Running head: JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 1

Embedded and Unilateral Journalists:

How their Access to Sources Affected their Framing During the 2003

Courtney Huck

Wittenberg University

JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 2

Abstract

With the 2003 United States’ led invasion of Iraq, the Department of Defense created an embedded program that had never been used to such a broad extent by the

U.S previously. Immediately, critics of the program claimed that embedded journalists would have a personal bias because of their continuous interactions with the soldiers, and, as a result, critics claimed that stories from embedded journalists would only present the Unites States in a positive light. This study examines articles from two embedded journalists and two non- embedded (unilateral) journalists throughout the first four months of the invasion (March 20,

2003-July 31, 2003). Through examination of the articles that emerged during the chosen time- period, findings show that embedded and unilateral journalists’ access to specific kinds of sources during different periods of the invasion greatly shaped the direction of their stories.

JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 3

Embedded and Unilateral Journalists:

How their Access to Sources Affected their Framing During the 2003 Iraq War

Introduction

This project originated as a way to tie together components of communication, history, and journalism. I’ve always been extremely interested in how historical events are perceived by the public based on the way the media decides to frame a story. For this reason, both embedded and unilateral journalists’ articles were examined during the first four months of the United

States’ 2003 Iraq War (March 20, 2003-July 31, 2003). This was done to discover if one group of journalists had a more positive viewpoint on the war in their articles than the other group. For the purpose of this study, positivity refers to journalists presenting the U.S government or the U.S military’s actions in a way that highlights only successes or applauds actions. Negativity refers to journalists framing an article in a way that does not highlight the United States’ successes or applaud the United States’ actions. Embedded and unilateral journalists’ articles were viewed separately to determine if personal bias was a main factor in shaping the embedded journalists’ stories. However, I will argue throughout the course of this essay that the two groups of journalists had access to certain types of sources based on each journalist’s location. Therefore, framing of a story or an event became based on this access to sources, rather than from a personal bias based off of a journalist’s relationship with U.S soldiers.

Background for U.S. Media Involvement in War

Over the years there has been a shift in how the United States government allows media to cover foreign conflicts. During the Vietnam War, censorship was almost nonexistent and journalists were only restricted from reporting on classified material (Keefe, 2009). In addition to the lack of censorship, the Vietnam War differed from all previous U.S wars because of the JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 4 widespread television coverage. The U.S administration and the press also had different goals in mind for what information would be distributed during the war. The administration and the military sought to keep a high public opinion “through optimistic briefings and relatively conservative body counts, the press sought to report the ‘whole story’ of the ongoing conflict”

(Paul & Kim, 2004, p. 36). This meant the press would televise graphic images “that often belied the ‘official’ accounts” (p. 36). The tensions that emerged between the press and the military due to their differing objectives, along with the widely circulated notion that the press caused a loss of public opinion for the war, and, as a result, contributed to the loss of the Vietnam War, led to an effort to restrict backlash in media freedoms for future foreign conflicts.

During the U.S invasion of Grenada in 1983, censorship played a more significant role for journalists. Journalists were not allowed to cover the initial invasion of Grenada at all (Paul

& Kim, 2004, p. 39). Forty-eight hours after beginning of the invasion, 15 journalists were escorted to the island by U.S forces. Three days later, the press was given complete access, but fighting had concluded long before that point (p. 39). The Department of Defense attempted to have more media involvement in the Persian Gulf War (1991) with the introduction of the press pool system (Norris, 1991). Journalists in the pool system were essentially employed by the

Department of Defense and “contractually, the censorship [took] the form of an agreement signed by the pool reporter, agreeing to ground rules or guidelines that [included] submitting ‘to a ‘security review’” (Norris, 1991, p. 226). Although the Persian Gulf War granted the press more freedoms than they had in Grenada, in the Persian Gulf War, journalists were, essentially, being subjected to “pre-censorship.” This meant that almost all journalists’ moves were directed by the government, and the government decided what events journalists could or could not see.

Journalists came to vehemently oppose the pool system because “the prior limitation and control JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 5 of access to combat news made the data and firsthand accounts needed for the historiography of the Persian Gulf War irretrievable” (Keefe, 2009, p. 5). Due to multiple media outlet’s loud opposition to the pool system, and the debate about whether or not the pool system was constitutional, the Department of Defense realized that a different, more middle ground, policy was necessary for the media’s coverage of the Iraq war.

The government took a completely different type of approach for how media would be permitted to cover the 2003 Iraq War when it introduced its program to “embed” journalists in military units. The Department of Defense allowed over 600 journalists to “live, work and travel as part of the units with which they are embedded to facilitate maximum, in- depth coverage of

U.S forces in combat and related operations” (Pfau et al., 2004, p. 74). The Department of

Defense defined embedded reporters as “a media representative remaining with a unit on an extended basis” (Pfau et al., 2004, p. 74). On the other hand, unilateral reporters were any war correspondent not associated with a military unit. They remained behind the lines of fighting or stayed in one main city. In the case of the Iraq War, many unilateral journalists remained in

Baghdad. Embedded journalists’ articles mainly contained quotes from soldiers and Iraqi citizens, while unilateral journalists gathered quotes from Iraqi government officials as well as

Iraqi citizens.

Right away, the embed program evoked arguments from both supporters and critics, and the exact reasons for the Department of Defense to initiate the program remain unclear.

However, Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Media Operations, claimed that the embedded program would allow the truth of what was happening in the fighting overseas to stand at the forefront and was completely necessary “‘because Saddam Hussein was a practiced liar, a master of deception’ and the only way to defend against that is through JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 6

‘objective third-party accounts from professional observers’” (Pfau et al., 2004, p. 75).

Supporters of the program argued that the embed program “offered a first-hand, up close view of combat missions that was unavailable to unilateral (unembedded) or pool reporters” (p. 75). In this sense, reporters would have the opportunity to report war in a way journalists had never been able to previously. In a New York Times article by Ralph Blumenthal and Jim Rutenberg (2003), headlined “Threats and Responses: The Media; Journalists are Assigned to Accompany U.S

Troops,” journalists expressed some cautious, but positive, reactions to the embed program.

David Halberstam acknowledged that journalists would benefit from their access to the soldiers in their units. Halberstam commented, “soldiers will always talk to reporters with them in the field… the grunt has an inalienable right to tell the truth” (Blumenthal & Rutenberg, 2003, p. 2).

In this article, even though journalists know they are doing a service for the Department of

Defense, they cannot miss the opportunity to report so closely on the military.

Additionally, although the program would provide journalists with an unprecedented opportunity to see military operations up close, critics also claimed journalists would be unable to remain objective in their writings. In response to Blumenthal and Rutenberg (2003), one week later published a letter to the editor that called the Department of Defense’s motives into question. In “War on Iraq? Calls to Act, and Voices of Doubt; At the Front,” by E.

