European and U.S. Constitutionalism

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

European and U.S. Constitutionalism Göttingen, 23-24 May 2003 . Science and technique of democracy, No. 37 CDL-STD(2003)037 Engl. only EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION) European and U.S. Constitutionalism UniDem Seminar organised in Göttingen on 23-24 May 2003 in co-operation with the Institute of International Law, University of Göttingen, and Yale Law School. TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD Mr Georg Nolte………………………………………………………………..7 INTRODUCTION European and U.S. Constitutionalism: comparing essential elements Mr Georg Nolte………………………………………………………………..9 FREEDOM OF SPEECH Freedom of speech in Europe and in the USA Mr Roger Errera……………………………………………………………..23 Freedom of expression adjudication in Europe And the United States: a case study in Comparative constitutionel architecture Mr Federick Schauer…..……………………………………………………41 Comment Ms Lorraine Weinrib…………………………………………………………55 Comment Mr Winfried Brugger………………………………………………………..59 HUMAN DIGNITY The concept of human dignity in European And U.S. Constitutionalism Mr Giovanni Bognetti………………………………………………………65 “Human dignity” in Europe and the United States: The social foundations Mr James Q. Whitman…………………………………………………….....81 Comment Mr Eyal Benvenisti…………………………………………………………93 Comment Mr Hugh Corder…………………………………………………………….95 THE PROTECTIVE FUNCTION The protective function of the State Mr Dieter Grimm…………………………………………………………………101 The protective function of the State in the United States And Europe : The constitutional question Mr Frank I. Michelman………………………………………………………..111 The protective of the State in the United States And Europe: a right to State protection? Comment Ms Heike Krieger……………………………………………………………….129 ADJUDICATION Constitutional adjudication iin Europe and The United States : Parodoxes and contrasts Mr Michel Rosenfeld…………………………………………………………..139 The road to constitutionalism in the UK : Responses to the United States and Europe Mr Jeffrey Jowell………………………………………………………………...169 Comment Mr László Sólyom……………………………………………………………….177 Comment Mr César Landa…………………………………………………………………183 DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES Democracy and international influenceS Mr Lech Garlicki………………………………………………………………187 The two world orders Mr Jed Rubenfeld……………………………………………………………...201 Comment Mr Armin Von Bogdandy…………………………………………………….213 Comment Mr Yasuaki Onuma……………………………………………………………..217 FOREWORD Mr Georg NOLTE Professor, University of Göttingen, Germany This book is the fruit of an intense collaboration between the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the “Venice Commission”) and academia. The Venice Commission is the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters. Established in 1990, the Commission has played a leading role in the adoption of constitutions that conform to the standards of Europe’s constitutional heritage. It contributes to the dissemination of the European constitutional heritage while continuing to provide “constitutional first-aid” to individual states. The Venice Commission also plays a role in crisis management and conflict prevention through constitution building and advice. The Venice Commission is composed of independent experts. The members are senior academics, particularly in the fields of constitutional or international law, supreme or constitutional court judges or members of national parliaments. Acting on the Commission in their individual capacity, the members are appointed for four years by the participating countries. All Council of Europe member states are members of the Venice Commission; in addition, Kyrgyzstan joined the commission in 2004. Argentina, Canada, the Holy See, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the United States and Uruguay are observers. South Africa has a special co-operation status similar to that of the observers. The European Commission and OSCE/ODIHR participate in the plenary sessions of the Commission. The work of the European Commission for Democracy through Law aims at upholding the three underlying principles of Europe’s constitutional heritage: democracy, human rights and the rule of law which represent the cornerstones of the Council of Europe. Accordingly, the Commission works in the four key areas of: constitutional assistance, elections and referendums, co-operation with constitutional courts, and transnational studies, reports and seminars. In May 2003, the Commission organised a seminar in Göttingen, Germany, on “European and American Constitutionalism”. This seminar was held in collaboration with the Institute of International Law, University of Göttingen, and Yale Law School. In addition to the Council of Europe, the Volkswagen Foundation provided generous funding. After the conference all speakers revised and completed their papers in the light of the discussions in Göttingen. Many people deserve to be thanked for their contributions. Apart from the authors, these are Professors Jeffrey Jowell, University College London, and Jed Rubenfeld, Yale Law School, for their support during the preparatory phase of the conference; Ms. Caroline Martin and Ms. Caroline Godard from the Council of Europe for all their organisational work; Ms. Anna-Jule Arnhold, Mr. Helmut Aust, Ms. Nina Naske, and Mr. Florian Prill, all University of Göttingen, for patiently and diligently checking the footnotes and putting them into the correct format; Ms. Roslyn Fuller, University of Göttingen, for enthusiastically and professionally dealing with all the language aspects of the text; and, finally, as ever, Ms. Christiane Becker, University of Göttingen, for being the friendly, competent and determined manager of the whole enterprise. INTRODUCTION - EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM: