DOCSLIB.ORG

"Because That's Where the Money Is": a Theory of Corporate Legal Compliance

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
"BECAUSE THAT'S WHERE THE MONEY IS": A THEORY OF CORPORATE LEGAL COMPLIANCE WILLIAM C. BRADFORD 1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 341 11. Toward a Theory of CLC ............................................................................. 345 A. Personality Theory ........................................................................... 345 1. General Premises and Assumptions .......................................... 345 2. Personality Constructs ............................................................... 346 a. Beliefs ................................................................................. 346 b. Images ................................................................................. 347 c. Values ................................................................................. 348 d. Attitudes .............................................................................. 348 e. Traits ................................................................................... 348 f. M otives ................................................................................ 348 g. Summary ............................................................................. 348 3. M easuring Personality ............................................................... 349 4. Conditionality and Contingency: Other Levels of Analysis ..... 350 B. A Theory of CLC ............................................................................. 351 I. Introduction ......................................................................... 351 2. Independent Variables: Personality Constructs ........................ 351 a. M ilitarism ............................................................................ 351 i. Sub-constructs of M ilitarism ........................................ 352 ii. Summary and Operationalization: M ilitarism ............. 354 b. Anomism ............................................................................. 354 i. Disregard for Law ........................................................ 354 ii. Disregard for Legal Authorities .................................. 355 iii. Amoralism .................................................................. 355 iv. Ignorance of Law ........................................................ 355 v. Ignorance of Corporate Law ........................................ 356 vi. Summary and Operationalization: Anomism ............. 356 c. Hostility ............................................................................... 356 i. Distrust ......................................................................... 356 ii. Narcissism ................................................................... 357 iii. Cynicism .................................................................... 357 338 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. Vi:I1 iv. M isanthropy ................................................................ 358 v. Ethnocentrism .............................................................. 358 vi. Hostility ...................................................................... 358 vii. M achiavellianism ...................................................... 359 viii. Lack of Em pathy ...................................................... 359 ix. Selfishness .................................................................. 359 x. Summ ary and Operationalization: Hostility ................ 359 d. Adventurism ....................................................................... 360 i. Tolerance of Risk ......................................................... 360 ii. Internal Locus of Control ............................................ 360 iii. Im pulsivity ................................................................. 360 iv. Anxiety ....................................................................... 361 v. Optim ism ..................................................................... 361 vi. Stress .......................................................................... 361 vii. M ale Sex ................................................................... 361 viii. Summary and Operationalization: Adventurism ...... 361 3. Dependent Variables: Decisions and Outcomes Regarding CLC ......................................................................................... 362 a. Introduction: Corporate Law and Major Sub-regimes ........ 362 b. Operationalization ............................................................... 365 c. Preliminary Hypotheses and Associative Linkages ............ 366 Ill. Personality and CLC: Heuristic Testing of the Theory ............................... 366 A. Data .................................................................................................. 366 1. Enron ......................................................................................... 367 a. CEO Jeffrey Skilling ........................................................... 367 i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs ......................... 367 a. M ilitarism ............................................................. 367 b. Anom ism .............................................................. 369 c. Hostility ................................................................ 371 d. Adventurism ......................................................... 372 e. Summary of Independent Variables: Jeffrey Skilling ..................................................................... 373 ii. DVs: CLC and Enron ......................................................... 373 2. W orldCom ................................................................................. 376 a. CEO Bernard Ebbers ........................................................... 376 i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs ......................... 376 a. M ilitarism ............................................................. 376 b. Anom ism ..............................................................377 c. Hostility ................................................................ 378 d. Adventurism ......................................................... 379 e. Summary of Independent Variables: Bernard Ebbers ....................................................................... 379 2014 A THEORY OF CORPORATE LEGAL COMPLIANCE 339 ii. DVs: CLC and W orldCom .......................................... 