M. Cowardin Jr., the intense bond and loyalty amongst soldiers in combat is emphasized.

Cowardin follows this crucial point by stating, “I suspect that the Pentagon hopes that this same group psychology will rub off on ‘embedded’ reporters… With ‘embedding,’ the Pentagon just may have discovered a brilliant way to turn reporters into public relations functionaries” (2003, p. 1). Cowardin’s critique is representative of critics’ arguments at the time. In a Washington

Post article, Howard Kurtz (2003) attempts to present multiple journalists’ opinions. One JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 7 especially negative opinion came from Janet Leissner, CBS’s Washington bureau chief at the time. She claimed the government wanted to have complete control over the embedding program and “‘they will dole out the embedding slots, who will go where. They say once you take someone out, there’s no guarantee you’ll be able to replace them’- a practice the Pentagon calls

‘embedding for life’” (2003, p. 2). Even a more optimistic perspective from ABC’s Washington bureau chief, Robin Sproul, still had an edge to it. Sproul stated, “this is a sea change in an effort to get us there. The intent is admirable,” but “the devil is in the details” (2003, p. 2). In this more positive consideration, Sproul seems to be acknowledging that journalists are selling part of their souls to gain access to the frontlines and the news-breaking stories that exist there.

Overwhelmingly, critics became concerned that journalists would become too biased to keep any kind of objectivity due to the close relationship journalists formed with soldiers during life and death situations as the units traveled through Iraq.

The Iraq War provides an opportunity to examine writings from two groups of U.S journalists that were in completely different situations for their positioning during the war.

Although their reporting covered the same time-period, and sometimes the same events, differences in writing emerged from the two groups. Due to the Iraq War being the first time the

United States used the embed program to this extent, it is important to examine how embedded journalists’ framed their stories when compared to unilateral journalists. Many critics argued that embedded journalists would become biased due to their involvement with their units and that would affect the way they shaped their articles (Cowardin, 2003; Kurtz, 2003). Though there is some evidence to support the idea that embedded journalists provided more positive coverage of the war, especially during the first phase (Pfau, 2004; Fahmey and Johnson, 2005), an in-depth look at coverage beyond the first phase of the war suggests that reporting was a bit more JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 8 nuanced. In this study, I argue that journalists, who are dependent upon sources in order to write the news, depict a more complex version of the Iraq War when they use non-elites (such as Iraqi citizens and enlisted soldiers) as sources rather than elites (official government sources.) This attention to sources shows that framing of news may be more a matter of who a journalist has access to as a source and less about the personal bias journalists form based on their relationships with soldiers or even an ethnocentric bias journalists have that may result from feelings of nationalism (Gans, 1979).

Objectivity and Embedded Reporting

Whether or not journalists are biased is an ongoing discussion among citizens, political elites, and journalists themselves. In a 2006 article from Columbia Journalism Review, Paul

McLearly argues “it’s almost inarguable that living and traveling with military units during a war does create connection, which produces a natural disinclination to make the troops you’re with look bad” (p. 2). McLeary also includes quotes from journalists who were war correspondents during the Vietnam War. At certain times during the war, reporters had to travel with U.S units for their own safety. One Vietnam reporter commented, “I had a serious identity relationship with the man in uniform” (2006, p. 1). This quote questions the long-held journalistic expectation of objectivity.

In another Columbia Journalism Review article, Brent Cunningham (2003) calls into question the reasonable expectations of objectivity. In his article, he claims “few would argue that complete objectivity is possible, yet we bristle when someone suggests we aren’t being objective-or fair, or balanced- as if everyone agrees on what they all mean.” (p. 2). Cunningham also makes the point that gaining objectivity does not necessarily mean an article will arrive at

“the truth” because a deeper meaning behind the story may not have been searched for. In fact, JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 9 he claims “objectivity excuses lazy reporting. If you’re on a deadline and all you have is ‘both sides of the story,’ that’s often good enough… we fail to push the story, incrementally, toward a deeper understanding of what is true and what is false” (p. 2). In addition, the search for objectivity can lead to an exuberant reliance on official sources because it “is the easiest, quickest way to get both the ‘he said’ and the ‘she said,’ and, thus, ‘balance’… so we end up with too much of the ‘official’ truth” (p. 2). Cunningham argues that a simple reliance on “both sides” of the story may present a misleading frame for the story; deeper analysis of the sources, and the context of the article as a whole, should not be overlooked.

Furthermore, Cunningham argues all reporters are bias in any capacity of news reporting.

He claims the true mistake is not deviating from objectivity, but a lack of reporters and newsrooms’ ability to acknowledge bias. He states, “we are not served in this effort by a paralyzing fear of being accused of bias… some [critiques about bias] are reasonable, but there is a line you can cross after which you are avoiding your duties to truth-telling” (p. 8). Some journalists believe the need for objectivity to be so important that an aspect of humanity is almost expected to be cast aside. Such was the case when Ron Martz, a reporter embedded with a U.S army unit in Iraq, helped provide medical assistance by holding an intravenous drip bag for a wounded Iraqi citizen (p. 10). Many “ethicists” criticized Martz for stepping away from his objective journalist position, but Martz responded that he “is a human being first, and a reporter second” (p. 10). Cunningham concurs and states, “that Martz, an accomplished reporter, should worry at all that his reputation could suffer from something like this says much about journalism’s relationship with objectivity” (p. 10). In Cunningham’s article alone, he outlines the stress that is put on journalists to remain objective during the regular news process. However, he also showcases how his intervention was a special circumstance, and uses his scenario to JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 10 highlight the fact that the expectation and standard for objectivity does not change during times of war.

The debate over objectivity and concern over the possibility that embedded journalists would uncritically support U. S government and military actions was especially acute in the lead- up to the Iraq War. As journalists joined their units, they were faced with a certain level of conformity to military practices and procedures. Journalists could not afford to ignore commands because they were forced into numerous life or death situations. As a result, the journalists became ‘encultured.’ Enculturation is the “process in which the members of an organization

‘acquire the social knowledge and skills necessary to behave as competent members’” (Pfau et al., 2004, p. 78). It became practically impossible for journalists to avoid some kind of bias as they survived combat situations with their units. More so, embedded journalists could not remain objective because they felt indebted to soldiers for saving their lives. Therefore “it is the general force of social cohesion that pressures the reporter to not report negative things on the people he is living with and depending on for protection” (Keefe, 2009, p. 6). In essence, journalists embedded both in a military unit and its culture: the two are virtually inseparable. The process of enculturation in combat conditions ensures that, to some degree, embedded journalists will be affected by a military unit’s values, including: shared meaning, shared understanding, and shared sense making (Pfau et al., 2004, p. 74). While the U.S government itself was not censoring journalists’ writings, reporters began to engage in a type of self- censorship (Keefe, 2009). In addition to being encultured, journalists also had to fight feelings of belonging to an “in-group” in order to remain objective.

According to (Filak, 2004) journalists not only relied on soldiers for protection, but they also looked to them for interpersonal communication during their time together throughout the JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 11 war. For this reason, it benefitted journalists to become a part of the “in group” in this social context. This group affiliation provided a sense of worth, social value, and belonging for individuals who joined this “in-group” (p. 219). As a result, journalists formed an intergroup bias. Intergroup bias “refers to the way in which members of competing groups tend to show favor toward their own group rather than favoring members of another group. This behavior can take place as either ingroup favoritism or outgroup derogation” (p. 219). The form of activity the group engages in also matters because “the more competitive the activity, the more likely intergroup bias is to persist, and the more likely members of the groups are to show in-group favoritism” (p. 220). There is not a more competitive activity than war where winning equals surviving and losing equals death. Anyone who was not a part of the unit would be perceived as the “outgroup” and would never be able to completely understand decisions the soldiers made based upon past experiences or the emotions they were feeling in a specific situation. With this thinking in place, it certainly makes sense that many would be concerned that journalists would not want to report negatively on the soldiers in their units.

