Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: CHN35125 Country: Date: 24 July 2009

Keywords: China – families – Fuqing City – Student demonstrations 1989 – Pro-democracy activists – Spring magazine – Falun Gong – Exit procedures – Passports

This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein.

Questions

1. Are there ongoing adverse effects for the children and grandchildren of former Kuomintang officers? 2. Please provide any background on a crackdown on students in Fuqing City around 1989. 3. Is there any relevant information available on “Beijing Spring”? 4. Would distributing the pro-democracy newspaper “Beijing Spring” or practicing Falun Gong have an adverse effect on obtaining tourist visas in 2007 and 2008?

RESPONSE

1. Are there ongoing adverse effects for the children and grandchildren of former Kuomintang officers?

Information about the historical background and activities of the Kuomintang Party (KMT) (also spelled ‗Guomindang‘) is provided in research response CHN14497 dated 1 February 2001 (RRT Country Research 2001, Research Response CHN14497, 1 February – Attachment 1).

Further background information is outlined in a research response dated 22 November 2007, which also provides extensive information about the treatment of people from KMT families (RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response CHN32428, 22 November – Attachment 2).

In particular, the response cites a report by the US State Department, which outlines the following background information about the KMT: In the 1920s, Sun Yat-sen established a revolutionary base in and set out to unite the fragmented nation. With Soviet assistance, he organized the Kuomintang (KMT or ―Chinese Nationalist People‘s Party‖), and entered into an alliance with the fledgling (CCP). After Sun‘s death in 1925, one of his proteges, Chiang Kai-shek, seized control of the KMT and succeeded in bringing most of south and under its rule. In 1927, Chiang turned on the CCP and executed many of its leaders. The remnants fled into the mountains of eastern China. In 1934, driven out of their mountain bases, the CCP‘s forces embarked on a ―Long March‖ across some of China‘s most desolate terrain to the northwestern province of Shaanxi, where they established a guerrilla base at Yan‘an.

During the ―Long March,‖ the communists reorganized under a new leader, (Mao Tse-tung). The bitter struggle between the KMT and the CCP continued openly or clandestinely through the 14-year long Japanese invasion (1931-45), even though the two parties nominally formed a to oppose the Japanese invaders in 1937. The war between the two parties resumed after the Japanese defeat in 1945. By 1949, the CCP occupied most of the country.

Chiang Kai-shek fled with the remnants of his KMT government and military forces to Taiwan, where he proclaimed Taipei to be China‘s ―provisional capital‖ and vowed to re- conquer the Chinese mainland. Taiwan still calls itself the ―Republic of China‖ (US Department of State 2007, Background Note: China, August – Attachment 3).

The response also provides information about the individual personal dossiers (called dang an) used in China, which contain information about a person‘s employment, education, party membership, qualifications and official merits or demerits, and is often kept by a person‘s employer or an employment agency (DIAC Country Information Service 2003, Country Information Report No. 82/03 - Personal Files, (sourced from DFAT advice of 10 June 2003), 17 June – Attachment 4).

In a 1989 book on Chinese politics and culture, Suzanne Ogden explains that Kuomintang membership is likely to be recorded in a person‘s dang an, along with information about relatives with ―bad class backgrounds‖:

In addition to black marks, letters, and the supervisor‘s own comments, a dossier will also contain information about a person’s class background, education, friends and relations (especially if they have bad class backgrounds or have lived abroad), and participation in political organizations. If a person has a bad class origin or has ever been labelled as one of the “five bad elements,” that fact can haunt him for the rest of his life. For example, one man who before 1949 had joined the Kuomintang Youth League when he was only 12 years old was struggled against repeatedly for twenty years as being a ―reactionary‖ and possibly a ―foreign spy.‖ When he finally discovered the reason he was victimized, he committed suicide. Another man, one of China‘s first college graduates in engineering and a ―model worker,‖ was in 1958 labelled an “historical counter revolutionary” because he confessed to joining a “reactionary youth league” several years before liberation and remaining in it for one year. He appealed the party‘s verdict, but the party refused to lift his political ―hat.‖ Instead, it sentenced him to seven years‘ imprisonment. When he was later released, he went to work again, but his background destined him to repeated ―struggle‖ (Researcher‘s emphases) (Ogden, Suzanne 1989, ‗Dossiers (Dang‘an)‘, from Chapter 6 ‗Socialist Legality and Social Control‘, in China’s Unresolved Issues – Politics, Development and Culture,– Attachment 5).

A research response from 8 January 1996 refers to documents that indicate that Chinese society was divided along class lines in 1949, following the victory of the Communist Party, resulting in Kuomintang leaders and bureaucrats being categorized as ―bad class.‖ In the mid- 1950s ‗anti-rightist campaign,‘ those identified as ―bad class,‖ including descendants of these classes, experienced widespread discrimination in terms of employment, wages, political involvement and general societal treatment (RRT Country Research 1996, Research Response CHN10897, 8 January – Attachment 6).

Information provided by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada in 1989 indicates that the rank and current place of residence of former Kuomintang officers has a large impact on the treatment of their children. A father‘s association with the KMT ―comes under the category of political background and is most likely noted on the personal dossier‖ of his children, the impact of which ―is assessed at the discretion of local officials.‖ It is also noted that children of former KMT officers may experience discrimination in areas such as employment:

A Canadian academic expert on Chinese politics states that the treatment of the children of former Kuomintang officers depends upon what the parents‘ rank had been and in what part of the country they now reside. The rank of officer will impart more significance because the attainment of this rank would have involved more active participation in politics. Otherwise, ordinary soldiers conscripted by the Kuomintang are of less concern to the Communist authorities. The person‘s residence is an important factor because the impact of the father‘s Kuomintang link which comes under the category of political background and is most likely noted on the personal dossier kept on every Chinese citizen is assessed at the discretion of local officials. (According to this source, there is a strong Chinese cultural tradition that sins of the father can be visited upon his children.)

A second academic source contacted on this request for information observes that a person with the abovementioned type of background might be discriminated against in such areas as employment.

The Department of External Affairs adds that since the events of the first weekend of June, there is a stronger possibility that such a person would encounter difficulties. Before that time, it appears that in the interests of fostering cordial relations with Taiwan (which is still governed by the Kuomintang), people with links to former Kuomintang officials were not harassed. The Departmental spokesperson corroborated the fact that the current treatment depends very much on the locale and rank factors (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989, CHN1715 – China: 1) Current treatment of children of a Kuomintang military officer; 2) Proportion of Chinese population who are members of the Communist Party; Possible sanctions for a person who voluntarily leaves the Party; 3) Information on the demonstrations in Guangzhou City, in April-May 1989, 1 August – Attachment 7).

A 2001 article describes the discrimination experienced by the children and grandchildren of former Kuomintang officials, stating that ―[u]ntil a few years ago, students whose parents or grandparents were once members of the KMT were still marked out‖:

When my family first arrived in the U.S. from Taiwan in 1970, I remember my mother excitedly writing a letter to her older brother in Nanjing, China. The two had not seen each other since 1949, when my mother fled with her parents to Taiwan. My maternal grandfather was a Kuomintang deputy minister of railroads, but he had no choice but to leave two of his sons in China in the aftermath of the sudden rout of the Nationalist regime. My mother had not been able to write from Taiwan because of restrictions on direct communications with the other side. Six weeks after sending her letter, she got a short note back from her brother pleading with her ―to never to ever write again.‖

We didn‘t find out until 1987, when she was able to re-establish contact with her lost family, that he had been sent to the countryside for two years of hard labor for receiving a letter from ―overseas,‖ which was classified as a ―counter-revolutionary‖ act. This was despite the fact that he had worked hard to ease the suspicion that sprang from the fact that his father was a KMT official. He had served in the People’s Liberation Army and had fought in the , but this was not seen as enough to erase the “sins” of his KMT father, nor to earn enough forgiveness for receiving a letter from the greatest devil of them all: America.

