Youth Citizens Participation in Local Governance Structures: Experiences and

Learning from Youth Councils in County, Coast Province, .

BY SALIM MVURYA MGALA,

IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR MASTERS OF

ARTS IN PARTICIPATION, POWER AND SOCIAL CHANGE.

SUBMITTED TO: INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES,

UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX, BRIGHTON, ENGLAND, UNITED

KINGDOM.

Candidate 48521

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgement ...... 4

Abstract ...... 5

Map of Coast Province of Kenya ...... 6

CHAPTER 1:

1.1: Introduction ...... 7

1.2: Methodology ...... 10

1.2:1 Positionality and Learning...... 12

1.2.2 Research Entry and Feedback Process ...... 15

CHAPTER 2:

2.0: RESEARCH CONTEXT AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ..17

2.1. Democratic Opportunities for Youth Participation...... 17

2.1.1 State led –Participatory Governance in Kenya ...... 17

2.1.2: ...... 19

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2.1.3 Non-State Actors and Youth Participation ...... 20

2.1.4: Plan Kenya Youth and Governance Initiatives ...... 21

2.2 : A framework of Youth Participation, Representation and Social

Accountability………………………………………………………. 22

CHAPTER 3:

3.0: YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE ...... 25

3.1: Summary ...... 32

CHAPTER 4:

4.0: YOUTH REPRESENTATION ...... 34

4.1: Structure of Representation for Youth Councils...... 39

4.2: Summary ...... 40

CHAPTER 5:

5.0: SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY ...... 42

5.1: Summary ...... 48

CHAPTER 6:

6.0: SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS ...... 49

6.1 Summary ...... 49

6.2 Implications for Practice ...... 50

6.2.1 Understanding and Experiencing the Process ...... 50

6.2.2: Three Dimensional Equations to Capacity Strengthening ...... 51

6.2.3: Consider new Dynamics of Youth Representation and Accountability 52

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6.2.4: Demonstration of Participatory Governance ...... 52

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 53

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. This Synthesis Paper is a product of a process that witnessed contribution and support from several people. Iam greatly indebted to my Supervisor, John Gaventa for the professional guidance and support through out the entire process of research and writing. My Sincere appreciation to all the Fellows in the Participation Team at IDS and the MAP05 colleagues for the feedback while developing the initial ideas, outline and the writing process. Thank you to the Plan Kenya Management for approving the Action Research, my colleagues in Plan Kenya for the support and the youth councils, Government Youth officers in Kwale, Bondo and Kisumu Counties for their contributions as co- researchers and learners in the Youth Governance project. It may not be possible to mention everyone by name, but I do appreciate everybody who has supported this work.

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ABSTRACT Youth Participation in governance has continued to receive much more attention globally but remains a process which is under construction. Initiatives from Governments in enacting legal frameworks for institutionalised youth participation, and the capacity building support from non-state actors provide a rare promise to inspire youth to engage the state. Even though this state and non- state actors partnership provides a formidable synergy to enable the youth engagement process, experiences from Youth Councils in Kenya suggest that the oscillation of power contests dominate the entire process of youth participation in the Local governance structures. In this paper, I illuminate these experiences by exploring the practice of youth participation, youth representation and Social accountability. I argue that actors need to focus on the forms of power that mediate these concepts as a prerequisite to achieving effective youth influence in the decision making mechanisms of the state. I conclude by suggesting four critical implications for practice as: actors to understand and experience the youth engagement process, consider a three dimensional equation to capacity building, put new emphasis on representation and accountability as well as demonstrating participatory governance in internal structures.

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Map of Coast Province showing Kwale County covering Kinango, Msambweni and Kwale Districts.

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CHAPTER 1

1.1: Introduction:

Around the world, Governments are attempting to reclaim their legitimacy through initiatives that bring citizens closer to the decision making arena. This move has witnessed an explosion of reforms targeting to make Governments responsive and be more inclusive to citizens. These efforts excited debates about multiple forms of governance within the academic and experts with arguments formulated around, ‘civil society democracy’, ‘deliberative democracy’, ‘participatory governance’ and ‘empowered participatory governance’ (Fung and Wright 2003, Gaventa 2006).

This paper is concerned about illuminating my experiences with youth councils as they participated in the participatory governance structures of the state. It also includes my reflections while engaging with processes of action, reflection and action (Reason and Bradbury 2008). It is a product of my experiences and interactions between Youth Councils, Plan Kenya colleagues, and Government officers. This is further inspired by experiences of working with Youth Councils to influence decisions in the Government of Kenya. We almost went into a near celebration in 2006 when the Government of Kenya assented to a bill enacting the National Youth Policy as we thought the dreams of the youth were finally realised. Five years down the line, although the legal progress has been impressive with finally entrenching youth participation in the new constitution, the process of enjoying full participation remains one that is under construction. This paper therefore, is part of the ongoing contribution to this journey which has now taken a global perspective.

In the paper, I will also share experiences of a participatory action research case study from Kenya which I undertook in 2010 with an overall objective of learning the power dynamics of youth citizen’s (aged between 18 to 35 years) participation in district and local governance structures. The youth participation in these spaces is through their representatives. The research inquiry also looked at the power dynamics of their representation and how they exercise their agency in holding their leaders and the Government to account. It was also interesting to learn how the concepts of participation, representative and accountability interrelate, mediated by power relations and the ultimate implications for practice.

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Since the 1990s, the Government of Kenya has continued to institute reforms to decentralise decision making and responsibility to the local levels. The momentum was however accelerated from 2002 when a new political regime took over (Odhiambo, Mitullah and Akivaga 2005).

In the period between 2003 to 2006, the Government enacted legislation to devolve financial resources to the constituencies with requisite institutions to manage these resources that opened spaces for citizens participation. One group of citizens who have been perpetually excluded from participating in governance are the youth with claims of not having the ability to handle complex decisions (O’Toole and Gale (n.d). However, the new reforms provided new opportunities for the youth to participate in local governance through the National youth councils, Constituency Development Funds and the Youth Enterprise Development funds (CDF Act 2003 and GOK 2006). This paper brings in the experiences and lessons of the power dynamics of their participation, representation and accountability both in the newly created spaces in Governments and internally in the youth councils.

These experiences are central to my work as an NGO actor who has worked with the youth and grassroots communities for over 10 years championing their inclusion in decision making. Youth participation is not entirely new in Kenya; however previous efforts have been restricted to preparing youth for future and more of apprenticeship to be better adults (O’Toole and Gale (n.d). The new experiences in raising the youth political voices through state-created spaces are interesting for Plan Kenya as a key actor, and for a broader constituency of change agents who may have struggled to advocate for inclusion and those who may wish to pursue further youth citizen engagement. Although Plan Kenya is implementing a youth and governance project for which this research was conducted, I make a distinction that this is not an evaluation of the project.

On the other hand, sharing these experiences is intended to inform the ongoing debate on participatory governance within the academic arena by contributing practical experiences of state created spaces which are operating both as part of state as well as youth led spaces.

I will advance two lines of arguments. First if actors fail to focus on the forms of power oscillating and streaming within participation, representation and accountability, broader objectives of empowering youth to influence decision making will not achieve desirable results. Secondly youth councils in Kenya will not be effective in challenging local governance structures in an environment of weak internal accountability.

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In terms of structure, this research paper has six chapters. Chapter one and two provide the introduction, methodology and the context of the research. Chapter three, deals with the concept of participatory governance, presentation of data specific to participation and analysis. Chapter four introduces participation by representation, brings in the field case studies and summary of findings. Chapter five looks at social accountability, both concept, practice and findings. The final Chapter six takes deeper discussions on the findings in chapter three to five and takes a summary of the framework of participation, representation and accountability. This paper also identified four fundamental implications for practice: actors to understand and experience the youth engagement process, consider a three dimensional equation to capacity building, put new emphasis on representation and accountability as well as demonstrating participatory governance in internal structures.

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1.2: Methodology

The action research was a follow up to the Analytical Paper and Learning Plan that I presented to the Institute of Development Studies in December 2009 and February 2010 respectively. The research was conducted within the activities of Plan Kenya’s youth and governance project in Kwale County1. However, there were also opportunities where I visited other counties like Bondo and Kisumu in western part of Kenya as well as hosted youth from Kilifi County in North Coast for learning purposes. The Youth and Governance program Facilitator for Kwale was my co-researcher and therefore the research activities were harmonised with those of the project to avoid duplication.

I found the topic of the research, ‘youth citizens’ participation in local governance’ compelling to the choice of research methodology for the following reasons. One, government officers sitting in these governance structures have power and authority defined by Government procedures, while youth enter state- led ‘spaces’(Cornwall 2002) as ordinary citizens who either finished high school or are still pursuing college training. The engagement and participation in the local governance was therefore not on neutral grounds, but full of power imbalances. I chose action research as a process that would enable youth to generate knowledge from their own experiences in these spaces and plan actions. Reason and Bradbury (2008) argue that the practice of action research is a form of engagement which is not about generating knowledge to be used externally, but one which develops immediate capacity to act differently.

Secondly, the overall research objective of understanding the power dynamics of youth participation put power as a central theme. In the first point, I brought in the importance of the youth to act and learn from their actions. These youth actions require the confidence to transcend boundaries; Veneklasen and Miller (2002) recognise the individual power to act, as power within as illustrated from the observations below.

While facilitating a youth workshop, one of the youth rose up and shared that they could not meet the district commissioner because they did not have identity cards to identify them as youth leaders. The overwhelming majority agreed with him. We suggested for two of them to fix an appointment with the district commissioner and then report back in the next workshop.

1 Kwale County comprises Kwale, Kinango and Msambweni districts. The constituencies are Kinango, Msambweni and Matuga.

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When they came back in the next meeting, they were very confident that at last they met the District commissioner and had a good meeting without even being requested to produce identity cards. These are the moments of action, discovery and reflection that the research was all about as a way of demystifying and learning from power.