COMPARING ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS Mr Georg NOLTE Professor, University of Göttingen, Germany Until the end of the Cold War comparative constitutional lawyers and political scientists tended to emphasise the common ground within the North Atlantic region.1 Today, some even speak of a “European-Atlantic constitutional state”.2 This view was and is perfectly legitimate. It was not only the radically different socialist understanding of law which made western constitutional theories and practices appear to be so similar. This similarity is also firmly grounded in the cross-fertilising constitutional developments between Western Europe and North America which have taken place before and since the eighteenth century. The end of the socialist systems in Eastern Europe and increasing “globalisation”, however, may bring about a change of emphasis from the similarities to the differences between the constitutionalisms in the United States and Europe. Over the past few years issues have emerged which seem to indicate that European constitutional theory and practice is becoming aware that it has developed certain rules and possesses certain properties which are characteristically different from U.S. constitutionalism and vice versa. This new perspective, or rather such a change in emphasis, is likely to be reinforced by political developments which expose discrepancies in the evaluation of fundamental questions between the majority of Europeans on the one hand and the majority of Americans on the other.3 This book was conceived before the drama of the latest Iraq crisis unfolded. That crisis has had profound repercussions on transatlantic and intra-European political relationships. It has obviously gone beyond disputes about international law. But has it also reached the level of constitutional law? It is true that weapons of mass destruction and Iraq as such have little to do with constitutionalism. The approaches of how to deal with such threats, however, may well be somehow connected to more fundamental questions of the respective political identity. This is where the area of constitutionalism begins. I. European Constitutionalism? 1 See e.g. Klaus Stern, Grundideen europäisch-amerikanischer Verfassungsstaatlichkeit (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984). 2 Thomas Giegerich, “Verfassungsgerichtliche Kontrolle der auswärtigen Gewalt im europäisch-atlantischen Verfassungsstaat: Vergleichende Bestandsaufnahme mit Ausblick auf die neuen Demokratien in Mittel- und Osteuropa” (1997) 57 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 405-564. 3 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power (New York: Knopf, 2003). Constitutionalism is about the fundamental rules and the identity, or better: the self- understanding (Selbstverständnis) of any particular political community.4 In different ways, the self-understanding of both the European states and Europe on the one hand, and the United States on the other, has become somewhat insecure over the past few years. The question is therefore whether this insecurity has affected the most fundamental areas of political self-understanding, the respective constitutionalisms, and whether a new relationship between Europe and the United States is emerging in this respect. In exploring this question the political context cannot be disregarded. At the same time, however, one should not lose one’s sense of proportion. Constitutional law concerns the deepest layers of the respective legal systems and political identities. Those layers cannot be changed easily even by major international developments. But does comparing “European and U.S. Constitutionalism” at all make sense? Is it not an exercise in comparing apples to oranges? European constitutionalism mostly appears to be a distinctly intra-European phenomenon.5 This is true even though reference to U.S. constitutionalism is frequently made in the intra-European debate.6
Recommended publications
  • Towards a Disinformation Resilient Society? the Experience of the Czech Republic
    Cosmopolitan ARTICLE (PEER-REVIEWED) Civil Societies: an Towards a Disinformation Resilient Society? Interdisciplinary Journal The Experience of the Czech Republic Vol. 11, No. 1 Ondřej Filipec 2019 Department of Politics and Social Sciences, Palacký University Olomouc, Křížkovského 511/8, 771 47 Olomouc, Czechia. ondrejfi[email protected] DOI: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11.i1.6065 Article History: Received05/09/2018; Revised 05/02/19; Accepted 14/02/19; Published 28/03/2019 Abstract © 2019 by the author(s). This is an Open Access article Disinformation is currently an important threat to modern democratic societies and has distributed under the terms a critical impact on the quality of public life. Tis article presents an organic approach to of the Creative Commons understanding of the issue of disinformation that is derived from the context of the Czech Attribution 4.0 International Republic. Te approach builds on the various similarities with virology where disinformation (CC BY 4.0) License (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ is compared to a hostile virus that is spread in a certain environment and may penetrate the by/4.0/), allowing third parties human body. Contribution is providing Czech experience in eight areas related to creation and to copy and redistribute the spread of disinformation and analyzing obstacles for building disinformation resilience. material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the Keywords material for any purpose, even Disinformation, Propaganda, Fake News, Information Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, Resilience, commercially, provided the Czech Republic original work is properly cited and states its license. Citation: Filipec, O. 2019.
