the (socio-economic) exploitation problem for Kurds, the Kurds‘ independence problem, the Kurdish invasion problem and/or class-based problem are strongly rejected (nos. 3, 4, 8, and 11). Consensus and disagreement among the scholars and journalists Even though the correlation between the two factors (idealized Q sorts) was low (r = .36), the two viewpoints are similar in various respects. First of all, both perspectives highly agree that the problem can be defined as a democracy problem as well as a rights and freedom problem. Both viewpoints also see the cause of the problem in the denial of the Kurds for many years. The resolution of the conflict lies in deep-rooted democratization and implementation of human rights as well as strengthening local administrations. The analysis produces 18 consensus statements (see Appendix G). These consensus statements include seeing the problem as a democracy problem (no. 2) and a rights and freedom problem (no. 9). Both viewpoints reject the idea of seeing the problem as the problems of Kurdish people (e.g., social and economic) rather than the Kurdish problem23 (no. 10) and reject the view that Kurds and Turks are two groups with the same

23 Statement 10, which is ―there is no Kurdish problem; there are problems of my fellow Kurdish brothers and sisters‖, was mentioned by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in April 2011. He said in original ―there is no Kurdish problem in this country. I don‘t accept it. My Kurdish fellows may have problems, but there is no longer a Kurdish problem.‖ 121

Chapter 7 rights (no. 25). This is because according to both viewpoints, the problem stems from the discrimination against Kurds, mistreatment of Kurds by state officials in the region and denial of the Kurds for many years (nos. 12 and 13). In terms of resolving the Kurdish conflict, both viewpoints agree on strengthening of local administrations (no. 38) and abolishing of village guards in the region (no. 40). Moreover, both viewpoints reject solution strategies such as uniting again under the umbrella of Islam or Turkey‘s independence in internal affairs (nos. 33 and 44). In addition to the consensual statements above, there are other consensual statements which are slightly agreed in one viewpoint (e.g., +1, +2), but not strongly rejected in the other viewpoint (e.g., 0, -1). Most of these statements concern the barriers to conflict resolution such as those who profit from this problem (no. 48), the lack of empathy between the parties (no. 52), the US‘ interests in the region (no. 53), and MHP (no. 54). Furthermore, there are some statements that might carry indications for compromise even though the analysis does not produce them as consensual statements. For example, both viewpoints reject causes of the problem such as Kurdish invasion (no. 11), PKK being an actor of the Greater Middle East Project (nos. 18 and 26), the Kurds being used by foreign powers as a pawn (no. 29). On the other hand, in terms of resolution strategies, both viewpoints reject an independent Kurdistan (no. 35), but accept the recognition of rights to education and broadcasting in the Kurds‘ own language (no. 37), PKK‘s laying down of arms (no. 39) as well as implementation of agrarian and land reform (no. 41). However, the two viewpoints also differ in various ways. The first viewpoint sees the problem more from an identity perspective whereas the second viewpoint sees it more from an economic and underdevelopment perspective. In the first viewpoint, the emphasis is more on the denial of identity, assimilation policies and nation-state ideology of Turkey whereas the second viewpoint sees the problem more in the economic backwardness and unemployment issue in the region. In addition, Viewpoint 2 also sees the PKK as a terrorist organization whereas Viewpoint 1 does not. There are also other issues that carry strong conflict potential between these two viewpoints. For example, the changes regarding the unitary structure of Turkey (no. 45) and amnesty for Öcalan (no. 43) are rejected by Viewpoint 2 but not by Viewpoint 1. Also, the view that Kurds should

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Chapter 7 be educated to resolve the Kurdish conflict is rejected by Viewpoint 1, but accepted by Viewpoint 2. This view is controversial since according to Viewpoint 1, it represents the hierarchical perception of Turks that Kurds are ignorant (no. 42), whereas Viewpoint 2 sees this as an essential part of the problem since the region where there is a large population of Kurds does not offer the same educational opportunities as largely Turkish regions. According to Viewpoint 2, the Kurds should be educated as the backwardness of the region also affects the educational situation of the Kurds. Therefore, this should be part of the resolution of the problem. Another important distinction between these two viewpoints is whether or not there should be constitutional recognition of the existence of the Kurdish identity. According to Viewpoint 1, this recognition is required for a long-lasting peace whereas for Viewpoint 2, this is not required since implementation of democracy will solve this problem as well. Viewpoint 2 has a different position from Viewpoint 1 on the existence of prejudice towards Kurds. Viewpoint 2 disagrees that the Turks are very prejudiced towards Kurds, but Viewpoint 1 accepts this. Lastly, disagreement stems from whether the status of Kurds in Turkey can be defined in terms of colonialism. While Viewpoint 1 slightly agrees on this, Viewpoint 2 strongly rejects this idea. In one expert‘s own words: ―Kurds are also part of Turkey and therefore, they are not exploited by Turkey.‖ 7.5 Discussion The analysis stresses two different conflict understandings among 41 scholars and journalists who have been focusing on the Kurdish conflict. These two conflict understandings are essential to focus on; first, they indicate a slightly high degree of consensus on the Kurdish conflict in Turkey among scholars and journalists who participated in this study, unlike other groups such as politicians (see Chapter 6) or laypeople (see Chapter 8). The areas of consensus lie in particular in certain problem definitions and solution strategies. These consensus points might suggest an important common ground for conflict resolution if the ideas are taken seriously by policy makers. Second, the analysis also indicates where the conflict among viewpoints stems from. These points of disagreement are also important as they obstruct the resolution of the conflict (see also Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011). Third, these perspectives of scholars and journalists are different from the conflict understandings of the AKP government (see

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Chapter 6). However, they might be very useful for conflict resolution and the peace process if the political leaders, especially the AKP government, take these perspectives into account. The first viewpoint (Factor 1) could be identified as a democracy and identity perspective. This perspective is also somewhat similar to the social democratic perspective of parliamentarians which are shared by some AKP and CHP members (see Chapter 6). However, scholars and journalists who share the first viewpoint reject the idea of PKK as a terrorist group. This point separates this view from the social democratic view shared by above-mentioned parliamentarians. The second viewpoint (Factor 2) could be identified both as a democracy and economy perspective. This understanding is different from denying the democracy aspect of the problem, but seeing it only from an economic perspective (see Tan, 2008). Unlike Viewpoint 1, the underdeveloped characteristic of the region is strongly emphasized in this perspective. Implications for unofficial diplomacy and conflict resolution The results indicate some key points for both unofficial diplomacy and conflict resolution for the Kurdish conflict. First, the results indicate that there are several common grounds where scholars and journalists can agree and suggest resolution strategies for the Kurdish conflict. In terms of unofficial diplomacy, these experts could provide input to the government or policy makers as these results indicate new ideas, priorities, immediate tasks to focus on as well as main concerns of the conflicting parties from an expert eye (Kelman, 2000). This might be a starting point for conflict resolution rather than searching for agreed points among scholars and journalists as there are already agreed points across all participants in this study. For example, if the consensus views are announced to the public as ‗expert views‘ rather than announced as the views of political elites or the views of the Commission of Wise People, the public reaction might be less harsh against the peace process. Similarly, Gürsel (2013) argues that the Commission of Wise People can only help convince the religious and conservative Turkish nationalists who vote for AKP. However, they do not have the capacity to persuade other groups in Turkey. Therefore, the media should also give place to these experts to explain their views, thus, they can

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Chapter 7 help calm the other groups in the society who questions the sincerity of the Commission of Wise People as they are selected by the AKP government. The role of scholars and journalists has become more significant in Turkey due to the peace process. For instance, about 140 workshops among academics were held to discuss the Kurdish conflict in 2010 in different cities in Turkey (see Başaran, 2010). The aim of these meetings was to look for consensus in a constructive way among even contradictory views rather than build resolution strategies directly. From the scholars‘ point of view, it is also important to be able to construct consensus, but building resolution strategies is a more immediate task to end the ongoing conflict. Therefore, I argue that my study might be seen as one step beyond these workshops and might be used in future workshops. Some intellectuals such as İhsan Bal, Halil Berktay, Can Paker, Baskın Oran, Cengiz Çandar and Fuat Keyman24 argue that if democratization is implemented, this will help diminish the influence of PKK over the Kurdish people (cf. Efegil, 2011). They also suggest various but tangible solutions such as the evacuation of the Makhmour Camp25 (to reassure Kurds of the state‘s good will); the end of military operations; permission to use the Kurdish language in the media; the improvement of education; the empowerment of local administrations; the provision for honorable surrenders to PKK militants; redefining the citizenship concept in the constitution, separating it from any ethnic bias; the provision for education in the mother tongue; the restoration of former Kurdish district names; the development of the local economy; the acceptance of a general amnesty for PKK militants; the abolishment of the village militia system; teaching the Kurdish language as an elective course; recognizing the rights of people victimized by terror activities; doing away with obstacles to freedom of expression and the formation of a civil society, and, lastly, the disarmament of the PKK (Efegil, 2011, p. 33).26 The findings have some overlaps with these above-mentioned solutions such as addressing identity issues and implementing democratization with different means (e.g.,

24 Some of these intellectuals also participated in the Kurdish Opening process in 2009. 25 It is one of the camps in Iraq that provides shelter for Kurds. 26 Some of these suggestions have already been addressed. 125

Chapter 7 strengthening local administrations). However, my study also indicates the conflicting viewpoints where scholars and journalists diverge. These points of disagreement are as important as the shared points, since conflict resolution requires addressing both shared and unshared viewpoints. Lastly, Q methodology is also a very useful tool to use in a conflict resolution context. Q methodology is also applied in various conflict settings such as in the assessment and management of policy conflict in Oklahoma (Focht, 2002), managing conflict at the county level between citizens and policy makers (Maxwell, 2000), and even in the facilitation of policy dialogue (Focht & Lawler, 2000). This study also indicates that Q methodology is very effective for finding points of disagreements and agreements among scholars and journalists in conflict resolution. Limitations and future directions This study has a few limitations. First of all, one can question the representativeness of the participants in this study as most scholars and journalists who have been working on the Kurdish conflict for years are relatively more pro-solution experts. Therefore, their position on the Kurdish conflict is fairly different from the parliamentarians in Turkey (see Chapter 6). However, I argue that collecting data from right-wing participants might not bring another viewpoint on the Kurdish conflict as there were also a few participants in this study who are known as ‗close to the AKP government or Islamist Gülen movement‘ such as those from Yeni Şafak newspaper. Another central issue regarding the representativeness of different perspectives is the lack of a terrorism perspective in the results. Even though the terrorism perspective is moderately widespread in the public and in MHP, it is not very visible among academics since this perspective is not respected and taken seriously in academia (Saraçoğlu, 2011). It should be acknowledged, though, that two scholars and journalists who are known as nationalist and having a Kemalist ideology (also known as Atatürkçü) chose not to participate in the study. In addition, two such persons agreed to participate in the study in the beginning, but withdrew later as they did not like the Q methodology. 27 The participation of these scholars might have provided additional results. It should be noted

27 One of the participants also indicated that he does not believe in quantitative methods and therefore, he would not like to participate in this study at all despite my effort explaining the nature of Q methodology. 126

Chapter 7 that their lack of participation in the peace process puts a barrier to healthy peacebuilding as they are not a small minority in society, but affect a broader population. Another limitation related to the viewpoints characterized above is not necessarily generalizations of the viewpoints of the scholars and journalists in my study and there may be individual deviations in some views. In fact, a within-factor analysis 28 was conducted on the 27 sorts defining Factor 1. Table 12 shows the results of the intra-factor analysis (two-factorial solution) and the bipolar second factor highlights the intra-factor differences beyond the consensus in Viewpoint 1. According to the results, the positive pole of the factor suggests that the problem is an exploitation problem as the status of Kurds can be defined in terms of colonialism; therefore, the solution lies in an independent Kurdistan and an amnesty for the PKK‘s leader, Öcalan. The positive pole represents the national independence viewpoint (for Kurds). On the other hand, the negative pole suggests that the problem is an identity problem, and addressing identity- related problems such as education and broadcasting in Kurdish together with democratization would help solve the conflict. This analysis also indicates that there might be a national independence view among experts which might be equally significant while approaching the Kurdish conflict. Different mid-level leaders might be part of the different processes of peace building such as reconciliation or negotiation. Various scholars from the participants in this study might be invited to be part of the peace process as some issues such as building trust among conflicting parties require additional expertise. It is known from the literature that lack of trust between conflicting groups poses an important barrier to a healthy conflict resolution (Çelebi, Verkuyten, Köse, & Maliepaard, 2014). In addition, further studies might focus on what democratization, rights and freedom and a long-lasting peace mean for experts and how they should be implemented as these concepts are very subjective notions. Another alternative might be to bring

28 The significance level of factor loadings is determined by the standard error of a zero-order loading (Brown, 1980). It is calculated by this formula: SE = 1/√N, where N refers to the number of statements (54 statements in this study). Thus, SE = 1/√54 = 1/7.35 = 0.14. After calculating the SE, Q sorts loading greater than 1.96 * (SE) are taken into account as statistically significant loadings (p < .05). In this study, (1.96) * (0.14) = ±0.27, that means that loadings greater than ±.27 were significant loadings and thus were flagged. A bipolar factor is defined as a factor that both negative and positive Q sorts load on it (Watts & Stenner, 2012). Both the positive pole and the negative pole of the factor are interpreted to identify the dimension of disagreement. 127

Chapter 7 together (e.g., in a workshop) the scholars and journalists who participated in this study and the wise people who were in the commission selected by the AKP government

Table 12. Factor loadings (intra-factor analysis) Expert # F1 E1 -.27X E5 -.17 E6 -.16 E7 .18 E9 .18 E10 .14 E11 .22 E12 -.25 E13 -.10 E15 -.24 E17 -.03 E18 .13 E20 -.03 E21 -.21 E23 -.03 E25 .15 E26 .27X E27 -.23 E28 -.40X E29 -.12 E30 -.07 E32 .03 E35 .45X E38 .47X E39 -.00 E40 -.06 E41 .12

(although there is some overlap between these two groups). Another Q study might be implemented to find the commonalities across all these people if the government takes them all into consideration. This will give a broader picture of the understandings of the Kurdish conflict. Conclusion Scholars and journalists are particularly central in the ongoing Kurdish conflict as they have the capability to influence the decisions of the political leaders‘ and laypeople‘s opinions. Therefore, the role of scholars and journalists has become more important, especially in conflict-ridden societies. Their conflict understandings come into prominence since they will influence the conflict resolution and peace process. Rather than focusing on the wise people the AKP government chose, I chose to explore the 128

Chapter 7 understandings of scholars and journalists who have been researching the Kurdish conflict. The results indicate common ground where almost all of the scholars and journalists agree as well as immediate issues that should be tackled, and thus contribute to the conflict resolution by presenting the significant points through the eyes of experts that should be addressed both in the short and in the long run.

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Chapter 8 An exploration of lay people’s Kurdish conflict frames in Turkey29

29 A modified version of this chapter has been submitted and accepted for publication as: Uluğ, Ö. M., & Cohrs, J. C. (2016). An exploration of lay people‘s Kurdish conflict frames in Turkey. Peace & Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 22(2), 109-119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000165 (This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record). 130

Chapter 8

In Turkey, especially after the Commission of Wise People of scholars and journalists was founded in 2013 to pave the way for the peace process, the focus of attention in the media and academia has been on the understandings of political elites, scholars and journalists. However, lay people (i.e., non-experts in the conflict) should not be overlooked as how they understand and frame the conflict in Turkey is as important for conflict transformation and peacebuilding (Başer & Çelik, 2014). Also, there has been criticism in the public towards the peace process and the Commission of Wise People as the peace process is perceived as top-down, not bottom-up or bidirectional. Lay people are vital in the conflict context since they are ―social and political actors who play major roles in the reproduction of conflict through their political socialization‖ (Başer & Çelik, 2014, p. 266). Başer and Çelik (2014) further argue that young people‘s conflict frames are relatively more crucial to focus on. This argument is applicable to other segments of society as well. In addition, the frames of lay people at the local level might provide us a way to grasp the nature of the conflict as it is ―a microcosm of the bigger picture‖ (Lederach, 1999, p. 43). Grasping people‘s conflict frames, or how they think and talk about conflict, also provides information about how people may react to conflict-related events (see Winslade & Monk, 2000). In this study, I aimed to understand how lay people perceive and frame the Kurdish conflict. In the following, the historical background of the Kurdish conflict is summarized to contextualize this study; the role of frames in a conflict context is discussed; and an empirical study with 71 lay people using Q methodology is presented. 8.1 Historical background of the Kurdish conflict After the foundation of the modern Republic of Turkey in 1923, Kurds living in Turkey were discontented with the modern Turkish state. They did not have an autonomous region and Turkish nationalism had become the main doctrine of the state. Kurdish identity was denied and Kurds‘ cultural expressions were banned under the state ideology, Kemalism (Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997). This ideology aims to homogenize the people in Turkey under the ‗Turkish‘ identity and leaves no room for being a Kurd (Yavuz & Özcan, 2006). For that aim, a large proportion of Kurds were expelled from the East and Southeast regions to the Western regions of Turkey to be assimilated into the Turkish population (Ekinci, 2011). Kurds revolted against the Turkish state 18 times between

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1923 and 1938; however, all the uprisings of the Kurdish movements were suppressed (Olson, 1996). Human rights violations against the Kurds such as torture and unidentified murders followed the 1980 military coup period. The junta regime banned all political parties and oppressed the people in the East and Southeast regions of Turkey. This allowed the armed wing of the Kurdish national movement, PKK, to get more supporters (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). After four years of military regime, PKK started its violent activities in 1984 under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan to challenge these cultural bans and humiliating practices. For 15 years, PKK continued their attacks and voiced their demands. In 1999, Öcalan was captured in Kenya; he has been in İmralı Prison since that year. In 2013, the peace process started in İmralı with the meetings of pro-Kurdish BDP parliamentarians and Öcalan. According to a public opinion survey conducted with a representative sample of 2502 participants in İstanbul (Metropoll, 2013), 56.1% of the population did not approve the direct talks with Öcalan. One year after the beginning of the peace process, another survey with a representative sample across Turkey indicated that 61.4% of the population thought that the peace process between the government and Öcalan/PKK was not successful (Metropoll, 2014). It is unknown how the peace process will continue because of both domestic (e.g., public furor) and regional and international developments (e.g., the conflict in Kobanê).30 Çelik and Blum (2007) indicate that there are three common conflict frames in the Kurdish conflict: a) a terrorism frame which defines the conflict as a conflict between the Turkish state and PKK; b) a minority rights frame that sees the conflict as a conflict between the Turkish state and an ethnic minority group, Kurds; and c) an ethnic tension frame that sees the conflict as a conflict between two ethnic groups, Turks and Kurds (see also Ergin, 2012; Yavuz & Özcan, 2006). However, it can be argued that there might also be other Kurdish conflict frames that are equally substantial, such as an economy frame that sees the Kurdish problem as an economic problem which stems from underdevelopment of the Kurdish region (see, e.g., Tan, 2008; Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016a). Also, Çelik and Blum‘s (2007) frames are not based on empirical research; therefore, I

30 It seems that the peace process has ended now and the attacks from both sides have been continuing. 132

Chapter 8 aim to provide additional empirical insights about the Kurdish conflict frames from the perspective of lay people. Additionally, any person can also relate to more than one frame as conflict frames do not necessarily have to be mutually exclusive. An individual can relate to more than one frame, and one frame‘s relative significance for one‘s conflict understanding might be less central than that of other frames. The public‘s frames of the Kurdish conflict will play a central role as they determine the public‘s attitudes towards conflict resolution and the peace process. 8.2 Frames and their roles in conflict context Frames are mainly the ways to describe circumstances and they play a filter role for what we view about an issue and how we react to it (Goffman, 1974; Kaufman et al., 2013). Shmueli, Elliott and Kaufman (2006) argue that frames play a critical role in intractable conflicts since different and opposite frames obstruct the communication process, thus facilitating the escalation of conflict. Frames can also cause different interpretations of the same event (Kaufman et al., 2003) and concentrate on only some features of the conflict while disregarding other key features (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994). Conflict frames of the public may also give a hint about people‘s attributions of responsibility, positive image of one‘s own group, sense of victimization of one‘s own group, and delegitimization of the adversary (see Bar-Tal, 2007; Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016a). Conflict frames are also associated with outgroup (dis)trust (Çelebi et al., 2014) and attitudes toward reconciliation (Bar-Tal, 2013). Accordingly, understanding lay people‘s frames is crucial to see what value different groups give to the different issues in the conflict. To systematically investigate frames, a comprehensive frame analysis is important (Gray, 2003). In this study, I built on Entman‘s (1993) frame analysis approach which has four main characteristics. A frame a) defines the problem, together with its costs and benefits (problem definition); b) includes a causal diagnosis that defines the forces that cause the problem (causal interpretation); c) includes judgments and evaluates the forces that create the problem and their (possible) effects (moral evaluation); and d) proposes solutions to the causes and forecasts the likely effects of proposed treatments (treatment recommendation). In addition to these four main domains, barriers to the solution of the problem solution as a fifth domain was also included (see also Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011).

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8.3 The present research The present research aims to investigate frames of the Kurdish conflict among lay people in Turkey. These frames were approached based on the systematic frame analysis of Entman (1993), modified to comprise five domains: 1) problem definition, 2) causal interpretation, 3) moral evaluation, 4) treatment recommendation, and 5) barriers to the solution of the problem. This five-domain framework allowed us to study the conflict frames systematically and to grasp the bigger picture of the conflict from the perspective of lay people. To do this, Q methodology was used because, first, it is a suitable method for finding socially shared perspectives even among conflicting parties (Watts & Stenner, 2005a; Wong & Sun, 1998); second, it allows us to see differences within and between different ethnic groups; and third, it can identify which particular concerns in the Kurdish conflict are psychologically more salient for each ethnic group and in which ways individuals from different ethnic backgrounds share the same conflict frames. 8.4 Method Participants Between January 2013 and March 2013, 71 persons participated in the study, 37 through personal interaction either in the participants‘ homes or in cafes, and 34 online via the Flash Q program (Hackert & Braehler, 2007).31 This number of participants is at the upper end of what has been recommended for Q methodological studies (40-60; see Shinebourne, 2009). Thirty-nine participants were Turkish, 20 Kurdish, and seven from other or mixed ethnic background. Three defined themselves as either having no identity or being a world citizen and two did not reveal their ethnic identity. Twenty-five participants were women, 46 were men, aged between 20 and 62 (M = 30) years (see Table 13 for further information concerning participants‘ place of residence, education level, political views, party voted for, intergroup contact, and experienced discrimination).