…[T]he sons and daughters of former KMT officials in China still suffer discrimination to varying degrees. Go to any Chinese ministry and you‘ll be hard pressed to find a single senior official who has even a relative with KMT links. The Chinese Communist Party, in its heyday of zealous radicalism, tried to weed out all those who had questionable lineage. In the hysteria directed at the bourgeoisie, even true believers in the communist cause were reviled. Until a few years ago, students whose parents or grandparents were once members of the KMT were still marked out. They had to score higher points to get into university; some were simply rejected by university admission committees because of their family background. Though the is long over, the deep roots of discrimination against the ―bourgeois‖ still linger in many Chinese government institutions.

China of course has come a long way since the Cultural Revolution. Increasingly, many people are judged by their abilities and not by their past. As China enters the World Trade Organization, the country will be transformed even more into a market-driven economy with greater emphasis on meritocracy. However, for the country to be truly healthy, politically, socially and economically, much will have to be done to heal the scars left by the 1960s and 1970s (Researcher‘s emphases) (Cheng, A.T. 2001, ‗A Tale of Two Countries China and Vietnam: These communists aren‘t the same‘, Asiaweek, 8 January http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/foc/ – Accessed 11 October 2007 – Attachment 8).

A research response of 29 May 2006 also highlights a number of relevant sources which describe the treatment received by the families of former KMT members (RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response CHN30199, 29 May – Attachment 9).

For example, the response cites a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) report from 1990 which provides some information relating to one particular applicant‘s claims of past links with the KMT regime:

Although China is technically still at war with the KMT regime in Taiwan, the war ended some 41 years ago in 1949. It may be that parents of some of the applicants may have been victimised for having past links with the KMT, but applicants themselves appear not to have been ostracised as they have been able to receive an education up to tertiary level, to seek employment, and indeed to be able to leave the country.

…His father‘s association with the Kuo Min Tang (KMT) in 1939 would have created difficulties for the family subsequent to 1949 when the Peoples Republic was founded.

However, the relationship between Taiwan and the PRC has relaxed in recent times to the extent that there is now a major influx of Taiwanese tourists visiting China. There is also a great deal of Taiwanese investment in China, and this investment is growing.

…Notwithstanding his family‘s support for the KMT, it is notes that he was not discriminated as he was able to be educated up to tertiary level, and be in employment up to the time of his departure (Researcher‘s emphasis) (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1990, Cable BJ 44445 – DORS applications, 7 December – Attachment 10). Additionally, advice from DFAT in 1991 indicates that the situation for KMT members and their families has changed since the 1980s, with the treatment of such people becoming less harsh:

There were 9 million KMT members in the PRC in 1949. Multiply this figure by the number of their immediate family you will get a very big number. Not all of them have been or are in prison solely because they themselves or members of their family have been in association with KMT.

Unlike in the 60‘s, unless one is involved with Taiwanese intelligence, action against families in the PRC for associating with KMT members has not been particularly harsh since the 80‘s. We are not aware of cases in recent years that have been punished because of family‘s KMT background (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1991, Cable BJ 48535 – Distinction between leaders and followers, 19 November – Attachment 11).

An IRB response of 12 March 1996 provides further background information, and indicates that, although in the 1950s many former KMT members were ―charged with being counter- revolutionaries and subjected to reform or re-education through labour;‖ a shift in policy in the late 1970s resulted in the release of most of these people from labour reform camps. It is noted that in more recent times, ―for the most part in China, former Nationalist [Kuomintang] Party connections have by now been relegated to history…[although] the treatment one receives from authorities depends greatly on individual officials in particular localities‖:

After the 1949 revolution former members of the Nationalist or Kuomintang/Guomintang Party in China were frequently charged with being counter-revolutionaries and subjected to reform or re-education through labour (HRIC 12 Mar. 1996; Ladany 1992, 57; Wu 1992, 19, 24). Human rights activist Hongda Harry Wu in his 1992 book Laogai—The Chinese Gulag describes this group as ―historical counter-revolutionaries,‖ a term which refers to all those people who before 1949 had served in the Kuomintang (KMT) regime at any level above secretary in the KMT Party, section chief in the government, company commander in the military, or chief in the police....Regardless of whether or not they had ever, at that time or in the past, directly resisted the Communist Party, they were all either punished or arrested and thrown into labor reform camps. Later this category gradually expanded so that anyone who had served in the Kuomintang regime at any level, even as an ordinary staff or Party member, was treated as a counter-revolutionary. In the 1950s, 50-60 percent of the prisoners in the laogaidui [labour reform camps] belonged to this category, totaling about 10 million in all. Following a major change in Communist policy in 1978, most of the remaining prisoners of this type were released. At present, 20,000-30,000 still remain in custody (24).

Wu also quotes a July 1983 Public Security announcement which stated that ―nationwide there was a total of 79,504 ‗landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, and bad elements.‘ Of these, 78,327 had already ‗removed their hat‘ (i.e., had their former charges dismissed)‖ (ibid. 78).

A representative of (HRIC), a New York-based group monitoring human rights practices in China, stated in a 12 March 1996 interview with the DIRB that HRIC has no recent information on the treatment of former Nationalist Party members or their relatives, but that for the most part in China, former Nationalist Party connections have by now been relegated to history. However, the HRIC representative also stated that especially in the countryside, the treatment one receives from authorities depends greatly on individual officials in particular localities, and it is possible that ill-treatment of former Nationalist Party members and their families still exists (12 Mar. 1996). According to the HRIC representative, family records and political history remain important parts of every Chinese citizen‘s dossier (ibid.). However, the HRIC representative also stated that current political tensions between the People‘s Republic of China and Taiwan, the home of the Nationalist Party, probably have no bearing on the treatment in China of individuals with a past connection to the Nationalist Party (ibid.). The representative noted that business links between China and Taiwan remain open, and that the Chinese government has made no official announcements concerning the treatment of people with former Nationalist Party connections (ibid.) (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1996, CHN23282.E – China: Information on the treatment by authorities of former members of the Nationalist Party and their families, 12 March – Attachment 12).

Advice received in 1996 from Professor J Bruce Jacobs of Monash University similarly states that:

I also agree that you are correct that basically ―those with KMT associations are now no longer at risk from the PRC authorities‖ (DIMA Country Information Service 1997, Country Information Report No. 97/97 - Request for advice on former member of KMT intelligence unit, (sourced from Professor J Bruce Jacobs advice of 12 December 1996), 5 March – Attachment 13).

In addition, a 2007 report by the US State Department claims that ―[d]uring the past decade, there have been no reports of official discrimination because of ‗bad class‘ background‖:

Some applicants may assert that they would suffer if they returned to China, citing past persecution of family members during the anti-rightist (i.e., ‗anti-counterrevolutionary‘) campaigns following the CCP‘s 1949 victory, or because of alleged association with the pre- 1949 Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) party, or membership in a ‗black five element‘ family (i.e., whose members before 1949 had been landlords, rich farmers, CCP opponents, criminals, or rightists). The political environment of China today is significantly different from that of the 1950s and 1960s. During the past decade, there have been no reports of official discrimination because of ‗bad class‘ background (US Department of State 2007, China Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions, May, Paragraph 64 – Attachment 14).