The research utilised primary data collected through various strategies but mostly tools that would enable participation. My choice of tools was based on the audience and objectives. During the youth workshops, we2 utilized pair wise ranking, Venn diagrams, Leakey buckets, Rivers of Life to reflect about the profile and achievements of the youth councils, storytelling and narratives and intergenerational dialogue between Government officers and the youth. These choices were informed by the opportunity the tools provided for interrogation, discussions and knowledge generation for raising awareness and capacity building. Gaventa and Cornwall (2008) argue that action research empowers people to construct their own knowledge from their actions and reflections. I demonstrate this using the narration below:

‘ As I was facilitating a session in one of the meetings, youth were proud to introduce their representatives in the district committees, but then we asked them to give a step by step process from the time they get the invitation letter to attend district meetings through telling a story. When they narrated the process, none of them mentioned, consulting with the youth council members as part of the agenda building process. This immediately elicited reactions from the youth on why they were not consulted to consolidate their priorities to the district meeting. In this scenario, the youth learned the importance of building a common agenda before attending meetings.

Focused group discussions were conducted with youth, Government youth officers and Plan staff for specific information. I also conducted semi structured interviews for key informants who included the Plan Kenya Strategic program Support Manager (SPSM), two district youth officers, four youth council chairpersons and four youth and Governance coordinators, Matuga constituency Development Fund Manager (also holding for Kinango),Constituency Development Fund committee members for both Matuga and Kinango.

In terms of documentation, I maintained my own research notes, reflection journal, recorded youth voices on video, and took photos of tools and proceedings. The youth on the other hand maintained their own records through video (some of them were trained on video production

2 We, is used to mean the co-researchers: youth leaders, my colleague in Plan and myself

11 and editing, radio production). They recorded part of their opinions and aired them through a local radio station.

On the other hand, I got access to secondary sources of information in the form of reports from Government and Plan Kenya. I also reviewed relevant documents and videos of a youth conference that brought together youth from eight counties.

1.2.1:Positionality and Learning.

My multiple positionality as a manager in Plan Kenya, researcher on one hand and facilitator on the other, sometimes put me on a point of advantage to access information and gained trust but at times was a dilemma that I struggled to reconcile.

I occupied three different faces in the research. One was being an ‘insider’ (Herr and Anderson 2005) studying my own practice and how my role influenced others and specifically in the youth governance project and also as a member of the state led district governance structures representing Plan Kenya. The reason for the insider role in the research was to have an opportunity to reflect on my own actions, practice and generate lessons for further action. Taylor, Rudolph and Foldy (2008) argue that reflective practice is centred on three stages. First, social construction of reality is shaped by perceptions which also influence actions. Stage two is on the contribution of an individual on the social construction of reality. This means, as one is part of the system, behaviour is part of how the system behaves. The final stage is about taking action to shape the reality or acting on knowledge. Drawing from this theory, I wanted also to learn from my own actions as a manager in Plan Kenya and the extent to which my power has shaped the direction of the youth project. As a consequence, I kept a research journal to record my daily reflections on experiences in the research but also on other interactions with colleagues and meetings with stakeholders. My experiences with the reflection process was that it was not predictable as I soon realised, it happened much more when driving, resting in bed and at traffic jam (Mgala 2011). The greatest lesson was therefore to deliberately free my self up to reflect.

Secondly I was an’ insider’ collaborating with another ‘insider’ (Herr and Anderson 2005), the colleague who was directly implementing the youth project. This was to facilitate feedback and validation of some of the observations as well as streamline project plans with research.

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The final face that presented my positionality was the ‘outsider collaborating with insiders’ (Herr and Anderson 2005). I was an outsider to the youth councils, also aged 40 years which is out of the youth age bracket, while the youth leaders were insiders in the youth council affairs. My outsider role was also extended to the state led governance processes where I am not a member, for example the constituency development fund, the youth enterprise development fund committees and other committees.

These multiple faces in the research influence my writing style and presentation of data in this paper. I will use mini-examples to illustrate the various experiences during the action research. These examples will take the shape of personal observations, quotes and mini-case studies.

As an insider, in some sections I will use the first person and will also bring in my observations, experiences, narratives and reflections. Secondly I also use the ‘we’ to make reference to joint experiences with colleagues and finally use’ they’ in reference to either Government or youth council leaders in a perceived outsider role. I also acknowledge generally that my role was significant to the learning process.

As argued by Herr and Anderson (2005), insiders in an action research process should acknowledge their own position in the research and build on self reflection even when faced with challenging positionality dynamics. The kind of learning generated by my multiple identities resonates with Reason and Bradbury (2008) three dimensional learning, from self, colleagues and the wider community. Here are some of the positionality tensions and reflections:

‘Having arrived from the UK, and manager of Plan Kenya, an international Non Government organisation (INGO) with its headquarters in the UK, my sudden concerns with the management of Constituency Development Fund were unusual to the Constituency Development Fund Committees (CDFCs) especially at a time when the National Tax Association (NTA) reported gross misappropriation of the funds in a number of constituencies countrywide. My research ignited suspicion from the political elites in the three constituencies and in one of them the security intelligence were briefed to monitor my activities closely. My unusual involvement was perceived a threat to political careers.

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These tensions denied me an opportunity to access crucial project records and to sit in the meetings as an observer. However, I got a lot of support from the Constituency fund managers and some of the committee members that I had a chance to interview.

As for the youth’s councils and the government, it was a laudable step for me to have more time with them as a break away from the tradition of supporting remotely. I note and agree with Grant, Nelson and Terry (2008) that relationship building is important to ease co researchers and cool off an ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ power relations(Chambers 2008:306). Drawing from my initial experiences shared in the reflective essay (Mgala 2011) on the first youth workshop, it was revealing that I needed to work on my practice:

‘The Government officer and the youth in the first workshop stopped the meeting to do formal introductions and invited me to make a speech when we had spent a lot of time with my co researcher from Plan Kenya to Plan the sessions and I arrived in time for my session. It dawned on me that my initial practice and behaviour had conditioned the youth and Government officers to consider me as disconnected from action with only brief appearances to make official statements and leave’.

Now here I present my own learning through emotions and my identity as a Manager. My role as a manager who had been away on studies, meant taking over responsibilities and address pending issues. Finalising Staff performance appraisals and project implementation was at its peak while I strived to maintain my research schedule. During this period, my decision making slowed down as I was balancing my new found meaning of participation concepts and sensitivity to power and the work environment (Mgala 2011). To manage the multiple tasks, I had to negotiate for a flexible working schedule with my supervisor that could allow me to focus on the research and also resorted to working late to catch up on reviewing project reports, deal with urgent mails and other administration tasks.

The other contradiction I found myself into was the balancing of support which also represents my second dimension of learning from colleagues. Plan Kenya, Kwale program Unit was implementing other projects apart from the youth and governance. My role requires that I give management support to all. My time presence in the youth project meant less in others and this was raised in a staff meeting. These reflections and feedback prompted me to adjust my schedule such that during the days I was not in the research then I would spend quality time in the other projects and also facilitate sessions.

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These dilemmas and experiences led me to find ways of reconciling expectations and learnt that I had to deal with my own power. It was ironical that my objectives in the research were to learn the power dynamics in youth participation in local governance and to learn how others were challenged, while my own power and practice was intact and needed to be challenged. As for the youth and Government staff, I focused on building relationships through informal out of class discussions, remembering and calling them by name and joining their table during lunch.

On the other hand I learned that the youth were not powerless, they could determine the direction of the research, as their consent and participation was important. Although Grant et all, suggests acknowledging ‘co-construction of knowledge’(2008:593) as the beginning of sharing power with co researchers, my strategy was to share my knowledge as an input to the youth discussions and made sure every new day began with a recap of the previous, to cross validate issues. Planning of the sessions soon changed to include the youth and agreeing on facilitation responsibilities. Could this be what Chambers calls ‘handing over the stick’? He further argues that the ‘uppers’ habitually underestimate the value and knowledge of ‘lowers’ (2008:305). For me it was basically to sound an alarm that I was also learning and the youth also could have an opportunity to utilise their skills and demystify power relations that existed before. Soon they began to relax and we could discuss and interrogate the tools with a collegial approach. This kind of learning and discovery represented my third dimension of learning.

1.2.2: Research entry and feedback process

During the initial stages of the research, I held a meeting with the Plan Kenya Country director. This session was to introduce the research topic and objectives. It was necessary to enlist support and also to get management buy in to study an internal project.

The other research entry activity was a meeting with the program facilitator, youth and Governance project in Kwale. It was important to also understand the activities of the project and synchronise with the action research to avoid duplication. This enabled me to identify other actors who did not feature in the initial research design. It is from this meeting that my colleague agreed to be my co-researcher and a critical friend (Herr and Anderson 2005) who could provide feedback to my observations. During the process of the research we planned the sessions and tools together and I shared my experiences for feedback. The timing of this

15 research also coincided with the formulation of the Plan Kenya country strategic Plan with emphasis on governance. My research was therefore a case study and I presented in the technical advisors meeting in the first quarter of field work in Kenya. I regarded this forum as a mini-validation session. In the final stages of the research and while at the Institute of Development Studies, I also had an opportunity to present the issues from the research in an international meeting of Youth and Governance advisors in London. My experiences in the action research stimulated discussions in the workshop and this became another opportunity to validate my observations.

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CHAPTER 2:

2.0: RESEARCH CONTEXT AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1: Democratic Opportunities for Youth Participation

Youth participation in governance has continued to receive much more attention globally but remains a process which is under construction. The World Youth Report (2007) recognised the ever expanding opportunities for youth engagement around the world, and also acknowledged the resultant challenge arising from the gap between enacting policies that inspire youth and the implementation process. However, more countries globally continue to establish formal structures and opportunities for youth participation in political decision making3.