31 One reason for online data collection was to reach participants from various cities and participants who do not feel comfortable in explaining their views on the Kurdish conflict face-to-face. There is some evidence that differences resulting from Q sorts obtained offline or online are negligible (Hogan, 2010). 134

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Table 13. Factor loadings and participant characteristics

Cont Cont Ethn Gen Pol. Pol. Discri ID F1 F2 F3 F4 Age Educ. City act act idnt. der view party minat. freq. qual. 1 .55X -.01 .09 -.55 K F 31 Prim Adana 3 N/rev 1 5 5 2 .33 .20 .68X -.33 T M 25 Bach Adana 4 CHP 0 5 4 3 .70X .41 .12 -.70 T M 48 Bach Mersin 4 CHP ? 5 5 4 .23 .79X .08 -.23 O M 62 Bach Mersin 0 CHP 0 4 4 5 .58 .62 -.11 -.58 T F 56 Bach Mersin 2 CHP 0 2 4 6 -.02 .05 .36 .02 O M 62 Bach Mersin 5 N/rev 0 5 2 7 -.67 -.37 .45 .67X O M 27 Bach Ankara 2 Other 0 5 4 8 -.34 -.14 .73X .34 K F 29 Bach İzmir 0 CHP 1 5 4 9 .59X .37 -.07 -.59 T M 28 MSc Ankara ? N/rev 1 5 1 10 .29 .23 .34 -.29 O F 33 MSc Bolu 1 CHP ? 5 4 11 -.03 .43 .67X .03 K F 29 MSc Ankara 3 CHP ? 5 5 12 .44 .23 .28 -.44 T F 29 Bach Ankara 3 CHP ? 5 3 13 .52 .42 .03 -.52 T M 27 Bach Ankara 0 CHP 0 1 3 14 -.62 -.19 .60 .62 O M 26 Bach Ankara 0 ? ? 3 5 15 .62X .42 .07 -.62 T M 52 Bach Ankara 8 MHP ? 5 4 16 .26 .40 .49 -.26 T M 32 Bach Ankara 2 CHP 1 2 5 17 -.56 -.34 .17 .56X K M 24 High Ankara 5 BDP ? 5 4 18 -.35 -.46 .39 .35 K M 22 Bach Ankara 5 BDP ? 5 4 19 -.60 -.42 .39 .60X K F 25 MSc Ankara 4 ? 1 5 4 20 .62 .48 -.01 -.62 T F 29 MSc Ankara 1 CHP 1 4 4 21 .10 .27 .52X -.10 N M 30 Bach Ankara 7 AKP ? ? 3 22 .31 .49 .56 -.31 T M 25 High Ankara 1 CHP 0 3 5 23 .72X .05 .11 -.72 T M 46 High Ankara 10 AKP 0 5 5 24 .65 .59 -.04 -.65 T F 48 Bach Ankara 5 CHP ? 2 4 25 .61X .13 -.02 -.61 T M 39 Prim Ankara 5 AKP 0 4 4 26 -.70 -.39 .21 .70X K M 20 High Ankara 0 BDP 1 5 4 27 .76X .26 -.24 -.76 T M 26 Bach Ankara ? MHP 1 3 2 28 .57X .30 -.17 -.57 T M 38 Bach Ankara ? MHP 1 5 4 29 -.08 .48 .70X .08 T M 33 PhD Ankara 1 CHP ? 5 4 30 -.73 -.25 .30 .73X K M 38 MSc Ankara 1 BDP 1 5 4 31 -.17 -.08 .67X .17 T M 29 MSc Ankara 3 CHP 0 4 4 32 .74X .25 .14 -.74 T F 26 MSc Ankara 3 CHP ? 3 3 33 .19 .63X .41 -.19 T F 32 MSc Ankara 2 CHP 0 4 5 34 -.23 .14 .66X .23 O M 25 Bach İstanbul 2 CHP 0 5 5 35 .54 .14 .39 -.54 N M 41 Bach Ankara 7 N/rev 0 ? ? 36 -.40 -.08 .64X .40 T M 30 MSc Ankara 2 CHP 0 3 4 37 .51 .43 .13 -.51 T F 59 Sec İstanbul 0 CHP ? 2 3 38 .36 .61X .09 -.36 T M 27 Bach İstanbul 5 N/rev ? 4 ? 39 .68X .35 .19 -.68 T F 22 High İstanbul 3 CHP ? 2 3 40 -.52 -.29 .60 .52 K F 26 Bach İstanbul 0 BDP 1 5 5 41 -.53 -.25 .50 .53 T M 22 High İstanbul 2 CHP ? 4 4 42 .83X .28 .00 -.83 T M 23 High İstanbul 5 N/rev 0 5 4 43 .49 .57 .21 -.49 T M 23 High İstanbul 7 MHP 1 4 4 44 .02 .13 .55X -.02 T F 21 High İstanbul 1 CHP ? 5 4 45 -.11 -.08 .62X .11 K M 23 Bach İstanbul 5 AKP 1 5 4 46 .78X .26 -.03 -.78 T M 23 High İstanbul 10 MHP 0 2 1 47 .73X -.02 .05 -.73 T F 22 High İstanbul 5 MHP 1 4 3 48 -.53 -.15 .60 .53 K M 23 High İstanbul 0 BDP ? 5 4 49 .67X .33 -.05 -.67 T M 24 Bach İstanbul 5 AKP 1 5 5 50 -.24 -.35 .47X .24 T M 22 Bach İstanbul 2 CHP ? 4 4

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Adıyam 51 -.63 -.20 .55 .63 K M 24 Bach 0 BDP 1 5 4 an 52 -.24 -.15 .72X .24 O M 24 High İstanbul 5 Other ? 4 3 53 -.23 .08 .85X .23 O F 21 High İstanbul 2 Other 1 5 5 54 -.59 -.10 .61 .59 T M 22 High İstanbul 1 CHP 0 5 4 55 -.24 -.38 .70X .24 K M 26 MSc Ankara 4 AKP 1 5 4 56 -.55 -.53 .32 .55X K F 23 High İstanbul 2 BDP 1 5 4 57 .73X .39 .01 -.73 T M 21 High Girne 5 MHP 1 5 3 58 .64 .50 .11 -.64 T F 24 High Ankara 3 N/rev ? 2 3 59 .80X -.00 .20 -.80 T M 21 High İstanbul 7 AKP 0 4 4 60 .78X .19 .15 -.78 T M 22 High İstanbul 5 CHP 0 5 5 61 .68X .31 .02 -.68 T M 28 Bach Mersin 6 CHP 0 5 4 62 -.64 -.39 .39 .64X K F 29 MSc Ankara 1 N/vote ? 5 4 63 .66X .21 .11 -.66 T F 26 High Ankara 4 N/rev ? 5 5 64 .24 .19 .62X -.24 O F 26 MSc İstanbul 4 N/vote 0 3 4 65 -.52 -.29 .55 .52 K M 27 Bach İzmir 3 BDP 1 5 5 66 -.50 -.10 .63 .50 K F 28 Bach Mersin 1 BDP ? ? 3 67 -.20 -.04 .66X .20 K M 26 MSc İzmir 5 N/vote 1 5 1 68 -.21 -.06 .60X .21 O M 25 Bach Ankara 3 N/vote 0 5 4 69 -.14 .38 .75X .14 K M 25 Bach Ankara 5 N/rev ? 5 5 Diyarba 70 -.35 -.20 .64X .35 K F 29 Bach 0 BDP 1 5 4 kır 71 .70X .20 .11 -.70 T F 51 High Bursa 5 N/rev 0 1 3 Notes. F1 to F4: Loadings on Factors 1 to 4; Loadings in bold indicate that the respective sort was used as a defining sort. Ethnic identity: T = Turkish, K = Kurdish, N = Not reveal, O = Other; F = Female, M = Male; Education: Prim = Primary school, Sec = Secondary school, High = High school, Bach = Bachelor, MSc = Master of Science, PhD = Doctor of Philosophy; Political view: 0 = left, 10 = right; Political party: AKP = Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, BDP = Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, CHP = Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, MHP = Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, Other = Other political parties, N/vote = participants did not vote, N/rev = participants did not want to reveal; Discrimination by the other group: 0 = no, 1 = yes; Frequency of contact with the other group: 1 = never, 2 = once or twice in a month, 3 = once in a week, 4 = twice or three times in a week, 5 = every day; Quality of contact with the other group: 1 = very negative, 2 = negative, 3 = neutral, 4 = positive, 5 = very positive.

Different from surveys, Q methodology requires a heterogeneous sample, not a representative one. Participants were selected through snowball sampling. I asked both online (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) and my contacts for potential participants and contacted potential participants based on their various positions on the Kurdish conflict to be able to get different perspectives. Although I was ethnically Turk, I believe the impact on the results was negligible. First, the material was already prepared heterogeneously before data collection. Second, my contacts already provided information about me and my research and also the Kurdish participants trusted me after this. Third, as almost half of the participants participated online, there was little or no impact of the researcher. In addition, to maximize heterogeneity in views on the Kurdish conflict, each participant was asked to nominate (at least) one additional participant whose conflict understanding may be very different from her/his own perspective. Procedure and materials

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Q methodology allows participants to express their subjective perspective by actively rank-ordering statements on the issue at hand, and thus differs from survey methodology where participants are being passively subjected to measurement (Watts & Stenner, 2012). In Q methodology, data collection begins with giving a set of statements to the participants. Each statement is printed on a card, numbered, and represents one idea for that specific issue (Brown, 1993; Shinebourne, 2009; Watts & Stenner, 2005a, 2012). After participants receive and read through the cards, they sort the cards based on a specific condition of instruction (e.g., most agree to most disagree, or most characteristic to most uncharacteristic) (McKeown & Thomas, 1988; Watts & Stenner, 2005a, 2012). The statements were formulated in Turkish and were collected from various sources: (a) focus group discussions conducted by me in Mersin and Diyarbakır, (b) academic articles and books on the Kurdish conflict written in Turkish and English, (c) newspaper articles (e.g., mainstream, pro-Kurdish and pro-Turkish), (d) party programs (platforms) of the four main political parties, (e) transcriptions of speeches by political party leaders, (f) survey results of NGOs, and (g) materials of an earlier Q methodological study on the Kurdish conflict (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016a). After this search for different perspectives on the conflict, I ended up with 106 statements. Seven scholars knowledgeable about the Kurdish conflict were consulted to check whether the statements were comprehensive and clear, whether there were any repetitions, overlaps or any missing content, and whether the perspectives of different groups were represented. After the scholars‘ evaluation, the statements were reduced to 54 statements. Finally, two pilot participants checked whether the statements were clear enough to ensure that the Q sorting procedure would work smoothly (see Appendix H for all final statements). The statements referred to the four domains of Entman‘s (1993) frame analysis: a) problem definitions (11 statements), b) causes of the problem (7 statements), c) moral judgments (13 statements), and d) solutions (16 statements), and the fifth domain of barriers to the solution of the problem (7 statements). The suggested range for statements in Q methodology is between 40 and 80 (Shinebourne, 2009).32

32 See Chapter 6 for the same materials and procedure with members of parliament; and Chapter 7 with scholars and journalists. 137

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In a first step, the participants were asked to sort the 54 items into three piles: the items they a) agree with, b) disagree with, and c) neither agree nor disagree with, or feel neutral or have no idea about. In a second step, the participants were asked to place these cards into a fixed quasi-normal distribution. First, the participants were told to start from the most agreed cards to place them on the cardboard starting from (+5) and to continue until all the agreed cards were located. Second, the participants were asked to repeat this process for disagreed cards starting from (-5) and to place the disagreed cards until all of them were placed. Lastly, the participants were asked to sort the remaining cards into the blank categories around ―0‖. After sorting all cards into the distribution, participants were asked to change the places of the cards until they were satisfied that the sorting pattern they produced reflected their viewpoint on the Kurdish conflict as much as possible. Next, participants were asked to comment on the statements they sorted at +5 and -5, why they sorted those statements there, and how well their Q sort pattern represented their own conflict understanding (1 = not at all, 5 = very well, M = 4.00). At the end, the participants were asked to provide demographic information such as age, gender, educational background etc. The same steps were used for those participants who participated online. Analysis Q methodology is not a hypothesis-testing technique; rather it is an exploratory technique that gives the possibility to reflect subjectivity. Thus, data analysis involves the calculation of correlations and a factor analysis across participants‘ Q sorts (rather than across statements/items), through which participants‘ holistic viewpoints are analyzed (rather than isolated pieces of opinions). Each factor denotes one perspective on the phenomenon in question; in my case, conflict frames. In other words, each perspective is shared by the participants whose Q sorts load on the same factor. Q sorts that load uniquely on a particular factor are flagged. An ‗idealized‘ Q sort (from a hypothetical person that perfectly represents the respective factor‘s perspective) is produced for each factor by aggregating across the flagged Q sorts, weighted by their loadings. Then, the meanings of these aggregated Q sorts are interpreted with the additional help of participants‘ comments on statements during and after sorting (Brown, 1993; Watts & Stenner, 2005a).

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There are different possibilities in Q methodology to extract and rotate factors and to decide on the final factor solutions; in principle there can be an unlimited number of acceptable solutions (Watts & Stenner, 2012). In this study, factors were extracted using Principal Component Analysis. Factors were Varimax-rotated and subsequently manually rotated to highlight the differences between factors and to aid interpretability of factors. Manual rotation is not uncommon in Q methodology (e.g., McKeown & Thomas, 1988; Walker, 2013) as there is no substantive reason to prioritize a ―mechanical‖ solution (i.e., Varimax) over others. The number of factors was decided based on the four criteria mentioned by Webler et al. (2009): 1) simplicity (fewer factors is better), 2) clarity (Q sorts loading highly and uniquely on one factor is better), 3) distinctness (low correlations between the idealized Q sorts are better) and 4) stability (some participants‘ loading on the same factor across different solutions is better). 8.5 Results A three-factor solution seemed optimal based on the above-mentioned criteria. It explained 58% of the variance. 33 One of the factors was a bipolar factor with both positive and negative loadings (see Watts & Stenner, 2012). As usual in Q methodology, this factor was split into two so that both the positive and the negative poles can be represented as socially shared perspectives (Factors 1 and 4 below; see, e.g., Akhtar- Danesh et al., 2008). Thus, the analysis has identified four perspectives in total. Of 71 participants, 49 loaded on one of the four factors and thus were used to define the factors. The remaining 22 participants had multiple loadings, which mean that their views represent a combination of the perspectives described below.34 In the following, the most agreed and most disagreed statements as well as distinguishing statements for each factor will be described and the factors will be interpreted. Factor 1: Terrorism and foreign power frame Factor 1 can be defined as a ―Turkish‖ view as almost all participants, except one Kurdish participant, define themselves as ethnically Turkish. Factor 1 had 20 defining sorts, with factor loadings ranging from .55 to .83. Six participants were women and 14

33 The first factor‘s explained variance was 28%, the second‘s 11%, and the third‘s 19%. However, it should be noted that different from regular factor analysis, these values are less meaningful in Q methodology. 34 There was no difference in loading patterns between those who participated through personal interaction and those who participated online. 139

Chapter 8 were men. The age range was between 21 and 52 (M = 30.85) years. The political view ranged from 3 to 10 (M = 5.47; 0 = left, 5 = middle, 10 = right). Four voted for AKP, five for CHP, six for MHP and five did not (want to) reveal. In general, the terrorism and foreign power frame can be interpreted as an expression of nationalist Turkish discourse on the Kurdish conflict. There is a strong emphasis on foreign powers and their big aims such as dividing Turkey and founding an independent Kurdistan. In Frame 1, the problem is seen as a PKK or terrorism problem (statement no. 5), but not seen as an independence or a class-related issue in the region (nos. 8 and 4; see Appendix H for z-scores of all statements). In this frame, both PKK and the instigation of foreign powers were seen as the causes of the Kurdish problem (nos. 14 and 18), not the denial of Kurds or the assimilation policies over Kurds (nos. 13 and 16). Indeed, according to Frame 1, both the terrorist organization, PKK and the Kurds are actors that are used by foreign powers (nos. 23, 26 and 29). PKK and the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, are seen as a ―devil,‖ or in one participant‘s own words, ―baby- killer‖. Therefore, both the embracement of PKK members with the pro-Kurdish BDP members and amnesty of Öcalan are unacceptable (nos. 24 and 43). According to Frame 1, the solutions to the conflict lie in TSK‘s active counter- terrorism policies (no. 46). However, this solution is not sufficient on its own as PKK‘s laying down their weapons for the resolution of the conflict is also prioritized (no. 39). In contrast, even small changes such as the (constitutional) recognition of the existence of the Kurdish identity and education and broadcasting in Kurdish are rejected (nos. 38 and 39); therefore, not surprisingly an independent Kurdistan view is also strongly rejected (no. 35). Lastly, education of Kurds might help for the resolution of the conflict as they have become pawns for foreign powers due to their ignorance (no. 42). Factor 2: Class, economy, and democracy frame Factor 2 had three defining sorts, with factor loadings ranging from .61 to .79. Factor 2 can be defined as a ―Turkish‖ view as two participants were Turkish and one defined himself as both Arab and Turkish. One participant was a woman and two were men. The age of the participants ranged from 27 to 62 (M = 40.33) years. Political views of the

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Chapter 8 participants ranged from 0 to 5 (M = 2.33). Two participants voted for CHP and one did not want to reveal the party he voted for. In Frame 2, since the east and southeastern parts of Turkey where the population of Kurds is relatively high are underdeveloped compared to the rest of Turkey, the problem is seen as an underdevelopment and unemployment problem (no. 6) and to a lesser extent a democracy problem (no. 2), but not as an identity or independence problem for Kurds (nos. 7 and 8). The underdeveloped characteristics of the region helped keep the feudal structure in the region, thus, the problem is also seen as a class- related problem in the region between landlords and workers (nos. 4 and 15). Similar to Frame 1, PKK is seen as a terrorist organization (no. 23) and causes of the problem such as discrimination, denial and assimilation policies over Kurds are rejected (nos. 12, 13 and 16). According to Frame 2, the resolution of the conflict lies in economic improvements, better job opportunities as well as the implementation of agrarian and land reform (nos. 34 and 41). At the same time, PKK should lay down their arms (no. 39) as it is seen as a threat to the unitary state structure of Turkey (no. 45). In addition to economy-oriented solutions, this problem could be solved through democratization and putting human rights into practice (no. 32). In general, Frame 1 and Frame 2 are similar to each other in terms of strongly rejecting certain views regarding the Kurdish problem such as recognition of the Kurdish identity and an independent Kurdistan (nos. 36 and 35). Therefore, the correlation between these two idealized Q-sorts is .57 (see Table 14). Nevertheless, even though they reject the same causes and resolution strategies, their definition of the problem and resolution strategies are clearly distinguishable. Factor 3: Rights, freedom, and democracy frame Factor 3 had 19 defining sorts, with factor loadings ranging from .47 to .85. Six participants were Turkish, seven Kurdish, four from other ethnic backgrounds (e.g., Albanian, Arab-Turk), and two did not reveal their ethnic identity. Six participants were women and 13 were men. The age ranged between 21 and 33 (M = 26.21) years. The political view ranged from 0 to 7 (M = 3.05). Three voted for AKP, one for BDP, nine for

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CHP, three participants did not vote, one participant did not reveal, and two participants voted for other parties. In Frame 3, the Kurdish problem is seen as a rights and freedom problem for Kurds and a democracy problem for Turkey (nos. 2 and 9), not as a terrorism problem or a problem stemming from the PKK (nos. 1, 5 and 18). According to Frame 3, the problem stems from the mistreatment of Kurds by state officials by denying them and by implementing assimilation policies (nos. 12, 13 and 16). Different from Frame 1 and 2, Frame 3 relatively rejects the negative views on Kurds such as Kurds‘ being pawns and Kurds‘ being invaders in other cities of Turkey (nos. 11 and 29). According to Frame 3, addressing this problem requires recognition of rights to education and broadcasting in Kurdish (no. 37) together with implementation of democracy and human rights (no. 32). In addition to these resolution strategies, it is also strongly agreed that PKK should disarm (no. 39). However, TSK‘s counter-terrorism policies do not address the core of the problem (no. 46). Similar to Frame 1 and 2, the views supporting an amnesty for Abdullah Öcalan and an independent Kurdistan are also rejected (nos. 35 and 43). Factor 4: Independence frame Factor 4 had seven defining sorts, with factor loadings ranging from .55 to .73. Factor 4 can be defined as a ―Kurdish‖ view as six participants were Kurdish (one participant did not reveal the ethnic identity). Three participants were women and four were men. The age range was between 20 and 38 (M = 26.57) years. The political view ranged from 0 to 5 (M = 2.14). Four participants voted for BDP, one participant for another political party, one did not vote, and one did not answer this question. In Frame 4, the problem is seen as an independence problem for Kurds (no. 8) because the status of Kurds living in Turkey could be defined in terms of colonialism under the Republic of Turkey (no. 3). In addition, this problem is also seen as an identity problem for Kurds because the Kurds were denied and subjected to assimilation in Turkey (nos. 7, 13 and 16). Complementarily, the beliefs related to terrorism are rejected. According to Frame 4, the cause of the problem is not ―terrorist‖ group PKK or PKK is not actor of Greater Middle East Project (nos. 1, 5, 18, 23 and 26), but an outcome of the Kurdish problem.

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Resolving the identity-related part of the problem necessitates constitutional recognition of rights such as education and broadcasting in Kurdish (nos. 36 and 37). Also, conflict resolution requires an independent Kurdistan and an amnesty for Öcalan (nos. 35 and 43), but definitely not active counter-terrorism policies (no. 46). The resolution strategy that suggests education for Kurds is rejected only in this frame. One participant who loaded on this factor commented on that statement by saying ―Kurds should be educated means that Kurds are more ignorant than Turks. What a humiliating suggestion!‖ Frame 3 and Frame 4 have some similarities in the definition of the Kurdish problem and suggested solution strategies. For example, similar to Frame 3, negative views about the Kurds such as seeing the problem as a Kurdish invasion and seeing Kurds as pawns of foreign powers are strongly rejected (nos. 11 and 29). This is also noticeable in Table 14 as the correlation between these two frames is .46. Lastly, it should be recollected that Factor 4 is the negative pole of Factor 1. The two frames are like mirror images, albeit not totally as there are some views that are not sorted completely oppositely. Thus, their negative correlation of -.81 is very high (see Table 14).