2. Please provide any background on a crackdown on students in Fuqing City around 1989.

Limited information could be found regarding a crackdown on students in Fuqing City in 1989.

However, a previous research response dated 9 November 2007 identifies student protests which occurred in June 1989 in Fujian Province (RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response CHN32464, 9 November – Attachment 15).

The response cites a book entitled The Pro-Democracy Protests in China – Reports from the Provinces, in which Jonathan Unger explains that ―[t]hroughout the spring of 1989…massive protests were engulfing cities and towns across China‖ (Unger, J. (ed) 1991, The Pro- Democracy Protests in China – Reports from the Provinces, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, pp. 1-2 – Attachment 16).

In a chapter on the 1989 democracy movement in Fujian Province, Mary Erbaugh and Richard Kraus show that in terms of tactics and demands, the movement in Fujian was mild in comparison to the majority of other Chinese cities. Erbaugh and Kraus do not specifically mention Fuqing City; however, they provide the following information regarding large student protests in Fujian in response to the June 1989 massacre in Beijing: The 1989 democracy movement in Fujian province followed a very different course from the tragedy in Beijing. The events in Fujian were derivative, confined to a small group of intellectuals and students, with very little participation by workers or other citizens.

…While there were no clashes with police or soldiers in Fujian, open tension between students and the army erupted even before the demonstrations began (Erbaugh, M. & Kraus, R. 1991, ‗The 1989 Democracy Movement in Fujian and Its Aftermath‘ in J. Unger (ed) 1991, The Pro-Democracy Protests in China – Reports from the Provinces, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, pp. 150-165 – Attachment 16).

The US Department of State report cited earlier describes student demonstrations and a government crackdown which occurred in 1986, although no specific area of China is mentioned. In addition, the report describes 1989 demonstrations in Fujian, explaining that ―these local demonstrations were smaller and less dramatic than those in Beijing, and appear to have been closed down by local authorities…less forcefully, i.e., and without violence or widespread retribution.‖

[69] 1989 Tiananmen Democracy Movement. Some asylum applicants have claimed that, when they left China, authorities had not realized the degree to which they had supported Beijing pro-democracy activists in 1989. Chinese authorities have claimed that all Tiananmen cases have been resolved, but they have not provided a credible accounting of those missing, dead, or still imprisoned. Individuals suspected of ongoing involvement in activities commemorating those killed in the Tiananmen Square massacre are subject to harassment and sometimes detention.

[70] 1989 Demonstration in Fujian and Guangdong. During the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations in Beijing, there were demonstrations in Fujian and Guangdong, both provinces with historically high volumes of asylum claims. However, these local demonstrations were smaller and less dramatic than those in Beijing, and appear to have been closed down by local authorities – as generally was the case elsewhere in China outside of Beijing – less forcefully, i.e., and without violence or widespread retribution.

[71] Some asylum applicants from Fujian Province assert that the security authorities were seeking them because they disseminated information in Fujian about the Tiananmen Democracy Movement. While we have no specific information regarding such claims, Chinese media enjoyed unprecedented freedom over several key days during the June 1989 Tiananmen period, openly reporting on many cases, such as riots in Xi‘an and Chengdu, foreign reports were also broadcast without interference during this period (US Department of State 2007, China Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions, May, Paragraphs 68-71 – Attachment 14).

The research response of 29 May 2006 mentioned earlier provides information received from DFAT regarding the pro-democracy demonstrations of June 1989 in various parts of China (RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response CHN30199, 29 May – Attachment 9).

For example, advice received from DFAT in 1990 indicated that although primarily focused in Beijing, demonstrations ―occurred in other parts of China as well.‖ The report highlights a government crackdown on 4 June 1989. Although many people were placed in detention as a result, those who were not considered to be ―major key players‖ were released after interrogation:

Like the Cultural Revolution, the sequence of events that occurred in June 1989 as another unhappy period of Chinese history. It was a turbulent period with mass suspicions of huge proportion. Given the extent of disenchantment against the government, it was practicable that the government in the aftermath of June 4th crackdown would want to ensure the disenchantment be crushed completely. Consequently, many people would have been caught in the government‘s broad sweep of suspects, only to be released after interrogation when it became clear the people being released were not the major key players they seek.

Although the focus of dissent as principally in Beijing, the phenomenon occurred in other parts of China as well. As a result of the June crackdown, many people have been placed under detention. Although it is true that many are still in prison, it is fair to say many have also been released since June 89 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1990, Cable BJ 44445 – DORS applications, 7 December – Attachment 10).

Similarly, DFAT country information on China from 1992 describes the treatment of those involved in the 1989 protests, indicating that ―[i]n the broad sweep crackdown, many individuals were detained and questioned but released when it was clear the person was not a major or key player…Chinese authorities are most concerned about those who have assumed leadership roles in organised opposition‖.

1989 Pro-democracy Protests

Inside China

After June 6 1989 there were mass suspicions of huge proportions. In the broad sweep crackdown, many individuals were detained and questioned but released when it was clear the person was not a major or key player. Prominent activists were rounded up fairly soon after 4 June, but investigation of activists in Shanghai really only began in mid-late August 1989, so 4 June to 31 August gave opportunity for them to leave.

China is concerned mainly, with those who led or participated actively in the protest movement in China itself, particularly in Beijing. Unless they had come to particular attention of the Chinese authorities through playing a leadership role, making public statements or having otherwise emerged with a high profile, it is unlikely that they would encounter any serious difficulties. Vast numbers of students and workers were given ―reform through education‖, which could include ―self criticism‖ and compulsory attendance of courses, but this kind of ―brainwashing‖ has been a way of life for the Chinese for centuries. Other punishments could include labour, but the grass roots education carried out today is not as severe as that of the Cultural Revolution.

…Outside China

It is important to draw the distinction between organisers and followers of pro-democracy movements. Chinese authorities are most concerned about those who have assumed leadership roles in organised opposition…People involved at a high level in these activities could be punished on return with education/reform through labour, imprisonment or treatment that could amount to persecution as defined by the UN Convention.

...China‘s attitudes to students.

There was an original MOU on education cooperation between Australia and China in which it was stated that ―Australia would take all possible steps to ensure that students return to the PRC‖. China reminded Australian of this (March 1990) and gave assurances of lenient attitude towards students who had participated in protests – ie they would not be persecuted on their return. While there has been evidence to the contrary, the more time that passes, the more the events of June 6 1989 fade and other issues take priority. While there is no hard evidence of this, it is reinforced by events. Why have we not heard stories of persecution of the 11,000 Australian PRC students (or others who have returned from other countries)?

…The Chinese Government would expect an account of some students‘ activities on their return home, but could allow that they were acting in good faith and had been misled by a biased western media. In many instances a term of ―self criticism‖ would be the only punishment administered.

…Participation in protest activity (as distinct from ―leader‖) would make little difference to the [employment] prospects in non-state sectors. State sector employment is declining and it would be difficult for anyone to find jobs there (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1992, Country Information China, 31 March – Attachment 17).

In addition, DFAT advice from 1 June 1993 outlines the likely treatment of pro-democracy supporters on their return to China:

We spoke recently with a former Senior Editor of a national daily newspaper and a prominent dissident released from detention last year who are well informed on dissident issues. On the question of likely treatment of office-bearers of overseas pro-democracy organisations returning to China, they made the following comments:

…It is clear from the foregoing that the Chinese authorities are not so much concerned about the issue of political activities overseas, but rather the question whether returnees have an intention to oppose the government in an effective and organised way after their return to China. Students and others who did not have a high dissident profile and significant influence in China at the time of the , even if they are now office bearers of overseas pro-democracy organisations, would have only a remote chance of facing administrative or criminal sanctions by the Chinese authorities unless, after their return, they initiated organised activities opposing the government in an effective way (Researcher‘s emphases) (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1993, Cable BJ 1879 – PRC application for refugee status – office-bearers of pro-democracy organisations, 1 June – Attachment 18).