380 3. lm Clone System s ...................................................................... 382 a. CEO Sam W aksal ............................................................... 382 i. [Vs: Scores on Personality Constructs ......................... 382 a. M ilitarism ............................................................. 382 b. Anomism .............................................................. 383 c. Hostility ................................................................ 384 d. Adventurism ......................................................... 385 e. Sum m ary of lVs: Sam W aksal ............................. 386 ii. DVs: CLC and Im Clone System s ................................ 386 4. AIG ............................................................................................390 a. CEO Hank Greenberg ......................................................... 390 i. lVs: Scores on Personality Constructs ......................... 390 a. M ilitarism ............................................................. 390 b. Anom ism .............................................................. 391 c. Hostility ................................................................ 392 d. Adventurism ......................................................... 393 e. Sum mary of lVs: Hank Greenberg ....................... 393 ii. DVs: CLC and AIG ..................................................... 394 5. HealthSouth ............................................................................... 396 a. CEO Richard Scrushy ......................................................... 396 i. lVs: Scores on Personality Constructs ......................... 396 a. M ilitarism ............................................................. 396 b. Anom ism .............................................................. 398 c. Hostility ................................................................ 399 d. Adventurism ......................................................... 400 e. Sum m ary of lVs: Richard Scrushy ....................... 401 ii. DVs: CLC and HealthSouth ........................................ 401 6. Sunbeam .................................................................................... 402 a. CEO Albert Dunlap ............................................................. 402 i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs ......................... 402 a. M ilitarism ............................................................. 402 b. Anom ism .............................................................. 404 c. Hostility ................................................................ 404 d. Adventurism ......................................................... 405 e. Summ ary of IVs: Albert Dunlap .......................... 406 ii. DVs: CLC and Sunbeam ............................................. 406 7. Tyco .......................................................................................... 408 a. CEO Dennis Kozlowski ...................................................... 408 i. lVs: Scores on Personality Constructs ......................... 408 a. M ilitarism ............................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Can Diversity in the Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption? Steven A
    Loyola University Chicago, School of Law LAW eCommons Faculty Publications & Other Works 2003 Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in the Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption? Steven A. Ramirez Loyola University Chicago, School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/facpubs Part of the Securities Law Commons Recommended Citation Ramirez, Steven, Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in the Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption, St. John’s L. Rev. 837 (2003). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A FLAW IN THE SARBANES-OXLEY REFORM: CAN DIVERSITY IN THE BOARDROOM QUELL CORPORATE CORRUPTION? STEVEN A. RAMIREZt INTRODUCTION Why talk about the intersection of race and corporate law? Because that is literally where the money is. Corporations produce ninety percent of our total gross domestic product.1 The top 500 corporations control seventy-five percent of our nation's most productive assets.2 In a society that is as materialistic as ours, to talk about any systemic racial reform without discussing corporate governance misses this central point.3 In short, if our society continues to be permeated by the consequences of yesteryear's apartheid, it is axiomatic that corporate governance f Professor of Law and Director, Business and Transactional Law Center, Washburn University School of Law. Courtney T. Kennedy and Brian Perkins provided excellent research assistance for this Article.
    [Show full text]
  • Criminal Law
    Criminal Law CASES AND MATERIALS Fourth Edition 2021 SUPPLEMENT Stephen A. Saltzburg John L. Diamond Kit Kinports Thomas Morawetz Rory Little CAROLINA ACADEMIC PRESS Durham, North Carolina Copyright © 2021 Carolina Academic Press, LLC All Rights Reserved Carolina Academic Press 700 Kent Street Durham, North Carolina 27701 Telephone (919) 489-7486 Fax (919) 493-5668 E-mail: [email protected] www.cap-press.com Copyright © 2021 Carolina Academic Press, LLC. All rights reserved. CHAPTER 1 THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL LAW [A] THE CORE AND PERIPHERY OF CRIMINAL LAW [1] THE FAMILIARITY OF CRIMINAL LAW Page 3: Add to the end of the section: Society’s perception of criminal law has potentially and hopefully been transformed by the police killing of George Floyd in May 2020 and the mostly peaceful demonstrations that followed worldwide. There is increased recognition of the systemic racism embedded in the criminal justice system and the country’s failure to provide equal justice for all. Movements such as Black Lives Matter have attempted to address these injustices and advance solutions. As you study criminal law, please keep in the forefront of your mind how your generation of lawyers can work to bring to our country a criminal justice system that reflects the kind of society our ideals aspire to. Below is the prepared statement presented by George Floyd’s bother, Philonise, before the House Judiciary Committee on June 10, 2020. Chairman Jerrold Nadler and members of the Committee: Thank you for the invitation to be here today to talk about my big brother, George. The world knows him as George, but I called him Perry.