These efforts were cascaded and demonstrated by the African Union through establishment of the African Youth charter in (2006)4 which outlined youth representation, and creation of opportunities for participation in governance structures among other priorities. In practice, the state led structures for youth participation in Africa, are in the form of youth parliaments, National youth councils and other short term youth consultative forums5 especially those that exploded with World Bank led poverty assessments. Although these are steps in the right direction, the African Report (2009) casts doubts on the success of these state led initiatives, as participation of youth has been confined to urban youth elites and excluding those in remote areas as well as marginalisation of female youth.

2.1.1: State led participatory Governance in Kenya.

Young people in Kenya below the age of 34 years constitute 78% of the population while the youth between 15 and 34 years account for 35 %( Njonjo 2010). Despite this numerical strengths youth still form the majority of citizens who are frustrated and idle due to unemployment and are subjects of harassment by state organs (Mbatia and Mbugua 2009).

3 African youth report 2009(http://www.uneca.org/acgd/publications/africanyouthreport_09pdf)21/3/11....11.30am.

4 African Youth Charter 2006( http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/conferences/mail/hrst/charter %20english.pdf.( 4th April 2011: 12.35pm)

5 African youth report 2009(http://www.uneca.org/acgd/publications/africanyouthreport_09pdf)21/3/11....11.30am

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This situation exposes youth to be manipulated and engaged in violent activities. As a result, the public perceive youth to be violent, troublesome and intolerant (African Report 2009, Mbatia and Mbugua 2009). This perception shapes the way the public and Government engages the youth. In order to make both social and economic corrections to empower citizens, the Government of Kenya embarked on a broad based policy reform from 2003 as outlined below.

Smarting from decades of unbalanced regional development, the government unveiled an economic recovery strategy paper that aimed at strengthening institutions of governance, improve service delivery as well as provide a democratic political atmosphere6. As a follow - up to these initiatives Parliament enacted legislation to set up Constituency Development Fund as part of fiscal decentralisation efforts aimed at ensuring equity in resource distribution and also provide opportunity for citizen’s participation in development activities

The Constituency Development Fund Act consequently defined governance structures from the national level, district and constituency levels. The constituency development fund committee 7(CDFC) (which was central to the research) provided opportunities for youth to be represented as well as other segments of society. However, the provision in the Act stated ‘one person representing the youth’8 giving room for misinterpretation to mean not necessarily a youth. The CDFC on the other hand is mandated under the Act to mobilise communities to draw their project priorities with the final submission to be made by the Area Member of Parliament who also chairs the committee.

The other initiative was the National Youth Policy which was formulated and enacted into law in 2006 as an acknowledgement of the economic and governance challenges facing the youth9 . Among the objectives of this was to create an affirmative action for youth participation in decision making at all levels. In order to operationalise the economic wing of this policy, the Youth Enterprise development fund (YEDF) was launched in 2006 to finance

6 Economic Recovery Strategy for wealth and employment creation 2003- 2007(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/KENYAEXTN/Resources/ERS.pdf) 21.44(20/2/11

7 Constituency Development Fund ACT 2003( http://www.fankenya.org/downloads/constituencyD...) 10.30pm: 20/2/11.

8 Constituency Development Fund ACT 2003: page 15( http://www.fankenya.org/downloads/constituencyD...) 10.30pm: 20/2/11.

9 National youth Policy 2006, Government of Kenya.

18 youth business initiatives through a loaning system that was deemed affordable to the youth. A Management structure was set up at the National level and also at the district level to vet and approve youth business proposals for loan disbursement purposes. Youth Enterprise Development Fund committees (YEDFC) were constituted by the District youth Officers with guidance from the Ministry headquarters and the district commissioners. These committees also provided opportunities for two youth representatives.

On the other hand, the National Youth Council Act 2009 was enacted to facilitate the implementation of the governance strand of the National Youth Policy. This was addressing youth social organisation challenges where the country had witnessed sudden mushrooming of youth groups especially during periods of general elections. The policy therefore set up comprehensive regulatory and legal coordination mechanisms. Among the objectives of this initiative was to promote the inclusion of youth in decision making bodies, and the youth councils to act as a voice to keep policy makers informed of youth aspirations10. The governance structure of the National youth council runs from National level, Provincial, District level, Divisional Level, Location and sub location level. The Act prescribes 8 youth representatives at National level and six representatives for each of the other levels. This structure resembles the administrative provincial administration and therefore the expectation is that youth councils at every level of the provincial administration will be able to send representatives to participate in decision making processes.

As a build up to these efforts, the Government launched guidelines for the establishment of social budgeting framework11. This was meant to open spaces for citizen’s participation in the budgeting and implementation process. The district level structure, District social budgeting observatory (DSBO) prescribes membership of all heads of departments, and allows representation of youth and children. This structure reports to the Sectoral Social budgeting observatory at the National level (SSBO)

10 National youth council Act 2009, Government of Kenya.

11 Guidelines for Establishment and Operation of the social budgeting Framework(Government of Kenya, 2010)

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2.1.2: Kwale County

Kwale County12 is in the Coastal province of Kenya. It consists of administrative districts of Kwale, Msambweni and Kinango. Politically, Kwale County has three Constituencies Matuga, Kinango and Msambweni constituencies which follow the district administrative boundaries. Each of the districts and constituencies are independent with district commissioner, heads of departments and Member of Parliament respectively. The population of the county is above 649,93113 with 43% of them youth of between 18-35. The major economic activities are tourism (proximity to the Indian Ocean beaches and wildlife), agricultural production, livestock production, commercial sugar farming and titanium mining. Youth councils are operational in each of the three districts. Their structure runs from the National to sub location level as represented below with leaders having a defined education level.

The National youth policy defines the education level for youth leaders to be elected at each level. A point to note is that this structure runs parallel with the provincial administration which has similar levels and governance structures at each level are expected to draw youth participation and representation at each given level (See flow chart in the Representation chapter 4).

2.1.3: Non State Actors and Youth Participation.

The World Bank report (2007) and the African Report (2009) set the momentum for the legislation of policies to create opportunities for youth participation in decision making. However both reports acknowledge the tricky nature of bureaucratic government’s capacity to develop participatory approaches as well as, the enormous task of building the capacity and confidence of youth to effectively engage. It is this assertion and openness that legitimises the role of non state actors to support youth participation initiatives. Since 2003, Save the Children (O’Kane 2006) has been leading efforts to work with young people to build their citizenship agency. The focus was on raising awareness, capacity building and initiatives to strengthen their capacity to participate in decision making structures. As these

12 Kwale County: The new constitution recognizes counties and not districts anymore.( Kenya Government(2010), The Constitution of Kenya)

13 Kenya Bureau of Statistics (http:www.knbs.or.ke/census%20results/knbs%2.....) 12.56: 22/2/2011.

20 initiatives targeted children, the resultant efforts were to prepare them to be better adults in the future (O’Kane 2006).

Building on the global efforts, Plan Kenya in partnership with Plan UK, Plan Finland in partnership with DFID and the Finnish Government is emerging to be a major actor in supporting youth governance projects in Kenya.

2.1.4: Plan Kenya Youth and Governance initiatives.

Plan Kenya works in partnership with youth and communities in Kwale County on 5 programs, Education, Health, Livelihood, Child protection and democratic Governance. For purposes of Plan program management, the operation unit is called Kwale Program Unit, previously Development area. This covers the 3 districts of Kinango, Kwale and Msambweni in Kwale County but not all administrative locations.

The Plan Kenya youth project in Kwale provides opportunities for young citizens to enhance their capacity, knowledge, skills and confidence for active participation in the decision making processes. This project supports the district youth councils and the Government through trainings, exposure and networking. I synchronised and harmonised the action research activities with the project plans to avoid duplication and seize the opportunity to learn together with the youth.

Plan (Global) designed a youth engagement framework that guides youth and governance programs and will be important as a point of reference in later chapters.

Engagement Expected Outcomes

Youth to State Greater participation and effective representation of youth citizens in Governance

Increase in accessible and accountable basic services through young citizen’s participation.

Youth to Plan Institutionalised participation and influence within Plan decision making structures.

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Support increased transparency and accountability.

Youth to youth Space to influence change and inspire each other.

Youth to Community Enable active participation of youth in community development.

Source: Plan Kenya: paper on youth engagement, Bangkok conference.

2.2: A Framework of Youth Participation, Representation and Social Accountability.

Drawing from the National youth council model designed by the Government of Kenya running from the autonomous youth groups to the state system through sub location to National level (as outlined above), the youth participate in the local governance structures through their representatives. Participation by representation is also implied in the ‘youth to state’ and’ youth to Plan’ strands of the Plan youth engagement framework. Using these two youth engagement models from Plan and Government, I go on to discuss the relationship between youth participation, youth representation and social accountability.

The creation of opportunities for youth participation both in the Government through legal frameworks, and in Plan through the youth engagement framework are both premised on outcomes of having more youth represented in governance structures, influencing decisions and achieve transparency and accountability. However, with these’ new spaces’ (Cornwall 2002) comes the power question which is silent in both models. Youth are admitted to participate in both governance spaces from weaker perspectives as having been ‘invited’ into other peoples’ space’(Cornwall 2002). This perspective implies both Plan and state have the power to decide who to’ invite’ in their own ‘space’ (Cornwall 2002). Fung and Wright (2003) argue that the democratic opportunity in participatory governance institutions could be challenged by power and domination. This may be demonstrated initially through deciding who comes in to participate, but also internally in the participatory governance institutions,

22 through preset agenda and rules of engagement. Powerful actors in both government and Plan could decide in advance the agenda, the venue and time of the meeting which may affect how the youth representatives participate. Veneklasen and Miller (2002) observe that hidden forms of power are demonstrated through deciding what issues to put on the table for discussion and those that would be kept away from public discussions. They go on to argue that visible forms of power are the exercise of laid down procedures and rules of engagement. These power dynamics put the argument of youth participation to influence decisions in government and Plan structures to be highly doubtful and justifies power relations as critical to engage with.