3. Is there any relevant information available on “Beijing Spring”?

The Beijing Spring website provides the following background information about the magazine, particularly claiming that it ―has been officially branded ―illegal‖ by the Chinese government, but is available in some restricted Chinese libraries. It is widely circulated within the dissident circle in China and is known as a standard bearer of the democracy movement.‖ It may be relevant to note that the website also claims that ―Beijing Spring sends compact discs with a complete collection of magazine articles to readers in China for free‖.

Beijing Spring, a monthly Chinese-language magazine dedicated to the promotion of human rights, democracy and social justice in China, has been in continuous publication since June 1993.

Over the years, Beijing Spring has made a substantial contribution to spreading the message of democracy and accelerating the economic and political reforms. Indeed, as the published Tiananmen Papers reveals, and other Chinese leaders believe that the 1989 Democracy Movement was in part instigated by China Spring, a predecessor of Beijing Spring. As the widespread 1989 democracy demonstrations have shown, although China is a country ruled by a totalitarian regime, the Chinese people have a keen interest in adopting a democratic form of government. Their inspirations, however, have been stifled by the repressive regime. At this time, advocating democracy in China can result in imprisonment or worse. As a result, pro-democracy publications such as Beijing Spring can only be printed outside of China. Anyway, these publications are often taken into China by the Chinese national living abroad.

Beijing Spring‘s articles cover the reporting of current political development, analysis of social issues, documentation of human rights violations in China, and discussion on how democratization can be achieved. About a third of its articles are contributed by authors in China. The magazine has been officially branded ―illegal‖ by the Chinese government, but is available in some restricted Chinese libraries. It is widely circulated within the dissident circle in China and is known as a standard bearer of the democracy movement. Beijing Spring sends compact discs with a complete collection of magazine articles to readers in China for free. Its website (www.bjzc.org) received thousands of hits every day. Beijing Spring magazine is published on the fifteenth of each month. The electronic version is normally uploaded to this site before the end of the month. With its editorial office based in New York, Beijing Spring has readers from all over the world.

The editorial office of Beijing Spring is also the center of a wide range of pro-democracy activities. In this regard it takes over certain roles formerly played by the Chinese Alliance for Democracy. It sponsors all kinds of gatherings, including formal conferences. Beijing Spring also regularly supports visits to China by overseas dissidents to organize and coordinate pro- democracy activities. It maintains close relation with various pro-democracy groups and with the exiled Tibetan and other minority groups. It helps organize the worldwide annual remembrance of the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen massacre. It provides assistance to newly arrived refugees and dissidents.

Beijing Spring is registered in the U.S. as a nonprofit corporation. It is assisted by a worldwide network, with liaison offices in Hong Kong, Japan, Europe, Canada, and Australia. Beijing Spring has an advisory board consisting of thirteen distinguished members and a five- member editorial board (‗About Beijing Spring‘ 2004, Beijing Spring website, 31 July http://bjzc.org/en/ – Accessed 8 July 2009 – Attachment 19).

A previous research response dated 3 October 2002 provides information on China Spring, which has been published in the USA from 1982 and associated with the Chinese Alliance for Democracy (CAD) and well-known Chinese dissidents (RRT Country Research 2002, Research Response CHN15435, 3 October – Attachment 20).

Information provided to the Department of Immigration in 1997 by Jonathan Unger, head of the Contemporary China Centre at the Australian National University, indicates that Beijing Spring is published in New York, and was created by ―Hu Ping, a well-known early dissident from China‖:

The Chinese-language journal Beijing Spring is indeed published in New York under the editorship of Hu Ping, a well-known early dissident from China. (As of the March 1994 issue, the address of Beijing Spring was P.O. Box 429, Woodside, NY, 1377, USA.) When the Chinese dissident movement split in the early 1990s, Hu left China Spring, which he used to help edit, and he started this new one, which is not part of the ADC (DIMA Country Information Service 1997, Country Information Report No. 416/97 – China - Penalties for Overseas Presentation of Anti-PRC Government Paper; Beijing Spring – CIS Request CHN 4473, (sourced from Jonathan Unger advice of 8 August 1997), 19 August – Attachment 21).

Similarly, an article from The Conservative Voice claims that both Hu Ping, ―Editor-in-Chief of Beijing Spring magazine,‖ and the magazine itself ―are institutions in the Chinese dissident community‖ (‗CHINA: Is CDP World-Ready?‘ 2007, The Conservative Voice, 14 March – Attachment 22). An article published on the Human Rights in China (HRIC) website describes the interrogation of a Chinese writer based on three of his articles, one of which was published in Beijing Spring in January 2009:

Human Rights in China (HRIC) has learned that Zhejiang-based writer Wu Gaoxing was interrogated by public security police for ―defaming the reputation of state organs.‖

On February 22, 2009, at 1:00 PM, public security officials from Linhai, Zhejiang, came to search Wu‘s home and confiscated his computer before taking him away to the Linhai Public Security Bureau. Wu was interrogated for eight hours about three articles he recently published, and was released at 9:00 PM that evening. He was told that as punishment, he must surrender the 1,200 yuan that he earned for the articles and pay an additional fine of 3,000 yuan.

The following is a list of the three articles Wu published:

…―Sunshine Wages Fear Sunshine‖, published in the January 2009 issue of Beijing Spring, which pointed out that in not disclosing the salary raises that officials received, the government‘s slogan of ―building an honest and clean government‖ is but an empty one.

―The Chinese government stated categorically during the UN Universal Periodic Review of the country‘s human rights record just earlier this month that there is no censorship in China. But punishing a writer for criticizing government actions is censorship,‖ said Sharon Hom, executive director of HRIC. ―It undermines the ‗right to criticize and make suggestions to state organs and officials‘ as protected in the Chinese Constitution itself.‖

Wu has been a vocal critic of the Chinese government since 1989. On June 7, 1989, he led a public demonstration in Taizhou, Zhejiang, to protest the government crackdown on the democracy movement in Tiananmen Square three days earlier. He was sentenced to two years in prison for the crime of ―spreading counter-revolutionary propaganda.‖ In the 1994-1996 period, he was detained more than ten times for calling for the rehabilitation of the June 4 democracy movement (‗Dissident writer interrogated for publishing critical articles‘ 2009, Human Rights in China website, 23 February – Attachment 23).

4. Would distributing the pro-democracy newspaper “Beijing Spring” or practicing Falun Gong have an adverse effect on obtaining tourist visas in 2007 and 2008?

A number of previous research responses address the issues of exit procedures from China and the issuance of passports, in particular:

 RRT Research & Information 2008, Research Response CHN34077, 17 December – Attachment 24

 RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response CHN32423, 30 October – Attachment 25

 RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response CHN32179, 29 August – Attachment 26

 RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response CHN30682, 28 September – Attachment 27 Information received from DFAT on 16 December 2008 regarding exit procedures and passport issuance procedures in China indicates that a person may be refused a passport if the individual ―is a person whom the relevant competent department of the State Council believes will undermine national security‖:

A. Passport issuance procedures in China;

2. In September 2003, the Ministry of Public Security announced simplified procedures for passport applications in 100 large and medium-sized cities in China. The procedures are as follows:

 Applicants need to submit an application form to a branch of the Exit and Entry Administration Bureau, including photocopies of their household registration (hukou) and ID card;

 Registered government officials should submit a ―certificate of exit approval‖ issued by their work unit (employer) or by higher authorities;

 Military personnel in active service, armed police and retired military personnel need to provide their military officer ID card and exit approval issued by the political department of their unit, above the level of military command;

 Applicants under the age of 16 and adopted children need to provide additional documents.