Indexing and Cascading Activation

Objectivity, and journalists’ reliance on sources in order to achieve it, is also viewed through Bennett’s (1990) theory on indexing. He, and others who build on this theory, argue that news reporters do not view themselves as sources and will rely on other people’s viewpoints of an event instead.

The dependence of reporters on official sources is so great that … ‘even when the

journalist is in a position to observe an event directly, he remains reluctant to offer

interpretations of his own, preferring instead to rely on his news sources. For the reporter, JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 12

in short, most news is not what has happened, but what someone says has happened.

(Zaller & Chiu, 1996, p. 386)

Sources make up the backbone of every journalist’s story, and “dependence on sources goes beyond the need to have someone to quote; it is one of the most ingrained features of modern journalism” (p. 386). Journalists tend to rely on sources that are “legitimate” or “official” (p.

386). Bennett’s indexing theory claims journalists will include voices in their stories that tend to stick to the ideas in a debate that reflect the mainstream viewpoints of the government (Bennett,

1990, p. 106). Bennett’s idea of indexing and the need for official voices also ties back into

Cunningham’s piece (2006) about the journalistic expectation to remain as objective as possible.

For this reason, Bennett and other communication critics examine journalistic articles because

“the normative worry at the center of the indexing concept is whether media discourse is so constrained by the boundaries and emphases of debate among political elites that the public remains poorly informed, its voice silent or reduced to granting manipulated consent” (Althaus,

1996, p. 408). Therefore, the indexing theory strives to examine the connection between the discourse of the press and debate amongst political elites (Althaus, 1996). Overall, the indexing model helps explain and predict how mainstream media will construct its stories: sources are key to understanding how a news story will be told.

The indexing model provides a viewpoint from which to examine news media. In fact, indexing “captures the nuanced differences found in differing news coverage and time periods by linking sourcing tendencies to the volume of coverage” (Kennis, 2009, p. 388). However, a shortcoming of the indexing model is its inability to illustrate patterns between “unofficial” voices- voices from lower officials or everyday citizens. Additionally, presenting “official” voices during a time of war may become more difficult because war correspondents may not JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 13 have continuous access to those official voices. While the embedded journalists had access to the

“official” higher-ranking generals of their units and unilateral journalists had access to Iraqi government officials, I am more interested in when journalists deviated away from “official” voices and relied on normal citizens or soldiers and how that affected the overall frame of the story, particularly in terms of whether or not it leads to a positive portrayal of military activity in a time of war.

Due to the indexing model’s shortcoming to factor in “unofficial voices” as part of journalists’ stories, it is necessary to also tie in Robert Entman’s (2003) cascading model. The cascading activation model allows for the inclusion of unofficial voices and explains how some articles can deviate from the dominant frame (p. 415). In this model, Entman outlines the varying levels of importance that certain sources hold: at the highest level would be the administration

(the White House, State Department, and Department of Defense), followed by other elites

(Congress members, ex- officials, and experts), then journalists, preceded by news frames, and finally, at the lowest level, the public (p. 419). Entman describes these different levels in terms of a water- fall effect.

Just as with real-world cascading waterfalls, each level in the metaphorical cascade

makes its own contribution to the mix and flow (of ideas), but the ability to promote the

spread of frames is also highly stratified, both across and within each level. As is true of

actual waterfalls also, moving downward in a cascade is relatively easy, but spreading

ideas higher, from lower levels to upper, requires extra energy- a pumping mechanism so

to speak. (p. 420)

In this way, it is simpler for official sources to frame news stories than it is for sources that are lower on the journalistic totem pole. JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 14

Framing of an event is a powerful tool journalists possess because “facts remain neutral until framed; thus how the press frames an issue or event will affect public understanding of that issue or event” (Kuypers & Cooper, 2005, p. 2). As a whole, framing includes the selection and interpretation of “some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communication text” so that text then promotes “a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation and/ or treatment recommendation for the item described”

(Fahmy & Johnson, 2005, p. 305). Personal bias from embedded journalists would influence how they constructed their stories, but in times of war, journalists only have access to certain sources due to the placement and location of battles and military action and indexing theory tells us that this might create a stronger impact on the frame of a news story overall.

Two pertinent studies have examined embedded journalists’ articles from the Iraq War.

Both of these studies were concerned with embedded journalists’ bias in their articles to see if the overall frame was different from the unilateral journalists’. The first study was conducted by

Pfau et al (2004). This study focused on the first five days of the United States invasion into Iraq

(March 20-25, 2003). The study found that embedded reporters could only focus on a small portion of the war, and they engaged more in episodic instead of thematic frames. Episodic framing “personalizes issues,” but thematic frames are a more “in-depth, interpretive analysis”

(Pfau et al., 2004, p. 77). An example of an episodic frame would be a story about how successful a certain battle may have been, but a thematic frame would focus on how that one battle ties into the course of the overall war. Embedded journalists could only provide a small

“snapshot” of what was going on in the larger context of the war. This was due to the fact that embedded journalists were forced to remain with the same group of people throughout their travels in Iraq (Pfau et al., 2004). Based on the relationships that embedded reporters formed JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 15 with the soldiers, they could then provide a deeper understanding of their units, but the reporters could not tie their stories into the broader context of the overall war (Pfau et al., 2004). Robert

Kaplan, author of “The Story of a War,” claimed that “profound portraits of individual soldiers were rarely complemented by placing the various military operation in the context of a grand strategic view” (Kaplan, 2003, p. 161-162). Although it appears as if embedded journalists were not being objective due to their inability to tie certain events into the larger context of the war, this was due to their location with their military units, not their own personal bias.

The same study by Pfau et al. (2004) also found that embedded journalists presented the first days of Operation “Iraqi Freedom” in a more positive light than unilateral journalists.

Embedded journalists were more likely to focus on “Iraqi weakness, the frequency of Iraqi desertion or surrender, and the joy of Iraqi citizens after the fall of the Hussein regime” (Fahmy

& Johnson, 2005, p.304). On the other hand, unilateral journalists tended to be more negative in their reporting and focused on the “possibility of important unconventional weapon counterattacks, the adequacy of Allied war planning, anger toward Americans for damage inflicted during the war, and mistrust of American intentions” (Fahmy & Johnson, 2005, p. 304).

Pfau et al. (2004) argues that the reason embedded journalists had a more positive viewpoint on the war was due to their involvement with the military units, and Pfau et al. (2004) claims this is the reason for the differences in framing between the embedded and unilateral reporters.