Table 14. Correlations between factors (idealized Q-sorts)

F1 F2 F3 F4

Factor 1 -- .57 -.11 -.81

Factor 2 -- .21 -.51

Factor 3 -- .46

Factor 4 --

8.6 Discussion The results of the study distinguished four different conflict frames across a heterogeneous sample of lay people. The first frame is a terrorism and foreign power frame that defines the problem as a terrorism and foreign powers problem and suggests

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TSK‘s active counter-terrorism policies as the solution to the problem. This frame is almost exclusively held by ethnically Turkish participants and can be defined as a Turkish nationalistic conflict frame; it is shared by supporters of different political parties such as AKP, CHP and MHP. This frame seems to appeal to the majority-status groups, Turks, who have an advantaged position in society irrespective of the political parties they support as this frame does not accept the role of Turks and/or the Turkish state in the Kurdish conflict, but rather blames PKK and foreign powers. The second frame is a class, economy and democracy frame that defines the conflict from a class and economic perspective. The priority should be on economic development in the region, improved job opportunities, land reform as well as democratization. This frame is shared by ethnically Turkish participants who voted for CHP and defined themselves on the left side of the political spectrum. Similar to the first frame, this frame may also appeal to the ethnically Turkish participants as this frame focuses on the underdeveloped characteristics of the region where the Kurdish population is high, but does not focus on the responsibilities of the Turks and/or the Turkish state. The third frame is a rights, freedom, and democracy frame. In this frame, denial of the Kurds and assimilation and discrimination policies of the Turkish state are prioritized and both recognition of rights to education and broadcasting in Kurds‘ own language and democracy are seen as necessary to help resolve the conflict. This frame is shared by Turks, Kurds, and people from other ethnic backgrounds. Another distinguishing point of this frame is that it is common among rather younger participants who voted for AKP, BDP and CHP. The demographic composition in this frame suggests that democracy and rights issues might be more popular among young people irrespective of political parties as young people are affected by the EU and democratization process of Turkey. The fourth frame is an independence frame that defines the problem as an independence problem for Kurds. Resolution is seen as possible through creating an independent Kurdistan. The independence frame, which accepts the amnesty of Öcalan as well, is the only frame that is held solely by rather younger Kurds who voted for BDP. It is not surprising that this frame only appeals to ethnically Kurdish participants. At this point, however, I should caution readers that the relationships presented here between the factor loadings and other variables such as ethnic identity or political party cannot be generalized due to the small sample size and

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Chapter 8 purposive sampling strategy (see also Thomas & Baas, 1993, for a discussion on the issue of generalization in Q methodology). The results indicate that there are more than the three frames indicated by Çelik and Blum (2007): a) terrorism frame, b) minority rights frame, and c) ethnic tension frame. The results were similar to Çelik and Blum (2007) with regard to the terrorism and minority rights frames; however, this study additionally highlights the democracy, foreign powers, independence and economic aspects of the Kurdish conflict. Therefore, I believe that approaching the Kurdish conflict empirically with a systematic conceptual model has proven worthwhile. The results also indicate that conflict frames do not have to be mutually exclusive. One person can relate to more than one frame. However, one frame‘s relative importance for one‘s conflict understanding might be less significant than another frame‘s for that individual. For example, there were some participants who were multiple loaders on the terrorism and economy frames or the rights and independence frames, respectively, and their views thus represent a combination of these perspectives. This indicates that holding one frame does not necessarily mean rejecting another frame totally, but rather highlights similarities between different frames. In short, conflict frames do not have to be mutually exclusive and there might be overlapping points between frames in terms of suggesting similar conflict resolution strategies. Therefore, assuming frames in isolation might not be appropriate in conflict research. Practical implications for conflict resolution Resolution of a conflict requires discovering compromise points across conflicting parties (Winslade & Monk, 2000). Q methodology is a useful tool to be used in conflict resolution contexts as it can help identify consensual points among participants (see Gargan & Brown, 1993). In addition, Q methodology also indicates which statements are highly agreed in some perspectives, but not highly rejected in others. For instance, this was the case for the implementation of democratization and human rights, economic development and increased job opportunities, as well as land reform. Furthermore, re- uniting under the umbrella of Islam for the resolution of the Kurdish conflict was not salient for any of the four viewpoints, thereby being another consensus point in the conflict resolution domain.

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On the other hand, these results also indicate statements that carry the greatest conflict potential in the Kurdish conflict. For example, both problem definitions and perceived causes of the problem vary among lay people. Discrimination against Kurds, assimilation policies, denial and suppression (of rights) of Kurds as the causes of the conflict are accepted by some, but strongly rejected by others. Also, disagreement lies in whether or not the PKK is a terrorist organization, Abdullah Öcalan should be released, and Kurds should be educated. These points should be taken into account as they carry great conflict potential. For conflict resolution, there might be potential consequences of the adherence to different frames of the Kurdish conflict. For example, the terrorism and (to some extent) economy frames might lead to higher levels of conflict as these frames disregard Kurds‘ concerns. On the other hand, the rights, freedom, and democracy frame may lead to more reconciliation and positive attitudes towards the peace process as this frame might be more open to change for a democratic society (see also Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016b). In addition, the results also speak to literature on ―master narratives‖ (Hammack, 2006). The terrorism and foreign power frame and the class, economy and democracy frame might be seen as different varieties of the Turkish master narrative whereas the rights, freedom and democracy frame and the independence frame might be seen as different varieties of the Kurdish master narrative. Therefore, conflict resolution practitioners should aim to look for varieties of master narratives, or of each group in general, rather than approaching them as homogenous narratives or groups (e.g., Turks or Kurds) (see also Cohrs et al., 2015). Similarly, Çelik (2014) argues that conflicting parties who are the active sides of the conflict are not homogenous and include various actors who are affected by the conflict in different ways. Long-lasting peace requires determining these various groups and including them in the peace process in some way. In line with this, a representative public opinion survey of 1204 participants across 27 provinces by Metropoll (2012) indicates that 44.6% of the population in Turkey believed that solving the Kurdish problem requires soliciting and including the Kurdish people‘s perspectives, 9.3% the pro-Kurdish BDP‘s and 3.3% PKK‘s perspectives. These results indicate that priority should be given to the Kurdish people. Since the Kurdish people have been the target of

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Chapter 8 denial, assimilation and discrimination (Yeğen, 2009), their opinions have utmost importance for conflict resolution. In addition to understanding the Kurds‘ perspectives on the conflict, understandings of ethnically Turkish people together with other ethnic backgrounds in Turkey should be taken into account to better grasp the conflict understandings of the whole society. Therefore, this study is an important attempt to take different ethnic groups‘ perspectives into account in the Kurdish conflict context. Limitations and future directions The study was conducted in Turkish as the biggest proportion of the population can speak Turkish. However, there are also some people who cannot speak or write in Turkish. Although this would not invalidate these factors, another study might be conducted in Kurdish as well to get viewpoints from these non-Turkish speaking participants. One could also argue that an Islam frame is missing (which has been found among AKP politicians; see Chapter 6). According to this frame, the problem stems from the nation-state ideology of Turkey and re-uniting under the umbrella of Islam might help resolve the Kurdish conflict. In this study, no such frame emerged. This might be due to two reasons. First, the participants in this study were mostly secular, and their political views were more to the left of the political spectrum; the Islam frame may not be very common among leftist people. Second, participants who vote for AKP may share the terrorism and foreign powers frame or the rights, freedom and democracy frame. These frames might be relatively more popular among the public compared to AKP politicians. I might argue that this sample is not very different from the general population except for the missing Islam frame. It should also be noted that Q methodology is an efficient way to pinpoint socially shared perspectives, but it does not aim to be representative of the entire population and cannot identify the prevalence of these shared perspectives in the public (Danielson, 2009). Also, unlike surveys, Q methodology is not suitable to identify the relationship between the viewpoints and other social-psychological variables. Follow-up survey studies based on the Q results are necessary for this (see e.g., Baker, van Exel, Mason, & Stricklin, 2010; Danielson, 2009). For example, the relationship between different conflict understandings and attitudes towards out-groups in terms of distrust and lynches is an important question to be asked. Especially after peacemaking, the focus should be

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Chapter 8 more on projects that address social problems since solving these problems is necessary for a new and permanent social order (Çelik, 2014). Similarly, follow-up survey studies might explore the relationships between various ideologies (e.g., Kemalist ideology) and socially shared viewpoints (e.g., terrorism frame). Conclusion Even though there are a few studies on lay people‘s conflict understandings (e.g., Başer & Çelik, 2014), the lack of empirical studies on the conflict frames of lay people in Turkey presents a barrier to a deeper understanding of lay people‘s perspectives. The results indicate that there might be more conflict frames among lay people than argued in the literature. Also, approaching conflict frames from a systematic approach such as frame analysis (Entman, 1993) and with an exploratory methodology such as Q methodology has proven useful. The results also indicate that conflict frames do not have to be mutually exclusive and there are varieties within the Turkish and Kurdish narratives. Lastly, the frames provide a picture of society in miniature and, thus, they provide information about the whole society in the Kurdish conflict.

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Chapter 9 Bringing the perspectives of politicians, scholars and journalists and lay people together: Second-order analysis of three studies

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In this chapter, first, an introduction to the results of previous chapters and the reasons why the results of politicians, scholars and journalists and lay people should be brought together are provided. Second, how these viewpoints were brought together in a second- order analysis in Q methodology is briefly explained. Third, the results of second-order factor analysis and each resulting viewpoint are presented and discussed in more detail. Lastly, a short discussion on the similarities between viewpoints and how these viewpoints correspond to different segments are provided. 9.1 Introduction In the previous chapters, a deeper understanding of the Kurdish conflict dynamics on different perceptions, aims, priorities, and desires of different segments was provided. To be more specific, different perceptions, aims, priorities, and desires of politicians (chapter six), scholars and journalists (chapter seven), and lay people (chapter eight) were presented. The results presented in chapter six (political elites), chapter seven (scholars and journalists) and chapter eight (lay people) distinguished different viewpoints among different segments of society. First, the study with the members of parliament distinguished four different viewpoints on the Kurdish conflict across the four political parties in the parliament: 1) a Turkish nationalist viewpoint, 2) a social democratic viewpoint, 3) an Islamist viewpoint, and 4) a pro-Kurdish viewpoint. Second, the study with the scholars and journalists distinguished two viewpoints among experts: 1) a democracy and identity viewpoint, and 2) a democracy and economy viewpoint. Third, the study with the lay people distinguished four viewpoints among lay people toward the Kurdish conflict: 1) a terrorism and foreign power viewpoint, 2) a class, economy, and democracy viewpoint, 3) a rights, freedom, and democracy viewpoint, and 4) an independence viewpoint. These 10 viewpoints thoroughly illustrated how each segment of society defines the Kurdish conflict, perceives the causes of the conflict and suggests solutions to this conflict. In addition to these points, these various viewpoints also indicated each segment‘s priorities and concerns in the Kurdish conflict. These various viewpoints might look different on the surface, but may have greater similarities than initially thought. For example, the problem might be defined similarly in some viewpoints; however, different solution strategies might be suggested.

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Similarly, the problem might be defined differently in some viewpoints, but the same solution strategies might be suggested. This does not necessarily mean that these viewpoints are very different from each other. In addition, multi-level peace process requires integrating perspectives of various segments of society and coordinating them (Saunders, 2001). A variety of conflict understandings might challenge conflict resolution practitioners, policy makers and politicians to develop an integrative and effective conflict resolution program (see Lederach, 1999). Therefore, these viewpoints should be brought together to be able to analyze the similarities and see the overlapping points between these viewpoints to develop the further steps in conflict resolution and peace-building. Thereby, general areas of where politicians, scholars and journalists and lay people agree and disagree in conflict context might be captured. As discussed in previous chapters, Q methodology is a very useful method to uncover socially shared perspectives, to identify within- and between-group differences and to help find commonalities across the different perspectives (Brown, 1980; Watts & Stenner, 2005a). After exploring the socially shared perspectives among different segments, Q methodology also allows for bringing the perspectives of different groups together and to conduct a second-order analysis to identify commonalities across the different perspectives (see Focht & Lawler, 2000 for a similar application). In order to identify commonalities and differences across these ten different perspectives, in this chapter, the Kurdish conflict understandings of politicians, scholars and journalists and lay people were brought together in a second-order analysis. 9.2 Analysis Using the same Q statements and identical procedure in different Q studies makes it possible to compare these studies via a second-order analysis (Watts & Stenner, 2012). In Q methodology, a second-order analysis is conducted to compare similarities between samples or different groups (see Thomas & McKeown, 1988). To apply a second-order analysis, the composite factor arrays from different samples are brought together and are treated as a new data in a new Q study. In Q methodology, a factor array is defined as ―a single Q sort configured to represent the viewpoint of a particular factor‖ (Watts &

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Stenner, 2012, p. 140, italics in original) and the factor arrays become the basis for factor interpretations. In this study, factor arrays from the data that were analyzed in the previous chapters (politicians, scholars and journalists, and lay people studies) for each factor were brought together. In the second-order analysis, these factor arrays were re-entered into the PQMethod program of Schmolck (2014) to apply factor analysis again (see also Robyn, 2005 for a cross-cultural application). A second-order factor analysis with Varimax rotation was conducted to identify whether there are any overlaps between viewpoints. Additionally, manual rotation was conducted to accentuate the differences between factors as much as possible (Watts & Stenner, 2005a). One of the factors was a bipolar factor–a factor which both negative and positive Q sorts load on–and therefore, this factor was inverted and saved twice for its positive and negative poles (Watts & Stenner, 2012). In total, the analysis has distinguished five perspectives and all 10 factors loaded on one of the five factors in the second-order factor analysis (see Table 15 for factor scores). This analysis allowed comparing each Kurdish conflict viewpoint with other conflict viewpoints. 9.3 Results A five-factor solution appeared optimal based on four criteria of Webler et al. (2009): 1) simplicity, 2) clarity, 3) distinctness, and 4) stability. Five shared viewpoints among politicians, scholars and journalists, and lay people toward the Kurdish conflict were distinguished: 1) a Kurdish rights viewpoint, 2) a democracy, rights and freedom viewpoint, 3) an Islamist viewpoint, 4) an economic viewpoint, and 5) a terror and foreign powers viewpoint. These first and second viewpoints (Kurdish rights viewpoint and democracy, rights and freedom viewpoint) are shared across all segments of society (i.e., parliamentarians, scholars and journalists, and lay people). The third viewpoint (Islamist viewpoint) is shared only at the top level by politicians, whereas the fourth viewpoint (economy viewpoint) is shared only at the bottom level by lay people. Lastly, the fifth viewpoint (terror and foreign powers viewpoint) is shared both at the top level (politicians) and at the bottom level (lay people). In the following, the meaning of these

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Table 15. Second-order factor analysis

# Factors Factor labels F1 F2 F3 F4 F5

Turkish 1 Politicians–1 -.73 .18 .13 .45 .73X Nationalist Social 2 Politicians–2 .03 .92X .18 .12 -.03 Democratic 3 Politicians–3 Islamist .07 .41 .90X .08 -.07 4 Politicians–4 Pro-Kurdish .82X .28 .05 -.20 -.82 Democracy 5 Experts–1 and identity .80X .48 .12 -.08 -.80 problem Democracy 6 Experts–2 -.04 .80X .31 .39 .04 and economy Terrorism and 7 Lay people–1 -.93 .25 .01 .08 .93X foreign power Class, 8 Lay people–2 economy, and -.38 .31 .07 .83X .38 democracy Rights, 9 Lay people–3 freedom, and .41 .75X .22 .03 -.41 democracy 10 Lay people–4 Independence .88X -.05 .03 -.27 -.88 % Exp. 38 27 10 12 - var. viewpoints, distinguishing characteristics of each viewpoint from the other viewpoints and the similarities and differences between first-order and second-order factors are discussed. Viewpoint 1: Kurdish rights viewpoint Three first-order factors, one factor from experts, one from members of parliament and one from lay people, with factor loadings ranging from .80 to .88, loaded on Factor 1. It indicates that the Kurdish rights viewpoint is shared by all three segments of society. According to Viewpoint 1, the Kurdish problem is an identity, rights and freedom problem for Kurds which stemmed from Turkey‘s nation-state ideology (see Appendix I for the complete list of statements and their z-scores). The causes of this problem are the denial of the Kurds and their cultural rights, and the assimilation policies aimed at Kurds. To resolve this problem, the existence of the Kurdish identity such as rights to education and broadcasting in Kurdish should be recognized. In this viewpoint, the status of Kurds

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Chapter 9 living in Turkey could be defined in terms of colonialism. According to Viewpoint 1, both Kurds and the resources of the Kurdish region of Turkey are exploited by the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, an independent Kurdistan should be established and its imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan should be released. The Kurdish rights viewpoint has some overlapping points with the first-order factors of pro-Kurdish viewpoint (politicians), democracy and identity viewpoint (experts) and independence viewpoint (lay people) in terms of understanding the Kurdish conflict. For example, this second-order factor and other first-order factors agree on the rights and freedom dimension of the Kurdish conflict. In all factors, solution strategies addressing the rights dimension of the Kurdish problem are agreed on. On the other hand, there are some differences in terms of understanding the Kurdish problem. For example, the Kurdish rights viewpoint diverges from politicians in terms of agreeing slightly on an independent Kurdistan, from experts in terms of not seeing the problem strongly also as a democracy problem, and from lay people not seeing the problem strongly as an independence problem. The Kurdish rights viewpoint does not have many similarities with other second- order factors; rather it has some differences. It is very different from the other second- order factors in terms suggesting amnesty for Abdullah Öcalan. In addition, only in Factor 1, an independent Kurdistan is suggested and the situation of Kurds in Turkey is defined in terms of colonialism. Viewpoint 2: Democracy, rights and freedom viewpoint Three first-order factors, one factor from members of parliament, one from experts, and one from lay people with factor loadings ranging from .75 to .92 loaded on Factor 2. Similar to Factor 1, this viewpoint was also shared by all three segments of society. According to Viewpoint 2, the Kurdish problem is a democratization problem as well as a rights and freedom problem. The Kurdish problem stems from the denial of the Kurds for many years, assimilation policies aimed at Kurds and withholding of their cultural rights. For the solution to the problem, there should be deep-rooted democratization, implementation of human rights and strengthening of local administrations. Different from Factor 1 (Kurdish rights viewpoint), according to Factor 2, the PKK should be accepted as a terrorist group and should lay down its arms for the

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Chapter 9 resolution of the Kurdish conflict. However, in Factor 2, using only security measures to address the Kurdish conflict is seen as barrier to the conflict resolution as well. Therefore, the correlation between Factor 1 and Factor 2 (r = .28, see Table 16) is not very large (see Cohen, 1988 for a discussion on correlation sizes). The social democratic viewpoint (politicians), the democracy and economy viewpoint (experts) and the rights, freedom, and democracy viewpoint (lay people) have some similarities with the democracy, rights and freedom viewpoint (second-order) in understanding the Kurdish conflict. For example, both the second-order factors and first- order factors agree not only on the rights and freedom aspects of the Kurdish problem, but also on the democracy aspect. In all factors, the causes of the problem are seen in the denial of the Kurds for many years and the assimilation policies aimed at Kurds and the withholding of their cultural rights. However, the democracy, rights and freedom viewpoint (second-order) diverges from the democracy and economy view of the experts groups. In the democracy and economy viewpoint of the experts groups, the economic dimension of the Kurdish problem is also emphasized. In this respect, experts differ from the lay people and politicians as well.

Table 16. Correlations between factors (idealized Q-sorts)

F1 F2 F3 F4 F5

Factor 1 -- .28 .21 -.41 -.76

Factor 2 -- .62 .44 .19

Factor 3 -- .26 .10

Factor 4 -- .61

Factor 5 --

Viewpoint 3: Islamist viewpoint Only one first-order factor from members of parliament (MPs from AKP), with a factor loading .90 loaded on Factor 3. This perspective is not shared at the middle (experts) and bottom levels (lay people).

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According to Viewpoint 3, the Kurdish problem is a democratization problem which stems from the abandonment of uniting under Islam and forcing Turkishness instead, based on the nation-state ideology of modern Turkey. The resolution of the Kurdish problem requires deep-rooted democratization, implementation of human rights, strengthening of local administrations as well as economic development and increased job opportunities. The most promising solution to the Kurdish problem is Turks‘ and Kurds‘ uniting again under the umbrella of Islam. However, MHP is a barrier to the solution of the problem because this political party puts an emphasis on Turkish ethnic identity and this prevents a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish problem. Factor 3 and Factor 1 do not share many common points, however, in both factors, the problem is not defined as a terrorism and/or PKK problem (r = .21). On the other hand, compared to the other factor correlation scores, the correlation between Factor 3 and Factor 2 is relatively high (r = .62, see Table 16). In both factors, the problem is seen as a democracy problem, and similar problem definitions and causes of the problem such as the terrorism problem or PKK are rejected. However, Factor 3 diverges from Factor 2 in terms of emphasizing Turks‘ and Kurds‘ uniting again under the umbrella of Islam as a solution strategy. Viewpoint 4: Economy viewpoint Only one first-order factor from lay people, with a factor loading .83 loaded on Factor 4. This viewpoint is present only at the bottom level (lay people), but not shared at the top (politicians) and middle levels (experts). According to Viewpoint 4, the Kurdish problem is an underdevelopment and unemployment problem in the region, but not an identity problem. Since the Kurdish problem stems from the feudal structure of the region, the problem is also seen as a class- related problem in the region. To solve the Kurdish problem, there should be economic development and increased job opportunities, and the implementation of agrarian and land reform. All these economic solutions addressing the economic aspect of the Kurdish problem might help solve the Kurdish problem. While addressing the economic problems, the unitary state structure of Turkey should not be changed either. Factor 4 is very different from Factor 1 in terms of defining the problem, and therefore, the correlation between Factor 1 and Factor 4 is both negative and large (r = -

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.41). Even the rights and freedom aspects of the Kurdish problem which were accepted in Factor 1 are rejected in Factor 4. On the other hand, Factor 4 and Factor 2 have some similarities in terms of seeing the problem as a democracy problem and seeing the PKK as a terrorist organization (r = .44). However, Factor 4 diverges from Factor 2 in terms of seeing the problem as an economic and class-related problem. Lastly, Factor 4 does not have many overlapping points with Factor 3 (r = .26) and these two factors converge only in seeing the PKK as a terrorist organization. Viewpoint 5: Terror and foreign powers viewpoint Factor 5 had two defining sorts, one from members of parliament and one from lay people with factor loadings ranging from .73 to .93. This viewpoint was shared both at the top level (politicians) and at the bottom level (lay people) whereas it was not shared at the middle level (experts). According to Viewpoint 5, this problem is created by the PKK and can be defined as a terrorism problem. The causes of this problem are the PKK and the instigation of foreign powers. For the resolution of the Kurdish problem, the PKK should lay down their arms and TSK should implement active counter-terrorism policies. However, the profiteers from the Kurdish problem are seen as a barrier to the solution of the problem. The terror and foreign powers viewpoint (second-order) has some similarities with the Turkish nationalist viewpoint from politicians and terrorism and foreign power viewpoint from lay people. In all viewpoints, the Kurdish problem is defined as a terrorism problem rather than a Kurdish problem. Both the PKK and instigation of foreign powers are seen as the causes of the Kurdish problem. On the other hand, among the politicians there is also an emphasis on economic development and increased job opportunities as a solution strategy whereas among lay people, PKK and the Kurdish people are seen as responsible for the Kurdish problem. In terms of emphasizing PKK both as a cause of the problem and responsible for the problem, the terrorism and foreign power viewpoint of lay people is more similar to the second-order terrorism and foreign power viewpoint. Therefore, I decided to name them identically. It should be noted that Factor 5 is the negative pole of Factor 1. Thus, their negative correlation is very high (r = -.76, see Table 16). Factor 5 and Factor 2 do not have many common points (r = .19) except seeing the PKK as a terrorist organization,

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Chapter 9 and they diverge in defining the Kurdish problem. Similarly, Factor 5 and Factor 3 are very different from each other in terms of defining the Kurdish problem and suggesting resolution strategies for it (r = .10). However, Factor 5 and Factor 4 have some similarities in terms of seeing the PKK as a terrorist organization, suggesting PKK‘s laying down the arms and emphasizing the unitary structure of the Turkish state as a primary concern (r = .61). These two factors also reject same solution strategies such as amnesty for Abdullah Öcalan and an independent Kurdistan. Although there are some overlaps between these two factors, their problem definitions are quite different. Factor 4 sees the problem as a class and economy problem whereas Factor 5 sees it as a terrorism and foreign power problem. In parallel with these problem definitions, their preferred solution strategies also differ. 9.4 Discussion The results of the second-order analysis of three independent Q studies distinguished five different viewpoints among members of parliament, scholars and journalists and lay people. Although there were slightly different understandings among the first-order factors, the results of second-order analysis indicated that there are also overlaps between various conflict understandings of each segment. It is known from the literature that each segment in society has different priorities and concerns (see Lederach, 1999), and understanding these priorities is an essential task in conflict assessment (Shmueli, 2003). For example, politicians have different agendas and they would like to keep strong support from their voter base. Experts do not have these kinds of priorities and have more freedom; however, from their perspective, implementing problem-solving workshops and finding commonalities between groups are relatively more essential. On the other side, for example, lay people would like to change the issues that affect their everyday lives on street. These results indicate that different concerns and priorities might come to the fore in different segments of society. Previous chapters indicated that parliamentarians‘ understanding of the Kurdish conflict is not monolithic as Loizides (2009) argued; on the contrary, there were four main viewpoints among politicians. The only consensus point among all four viewpoints was deep-rooted democratization and implementation of human rights for the resolution of the conflict. On the other hand, experts‘ understandings were not as diverse as

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Chapter 9 politicians‘, and different from parliamentarians, there was a slightly high degree of consensus on the Kurdish conflict in Turkey among scholars and journalists who participated in my study. These consensus points indicated an important common ground for conflict resolution through the eyes of experts. Lastly, similar to politicians, but different from experts, lay people‘s Kurdish conflict understandings were also very diverse. There was almost no common ground among lay people regarding the Kurdish conflict. Lastly, in terms of conflict resolution strategies, the results indicated another important point. It could be argued that if one idea/view is shared across all groups, this might be called common ground and might be helpful for conflict resolution. In this PhD research, especially, the Kurdish rights viewpoint (to a lesser extent) and the democracy, rights and freedom viewpoint give hope for a peaceful conflict resolution as they are shared at all levels. Compared to the Kurdish rights viewpoint, which includes some controversial issues (e.g., amnesty for Abdullah Öcalan); the democracy, rights and freedom viewpoint might provide a common ground for conflict resolution process in Turkey. Thus, as almost all groups have consensus on democratization point; this perspective might help resolve the Kurdish conflict in the long run.