3. The whole application process should take around 14 working days, or 5 working days with the express service. The city of Shanghai has established a computerised application process which can provide a passport within minutes of application.

4. The passport application fee is around RMB 200.

B. Difficulty experienced by a person who had come to the adverse attention of the PRC government in obtaining a passport and/or leaving the country legally

Obtaining a passport

5. According to Passport Law of PRC, which came into force on 1 January 2007, the passport issuing authority shall refuse to issue a passport if the applicant:

i. is not a PRC national;

ii. cannot prove his or her identity;

iii. practises fraud in the course of application;

iv. has been punished for a crime and is serving a sentence;

v. is not allowed to leave the country because of an unsettled civil case, as is notified by a people‘s court;

vi. is a defendant in a criminal case or a criminal suspect; or

vii. is a person whom the relevant competent department of the State Council believes will undermine national security or cause major losses to the interests of the State. Leaving the country

6. According to Implementing Rules for the Law of the PRC on Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens, the border inspection office shall have the right to forbid a person who falls into any of the following categories from leaving the country:

i. those who hold no passports issued by the People‘s Republic of China or other entry-exit certificates;

ii. holders of invalid passports or other invalid entry-exit certificates;

iii. holders of forged or altered passports and certificates, or passport and certificates other than their own;

iv. those who refuse to produce their certificates for examination.

7. We are aware of reports of Chinese citizens with legally-obtained passports being prevented from leaving China because the local security bureau believes them to be involved in a sensitive case or believes they will undermine national security (Researcher‘s emphasis).

…10. For your reference, we attach copies of the PRC‘s Passport Law, Entry and Exit Law, and the implementing rules of the Entry and Exit Law (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2008, DFAT Report No. 943 – China: RRT Information Request: CHN34077, 16 December – Attachment 28; Passport Law of the People’s Republic of China 2006 (Adopted 29 April 2006 & Promulgated 1 January 2007), Provided to the Refugee Review Tribunal by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on 16 December 2008 – Attachment 29; Law of the People’s Republic of China on Control of the Entry and Exit of Aliens 1985 (Adopted 22 November 1985 & Promulgated 1 February 1986), Provided to the Refugee Review Tribunal by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on 16 September 2008 – Attachment 30; and Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens (Approved 4 December 1986 & Promulgated 26 December 1986), Provided to the Refugee Review Tribunal by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on 16 September 2008 – Attachment 31).

The Congressional-Executive Commission on China‘s annual report for 2007 states that ―[t]he Chinese government uses restrictions on inter-national travel to punish activists and control religious communities,‖ providing a number of examples:

The Chinese government continues to enforce restrictions on citizens‘ right to travel, in violation of international human rights standards. The Chinese government uses restrictions on inter-national travel to punish activists and control religious communities. In addition, Western academics, NGOs, and even Commission staff and Members have been restricted in their ability to travel to China. The Passport Law, effective January 2007, articulates some beneficial features for passport applicants, but permits officials to refuse a passport where ―the competent organs of the State Council believe that [the applicant‘s] leaving China will do harm to the state security or result in serious losses to the benefits of the state.‖ In August, Shanghai authorities denied the passport applications of rights defense lawyer and former political prisoner Zheng Enchong and his spouse, Jiang Meili. The same month, authorities in Beijing prevented Yuan Weijing, spouse of imprisoned rights activist Chen Guangcheng, from traveling overseas to accept an award on behalf of her husband. House church leader Zhang Rongliang, who resorted to obtaining illegal travel documents after the government refused to issue him a passport, was sentenced to seven and one half years‘ imprisonment in 2006 on charges of illegally crossing the border and fraudulently obtaining a passport. Also in 2006, authorities detained two leaders of the unregistered Wenzhou diocese, Peter Shao Zhumin and Paul Jiang Surang (who is also known by the name Jiang Sunian), after they returned from a pilgrimage to Rome. Authorities later handed down prison sentences of 9 and 11 months, respectively, alleging they had falsified passports and charging them with illegal exit from the country (Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2007, ‗Annual Report 2007‘, US Government Printing Office website, 10 October, pp. 17-18 http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi- bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:38026.pdf – Accessed 22 July 2009 – Attachment 32).

A number of sources indicate that Chinese authorities maintain alert lists and conduct checks with the Public Security Bureau‘s (PSB) central database when issuing passports and allowing travellers to exit China at international airports.

For example, DFAT advice from 2006 confirms that ―Chinese authorities check all outgoing passengers against an ―alert‖ list;‖ however, DFAT advises that it is unclear ―how comprehensive this list is‖ (DIAC Country Information Service 2006, Country Information Report No.06/42 – China: Failed asylum seeker return decision, (sourced from DFAT advice of 7 August 2006), 25 August – Attachment 33).

Further advice received from DFAT in 2006 explains that ―Chinese citizens subject to arrest warrants…[and] people under investigation but for whom a formal arrest warrant is yet to be issued would…be on these alert lists‖. In addition, it is advised that dissidents and human rights activists have in the past been ―denied…passports to prevent them from leaving the country‖.

A.2. We have so far been unable to obtain comprehensive information on alert lists from China‘s Ministry of Public Security. We can confirm that Chinese citizens subject to arrest warrants would be on the alert lists. It is likely that people under investigation but for whom a formal arrest warrant is yet to be issued would also be on these alert lists. The alert lists are connected to Chinese identity cards as well as passports. The alert lists operate at railway stations as well as airports and border crossings. We will continue to seek information on this issue.

A.3. We are aware of several instances where Chinese authorities have denied citizens passports to prevent them from leaving the country. These have included dissidents and human rights activists and their relatives. In the cases which we are aware of, the refusal to issue the passport came after the dissident or activist had served a period of imprisonment (but this is not necessarily an essential factor in denying a passport to this group of people). We are also aware of several cases where Tibetans have been refused passports. In these cases, the Tibetans had not previously been imprisoned or otherwise convicted of any illegal activity. There would very likely be other groups of people to whom China might refuse to issue passports but it is not possible to obtain information from the Chinese authorities on this practice (DIAC Country Information Service 2006, Country Information Report No. 06/65 – China: Passport and exit arrangements, (sourced from DFAT advice of 8 November 2006), 10 November – Attachment 34).

A 2005 report from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) explains that officers of China‘s Frontier Defense Inspection Bureau (FDIB) are required to ―verify the identity of [Chinese travellers] through a ―computerised record system‖… at each of the 115 Chinese ports currently open for international departures and arrivals‖:

According to an official at the Embassy of the People‘s Republic of China in Ottawa, Chinese citizens travelling overseas must present a valid passport and visa for the country of destination to an immigration official, before being allowed to exit China (11 Oct. 2005). Without elaborating, the official noted that this procedure is standard at all international airports in the country.