Another study that focused on journalists’ framing during the Iraq war was conducted by

Jim A Kuypers and Stephen D. Cooper (2005). They examined a longer time-period than the study by Pfau et al. (2004) looking at news articles from The New York Times and Washington

Post between the dates of March 21, 2003 and April 10, 2003. Their study discovered two major themes from embedded journalists’ articles during this time-period. The first reflected the study JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 16 by Pfau et al. by showing that embedded journalists were much more likely to show light Iraqi military resistance then the unilateral journalists were (Kuypers & Cooper, 2005). On March 21st,

2003, a headline run by an embedded reporter was titled “G.I’s and Marines See Little Iraqi

Resistance.” However, a title from an article written on the same day by a unilateral reporter read

“16 Die On Copter; U. S and British Forces Suffer First Losses in Crash in Kuwait.” While the differences for these specific articles could have been a simple matter of location, across the board Kuypers and Cooper (2005) found that embedded journalists had a more positive framing of the initial invasion. This trend continued, and became even more striking, as the battle for

Baghdad began. Unilateral reporters described Iraqi forces in Baghdad as “defiant” and as “a

‘dilemma’” for the Allied forces, who faced urban combat against “Hussein’s most loyal fighters, drawn from the Republican Guard and his bodyguard Special Republican Guard’”

(Kuypers & Cooper, 2005, p. 5). On the other hand, embedded reporters presented a much different viewpoint on the events that were about to conspire in Baghdad. These reporters saw

“surprisingly little resistance” and saw no “sign of the heavy Iraqi equipment expected to mount the main defense of Baghdad” (Kuypers & Cooper, 2005, p. 5). Overall, Kuypers and Cooper

(2005) found that “stories filed by behind-the-lines journalists framed the hostilities as being more intense” (p. 6). The description of fighting from the embedded and unilateral journalists’ perspectives presented two different kinds of frames for the type of war that was taking place, one that seemed to highlight the success and dominance of the U.S. military and one that did not.

The other main theme found in Kuypers and Cooper’s (2005) study dealt with the response from Iraqi civilians in regards to U.S forces. Overall, this theme showed that unilateral journalists saw resentment and anger from Iraqi civilians after U.S combat units passed through their area (Kuypers & Cooper, 2005). On the other hand, embedded reporters presented positive JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 17 interactions between the soldiers and civilians (Kuypers & Cooper, 2005). Some unilateral reporters may have captured more sentiments of anger from Iraqi citizens due to being stationed in Baghdad, which was bombed from the beginning of the war. It is also possible that unilateral journalists saw a different reaction from Iraqi civilians because they tended to enter an area after

U.S troops had moved on, but that was certainly not the case for every situation, so the correlation is too strong to ignore.

The studies by Pfau et al. (2004) and Kuypers and Cooper (2005) have also provided instances where embedded reporters for the Iraq War framed the war in a positive light. In this research study I will argue that the news coverage is more nuanced, in terms of positive framing, than Pfau et al. (2004) and Kuypers and Cooper (2005) suggest when one looks across longer periods of news coverage by both embedded and unilateral journalists.

Method

The research for this project was conducted by looking at news articles written by four war correspondents: Anthony Shadid, Steven Lee Myers, John F. Burns, and Dexter Filkins.

Filkins and Myers were both embedded journalists. Filkins traveled with the U.S First Marine

Division and Myers traveled with the U.S Third Infantry Division, while Shadid and Burns were unilateral reporters. Shadid wrote for while Filkins, Myers, and Burns wrote for The New York Times. Only articles from the New York Times or the Washington Post were chosen so differences in newspapers would not be a factor in analyzing the overall framing of the articles.

The articles were gathered using the LexisNexis Academic database. Each individual author’s name was typed into a Boolean search with AND Iraq. The time-period examined for this study began March 20, 2003 and ended July 31, 2003. In total, between the four journalists, JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 18 there were 195 articles produced during the selected time-period. This four-month time span was then broken down into four phases for more specific examination: the initial invasion (March 20-

March 25), the battle of Baghdad (April 6th- April 11th), Bush’s claim of “Mission

Accomplished” and the end of major combat operations (April 21th- May 3rd), and a continuation of fighting and the beginnings of insurgency (throughout all of June and July). The phases were broken down in this way to focus on major events occurring. Additionally, the four-month time span was broken down into specific phases so a more in-depth analysis would be feasible In total, 81 articles were examined for this study.

To organize data from the news articles, an excel spreadsheet was created with various categories: sources, descriptive language, actors, headlines, locations, deaths (either American or

Iraqi), and references to past. The excel spreadsheet was then color coded based on what source the information came from. The different coded sources included: Iraqi military, Iraqi citizen,

Iraqi government official, Iraqi media, U.S soldier, U.S officials, My research found that, as the indexing and cascading activation models indicate, sourcing appeared to have the most impact on the overall frame of an article.

Analysis

Phase I: Life in Baghdad- Burns and Shadid’s First Five Days of War

Both Burns and Shadid, unilateral journalists, were stationed in Baghdad during the beginning course of the war. Burns and Shadid do not use any troops as sources during this time- period because the American military soldiers have not yet reached Baghdad, but Baghdad is being bombed relentlessly in the first few days of the war by Allied forces. The unilateral journalists stationed in Baghdad focused on how the Iraqi government responded to American attacks. Due to these journalists’ location and their access to televisions, they reported on what JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 19 the Iraqi government was putting on the air. On March 20th, when the United States’ invasion began, Hussein aired a television broadcast where he claimed “‘God willing, we will take them to the limit where they lose their patience and any hope to achieve what they have planned and what the Zionist criminals have pushed them to do’” (Burns, 2003, p. 1). However, after a U.S assassination attempt on Saddam, he appeared in another broadcast, yet was clearly more shaken this time. Burns observed that “the attacks appeared to have taken a toll on Mr. Hussein, whose somewhat disordered appearance on television shortly after the first raid left one Iraqi with the feeling that his leader had, as he put it, been exposed to a sudden, shocking blast of reality”

(Burns, 2003, p. 2). Despite this disheveled appearance of Hussein, the Iraqi government tended to only broadcast confident messages to convince the Iraqi people to fight against the invading

Americans. As American forces were slowed more than what initial U.S officials had expected,

Shadid reported “Hussein’s government emerged emboldened Sunday and claimed that its carefully laid plans to create a quagmire for U.S forces were succeeding” (Shadid, 2003, p. 1).

Burns also commented that “officials who had worried privately about a possible collapse of authority began talking as if the capture of the city could be held off for weeks or even months”

(Burns, 2003). Iraqi officials were even welcoming the assault on Baghdad because they believed that the Americans would face a fierce battle within the city. “The Iraqi units in holding out for days against British troops in at least some districts of [Umm Qasr] appears to make

Baghdad’s leaders feel that the strategy could be the template for the fighting in Baghdad”

(Burns, 2003, p. 2). In regard to American forces, Iraqi Vice- President Taha Yassin Ramadan stated, “’they are roaming in the desert, and in fact, we have allowed them to roam the desert. I tell you, we wish and beg that they come to Baghdad so that we will teach a lesson to this evil administration and all who cooperate with it” (Shadid, 2003, p.2). Even as Burns and Shadid JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 20 reported the government’s confident claims that Baghdad would not fall without a bloody fight, they juxtaposed those claims with the tangible fears and doubts of Baghdad residents.