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Chapter 10 General discussion

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The aim of this PhD research is to explore the conflict understandings of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey among politicians, scholars and journalists and lay people. In other words, the aim is to identify what the Kurdish conflict is about, why it has occurred and what the possible solutions are through the eyes of society. The rationale behind investigating the conflict understandings was, first, that conflict understandings and/or conflict frames should not be ignored in a conflict context as they play the filter role in how people perceive certain phenomenon. Second, as conflict understandings indicate to us what we should view about the conflict and how we should react to it (Kaufman et al., 2013), they should be understood in the first place. These conflict understandings were investigated systematically based on Entman‘s (1993) conceptualization of frame analysis: a) problem definition, b) causal interpretation, c) moral evaluation and d) treatment recommendation. First, the conflict understandings were explored qualitatively through the focus group discussions and open-ended questionnaires among Turks and Kurds in two different cities, Mersin and Diyarbakır. Based on the results of qualitative content analysis, one more domain–barrier to the conflict resolution–was also added to Entman‘s (1993) conceptualization of frame analysis (chapter four). To investigate conflict understandings systematically among different segments of society, Lederach‘s (1999) pyramid approach to peace-building was used. According to this pyramid, there are three critical levels in various roles in peace building that are affected differently by the conflict: a) top-level leadership (e.g., political leaders), b) mid- level leadership (e.g., intellectuals) and c) grassroots leadership (e.g., local leaders). Based on Lederach‘s (1999) approach, first, conflict understandings of the parliamentarians from four political parties represented at TBMM were investigated (chapter six). Second, conflict understandings of scholars from various universities and journalists from different media establishments were investigated (chapter seven). Third, conflict understandings of lay people from various cities were investigated (chapter eight). In these three studies, Q methodology, which is a suitable method to identify socially shared perspectives (Watts & Stenner, 2005a), was used. Q methodology was also used to identify the differences within- and between-groups, similarities between groups and a common ground on which different groups might agree.

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In the following, first, a summary of the findings of each empirical study is presented. Second, the theoretical and practical contributions of this PhD dissertation are discussed. Third, limitations of the studies and future directions are concisely mentioned. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion of the whole PhD thesis. 10.1 Summary of the findings The results of the studies presented in the previous chapters provide support for approaching each segment such as politicians, scholars and journalists and lay people independently to see qualitatively different understandings within these segments. In line with the conflict resolution literature, as each segment‘s priorities and concerns might be different, their priorities should be understood in detail in the first place. The results highlighted qualitatively different understandings, priorities and concerns in depth within each segment. In chapter four, the results of the focus group discussions and open-ended questionnaires underlined many different topics that came to the fore among lay people. Compared to the historical background of the Kurdish conflict which was presented in chapter 3, it seems that there are more alternative conflict understandings among lay people than the discussions in the literature suggest. In addition, Power (2011) argues that both history and memory play a central role in grasping present issues in the context of a conflict. The results indicated that some historical themes such as the regional underdevelopment theme or the economic backwardness theme reappear in today‘s conflict understandings as well. Identifying these themes is central in a conflict context as it is these themes that can play even a crucial role in identity politics (see Liu & Hilton, 2005 for a discussion on representations of history). However, the results also highlighted that there might be some newly emerging themes in a new political environment such as a democracy theme which might not be visible in the historical themes (see Özhan, 2009). Moreover, some topics were emphasized more in the focus group discussions (also in the open-ended questionnaires) of Kurds whereas others were mentioned more in the focus group discussions (also in the open-ended questionnaires) of Turks. For example, identity issues were mentioned more often in the Kurdish groups and references to foreign powers were made more often in the Turkish groups. This was also the case in different cities. There were some priorities which were emphasized more in Mersin and

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Chapter 10 some other topics came to the fore in Diyarbakır. These results might indicate that both ethnic identity and the region or city where people live might have an effect on shaping people‘s conflict understandings. In addition, although problem definitions, sources of the problem, moral evaluations, and solutions to the problem were asked based on the frame analysis of Entman (1993) during data collection through the focus-group discussions and open- ended questionnaires, the results of chapter four also indicated that barriers to the resolution of the conflict might be equally significant in conflict analysis and conflict resolution. Barriers to conflict resolution are often overlooked; however, they obstruct a healthy conflict resolution and peace-building. Also, they are not only found in the public, but also among the leaders (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Hameiri, Bar-Tal, & Halperin, 2014). Therefore, they should be grasped and tackled in the first place for a healthy conflict resolution. Based on the findings of chapter four, the Q studies with different samples were conducted. The results of chapter six indicated how parliamentarians interpreted and evaluated the Kurdish conflict from a Track–I perspective, an official diplomacy perspective. These results distinguished four different conflict understandings among four political parties: 1) Turkish nationalist viewpoint, 2) social democratic viewpoint, 3) Islamist viewpoint, and 4) pro-Kurdish viewpoint. These results pointed out which particular issues in the Kurdish conflict matter more or which specific issues are psychologically more salient for each political party. The results of chapter six also indicated that there might be within-group differences among political parties such as differences within AKP and CHP. Therefore, researchers should not conclude that political parties are homogenous entities and there are no ideological differences within these political parties. Furthermore, the frames of the MPs on the Kurdish conflict are no longer as monolithic as they were in the 1990s as Loizides (2009) argued. It could be argued that it was relatively essential to understand politicians‘ positions and interests to identify whether peace could be achieved by using only a Track–I approach (see Çelik, 2010). This research identified politicians‘ various positions and interests, and the diversity of these viewpoints indicated that it is difficult to achieve peace by using only Track–I approach.

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If resolution of a conflict is not possible with a Track–I approach (e.g., if one side to the conflict is not seen as legitimate; Çelik, 2010), then, a Track–II approach becomes very substantial. It is known from the literature that complementary use of official and unofficial actors helps raise the success of conflict resolution and peace building efforts (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, 2007). In this regard, the results of the experts study (unofficial actors) complement the results of the study with the parliamentarians (official actors). The results of chapter seven indicated socially shared conflict understandings among scholars and journalists in Turkey. Rather than the wise people who are chosen by the AKP government to pave the way for Turkey‘s Kurdish peace process, understandings of the Kurdish conflict among mid-level leaders who are known as ‗experts‘ in Turkey were explored. Two socially shared conflict frames among these experts were distinguished in the results: 1) a democracy and identity viewpoint, and 2) a democracy and economy viewpoint. Unlike politicians who have different views in the Kurdish conflict, experts seem to have a more singular perspective. This might be because of the fact that experts do not worry about the voter base and can focus on the relevant information in the conflict whereas politicians have to keep their political base(s) strong. The results also indicated some common grounds where many scholars and journalists in my study agree as well as immediate issues that should be tackled in the first place through expert eyes. In other words, these results present priorities and immediate tasks to focus on as well as main concerns of the conflicting parties through an expert eye (see also Kelman, 2000). Therefore, these results are also very useful for providing input to the government or policy makers and for presenting the key role of unofficial diplomacy (Track–II diplomacy) in conflict resolution and peace process. The findings of chapter eight were complementary to the findings of the fourth chapter (pilot study with lay people). In this chapter, four socially shared conflict frames of lay people were presented by indicating what the conflict is about, where it stems from, and how it should be tackled from a lay perspective. These viewpoints were 1) a terrorism and foreign power viewpoint, 2) a class, economy, and democracy viewpoint, 3) a rights, freedom, and democracy viewpoint, and 4) an independence viewpoint.

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As relatively little attention has been given to the understandings of lay people in the conflict (see Başer & Çelik, 2014; Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016a), the results of this study also contributed to the relevant literature in terms of indicating the role of lay people‘s conflict frames in the Kurdish conflict. It should be noted that these conflict frames provide a picture of society in miniature (Lederach, 1999). As a final note, the results also indicated that conflict frames do not have to be mutually exclusive and point to the variety of perspectives within the Turkish and Kurdish conflict frames. These results are in line with the conflict resolution literature there often are different perspectives about the conflict within each conflict party (e.g., Cheldelin et al., 2003; Kelman & Fisher, 2003). The findings of chapter eight highlighted the role of socio-psychological variables on how people subscribe to these conflict frames. The results indicate that ethnic identity might be a central category in understanding conflict frames. For example, the terrorism and foreign power frame is more popular among ethnically Turkish participants and the independence frame is more popular among rather younger Kurds who voted for BDP. However, the ethnic category is insufficient in explaining how people subscribe to these conflict frames as it does not explain why people from different ethnic backgrounds share, for example, the democracy frame. In addition to ethnic category, it seems the political parties people vote for might be another category which should be taken into account in a conflict context. For example, the independence frame is more popular among Kurds who voted for BDP. Identifying this relationship might be very significant in conflict contexts as political parties and their leaders might shape people‘s conflict understandings as well (see also Kelman, 2007). Furthermore, it seems that age is also a very central category to comprehend conflict understanding dynamics. For example, democracy and rights issues are more popular among young people as young people might have been influenced by the EU and democratization process of Turkey. All in all, the results highlight that socio- psychological predictors might be very essential to understand conflict dynamics. Lastly, chapter nine presented the results of a second-order analysis. In this second-order analysis, the results of previous studies with a) politicians (chapter six), b) scholars and journalists (chapter seven) and c) lay people (chapter eight) were brought together. The results of this chapter indicated that there are some overlaps among conflict

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Chapter 10 frames of politicians, scholars and journalists and lay people. Overall, five conflict frames were distinguished among the three segments of society: 1) a Kurdish rights viewpoint, 2) a democracy, rights and freedom viewpoint, 3) an Islamist viewpoint, 4) an economy viewpoint and 5) a terror and foreign powers viewpoint. The first and second frames were also shared at three segments of society whereas other three frames were not shared at three segments of society. To sum up, these results pointed out different segments should be included in conflict analysis and resolution (see Lederach, 1999). The most comprehensive peace processes require different leaders who work at different levels (Çelik, 2010). However, they should also communicate with each other and coordinate their efforts. In other words, each segment of society should participate in the conflict resolution process as the voices of all segments should be heard for a healthy conflict resolution and peace building (Saunders, 2001). If this is not achieved and some groups are excluded from the peace process, a sustainable peace cannot be achieved either (see Yıldız, 2014). These results also provided support for approaching these segments independently to grasp qualitatively different understandings in the conflict as well as priorities and concerns of each segment. In addition to grasping these qualitatively different conflict understandings, in the end, these viewpoints should also be brought together and analyzed together in a second order analysis to see overlaps and similarities among different segments for an integrated conflict analysis and resolution framework. 10.2 Theoretical contributions There are various theoretical contributions of this PhD thesis. First, the results of the Q studies indicate that the different elements of conflict frames are certainly aligned. For example, if the problem is defined as a terrorism problem, then, the causes of the problem are seen in PKK. In addition, PKK is blamed and seen responsible for the conflict. The solutions to the problem are seen in counter-terrorism policies. Similarly, if the problem is defined as an independence problem for Kurds, then the causes of the problem are seen in Turkey‘s nation-state ideology. The Republic of Turkey is blamed and seen as responsible for the problem. The solution is seen in an independent state for Kurds. All these results highlighted that different domains of conflict frames are definitely well

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Chapter 10 associated and aligned. Therefore, conflict researchers should take different conflict domains into account in order to grasp conflict dynamics in a more detailed way. In addition, the results of the Q studies present that conflict frames do not necessarily have to be mutually exclusive. This means that any individual can also relate to more than one frame and one frame‘s relative significance for one‘s conflict understanding might be less central than that of other frames. For example, one can relate to the terror and foreign power frame, but at the same time, relate to the economy frame. It could be argued that these individuals‘ views represent a combination of two frames. In conflict research, one should not approach frames as perspectives in isolation. Rather, conflict researchers should keep in mind that holding one frame does not necessarily mean rejecting another frame totally. Therefore, they should also look for similarities between frames and how people might share more than one frame at the same time. As mentioned above, the results also point out some socio-psychological predictors to explain how people subscribe to these conflict frames. The first one is ethnic identity. Ethnic identity might be a significant predictor to identify common conflict frames among ethnic groups. In line with this, the terrorism and foreign power frame seems appealing to Turks and the independence frame seems appealing to Kurds. However, there are other frames such as the rights, freedom, and democracy frame which are shared both by Turks, Kurds and other ethnic identities. These results indicate that there might be variations within each group and ethnic identity does not help explain, for example, why an ethnically Turkish person does not share the terrorism and foreign powers frame. Therefore, conflict researchers should not neglect the alternative viewpoints within each group and should look for alternative frames and grasp how people from different ethnic backgrounds subscribe to the same conflict frame. It is known from the social-psychological literature that it is these alternative frames within each group which have the potential to exacerbate the conflict or alleviate it (Kelman, 2009). In light of the results of the PhD thesis, it seems that participants‘ place of residence, participants‘ age, the political party they vote for and their political view (e.g., being on the left or right on a political spectrum) might also be related to how people subscribe to various conflict understandings although it should be noted that the

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Chapter 10 relationships between these variables and subscribing to particular conflict frames should not be generalized due to the small sample size of the studies. For instance, living in Mersin or Diyarbakır might affect people‘s conflict understandings as people might experience the conflict and its outcomes differently in these cities. In addition, for example, the class, economy and democracy frame appealed to the ethnically Turkish people who defined themselves on the left side of the political spectrum and voted for CHP. It could be argued that ―backwardness‖ of the region is a popular narrative among CHP supporters. The reason behind this argument might be that most of the CHP supporters are inclined to ignore the Kurdish identity in their formulation of the Kurdish problem as they might define the national identity based on Turkishness. According to them, the founder of the Republic of Turkey Mustafa Kemal Atatürk‘s own words ―how happy is the one who says ‗I am Turk‘‖ embraces everyone including Kurds and therefore, there is no problem regarding the identity of the Kurds. However, most Kurds might not feel comfortable with this definition and might reject it. Similarly, it could be argued that being young might influence people‘s conflict understandings in terms of seeing the problem as a democracy problem and proposing democratization and human rights aligned with this problem definition. As opposed to the elder generation who have fresh memories of the over-securitized domestic policy making that prevailed after the 1980 coup and during the anti-terror campaign and Kurdish conflict that characterized the 1990s, the younger generation in Turkey spent their lifetime in a period when democracy and the EU agenda came to the fore in domestic politics. This argument is also in line with the 2015 general election results of Turkey that approximately 23% of young people preferred the pro-Kurdish political party, HDP35 (Halkların Demokratik Partisi–People‘s Democratic Party) (see Balkan, 2015). HDP is a leftist political party which heavily emphasizes the need for minority rights as well as democracy and human rights. It also emphasizes a democratic solution to the Kurdish conflict. Therefore, it is not surprising that approximately one fourth of young people voted for HDP in these elections and that they have a similar conflict understanding with the HDP in the Kurdish conflict context.

35 The name of the political party was BDP when I collected the data. 168

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Lastly, the results of this PhD also speak to social psychology literature on two aspects: a) master narratives and b) mirror images. Master narratives in a conflict context could be defined as a dominant narrative individuals confront in society while trying to make sense of the conflict itself (see Hammack, 2008; see also Bar-Tal, 1998, 2007 for a similar discussion on ethos of conflict). Rather than focusing on only one dominant narrative in society, conflict researchers should also focus on alternative narratives among conflicting parties (see Cohrs et al., 2015). There might be equally substantial alternative narratives in society that make it possible to exacerbate or lessen the conflict (see also Kelman, 2009). In this respect, it could be argued that the terrorism and foreign power frame and the economy frame might be understood as different varieties of the Turkish master narrative whereas the rights, freedom and democracy frame and the independence frame might be seen as different varieties of the Kurdish master narrative. The results indicate that conflict researchers should not take ethnic groups as homogenous entities; rather they should approach them to understand varieties within (conflicting) groups (Cohrs et al., 2015). It could be argued that if conflict researchers identify multiple standpoints in conflict, the complexity of the conflict might be better captured. The results of this PhD also indicate that the terrorism and foreign power frame and the independence frame might be described as mirror images of Turks and Kurds (albeit not totally). According to the mirror image concept, both conflicting groups are inclined to have parallel images of their own group and out-group (see Bronfenbrenner, 1961; White, 1965). Both groups have a tendency to see their own group positively, but the out-group negatively (see also Kelman, 2007). It could be contended that this was the case in both frames. In the terrorism and foreign power frame, Kurds and the PKK were seen as a pawn and therefore responsible for the problem whereas in the independence frame, the Turkish state and Turks (to a lesser extent) were seen as responsible for the problem. Similarly, in the terrorism and foreign power frame, the demands of Kurds were perceived as a central threat to (the unitary structure of) Turkey whereas in the independence frame, it is the Kurdish identity that is being perceived as under attack. It is known from the literature that mirror images have the potential to make conflicts even more difficult to resolve as the severe difference between good-self and bad-other makes

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Chapter 10 it even harder to change the zero-sum perception of the conflict (Kelman, 2007; 2009). To put it in a nutshell, the results highlight the mirror images and their natures in the Kurdish conflict context and help grasp the conflictual yet parallel perspectives between conflicting parties. Thus, these results contribute to social-psychology literature in terms of identifying possible images between groups which create incompatible perceptions in the Kurdish conflict context. 10.3 Practical contributions There are various practical significances of this PhD dissertation. To my ultimate knowledge, this PhD research is the first application of Lederach‘s (1999) pyramid in terms of approaching the Kurdish conflict in a real-life setting. This pyramid helped capture how the Kurdish conflict is represented at different levels and helped understand the population‘s concerns and priorities fundamentally. The results also indicated that Q methodology is a very practical and suitable tool in a conflict context. The strength of Q methodology lies in scrutinizing the within-group differences, which might not be visible on the surface, as well as highlighting the between-group differences by indicating the conflictual points between these groups. Q methodology also makes it possible to find a common ground across different groups. Accordingly, it provides a common ground where all groups might agree and, therefore, contribute to the conflict resolution by indicating the points where the conflict resolution might start. To be more specific, this PhD research provided information for policy-makers and politicians in terms of indicating the issues that carry the greatest conflict potential or dissent (for a discussion on dividers in a conflict context, see Moore, 2014). For example, among politicians, the issues such as the amnesty for Öcalan and recognition of the Kurdish identity in the constitution and of the Kurdish language in education and/or broadcasting are very controversial topics and it is these topics that divide the political parties. Among scholars and journalists, the views such as whether or not the PKK is a terrorist organization, whether there should be recognition of the Kurdish identity in the constitution, whether the unitary structure of Turkey should be kept, whether there should be an amnesty for Öcalan are very contentious. Among lay people, the concerns such as whether or not the Kurdish problem is an identity problem, whether it stemmed from the

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Chapter 10 discrimination against the Kurds or denial of the Kurds, whether the PKK is the actor of Greater Middle East Project, whether the Kurds are pawns who are used by foreign powers, whether the Kurdish identity should be recognized in the constitution, in the education system and in broadcasting arena and whether Öcalan should be released divide them. These points indicated the utmost psychological points where different groups diverge in terms of understanding the Kurdish conflict. After identifying dividers in a conflict, one can ask what to do with the irreconcilable frames. Analyzing irreconcilable frames indicates points which ―act as sieves through which information is gathered and analyzed, positions are determined (including priorities, means, and solutions), and action plans developed‖ (Kaufman et al., 2013, para. 9). Examining these types of frames in greater detail is particularly useful for stakeholders as these frames represent the differences which cannot easily be bridged. Therefore, conflict resolution practitioners should try to understand the degree of importance attributed to these irreconcilable frames and discover new ways to address those (Kaufman et al., 2013). One way to address these kinds of irreconcilable frames is reframing them. Negotiation starts with understanding the definitions of a conflict by different groups and continues with reframing these conflict frames in order to help resolve conflicts. Reframing could be defined as openly managing of frames and their shifts during reconciliation, negotiation and conflict resolution (Kaufman et al., 2013). In negotiation, groups‘ frames affect each other‘s frames and they also converge throughout negotiation process (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994). This whole process could be seen as part of the reframing and includes changing the content of the irreconcilable frames as well. Thus, it could be argued that reframing might pave the ways for managing or resolving a conflict as they may change the content of irreconcilable frames or the frames directly (Kaufman et al., 2013). Based on the results of this PhD study, I could argue that conflict resolution practitioners in the Kurdish conflict context may try to understand the degree of importance attributed to these irreconcilable frames by each group as well as try to reframe them during negotiation: whether there should be an amnesty for Öcalan, whether there should be recognition of the Kurdish identity in the constitution and of the

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Kurdish language in education and/or broadcasting, whether the PKK is a terrorist organization and/or the actor of Greater Middle East Project, whether the Kurds are pawns who are used by foreign powers, whether the unitary structure of Turkey should be kept, whether the Kurdish problem is an identity problem, and whether it stemmed from the discrimination against the Kurds or denial of the Kurds. At this point, one can argue that some of these irreconcilable frames such as issues around the amnesty for Öcalan and/or the definition of PKK might be difficult to reframe. Therefore, rather than focusing on reframing these frames at the beginning, reframing identity problems of Kurds as democracy problems of Turkey might be an agreeable starting point in negotiation. The results of the studies also pointed out the opinions on the resolution strategies that almost all parties see as ineffective and therefore reject. For example, all politicians reject seeing the problem as an independence problem for Kurds and therefore reject the idea of an independent Kurdistan. This is a significant point as the pro-Kurdish political party, HDP (then BDP), is often seen as a separatist political party that tries to divide Turkey and therefore accused in the political arena (see Noi, 2012). However, the results indicate that this is not the case. Second, several scholars and journalists in this study reject uniting under the umbrella of Islam, founding of an independent Kurdistan, Turkey‘s being independent in internal affairs and TSK‘s counter-terrorism policies as solution strategies to the Kurdish conflict. Third, lay people reject one solution strategy which is uniting under the umbrella of Islam. Compared to the other two segments, the perspectives of lay people are relatively more diverse in the Kurdish conflict. In addition to identifying ineffective resolution strategies which are rejected by the participants, this PhD research also provided substantial consensual views where almost all parties could agree (for a discussion on connectors in a conflict context, see Moore, 2014). For example, among parliamentarians, the problem is seen mostly as a democracy problem and therefore, it should be resolved through implementation of democratization and application of human rights. The economic development and increasing job opportunities for the people living in the region were seen effective for the solution of the Kurdish problem as well. Unlike parliamentarians, there is a slightly high degree of consensus on the Kurdish conflict in Turkey among many scholars and