    [Show full text]
  • The Polysemy of Privacy
    Alabama Law Scholarly Commons Articles Faculty Scholarship 2013 The Polysemy of Privacy Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr. University of Alabama - School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles Recommended Citation Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 Ind. L.J. 881 (2013). Available at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles/224 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Alabama Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Alabama Law Scholarly Commons. The Polysemy of Privacy RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR. "The Polysemy of Privacy " considers the highly protean nature of the concept of "privacy," which extends to myriad disparate legal interests, including nondisclosure, generalized autonomy interests, and even human dignity. For a concept of such central importance to many systems of protectingfundamental rights, its precise contours are surprisingly ill defined This lack of determinate meaning is not limited to the concept of privacy in the United States; virtually all legal systems that utilize privacy (or its first cousin, "dignity") have difficulty reducing the concept into specific, carefully delineated legal interests. In some respects, privacy means everything-and nothing-at the same time. Moreover, even in those contexts where one can identify privacy at a relatively choate, rather than highly abstract, level of jurisprudentialanalysis, the right of privacy often comes into direct conflict with other fundamental rights. For example, commitments to freedom of speech and to a free press often conflict with privacy interests; these conflicts, in turn, force courts to secure one interest only at the price of undermining another.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy Sunday, July 8, 2018 12:01 PM
    Philosophy Sunday, July 8, 2018 12:01 PM Western Pre-Socratics Fanon Heraclitus- Greek 535-475 Bayle Panta rhei Marshall Mcluhan • "Everything flows" Roman Jakobson • "No man ever steps in the same river twice" Saussure • Doctrine of flux Butler Logos Harris • "Reason" or "Argument" • "All entities come to be in accordance with the Logos" Dike eris • "Strife is justice" • Oppositional process of dissolving and generating known as strife "The Obscure" and "The Weeping Philosopher" "The path up and down are one and the same" • Theory about unity of opposites • Bow and lyre Native of Ephesus "Follow the common" "Character is fate" "Lighting steers the universe" Neitzshce said he was "eternally right" for "declaring that Being was an empty illusion" and embracing "becoming" Subject of Heideggar and Eugen Fink's lecture Fire was the origin of everything Influenced the Stoics Protagoras- Greek 490-420 BCE Most influential of the Sophists • Derided by Plato and Socrates for being mere rhetoricians "Man is the measure of all things" • Found many things to be unknowable • What is true for one person is not for another Could "make the worse case better" • Focused on persuasiveness of an argument Names a Socratic dialogue about whether virtue can be taught Pythagoras of Samos- Greek 570-495 BCE Metempsychosis • "Transmigration of souls" • Every soul is immortal and upon death enters a new body Pythagorean Theorem Pythagorean Tuning • System of musical tuning where frequency rations are on intervals based on ration 3:2 • "Pure" perfect fifth • Inspired
    [Show full text]
  • The Paradox of Tolerance
    Religious privilege, tolerance and discrimination (part 2) – The paradox of tolerance What are religious privilege, tolerance and discrimination? Why do people support or oppose secularism? Q1. Should religious tolerance be limited? The paradox of tolerance The so-called “paradox of tolerance”, was first described by a philosopher called Karl Popper in his 1945 book: The Open Society and Its Enemies Vol. 1: “Less well known is the paradox of tolerance: Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. — In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be unwise. But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all argument; they may forbid their followers to listen to rational argument, because it is deceptive, and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists or pistols. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant.” Popper is not saying that we should abandon tolerance or have no tolerance for intolerance. But that in the interest of preserving overall tolerance we might have to limit tolerance in specific instances.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rhetorical Function of Law for the Boundaries of Tolerance by João Maurício Adeodato
