[ 1] -

UNITED STATES NAVY AT WAR

Final Official Report to the Secretary of the Navy

Covering the period March 1, 1945, to October 1, 1945

by FLEET AD .URAL ERNEST J. KING Comnander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations [ 2]

ft ft ft ft ft TABLE Dear Mr. Secretary: On 1 March of this year I presented to you my of second annual report of the progress of our naval CONTENTS operations and the expansion of our naval establish­ ment during the preceding year. Page Since the terminal date of my second report major hostilities on all fronts have terminated victori­ LETTER OF TRANSMITTAI 2 ously for the nations allied against the Axis powers, I—INTRODUCTION 3 and I transmit to you herewith my third and final II—COMBAT OPERATIONS: PACIFIC. 6 report of operations of the United States Navy in The Capture of Iwo Jima - 6 Assault on Okinawa and Its Capture 8 World War II. This report covers the period 1 March Fast Carrier Force Operations in 1945 to 1 October 1945. Support of Okinawa Invasion — 12 Joint Operations in the Philippines and The Navy built and manned by the united Borneo .14 Fast Carrier Force Preinvasion efforts of this country continued to carry the action Operations Against Japan 17« to the enemy, engaged him by sea and air, maintained Contributory Operations 19 control of the essential lanes of sea communication The Surrender and Occupation of Japan .20 and transported men and supplies over all oceans to III—LOGISTICS AND BASES—PACIFIC .22 all theaters. The significant role of amphibious oper­ IV—SUBMARINE OPERATIONS .26 Attacks on Merchant Shipping... .26 ations in this war was strikingly portrayed in the cap­ Attacks on Naval Vessels .....27 ture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, which were the out­ Special Missions 28 standing operations of this type during the last V—ATLANTIC OPERATIONS 28 months of the war. They exemplify the teamwork Antisubmarine Operations 28 of all services which brought victory on both the Tenth Fleet - 29 U. S. Naval Forces in Europe .29 European and Pacific fronts. U. S. Atlantic Fleet 32 For the officers and men of the Navy, Marine VI—SHIPS, AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL..32 Corps, and Coast Guard, I am happy to report, at the Shipbuilding Program 32 end of the war, that the missions and tasks assigned Aircraft 33 Personnel 35 all of them, singly and collectively, have been success­ Health 37 fully accomplished. The Marine Corps 38 The Coast Guard 39 VII—NAVAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOP­ MENT DURING WORLD WAR II 40

VII—CONCLUSION 45

APPENDIX A—Status of major combatant ships of the Japanese Navy at the conclu­ Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy, sion of hostilities.! 48 Commander in Chief, United States Fleet APPENDIX B—Major combatant ships add­ and Chief of Naval Operations ed to the United States Fleet, 7 December 1941—1 October 1945 56

APPENDIX C—Losses of U. S. Naval Vessels The Honorable James Forrestal, from all causes, 7 December 1941—1 Octo­ Secretary of the Navy, ber 1945 67 Washington, D. C. • ft