    [Show full text]
  • Media Coverage of Ceos: Who? What? Where? When? Why?
    Media Coverage of CEOs: Who? What? Where? When? Why? James T. Hamilton Sanford Institute of Public Policy Duke University [email protected] Richard Zeckhauser Kennedy School of Government Harvard University [email protected] Draft prepared for March 5-6, 2004 Workshop on the Media and Economic Performance, Stanford Institute for International Studies, Center on Development, Democracy, and the Rule of Law. We thank Stephanie Houghton and Pavel Zhelyazkov for expert research assistance. Media Coverage of CEOs: Who? What? Where? When? Why? Abstract: Media coverage of CEOs varies predictably across time and outlets depending on the audience demands served by reporters, incentives pursued by CEOs, and changes in real economic indicators. Coverage of firms and CEOs in the New York Times is countercyclical, with declines in real GDP generating increases in the average number of articles per firm and CEO. CEO credit claiming follows a cyclical pattern, with the number of press releases mentioning CEOs and profits, earnings, or sales increasing as monthly business indicators increase. CEOs also generate more press releases with soft news stories as the economy and stock market grow. Major papers, because of their focus on entertainment, offer a higher percentage of CEO stories focused on soft news or negative news compared to CEO articles in business and finance outlets. Coverage of CEOs is highly concentrated, with 20% of chief executives generating 80% of coverage. Firms headed by celebrity CEOs do not earn higher average shareholder returns in the short or long run. For some CEOs media coverage equates to on-the-job consumption of fame.
    [Show full text]
  • Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall Street
    GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 2013 Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving In to Wall Street Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr. George Washington University Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving In to Wall Street, 81 University of Cincinnati Law Review 1283-1446 (2013). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. GW Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Paper No. 2013‐117 GW Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013‐117 Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving In to Wall Street Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. 2013 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283-1446 This paper can be downloaded free of charge from the Social Science Research Network: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2327872 TURNING A BLIND EYE: WHY WASHINGTON KEEPS GIVING IN TO WALL STREET Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.* As the Dodd–Frank Act approaches its third anniversary in mid-2013, federal regulators have missed deadlines for more than 60% of the required implementing rules. The financial industry has undermined Dodd–Frank by lobbying regulators to delay or weaken rules, by suing to overturn completed rules, and by pushing for legislation to freeze agency budgets and repeal Dodd–Frank’s key mandates.