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Chapter 10 journalists who participated in my study. For example, many scholars and journalists in this study agreed that the Kurdish problem is a democracy, identity, and rights and freedom problem. The Kurdish problem stemmed from the discrimination against the Kurds, denial of their existence and assimilation policies towards them. In general, it is also agreed that modern Turkey‘s nation-state ideology has caused the Kurdish problem. According to several scholars and journalists, the victims of the Kurdish problem are the people living in the region. The solution to the Kurdish problem requires the recognition of rights to education and broadcasting in Kurdish, strengthening of the local administrations, PKK‘s laying down their weapons, abolishing the village guard system and implementing agrarian and land reform. Unlike scholars and journalists, there is not a high degree of consensus on the Kurdish conflict in Turkey among lay people. It could be argued that lay people agree only on seeing the people living in the region as the victims of the Kurdish problem, suggesting the implementation of democracy and human rights and economic development as a solution strategy. After identifying connectors and/or finding common ground in a conflict, one can ask the same question: what to do with the connectors or common ground in conflict? Common points in conflict have the potential to promote greater cooperation and collaboration (see Moore, 2014). Grasping common ground of various groups‘ concerns and priorities may pave the way for having resources to solve problems in conflict context and identifying agreements on a number of issues such as certain solutions may be a significant contribution both to public and official diplomacy (see Saunders, 2001). Thus, finding common ground in a conflict context provides a basis for early steps in conflict resolution and peace building. To put it differently, I can argue that these common points between various parties could be used in consensus building. Through consensus building, collaborating on problem solution strategies and finding solutions that are acceptable to all groups may be applied and thus, a variety of people from different segments of society may be included easily in decision-making processes in the conflict context (Burgess & Spangler, 2003). Based on the results of this PhD study, I could argue that conflict resolution practitioners in the Kurdish conflict context may try consensus building on consensual views where almost all parties could agree such as

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Chapter 10 implementation of democratization, application of human rights, the economic development, and increasing job opportunities for the people living in the region. The results also indicated that there might be some points for compromise, for instance some points that are highly agreed for some participants but not highly disagreed for other participants. For example, among parliamentarians, these points are about seeing the problem as a rights and freedom problem; seeing the cause of the problem in the mistreatment of Kurds in the region by state officials; seeing the people living in the region as the victim of the problem; suggesting strengthening local administrations, PKK‘s laying down of arms, implementing agrarian and land reform and abolishing the village guard system; seeing the profiteers from this problem and America‘s interests in the region as barriers to the resolution of the Kurdish conflict. As mentioned above, there were many common points among scholars and journalists in terms of understanding the Kurdish conflict. In addition to these points, there are also compromise points such as seeing the problem as an identity problem, suggesting continuation of the negotiations, and seeing the profiteers from this problem, using harsh security measures and the lack of empathy between the parties as barriers to resolution of the Kurdish problem. Among lay people, implementation of democratization and human rights, economic development and increased job opportunities, as well as land reform were compromise points. In brief, it could be argued that these results are not only very helpful for identifying both effective and ineffective resolution strategies through the eyes of different segments in the Kurdish conflict, but also very beneficial to identify potential compromise points. As mentioned above, the results indicated that conflict understandings vary across all three segments of society. The results also highlighted how these viewpoints are both similar and different from each other and how they might share a common ground. First, the study with political elites indicated that there might be common grounds between these political parties in terms of agreeing on the same conflict resolution strategies. After conducting the first study with political elites, the study itself attracted the media‘s attention in Turkey and the results of this study were published in a daily national newspaper, Bugün. The key solution strategy that all political parties agreed on, which is implementation of democratization and human rights, was presented in the newspaper with this headline: ―The parliament said democracy‖ (see Üstünkaya, 2013).

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The study with scholars and journalists (experts) indicated many common points for the resolution of the Kurdish conflict through the eyes of experts. For this reason, this study also received media attention. The results of this study with experts were published in another newspaper, Agos (see Gültekin, 2013). In that newspaper, the differences between experts and lay people in terms of understanding the Kurdish conflict were discussed based on these PhD results. At the time of this publication in the newspaper, the Commission of Wise People was preparing a commission report on the meetings of the wise people with the public. Therefore, it could be claimed that the results of the expert study also complemented the report prepared by the Commission of Wise People in Turkey. 10.4 Limitations and future directions This PhD research has some limitations. First of all, although women comprise approximately 50% of the population in Turkey, it could be argued that their voices are not well represented in the current PhD study. Unfortunately, at the political party level, there were only three women participants out of 23 participants (see also Güneş-Ayata & Tütüncü, 2008 for underrepresentation of women in TBMM); at the scholars and journalists level, only 14 women participants out of 41 participants; and at the lay people level, only 25 women participants out of 71 participants. In this sense, this PhD study lacks in representing women‘s perspectives in conflict resolution and peace building process in Turkey. The literature indicates that women are also systematically excluded from peace processes and political decision-making mechanisms not only in Turkey, but also in other places as well (see UNIFEM, 2010 for women‘s participation in peace negotiations; see also Üstündağ, 2014b). The conflict can be resolved and peace can be built; however, if women are excluded, it is highly likely that casualties will not be recognized in this process and repair and compensation mechanisms will not function, either (Üstündağ, 2014b). If they are not excluded from the peace process and instead are included in it, there are more changes for the peace process to have successful negotiation and implementation outcomes (Paffenholz, 2015). Second, one can also question the representativeness of the participants at three levels: a) representativeness of members of parliament, b) representativeness of scholars and journalists, and c) representativeness of lay people. Although each participant in each

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Chapter 10 segment was asked to nominate (at least) one additional participant whose conflict understanding may be very different from her/his own perspective to maximize diversity within their own group, representativeness of the participants might still be a problem. For example, Turkish nationalist AKP deputies and Turkish nationalist scholars and journalists refused to participate in this PhD study of their own will. However, I argue that this does not invalidate these conflict frames among different groups as the terrorism and foreign powers frame (Turkish nationalist frame), which is shared mainly by Turkish nationalists, has also been found in the political parties and lay people samples. In addition, one can also argue that the Turkish nationalist frame would look more extreme if these participants had also participated. Then, this viewpoint would look more similar to the lay people‘s conflict understanding (terrorism and foreign power viewpoint) as the terrorism and foreign power viewpoint (lay people) is more extreme than the Turkish nationalist frame (politicians) in terms of derogating the Kurds. Another problem in the studies might be social desirability. Some participants might have refrained from representing their ―real‖ views on the Kurdish conflict or Kurds in general to represent a more positive image of themselves. However, participants in the experts and lay people samples also participated in the study online via the Flash Q program allowing them to be more anonymous; this might have prevented possible effects of social desirability to a certain extent. In addition, I should also note that I collected the conflict frames of politicians, experts and lay people between 2012 and 2013. In other words, I collected data during the de-escalation period of the Kurdish conflict and the peace process was being implemented. Therefore, one can question whether the same results would be obtained if the study was conducted in the escalation phase of the Kurdish conflict as of 2016. I believe the terrorism viewpoint would be more common if I collected data today. Although this would not invalidate these conflict frames, future studies may also focus on conflict understandings during escalation and de-escalation phases of the Kurdish conflict to compare and contrast them (see also Bilali, Çelik, & Ok, 2014). In this PhD research, focus-group discussions, open-ended questionnaires and Q methodology approaches were used. These methods (Q methodology to a lesser extent) are closer to qualitative methods and do not aim to measure the frequencies of these

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Chapter 10 viewpoints in society. However, Q methodology also makes it possible to transform the Q results into quantitative measures. This can be implemented by using profile correlation (presenting distinguishing statements from the Q study as Likert items) and/or scale creation (a 7-point scale ranging from ‗least important‘ to ‗most important‘) (Baker et al., 2010; Brown, 2002; Danielson, 2009). Thus, the distribution of the viewpoints could be assessed across the population with a quantitative approach. Additionally, using quantitative approaches which are transformed from Q methodology results provide the opportunity to determine the relationship between the demographic information of the participants such as age, gender, or socio-economic status and factors (Brown, 2002). Therefore, the results of these three studies might also be used in future survey studies (Baker et al., 2010; Brown, 2002; Danielson, 2009) to understand the relationship between conflict understandings and other related conflict dynamics, such as intergroup contact (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000; 2006), political solidarity between groups (Glasford & Calcagno, 2012), attitudes towards reconciliation (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi & Lewis, 2008; Noor et al., 2008) and attitudes toward the peace process in Turkey (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016b). Future studies might also focus on other political parties which are not represented in TBMM. The national threshold system forces political parties to achieve a 10% share of the national votes. This system has only allowed four out of 78 political parties to be represented in TBMM. For a more participatory peace building (see Dudouet, Giessmann & Planta, 2012), other political parties such as BBP (Büyük Birlik Partisi– Great Union Party), DP (Demokrat Parti–Democrat Party) and Vatan Partisi (Patriotic Party) might be also included at political party level as these political parties and their voter bases could play a central role in terms of exacerbating the Kurdish conflict. Another limitation of this PhD study is that it did not focus on NGOs. For this reason, people from very influential NGOs did not participate in the expert study.36 However, civil society and NGOs are particularly significant in conflict context and might play a constructive role in fostering peace and establishing or strengthening democracy (Belloni, 2001; Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006). They can even influence policy processes in peace contexts (Fitzduff & Church, 2004). In addition to the constructive

36 There were only five experts who were also members of an NGO. 177

Chapter 10 role of civil society and NGOs, they can play a destructive role in conflict transformation and peace building as well (Spurk, 2010). Therefore, the perspectives of both pro-and anti-peace NGOs should be taken into account in future studies to build sustainable peace. Finally, peace requires bringing various parties together, but it also requires a political culture that prevents (and if needed punishes) racist, aggressive and discriminatory behaviors and that promotes mutual trust, acceptance and cooperation (Bar-Tal, 2000; Çelik, 2014). Future studies should also focus on ways to bring various parties together and to construct a political culture that promotes mutual trust, acceptance and cooperation. Similarly, other studies might also be conducted on what peace means, how peace should be created, built and preserved, and how broken relationships could be restored between different groups. All segments of society should be part of this process and contribute to the conflict resolution and peace building process in the long-run. 10.5 Conclusion In conflict resolution and peace building, perceived incompatibilities and subjective positions among people play a key role in the outbreak and escalation of a conflict. Therefore, understanding subjective positions is the first and most important task in conflict analysis and conflict resolution. To identify these various positions and to grasp each segment‘s priorities and desires, each segment of society should be approached separately and included in the conflict resolution process. Peace might be achieved, but it cannot be permanent unless all segments of society participate. In this PhD research, rather than a top-down approach, a bottom-up approach was implemented from lay people to the political parties at TBMM. In this sense, this PhD research is unique in examining the Kurdish conflict with a systematic and holistic approach and contributes to the relevant literature in terms of indicating both actual and potential problem points in conflict resolution among different segments of society. This approach is quite promising in terms of investigating socially shared frames of the Kurdish conflict, indicating disagreements and agreements of conflicting parties as well as providing a common ground for conflict resolution. To sum up, this PhD research not only theoretically, but also practically contributes to the social psychology, conflict resolution and peace building literatures. The studies that were conducted in this PhD

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Chapter 10 studies might yield new research both in the Kurdish conflict in particular and in the conflict and peace literature in general.

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Appendix A. The full list of questions in FGDs and open-ended questionnaires

Research Title: How do people in Turkey understand the Turkish-Kurdish relations? The issue sometimes referred to as the Kurdish question, the South-eastern question or the Kurdish conflict has been discussed for a long time because it affects the everyday life, the politics and different groups in Turkey. Recently, the Turkish government has launched a Kurdish Initiative in order to end this problem and to introduce more democratic reforms. However, there is no clear roadmap for the initiative and strong criticisms are made against this initiative. Therefore, there is no agreed solution either.

Even two months ago in October, 26 Turkish soldiers were killed by PKK members and in return, so many PKK members (because there is no exact statistics) were killed by Turkish Army. All these events increase tension in Turkey. Unfortunately, the problem still continues to exist even though there are so many deaths. Today, as a researcher, I am interested in what you personally think about this problem and what your point of view is.

1) How do you define this problem? 2) Why would you say it is a problem? a. What are the costs (and benefits, if any) of the problem? b. What are the effects and impacts of this problem on the individuals, groups, society, the country and political position of the country in the international arena? 3) Why is there a Kurdish problem? a. Are there any particular groups or actor(s) causing this problem? 4) What kind of moral issues do you think are involved in this problem? a. Who are the victims of the problem? b. Are these victims innocent? c. Who is to blame and responsible for the problem? d. Who should feel most shame, guilt and/or embarrassment because of the problem? e. Do you think that there are any groups who should feel pride? 5) What would you suggest could be done about solving the problem? a. What is your ideal solution to the problem? b. If you take into the account the realities of Turkey, how can you solve this problem? 6) What do you think that other people think about this problem? 7) Do you think there are still a few things to add as a last word?

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Appendix B. Participant information sheet

Research Title: How do people in Turkey understand the Turkish-Kurdish relations?

This study is being done as part of the PhD‘s thesis of Özden Melis Uluğ, in the School of Psychology at Queen‘s University Belfast. The aim of the study is to examine how people understand the issue sometimes referred to as the Kurdish question, the South- eastern question or the Kurdish conflict.

The study is composed of a discussion group which includes 8 people, 1 researcher and 1 rapporteur. You are expected to talk about the Kurdish question or South-eastern question according to your point of views. As a researcher, I am absolutely interested in what you personally think about this issue.

It is a voluntary study. It won‘t take more than 90 minutes to discuss the issue. It is a one- session study; therefore, participating more than once is not necessary.

If you do not want to continue to participate in the study, you can withdraw from the study at any time you wish. Also, you are not required to explain the reason for your withdrawal. But due to the difficulties of identifying participants on the recording, the recording will be included in the analysis and your contribution may be transcribed as well. However, if your contribution is clearly identifiable, it will not be transcribed.

Before the discussion starts, signing the participant consent form, which will be kept separately from what you talk about, is required. Any information you share will be kept confidential and will be used only for scientific purposes.

If you have any questions about the study, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher.

Özden Melis Uluğ School of Psychology Queen‘s University Belfast University Road Belfast Northern Ireland BT7 1NN UK Tel: +44 775 955 49 05 E-Mail: [email protected]

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Appendix C. Participant consent form

Research Title: How do people in Turkey understand the Turkish-Kurdish relations?

This study is carried out as part of the PhD thesis of Özden Melis Uluğ, in the School of Psychology at Queen‘s University Belfast. The topic of the research is how people understand the issue sometimes referred to as the Kurdish question, South-eastern question or Kurdish conflict.

The aim of the study and the procedure for the study were elucidated in the ―Participant Information Sheet‖. Please make sure you have read and understood the form correctly. If you need further explanation and help, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher. If you consent to participate in the research, please tick (√) the statements and sign the sheet.

I have understood the aim of the study. ……… I agree to participate in this research on my free will. ……… I have been assured that I can withdraw from the study anytime without showing a reason. ……… I have been assured that I can ask the researcher at any time if I have any questions related to research. ……… I have been assured that all the information I give will be kept confidential. ……… I have been assured that my information will be used only for scientific purposes. ………

Name: ......

Address: ......

Signature: ......

Date: ......

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Appendix D. Coding frame Codes in main category 1: Frame Analysis Segments should be coded under one of the codes below if a participant 1) tries to frame the Kurdish problem by defining it, 2) indicating the sources of the Kurdish problem, 3) mentioning the effects of the Kurdish problem, 4) making a moral judgment for the actors involved in the Kurdish problem, 5) suggesting a solution for the Kurdish problem and 6) mentioning barriers to the solution of the Kurdish problem. Label 1.1. Definition of the problem (Problem tanımı) Definition: A unit of coding belongs into this category 1) if a participant expresses any opinion about naming and conceptualizing the problem and 2) if a participant expresses anything related to what the problem is and what the problem is not. In this category, if a participant expresses a label together with the word ‗problem‘, it will be clearly classified as a problem definition. Indicators: ―X sorunu‖, ―Y sorunu‖, ―bu sorun X sorunu değildir‖ [―X problem‖, ―Y problem‖, ―this is not an X problem‖] Example: Yani bu demokrasi sorunudur. [Therefore, this is a democracy problem.] Label 1.2. Sources of the problem (Problemin sebepleri) Definition: A unit of coding belongs into this category if a participant expresses any forces, actions, and situations that create or cause the Kurdish problem. The category applies regardless of the time, e.g., before the Republic of Turkey or after the Republic of Turkey. Indicators: Sebep, neden, yüzünden [cause, reason, because of] Example: Hep bunlardan mesela Kürt olarak yardım alıyorsun ve devleti kurduktan sonra bunları inkâr ediyorsun. Yani beraber kuruyorsun ve inkâr ediyorsun. [You always benefit from these [people] as Kurds but after you establish the state you deny them. I mean you establish the state together and then you deny.] Decision rule 1: If a unit of coding can be coded both under problem definition and sources of the problem, it should be coded under sources of the problem.

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Decision rule 2: If a unit of coding can be coded both under sources of the problem and moral evaluations, it should be coded under sources of the problem. Label 1.3 Outcomes of the problem (Problemin sonuçları) Definition: A unit of coding belongs into this category if a participant identifies the direct or indirect effects and consequences of the problem. Indicators: Zarar, yarar, kişiler, sistem, hayvan, çevre [damage, benefit, people, system, animal, environment] Example: 50-60 bin küçükbaş hayvanın yaşadığı yani yetiştirdiği onların deyimiyle doğu, güneydoğu, biz Kürdistan diyoruz, bugün inmiş 20.000 küçükbaş hayvan. 50-60 bin küçükbaş hayvanın yetiştirdiği bir coğrafya bugün işte dedim ya 15-20 bin küçükbaş hayvan yetiştiriyor. O kadar demek ki zarar vermiş. Hiçbir insan gidip de o yaylalarda hayvancılık yapamıyor, arıcılık yapamıyor. [50-60 thousand sheeps and goats used to live in, in their saying East and Southeast [Turkey], in our saying Kurdistan. Now the number decreased to 20 thousands sheeps and goats. This region used to breed 50-60 thousand sheeps and goats, but now as I said 15-20 thousands sheeps and goats. This means [the problem] inflicted that much damage. No one could breed animals on those higlands any more, no one could do beekeeping.] Label 1.4. Moral judgments (Ahlaki değerlendirmeler/yargılar) Definition: A unit of coding belongs into this category if a participant evaluates causal agents and their effects. If a participant expresses any kind of moral judgment related to the parties to the problem, this will be classified in this category. It can also include general evaluations for actors. Indicators: Aktörler için olumsuz ifadeler, mağdur, masum, suçlu, gururlu [negative statements for actors, victim, innocent, guilty, proud] Example 1: [Hiçbir Kürt genci, Mustafa Kemal‘in kitabını okumuyor. Önyargılı çünkü.] [No Kurdish youth reads Mustafa Kemal‘s book because they are prejudiced.] Example 2: [Bu sorun yüzünden Kürtler mağdur oldu.] [Kurds were victimized because of this problem.]

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Decision rule: If a unit of coding can be coded both under moral evaluations and outcomes of the problem, it should be coded under moral judgments. Label 1.5. Solutions to the problem (Problem için çözüm önerileri) Definition: A unit of coding belongs into this category if a participant expresses any offer, any treatments and any recommendation for the resolution of the problem. If a participant suggests any idea for the improvement of the problem, this should be classified under this category. Indicators: Gerek, istek [need, wish] Example: Hani biz diyoruz ya tek taraflı hiçbir şey çözülemez. Yani ister istemez çift taraflı olmak gerekiyor. Yani bizim liderimiz Öcalan‘dır, onların lideri, hani, Erdoğan‘dır. İkisinin görüşmesi ister istemez olması gerekiyor. [We say that nothing can be solved unilaterally. I mean, whether you want or not, two sides should participate. Our leader is Öcalan and their leader is Erdoğan. They should meet no matter what.] Decision rule: If a unit of coding can be coded both under barriers to the problem and solutions to the problem, it should be coded under solutions for the problem. Label 1.6. Barriers to the solution of the problem (Çözümün önündeki engeller) Definition: Segments should be coded under one of the codes below if a participant expresses 1) any obstacles to the resolution of the problem, 2) any reason why this problem will not be solved and 3) any opinion why this problem will continue to exist. Indicators: Neden çözülmüyor, engeller [why it is not solved, obstacles] Example: yani, açık ve dürüst bir politika izlenmediği için çözülmez, birincisi bu. [I mean, first of all, it cannot be solved due to lack of a transparent and honest policy.]

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Codes in main category 2: Definition of the problem Segments should be coded under one of the codes below 1) if a participant expresses any opinion about naming and conceptualizing the problem and 2) if a participant expresses anything related to what the problem is and what the problem is not. In this category, if a participant expresses a label together with the word ‗problem‘, it will be clearly classified as a problem definition. Label 2.1. Basic, historical and multifaceted problem (Temel, tarihi ve çok yönlü bir sorun) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label below if a participant expresses any characteristics of the problem such as its being very old, very historical, very basic or being multifaceted. Indicators: Büyük, köklü, çok yönlü, diğer halkları da kapsayan bir sorun [big, deep-rooted, multi-faceted, a problem including other people too] Example 1: [Sorunun tarihsel bir geçmişi olduğunu düşünüyorum.] [I think the problem has a historical background.] Example 2: [Türkler diyor ki Kürt sorunu. Hâlbuki ülke sorunudur. Bizim sorunumuz değildir diyorlar.] [Turks say that it is a Kurdish problem. However, it is the country‘s problem. They say it is not our problem.] Label 2.2. Social and economic problem (Sosyal ve ekonomik bir sorun) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label below if a participant expresses any characteristics of the problem such as its being social and societal and/or economic. In addition, if the problem is defined as an underdevelopment problem, it should be coded under this label as well. Indicators: Ekonomik, geri kalmışlık, sosyal, toplumsal [economic, underdevelopment, social, societal] Example: Sosyal boyutu var. [It [Kurdish question] has a social dimension.] Label 2.3. Rights, identity and democracy problem (Hak, kimlik ve demokrasi sorunu)

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Definition: Segments should be coded under this label below if a participant expresses the problem as a Kurdish rights and identity problem or democratization problem (of Turkey). Indicators: Haksızlıklar, dil, anayasal ve hukuk sorunu [injustices, language, constitutional and legal problem] Example 1: Kimlik, kimlik sorunudur. Böyle bir sorundur. [It is an identity problem. It is such a problem.] Example 2: Bu bir demokrasi sorunu yani. [I mean, this is a democracy problem.] Example 3: Bir hukuk sorunu var bu anlamda. [In that sense, there is a legal problem.] Label 2.4. Independence and exploitation problem (Bağımsızlık ve sömürgecilik sorunu) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label below if a participant mentions the problem as independence and freedom problem for Kurds. In addition, the segments should be coded under this label if participants also mention the problem as an exploitation problem which is caused by Turkey. Indicators: Varlık, bağımsız olmak, özgürlük, Kürdistan, sömürge [existence, to be independent, freedom, Kurdistan, colony] Example 1: Özetle belirtirsek, bu Kürtlerin varlık meselesi. [In a nutshell, this is an existence problem for Kurds.] Example 2: Ya temelde Kürt sorunu deyince yani buradaki herkesin de söyleyeceği şey bağımsızlık, özgürlük. [Fundamentally, when the Kurdish problem is mentioned, everybody in here will say independence, freedom.] Label 2.5. Terrorism and PKK problem (Terörizm ve PKK sorunu) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label below if a participant mentions the problem as a terrorism and/or PKK problem in general. Indicators: Bölücülük, terörist [separatism, terrorist] Example: Terörist sorunu. PKK sorunu. [It is a terrorist problem. A PKK problem.]