COVER ART—Official U. S. Navy photographs

* ft ft ft ft ft [3] I—Introduction

My two previous reports carried to 1 March 1945 which he had seized early in the war, and furnished the account of the development of our naval strength us the bases essential to the operations of shore-based and the participation of the United States Navy in aircraft from which the atomic bombs finally were combat operations. The present report is intended despatched, and on which troops and supplies were primarily to cover the period of the succeeding seven being massed for the invasion of Kyushu and of months, during which Germany surrendered and the Honshu. The defeat of Japan was directly due to war with Japan came to an end. This being my last our overwhelming power at sea. report, however, I am including herein my con­ The destruction of the Japanese Navy followed the sidered general comment and observations on the Nelsonian doctrine that .naval victory should be fol­ war as a whole. lowed up until the enemy fleet is annihilated. Of 12 The major strategic decision of the war provided battleships, 11 were sunk; of 26 carriers, 20 were first for the defeat of Germany and then for the de­ sunk; of 43 cruisers, 38 were destroyed; and so on feat of Japan. Both of these tasks have now been throughout the various types of ships, which col­ accomplished and we can view in clearer perspective lectively constituted a fleet considerably larger than the two major campaigns which led to victory. The ours was before the war began. The few ships that contrast between them is at once apparent. The war remained afloat were for the most part so heavily in Europe was primarily a ground and air war with damaged as to be of no military value. naval support, while the war in the Pacific was pri­ In striking contrast is the record of our ships. Al­ marily a naval war with ground and air support. though 2 old battleships were lost at Pearl Harbor, In the European war, sea power was an essential 8 new battleships have since joined the fleet. Against factor because of the necessity of transporting our 5 aircraft carriers and 6 escort carriers lost, we com­ entire military effort across the Atlantic and sup­ pleted 27 carriers and 110 escort carriers. While we porting it there. Without command of the sea, this lost 10 cruisers, 48 new cruisers have been commis­ could not have been done. Nevertheless, the sur­ sioned. We lost 52 submarines and built 203. The render of the land, sea and air forces of the German capacity of the United States to build warships, aux­ Reich on 8 May 1945 was the direct result of the iliary ships and merchant ships, while supporting our application of air power over land and the power of forces and our allies all over the world, exceeded the Allied ground forces. all former records and surpassed our most sanguine In the Pacific war, the power of our ground and hopes. It proved to be a vital component of that sea strategic air forces, like sea power in the Atlantic, power which Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz has was an essential factor. By contrast with Germany, well defined in the following words: however, Japan's armies were intact and undefeated "Sea power is not a limited term. It includes many weapons and many techniques. Sea power means more and her air forces only weakened when she 'sur­ than the combatant ships and aircraft, the amphibious rendered, but her navy had been destroyed and her forces and the merchant marine. It includes also the merchant fleet had been fatally crippled. Dependent port facilities of New York and California; the bases in Guam and in Kansas; the factories which are the upon imported food and raw materials and relying capital plant of war; and the farms which are the upon sea transport to supply her armies at home and producers of supplies. All these are elements of sea power. Futhermore, sea power is not limited to overseas, Japan lost the war because she lost com­ materials and equipment. It includes the functioning mand of the sea, and in doing so lost—to us—the organization which has directed its use in the war. island bases from which her factories and cities could In the Pacific we have been able to use our naval power effectively because we have been organized be destroyed by air. along sound lines. The present organization of our From the earliest days of the war our submarines, Navy Department has permitted decisions to be made effectively. It has allowed great flexibility. In each operating offensively in the farthest reaches of the operation we were able to apply our force at the time Pacific, exacted a heavy toll of Japanese shipping. and place where it would be most damaging to the At a conservative estimate, they sank, in addition to enemy." many combatant ships, nearly two thirds of the mer­ In the successful application of our sea power, a chant shipping which Japan lost during the war. prime factor has been the flexibility and balanced Our surface forces—fast task forces composed of character of our naval forces. In the Atlantic the aircraft carriers, fast battleships, cruisers, and de­ German Navy was virtually limited to the use of sub­ stroyers—carried the war to the enemy homeland marines, without surface and naval air support. In and destroyed impressive numbers of naval vessels the Pacific, Japanese sea power was hampered by and merchant ships. Our amphibious forces, operat­ army control, and Japanese naval officers lacked the ing initially behind air offensives and under air cover freedom of initiative so necessary to gain and exer­ launched from carriers, seized the island bases which cise command of the seas. On the other hand, while made possible the achievements of land-based aircraft ours was a vast fleet, it was also a highly flexible in cutting enemy lines of communications and in and well balanced fleet, in which ships, planes, am­ carrying devastation to the Japanese home islands. phibious forces and service forces in due proportion Thus our sea power separated the enemy from vital were available for unified action whenever and wher­ resources on the Asiatic mainland and in the islands ever called upon. m It is of interest to note, in connection with formu­ submarine officers, and by requiring non-aviators to lation of plans for the future strength of our