As the Iraq government attempt to espouse confidence despite airstrikes on the city, both

Burns and Shadid observed the fear of the Iraqi people. As airstrikes hit the city, “a deep-rooted fear was palpable, a fear of being obliterated in an Armageddon deployed by the world’s greatest military power” (Burns, 2003, p. 3). Part of Iraqi’s fear was due to a lack of defensive preparations and “even in the heart of the government quarter…the most visible defenses have been the shoulder high, sandbagged bunkers that have sprung up at traffic intersections” (Burns,

2003, p. 2). The Iraqi government lacked the necessary weapons to stop U.S missiles and protect

Baghdad citizens. Even though the precision missiles usually hit their intended targets, not every missile was perfect. Missiles could hit civilian neighborhoods even if the neighborhood was not located near a military or government site. Such was the case with Adhimiya, a lower-class neighborhood, that was hit by a missile on the fifth day of the war (Shadid, 2003). At least three people died while an additional four people were wounded (Shadid, 2003). Many Iraqis were infuriated by the airstrikes but were also aware that they could not stop them or avoid them. One

Iraqi citizen whose house had been hit by the missile said “he was resigned to his fate, a fate that could be decided by either the U.S or his own government. ‘It’s not in our hands,’ he said, speaking in a vague vernacular so common here to speech in public. ‘We don’t have a choice’”

(Shadid, 2003, p. 2). Despite Baghdad citizens’ realization that they could not affect the outcome of the war, Shadid and Burns found in interviews with Iraqi citizens that their Muslim identity, pride of Iraq, and distrust of the United States would lead them to oppose the U.S invasion. JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 21

While many Iraqi citizens knew Hussein was a vicious dictator, that knowledge did not directly correlate to citizens being pleased with the American led invasion. During an interview conducted with a wealthy Baghdad citizen, he acknowledged Iraq

‘Could never defeat the Americans and the British. It is a Third World country, and the

U.S is a superpower. But a U.S victory would have to come as a cost- suicide perhaps,

but with a sense of dignity. It was a sentiment, he said, that was rooted in his identity as

an Iraqi and his faith as a Muslim.’ Not once did he mention President Saddam Hussein’s

name. (Shadid, 2003, p. 3)

This citizen had no particular favor for Hussein, nor was he a radical Muslim. He only possessed a need to not allow his country to be taken over by foreign invaders. Another man commented,

“‘you can’t surrender easily; we should fight… our religion says we should fight for our honor.

We fear God. We’re more afraid of God than we’re afraid of the Americans’” (Shadid, 2003, p.

3). This citizen wanted to ward off American advances due to Westerners’ different way of life that many Muslims saw as “unholy.” In a different interview with a family where a government official was not present and the family’s identity was kept anonymous, the family discussed how

Iraqis are ready for change because they want more freedoms (Shadid, 2003). However, despite the desire for new freedoms, “family members expressed anger at the U.S government, which has promised to liberate them. They criticized Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his dictorial rule, but insisted that pride and patriotism prevent them from putting their destiny in the hands of a foreign power” (Shadid, 2003, p. 2). The father continued the theme of pride for Iraq when he stated “‘when somebody comes to attack Iraq, we stand up for Iraq. That doesn’t mean we love

Saddam Hussein, but there are priorities… There are rumblings of dissent, but these rumblings don’t mean: Come America, we’ll throw flowers at you’” (Shadid, 2003, p.3). Shadid and Burns JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 22 captured numerous Iraqis’ acknowledgement that change needed to come to the country, but they also caught many citizens’ anger at being invaded by the United States. While the reporters stationed in Baghdad saw citizens’ unhappiness with the war America was creating, Filkins and

Meyers saw Iraqi citizens greeting the U.S soldiers with more enthusiasm.

Phase I: The Race to Baghdad- Filkins and Myers Make Moves

Within the Phase 1 time period of the first five days, Filkins and Myers, both embedded journalists, reported on American troops’ movements through the desert and the takeover of Iraqi villages. American soldiers encountered jubilant responses from Iraqi villagers. On the second day of the invasion, as Safwan became the first Iraqi village to fall, “happiness and dread rose together… where some of the first Iraqis to encounter American and British troops found the joy of their deliverance muted by the fear that it was too good to last” (Filkins, 2003, p. 1). Many of

Safwan’s citizens ran up to the troops and told them how happy they were that Saddam would soon be gone. While Filkins could have only been positive and simply focusedhis article on the cheering Iraqis, he also includes a quote from an angered villager at the troops’ destruction of

Hussein’s shrines. “How would you like it if I were to cut up a poster of President Bush?”

(Filkins, 2003, p. 2). Yet, while Filkins includes this quote, he qualifies it in the next sentence when he states, “but his remarks where quickly drowned out by catcalls” (Filkins, 2003, p. 2).

The inclusion of the quote from the angered Iraqi man shows Filkins’ attempt to be as objective as possible and capture both sides.

The differences in reporting for Iraqi citizens’ reactions to the U.S could also be a result of location. Safwan was “the heartache of a town that has felt some of the hardest edges of

Saddam Hussein’s rule” (Filkins, 2003, p. 1). In Baghdad, many people wanted change from

Hussein’s oppression, but they had not experienced having family members murdered by JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 23

Hussein’s regime like some of the villagers in Safwan had. Another effect on the villager’s reactions could have also been the presence of troops. The villagers may have wanted to seem more excited in front of the new foreign power. The troops also did not destroy the village, where in Baghdad innocent civilians were being killed by the airstrikes. This article about

Safwan is representative of many similar encounters that Filkins and Myers had as the invasion moved towards Baghdad.

Another theme in Myers and Filkins’ articles in the first few days of the invasion was the lack of Iraqi resistance the invasion force faced. In his article, “Armored Units Sweep

Unchallenged Across Iraqi Desert,” Myers (2003) reported that his unit was ahead of schedule.

The Colonel of the unit described “Iraqi forces as ‘relatively disorganized and sporadic’” (Myers,

2003, p. 2). U.S commanders did not expect the Iraqi units in the desert to be as tough as they believed that the fighting would be in Baghdad where they were anticipating “fiercer resistance from Republican Guard divisions considered more loyal to President Saddam Hussein than regular army units” (Myers, 2003, p. 1). Not only did American troops see a lack of resistance, they encountered many Iraqi troops who were surrendering to them. “Around Basra, where hundreds of Iraqi soldiers surrendered Friday, the Americans and British have constructed what appears to be a low- intensity siege” (Filkins, 2003, p. 2). To avoid being slowed down on the way to Baghdad, the units were not taking all of the surrendered soldiers as prisoners of war.

One Iraqi solider said, “The Americans just said to us, ‘Give us your guns and go home’”

(Filkins, 2003, p. 2). This early lack of heavy resistance made many U.S commanders hopeful for how the rest of the trip to Baghdad would go. Filkins and Myers had a relatively positive view on the first few days of the invasion because Iraqi resistance did not give them much reason to report on the United States’ movements in a negative manner. When skirmishes occurred the JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 24 reporters mentioned them, but heavy fighting was lacking overall in the first few days of the invasion for those reporters who were embedded with military units.