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Label 2.6. “There is no Kurdish problem” (Kürt sorunu yoktur) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label below 1) if a participant mentions that there is no Kurdish problem indeed, 2) if a participant denies the reality of the problem and 3) if a participant mentions this is also part of a plot of foreign powers on Turkey. Indicators: İnanmamak, oyunun bir parçası [not believing, part of a plot] Example: Bu normalde esasında bir sorun değil. Ben 1980 öncesi Mersin siyasi hareketinde uzun süre sol, sosyalist bir yapıda olduğum için mücadele vermiş bir insanım. Biz o zamanlarda sokaklarda eylemler yaptığımız zaman, o zamanın Kürtleri, Kürt sosyalist arkadaşlarımızla asla nerelisin dahi diye söylemezdik, sormazdık. Çünkü bir amaç vardı, sosyalizm, amacımız oydu çünkü. Onun uğruna bir mücadele vermekti. O yüzden de burada sokaklarda çok rahat bir şekilde sokaklarda eylemlerimizi yapıyorduk, kimseye kimliğinden dolayı şey yapmıyorduk, akıllara bile gelinmiyordu. [In fact, this is normally not a problem. I am a person who struggled in a leftist and socialist movement in Mersin before 1980. At that time, when we protested with our Kurdish socialist friends on the streets, we were not telling or asking each other ‗where are you from?‘ Our aim was socialism. That‘s why we were protesting on these streets, we were not interested in anybody‘s identity; we were not even thinking about it.] Label 2.7. Kurdism problem (Kürtçülük sorunu) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label below if a participant mentions the problem 1) as a Kurdism problem and 2) as a problem caused by the Kurdish nationalists and their emphasis on the Kurdish identity. Indicators: Dayatma, Kürtçü [imposition, Kurdist] Example: Kürtçülük sorunu var. [There is a Kurdism problem.] Label 2.8. Miscellaneous A unit of coding belongs into this category if a participant expresses anything that does not belong to the above categories, but related to the definitions of the problem.

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Codes in main category 3: Sources of the problem Segments should be coded under one of the codes below if a participant expresses any forces, actions, and situations creating the Kurdish problem. The category applies regardless of the time that causes of the problem have emerged e.g., before the Republic of Turkey or after the Republic of Turkey. Label 3.1. Suppression of Kurds and Kurds’ not having freedom (Kürtlerin baskı altında olması ve özgür olamaması) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label below if a participant expresses 1) Kurds‘ feelings of suppression, 2) Kurds‘ not being free, and 3) lack of justice and equality in Turkey as the sources of the Kurdish problem. Indicators: Eşitlik, adalet, eksiklik, yoksunluk, hak, özgürlük arayışı, baskı, yasaklar, tutuklamalar [equality, justice, deficiency, deprivation, rights, quest for freedom, suppression, prohibitions, arrests] Example 1: Mademki biz bugüne kadar kardeşlik, eşitlik, hak ve hukuk çerçevesi içerisinde bakıyorsak birbirimize, bir kardeşin ve bir hak ve adaletin olduğu bir yerde kimse kimseye bunları yapamaz ki bunun adı da ne kardeşliktir, ne adalettir, ne eşitliktir. Bu yüzden bu sorun bugüne kadar geldi. [If we are seeing each other from the perspective of fellowship, equality, rights and law, nobody can do these to anyone in a place where there is fellowship, rights and justice. This is not fellowship, justice, or equality. Because of this, this problem has lingered until today.] Example 2: Bunların temeline baktığımız zaman bunların temelinde bir hak arayışı bir özgürlük arayışı var. [When we look at the sources of these, there is a quest of right, a quest of freedom.] Label 3.2. Denial of Kurds’ existence and their cultural rights (Kürtlerin varlığının ve kültürel haklarının inkârı) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if participants express denial of the existence of Kurds and their cultural rights by the Turkish state either consciously or unconsciously as the sources of the Kurdish problem.

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Indicators: İnkar, dil, kültür, kimlik, haksızlık, asimilasyon politikaları [denial, language, culture, identity, injustice, assimilation policies] Example 1: Biz Türkiye‘nin varlığını arkadaşların da belirttiği gibi kabul ediyoruz varlığını yani, dillerini, eşitliklerini kabul ediyoruz ama o sistemin dayattığı dayanağa göre onlar bizim varlığımızı kabul etmiyorlar. [As our friends also noted, we accept the existence of Turkey. I mean, we accept its existence, language and equalities but, they do not accept our existence due to the imposition of the system.] Example 2: En son işte geldin asimile ettin. Asimile ettikten sonra sistemi dayattın, sistemi kabul etmek için zorladın ve en sonunda hani Kürtler dedi ki böyle olmaz, artık bu kadarına biz yokuz. [Lastly, you came and assimilated [Kurds]. After assimilation, you imposed the system, forced us to accept the system and, at the end, Kurds said it is unacceptable. We can no longer tolerate it.] Label 3.3. Economic reasons and feudalism (Ekonomik sebepler ve feodalite) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label 1) if a participant expresses economic problems especially the financial problems in the East and Southeast regions of Turkey and 2) if a participant mentions feudalism and negligence of the region as the sources of the Kurdish problem. Indicators: Maddi yetersizlik, geri kalmışlık, yatırım, yaşam standartları, bölgenin ihmali, feodalite, feodal yapı [financial difficulty, backwardness, investment, living standards, negligence of the region, feudalism, feudal structure] Example 1: Ülke yönetiminde yer alan birçok iktidarın Doğu ve Güneydoğu‘ya zamanında ve doğru yerde yatırım yapmaması, kendi kaderine terk etmesi. [The failure of most governments to invest in the East and Southeast in the right time and place, leaving the region to its own fate.] Example 2: Kimisi diyor niye bizim toprağımız yok. Toprak var da kullandığı, ektiği, biçtiği de niye bizim ismimiz yok o toprakta. [Some ask why we do not have lands. There is a land, but why are our names not on the land we use and cultivate?] Label 3.4. Humiliation of and discrimination against Kurds (Kürtlere ayrımcılık

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Appendices yapılması ve Kürtlerin aşağılanması) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) discrimination against Kurds, 2) exclusion of Kurds in society and 3) humiliation of Kurds as the sources of the Kurdish problem. It should be noted that only negative discrimination, but not positive discrimination, should be coded under this label. Indicators: Dışlamak, hor görmek, aşağılamak [to exclude, to despise, to humiliate] Example 1: Ama sonradan gördüğünüz gibi biz sanki ikinci sıradan bir ırkmışız gibi, ikinci sınıfmışız gibi. Ondan dolayı yani şu an Batı‘ya ya da başka bir yere giderseniz Kürt‘üm desen, ay bu Kürt‘müş. Sonuçta onlar bana bunu yapıyorsa ben de hani bunun bir sorun olduğunu düşünürüm. Yani sorun ortada ki biz başka dili konuştuğumuzda siz bu dili iyi konuşamıyorsunuz derler, ama bizim dilimiz değil ki! [As you see afterwards, we are like a secondary race, like second-class citizens. Because of that, if you go to West and say you are a Kurd, they will say ―Oh, this is a Kurd!‖ In the end, if they do this to me, I think this is a problem. I mean they say you cannot speak this [Turkish] language very well when we speak it. But this [Turkish] is not our language anyway!] Label 3.5. Existence of Kurds (Kürtlerin var olması) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if participants express the existence of Kurds, or in other words, their living in Turkey, as causes of the problem. It should be noted here this label is mentioned in a sarcastic way. Indicators: Kürtlerin varlığı, Kürtlerin TC‘de yaşaması [existence of Kurds, Kurds‘ living in Turkey] Example 1: Diyor ki eğer bugün Türkiye‘de bir ekonomi sorunu olursa, Türkiye‘de bir ekonomi sorunu varsa ya da bir iç çatışma sorunu varsa ya da bir kaos noktasına gelecek noktalar varsa ya da biri hak aramaya kalkıyorsa bunun sebebi Kürtlerdir. Kürtleri aslında yok edersek bu varlık sebebini yok edersek aslında o sorun çözülecek. Bu noktada bakıyor, diyor ki ekonomisinin çökmesinin sebebi Kürtlerdir.

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[They say if there is an economic problem in Turkey, an internal conflict problem or if there are some issues which evolve into chaos or some people start claiming their rights, the reason is Kurds. They think if they get rid of Kurds, the problem will be solved. They see the problem from this point. They say that the reason behind economic downfall is Kurds.] Label 3.6. Turkish Republic’s founding philosophy (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin kuruluş felsefesi) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label 1) if a participant expresses the founding philosophy of the republic of Turkey as problematic and that this is the cause of the problem and 2) if a participant expresses lack of tolerance on cultural rights in Turkey unlike in Ottoman Empire as the causes of the Kurdish problem. Indicators: Hoşgörü, kabul, Cumhuriyet, bağımsızlık, toprak, verilen sözlerin tutulmaması [tolerance, acceptance, Republic, independence, land, broken promises] Example 1: Osmanlı Devleti ve Kürtlerle 1800‘lü yıllara kadar hiçbir sorun yoktur. Kürtler mesela eğitimlerini o dönemlerde medreselerde bir biçimiyle ana dilleriyle görüyorlar. İşte bölgedeki köy isimleri, il isimleri, eyalet isimleri Kürtçe telaffuz ediliyor. Osmanlılarca hoş görülüyor, kabul görülüyor, sıkıntı olmuyor. [There was no problem between the Ottoman state and the Kurds up to 1800s. For example, Kurds had their education in Kurdish in madrasas. The names of villages, provinces, counties were all pronounced in Kurdish. These were tolerated and accepted by the Ottomans. There was no problem.] Example 2: Cumhuriyetin kuruluşundan beri mesela bu ülke zaten kaynağından sorun yaratılmış, zemininden sorun var. Çünkü Kürtleri 4 parçaya bölüyor. [Since the foundation of the Republic, there was a problem from the root, from the foundation. Because it divided the Kurds into four.] Label 3.7. Parties (Taraflar) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if participants express any actor or party as the causes of the problem. This category should be applied regardless of the country.

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Indicators: Eski iktidarlar, dış etkenler/ülkeler (İngiltere gibi), milliyetçi Türkler, İsmet İnönü, Suriye [former governments, external factors/countries (such as England), nationalist Turks, İsmet İnönü, Syria] Example 1: yani uluslararası devletler, örneğin bir Amerika veya bir İngiltere veya bir Fransa. [I mean international states such as America, England or France.] Example 2: Grup olarak da kendi ırklarını üstün görmeye çalışan milliyetçi Türkler mi desem, milliyetçi insanlar mı desem? [In terms of groups, shall I say nationalist Turks who see their race superior, or shall I say nationalist people?] Label 3.8. Kurds’ being deceived (Kürtlerin kandırılması) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses the causes of the problem as 1) Kurds‘ being deceived very easily, 2) believing very fast and 3) Kurds‘ being used by other groups or countries. Indicators: Piyon, kandırılmak, Kürt milliyetçiliği [pawn, to be deceived, Kurdish nationalism] Example 1: Bu sorun aslında Türkiye‘de çoğunluğun kullanılması. İstediği zaman bir yöne, bir tarafa doğru yönlendirebiliyorsun insanları. Kürt memleketin en, şu an çoğunlukta olan bir grubu. Yani kullanıldı. [This problem is indeed about using the majority in Turkey. You can direct people in one direction whenever you want. Kurds are in majority [among minorities] in the country. I mean they were used.] Example 2: Kandırılabilecek en kolay toplum onlar olduğu için. [Because it is the easiest to deceive them [Kurds].] Label 3.9. Turkish state’s wrongdoings (Devlet eliyle yanlışlıklar yapılması) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) mistakes of the Turkish state either consciously or unconsciously such as 12 September coup and 2) provocations of political parties as the causes of the problem. Indicators: Faşizm, askeri darbe, 12 Eylül [fascism, military coup, 12 September]

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Example: Tabi yanlışlıklar da oldu. Devlet eliyle, işte başka yöntemlerle. Ne gibi yanlışlıklar mesela askeriye tarafından kullanılmış, efendime söyleyeyim, yani askeriye tarafından bombalanmış, PKK‘ya atılmış. Efendime söyleyeyim onun eliyle olaylar çıkartılmış. [Indeed there were some mistakes, either by the state or other methods. What kind of mistakes? For example, it was bombed by the [Turkish] military, but PKK was blamed. [The military] created the tension.] Label 3.10. Imperialism (Emperyalizm) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses imperialism or the Greater Middle East Project which is also the outcome of imperialism as the causes of the Kurdish problem. Indicators: Emperyalizm, Amerika, İsrail, Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi [imperialism, America, Israel, Greater Middle East Project] Example 1: Ama ne yazık ki uzak yerlerdeki emperyalizm, baktı ki bununla iç savaş çıkaramayacak. [Unfortunately, imperialism at the far places realized that it won‘t be able to create a civil war with this.] Example 2: Bunda da dayatmanın kökeni nereye geliyor, bana göre, emperyalizm. [In this, what is the cause of imposition? In my opinion, it is imperialism.] Decision rule: If imperialism is mentioned as an ideology, it should be coded under this label. Label 3.11. Miscellaneous A unit of coding belongs into this category if a participant expresses anything that does not belong to the above categories, but related to the sources of the problem.

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Codes in main category 4: Moral judgments A unit of coding belongs into this category 1) if a participant evaluates causal agents and their effects, 2) if a participant expresses any kind of moral judgment related to the parties to the problem, and 3) if a participant expresses general evaluations for actors. This will be evaluated in two main subcategories: a) blame and b) praise. Label 4.1. Blame A unit of coding belongs into this category if a participant evaluates causal agents and their effects negatively in terms of 1) blaming and holding responsible for the Kurdish problem and 2) thinking they should feel shame, guilt and embarrassment because of the problem. Label 4.1.1. Turks (Türkler) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant accuses Turks among the other groups while making negative moral judgments. Indicators: Türk anneleri [Turkish mothers] Example: ya orada ―vatan sağ olsun değil‖ de ―bu kanın durmasını istiyoruz‖ demeleri gerekirken, demiyorlar. Bir daha evladımız olursa göndeririz. Çok yanlış. [Instead of saying ―long live homeland!‖ they should say ―we want this bloodshed to stop‖, but they don‘t say. They say they send their children [to the army] once again. This is very wrong.] Label 4.1.2. AKP, Erdoğan and his voter base (AKP, Erdoğan ve seçmeni) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant accuses the AKP government, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and people who vote for this political party among the other groups while making negative moral judgments. Indicators: İktidar, AKP‘liler [government, AKP supporters] Example: Şimdi 10 yıldır AKP hükümeti iktidarda, 10 yıl süre içerisinde hiçbir şekilde Kürt sorununa ilişkin herhangi bir şey yapmamıştır. Her defasında şeyi vadetmiş, işte demokratik açılım. [AKP government has not done anything related to the Kurdish problem in the last ten years. They always promised this democratic opening thing each time.] Label 4.1.3. The Turkish state and its system (Türk devleti ve sistem)

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Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant blames and holds responsible the Republic of Turkey, Turkish state or the system in this country among the other groups while making negative moral judgments. Indicators: T.C., sistemin kendisi, Türk ordusu, polis [The Republic of Turkey, system itself, Turkish Army, police] Example: 70‘lerde, 90‘larda o kadar öldürdün. Bir şey oldu mu? O kadar fail-i meçhul yaptın, bir şey oldu mu? Bitmez, ölümle bitmez. [You [the Turkish state] killed so many people in the 70s and in the 90s. So what? You caused so many unidentified murders. It does not end; it does not end with killings.] Label 4.1.4. Media (Medya) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant accuses media among the other groups while making negative moral judgments. Indicators: Medya, kanal, gazete [media, channel, newspaper] Example: aslında bu biraz da medyanın hatası da olabilir çünkü medya Diyarbakır‘ı çektiği zaman en kötü yerleri çekiyor. [Actually this might also be the mistake of the media because when media broadcasts in Diyarbakır it shows the worst places there.] Label 4.1.5. Kurds (Kürtler) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant accuses Kurds and think Kurds are responsible for the Kurdish problem among the other groups while making negative moral judgments. Indicators: Onursuz Kürtler, korucular [dishonorable Kurds, village guards] Example: Bugün Kürtlerin yaptığı hatalar da vardır. [Today, Kurds also made some mistakes.] Label 4.1.6. Those who deny the problem (Problemi inkâr edenler) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant accuses people who deny the reality of the Kurdish problem among the other groups while making negative moral judgments. Indicators: Reddedenler, terörizm sorunu [deniers, terrorism problem]

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Example 1: [İnsanlar da suçludur. Çünkü bu sorun vardır ve bu sorun yoktur diyen insan da suçludur. İktidar olması önemli değil. Bu sorunun varlığını inkâr eden herkes suçludur.] [People are guilty as well. Because, this [Kurdish] problem exists and those who say it does not are also guilty. It is not important whether they are in the government or not. Everyone who denies the existence of this problem is guilty.] Label 4.1.7. Large landowners (Büyük toprak sahipleri) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant accuses landowners among the other groups while making negative moral judgments. Indicators: Şıhlar, ağalar, toprak sahipleri [sheikhs, tribal leaders, landowners] Example 1: [Ama masum olmayanlar da kimi siyasi gruplardır, uzantılarıdır. Şıhlardır, toprak sahipleridir, büyük toprak sahipleridir.] [Those who are not innocent are some political groups and their extensions. They are sheikhs, landowners, and large landowners.] Label 4.1.8. Everybody (Herkes) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant accuses everybody while making negative moral judgments. Indicators: Hepimiz, her iki taraftan [all of us, from both sides] Example: hepimiz suçluyuz. [We are all guilty.] Label 4.1.9. Foreign powers (Dış etkenler) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label 1) if a participant accuses foreign powers and 2) thinks foreign powers are responsible for the Kurdish conflict among the other groups while making negative moral judgments. Indicators: Dış güçler, Amerika, İsrail [foreign powers, America, Israel Example: Deminden beri söz edilen dış etkenleri suçlayabiliriz. [We can blame the foreign powers that we have been talking about just a while ago.] Label 4.1.10. PKK and Abdullah Öcalan (PKK ve Abdullah Öcalan)

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Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant accuses either PKK or Abdullah Öcalan, or both among the other groups while making negative moral judgments. Indicators: Öcalan, Apo, örgüt [Öcalan, Apo, organization] Example: PKK‘yi suçlayabiliriz. [We can blame the PKK.] Label 4.1.11. Miscellaneous A unit of coding belongs into this category if a participant expresses anything that does not belong to the above categories, but related to negative moral evaluations in terms of blaming someone/some groups in the Kurdish problem.

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Label 4.2. Praise A unit of coding belongs into this category if a participant evaluates causal agents and their effects positively in terms of 1) evaluating actors/groups as victims of the problem, 2) evaluating actors/groups as innocent in this problem, 3) evaluating actors/groups that should feel pride in this problem, and 4) praising actors/groups in general. Label 4.2.1. Kurds and people who support their cause (Kürtler ve Kürtlerin davasına destek verenler) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses Kurds and people who support Kurds in the Kurdish struggle while making positive moral judgments. Indicators: Kürt çocukları, onurlu Kürtler [Kurdish children, honorable Kurds] Example 1: Yani biz geniş görüşlüyüz. [I mean we [Kurds] are open-minded.] Example 2: Çünkü bizim Türklere karşı bir önyargımız yok. [Because we [Kurds] don‘t have prejudice against Turks.] Label 4.2.2. Everybody (Herkes) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses everybody and people in general while making positive moral judgments. Indicators: Halk [people] Example: Ya sadece Türkü, Kürt‘ü değil, bütün Türkiye mağdur bence. [Not only Turks or Kurds, I think the whole Turkey has been victimized.] Label 4.2.3. PKK Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses PKK while making positive moral judgments. Indicators: PKK, örgüt [PKK, organization] Example: Şu anda mesela bulunduğumuz yerde rahatlıkla Kürtçe müzik dinleyebiliyoruz. Bunun nedeni ise devletin Kürt sorunuyla, Kürtleriyle kültürlerini tanıdıkları için değildir, devlete karşı mücadele veren silahlı güçler. [For example, we are now able to listen to Kurdish music without facing any difficulty. This is not because the government recognized the Kurdish problem or

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the Kurdish culture. [This is because] of the armed forces [PKK] who fight against the [Turkish] state.] Label 4.2.4. People who live in the region (Bölgede yaşayanlar) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses people who live in the East and Southeast regions of Turkey while making positive moral judgments. Indicators: Göç edenler, köylüler [migrants, villagers] Example 1: Köylerinden zorla topraklarından kovularak onlar mağdur. O çocuklar, orada yaşadıkları, topraklarına geri dönememeleri… [Those who were displaced from their lands [in the region] are the victims. Those people [in the region], their feelings, their not going back to their lands …] Example 2: Bu sorunun mağdurları açıkça ortadadır. Köylüler oldu. [The victims of this [Kurdish] problem are obvious. Villagers are the victims.] Label 4.2.5. Mothers (Anneler) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses mothers while making positive moral judgments. Indicators: Anne [mother] Example: Onun annesi masumdur çünkü acı çekiyordur. Evladını kaybetmiştir. O masumdur. [His mother is innocent because she is in pain. She lost her son. She is innocent.] Label 4.2.6. Low socio-economic status groups (Alt tabakalar) Definition Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses low SES groups or lower social class while making positive moral judgments. Indicators: Fakirler [poor people] Example: Mağdur olan bu ülkede yaşamakta olan alt tabakalar. [The people who are the victims [of this problem] are lower class people.] Label 4.2.7. People who work for conflict resolution and who pay a price (Çözüm için çalışanlar ve bedel ödeyenler) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) people who work and spend effort for the resolution of the Kurdish conflict and 2) people who pay the price for peace while making positive moral judgments.

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Indicators: Bedel, çözüm, can veren [price, solution, people who died] Example: Yani bu sorunun çözümü için mücadele edenler, Türkler olsun, Kürtler olsun, yani hangi etnik kimliğe sahip olursa olsun, bu yolda can verenler, bu yolda bedel ödeyenler, cezaevine girenler, yani, eline taşın altına koyanlar, bence gurur duyması gerekenler bunlardır. [I mean people who should feel proud of are those who struggle for the resolution of this problem, Turks or Kurds regardless of their ethnic identity, those who died in this cause, paid a price, went into prison, or took a responsibility.] Label 4.2.8. Turks (Türkler) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses Turks while making positive moral judgments. Indicators: Türkler, mağduriyet [Turks, victimhood] Example: Yarın öbür gün ne olacak, bir iç çatışma olabilir mi, çocuklarımız güzel okuyabilecek mi, çocuklarımız iyi bir ortam bulabilecek mi diye en büyük mağdur biziz. [What will happen the day after tomorrow? May there be an internal conflict? Will our children continue their education freely? Will they find a free environment? We [Turks] are the biggest victims.] Label 6.2.9. Casualties and their relatives (Ölenler ve yakınları) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses casualties due to the Kurdish conflict and their relatives while making positive moral judgments. Indicators: Ölmek, ölenin yakını [to die, relatives of the deceased] Example 1: ölen askerler. [Soldiers who died.] Example 2: ölenler, ölenlerin yakınları. [People who died and their relatives.] Label 4.2.10. The Republic of Turkey and its army (TC ve ordusu) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Armed Forces while making positive moral judgments.