    The Rhetorical Function of Law for the Boundaries of Tolerance by João Maurício Adeodato The Rhetorical Function of Law for the Boundaries of Tolerance by João Maurício Adeodato English Abstract Thinking of the discussions about the legal effects of the Brazilian Amnesty Law, the thesis in this paper is that positive law has to coercively assure the basic environment for the development of tolerance. So it has to stay completely apart from religion, politics, money etc., and it cannot privilege any sort of moral view, which would be in itself valid. The price to pay is the formalization, that is: the task of law is to guarantee an arena, a public space of procedural rules in which the different ideologies towards how the world ought to be can confront each other to gain the minds and opinions of the people. On the way to the thesis, I will first show how the sophistical movement turned into a rhetorical philosophy through the incorporation of the ideas of historicism, humanism and skepticism. In the second place, there will come an historical analysis of the idea of tolerance, nearly as old as culture itself. Then, in the same line, I will try to show more specifically how this evolution led to modern rhetoric, in order to, finally, situate the paradox of tolerance and how law could be able to deal with it and overcome the ethical burden that the modern democratic world has brought to it. Resumen en español En el contexto de las discusiones acerca de la Ley de la Amnistía a los crímenes políticos, cuyos efectos están en discusión en Brasil, la tesis en este texto es que el derecho positivo necesita asegurar coercitivamente el ambiente para el desarrollo de la tolerancia.
    [Show full text]
  • Paradoxes Situations That Seems to Defy Intuition
    Paradoxes Situations that seems to defy intuition PDF generated using the open source mwlib toolkit. See http://code.pediapress.com/ for more information. PDF generated at: Tue, 08 Jul 2014 07:26:17 UTC Contents Articles Introduction 1 Paradox 1 List of paradoxes 4 Paradoxical laughter 16 Decision theory 17 Abilene paradox 17 Chainstore paradox 19 Exchange paradox 22 Kavka's toxin puzzle 34 Necktie paradox 36 Economy 38 Allais paradox 38 Arrow's impossibility theorem 41 Bertrand paradox 52 Demographic-economic paradox 53 Dollar auction 56 Downs–Thomson paradox 57 Easterlin paradox 58 Ellsberg paradox 59 Green paradox 62 Icarus paradox 65 Jevons paradox 65 Leontief paradox 70 Lucas paradox 71 Metzler paradox 72 Paradox of thrift 73 Paradox of value 77 Productivity paradox 80 St. Petersburg paradox 85 Logic 92 All horses are the same color 92 Barbershop paradox 93 Carroll's paradox 96 Crocodile Dilemma 97 Drinker paradox 98 Infinite regress 101 Lottery paradox 102 Paradoxes of material implication 104 Raven paradox 107 Unexpected hanging paradox 119 What the Tortoise Said to Achilles 123 Mathematics 127 Accuracy paradox 127 Apportionment paradox 129 Banach–Tarski paradox 131 Berkson's paradox 139 Bertrand's box paradox 141 Bertrand paradox 146 Birthday problem 149 Borel–Kolmogorov paradox 163 Boy or Girl paradox 166 Burali-Forti paradox 172 Cantor's paradox 173 Coastline paradox 174 Cramer's paradox 178 Elevator paradox 179 False positive paradox 181 Gabriel's Horn 184 Galileo's paradox 187 Gambler's fallacy 188 Gödel's incompleteness theorems
    [Show full text]
  • Legal Reasoning: Justifying Tolerance in the U.S. Supreme Court
    LEGAL REASONING: JUSTIFYING TOLERANCE IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT Harel Arnon* Introduction The concept of tolerance is central to liberal political and moral traditions, yet it raises a number of challenging questions. Is tolerance unlimited? When is it required? If acts or beliefs are morally wrong, why tolerate them at all? If they are not morally wrong, is tolerance still necessary? Indeed, the paradox of “tolerating the intolerable” has attracted significant attention in liberal political and moral writings. Several lines of justifications have been offered in the attempt to resolve the paradox of tolerance. John Locke and John Stuart Mill justified tolerance primarily on utilitarian grounds, while contemporary justifications center on notions of personal autonomy and pluralism. This Article tracks a shift within the liberal tradition from utility-based to autonomy- and pluralism-based justifications for tolerance. It further attempts to locate a similar shift in legal argumentation for tolerance, as offered by liberal Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in the context of homosexuality, and to demonstrate that the transformation of * LL.B., M.A. (Phil), 2000, Bar-Ilan University; LL.M. 2003, S.J.D. 2006, Harvard Law School. I am greatly indebted to Avi Sagi who initially introduced me to the paradox of tolerance and to Lew Sargentich for his comments and insights. 262 2007] Legal Reasoning: Justifying Tolerance 263 tolerance that had occurred in general liberal discourse trickled into liberal adjudication. The purpose of this Article is to illuminate a link between the law and political and philosophical discourse through the lens of the Supreme Court Justices’ treatments of homosexuality.