Phase II: A Shift in Sourcing

As the United States military units moved into Baghdad, intense fighting ensued. On the first day U.S troops were there, over 1,000 Iraqi soldiers died as well as hundreds of civilians who got caught in the cross-fire (Filkins, 2003). At this point in the war, the embedded journalists have been with their military units for several weeks and have gained the trust of many of the soldiers in their units. As a result, the embedded reporters begin to show more of the soldiers’ emotions in their articles. One soldier who commented on the close combat necessary to fight in Baghdad said, “it was hard to shoot, because you don’t want to shoot the civilians. It was hard to pick out the threat” (Myers, 2003, p. 2). Another soldier, upon seeing a family that had died in a car crash as they tried to avoid the fighting said, “being a dad myself, that’s the hardest part…I’ve got six kids at home, and I can’t imagine it. I’d just as soon die than see that happen to my kids” (Myers, 2003, p. 2). They make it very clear that many troops feel sadness and guilt as innocent civilians lose their lives. “‘It’s a little sobering,’ said Capt. Sal Aguilar, standing in a field with dead Iraqis all around him. ‘When you’re training for this, you joke about it, you can’t wait for the real thing. Then when you see it, when you see the real thing, you never want to see it again’” (Filkins, 2003, p. 1). In another instance where U.S troops fired on a family of ten, six of which were killed, “one marine, according to witness there, began to cry” (Filkins,

2003, p. 2). The embedded reporters also see some of the trepidation the U.S. soldiers are feeling as they move into Baghdad. During a lull in the fighting, one Marine took time to phone home and “in a call to his parents, he only alluded to the dangers he had faced. ‘I’ll have some stories when I get home,’ Corpsman Smith said, ‘I love you, too, ma’” (Filkins, 2003, p. 2-3). As JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 25

Marine units prepared to siege the city, a medic stated “the guys are really tense” (Filkins, 2003, p. 1). In contrast to some of the emotional quotes embedded journalists earned from their immersion with the soldiers, the unilateral reporters come to lack this kind of emotional response as they gained quotes from soldiers.

As United States military units arrive in Baghdad, this provided an opportunity for unilateral reporters to interview them. Unlike the embedded reporters who included more of an emotional side in some of their quotes from the American soldiers, the unilateral reporters tended to only focus on the strategic or rational information the soldiers could provide. One of the first quotes by a soldier to appear in an article by Shadid was about the United States’ plan for taking control of Baghdad. Other quotes from U.S soldiers discussed the increase in Iraqi resistance they had faced in Baghdad, the falling of Hussein’s government, and weapon seizures. Even civilian deaths contained more of a distant tone when soldiers talked to the unilateral journalists about them. When a U.S army vehicle fired at a car that had evaded a roadblock, it killed three out of the four family members. A major who was commenting on the incident said, “our soldiers have to make a split-second decision on what to do when a car is rushing at them”

(Shadid, 2003, p. 3). This quote certainly presents a different side for how soldiers were represented after a family of civilians was killed by American troops than what the embedded reporters were showing. While embedded reporters could be considered to be biased because of their presentation of the soldiers’ emotions, they could also be seen as having access to a kind of source that the unilateral reporters do not. Even though both the unilateral and embedded journalists can interview troops during this time-period because of the American troops’ location, embedded journalists have earned a relational kind of access to troops from traveling with them that unilateral journalists lack. JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 26

Phase II: The Toppling of a Statue

By April 9th, 2003, much of the Iraq government had fallen or fled Baghdad. Nothing captured the sentiments of the fall of Hussein’s rule more than the toppling of a large Saddam

Hussein statue in Firdaus Square. Iraqi civilians started the process of bringing down the statue by tying a rope around the statue’s neck and using a sledgehammer at the statue’s base (Shadid,

2003). Yet, the civilians could not get the statue to fall by themselves, and they eventually enlisted the help of a U.S tank, which ultimately brought the statue down. Every major American television news station covered this “historic moment” and both Shadid and Burns were able to attend the falling of the statue due to their ability to freely travel Baghdad.. Shadid described the scene as “what is likely to become the lasting image of the U.S entry into Baghdad” (Shadid,

2003, p. 3). Shadid depicts a jubilant crowd, who, when the statue finally fell, “converged, kicking it, pummeling it with a chain, rocks and a sledgehammer, and slapping it with shoes- a great insult in the Arab world” (Shadid, 2003, p. 3). While the unilateral journalists were able to capture the falling of the statue, the embedded journalists hardly even commented on it in their writings.

Filkins and Myers barely focus on the toppling of the Hussein statue in their writings because their military units were engaged in battle while the event occurred. Myers makes only a passing comment about the fall of the statue in his writing. “The events in downtown Baghdad on Wednesday- the waving, happy crowds of Iraqis in the streets happened only a mile or two away, but they remained distant news to the Third Infantry Division’s engineers as they meticulously cleared hundreds of mines from the roadway this morning” (Myers, 2003, p. 1). If the overarching expectation is that embedded journalists would simply be biased and only show the United States in the strongest and most positive light, then how the two groups of journalists JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 27 framed this event stands in direct contrast to that. Here, it is the unilateral journalists who are taking on an extremely positive outlook and are looking for the Iraq conflict to draw to a close soon after the symbolic falling of the Hussein statue. On the other hand, the embedded journalists show that fighting is still occurring across the city of Baghdad. This finding stands in direct contrast to Kuypers and Coopers study (2005). The embedded journalists did not report on the toppling of the statue at length because of their inability to be at the event due to their forced travel with their units; this instance demonstrates a clear occasion where the unilateral journalists take on a more positive tone than the embedded journalists.

Phase III: Shadid Shows Iraqi Distrust

At this point in the conflict, the U.S considered the war to be over. On May 1st, 2003, in what came to be known as the “Mission Accomplished” speech, President Bush claimed that major combat operation in Iraq were over (Cline, 2013). Due to this perception, it is important to note that Burns (unilateral) and Myers (embedded) do not produce any additional articles during the time-period this study examines because they have been pulled out of Iraq. However, despite the claims that the war is over because Hussein’s rule has fallen, that does not mean that the

United States has control of Baghdad. In fact, the coverage suggests quite the opposite. Shadid focuses on Iraqi citizens as his key sources during this time-period. Many Iraqis’ trust in the

American forces is quickly fading due to the lawlessness and looting that has begun in Baghdad.

When asked about the looting of the National Museum of Antiquities, which held ancient artifacts from the Assyrian and Babylonian Empires, “many blamed U.S forces for not intervening to stop the demolition- deepening their skepticism of the American presence”

(Shadid, 2003, p. 2). An owner of an art gallery commented on the American failings at preventing the looting. “When I see an occupier, am I happy? Looting the museum, burning the JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 28

National Library, robbing the Saddam Center for Arts? The great America is not able to exert control over a gang of thieves?” (Shadid, 2003). Shadid captures Iraqi’s growing distrust in the

American forces and presents their cynicism that the U.S is only there to liberate them from a dictator. Interestingly, the group of artists feared that religious groups would ultimately take power in the upcoming years, and they feared what censorship that would bring (Shadid, 2003, p.