Secondly, youth representation in the governance structures assumes an articulation of all excluded voices of the youth. Questions emerge on whose voice do they actually represent? Goetz and Gaventa (2001) argue that representation of the marginalised and voice claims should be followed with a critical inquiry on the process of aggregating the interests and the ultimate voice that is being amplified. It becomes imperative to examine who holds the power to elect representatives, how they exercise their representational power both in the mediation roles in ‘invited spaces’ and back to the autonomous spaces (Cornwall 2002). Drawing from Veneklasen and Miller (2002) view of power as agency, for youth representatives to engage in the governance structures, they need to exercise their inspirational power (power within) to effectively articulate the interests of the youth councils. It is how this kind of power is invoked that will determine the scope of influencing decisions.

Finally, both the government and Plan models, envisage that youth participation and representation will result into transparency and accountability. Accountability defined as holding leaders responsible for own actions (Ackerman 2004), has power connotations both to the governance structures where youth participate and also back in the youth councils. The practice of power for accountability comes with preconditions. One, youth leaders can be held to account in the youth councils when members participated in the process of legitimising their representation. Secondly, youth representatives will hold state actors to account when they are armed with full information about the processes and how decisions are arrived at. In all these two propositions, power relations become a critical component.

Having looked at youth participation, youth representation and accountability, power is central and significant in determining the success of engagement outcomes in both state and Plan governance structures. In both models, the three concepts form a co-existence style of

23 relationship, with power revolving among them. These kinds of connections lead me to imagine the mediation role of power.

Youth Participation

Power

Youth relations Social Representation accountability

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CHAPTER 3

3.0: YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE.

Citizen’s participation in governance mechanisms of the state continue to shape the direction of policy reforms. At the core of these efforts is the debate on participatory governance which has been acknowledged as a new way to address deficits of representative democracy, through opening new doors for citizens (Pearce 2010). The practical implications of this debate has been the mushrooming of state created opportunities aimed at admitting groups of citizens perceived to have been left out of the decision making processes. These opportunities have also been described as new sources of state support through capturing ‘ordinary’ experiences and knowledge, but also sites for new power tensions where the state claim new found legitimacy through broad based consultation, while citizens struggle to influence state decisions (Barnes, Newman and Sullivan 2007)

Fung and Wright (2003) describe these state led institutions as empowered participatory governance and argue for their success to be based on reasoned deliberation, fair balance of power and empowered participation of ordinary citizens. Reasoned deliberation means that both citizens and state officials put their arguments in the open, negotiate and achieve consensus in decisions, while balancing of power assumes some form of equality between the citizens and state actors. Finally, empowered participation implies the confidence and inspiration of ordinary citizens to challenge state actors.

On the other hand, other proponents see these as opportunities to address challenges of state service delivery, an arena to build the confidence and skills of citizens to hold states to account, as well as challenge state to make decisions that favour the poor (UN 2008(cited Gaventa and Barret 2010),Geissel 2009). These arguments are based on assumptions that citizens in these institutions have the capacity to make meaningful contributions to discussions and that their voices genuinely represent the excluded and vulnerable in the society.

According to Cornwall and Coelho, the theory around bringing citizens to state led governance structures are based on expected outcomes of ‘better citizens, better decisions and better government,’ (2007:4) with assumptions that ‘citizens will be ready to participate and state willing to listen and respond’(2007:5). This may not always be the case. The contention of power imbalances between state officials and citizens may not favour genuine debates.

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Perceived unilateral power of the state to invite, setting the agenda and determining the rules may weaken the negotiating prowess of ordinary citizens (Fox 2007, Barnes, Newman and Sullivan 2007). This could be demonstrated in the form of ‘visible power’ through state procedures or ‘hidden’ through deciding a strict agenda (Veneklasen and Miller 2002). For example, drawing my experiences from Kenya, a district development committee has provision for the participation of non state actors including representatives of community organisations. However, the district commissioner is the designated chairperson and agenda of the meeting could be shared either a day to the meeting or during the meeting subordinating any other issues to any other business which is taken for information only with no substantive discussion. These kinds of structures have a fairly predictable way of engaging with the predetermined agenda and specific mandate which could challenge the enthusiasm of ordinary citizens to influence decisions.

Other critics argue that state may not necessarily be influenced through participatory governance, instead this could be a mechanism to enlist new forms of legitimacy, create new local elites and decentralise corruption to the local level ( Raymond 2002 cited Geissel 2009,Pearce 2010,Bastian and Luckam 2003,Fung and Wright 2003). New forms of legitimacy are drawn in situations where even if ordinary citizens may not have contributed actively in the discussions, documented proceedings of the meeting reflect their presence and in some instances they sign the attendance lists. In other situations, ordinary citizens participating in participatory governance may not champion the interests of the perceived marginalised groups they purport to represent and instead represent their own interests. This criticism considers that citizen representatives in these spaces could be influenced by their own attitudes, skills and ego related interests which could be contrary to the expectations of the perceived excluded population (Geissel 2009).

In light of this debate where proponents see a promise for ordinary citizens while sceptics paint a gloomy picture with the reality of state reforms in favour of participatory governance, two issues stand out:

1. So how do ordinary citizens participate in local governance structures? 2. What are the barriers to their participation in these governance structures?

To explore these issues I now draw my own experiences working with the Youth councils in Kenya. As mentioned in chapter 3 of this paper, the State reforms in Kenya targeted the opening up of opportunities for youth to participate in governance structures of the state. The

26 youth were victims of state exclusion in decision making structures and now the Government is making efforts to institutionalise youth participation.

Here I give a number of examples to bring out the experiences with state led participatory governance. In some instances I also bring my own experiences, observations and reflections.

Example 1: This example is drawn from my observations during a District Development Committee meeting in Kwale. The District Development Committee is the supreme organ in terms of decision making and is chaired by the district commissioner and the District Development Officer is the secretary. The experience relates to a time the district development committee members were supposed to be taken through the draft constitution and raise any issues for consideration. The guest facilitators were the Permanent Secretary Forestry and wildlife, the Director of administration office of the president and a Principal of a local University campus. The timing was in the middle of the constitutional referendum debate and the government was making efforts to clarify all issues and minimise dissenting views. The district development committee was a key organ to facilitate this process.

I arrived in the Kwale county hall fifteen minutes before the meeting and there was a good quorum already of about 35 participants. Among these were 5 youth council leaders from the Kwale youth council. Although people were talking in low tones and exchanging jokes, everybody was seated waiting for the chairman to arrive. The arrangement in the room was a high table in front with a microphone strategically positioned. I noticed it was unusual scene as the District Officer in the District Commissioner’s office kept checking whether everything was in order and consulting the security men outside the hall. Then in about 3 minutes before the start of the meeting the District Commissioner arrived and requested that when the main facilitators arrive, we should all stand up to show respect. I had my own thoughts about this but as I have done before, in the government meetings I do follow instructions. Then our main facilitators arrived and we all stood up as hinted to us before. The permanent secretary was dressed in a suit while the other two were dressed in almost coastal related relaxed outfits. It began with the prayers from Christians then Muslims clerics. All those who conducted the prayers had a clear message that God prevails for the constitution to go through (Was this to impress our guests?). As the discussions ensued, people who made contributions had to raise up their hand, the district commissioner gave the permission, and one would stand while making his/her remarks. I was delighted though to find the 5 youth in attendance as I thought we were making good progress to have them included in governance structures. However, I

27 noticed that they were not volunteering to say anything even as the chapter on youth was being discussed. I passed a small note to one of them saying’ the time is now, say something’ but this could not yield results. Towards the end of the meeting, the district commissioner, asked the youth and women to also say something. The youth were given two chances where only one chance was utilised. And this youth who made the contribution, did not focus on the inputs to the constitution, but instead thanked the government through the District Commissioner for recognising youth and that he supports the constitution. After the meeting, I caught up with them and inquired why they could not contribute views and these were the insights: ‘How do you dare contradict the District Commissioner, we did not know, whether this was genuine consultation, from the way the district commissioner behaved, everything had to be right and that put me off. Yeah, another one said, this constitution seems to be a government project and could even land somebody in unfamiliar territory’, The third one was just happy to share a platform with senior people and at least happy to have known the permanent secretary. The fourth and fifth were categorical, the game was above bar, we had not read the constitution and copies were circulated during the meeting, there was nothing to say……….

In this example, there were different manifestations of power in the engagement space. This was demonstrated by the high table, the rules to stand up, and presence of security. Power was very symbolic. This symbolic nature affected genuine participation not only for the youth but also other participants as it was also clear the seniority of officials through bureaucracy was playing out. This weakened the inspiration of the youth to make genuine contributions and relegated them to mere spectators. Participants especially youth may have struggled to reconcile tensions of having a point to raise, but quickly felt inferior.

Example 2: While facilitating an exchange visit between Bondo, Kisumu and Kwale county youth and discussing the issue of participation in governance, I was able to pick some interesting quotes from the representatives sharing their experiences in the governance spaces:

‘There are too many stumbling blocks in the government meetings, than stepping stones, there is a long way to go since our representatives do not really give our views in the meetings, they are bulldozed and it’s a pity.’

‘This can be equated like fleshing an already created skeleton, you are not given a chance to form or create the agenda. Youth end up discussing other people’s agenda.’

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‘Youth are just there as sculptures to silence those making noise, youth are truly not represented.’