    [Show full text]
  • LEADING and MANAGING GLOBALLY VP+ Directors Managers with YALE SCHOOL of MANAGEMENT and INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE for MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT (IMD)
    Target Audience LEADING AND MANAGING GLOBALLY VP+ Directors Managers WITH YALE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT (IMD) Companies around the world have gone global at an accelerated speed. Yet many companies are not fully prepared for a world in which the biggest business opportunities are global in nature and scope. Executives in the six-week program, Leading and Managing Globally, acquire the global mindset and competencies needed to effectively lead in this world, from bridging cultural divides, to PROGRAM STRUCTURE recognizing more deeply the sources of organizational power and information flow, to overcoming barriers to change. Time Commitment: 6 weeks/ 5 flexible hours per week USE INFORMAL AUTHORITY TO IDENTIFY AND BRIDGE CULTURAL LEAD EFFECTIVELY IN A MATRIXED CREATE ALIGNMENT AND CHANGE DIFFERENCES ACROSS DISTANCE GLOBAL ORGANIZATION Format: Self-paced with live faculty and team Improve management of global Identify sources of informal Overcome resistance to change interactions power and leverage your virtual teams across cultural, and achieve team integration and language and time differences network of relationships alignment within complex matrixed Output: Action plan with to influence those sources structures concrete roll-out strategy Use cultural decentering Manage interdependence techniques to diagnose cultural Define new metrics and KPIs to between organizational units differences and avoid team align purpose and drive FACULTY and foster knowledge flows conflicts arising from misaligned
    [Show full text]
  • Good Governance and the Misleading Myths of Bad Metrics
    ஽ Academy of Management Executive, 2004, Vol. 18, No. 1 ........................................................................................................................................................................ Good governance and the misleading myths of bad metrics Jeffrey Sonnenfeld In the aftermath of the well-publicized corruption governance metrics ratings services, the best and malfeasance in several large public corpora- known of which are Institutional Shareholder Ser- tions, especially at the executive and board levels, vices (ISS) and Governance Metrics International investors and analysts are searching for manage- (GMI). While firms such as Moody’s and The Cor- ment tools to measure the vulnerability of firms to porate Library use a wide mix of criteria to evalu- dishonesty, fraud, and corruption. While this effort ate companies, including their openly qualitative to improve governance through uniform guidelines judgment, ISS and GMI rely more on crisp numer- is understandable, at times boards and companies ical scoring systems. Some even believe that it is are reaching out for any life preserver that comes dangerous for firms to challenge the influential ISS along. Some firms are capitalizing on this desper- and GMI ratings services, given the attention paid ation by setting themselves up as corporate gover- to them by credit analysts, institutional portfolio nance experts. In 1999, when William Donaldson managers, and liability underwriters.3 was chairman of Aetna, he said prophetically, “I ISS and GMI look at public records to score firms fear that there is a growing cottage industry of on their governance effectiveness by using sim- superficial thought about corporate governance.”1 plistic checklists of standards or metrics based The swelling number of governance consultants heavily upon cliche´s and myths, rather than on has made Donaldson’s statement truer than ever.
    [Show full text]
  • Communities of Resistance