    [Show full text]
  • Putting up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered
    Putting up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. Citation Minow, Martha, Putting up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 409 (1990). Published Version http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol28/iss2/4/ Accessed February 16, 2015 2:32:25 PM EST Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12933381 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA (Article begins on next page) Osgoode Hall Law Journal Article 4 Volume 28, Number 2 (Summer 1990) Putting up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered Martha Minow Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj Citation Information Minow, Martha. "Putting up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 28.2 (1990) : 409-448. http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol28/iss2/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons. PUTTING UP AND PUTTING DOWN: TOLERANCE RECONSIDERED© By MARTHA MINOW* One of the paradoxes of liberal societies arises from the commitment to tolerance! A society committed to respecting the viewpoints and customs of diverse people within a pluralistic society inevitably encounters this challenge: will you tolerate those who themselves do not agree to respect the viewpoints or customs of others? Paradoxically, the liberal commitment to tolerance requires, at some point, intolerance for those who would reject that very commitment.
    [Show full text]
  • Heinonline ( Tue Mar 17 17:45:49 2009
    +(,121/,1( Citation: 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1992-1993 Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org) Tue Mar 17 17:45:49 2009 -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. -- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your HeinOnline license, please use: https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do? &operation=go&searchType=0 &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0017-811X "HE DREW A CIRCLE THAT SHUT ME OUT": ASSIMILATION, INDOCTRINATION, AND THE PARADOX OF A LIBERAL EDUCATION Nomi Maya Stolzenberg TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE I. ExPosuRE - WHAT'S THE HARM? ......................................... 588 A. The Litigation of Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education ........... 589 B. Analysis of the Harm in Mozert ......................................... 599 i. Offense ............................................................ 599 2. Coercion of Conduct in Contravention of Religious Commands ........... 6oo 3. Coercion of Declarations ............................................. 605 4. Indoctrination or Interference with Parental Control .................... 6og II. WHAT IS INDOCTRINATION? ................................................ 6i A. The Standard Dichotomy: Objectivity vs. Indoctrination ................... 611 B. The Critique of the Dichotomy: Objectivity As Indoctrination ............... 612 z. Fundamentalism'sHistoric
    [Show full text]
  • THEORY and PRAXIS of RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE Igboin O
    THEORY AND PRAXIS OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE Igboin O. Benson* http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/og.v12i 1.16 Abstract More often than not, intolerance is extremely rejected in favour of tolerance simply because of the belief that the latter produces a better chance of inter-personal relationship in a pluralistic society. In this sense tolerance will mean to allow others to practise their religious belief without hindrance. While the term ‘allow’ carries a legal import i.e. authorisation, toleration means only the absence of objection rather than genuine approval of another’s religious belief. It is therefore the argument of this paper that tolerance already divides between the powerful and the less-powerful, the privileged and the less-privileged. It is this inherent weakness in tolerance that makes the paper to insist on frank dialogue; truth-meeting-truth. Introduction Since our views of the future plays a significant role in our attitudes towards the immediate future, it is essential to ask whose view of reality is most accurate. When we fail to formulate concrete ideas, we leave the field to sects... who bank on their special eschatological system. In fact, once you understand their eschatology, you understand their doctrines.... we must find definite answers to such movements, even though we need to tolerate a certain amount of variation. 1 Thomas Schirrmacher’s thesis above speaks volume about tolerance. Certain delineations need to be made quickly in order to underscore what tolerance could possibly mean. First, emphasis is placed on asking, which for us, implies interrogation. An act of interrogation necessarily means that there is an interrogator and the interrogated.