A representative of the Canadian Embassy in Beijing provided the following observations on exit controls at Chinese airports in 4 October 2005 correspondence to the Research Directorate. Separate inspection barriers at airports are designated for Chinese citizens, foreign travellers, diplomatic staff, and airline personnel. The Frontier Defense Inspection Bureau (FDIB) is in charge of the inspection barriers, and FDIB officers examine the passports and immigration departure cards of Chinese travellers. The officers also verify the identity of the person through a ―computerised record system.‖ Chinese travellers do not need to present their resident identity card during the inspection. According to information contained on the Website of , there is a Frontier Defense Inspection station at each of the 115 Chinese ports currently open for international departures and arrivals (n.d.) (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, CHN100513.E - China: Exit controls for citizens travelling overseas, including documents and police checks, and whether a person wanted by authorities could leave China using a passport in his or her name; exit procedures at Beijing airport (2003 – 2005), 25 October – Attachment 35).

In addition, a 2007 report from the IRB outlines a program established by the PSB in 2003, which ―allows PSB officers to access a Chinese citizen‘s work history, financial information, and law enforcement records from a central database‖. PSB officers also have access to the ―political activities of citizens, as well as family background,‖ and ―[o]fficials in the PSB‘s State Council Leadership Team for Preventing and Monitoring Cults Tianjin [] branch reportedly keep a database containing over 30,000 names of Falun Gong practitioners‖.

In 2003, the PSB established its ―Golden Shield‖ program, designed to monitor and collect information on Chinese citizens (Reuters 7 Apr. 2006; see also CQ Transcriptions 15 Feb. 2006; Legal Affairs Jan.-Feb. 2006). ―Policenet,‖ which is part of the program, reportedly allows PSB officers to access a Chinese citizen‘s work history, financial information, and law enforcement records from a central database (Legal Affairs Jan.-Feb. 2006; see also CQ Transcriptions 19 Apr. 2006). Other types of personal information accessible to PSB officers through ―Policenet‖ include political activities of citizens, as well as family background, internet surfing history, and fingerprints (CQ 19 Apr. 2006; Taipei Times 1 Sept. 2005). Photographs and other images are also apparently stored in the database (Taipei Times 1 Sept. 2005; see also CQ Transcriptions 15 Feb. 2006).

Since the implementation of China‘s ―Golden Shield‖ program, the PSB has reportedly collected information on more than 96 percent of the country‘s population (Reuters 7 Apr. 2006; CQ Transcriptions 19 Apr. 2006). Sources consulted indicate that, with the exception of the province of Sichuan, the ―Policenet‖ system has been introduced in all of China‘s 22 provinces (Taipei Times 1 Sept. 2005; see Legal Affairs Jan.-Feb. 2006).

Officials in the PSB‘s State Council Leadership Team for Preventing and Monitoring Cults Tianjin [northeast China] branch reportedly keep a database containing over 30,000 names of Falun Gong practitioners, as well as names of persons belonging to other banned religious groups (Independent On Sunday 10 Sept. 2006). Some of the data on these persons has apparently been drawn from the country‘s hukou registration system, which is being digitized under the ―Golden Shield‖ program (ibid.) (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007, CHN102493.E - ‘China: Whether a person detained at an underground church meeting would have his or her name placed in the Public Security Bureau (PSB) database’, 8 May – Attachment 36). DFAT advice from 2003 explains that adverse information held by the PSB may result in the denial of a passport:

Checks with the Public Security Bureau [PSB] in the applicant‘s place of registered residence would reveal any adverse records held by public security organs on the applicant. An applicant ―whose exit, in the judgement of the relevant department of the state council, would be harmful to state security or cause a major loss to national interests‖ would likely be denied a passport. Illegally obtaining a passport in the applicant‘s own name through bribery would be possible, but highly risky and expensive. It would be easier to obtain a passport using someone else‘s identity (DIAC Country Information Service 2003, Country Information Report No. 12/03- Passport and exit procedures, (sourced from DFAT advice of 15 January 2003), 24 January – Attachment 37).

The most recent UK Home Office report on China cites a 2000 IRB response which states that ―[l]eaving China without exit permission or a passport is a criminal offence in China punishable of [sic] up to one year in prison‖. However, the same report cites an article in the New York Times which claims that ―one Chinese legal scholar…Daniel Yu, said that while there is a law on the books in China that calls for a short jail sentence if a person leaves the country illegally, more than likely whatever punishment there might be is at the discretion of local officials‖ (UK Home Office 2009, Country of Origin Information Report – China, April, pp. 151-152 – Attachment 38).

In addition, a 1992 DFAT report cited earlier claims that punishment for organising an illegal exit permit is generally not severe as it is a common occurrence in China:

Illegally organising an exit permit for departure is not something that can readily be detected when a person returns. Even if the offence is discovered, it is likely he would be admonished but not severely as this kind of corruption is not uncommon in China. Much of China operates on the basis of personal relationships to get things done and there is jealousy between bureaucratic organisations which inhibits information flow (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1992, Country Information China, 31 March – Attachment 17).

Falun Gong Practitioners

The following sources outline specific information regarding the exit from China of Falun Gong practitioners:

A 2008 DFAT report cited earlier indicates that in general, only Falun Gong leaders are denied passports; however, there is evidence to suggest that Falun Gong followers are also prevented from exiting China:

8. In regard to members of Falun Gong, we have been advised by sources within the Ministry of Public Security that only those considered to be Falun Gong leaders are refused passports and hence would be prevented from leaving China legally. However, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that the Chinese Government does act to prevent identified Falun Gong followers from leaving China. In many cases, Chinese citizens who have been identified by the Government as Falun Gong followers have their Chinese identity cards confiscated and hence are unable to obtain a passport and leave the country legally. Those that have not been identified by the Government as Falun Gong followers can obtain passports and leave the country legally (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2008, DFAT Report No. 943 – China: RRT Information Request: CHN34077, 16 December – Attachment 28). A 2006 DFAT report outlines the border exit procedures mentioned earlier and the circumstances under which a Chinese citizen would not be permitted to exit China, including ―[i]f the relevant organs of the State Council believe that, after departing the country, that person might cause danger to national security or cause extreme harm to national interests‖. DFAT advises that ―the broad wording of the last point could be interpreted to include Falun Gong practitioners, given the Chinese Government‘s extreme sensitivity to vocal campaigning by Falun Gong practioners abroad [sic]‖. In addition, it is noted that the ―implementation of rules in China can be incomplete, or over-zealous‖ (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2006, DFAT Report No. 540 – China: RRT Information Request CHN30682, 28 September – Attachment 39).

DFAT advice from 2005 provides similar information:

The MPS [Ministry of Public Security] has wide powers to interpret who may be denied a passport. Local public security organs could conceivably deny a known Falun Gong practitioner a passport.

A.2. If a person was detained and tortured by the Chinese authorities for practising Falun Gong it is conceivable that the local public security authorities would deny him or her a passport should the person apply (DIAC Country Information Service 2005, Country Information Report No. 05/43 – Chinese passports for Falun Gong practitioners, (sourced from DFAT advice of 9 August 2005), 10 August – Attachment 40).

In addition, the most recent US Department of State human rights report provides the following information on freedom of movement; indicating that in 2008, religious leaders and political dissidents, including Falun Gong activists, were not only prevented from leaving China, but also refused re-entry if they did travel abroad:

The law provides for freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration and repatriation; however, the government generally did not respect their rights in practice. Authorities heightened restrictions periodically, particularly curtailing the movement of individuals deemed politically sensitive before key anniversaries and visits of foreign dignitaries, and to forestall demonstrations.

…The government permitted legal emigration and foreign travel for most citizens. There were reports that some academics faced travel restrictions around the year‘s sensitive anniversaries, particularly the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre and the Olympics. Most citizens could obtain passports, although those whom the government deemed threats, including religious leaders, political dissidents, and ethnic minorities were refused passports or otherwise prevented from traveling overseas.