During the same meeting, the youth in Bondo shared the tensions that existed between the district leaders and the District Youth Officer. Initially the youth officer would involve them in every meeting and decisions. However, as they became more aware, they asked questions, especially on the management of the youth fund. At this point the officer now decided to exclude them from all invitations and instead nominated other youth that she could work with. Some of the comments from the youth officer when she left the youth out of invitation: ‘We had a meeting yesterday but it was brief and we did not see the need of disturbing the youth leaders with invitations’.

Participating in the meetings is therefore challenging and youth ended up with a conclusion: ‘it’s like sitting at the bench and watching the game, not being given a chance to play’

‘One challenge of invited spaces, is that you have to behave well, if not, you do not get invited again’14.This seems to be the experiences of the youth engagement in Bondo. Youth became passive participants and ended up legitimising decisions but conscious of their powerlessness. Their power of agency got eroded in the meetings. However, challenging the youth officer also implied facing new ways of exclusion through non invitation.

Example 3: Reflecting on the journey with youth councils: This example stems from a youth council meeting held towards the end of 2010 at Shimba lodge. The Government had issued a notice that elections for new officials would be called early 2011. The district youth officers and the youth leaders and Plan therefore felt it would be crucial to reflect over the experiences of engaging in governance processes and do a report which would be a handover brief to the new officials. I did facilitate this session together with two other colleagues. 28 Participants were drawn from the three councils of Kinango (9) Kwale (10) and Msambweni (9) forming four focus group discussions. The youth officers (2) also had their own reflection group while the youth councils went into different groups. The tool used for reflection was the river of life. This is a tool that equates progress in the form of a river, with a source, tributaries, rocks and logs. Participants use the features to symbolise issues which later assist in interrogation and make meaning. In the case of the youth council participants, the logs and

14 Gaventa (2010) addressing a conference, video quote from: http://www.powercube.net/resources/video/.

29 rocks represented challenges while tributaries represented networks with other organisations. A summary of the three presentations highlighted the following experiences:

Youth council leaders earlier demanded identification cards from the youth officers and Plan Kenya office before engaging any government office or going to government meetings for fear of intimidation. They cited the capacity building workshops by Plan and Government as having been key to realise that they were citizens and did not require special identification. This forced Kinango youth to do a formal introduction for all departments at once to get the due recognition. The capacity building initiatives were acknowledged as having imparted other skills like public speaking, confidence building, and technical skills especially video production and other emerging talents. Some youth were reported to have utilised the technical skills either for employment or business. Two youths who felt confident and eloquent, aspire to contest elective positions in 2012.

The youth councils registered good progress in having representatives in local governance structures with overall 16 youth representatives admitted in district committees (4-Kinango, 8 Kwale and 4 Msambweni). However they could not trace any agenda that was specific from the youth as every time they got invitation for meetings, the agenda is disclosed during the meeting. The youth councils get selective invitation to meetings at short notice through phone messages without agenda. The most invited are those near the district offices and one could represent the youth in more than one meeting because of their proximity. Female youth leaders are still few as many are challenged by venue of meetings and cultural challenges. For example Kinango, out of 6 district youth leaders 5 are males and 1 female. The female youth have to as for permission from parents to attend meetings.

Many youths do not subscribe to the youth councils as they are not aware of the councils and membership. Youth leaders on the other hand do not have logistical resources to reach out to the youths in the grassroots. Only in 1 district they reported they mobilise through sports activities.

The district youth officers on the other hand appreciated that the meetings have changed the attitude of the youth and are becoming more assertive. They reported that they delegate responsibilities to the youth making their work easier. Other experiences were that the youth were not assertive in the meetings leaving the youth officers to continue to be the champion all the time.

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This example has illuminated the role of capacity building in preparing youth to engage district committees. The fear created by lack of identification cards and the perception about youth was stifling their participation. They did not feel confident to visit government offices and this could be linked to the perception of violence and troublesome (chapter 3 of this paper). New skills are emerging and enthusiasm to realise their potential through employable skills and political contest signify the impact beyond claiming spaces in public but also addressing personal ambition. However, the inclusion of youth in the district committees did not necessarily translate into youth favourable decisions.

Example 4: The Constituency Development Fund Kwale County was allocated to all the three constituencies (Matuga, Kinango and Msambweni).In each constituency; this is managed by the constituency development fund committee as mentioned in chapter 3.One member of this committee, is supposed to represent youth. All the 2 representatives in 2 constituencies were aged 45 and 49 years old. According to them their choice by the MP was based on their passion and experience working with youth. In the CDF committee they are the key advisors on youth related issues.

I got interested to find out more because one of the objectives of the youth councils is to participate in the management of the constituency fund. However, in their presentations in the reflection meeting (in example 2) and other previous meetings, they avoided mentioning these funds. Some of the quotes I could pick from the 3 focus groups:

‘This is a political fund, we lost hope, and the Member of Parliament cannot listen and will only involve people to reward. We do not think they could be partners as members of constituency committee do not want challenge, their decisions are guided by personal interests, ‘they bleed a leech to fatten a heifer’. From experience, the politicians wield a lot of unchecked power with citizens complaining by the side and not in the open.

The final quote summed the relationship between politicians as one where they only use youth for selfish gains. This example demonstrates the power of state actors as the ones to make the decisions on who to invite. Voices of apathy creep in for this example. In this example, it could be a build up to the way politicians and citizens have socialised, where on one hand the politicians feel they should be the ones to make decisions and on the other ordinary citizens have accepted their powerlessness

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Example 5: In this example, I highlight my reflections from a review of Plan Kenya’s internal governance structures as a follow up to the youth engagement framework in chapter 3. Under the youth to plan engagement, the purpose was to institutionalise youth participation in internal decision making structures to foster transparency and accountability. Structures of decision making in the Kenyan Program are at three levels:

Level1: Decision making at the program unit in the field. At this level, there is a Program Unit Management team which is composed of the Program Unit Manager and the program coordinators. Meetings are held monthly.

Level 2: Is the Extended Country Management (ECMT) team and the program unit managers with meetings held quarterly.

Level 3: The Country Management Team comprising the top country managers. Meetings are also held monthly. While reviewing all these management charters, there was no mention of how youth come in. The mandate for all of them is very clear and more importantly, decisions are guided by regional and global policies. The ECMT has provision for an open space to invite outsiders to share, but not necessarily for decision making. My previous experiences are that they present and may not influence the direction, just for learning purposes. Youth were invited before to share a particular issue or progress for one hour and have had little influence to the final decisions.

I brought in this example to demonstrate further the challenge of invited spaces that hinges on the veto power of the ‘owners’ of the space to decide who is invited, rules on arriving at decisions as well as the rules of engagement. In these internal governance structures youth do not participate in the decision making because the rules and the mandate does not allow that kind of invitation.

3.1: Summary

Participatory governance opportunities offer a great promise to act as spaces to capture the aspirations of ordinary citizens into state decision making mechanisms as discussed by the various literatures (Pearce 2010, Fung and Write 2003, Barness, Newman and Sullivan 2007). In practice however, the experiences with the youth councils portray this as a highly tense and contested exercise muddled by power games. As demonstrated by the examples, one

32 battle that has been fairly won by the youth councils is that of inclusion in the state led governance structures, where their presence is getting recognized. However, the impact of this victory is undermined by the rules of engagement and behaviour of officials that remain unchanged. The ‘visible forms of power’ (Veneklasen and Miller 2002) through state procedures and protocol reduce youth to mere spectators.

Even though youth representatives may remain perplexed in state- led spaces, the decisions that finally come out binds them as part of collective responsibility, giving an easy claim for state legitimacy. Fung and Wright (2003) acknowledged this challenge as a prior notice to the functioning of state designed spaces.

The other point that these youth engagement experiences have illuminated is to situate the location of state power. Members of Parliament for example, remain unchallenged in the nomination process because their power resides in the Act of Parliament which can only be changed in parliament for which they are the only representatives allowed to participate. Parliament is a ‘closed space’(Cornwall 2002) which cannot be easily influenced by actions of a few youth councils, although the behaviour and flexibility of the individual Member of Parliament could still be challenged by youth councils. These possibilities remain untried as youth councils have internalised the political patronage and developed a sense of apathy. This represents the new ‘invisible power’ (Veneklasen and Miller 2002) that makes the system to remain unchallenged.

The examples also demonstrated the role of non state actors in preparing youth to engage in participatory governance. Cornwall and Coelho (2007) argue that effective participation of citizen is enabled by skills which boost their confidence to engage the state. In this respect, Plan Kenya played a central role in strengthening the capacity of the youth. New skills and talents emerged that inspired youth to participate. The other lesson drawn from the examples is the influential nature of facilitating processes of participatory governance. To demonstrate commitment Plan formulated a youth engagement framework to institutionalise youth participation in internal governance structures but with little success in implementation.

I now turn to the next chapter which will discuss representation and how youth representatives derive their legitimacy.

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CHAPTER 4:

4.0: YOUTH REPRESENTATION.