    [Show full text]
  • List of Paradoxes 1 List of Paradoxes
    List of paradoxes 1 List of paradoxes This is a list of paradoxes, grouped thematically. The grouping is approximate: Paradoxes may fit into more than one category. Because of varying definitions of the term paradox, some of the following are not considered to be paradoxes by everyone. This list collects only those instances that have been termed paradox by at least one source and which have their own article. Although considered paradoxes, some of these are based on fallacious reasoning, or incomplete/faulty analysis. Logic • Barbershop paradox: The supposition that if one of two simultaneous assumptions leads to a contradiction, the other assumption is also disproved leads to paradoxical consequences. • What the Tortoise Said to Achilles "Whatever Logic is good enough to tell me is worth writing down...," also known as Carroll's paradox, not to be confused with the physical paradox of the same name. • Crocodile Dilemma: If a crocodile steals a child and promises its return if the father can correctly guess what the crocodile will do, how should the crocodile respond in the case that the father guesses that the child will not be returned? • Catch-22 (logic): In need of something which can only be had by not being in need of it. • Drinker paradox: In any pub there is a customer such that, if he or she drinks, everybody in the pub drinks. • Paradox of entailment: Inconsistent premises always make an argument valid. • Horse paradox: All horses are the same color. • Lottery paradox: There is one winning ticket in a large lottery. It is reasonable to believe of a particular lottery ticket that it is not the winning ticket, since the probability that it is the winner is so very small, but it is not reasonable to believe that no lottery ticket will win.
    [Show full text]
  • Oprah Winfrey (B 1954) Is an American Talk Show Host, She Was Born in Baghdad and Came to the United States at 19
    The twenty-first century has been called the Century of Women, highlighting THE the critical role of women in creating a peaceful future. • Throughout history, women have worked tirelessly—often behind the scenes— for the peace and safety of their families and their CENTURY communities. Today women are taking leading roles in the quest for global security and equal rights. • The continuing empowerment of women throughout the world is a key to solving the world’s most pressing issues, ranging from of the abolishment of nuclear weapons to poverty and hunger. • This exhibit features the contributions of a few women. Untold millions more—both prominent and little known—have WOMEN dedicated themselves to a fair and peaceful future. WOMEN and the NOBEL PEACE PRIZE he Nobel Peace Prize has become the world’s most prestigious prize for the preservation Tof peace. Since 1901 it has been awarded to individuals and organizations committed to peace, human rights and humanitarian causes. Ninety-seven individuals and 20 organizations had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize by 2010. Nine of these women have received the award since 1976 when Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan won for their roles in the peace movement in Northern Ireland. Female Nobel Peace Prize Laureates 1905 – Bertha von Suttner 1931 – Jane Addams 1946 – Emily Greene Balch 1976 – Betty Williams 1976 – Mairead Corrigan 1979 – Mother Teresa 1982 – Alva Myrdal 1991 – Aung San Suu Kyi 1992 – Rigoberta Menchú Tum 1997 – Jody Williams 2003 – Shirin Ebadi 2004 – Wangari Maathai e are deeply, passionately dedicated to Wthe cause of nonviolence, to the force of “ truth and love, to soul-force.
    [Show full text]