    COMMUNITIES OF RESISTANCE: HOW ORDINARY PEOPLE DEVELOPED CREATIVE RESPONSES TO MARGINALIZATION IN LYON AND PITTSBURGH, 1980-2010 by Daniel Holland Bachelor of Arts, Carnegie Mellon University, 1991 Master of Arts, University of Pittsburgh, 2015 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The Kenneth P. Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2019 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH THE KENNETH P. DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Daniel Holland It was defended on March 7, 2019 and approved by Sabina Deitrick, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs Laurence Glasco, Associate Professor, Department of History Rob Ruck, Professor, Department of History Committee Chair: Ted Muller, Professor, Department of History !ii Copyright © by Daniel Holland 2019 !iii Communities of Resistance: How ordinary people developed creative responses to marginalization in Lyon and Pittsburgh, 1980-2010 Daniel Holland, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2019 Abstract In the 1980s and 1990s, several riots erupted in suburbs, or banlieues in French, outside of Lyon, France, involving clashes between youth and police. They were part of a series of banlieue rebellions throughout France during these decades. As a result, to some French the banlieues became associated exclusively with “minority,” otherness, lawlessness, and hopelessness. Meanwhile, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in the 1980s and 1990s was reeling from a
    [Show full text]
  • A Case of Corporate Deceit: the Enron Way / 18 (7) 3-38
    NEGOTIUM Revista Científica Electrónica Ciencias Gerenciales / Scientific e-journal of Management Science PPX 200502ZU1950/ ISSN 1856-1810 / By Fundación Unamuno / Venezuela / REDALYC, LATINDEX, CLASE, REVENCIT, IN-COM UAB, SERBILUZ / IBT-CCG UNAM, DIALNET, DOAJ, www.jinfo.lub.lu.se Yokohama National University Library / www.scu.edu.au / Google Scholar www.blackboard.ccn.ac.uk / www.rzblx1.uni-regensburg.de / www.bib.umontreal.ca / [+++] Cita / Citation: Amol Gore, Guruprasad Murthy (2011) A CASE OF CORPORATE DECEIT: THE ENRON WAY /www.revistanegotium.org.ve 18 (7) 3-38 A CASE OF CORPORATE DECEIT: THE ENRON WAY EL CASO ENRON. Amol Gore (1) and Guruprasad Murthy (2) VN BRIMS Institute of Research and Management Studies, India Abstract This case documents the evolution of ‘fraud culture’ at Enron Corporation and vividly explicates the downfall of this giant organization that has become a synonym for corporate deceit. The objectives of this case are to illustrate the impact of culture on established, rational management control procedures and emphasize the importance of resolute moral leadership as a crucial qualification for board membership in corporations that shape the society and affect the lives of millions of people. The data collection for this case has included various sources such as key electronic databases as well as secondary data available in the public domain. The case is prepared as an academic or teaching purpose case study that can be utilized to demonstrate the manner in which corruption creeps into an ambitious organization and paralyses the proven management control systems. Since the topic of corporate practices and fraud management is inherently interdisciplinary, the case would benefit candidates of many courses including Operations Management, Strategic Management, Accounting, Business Ethics and Corporate Law.
    [Show full text]
  • Power & Politics
    POWER & POLITICS Langone (Draft) MGMT-GB.3366.10 Fall 2017 Professor R. Kabaliswaran Office: KMC 7-56 Class: KMC 4-80 E-mail: [email protected] (best way to reach me) Class Hours: W 6:00:9:00. Dates: 9/27-12/20. Office Hours: Usually an hour before class and by appointment Deliverables: My Constituency Map due session 7. One individual midterm case report due session 9. Class Reflection Journal: Do each session on previous session’s case/s and discussion. Put it all together , broken by session, and post as ONE word document before last class session. No need for journal write up on content of midterm case session and the last session. One take-home final due last session. Welcome to the elective course in Power & Politics! Course Theme Politics is not a dirty word! We just got to learn how to play good politics and keep out bad politics. By the same logic, power by itself does not necessarily corrupt though absolute power may corrupt absolutely. In other words, this course is about how to conquer the world, or at least survive the corporate jungle, without losing our soul. Even if you don’t want to play politics, good or bad, you still need the skills from this course to ensure that you don’t become a victim of politics. Course Objectives • Understanding what power is: People often have a misperception of what power, the basis of political behavior, really means. By the end of this course you should be able to have not only a conceptual understanding of what power is within an organizational context but a practical grasp of what the actual sources of power are.