Representation is a popular term both in development and in democratic practice. In democratic practice, Pitkin (1967) argues that representation draws legitimacy through granting authority to a few people through the practice of elections. This argument means, the represented or citizens delegate their power and authority to the representative, trusting that the representatives will be able to articulate issues on their behalf. It is not clear the boundaries and scope of decisions. In an attempt to address these challenges, Pitkin (1967) goes on to introduce the accountability angle to representation, where representatives could be required to answer for their actions and decisions. This assumes both the represented and the representative will be in a form of interaction to be aware of what to account and how to be held to account. If this was to be applied through elections, those who may have lost interest to continue may not find it useful to engage in the practice of accountability (Pitkin 1967). The other assumption of this model is that the representative is aware all the time about the interests of the represented, or always acts in their best interests. The other practical challenges of representation in this nature are that during decision making, views and positions representing certain interests are modified, negotiated, positions dropped and product of final decisions are highly harmonised. Other challenges that emerge with representation are that the citizens or community are not homogenous, others are youth, women, children, disabled to mention but a few with diverse interests which one representative may not articulate all of them. In this regard, new debates emerge introducing characteristic representation (Heywood 1994) This considers, representatives to be drawn from a particular group that share common characteristics. The theory advanced here is that representatives from a specific group have the knowledge to genuinely articulate the interests of that category. If representation means acting on behalf, then only those who have knowledge and experiences of the people they represent will be able to do so. The Kenya Government model of youth council’s participation in local governance is based on the assumptions that by bringing youth representatives, then it would be possible to capture all the interests of the youth constituency. There are however, arguments levelled against characteristic representation from experiences of feminists. Cornwall and Goetz (2005) suggests for example that creating representation slots for women may not be an automatic extension of their influence in

34 policy, but has to be backed by capacity building initiatives for the representatives as well as proper link to the women constituency where they draw legitimacy and are held to account. Representation over time has admitted many actors interested in opening up the ‘democratic space’ (Cornwall and Coelho 2004 cited in Cornwall and Coelho 2007:1).

The entry of civil society changed the dynamics and nature of representation. The civil society may not draw elective or characteristic legitimacy(Heywood 1994) when participating in decision making arenas but play an important role either in mediating relations between citizens and the state or building capacities for effective representation. Drawing from experiences in Brazil, Houtzager and Lavalle(2009: 19-22) and suggests six modes of representation, ‘electoral’, ‘membership’, ‘identity’, ‘proximity’, ‘mediation’, and’ service’. Electoral representation is through electing representatives where legitimacy is through established procedures. On the other hand, membership is where individuals or group establish their organisation defining their interests to be represented in any forum. In this mode, boundaries of accountability are created and relationship between members and leaders predefined. Representation by identity is based on shared identity. Just like in characteristic representation (Heywood 1994), the focus is on specific groups of the population. While in proximity is more related to what Houtzager and Lavalle (2009) calls solidarity with the represented through being physically close. Mediation forms of representation, he argues are based on inequality in terms of access to spaces of representation. For example, there could be professional capacity limitations for citizens to send representatives to technical forums, in this case professional bodies working with the marginalised could represent and then simplify technical information to them later. Finally the service mode is based on demonstrated commitment to serve the interests of the represented, for example organisations working with youth.

The practice of representation and the construction of legitimate representatives are not linear but tangled with power plays. There are power questions that require answers in the practice of representation. Whose voice are the representatives representing in the governance structures? What are the processes to collate their agenda? Relating these questions to the

35 argument advanced by Pitkin(1967) where the represented delegates their participation power, authority and opportunity to the representative there is reason to be concerned about how this power is exercised especially locating the ultimate interests that are advanced. There are possibilities where representatives could be swallowed in a new system that modifies their group interests. Fung and Wright (2003) argues that those who represent the excluded members of society in state led institutions could easily be trapped in behaviours where public interests disappear and replaced with their private interests with new found alliances. Other arguments from Barnes, Newman and Sullivan (2007) suggest that ordinary citizens participating in state-led spaces could acquire new experiences, knowledge and skills which significantly modify their identities and interests to become pseudo insiders to state. As a result of the new identities, they become a state darling and agents for their articulation of state language and regarded as people ‘who know how to participate’ (Geissel 2009). These new acquired identities and alliances, ultimately disconnects representatives from the ordinary citizens they originally went in to represent. The overall question that ultimately emerges from the discussion is: how and where do citizen representatives in governance spaces draw their legitimacy? Relating this question with my experiences with representatives of youth councils, I will explore further examples and reflections.

Example 6. The ministry of youth affairs in Kenya (chapter3) emphasised its commitment to allow youth to manage and make decision on the youth funds through the youth enterprise development fund committee and generally committed to ensure genuine citizens participation in the devolved funds. The youth enterprise development fund (YEDFC as mentioned in chapter 3) is a governance structure that manages the youth fund. They receive proposals and consider them for funding. It has slots for 2 youth’s representatives. During focus group discussions involving 26 youths in the first phase and 23 youths in the second phase, on varying dates, the experiences show that the youth officers nominated the 4 youth representatives without any process. These representatives have never shared with the youth councils. The youth officers on their part justified this that they needed to compose a committee very quickly, communicate to the headquarters and apply for funds. The broader youth council members have not engaged with this committee citing an upper hand from the government. This has created suspicions since the committee meetings attract a sitting allowance. Similar experiences were shared for youth representatives in the constituency development funds committees in the three constituencies where the members of parliament

36 filled the slots reserved for youth with non youth representatives mostly campaign teams and have not contacted the youth to update them on the management of the funds or for project priorities. In Msambweni youth council, the leaders were equally nominated by the youth officer without any credible process and one youth had this to say, ‘our chairman in the youth group is not committed and we appeal to the youth officer to remove him’ In all the three youth councils in the county, there was no evidence of a constitution to guide their operations or register of members. The councils relied on the national youth council policy for mission and objectives and guidelines for elections from the government. This example highlights the practical challenges of representation. Although the nominees are perceived to represent the youth, the process renders them illegitimate. The assumption could be that any youth would take care of the interests of the youth. It would be interesting in this scenario to question where this nomination power is derived. In the case of Constituency Development Funds, this power is situated in the Act of parliament. However, on one hand the appeal by some of the youth for the youth officer, to remove their chairman implies they have legitimised the power of the officer to hire and fire officials. The good news is that youth exercise their power of agency through resistance by not engaging with the youth enterprise fund citing government control, while the bad news is that those without legitimacy continue to make decisions on their behalf.

Example 7: While reviewing documents from the ministry of youth affairs, I noted that the ministry developed guidelines for conducting elections of the national youth councils from the sub location level to the national level. These guidelines in part, predetermine the criteria of the youth representatives to be elected by specifying the education criteria. At the sub location and location level, expected education level is primary school certificate, while division and district level is Secondary school certificate, provincial and National level leaders to be first degree graduates. The government further commits to fund the elections. My observation is that the national councils have been waiting for an election date from the ministry headquarters since November 2010.

The move by the government to inculcate guidelines on how to operationalise youth councils could be viewed as a step to standardise more support across the country. However, deciding the criteria and taking the ownership of setting date of elections away from the youth, compromises the legitimacy of leaders and leave no room to replace non-performing leaders.

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Example 8: One of the exercises we engaged in with the youth councils in two focus group discussions bringing together youth representatives from 2 districts was to draw a sketch social map( using youth to stand at different point of the districts). This map was to assist in locating where the youth councils had representatives in the various locations to map out the grassroots spread of the youth councils. This exercise was important for the youth also to learn where they draw their legitimacy on who they really represent. We facilitated this to bring in the open the issue of representation by geography for us and the youth to learn where the leaders draw their legitimacy or which areas do they actually represent. It was visible when they took count; the concentration of representatives was either near town centres or the district headquarters. This exercise considered whether the representatives had any knowledge of representatives not just those who were in the workshop. It also happened that the remote areas of the district did not have female representatives. The other observation was that 10 locations did not have a single representative. They also shared that in 3 other locations where youth elected their representatives, the area chiefs selected their own youth who are not in the youth councils. These are the ones who are invited to meetings and all location activities. They do not report to anyone other than the chief himself. (The chief is the head of an administrative location and a civil servant).The youth councils tried to harmonise this but is creating tensions in government offices. This example demonstrates the heterogeneity of the youth councils. Generally, youth representation assumes homogeneity of interests where youth representatives were expected to articulate interest based on knowledge and experience of having lived as such. However, patterns of heterogeneity emerge between the rural and urban youth and they face different experiences, challenges and knowledge. This suggests that it is important to unpack the ‘youth’ to be able to understand specific challenges facing each category of youth.

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4.1 Structure of Representation for the Youth Councils.

National Level (8 youth representatives, undergraduate degree) Members of youth

Board to be appointed by Minister of youth affairs.

Provincial Level (6 youth representatives,

must have completed undergraduate degree)

District level (6 youth representatives, must have completed secondary level education.

Division Level (6 youth representatives, must have completed secondary level education

Location level :( 6 youth representatives, must have completed primary level of

education

Sub location Level. (6 representatives elected must have completed primary level of education.

Autonomous youth Groups

Source: Summarised from Government National Youth Council Election Guidelines (2009)

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4.2: Summary.

This chapter has demonstrated both the theory and practice of representation. Youth participation in invited spaces of government is through representatives.

It is through the representatives that the state hopes to capture the aspirations of all the youth. In the literature, Pitkin (1967) argues that representatives are delegated power and authority. This assertion therefore underlines the importance of having legitimate youth representatives. However, the experiences of youth council raise the following findings:

First, the legitimacy of representatives in the youth councils presents a situation in crisis. The government through youth officers and members of parliament still wields power and control in nominating representatives. This is found in the Youth Councils, the Youth Enterprise Development Fund committees and also the Constituency Development Fund. If representatives represent interests (Pitkin 1967) in the state led spaces, whose interests will these youth representatives propagate? From the experiences, the government determines the criteria for representatives and present it as a guidelines thereby extending influence through ‘visible power’ of state procedures (Veneklasen and Miller 2002). State control is further demonstrated through holding the election date as a secret weapon. The youth councils do not have their own constitution to guide the operations and rely on the government documents for direction. This renders the youth councils ineffective as evidence suggest they now accept the powers of youth officers to hire and fire officials.

Secondly, the representation structure of the youth councils is exclusive by design. Heywood’s (1994) formulation of characteristic representation assumes representation through lived experience and knowledge. Based on this premise, the youth councils are dominated by representatives from the urban areas and those close to district headquarters. The government officers tend to engage with urban youth much more due to proximity and gradually exclude the rural youth. This exclusion is reinforced through the predetermined education criteria for elected youth representatives in each administrative area. Education could be used to enhance communication and engagement with government officers. However, Barnes, Newman and Sullivan (2007) argue that ordinary citizens who may be perceived to have acquired new and accepted capacity to communicate with state actors,

40 loose their original identity. If this happens to youth leaders, how will they be held to account? This question moves the discussion to the next chapter.