Navy, familiarize themselves with aircraft operations—not that our fleet in World War II was not solely en­ a difficult matter, since not only carriers but also gaged in fighting enemy fleets. On numerous occa­ battleships and cruisers are equipped with aircraft. sions a large part of the fleet effort was devoted to Aviation is part of the ordinary daily life of the operations against land objectives. A striking ex­ officer at sea. ample is the capture of Okinawa. During the three Of course, it is not possible to effect rotation of months that this operation was in progress our Pa­ duties of all submarine and air officers during war. cific Fleet—the greatest naval force ever assembled As a matter of fact, this is true of duty in all classes in the history of the world—was engaged in a con­ of ships. It is necessary during wartime to train tinuous battle which for sustained intensity has never certain officers—especially the reserves—for one par­ been equaled in naval history; yet at this time the ticular type of duty and to keep them at it. How­ Japanese Navy had virtually ceased to exist—we were ever, the long periods of peace-time training, in fighting an island, not an enemy fleet. which an officer obtains the rounded experience to With the possible exception of amphibious war­ fit him for higher command, have been utilized in fare, which covers a field of considerably broader the past to give officers experience in varied duties scope, the outstanding development of the war in the and the practice will be continued in the future. The field of naval strategy and tactics has been the con­ wisdom of that system was proved during the war by vincing proof and general acceptance of the fact that, the efficiency of aircraft carriers, commanded by in accord with the basic concept of the United States qualified aviators who also were experienced in han­ Navy, a concept established some 25 years ago, naval dling ships, and, particularly, by the efficiency of aviation is and must always be an integral and pri­ the high combat commands of the Pacific Fleet. mary component of the fleet. Naval aviation has Many of the major units of the Pacific Fleet, com­ proved its worth not only in its basic purpose of de­ posed of carriers and vessels of all other types, were stroying hostile air and naval forces, but also in commanded by aviators. The strength of the Navy amphibious warfare involving attacks in support of lies in the complete integration of its submarine, landing operations, in reconnaissance over the sea surface and air elements. and in challenging and defeating hostile land-based The epic advance of our united forces across the planes over positions held in force by the enemy. In vast Pacific, westward from Hawaii and northward these fields our naval aviation has won both success from New Guinea, to the Philippines and to the and distinction. Because of its mobility and the shores of Japan, was spearheaded by naval aviation striking power and long range of its weapons, the and closely supported by the power of our fleets. In aircraft carrier has proved itself a major and vital these advances, some of the steps exceeded 2000 element of naval strength, whose only weakness—its miles and the assaulting troops often had to be trans­ vulnerability—demands the support of all other ported for much greater distances. The Navy moved types, and thereby places an additional premium on them over water, landed them and supported them in the flexibility and balance of our fleet. The balanced great force at the beaches, kept them supplied and, fleet is the effective fleet. particularly at Okinawa, furnished air cover during In a balanced fleet the several components must be weeks of the critical fighting ashore. welded together rather than simply coordinated. For The outstanding development of this war, in the example, submarines normally operate "on their field of joint undertakings, was the perfection of own" and hasty consideration might lead to the false amphibious operations, the most difficult of all op­ conclusion that it would be advantageous for sub­ erations in modern warfare. Our success in all such marines to constitute a separate independent service. operations, from Normandy to Okinawa, involved However, careful consideration will disclose the fal­ huge quantities of specialized equipment, exhaustive lacy inherent in reasoning from this premise. Ac­ study and planning, and thorough training as well tually, the commanding officer of a submarine, to as complete integration of all forces, under unified fight his ship most effectively, must be familiar with command. all phases of naval tactics and strategy. It is also Integration and unification characterized every essential that officers in surface ships understand the amphibious operation of the war and all were suc­ capabilities and limitations of submarines. This is cessful. Command was determined chiefly by applica­ accomplished in time of peace by requiring that sub­ tion of the principle of paramount capability. A marine officers alternate periods of submarine duty naval officer was in over-all command of an amphi­ with duty in vessels of other types. By this means, bious operation while troops were embarked and the point of view of the officer corps as a whole is until they had been landed and were firmly estab­ broadened and in the higher echelons of command lished in their first main objectives ashore. Beyond there are always included officers who have had sub­ that point, an officer of the ground forces was in marine experience. command and directed whatever naval support was Aviation, though a specialty, is much more closely considered necessary. interwoven with the rest of the fleet than is the sub­ Unity of command at the highest military level, in marine branch of the Navy. It is, in fact, impossible Washington, (as an extension of the principle of to imagine an efficient, modern fleet in which there unity of command) was never attempted nor, in fact, is not a complete welding of aviation and surface seriously considered. It is a matter of record that elements. This is accomplished by requiring aviators the strategic direction of the war, as conducted col­ to rotate in other duties in the same manner as do lectively by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was fully as [ 5]