…The law neither provides for a citizen‘s right to repatriate nor otherwise addresses exile. The government continued to refuse reentry to numerous citizens who were considered dissidents, Falun Gong activists, or troublemakers. Although some dissidents living abroad were allowed to return, dissidents released on medical parole and allowed to leave the country often were effectively exiled. Activists residing abroad were imprisoned upon their return to the country (Researcher‘s emphases) (US Department of State 2009, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008 – China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), February, Section 2d – Attachment 41).

Information provided by the IRB in 2005 indicates that in some cases, ―former Falun Gong detainees…have been able to leave the country;‖ however, it is also noted that ―there was a high likelihood that practitioners who had undergone re-education would face difficulties in obtaining passports‖:

Both Gail Rachlin [spokesperson for the New York-based group of Falun Gong practitioners known as the Falun Dafa Information Center] and Stacy Mosher [the communications director at Human Rights in China (HRIC)] stated that their respective organizations were aware of some former Falun Gong detainees who have been able to leave the country (Mosher 30 Mar. 2005; Rachlin 23 June 2005). In particular, it is possible for those with family members overseas to leave China on family reunification grounds (Mosher 30 Mar. 2005), or else through connections or ―contacts with officials who are sympathetic‖ (Rachlin 23 June 2005). In contrast, the former detainee from Guangzhou profiled in The Age claimed to have been told by police that she would be unable to obtain a passport to leave China (16 Oct. 2004). According to Country Reports 2002, some Falun Gong practitioners allegedly had difficulty obtaining passports that year (31 Mar. 2003, Sec. 2). Grace Wollensak [a representative of the Falun Dafa Association of Canada (FDAC)] stated that there was a high likelihood that practitioners who had undergone re-education would face difficulties in obtaining passports, as well as securing state housing or pensions (4 Apr. 2003) (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, CHN100726.EX – China: Situation of Falun Gong practitioners and treatment by state authorities (2001 – 2005), 31 October – Attachment 42).

Distributing pro-democracy material

In terms of individuals who disseminate pro-democracy material being able to leave China, it may be relevant to note an article dated 20 September 2001, which describes how one woman, Kang Zhengguo, was detained in China on a return visit from the United States under accusation of endangering national security, for mailing copies of Beijing Spring from the United States to friends in China. After being interrogated and forced ―to submit a written self-criticism,‖ which involved acknowledging the crime of violating ―the state security law that prohibits the ―production, distribution, or reading of materials that endanger state security‖,‖ Zhengguo was released and able to voluntarily return to the United States. Although no mention is made of any trouble experienced when departing China, Zhengguo makes the following observation about re-entering China: ―[a]ny Chinese who gets detained during a trip home to China also normally receives ―send-off instructions‖ just before being released. Your handlers tell you to seal your experiences inside yourself...And they back this up with a threat: should you ever dare mention anything to the media, your next visit home will be even more rocky - in fact you might just forget about being allowed back into the country at all‖.

A year ago, after my classes teaching Chinese at Yale were over and the students had left, I set out for my old home in Xi‘an, China, to visit relatives. Early in the morning on June 15, the fifth day of my stay in my mother‘s house, I had a rude awakening. Before I had gotten out of bed, eight plainclothes agents of the local State Security Bureau burst in, tersely stated their purpose, and forced me to leave with them immediately.

They said they wanted me to take part in a ―returnee interview‖—which was a standard thing, they said, and nothing for me to be upset about.

…Their first item of business was to inspect my documents. The agents took my Chinese passport and my US green card, and said they would keep them for the time being. This little move, both they and I knew, was in fact like attaching to me an invisible leg iron. Every Chinese who goes home and gets into trouble knows that once your documents are gone, they‘ve got you. Even if they let you go, you can‘t move. …They began by asking about letters I had exchanged with friends in Xi‘an after I had left for the West. Then they asked about my contacts in the US with Liu Binyan and Hu Ping, two well-known critics of the Chinese government. They wanted to make clear their especially profound distaste for an essay called ―The Crime of Counterrevolution and the Mendacity of Dictatorship‖ which I had published in the Hong Kong Ming Pao Monthly in 1995 after had been sentenced to a second lengthy prison term. But both they and I knew that none of this added up to ―endangerment of national security‖ and that my responses were unlikely to yield much of value to them. Hence they were obliged to play their trump card, which revealed more directly why they had arrested me.

They had, they said, concrete evidence that made it necessary for them to talk to me. They had searched the home of an elderly friend of mine the day before, and had confiscated all of the letters, magazines, and newspaper clippings that I had mailed to him after moving to America. Now they had some questions: What publications had I mailed to this friend? How many, all together? To whom else had I mailed similar publications? How many? On whose instructions had I mailed these banned publications into China? And so on. So now things were coming clear: my article supporting Wei Jingsheng had sparked their interest, and their raid on my friend‘s house had delivered the goods.

This elderly friend of mine was retired, lived at home, and had time on his hands. But he maintained a lively interest in public affairs, and he kept up a steady correspondence with me after I went abroad. He was always eager to learn, and wanted to use me as a way to get hold of information and opinions that were prohibited inside China. I was over fifty years old, had already been through enough political battles, and perhaps should have put him off. But I thought that, well, if I can supply the needs of an old friend for information and at the same time send some uncensored materials to China, those are things one simply ought to do. So I began to buy magazines like Democratic China and Beijing Spring, which published independent comment on Chinese society, and to mail them to China. The police specifically asked about Liu Binyan because I had given the address of my elderly friend to Liu, who in turn had mailed some writings directly to him. They had asked about Hu Ping because another friend had sent me an article that he wanted to have published, and I had sent it to Hu Ping’s magazine Beijing Spring.

After a full day of questioning, certain things dawned on me. During all that time that I was mailing materials to my elderly friend, we thought nothing was amiss because all of them got through. In fact, though, the police had been reading the mail from the beginning and had let things pass on purpose. They wanted to catch bigger fish; they would cut me some slack, let me pile up a bad record, and then deal with everything at once when I came back to Xi’an to visit relatives.

Now their day of reckoning had arrived. First they raided the home of my elderly friend and took away what they would need for their case; one of the confiscated items, as it happened, was the issue of Beijing Spring that contained the article by my friend which I had sent to the magazine. I now realized why they had asked me about Liu Binyan and Hu Ping at the beginning of the day. They wanted me to confirm and perhaps say more about matters that, from months of reading my mail, they already knew.

My ―returnee interview‖ lasted into the evening. When it was over my handlers made it clear that I would remain on the seventh floor of that guest house while they prepared to spend the night with me.

In the morning they tightened the noose. The section chief who was in charge put on a stern face and said I would have to submit a written self-criticism. They would not let me go home until I put in writing that I admitted my crimes and promised never to mail this kind of publication again. I tried two or three drafts and each was rejected. The two main points at issue were: (1) my statement that ―I viewed my mailings of these materials from the standpoint of my context overseas, where, with press freedom and legal guarantees of private correspondence, such mailings violated nothing‖; and (2) my insistence that the police had not just happened to discover my mailings during their raid on my friend‘s house the day before my arrest, but had long been building their case by opening my mail. This monitoring of my mail, I wrote, gave me a sense of having been entrapped.