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CHAPTER 5.

5.0: SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY.

Accountability is increasingly being viewed as a key aspect in enabling effective governance processes through holding public officials to take responsibility for their actions. In the practice of accountability, ‘answerability and enforcement’ are critical elements (Ackerman 2004:447). Answerability refers to a process where state actors explain their actions, while enforcement is the capacity to sanction public leaders who do not measure up to the agreed expectations. Accountability therefore assumes a relationship between public officials and citizens. In the conventional accountability mechanisms, this relationship is demonstrated by the state through bureaucratic procedures, and conducting regular financial audits (Malena, Forster and Singh 2004). They continue to argue that these forms of accountability have remained inward looking within the state and have had little impact in terms of improved service delivery and dealing with corruption. Further, the voice of citizens and marginalised groups in society does not have space in accountability arrangements that oscillate within state institutions (Malena, Forster and Singh 2004). This lack of citizen’s voice weakens the ‘answerability’ (Ackerman 2004) element and makes it impossible to sanction non performing state officials. As a consequence of these weaknesses and the exclusive nature of structured state accountability, new forms of accountability have emerged through social accountability. Malena, Forster and Singh (2004) argue that Social accountability on the other hand enhances the voice of citizens to directly engage the state in demanding accountability. They continue to suggest that social accountability shifts citizen to state engagement away from protests to more formal ways in terms of availability of information, dialogues and structured consultative processes. The theory around social accountability is to shame and expose state failure to the public domain to trigger actions from other state apparatus (Joshi 2008). Legal tensions and questions could emerge when citizens demand accountability from state officials. In order to avert these contests, Joshi (2008) suggests that processes of social accountability should be entrenched in the legal framework while accountability claims to be based on citizenship rights. Integrating social accountability claims with rights require citizens who are informed and have the capacity to engage the state.

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These direct forms of engaging the state, implies that social accountability opens a new space for citizen’s participation. Ackerman argues that ‘inviting social actors to participate’ in state affairs through ‘co-governance’ (2004:447) arrangements strengthens accountability. While this argument could be promising, it assumes equality of power and neutrality of the ‘new spaces’ (Cornwall 2002). The power for state officials to decide who to invite and which information to avail to citizens could put social accountability efforts in jeopardy. On the other hand, Joshi (2008) argues, for social accountability processes to be credible and legitimate, actors should delink themselves from the state. This is to provide an opportunity for social actors to act independently without feeling guilty of collective responsibility for actions and decisions made with state actors in state led spaces.

In other instances, avenues of formal accountability may fail to function as expected. Hossain (2009) argues that in such situations, ordinary citizens retreat back to ‘rude’ forms of accountability through on the spot complaints, shouting and protests. She goes on to argue that the theory around rude accountability is based on ‘shame and embarrassment’ with a negative impact on the part of public officials to damage their ‘reputation and status’ (2009:28). The fear of sustained shouts and violence put pressure on officials to take immediate action.

Even though direct citizen engagement through social accountability is hailed as a step to improve service delivery and decision making, the literature has overemphasised citizen to state accountability. As a result, this has insulated social actors from public scrutiny of their internal democracy and accountability arrangements (Fox 2007). Non state actors have a leadership which draws legitimacy from its members. These leaders are expected to represent the interests of their groups in social accountability processes or in state led spaces. The Practice of social accountability through ‘invited spaces’ (Cornwall2002) of the state implies citizens engage through representatives. Participation of citizens in social accountability through representatives shifts the attention to explore the internal spaces of citizens themselves, and specifically the power relations between leaders and members. Fox (2007) argues that leadership accountability within non state actors require members who have the capacity to hold leaders to account for their own actions. Although leaders in non state actors may be entrusted with responsibility to challenge the state, new forms of domination through new found confidence, skills and knowledge could make them less accountable to members. Members of these groups may further contribute to leadership domination and less

43 accountability when they stay withdrawn and disconnected from the group activities (Fox 2007). However, the literature is silent on inter citizen accountability in their own groups and to the state. Citizens are not immune to the same behaviours that they demand action from state officials.

In the overall, the literature above raises critical points on the dreams of social accountability. However, two practical questions that remain unanswered are: 1. How do ordinary citizens hold the state to account? 2. How do representatives of ordinary citizens account to the state and their members?

At this point I go on to address these questions by drawing examples and experiences from activities of the youth councils

Example 9: Youth participation in the governance structures is through their representatives. These representatives are supposed to represent the interests of the youth and ideally should consult on the issues from youth, as well as give feedback from meetings as a mechanism for internal accountability. Based on this premise, we engaged youth in 4 focused group discussion attended by 28, 20, 18 and 30 participants from Kwale, Msambweni, Kinango and Bondo. The Bondo youth councils was done during an exchange visit. We asked this question: When you as representatives receive a letter of invitation to attend a meeting, what happens? The general response was, they just attend the meeting, and when they come back, there is no effort to share. In fact some were categorical;’ most youth representatives do not even show the letter to fellow youth that they do represent’. In situations where nomination was done by youth officers, the loyalty is to the officer. In another session (different dates) attended by 13 youth representatives (2 females and 11 males), 5 representatives shared various examples on how they consolidate agenda: One of the representatives collates agenda during normal one to one interactions with fellow youth. Two responded: Being a youth, then it is possible to know the issues(‘wearer of the shoe knows where it hurts’) One consulted through the quarterly meetings of youth groups in(April, August and December) One consulted by sharing during church days on Sundays and Wednesdays.

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This example demonstrates that although youth Councils were entrusted with the responsibility to hold state officials to account, they do not account back to the youth members and have no mechanisms to collate the youth agenda before the meetings.

Example 10: The youth councils in Kwale County were trained on social audit processes. Social audit is an independent evaluation of the performance of an organisation or project as it relates to attainment of social goals15. This is to demonstrate social, economic and environmental benefits of a project. These skills were important to the youth to enable them assess the community projects funded through devolved funds as well as any other project at community level as a way of holding actors to account. The youth office and Plan Kenya supported the trainings and logistics for the social audits. The process involved the youth, developing their own checklist; they get records of the project and visit the project to confirm. They later prepare a visit report which is presented in public for information and clarification from the implementing organisation. Having supported this process, to the point of purchasing 3 accountability boards for government offices to display crucial information, I felt personal guilt and approved purchase of one accountability board for Plan office and asked the youth to also audit Plan supported projects. I was influenced to demonstrate this commitment. It is at this point that the youth officers also committed to volunteer the audit ministry of youth projects. And the youth social audit team was composed of 27 members (13male and 14 female).They audited 2 youth empowerment centres and Plan supported birth registration project on different days. I would like to draw experiences from one of the youth empowerment centre (audited by 21 youth 12 male, 9 females) which was built nicely, with a meeting hall without chairs. Every time the youth held a meeting they would hire chairs. However, on this day they wanted to present a report to district government leaders, they decided not to hire chairs, but assume everybody would sit on the floor. First to arrive was the District Development Officer and the youth officer to confirm preparations and alert the District Commissioner. It was not to be, emotions, arguments and tensions ensued as the youth remained adamant. The message they wanted to pass, was why budget for a centre without chairs? This message was passed, however, the relationship with the youth officer was tainted, every meeting the officer says’ youth should accuse people when they have evidence, and youth should behave maturely, as

15 Social audit- A tool kit . A guide for performance improvement and outcome measurement (http://unpan1.unorg/intradoc/groups/public/d...) 2.15am on 24th/3/11.

45 future leaders’. Engaging in neutral places where Government power is has less influence provided confidence to the youth councils. Hold state to account through resistance excites emotions due to shame and disgust. This redefined a new relationship that was hostile to the youth councils.

Example11: The other way youth councils hold the state to account is through intergenerational dialogue. Intergenerational dialogue is a process that brings together youth, government officers and other stakeholders in a public forum. This is an open forum where youth have a chance to raise issues of concern to government and other actors. During this forum, a youth facilitator co-hosts with either government or non state actor. In these dialogue forums youth also utilised their skills in information technology (through video clips) to collect evidence. In some instances, the discussions were recorded and aired through the radio. Separate radio interviews were also conducted where youth were able to broadcast messages especially emphasizing on inclusion of youth and mobilising other youth to participate in development. The dialogues were important for learning and also demystify state power in ‘invited spaces’ (Cornwall 2002) the government representatives and some select stakeholders form a panel. The youth therefore have a chance to ask different questions/issues for clarification and also to get progress on various development processes. During the research we conducted one intergenerational dialogue forum which involved Kwale, Bondo county youth councils. The government was taken to task why it was taking long to issue identity cards, and also the youth raised issues on the arbitrary youth arrests that amounted to harassment. My experiences with this process is that youth become very enthusiastic to really engage the government, while the government works from a point of defence. These tensions were visible when one officer said:’ youth have a right to ask questions and engage us but should exercise responsibility, some youth look like criminals’ Even though invited spaces are opportunities to hold the state actors to account, as mentioned in chapter 4, state rules of engagement, agenda setting possibly challenges the eloquence of youth representatives. However, the example above shows that the power of numbers and the neutral space, changes the equation in terms of self confidence to engage government to clarify inconsistencies either through the social audits or intergenerational dialogues. The use of information technology also indicates an emerging alternative engagement space that surpasses any forms of control from the Government. Here it makes a whole difference when the youth set the rules and control the agenda. On the other hand, the youth officer and I were victims of personal guilt, through facilitating youth

46 to engage others in social audits; we got influenced to demonstrate commitment. ‘I personally, felt tensed by the shame, exposure and disgust of social accountability, and although I committed that they could review Plan Kenya projects, I sent a colleague in charge of monitoring and evaluation to bring me a report of the project so the youth do not bring surprises’ The other lesson from the example are the tensions and new emerging relations that come with social accountability mechanisms where Government officers struggle to explain to youth councils.