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Indicators: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, ordu [Republic of Turkey, army] Example 1: Ama en büyüğü Türkiye Cumhuriyeti mağdur. [But, the biggest victim is the Republic of Turkey.] Example 2: Türk ordusu mağdur. [Turkish Armed Forces are the victim.] Label 4.2.11. Miscellaneous A unit of coding belongs into this category if a participant expresses anything that does not belong to the above categories, but related to moral evaluations in terms of praising someone/some groups/actors in the Kurdish problem.

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Codes in main category 5: Solutions to the problem Segments should be coded under one of the codes below 1) if a participant expresses any offer, any treatments and any recommendation for the resolution of the problem, and 2) if a participant suggests any idea for the improvement of the problem. Label 5.1. General amnesty and reintegration of PKK members into society (Genel af ve gerillayı topluma kazandırma) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) an amnesty both for Abdullah Öcalan and PKK members, and 2) reintegration of both ex-PKK members and current PKK members into society as the solution for the Kurdish conflict. Indicators: Hapis, af, Abdullah Öcalan‘ın serbest bırakılması, PKK üyeleri, gerilla, topluma kazandırma [imprisonment, amnesty, release of Abdullah Öcalan, PKK members, guerrillas, reintegration] Example 1: Tabii arkadaşın da dediği gibi başta başkan Apo‘nun [özgür] olmasını istiyoruz. [Of course, as our friend said, we want them to release our leader Abdullah Öcalan first.] Example 2: Ama sadece af değil, aftan sonra bu iyileştirme programı, yani topluma kazandırmaları lazım. [Not only an amnesty, but also an improvement program after the amnesty, I mean integration [of PKK members] into society should be facilitated.] Label 5.2. Restoration of rights and changes to the constitution (Alınan hakların geri verilmesi ve anayasada değişim) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) reinstating the rights of Kurds which were taken away for a long period of time and 2) eliminating the barriers for the cultural rights of Kurds such as barriers to education in the mother tongue, and 3) suggesting a new constitution which includes these changes and changing the words of ‗Turks‘ into an inclusive identity as the solution for the Kurdish conflict. Indicators: Kimlik, dil, müzik, kültür, baskıyı azaltmak, Kürtçe, anadil, yeni bir anayasa/anayasada değişim, evrensel hukuk, demokratik, yasa değişiklikleri

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[identity, language, music, culture, reducing the pressure, Kurdish language, mother tongue, a new constitution/constitutional changes, universal law, democratic, changes in law] Example 1: Dilini serbest, müziğini, bayramını, bayrağını, her şeyini serbest bırakmak. Doyum olursa sorun ortadan kalkar. [To legalize their language, their music, their festivals, their ‗everything‘. If there is satisfaction, the problem will end.] Example 2: Eğer sen bunun ismine bile ‗Kürt açılımı‘ diyorsan benim haklarım olacak burada. E peki benim hangi haklarım olacak? Anadilde eğitim. [If you name it ‗Kurdish Opening‘, my rights must be included in it. What kind of rights? Education in mother tongue.] Label 5.3. To live equally with equal rights (Eşit haklarla eşit şekilde yaşamak) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) living together equally, 2) living with equal rights irrespective of ethnic identity and 3) implementation of democracy and human rights as the solution of the Kurdish conflict. Indicators: Eşitlik, eşit haklar, özgürlük, adalet, insan hakları ve demokrasi [equality, equal rights, freedom, justice, human rights and democracy] Example 1: İnsanoğlu fıtratı gereği toplu halde yaşamaktadır. Bu bence eşit hakları beraberinde getirmektedir. İnsanlar barış ve huzur içinde yaşamalıdır ve eşit haklara sahip olmalıdır. [Humankind lives together by nature. I think this also brings along equal rights. People should live in peace and should have equal rights.] Example 2: Bu sorunun en ideal çözümü, önce özgürlük, eşitlik, adalet. [The most ideal solution to the [Kurdish] problem is, first, freedom, equality and justice.] Label 5.4. Dialogue between parties (Tarafların diyalog kurması) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) bringing the conflicting parties together and 2) establishing dialogue between the sides to the Kurdish conflict as the solution to the conflict.

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Indicators: AKP, Erdoğan, PKK, Abdullah Öcalan [AKP, Erdoğan, PKK, Abdullah Öcalan] Example: şimdi bu sorunun öncelikle tarafları kimlerdir, onlar bir araya gelmelidir. Yani bu sorunun makul çözümü taraflar diyalogla çözer. Yani konuşarak dolaylı ya da dolaysız, yani direk birbirleriyle görüşemeseler dahi kişilerin sözcüleri veya aracıları olmalıdır. [Now, those who are the sides to this problem should come together. I mean, sides solve this problem in the most reasonable way through dialogue. I mean, either directly or indirectly, they should have spokespersons or mediators even if they cannot meet directly.] Label 5.5. To stop deaths and lay down arms (Ölümleri durdurmak, silahları bırakmak) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) stopping the deaths, 2) laying down the arms and 3) protesting on the streets to stop bloodshed as the solution for the Kurdish conflict. Indicators: Gençler, ölümleri bitirmek, ateşkes sağlamak, PKK‘yı bitirmek, TSK, silah, şiddetin terk edilmesi, susturmak [young people, to halt the killings, to ensure ceasefire, to eliminate the PKK, Turkish Armed Forces, weapons, abandoning violence, to silence] Example 1: Yani bu ölümlerin bir kere durması lazımdır. Kesinlikle bunun durması lazımdır. [First, killings must be stopped. They must definitely be stopped.] Example 2: Bu çocukları öldürmesinler. [Let them not kill these kids.] Label 5.6. Economic development (Ekonomik kalkınma) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) economic development and 2) ending unemployment as the solution for the Kurdish conflict. Indicators: İş, işsizlik, ekonomik kalkınma, gelişme, işçi ve köylü sınıfına değer vermek [job, unemployment, economic development, growth, to value working class and villagers]

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Example 1: Ekonomik kalkınma ile. [With economic development.] Example 2: İşçi ve köylü sınıfına değer vererek çözmeyi düşünürdüm. [I would solve it [the problem] by valuing working class and villagers.] Label 5.7. To form a commission and discuss in a public forum (Bir komisyon oluşturulmalı ve kamuoyunda tartışılmalı) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) forming a commission such as wise people commission and a commission that includes opinion-leaders and 2) discussing the problem in public with a bottom-up approach such as referendum as the solution of the Kurdish conflict. Indicators: Akil adamlar, akil insanlar, hakikatleri araştırma komisyonu, tartışmak, halk, referandum yapmak [wise men, wise people, truth and reconciliation commission, to discuss, people, to hold a referendum] Example 1: Bir araya gelip bir komisyon mu oluşturulur, bir akil adamlar grubu mu oluşturulur. [I don‘t know whether they come together and form a commission or form a wise- men commission.] Example 2: Oturacaklar o zaman hani sorunu karşılıklı tartışacaklar ama kimler gerçekten bu sorunu çözebilecek olan kişiler tartışacak. [They will then come together and discuss reciprocally, but only those who can really solve this problem.] Label 5.8. To meet with the concerned party (Sorunun muhatabıyla görüşülmeli) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses meeting with the concerned party such as the Kurdish movement or their leaders as the solution for the conflict. Indicators: BDP, PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, Erdoğan Example: Bizi bugüne getiren yani önderliğimizdir. Hani Türk halkını da bugüne getiren Erdoğan‘dır. Yani ikisi, muhatabı ikisidir. [The person who brings us until today is our leader [Öcalan]. The person who brings Turkish people until today is Erdoğan. I mean these two people are the addressees of the problem.]

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Label 5.9. Education (Eğitim) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) educating people or 2) improvement of the education system as the solution for the conflict. Indicators: Eğitim, eğitim sistemini iyileştirmek, cehaleti ortadan kaldırmak [education, to improve education system, to eliminate ignorance] Example 1: Ya eğitim sanırım tek çözüm, ama eğitim de böyle bir yanda, tamam sizi eğittik artık sorun kalmadı denebilecek bir şey değil. Bence çok zor bunun yok olması tamamen. [I think education is the only solution [to the problem], but education is not something like ―we educated you, there is no problem anymore‖. It is difficult to totally annihilate the problem.] Example 2: Ortadaki cehaleti kaldırarak. [By eliminating the ignorance.] Label 5.10. Awakening (Bilinçlenme olmalı) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) awakening such as need for awareness and love for the country people live in and 2) organizing of Turks and Kurds together, 3) bringing youn people together, 4) managing the country independently, and 5) applying Atatürk‘s principles as the resolution of the Kurdish conflict. Indicators: Bilinç oluşturmak, vatan, tek devlet, Türkler ve Kürtler birlikte örgütlenmeli, ortak çıkar, birleşmek, gençliği bir araya getirmek, güven, bağımsız, içişler, halkçılık, Atatürkçü [to create awareness, homeland, one state, Turks and Kurds should organize together, shared interests, to unite, bringing youth together, trust, independent, interior affairs, populism, Ataturkist] Example 1: İnsanları bilinçlendirmek. [To create awareness among the people.] Example 2: Yani ikincisi, neden Türkiye kendi iç dinamikleriyle bunu çözemiyor, güven ortamının yaratılması gerekiyor. Kürt ve Türklerin, birbirlerine güven ortamı yaratmaları gerekiyor ki bu güven ortamının yaratılmasının çok zor olduğunu düşünüyorum.

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[I mean, secondly, why could Turkey not solve this problem with its own internal dynamics? There is a need to create an environment of trust. There is a need for Turks and Kurds to create a mutual environment of trust but I think it is very difficult.] Label 5.11. Islam Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) Islam and 2) uniting under the same religion (Islam) as the resolution of the Kurdish conflict. Indicators: Kuran-ı Kerim, İslam, Müslüman dindaşlığı [The Koran, Islam, Muslim fellowship] Example: Dindir. Dindaşlık çok kuvvetli bir kavramdır ve bütün meseleleri çözer diye düşünüyorum. [It is religion. Muslim fellowship is a very strong concept and I think it can solve all problems.] Label 5.12. Miscellaneous A unit of coding belongs into this category if a participant expresses anything that does not belong to the above categories, but related to the resolution of the problem.

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Codes in main category 6: Barriers to the solution of the problem Segments should be coded under one of the codes below if a participant expresses 1) any obstacles to the resolution of the problem, 2) any reason why this problem will not be solved and 3) any opinion why this problem will continue to exist. Label 6.1. Profiteers (Rant yiyenlerin olması) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses profiteers from the Kurdish problem such as the Republic of Turkey or other actors such as arm traders as obstacles to the resolution of the problem. Indicators: Rant, çıkar, TSK, OHAL‘i isteyenler, MHP [rent, interest, Turkish Armed Forces, people who want to keep OHAL37 regime, MHP] Example 1: Bu sorunu bence devlet isteseydi şimdiye kadar çoktan çözerdi. Mutlaka bunun altında bir rant var, bir şeyler var. Çözmemek için elinden gelen her şeyi yapıyorlar. [If the [Turkish] state wanted to solve this problem, it would solve it long time ago. Certainly, there is a rent behind it, there is something. They do anything not to solve the problem.] Example 2: Yani o işten rant görenler, bu işten ekmek yiyenler, bu işin bitmesini istemiyorlar. Keza yine hala öyle de. OHAL‘i getirmeye çalışıyorlar. MHP bir kaç defa şeyde bulundu. Olmadı inşallah olmaz bu şekilde gider. [I mean those who seek rents from this problem, they do not want this problem to be solved. It is still like that. They want to bring OHAL regime back. The MHP made a few attempts. It didn‘t happen and I hope it will not happen.] Label 6.2. Lack of empathy (Empati kurmadığımız için) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) lack of empathy, 2) Turks‘ continuing to say ―long live homeland!‖ and 3) Turks‘ not saying ―we want peace‖ as obstacles to the resolution of the problem. Indicators: Empati, barış, vatan sağolsun, yine gönderirim [empathy, peace, long live homeland, I send [my son] again]

37 The OHAL (Olağanüstü Hal) was created in 1987 which means a state of emergency legislation as an attempt to deal with the Kurdish conflict. 232

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Example 1: Bir sorunu çözmenin veyahut anlamının en basit yolu empati kurmaktır. Çok basit. Ama biz en basit bir şey yapmadığımız için işimizi zorlaştırıyoruz. Empati kurmadığımız içindir. Kendimizi karşı tarafın yerine koymazsak bu sosyal ortamdaki sorunları bile anlayamayız. [The easiest way to solve or to understand a problem is to empathize. It is very easy. But, we make it difficult as we do not even do the easiest one. It is because we are not empathizing [with the other]. If we do not empathize for the opposing party, we cannot even understand the problems in this social environment.] Label 6.3. Not accepting the existence of the problem (Bir sorun olduğunu kabul etmemek) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses not accepting the existence of the Kurdish problem or seeing it as a terrorism problem as obstacles to the resolution of the Kurdish problem. Indicators: Reddetmek, inkâr etmek, kabul etmemek, terör sorunu [to reject, to deny, not to accept, terrorism problem] Example 1: Eğer bu sorunu kabul ediyorlarsa zaten hani çözüm olur. Sen ortada bir sorun olduğunu kabul etmiyorsun ki, ortada bir Kürt sorunu olduğunu kabul etmiyor. [If they accept this problem, then, there can be a solution. You don‘t even accept the existence of a problem. They don‘t accept that there is a Kurdish problem.] Label 6.4. Trying to silence the Kurds (Kürtleri susturmaya çalışmaları) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) silencing the Kurds and 2) arguing Kurds as pawns of the foreign powers as obstacles to the resolution of the problem. Indicators: İngilizler, Amerika, maşa, ―Kürtler kullanılıyor‖ demek, hor görmek, aşağılamak [British people, America, pawn, to say ―Kurds are used‖, to look down, to humiliate] Example 1: Diyorlar ki işte Kürtler işte İngilizlerle Amerikalıların maşasıdır. Öyle olaya dar da bakan ciddi bir kesim de vardır. Hani bu dil de daha çok hükümetin, devletin, siyasetçilerin dilidir. Bu sorunun çözümünü istemeyenlerin dilidir.

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[They say that Kurds are the pawns of British and Americans. There is a vast majority who see this problem from this narrow perspective. This discourse often belongs the government, the [Turkish] state, and politicians. This is the discourse of those who do not want a solution for this problem.] Example 2: Ama bir çözümün olacağını hiç düşünmüyorum. Çünkü her defasında Kürtleri susturmaya çalıştılar. [I don‘t think there will be a solution because they tried to silence the Kurds every time.] Label 6.5. Trying to solve the problem with non-parties (Sorunu taraf olmayanla çözmeye çalışmak) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) trying to solve the problem with non-parties or with parties who are not side to the conflict and 2) not meeting with Abdullah Öcalan as obstacles to the resolution of the problem. Indicators: PKK, BDP, Abdullah Öcalan Example: Mesela bu sorunun muhatabı kardeşim PKK‘dir yani, bu bir gerçektir. İnkâr edilemez. Mesela bu sorunun, PKK‘nin lideri işte Türkiye‘de İmralı‘da cezaevinde tutuklanıyor, gidip CHP ile çözüm arayamazsın mesela bu bir çelişki olur. CHP bu sorunu başlatmamıştır. Bu sorunu PKK başlatmıştır. Abdullah Öcalan başlatmıştır. [For example, the addressee of this problem is PKK, this is the reality. This cannot be denied. For example, the leader of this problem has been kept in İmralı in Turkey. You cannot look for a solution with CHP. That would be a contradiction. CHP did not start this problem. PKK started it. Abdullah Öcalan started it.] Label 6.6. Foreign powers and their political interest, imperialism (Uluslararası devletler ve siyasi payları, emperyalizm) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) foreign powers, 2) their political interest in the Kurdish conflict, and 3) imperialism in general as obstacles to the resolution of the problem.

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Indicators: Amerika, Rusya, Yunanistan, Fransa, İngiltere, Avrupa, İran, Suriye, çıkar [America, Russia, Greece, France, England, Europe, Iran, Syria, interest] Example 1: Sorunun bitmesini istemeyen Amerikan ajanları, İsrail ajanları olsun. Bizim burada hepsi fink atıyorlar. [American spies and Israeli spies, who do not want this problem to end, travel around here in this region.] Example 2: Yabancılar Kürtleri yönetiyor. Bu el kalkmadıkça çözülmez. [Foreign powers manage the Kurds. Without the removal of this hand, the problem cannot be solved.] Label 6.7. Incompetent government officials and administrators (Kötü yöneticiler) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) incompetent government officials and administrators such as ignorant governors and 2) being kept same positions by the same people/politicians as obstacles to the resolution of the problem. Indicators: İktidar, cahil insanlar, eğitimsiz, başbakanın tek adam rolünü üstlenmesi, görüş almamak [government, ignorant people, uneducated, prime minister‘s one man role, not taking another opinion] Example 1: Ama böyle cahil insanlar baştayken mümkün değil. [It is not possible [to solve it] with these ignorant people who are in the government.] Example 2: Onla çözüm üretmek biraz zor gözüküyor çünkü öyle kuruluşlar yani bütün kuruluşlar tek bir insanın ağzına bakıyor. Tek bir insanın ağzına bakıyor. Örneğin eğitimde bir politika geliştirilecekse başbakanın ağzına bakılıyor, onlar milli eğitim bakanının, bilmem oradaki bürokratların falan veyahut da eğitim sendikalarının görüşü alınmıyor. Böyle de olunca bu iş zor. Zor hem de çok zor. [It seems very difficult to find a solution with that because all of the organizations wait for his [Erdoğan‘s] decision. Just one man‘s decision. For example, they wait for prime minister‘s words before developing education policies. Opinions of Minister of Education, bureaucrats or education unions are not taken into account. It is very difficult [to solve it] when the situation is like that.] Label 6.8. Kurds’ always demanding more (Kürtlerin hep daha fazla istemesi)

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Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) Kurds‘ always demanding more, 2) their discontent with whatever they get and 3) their desire for an independent Kurdistan as obstacles to the resolution of the problem. Indicators: Fazlasını istemek, anadilde eğitim, Kürdistan ya da özerkliğin istenmesi, açık açık anlatmamak [asking for more, education in mother tongue, demand for Kurdistan or an autonomous region, not to explain clearly] Example 1: O kadarını konuşamıyorum ben şu an için konuşabiliyorum, geleceği göremiyorum maalesef ama…çünkü ne kadar hak verirsek, istedikleri şeyleri versek, daha fazlasını istiyorlar, hep daha fazla, hep daha fazla, o yüzden çözülebileceği kanaatinde değilim. [I can‘t speak for that time but I can speak for this moment. Unfortunately, I cannot see the future but no matter how many rights or things we give them, they [Kurds] always want more, always more and more. For this reason, I don‘t believe this problem can be solved.] Example 2: İşte ama kardeşim gel bunu bölelim sen orada Kürdistan kal, biz burada Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kalalım, işte bu zor. Öyle kolay kolay çözülecek bir şey değil. Yani ben bunu 2 senede, 3 senede, 30 senede, 100 senede çözerim. Mümkün değil. Her şey verilir. Ama onun çözümü olmaz. Çünkü sen nitekim bu uğurda ölen iki taraftan da. [―Let‘s divide this country: you stay there in Kurdistan and we stay here in the Republic of Turkey.‖ This is difficult. It is not something that can be solved easily. I mean can I solve it in two years, three years, 30 years, 100 years… It is impossible. Everything might be given. But, this is not solvable as there are deaths from both sides.] Label 6.9. Turkey’s domestic politics (Türkiye’nin iç politikası) Definition: Segments should be coded under this label if a participant expresses 1) Turkey‘s internal politics, 2) lack of honest politics and 3) suppression of oppositions in the current system as obstacles to the resolution of the problem. Indicators: Açık ve dürüst politika eksikliği, TC anayasası, TC devleti, muhalefet edenlerin bastırılması, KCK, Ergenekon, Ermeniler, etnik gruplar [lack of

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transparent and honest policies, Turkish Constitution, Turkish state, suppression of the opposition, KCK, Ergenekon, Armenians, ethnic groups] Example 1: Şimdi bu bakımdan, yani, açık ve dürüst bir politika izlenmediği için çözülmez, birincisi bu. [Now, in this matter, I mean, the problem cannot be solved for the lack of transparent and honest policies.] Example 2: O nedenle bu sorunun çözülmesi biraz orayla ilgili. Ha, biz ne yapacağız o ayrı bir nokta ama ben objektif olarak böyle görüyorum ve çözülebileceğine inanmıyorum. Türkiye‘nin iç politikasıyla çözülebileceğine inanmıyorum. [Consequently, the solution of this problem is related with this. It is a different topic what we will do about it, but, objectively, I see this problem like that and I don‘t believe [the problem] will be resolved. I don‘t believe this problem will be solved with the [current] domestic politics of Turkey.] Label 6.10. Miscellaneous A unit of coding belongs into this category if a participant expresses anything that does not belong to the above categories, but related to barriers to the resolution of the Kurdish problem.

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Appendix E. The complete list of statements No Statements Domain 1- Problem definitions 1 There is no Kurdish problem; there is a terror problem. 2 This problem is in fact a democratization problem. 3 The status of Kurds in Turkey can be defined in terms of colonialism. 4 This problem is a class-based problem 5 This problem is a problem created by the PKK. 6 This problem is an underdevelopment and unemployment problem. 7 This problem is a Kurdish identity problem. 8 This problem is Kurds‘ independence problem. 9 This problem is a rights and freedoms problem. 10 There is no Kurdish problem; there are problems of my fellow Kurdish brothers and sisters. 11 There is no Kurdish problem, there is a Kurdish invasion. Domain 2- Sources of the problem This problem exists because of the discrimination against Kurds and the mistreatment of Kurds in 12 the region by state officials. 13 This problem exists because of the denial of the Kurds for many years. 14 This problem stems from the instigation of foreign powers. 15 This problem stems from the feudal structure in the region. The source of the problem is the assimilation policies towards Kurds and withholding of their 16 cultural rights. 17 The source of this problem is the nation-state ideology of Turkey. 18 The cause of this problem is PKK and terror. Domain 3- Moral judgments 19 Turks and Kurds are fellows; separatists are traitors. 20 The media represent this problem to the people in a biased way. 21 AKP tries to dominate the region by inciting religious movements. 22 You don‘t have feelings if you don‘t cry for the terrorist who died in the mountains. 23 The PKK is a terrorist organization. 24 It is unacceptable that BDP embraces PKK militants. 25 Kurds and Turks have the same rights; I cannot understand what Kurds want. 26 The PKK is the actor of the Greater Middle East Project. 27 Village guards are betraying Kurds‘ cause. 28 The victims of this problem are the people living in the region. 29 Kurds are used as pawns by foreign powers. 30 Most Turks are quite prejudiced against Kurds. 31 CHP doesn‘t work enough for the solution of the problem. Domain 4- Solutions to the problem This problem can be solved through deep-rooted democratization and implementation of human 32 rights. 33 Turks and Kurds should unite again under the umbrella of Islam. 34 This problem can be solved through economic development and increased job opportunities. 35 An independent Kurdistan should be established. 36 The constitutional recognition of the existence of the Kurdish identity is required. 37 The recognition of rights to education and broadcasting in Kurds‘ own language is required. 38 Local administrations should be strengthened. 39 PKK should lay down their weapons. 40 Village guards should be abolished. 41 Agrarian and land reform should be implemented. 42 Kurdish people should be educated. 43 Abdullah Öcalan should be released. 44 The problem can be solved through Turkey‘s being independence in internal affairs. 45 The unitary state should not be changed. 46 TSK should fight and end terror through active counter-terrorism policies.