2). One artist commented, “religious extremism is the biggest threat…it will come to the surface”

(Shadid, 2003, p. 3). This growing distrust also continues as the United States fails to repair the utilities of Baghdad.

In contrast to the more secular, artistic groups in Baghdad, Shadid also presents the viewpoint of religious Iraqis. During this time, Shadid presents Iraq citizens’ feelings on religion in terms of the American occupation. From the time the American invasion began, many citizens had commented that their fate was not in their hands, but instead they felt that the outcome of their lives was inevitable because only God knew what would happen. The majority of the

Muslims in Iraq belong to the Shiite sect, yet Hussein had been a Sunni Muslim who had enforced a secular regime. In Karbala, which is considered to be one of the most holy cities in

Iraq for Shiite Muslims, a mass pilgrimage began after the fall of Hussein’s regime because the government had forbidden it previously (Shadid, 2003). As Hussein’s party fell, it also presented a vacuum of power. In Karabala, the Shiite clergy attempted to fill that void and “were out in force directing traffic, overseeing crowds and providing first aid to pilgrims who entered under the banners of mosques and neighborhoods of Baghdad and cities across southern Iraq” (Shadid,

2003, p. 2). Karabala represents one of many cities in southern Iraq where Iraqi clergy was attempting to take the opportunity to step up and provide a religious based government for a group of people who had been repressed for decades. Yet, for as much as the Shiite majority JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 29 despised Hussein, there also lies a deep distrust of American forces. Part of that “bitterness at the

United States lingers over its perceived failure to support a Shiite uprising after the 1991 Persian

Gulf War; it was bloodily crushed weeks later by the Republican Guard” (Shadid, 2003, p. 2). In addition to the distrust of Americans, there lies an uncertainty in what the Americans’ true intentions are for the country. One citizen commented, “we still don’t know what [the United

States] wants in return for the overthrowing for the regime,” while another citizen’s skepticism leaked through as he asked “they did it for nothing?” (Shadid, 2003, p. 3).

More important than the distaste for and skepticism about the U.S occupation, Shadid also shows a willingness of Iraqis to possibly take action against American forces. Shiite

Muslims in Karabala stated, “the decision was not theirs but instead in the hand of the Hawza, or perhaps clergy who spoke on its behalf (Shadid, 2003). One resident commented, ‘If they say make resistance, we will obey them’” (Shadid, 2003, p. 87). Here Shadid represents more than just a dislike of the American occupation. He shows a willingness on the part of Iraqi citizens to resist the nation who overthrew a man they despised only two weeks earlier. Overall, in interviews with Iraqi citizens, whether they be secular artists and intellects in Baghdad or the more overtly religious group in Karbala, Shadid presents Iraqi citizens who hold a strong distrust of the American forces.

Phase III: Filkins Presents a Paralleled Distrust from the Perspective of American Troops

Interestingly, as of April 21st, Filkins begins all of his articles with the overarching title

“Aftereffects.” However, thousands of U.S troops still remain in Iraq. During this time, even these troops begin to express frustrations and uncertainty for what lies ahead of them. A mass search begins to locate Hussein and execute him. American soldiers begin to accept anonymous tips from civilians to aid in locating him. While many tips were perceived as unhelpful, one JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 30 assertion from a male citizen caught the attention of Maj. Doug Davids, an American Special

Forces officer (Filkins, 2003). He put together a group of soldiers to make a move on the tip, but, as the unit was about to head out, the mission was cancelled by senior military officials. Filkins

(2003) described the American commanders as “bristling” at what they believed was a missed opportunity to capture Hussein. While commanders acknowledged the mission may have been terminated due to the proposed location already being under surveillance by another branch of the American military, “officers on the scene also suggested that the operation had been canceled because of excessive bureaucratic inefficiency. They complained that they had not even been given the chance to explore the possibility that Mr. Hussein was there” (Filkins, 2003, p. 1).

Here, Filkins is presenting a side where it is not only Iraq’s citizens who are frustrated with the

Americans handling of their time in Baghdad. This side of the war, the soldier’s frustration, is a side that would never have been presented if it were not for the use of embedded journalists. Yet, instead of having a positive bias and presenting only a positive side of what the troops are doing in Baghdad, Filkins uses his access to soldiers to show their frustrations with what is occurring following the fall of Hussein’s regime.

Even after the U.S has taken over Baghdad, they still do not have total control in the area, and, despite the end of major combat operations, American troops are still killing Iraqis, as was the case when eighteen Anti-American protesters were shot (Filkins & Fisher, 2003). Filkins

(2003) comments “the war in Iraq has officially ended, but the momentous task of recreating a new Iraqi nation seems hardly to have begun…American troops are straining to manage the forces this war has unleashed: the anger, frustration and competing ambitions of a nation suppressed for three decades.” In this article, Filkins parallels what Shadid found with Iraqi citizens gaining a larger and larger distrust of American forces. Educated Iraqi’s who were JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 31

“eager for the American led transformation of Iraq to work that the Americans may be losing the initiative, that the single-mindedness that won the war is slackening under the delicate task of transforming a military victory in to a political success” (Filkins & Fisher, 2003, p.1). This growing sentiment of American inadequacy for setting up a new, stable government is repeated in several of Filkins’ following articles.

In addition to losing Iraqis’ trust because of the killing of civilians, many of Baghdad’s citizens experienced a waning trust in the American forces due to a lack of basic utilities in the city. Piles of garbage lined the streets, electricity and running water were still down a majority of the time, and many storeowners were still too scared to reopen their shops (Filkins & Fisher,

2003). While the lack of utilities represent the superficial issue at hand, Iraqi citizens were justified in questioning the United States’ dedication to rebuilding Iraq because of the small amount of troops there. In Baghdad, “only 12,000 American soldiers have been assigned” there, even though it is “a city of 5 million people. Only 150, 000 American soldiers are being asked to maintain order across all of Iraq, population 25 million, and that number may be substantially reduced by the fall” (Filkins & Fisher, 2003). A majority of Iraqi citizens did not want U.S forces in Iraq, yet they would tolerate them for a while if the U.S could help rebuild and bring order to the nation. However, Filkins shows a side where U.S forces are in a state of limbo; they are present in Iraq, yet there was not enough American planning to have the proper amount of troops to handle the tasks of rebuilding. Once again, despite being embedded, Filkins frames his articles in a way that is not completely positive for the Americans. Instead, Filkins represents the very real concerns of Iraq citizens that will ultimately lead to even more tensions between Iraq civilians and American forces.

JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 32

Phase IV: If We Thought Iraq had Issues Before, This Takes It to a New Level

Throughout the months of June and July, U.S forces see a rise in American casualties as pockets of Iraqi resistance emerge. In an article by Filkins headlined “After the War: New

Attack” an American soldier was killed in a bombing. Filkins’ headline perfectly captures the tone of the time-period because even though an end to the war had been declared on the U.S side fighting was still going on. The bombing “resembled the many that have preceded it, and which have made the summer such a trying one for American forces. The attackers hit, ran and got away. No one was detained, and the Americans had no chance to return fire” (Filkins, 2003, p.