    [Show full text]
  • The Great Telecom Meltdown for a Listing of Recent Titles in the Artech House Telecommunications Library, Turn to the Back of This Book
    The Great Telecom Meltdown For a listing of recent titles in the Artech House Telecommunications Library, turn to the back of this book. The Great Telecom Meltdown Fred R. Goldstein a r techhouse. com Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the U.S. Library of Congress. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Goldstein, Fred R. The great telecom meltdown.—(Artech House telecommunications Library) 1. Telecommunication—History 2. Telecommunciation—Technological innovations— History 3. Telecommunication—Finance—History I. Title 384’.09 ISBN 1-58053-939-4 Cover design by Leslie Genser © 2005 ARTECH HOUSE, INC. 685 Canton Street Norwood, MA 02062 All rights reserved. Printed and bound in the United States of America. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. All terms mentioned in this book that are known to be trademarks or service marks have been appropriately capitalized. Artech House cannot attest to the accuracy of this information. Use of a term in this book should not be regarded as affecting the validity of any trademark or service mark. International Standard Book Number: 1-58053-939-4 10987654321 Contents ix Hybrid Fiber-Coax (HFC) Gave Cable Providers an Advantage on “Triple Play” 122 RBOCs Took the Threat Seriously 123 Hybrid Fiber-Coax Is Developed 123 Cable Modems
    [Show full text]
  • Principles of Management
    Principles of Management [AUTHORS REMOVED AT REQUEST OF ORIGINAL PUBLISHER] UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LIBRARIES PUBLISHING EDITION, 2015. THIS EDITION ADAPTED FROM A WORK ORIGINALLY PRODUCED IN 2010 BY A PUBLISHER WHO HAS REQUESTED THAT IT NOT RECEIVE ATTRIBUTION. MINNEAPOLIS, MN Principles of Management by University of Minnesota is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License, except where otherwise noted. 7.5 Organizational Change 317 7.6 Planning and Executing Change Effectively 328 7.7 Building Your Change Management Skills 334 Chapter 8: Organizational Culture 8.1 Organizational Culture 337 8.2 Case in Point: Google Creates Unique Culture 339 8.3 Understanding Organizational Culture 342 8.4 Measuring Organizational Culture 346 8.5 Creating and Maintaining Organizational Culture 356 8.6 Creating Culture Change 370 8.7 Developing Your Personal Skills: Learning to Fit In 375 Chapter 9: Social Networks 9.1 Social Networks 379 9.2 Case in Point: Networking Powers Relationships 381 9.3 An Introduction to the Lexicon of Social Networks 383 9.4 How Managers Can Use Social Networks to Create Value 389 9.5 Ethical Considerations With Social Network Analysis 400 9.6 Personal, Operational, and Strategic Networks 408 9.7 Mapping and Your Own Social Network 414 Chapter 10: Leading People and Organizations 10.1 Leading People and Organizations 421 10.2 Case in Point: Indra Nooyi Draws on Vision and Values to Lead 424 10.3 Who Is a Leader? Trait Approaches to Leadership 427 10.4 What Do Leaders
    [Show full text]
  • The Face of the Subprime Crisis
    VOICES ON... HISTORY The Face of the Subprime Crisis Though he denies causing it, Angelo Mozilo is forever linked with last decade’s mortgage meltdown. BY GLENN RIFKIN “I wish I had that kind of power.” t was the 10th anniversary of the Of course, most observers have a drastically two fnancial crises, but Angelo R. diferent take on Mozilo’s role, tagging him as I Mozilo was having no part in tak- among the key villains of the crisis, the chief ing any blame. In a rare interview executive whose avarice and arrogance turned last summer with The Wall Street Countrywide into the leading purveyor of the Journal, the once-iconic fgure synonymous with toxic subprime loans. Indeed, the more prevalent the words “subprime crisis” continued to argue he conversation during the years of the recession that didn’t help fuel an epidemic of ailing mortgages followed was whether Mozilo would be indicted for that preceded the worldwide economic meltdown. his role in spearheading Countrywide’s controver- The 80-year-old former CEO of Countrywide sial behavior as a mortgage lender. Financial Corp. blamed the liquidity crunch and Mozilo escaped prosecution, though he fought the ensuing fnancial panic for the crisis. a decade-long legal battle to settle an accusation “Not subprime mortgages, not Countrywide, by the Securities Exchange Commission that he not Angelo Mozilo,” he said. “I wish I had that profted to the tune of $140 million due to insider kind of power.” trading. As part of the 2010 settlement, Mozilo 16 Korn Ferry Briefings The Voice of Leadership neither admitted nor denied any wrongdoing When Mozilo resigned as CEO of Countrywide but was ordered to pay a $67.5 million fne (most as the economic meltdown was gaining momen- of which was paid for him by Bank of America, tum, the Los Angeles Times noted that Mozilo which acquired Countrywide).
    [Show full text]