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47 The Oslo negotiations should continue. Domain 5- Barriers to the solution of the problem 48 This problem has not been solved because of those who profit from the problem. 49 This problem has not been solved because only harsh security measures have been used. 50 TSK doesn‘t want to finish this war. 51 AKP tries to create its own Kurds. 52 This problem has not been solved due to the lack of empathy between the parties. 53 This problem has not been solved because of America‘s interests in the region. 54 MHP is the biggest obstacle to the solution of the problem.

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Appendix F. Z-scores of the statements for each factor (Politicians) No Statements F1 F2 F3 F4 Domain 1- Problem definitions 1 There is no Kurdish problem; there is a terror problem. 1.25 -1.07 -1.23 -0.84 2 This problem is in fact a democratization problem. 0.23 1.11 0.75 1.78 3 The status of Kurds in Turkey can be defined in terms of -1.93 -1.88 0.25 -1.80 colonialism. 4 This problem is a class-based problem 0.39 -0.87 -0.08 -0.64 5 This problem is a problem created by the PKK. 0.04 -0.42 -1.60 -1.36 6 This problem is an underdevelopment and 0.34 -0.09 -1.31 -0.26 unemployment problem. 7 This problem is a Kurdish identity problem. -1.00 1.12 1.70 -0.03 8 This problem is Kurds‘ independence problem. -1.66 -1.23 -0.19 -0.64 9 This problem is a rights and freedoms problem. 0.13 1.26 1.52 0.26 10 There is no Kurdish problem; there are problems of my 0.34 -1.48 -1.34 -0.35 fellow Kurdish brothers and sisters. 11 There is no Kurdish problem, there is a Kurdish -0.73 -1.78 -1.30 -1.66 invasion. Domain 2- Sources of the problem 12 This problem exists because of the discrimination against -0.20 0.42 0.42 0.93 Kurds and the mistreatment of Kurds in the region by state officials. 13 This problem exists because of the denial of the Kurds -0.69 1.58 1.09 0.96 for many years. 14 This problem stems from the instigation of foreign 0.97 -0.11 -0.74 -0.64 powers. 15 This problem stems from the feudal structure in the 0.52 0.26 -0.83 0.23 region. 16 The source of the problem is the assimilation policies -1.18 1.15 0.95 0.93 towards Kurds and withholding of their cultural rights. 17 The source of this problem is the nation-state ideology of -1.14 0.61 1.30 0.73 Turkey. 18 The cause of this problem is PKK and terror. 0.01 0.29 -1.63 -0.67 Domain 3- Moral judgments 19 Turks and Kurds are fellows; separatists are traitors. 0.41 0.28 -0.77 -0.49 20 The media represent this problem to the people in a 0.38 -0.56 0.60 0.70 biased way. 21 AKP tries to dominate the region by inciting religious 0.60 -0.54 -0.33 -1.17 movements. 22 You don‘t have feelings if you don‘t cry for the terrorist -0.94 -0.10 1.07 -0.70 who died in the mountains. 23 The PKK is a terrorist organization. 1.44 1.30 -1.82 1.19 24 It is unacceptable that BDP embraces PKK militants. 0.10 0.15 -1.04 0.49 25 Kurds and Turks have the same rights; I cannot 0.08 -1.29 -1.13 -1.77 understand what Kurds want. 26 The PKK is the actor of the Greater Middle East Project. 1.58 -0.40 -1.03 0.32 27 Village guards are betraying Kurds‘ cause. -0.70 -0.69 0.48 -0.79 28 The victims of this problem are the people living in the 0.69 1.03 0.30 -0.38 region.

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29 Kurds are used as pawns by foreign powers. 0.64 -0.67 -1.21 -0.96 30 Most Turks are quite prejudiced against Kurds. -1.02 0.04 0.08 -1.63 31 CHP doesn‘t work enough for the solution of the -0.04 -1.32 0.48 0.11 problem. Domain 4- Solutions to the problem 32 This problem can be solved through deep-rooted 0.95 1.13 0.75 1.46 democratization and implementation of human rights. 33 Turks and Kurds should unite again under the umbrella -0.58 -1.12 -0.20 1.83 of Islam. 34 This problem can be solved through economic 1.09 0.92 0.22 1.02 development and increased job opportunities. 35 An independent Kurdistan should be established. -2.44 -1.88 -0.53 -0.99 36 The constitutional recognition of the existence of the -1.29 0.14 1.80 0.37 Kurdish identity is required. 37 The recognition of rights to education and broadcasting -1.28 0.47 1.58 0.64 in Kurds‘ own language is required. 38 Local administrations should be strengthened. -0.01 1.46 0.70 1.69 39 PKK should lay down their weapons. 1.88 2.20 -0.62 1.48 40 Village guards should be abolished. -0.27 0.39 0.93 -0.20 41 Agrarian and land reform should be implemented. 0.67 0.77 -0.01 -0.38 42 Kurdish people should be educated. 0.16 -0.02 -0.75 0.53 43 Abdullah Öcalan should be released. -1.83 -1.74 1.85 -1.05 44 The problem can be solved through Turkey‘s being 0.62 -0.28 -0.44 -0.67 independence in internal affairs. 45 The unitary state should not be changed. 2.03 0.69 -0.53 0.64 46 TSK should fight and end terror through active counter- 0.98 -0.97 -1.48 -0.32 terrorism policies. 47 The Oslo negotiations should continue. -1.17 0.47 1.65 0.70 Domain 5- Barriers to the solution of the problem 48 This problem has not been solved because of those who 0.99 0.87 -0.06 0.64 profit from the problem. 49 This problem has not been solved because only harsh 0.03 1.10 0.76 1.48 security measures have been used. 50 TSK doesn‘t want to finish this war. -0.65 -0.84 -0.16 -0.52 51 AKP tries to create its own Kurds. 0.47 0.08 0.78 -1.46 52 This problem has not been solved due to the lack of -0.17 0.87 0.30 -0.79 empathy between the parties. 53 This problem has not been solved because of America‘s 1.42 0.12 -0.03 0.52 interests in the region. 54 MHP is the biggest obstacle to the solution of the -0.50 -0.94 0.08 1.51 problem. Note. Z-scores in bold are significantly (p < .05) different from each of the other three z-scores, indicating ‗distinguishing statements‘.

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Appendix G. Z-scores of the statements for each factor (Experts)

No Statements F1 F2 Domain 1- Problem definitions 1 There is no Kurdish problem; there is a terror problem. -1.72 -0.39 2 This problem is in fact a democratization problem. 1.16 1.60 3 The status of Kurds in Turkey can be defined in terms of colonialism. 0.39 -1.91 4 This problem is a class-based problem 0.14 -1.06 5 This problem is a problem created by the PKK. -1.54 -0.41 6 This problem is an underdevelopment and unemployment problem. -0.31 1.23 7 This problem is a Kurdish identity problem. 1.41 0.66 8 This problem is Kurds‘ independence problem. 0.12 -1.99 9 This problem is a rights and freedoms problem. 1.53 1.16 10 There is no Kurdish problem; there are problems of my fellow Kurdish brothers -0.78 -0.70 and sisters. 11 There is no Kurdish problem, there is a Kurdish invasion. -1.81 -1.15 Domain 2- Sources of the problem 12 This problem exists because of the discrimination against Kurds and the 0.73 1.04 mistreatment of Kurds in the region by state officials. 13 This problem exists because of the denial of the Kurds for many years. 1.43 1.26 14 This problem stems from the instigation of foreign powers. -1.17 0.39 15 This problem stems from the feudal structure in the region. -0.66 -0.35 16 The source of the problem is the assimilation policies towards Kurds and 1.59 0.54 withholding of their cultural rights. 17 The source of this problem is the nation-state ideology of Turkey. 1.67 0.22 18 The cause of this problem is PKK and terror. -1.65 -0.48 Domain 3- Moral judgments 19 Turks and Kurds are fellows; separatists are traitors. -0.86 -0.10 20 The media represent this problem to the people in a biased way. 0.44 -0.23 21 AKP tries to dominate the region by inciting religious movements. 0.17 -0.65 22 You don’t have feelings if you don’t cry for the terrorist who died in the 0.21 0.02 mountains. 23 The PKK is a terrorist organization. -1.09 1.21 24 It is unacceptable that BDP embraces PKK militants. -0.78 0.07 25 Kurds and Turks have the same rights; I cannot understand what Kurds want. -1.49 -1.30 26 The PKK is the actor of the Greater Middle East Project. -0.94 -0.29 27 Village guards are betraying Kurds’ cause. -0.30 -0.32 28 The victims of this problem are the people living in the region. 0.56 1.32 29 Kurds are used as pawns by foreign powers. -1.28 -0.66 30 Most Turks are quite prejudiced against Kurds. 0.79 -1.44 31 CHP doesn’t work enough for the solution of the problem. 0.35 0.70 Domain 4- Solutions to the problem 32 This problem can be solved through deep-rooted democratization and 1.03 1.68 implementation of human rights. 33 Turks and Kurds should unite again under the umbrella of Islam. -1.01 -1.01

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34 This problem can be solved through economic development and increased job 0.37 1.37 opportunities. 35 An independent Kurdistan should be established. -0.15 -2.09 36 The constitutional recognition of the existence of the Kurdish identity is required. 1.00 -0.67 37 The recognition of rights to education and broadcasting in Kurds‘ own language 1.62 0.66 is required. 38 Local administrations should be strengthened. 1.12 1.48 39 PKK should lay down their weapons. 0.40 1.74 40 Village guards should be abolished. 0.88 0.50 41 Agrarian and land reform should be implemented. 0.35 1.01 42 Kurdish people should be educated. -0.86 0.68 43 Abdullah Öcalan should be released. 0.64 -1.58 44 The problem can be solved through Turkey’s being independence in internal -0.84 -0.52 affairs. 45 The unitary state should not be changed. -1.07 0.88 46 TSK should fight and end terror through active counter-terrorism policies. -1.74 -0.52 47 The Oslo negotiations should continue. 0.93 0.03 Domain 5- Barriers to the solution of the problem 48 This problem has not been solved because of those who profit from the problem. 0.34 0.10 49 This problem has not been solved because only harsh security measures have 0.95 -0.08 been used. 50 TSK doesn‘t want to finish this war. -0.28 -1.05 51 AKP tries to create its own Kurds. 0.08 -0.86 52 This problem has not been solved due to the lack of empathy between the parties. 0.33 0.68 53 This problem has not been solved because of America’s interests in the region. -0.58 -0.28 54 MHP is the biggest obstacle to the solution of the problem. 0.20 -0.16 Notes. Z-scores in bold are significantly (p < .05) different from each other, indicating ‗distinguishing statements‘; Statements in italic indicate consensus statements.

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Appendix H. Z-scores of the statements for each factor (Lay people)

No Statements F1 F2 F3 F4 Domain 1- Problem definitions 1 There is no Kurdish problem; there is a terror problem. 1.08 -0.01 -1.54 -1.68 2 This problem is in fact a democratization problem. -0.75 1.21 0.99 0.68 The status of Kurds in Turkey can be defined in terms of 3 -1.21 -1.66 -0.97 1.49 colonialism. 4 This problem is a class-based problem -1.05 0.98 -0.26 0.05 5 This problem is a problem created by the PKK. 1.28 -0.13 -1.39 -1.61 6 This problem is an underdevelopment and unemployment problem. -0.33 2.27 -0.13 -0.31 7 This problem is a Kurdish identity problem. -0.55 -1.19 0.35 1.19 8 This problem is Kurds‘ independence problem. -0.81 -1.44 -0.85 1.75 9 This problem is a rights and freedoms problem. -0.73 0.74 1.19 1.05 There is no Kurdish problem; there are problems of my fellow 10 -0.14 0.71 -0.82 -0.90 Kurdish brothers and sisters. 11 There is no Kurdish problem, there is a Kurdish invasion. 0.23 -0.95 -2.24 -1.27 Domain 2- Sources of the problem This problem exists because of the discrimination against Kurds 12 -0.57 -0.96 1.41 0.27 and the mistreatment of Kurds in the region by state officials. This problem exists because of the denial of the Kurds for many 13 -1.20 -1.31 1.33 1.24 years. 14 This problem stems from the instigation of foreign powers. 1.19 0.46 -0.69 -0.69 15 This problem stems from the feudal structure in the region. -0.08 0.98 -0.51 -0.44 The source of the problem is the assimilation policies towards 16 -1.05 -1.18 1.26 1.17 Kurds and withholding of their cultural rights. 17 The source of this problem is the nation-state ideology of Turkey. -0.25 -0.35 0.69 0.90 18 The cause of this problem is PKK and terror. 1.15 -0.12 -1.32 -1.75 Domain 3- Moral judgments 19 Turks and Kurds are fellows; separatists are traitors. 0.62 0.26 0.00 -0.90 20 The media represent this problem to the people in a biased way. -0.17 -0.01 0.46 0.56 21 AKP tries to dominate the region by inciting religious movements. -0.28 0.13 0.05 0.34 You don‘t have feelings if you don‘t cry for the terrorist who died 22 -1.74 -0.37 -0.29 1.06 in the mountains. 23 The PKK is a terrorist organization. 2.13 1.57 0.45 -1.91 24 It is unacceptable that BDP embraces PKK militants. 1.68 0.25 -0.20 -1.05 Kurds and Turks have the same rights; I cannot understand what 25 0.60 0.23 -1.73 -1.32 Kurds want. 26 The PKK is the actor of the Greater Middle East Project. 0.79 0.58 -0.30 -1.12 27 Village guards are betraying Kurds‘ cause. -0.50 -0.84 -0.52 0.73 28 The victims of this problem are the people living in the region. 0.62 0.35 0.98 0.16 29 Kurds are used as pawns by foreign powers. 1.46 0.84 -1.00 -1.55 30 Most Turks are quite prejudiced against Kurds. -0.50 -0.46 0.55 0.07 31 CHP doesn‘t work enough for the solution of the problem. 0.43 0.12 -0.06 0.01 Domain 4- Solutions to the problem This problem can be solved through deep-rooted democratization 32 -0.07 0.85 1.59 0.46 and implementation of human rights. 33 Turks and Kurds should unite again under the umbrella of Islam. -0.35 -1.34 -1.09 -0.46 This problem can be solved through economic development and 34 0.19 1.30 0.92 0.01 increased job opportunities. 35 An independent Kurdistan should be established. -2.45 -2.04 -1.63 1.37 The constitutional recognition of the existence of the Kurdish 36 -1.27 -1.92 0.59 1.29 identity is required.

37 The recognition of rights to education and broadcasting in Kurds‘ -1.29 -0.85 1.38 1.44

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own language is required. 38 Local administrations should be strengthened. -0.29 0.95 0.57 -0.08 39 PKK should lay down their weapons. 1.77 1.20 1.04 -0.60 40 Village guards should be abolished. -0.09 -0.36 -0.20 -0.16 41 Agrarian and land reform should be implemented. 0.10 1.07 0.29 -0.10 42 Kurdish people should be educated. 1.09 1.07 0.13 -1.20 43 Abdullah Öcalan should be released. -2.17 -2.28 -1.31 1.49 The problem can be solved through Turkey‘s being independence 44 0.38 0.48 -0.41 -0.35 in internal affairs. 45 The unitary state should not be changed. 0.89 1.19 -0.59 -1.09 TSK should fight and end terror through active counter-terrorism 46 1.13 -0.83 -1.64 -1.59 policies. 47 The Oslo negotiations should continue. -0.50 0.00 0.84 0.51 Domain 5- Barriers to the solution of the problem This problem has not been solved because of those who profit from 48 1.22 0.34 0.92 0.09 the problem. This problem has not been solved because only harsh security 49 0.69 -0.12 1.93 1.07 measures have been used. 50 TSK doesn‘t want to finish this war. -0.43 -0.73 0.06 0.59 51 AKP tries to create its own Kurds. -0.04 0.72 0.02 0.26 This problem has not been solved due to the lack of empathy 52 -0.29 0.24 1.60 0.52 between the parties. This problem has not been solved because of America‘s interests in 53 1.01 0.69 -0.42 -0.02 the region. 54 MHP is the biggest obstacle to the solution of the problem. -0.60 -0.36 0.52 0.37 Note. Z-scores in bold are significantly (p < .05) different from each of the other three z-scores, indicating ‗distinguishing statements‘.

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Appendix I. Z-scores of the statements for each factor (Second-order analysis)

No Statements F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 Domain 1- Problem definitions 1 There is no Kurdish problem; there is a terror problem. -1.56 -1.14 -0.78 0.00 0.89 2 This problem is in fact a democratization problem. 0.95 1.35 1.95 1.56 -0.65 3 The status of Kurds in Turkey can be defined in terms of 1.18 -1.79 -1.95 -1.56 -1.38 colonialism. 4 This problem is a class-based problem 0.00 -0.86 -0.39 1.17 -0.90 5 This problem is a problem created by the PKK. -1.68 -0.56 -1.17 -0.39 1.31 6 This problem is an underdevelopment and -0.67 0.28 0.00 1.95 -0.25 unemployment problem. 7 This problem is a Kurdish identity problem. 1.38 0.93 0.00 -1.17 -0.81 8 This problem is Kurds‘ independence problem. 0.83 -1.37 -0.39 -1.56 -1.30 9 This problem is a rights and freedoms problem. 1.18 1.51 0.00 0.78 -0.65 10 There is no Kurdish problem; there are problems of my -1.09 -1.35 0.00 0.78 0.08 fellow Kurdish brothers and sisters. 11 There is no Kurdish problem, there is a Kurdish -1.47 -1.65 -1.56 -0.78 0.17 invasion. Domain 2- Sources of the problem 12 This problem exists because of the discrimination against 0.53 0.72 0.78 -1.17 -0.73 Kurds and the mistreatment of Kurds in the region by state officials. 13 This problem exists because of the denial of the Kurds 1.37 1.76 1.17 -1.17 -1.14 for many years. 14 This problem stems from the instigation of foreign -0.95 -0.30 -0.39 0.39 1.22 powers. 15 This problem stems from the feudal structure in the -0.54 -0.16 0.00 1.17 0.08 region. 16 The source of the problem is the assimilation policies 1.37 1.07 0.78 -1.17 -1.22 towards Kurds and withholding of their cultural rights. 17 The source of this problem is the nation-state ideology of 1.28 0.49 0.78 -0.39 -0.24 Turkey. 18 The cause of this problem is PKK and terror. -1.99 -0.05 -0.78 -0.39 0.98 Domain 3- Moral judgments 19 Turks and Kurds are fellows; separatists are traitors. -0.84 0.26 -0.39 0.39 0.73 20 The media represent this problem to the people in a 0.42 -0.19 0.78 0.00 0.08 biased way. 21 AKP tries to dominate the region by inciting religious 0.07 -0.44 -1.17 0.00 0.16 movements. 22 You don‘t have feelings if you don‘t cry for the terrorist 0.75 -0.33 -0.78 -0.39 -1.47 who died in the mountains. 23 The PKK is a terrorist organization. -1.88 1.37 1.17 1.95 1.95 24 It is unacceptable that BDP embraces PKK militants. -0.73 -0.07 0.39 0.00 1.31 25 Kurds and Turks have the same rights; I cannot -1.26 -1.39 -1.95 0.00 0.33 understand what Kurds want. 26 The PKK is the actor of the Greater Middle East Project. -1.03 -0.42 0.39 0.39 0.97 27 Village guards are betraying Kurds‘ cause. 0.40 -0.74 -0.78 -0.78 -0.49 28 The victims of this problem are the people living in the 0.23 0.93 -0.39 0.39 0.49 region.

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29 Kurds are used as pawns by foreign powers. -1.26 -0.91 -1.17 0.78 1.47 30 Most Turks are quite prejudiced against Kurds. 0.21 -0.30 -1.56 -0.78 -0.89 31 CHP doesn‘t work enough for the solution of the 0.23 -0.58 0.00 0.00 0.25 problem. Domain 4- Solutions to the problem 32 This problem can be solved through deep-rooted 0.76 1.51 1.17 0.78 0.16 democratization and implementation of human rights. 33 Turks and Kurds should unite again under the umbrella -0.53 -1.25 1.95 -1.17 -0.41 of Islam. 34 This problem can be solved through economic 0.11 1.02 1.17 1.56 0.56 development and increased job opportunities. 35 An independent Kurdistan should be established. 0.53 -2.02 -1.17 -1.95 -2.03 36 The constitutional recognition of the existence of the 1.50 -0.04 0.39 -1.56 -1.62 Kurdish identity is required. 37 The recognition of rights to education and broadcasting 1.79 0.63 0.39 -0.78 -1.55 in Kurds‘ own language is required. 38 Local administrations should be strengthened. 0.38 1.46 1.56 0.78 -0.41 39 PKK should lay down their weapons. -0.40 1.95 1.17 1.56 2.03 40 Village guards should be abolished. 0.27 0.35 0.00 -0.39 -0.08 41 Agrarian and land reform should be implemented. -0.08 0.77 -0.39 1.17 0.49 42 Kurdish people should be educated. -1.03 0.18 0.39 1.17 0.98 43 Abdullah Öcalan should be released. 1.59 -1.60 -1.17 -1.95 -1.95 44 The problem can be solved through Turkey‘s being -0.53 -0.51 -0.78 0.39 0.49 independence in internal affairs. 45 The unitary state should not be changed. -0.82 0.56 0.78 1.17 1.05 46 TSK should fight and end terror through active counter- -1.79 -0.88 0.00 -0.78 1.22 terrorism policies. 47 The Oslo negotiations should continue. 0.90 0.40 0.78 0.00 -0.56 Domain 5- Barriers to the solution of the problem 48 This problem has not been solved because of those who 0.00 0.74 0.39 0.39 1.22 profit from the problem. 49 This problem has not been solved because only harsh 1.03 1.12 1.56 -0.39 0.65 security measures have been used. 50 TSK doesn‘t want to finish this war. 0.27 -0.79 -0.39 -0.78 -0.49 51 AKP tries to create its own Kurds. 0.25 -0.18 -1.56 0.78 0.08 52 This problem has not been solved due to the lack of 0.31 1.04 -0.78 0.00 -0.41 empathy between the parties. 53 This problem has not been solved because of America‘s -0.11 -0.07 0.39 0.39 0.97 interests in the region. 54 MHP is the biggest obstacle to the solution of the 0.19 -0.44 1.56 -0.39 -0.73 problem. Note. Z-scores in bold are significantly (p < .05) different from each of the other four z-scores, indicating ‗distinguishing statements‘.

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Statutory Declaration (on Authorship of a Dissertation)

I, Özden Melis Uluğ, hereby declare that I have written this PhD thesis independently, unless where clearly stated otherwise. I have used only the sources, the data and the support that I have clearly mentioned. This PhD thesis has not been submitted for conferral of degree elsewhere.

I confirm that no rights of third parties will be infringed by the publication of this thesis.

Bremen, May 31, 2016

Signature ______

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