1). Filkins (2003) interviewed a soldier who stated “‘I’m not supposed to talk to you, but it’s terrible’” (p. 1). Even though the soldier was not supposed to speak with Filkins about the incident, Filkins’ position as an embedded journalist privileged him to get this quote. This bombing marked the 50th death of an American soldier since Bush’s declaration for the end of combat operation on May 1st, and it was the 15th death in the past eight days (Filkins, 2003).

Filkins did not attempt to provide a number for how many Iraqis had been killed during that same time-period. Filkins was also able to provide additional information on the attack due to his position as an embedded reporter. He stated, “today’s death illustrated the relative sophistication of the attacks against the Americans. The metal shards left behind suggest that the bomb was larger than a grenade, and the aim and timing of the detonation suggests no small competence on the part of the assailants” (Filkins, 2003). Once again, Filkins did not attempt to sugar coat or hide the growing issues U.S forces were facing. Instead, Filkins uses his access as an embedded reporter to gain more information on the situation.

Shadid focuses more on Iraqi citizen’s responses during this time-period as American troops begin to conduct more and more raids on civilian homes in the search for Saddam JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 33

Hussein. In the small village of Thuluya in northwestern Iraq, Americans arrested more than 400 residents for being members of the Baath Party or a part of Hussein’s government (Shadid,

2003). One elderly resident angrily commented, “they carried out the raid here because we’re

Sunni and Saddam was Sunni… after this operation, we think 100 Saddams is better than the

Americans” (Shadid, 2003, p. 2). These raids created a growing animosity on the part of the

Iraqis. They also show a shift in who the American officials see as criminals. Before, the

Americans largely bypassed civilians and were concerned about the number of civilian casualities. There was a clear line between the Iraqi soldiers and the regular citizens. By mid-

June though, the raids make it clear that almost any Iraqi civilian could be a threat to the

Americans, and the raids show a lack of consideration for Iraqi citizens’ right to privacy. Shadid travels to Baghdad and Samarra where similar raids are also happening. He finds similar sentiments from Iraqi citizens in each city. Shadid’s position as a unilateral journalist allows him to travel between cities as long as he has hired an Iraqi translator and, possibly, a bodyguard.

Since Shadid is not committed to one area of Iraq, he is able to gain quotes from Iraqi citizens in multiple areas. His access to residents from multiple cities allows him to frame multiple articles where civilians are angered by the American raids.

Limitations/ Future Research

This study mainly argues that access to certain sources shapes the way that journalists construct and frame their stories. However, many other factors also play a part in how journalists frame a certain event. A more in-depth qualitative analysis could be used for future studies to look more closely at the language used by the journalists to describe American attacks or to describe the Iraqi people in general. Research could also focus more on the connections between JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 34 articles and their headlines, since the main theme for some of the articles did not always align with their headline.

A limitation of this study is the small sample of reporters chosen for examination. With hundreds of U.S war correspondents covering the Iraq war, the conclusions reached in this study may not be reflective of all embedded or unilateral journalists. This study also only examines the first four months of the invasion. Future studies could examine the time-period directly before the United States invaded or a longer length of time after the war began.

An additional area for future research, in regards to the indexing and cascading activation theories, could involve a qualitative analysis of embedded journalists in comparison to journalists who are covering the administration’s viewpoint in the United States. While this study focuses on the comparisons and contrasts between embedded and unilateral reporters’ stories, both groups utilize many “unofficial” sources. A comparison between journalists who rely on the unofficial sources and the journalists who rely mainly on official government voices could also yield interesting results about the power of objectivity and sourcing in the free American press.

Concluding Thoughts

The 2003 Iraq War provides the first opportunity to view embedded and unilateral journalists’ writings to such a large extent. While critics of the embedding program argued that bias would affect how embedded reporters wrote about the war, access to certain sources actually played a more significant role in how journalists framed their stories. While it is true that in the first phase embedded journalists had a more positive outlook on the war, it seems to be due to the lack of resistance American troops were facing at that time. During that phase, unilateral journalists had a more negative viewpoint on the war because of the devastation the American airstrikes were causing in Baghdad. In phase two, both the embedded and unilateral reporters JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 35 have access to interview American soldiers, but embedded journalists present more of the soldiers’ emotions because they have gained their trust over the past few weeks. Despite expectations, in some cases the unilateral journalists have a more positive outlook on the United

States’ takeover of Baghdad than some of the embedded journalists. In phase three and four,

Burns and Myers have been pulled from Iraq, which indicates that U.S newspapers are allocating their resources to more “newsworthy” matters. In phase three, Filkins presents uncertainty on the American troops’ side for what lies ahead, as well as Iraqi citizens’ growing distrust of the

United States’ occupation. Shadid only focuses on Iraqi residents during this time-period, and he shows a resentment from citizens whether they are religious or not. In phase four, many of the underlying emotions that were emerging in phase three completely come to the surface. Filkins shows more wariness on the part of U.S troops because of ambushes, and Shadid also shows a more evident distrust that the Americans have formed for civilians with the increase in house raids. Shadid’s ability to travel to multiple cities also allows him to capture the residents’ feelings of resentment that grow because of the raids. Each phase of the war during the four- month time-period examined allows the two different groups of journalists to have access to different sources, which affects how their articles are framed.

Overall, neither group of journalists is more effective at presenting war than the other.

Both groups become essential in presenting a full picture of the Iraq War. Embedded journalists could present a perspective of the war that had never been shown up-close before. Americans gained a better understanding of U.S military units as embedded journalists reported on their everyday tasks. However, embedded journalists could only provide a small slice of the war due to their forced travel with their units as Pfau (2004) also argued. On the other hand, unilateral journalists could remain in one area for an extended length of time to gain the information JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 36 needed for their stories. As of now, it is unclear if the U.S Department of Defense will look to use the embed program in future foreign conflicts. Regardless, in terms of the Iraq War, both embedded and unilateral journalists were necessary to capture the whole story.

Through examining the embedded and unilateral journalist’s use of sources, one can see how a lack of reliance on “official” sources allows for deviance from the dominant frame. Many of the sources used, especially in Phases 3 and 4, would not be considered “official.” The articles fall further away from the indexing model and become more aligned with Entman’s cascading activation model. This becomes evident in Phase 2 when most of the media organizations focus on the falling of the Saddam statue and many government officials claim the fall of the statue represents the fall of Saddam’s regime. Yet, embedded reporters fail to fit into the dominant framework because they show that close, intense street combat is occurring in Baghdad simultaneously as the statue falls. In this instance, embedded reporters showed a “truth” that differed from official sources claims.

A very similar situation emerges in Phases 3 and 4. Despites Bush’s claim about the end of major combat operations in Iraq, journalists rely on unofficial sources to present the discord and the battles that are taking place in the country. The 2003 Iraq War provides an opportunity to not only examine the differences in reporting between embedded and unilateral journalists. The war also offers the chance to see how sources that are lower within the cascading model can provide a more in-depth “truth” than official sources could provide.

JOURNALISTS’ ACCESS TO SOURCES 37

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