Example 12: This example will be concerned with financial accountability of youth groups. I interviewed 2 youth officers and accessed copies of the financial records. The government rolled out the youth enterprise development fund which was meant to assist youth to access affordable credit to start income generating activities. The procedure was to write a proposal to the youth enterprise development fund committee for consideration. In Kinango 45 groups were advanced loans amounting to Kenya shillings (Kshs) 1,656,195. The repayment rate is 2.07%. On the other hand in Kwale, 32 groups were funded at Kshs. 1,985160 and the rate of repayment is 6.98%.In both cases, youth groups have a high rate of defaulters and the government is applying legal measures to recover the money. In a related development, the constituency development fund by design cannot be advanced to interest groups like the youth council or youth groups. However interview with the secretary in one of the constituencies indicate that the youth pushed the MP and two groups were funded 1million shillings each to construct youth empowerment centres. One of these groups misappropriated the funds and gave fake receipts while project remained at slab level. They disbanded the group and leaders cannot be traced. The centre was eventually done by the government. The second group went into leadership conflicts which took almost one year to resolve. They were just funded towards the end of 2010 and just started on their project. The literature on social accountability puts emphasis on state accountability and now Fox (2007) introduced the angle on leadership accountability. This kind of focus may have insulated citizens and made them immune to scrutiny. The example above with the youth groups shows that there are issues to widen and deepen the accountability agenda. Internal mechanisms of accountability in citizens groups weaken their visibility in participation spaces.

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5.1: Summary

In the previous chapter, I explored issues related to the legitimacy of youth representatives. Legitimacy of representatives determines how they hold the state to account as well as their accountability to their members. The literature in this chapter has created hope that participation of representatives in state led spaces could double up as an accountability mechanism (Joshi 2008). However, due to power dynamics (discussed in chapter 3), this does not readily happen. Instead this chapter raises the following issues:

First, youth councils suffer from weaker internal accountability mechanisms. Fox (2007) argues that since leaders in non state actors draw legitimacy from members, their internal democracy and accountability should equally be subjected to public scrutiny. Based on this argument and looking at the examples, youth leaders do not properly account to their members. There are no mechanisms to collate agenda before they attend meetings and do not mediate the feedback from state governance structures. Although, Joshi (2008) suggests that state could be held to account through their own spaces, youth councils may not find the confidence to engage on accountability issues as the examples show that youth groups misappropriated Constituency Development Funds and Youth Enterprise Development funds. This slows down participation, as defaulters are likely to shy away from public officials and forums.

Secondly, youth councils hold the state to account through ‘resistance’ and open dialogue. Due to the failure of state governance spaces to provide a conducive environment for participation, youth councils hold state to account through resistance. Hossain (2009) argues that when state mechanisms fail to respond, ordinary citizens resort to ‘rude’ forms of accountability through complaints and protests. As demonstrated by the examples, youth councils resorted to hold the youth officer through ‘resistance’. On the other hand, dialogue in open public forums complimented the lost opportunities to hold state to account in the official spaces. This demonstrates that neutral spaces of engagement have to be created to scale down state power and influence.

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CHAPTER 6

6.0: SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS.

6.1: Summary

The previous chapters of this paper explored the concepts of participation in governance, representation and social accountability. This section will deal with a summary of the arguments in the entire thesis, the interconnections across the chapters and the potential implications for practice. Drawing from the National youth Council model of the government and Plan’s youth engagement framework, I have argued for a framework of interrelationships between the three concepts of participatory governance, representation and accountability mediated by power relations. The literature in each of the chapters (from chapter 3 to 5) and the subsequent practical experiences from the youth councils demonstrate this relationship. Participation of youth in the state led governance spaces is through representatives. However, the effectiveness of their representation is challenged by the power and control mechanisms of the state. In effect this denies representatives an opportunity to influence decisions and hold the state to account. In summary the relationship is demonstrated in 3 ways: 1. It is through the active participation of youth representatives in state- led spaces that could lead to greater influence on decisions and fostering accountability. 2. It is through participation of legitimate youth representatives that the state captures the aspirations of the youth. 3. Representatives claim to be accountable while in practice they are not. This makes them loose legitimacy to represent youth and weakens their accountability demands from the state.

Secondly, this paper advanced two arguments which I summarise how the paper has demonstrated: 1. If actors fail to focus on the forms of power oscillating and streaming over participation, representation and accountability, broader objectives of empowering youth to influence decision making will not achieve desirable results.

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Let me begin by a personal confession that before this action research, I celebrated the number of youth who were admitted in state led governance as a success of advocacy efforts. However from the experiences of the research with youth councils I see a different picture. From the examples in this paper, I now realise actors have to go beyond the number of youth admitted in governance structures and to be sensitive on what really happens inside those spaces, as well as, getting interested to know how youth representatives exercise their power. Goetz and Gaventa (2001) further suggest that accessing and being present in governance structures does not automatically lead to influence. Influencing of decisions depends on the power relations as demonstrated in this paper.

2. Youth Councils in Kenya will not be effective in challenging local governance structures in an environment of weaker internal accountability.

The examples in this paper have demonstrated this to be true. Youth council leaders who misappropriated Constituency Development Funds and Youth Enterprise Development Funds shy away from public officials and participation forums. Non financial forms of social accountability like the collation of youth agenda and providing feedback after meetings are also important. Youth council leaders who do not have a mechanism to collate agenda and provide feedback to their members loose their representative legitimacy. This loss of moral standing weakens their confidence to challenge the Government, as they exhibit the same behaviours they are supposed to transform.

6.2: Implications for Practice:

The discussions and experiences expressed in this paper raise four fundamental implications for both state and non state actors:

6.2.1: Understanding and experiencing the process.

In the earlier stages of this paper, I talked about my positionality as a Plan Kenya Manager. One of my roles is to support program implementation. This makes me a key actor; however, due to the nature of responsibilities, I remain far removed from processes (Mgala 2011). The experiences in this action research demonstrate that it is vital to stay connected to the youth engagement process, to build an understanding of the dynamics from within, and experience the issues that may not be reflected in project reports. By being close to the process, it avails an opportunity even to reflect on power representation through gestures, quotes and

50 narratives of youth leaders and Government officials. It is also an opportunity to build relations that demystify the power of an actor which may have been an impediment to energise people’s aspirations. This kind of connection is vital when making decisions not only in project design but also in strategic decisions on the kind of partnerships to venture into. I have used my own experience to present this point but could be applicable to actors who are in a similar position and facing similar experiences.

6.2.2 Three dimensional equations to capacity strengthening.

Gaventa (2004:27) argued for ‘working on both sides of the equation’ to mean Government and citizens, however, experiences illuminated in this paper lead me to add a three dimensional equation to capacity strengthening.

First is government level capacity strengthening: The government designed participatory governance models to capture aspirations of youth citizens but failed to re-orient state officials on the requisite attitudes and skills to enable youth to participate genuinely. Strengthening of state capacity is not entirely a training issue but also one of challenging high level policy to understand the implications of implementing such policies. As we saw in the examples, allowing youth or ordinary citizens to participate in state spaces while retaining original bureaucratic tendencies and protocol is not conducive for participation. Advocating for changes at the district may only change behaviour of a few officials but national level efforts with policy makers to lead these efforts will be an important intervention.

The second level is for the youth councils. The youth councils as a structure remained the focus both for state and non state actors in terms of capacity building. These are critical efforts that should continue to make sure representatives are adequately prepared with skills, confidence and exposure necessary for engagement.

Thirdly, while the focus on youth council leaders has been given prominence in the second level dimension, examples in the paper demonstrate that focus on members is equally critical. The experiences with the youth councils leaders who fail to account back to members and lacking a mechanism to collate joint agenda, justify a refocus to mobilise youth council members for adequate capacity building. Drawing from the representative model designed by Government, focusing on leaders alone may create new dominators due to new found identities and alliances with state officials (Barnes, Newman and Sullivan 2007). Mobilising the other youth council members for capacity strengthening and exposure will act as a

51 countercheck to the behaviour of youth leaders and how they exercise their new found power. Fox (2007) argues that leaders of citizens groups could consolidate their own power and become less accountable to members.

6.2.3: Consider new dynamics of youth representation and accountability.

This paper attempted to bring an interactive framework between participation, representation and accountability. The implication of this framework in practice means both state and non state actors now need to pay closer attention to representation and accountability. Initially much emphasis has been on participation.

‘….much of what is considered participatory is more a process whereby a large number of people are represented by a relatively small group of participants…. this is primarily about the organised interaction of leaders rather than members’ (Hickey and Mohan 2004:19).

Drawing from this quote and the examples, the practice of representation and its legitimacy is critical to focus in terms of training representatives but also making members aware of the expectations from both representatives and the represented. Further, the experiences with youth councils have shown that challenging power (especially holding state to account) is not a linear and easy process; it could generate emotions, tensions and reprisals which give more justification for representatives who have legitimate support from their members.

6.2.4. Demonstration of participatory governance.

Non state actors, represented by Plan Kenya’s role in this paper, work with citizens and the state to enhance participation in governance processes. However, they remain hesitant to open up their own internal governance systems to public scrutiny and influence. The attempt by Plan as enshrined in the youth engagement framework is laudable although from the experiences and internal review of the governance charters, the commitment was not translated into practice. Actors should strive to demonstrate participatory governance and lead by example. However, this process will also require re-orientation of staff skills and attitudes to embrace institutionalisation of youth participation, and be ready to face the new realities of tensions that come with power contests. In the initial stages, this process may be taken up by champions of youth participation within the organisation to advocate for this kind of institutionalisation to staff and partners.

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