…The third day was the beginning of a weekend, and they told me that my case would have to be resolved before the end of the work day. They kept urging me to write a new statement. Since I did want to go home, I decided to relent and open the way to a solution. I deleted the two points that I had been insisting upon, and yielded to the demand that I acknowledge the crime of which I was accused: I had violated the state security law that prohibits the “production, distribution, or reading of materials that endanger state security.” This self-criticism worked. About 6 PM they announced that ―supervised residence is ending at this point.‖

… Any Chinese who gets detained during a trip home to China also normally receives ―send- off instructions‖ just before being released. Your handlers tell you to seal your experiences inside yourself, just as you might seal exposed film inside a light-impenetrable canister. And they back this up with a threat: should you ever dare mention anything to the media, your next visit home will be even more rocky—in fact you might just forget about being allowed back into the country at all. This is the reason why, even though hundreds and thousands of people get harassed in things like ―returnee interviews,‖ so few are willing—or dare—to tell what has happened to them once they reach the outside world (Researcher‘s emphases) (Zhengguo, K. 2001, ‗Arrested in China‘, The New York Review of Books, Vol. 48, No. 14, 20 September http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14501 – Accessed 20 July 2009 – Attachment 43).

As outlined earlier, the most recent US Department of State human rights report for 2008 similarly claims that ―[t]he government continued to refuse reentry to numerous citizens who were considered dissidents.‖ However, it is also reported that ―those whom the government deemed threats, including…political dissidents…were refused passports or otherwise prevented from traveling overseas‖ (US Department of State 2009, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008 – China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), February, Section 2d – Attachment 41).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources:

Government Information & Reports US Department of State http://www.state.gov/ Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/ UK Home Office http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ US Government Printing Office http://www.gpo.gov/ Non-Government Organisations European Country of Origin Information Network http://www.ecoi.net/ International News & Politics The New York Review of Books http://www.nybooks.com/ Topic Specific Links Beijing Spring http://bjzc.org/en/ Search Engines Google http://www.google.com.au/ Databases:

FACTIVA (news database) BACIS (DIAC Country Information database) REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database) ISYS (RRT Research & Information database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports) MRT-RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. RRT Country Research 2001, Research Response CHN14497, 1 February.

2. RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response CHN32428, 22 November.

3. US Department of State 2007, Background Note: China, August. (CISNET China CX184267)

4. DIAC Country Information Service 2003, Country Information Report No. 82/03 - Personal Files, (sourced from DFAT advice of 10 June 2003), 17 June. (CISNET China CX79779)

5. Ogden, Suzanne 1989, ‗Dossiers (Dang‘an)‘ from Chapter 6 ‗Socialist Legality and Social Control‘, in China’s Unresolved Issues – Politics, Development and Culture. (CISNET China CX21865)

6. RRT Country Research 1996, Research Response CHN10897, 8 January.

7. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989, CHN1715 – China: 1) Current treatment of children of a Kuomintang military officer; 2) Proportion of Chinese population who are members of the Communist Party; Possible sanctions for a person who voluntarily leaves the Party; 3) Information on the demonstrations in Guangzhou City, in April-May 1989, 1 August.

8. Cheng, A.T. 2001, ‗A Tale of Two Countries China and Vietnam: These communists aren‘t the same‘, Asiaweek, 8 January http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/foc/ – Accessed 11 October 2007.

9. RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response CHN30199, 29 May.

10. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1990, Cable BJ 44445 – DORS applications, 7 December. (CISNET China CX755)

11. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1991, Cable BJ 48535 – Distinction between leaders and followers, 19 November. (CISNET China CX1365)

12. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1996, CHN23282.E – China: Information on the treatment by authorities of former members of the Nationalist Party and their families, 12 March. (REFINFO) 13. DIMA Country Information Service 1997, Country Information Report No. 97/97 - Request for advice on former member of KMT intelligence unit, (sourced from Professor J Bruce Jacobs advice of 12 December 1996), 5 March. (CISNET China CX21553)

14. US Department of State 2007, China Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions, May.

15. RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response CHN32464, 9 November.

16. Unger, J. (ed) 1991, The Pro-Democracy Protests in China – Reports from the Provinces, Allen & Unwin, Sydney. (RRT Library)

17. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1992, Country Information China, 31 March. (CISNET China CX11485)

18. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1993, Cable BJ 1879 – PRC application for refugee status – office-bearers of pro-democracy organisations, 1 June. (CISNET China CX1372)

19. ‗About Beijing Spring‘ 2004, Beijing Spring website, 31 July http://bjzc.org/en/ – Accessed 8 July 2009.

20. RRT Country Research 2002, Research Response CHN15435, 3 October.

21. DIMA Country Information Service 1997, Country Information Report No. 416/97 – China - Penalties for Overseas Presentation of Anti-PRC Government Paper; Beijing Spring – CIS Request CHN 4473, (sourced from DFAT advice of 8 August 1997), 19 August. (CISNET China CX26467)

22. ‗CHINA: Is CDP World-Ready?‘ 2007, The Conservative Voice, 14 March. (CISNET China CX173774)

23. ‗Dissident writer interrogated for publishing critical articles‘ 2009, Human Rights in China website, 23 February. (CISNET China CX221338)

24. RRT Research & Information 2008, Research Response CHN34077, 17 December.

25. RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response CHN32423, 30 October.

26. RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response CHN32179, 29 August.

27. RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response CHN30682, 28 September.

28. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2008, DFAT Report No. 943 – China: RRT Information Request: CHN34077, 16 December.

29. Passport Law of the People’s Republic of China 2006 (Adopted 29 April 2006 & Promulgated 1 January 2007), Provided to the Refugee Review Tribunal by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on 16 December 2008. 30. Law of the People’s Republic of China on Control of the Entry and Exit of Aliens 1985 (Adopted 22 November 1985 & Promulgated 1 February 1986), Provided to the Refugee Review Tribunal by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on 16 September 2008.

31. Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens (Approved 4 December 1986 & Promulgated 26 December 1986), Provided to the Refugee Review Tribunal by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on 16 September 2008.

32. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2007, ‗Annual Report 2007‘, US Government Printing Office website, 10 October http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi- bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:38026.pdf – Accessed 22 July 2009.

33. DIAC Country Information Service 2006, Country Information Report No.06/42 – China: Failed asylum seeker return decision, (sourced from DFAT advice of 7 August 2006), 25 August. (CISNET China CX160293)

34. DIAC Country Information Service 2006, Country Information Report No. 06/65 – China: Passport and exit arrangements, (sourced from DFAT advice of 8 November 2006), 10 November. (CISNET China CX164795)

35. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, CHN100513.E China: Exit controls for citizens travelling overseas, including documents and police checks, and whether a person wanted by authorities could leave China using a passport in his or her name; exit procedures at Beijing airport (2003 – 2005), 25 October. (REFINFO)

36. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007, CHN102493.E - ‘China: Whether a person detained at an underground church meeting would have his or her name placed in the Public Security Bureau (PSB) database’, 8 May.

37. DIAC Country Information Service 2003, Country Information Report No. 12/03- Passport and exit procedures, (sourced from DFAT advice of 15 January 2003), 24 January. (CISNET China CX72393)

38. UK Home Office 2009, Country of Origin Information Report – China, April.

39. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2006, DFAT Report No. 540 – China: RRT Information Request CHN30682, 28 September.

40. DIAC Country Information Service 2005, Country Information Report No. 05/43 – Chinese passports for Falun Gong practitioners, (sourced from DFAT advice of 9 August 2005), 10 August. (CISNET China CX130538)

41. US Department of State 2009, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008 – China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), February.

42. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, CHN100726.EX – China: Situation of Falun Gong practitioners and treatment by state authorities (2001 – 2005), 31 October. 43. Zhengguo, K. 2001, ‗Arrested in China‘, The New York Review of Books, Vol. 48, No. 14, 20 September http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14501 – Accessed 20 July 2009.