Comparative Status of U.S. and Japanese Combatant Ships

NUMBER JAPAN OF SHIPS

BATTLESHIPS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS ESCORT CARRIERS HEAVY CRUISERS LIGHT GRUiSERS 40 Jan. 1944 30

20

10

0 s/ BATTLESHIPS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS ESCORT CARRIERS HEAVY CRUISERS LIGHT CRUISERS 80 15 Aug. 1945 70

60

50

40

BATTLESHIPS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS ESCORT CARRIERS HEAVt CRUISERS LIGHT CRUISERS

—Official U. S. Navy [6] successful as were the operations which they di­ a mixed Army-Navy organization which was en­ rected. The Joint Chiefs of Staff system proved its trusted to the command of Fleet Admiral Nimitz. worth. There is no over-all "paramount capability" A still different situation existed in the early days among the Joint Chiefs of Staff to warrant elevating of the war during the Solomon Islands campaign one of their members to a position of military com­ where Army and Navy became, of necessity, so thor­ mander of all the armed forces,—nor, in my opinion, oughly intermingled that they were, to all practical is there any known system or experience which can purposes, a single service directed by Admiral Wil­ be counted upon to produce the man qualified for liam F. Halsey, Jr. Under General of the Army such a position. This war has produced no such man Douglas MacArthur, Army, Army Aviation, and the —for the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will naval components of his command were separate show that the proposals, or the convictions of no entities tied together only at the top in the person one member were as sound, or as promising of suc­ of General MacArthur himself. In the Mediterra­ cess, as the united judgment and agreed decisions nean the scheme of command differed somewhat from of all of the members. all the others. In connection with the matter of command in the All these systems of command were successful field, there is perhaps a popular misconception that largely because each was placed in effect to meet a the Army and the Navy were intermingled in a stand­ specific condition imposed by the characteristics of ard form of joint operational organization in every the current situation in the theater of operations. I theater throughout the world. Actually, the situation emphasize this fact because it it important to realize was never the same in any two areas. For example, that there can be no hard and fast rule for setting up after General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower commands in the field. Neither is it possible to an­ had completed his landing in Normandy, his opera­ ticipate with accuracy the nature of coming wars. Methods adopted in one may require radical altera­ tion became purely a land campaign. The Navy was tion for the next, as was true of World Wars I and responsible for maintaining the line of communica­ II. It was fortunate that the War Department and tions across the ocean and for certain supply opera­ the Navy Department working together for many tions in the ports of Europe, and small naval groups years—definitely since World War I—before the war became part of the land army for certain special pur­ began, had correctly diagnosed what was likely to poses, such as the boat groups that helped in the occur and had instituted, not rigid rules, but a set of crossing of the Rhine. But the strategy and tactics principles for joint action in the field which proved of the great battles leading up to the surrender of sufficiently flexible to meet the varying conditions Germany were primarily army affairs and no naval that were encountered during the war. officer had anything directly to do with the command We now have before us the essential lessons of the of this land campaign. war. It is my earnest conviction that whatever else A different situation existed in the Pacific, where, may have been learned as to the most effective in the process of capturing small atolls, the fighting relationship of the ground, naval and air forces, was almost entirely within range of naval gunfire; the most definite and most important lesson is that that is to say, the whole operation of capturing an to attempt unity of command in Washington is atoll was amphibious in nature, with artillery and ill-advised in concept and would be impracticable air support primarily naval. This situation called for of realization.

II—Combat Operations: Pacific

The final phase of the Pacific naval war commenced THE CAPTURE OF IWO JIMA with the assault on Iwo Jima in February 1945, closely followed by that on Okinawa in April. These The strategic situation prior to the assault on Iwo two positions were inner defenses of Japan itself; Jima, the command organization for that operation their capture by United States forces meant that the and the forces involved, the landing on 19 February, heart of the Empire would from then on be exposed and the first ten days of ground fighting, have been to. the full fury of attack, not only by our carrier included in my previous report and will not be re­ aircraft but also by land-based planes, the latter in peated herein. As March opened, fierce ground fight­ a strength comparable to that which had wreaked ing on Iwo Jima was still in progress. The front line such devastation against the better protected and ran roughly parallel.to the short axis of the island, less vulnerable cities of Germany. After Okinawa the northeastern third of which was still held by the was in our hands, the Japanese were in a desperate enemy. Our right flank (4th Marine Division) ex­ situation, which could be alleviated only if they tended inland from the beach just beyond the East could strike a counterblow, either by damaging our Boat Basin and faced the enemy's skillfully prepared fleet or by driving us from our advanced island posi­ defense positions in steep and rough terrain, which tions. The inability of the Japanese to do either was made progress difficult; our left flank (5th Marine strong evidence of their increasing impotence and Division) rested on Hiraiwa Bay directly across the indicated that the end could not be long delayed. island; in the center the 3rd Marine Division had [ 7] pushed a salient along the central Motoyana Plateau the number which would have been lost at sea had to occupy Motoyama village and the nar end of Iwo Jima not been available for emergency landings. Airfield No. 3. By nightfall of 2 March tlis last air­ It is estimated that the lives saved through this lat­ field and the whole of the Motoyama tablland were ter factor alone, subsequent to the capture of Iwo under our control, leaving the enemy in possession Jima, exceeded the lives lost in the capture itself. of a diminishing horseshoe-shaped area frnging the This loss of life during the capture resulted in­ northeastern end of the island. evitably from the strength of Iwo Jima as a defen­ Airfield No. 1 had for some days beei in use by sive position and from the readiness of the enemy. light artillery spotting planes, but on March it Neither strategic nor tactical surprise was possible came into its own when a B-29, after a stike against in our landing since, with Luzon and the Marianas the Japanese mainland, made a succesful forced in our hands, the seizure of some point in the Nanpo landing at Iwo Jima. More of such landing followed Shoto chain was obviously our next move, and Iwo as the tempo of air strikes against Japan ws stepped Jima was by its location and the character of its up. On 6 March the first land-based figher planes terrain the most profitable objective. came in, made patrol flights the following day, and It had no extensive coast line to afford invading relieved carrier aircraft in close support if troops troops a choice of landing points where they would on the third day after arrival. Airfield ro. 2 was meet little opposition, either on the beaches or in operational on 16 March. subsequent deployments for advance against enemy Progress during the first week of March vas slow positions. Landing was feasible on only two beaches despite daily artillery preparation, supplemnted by of limited extent, and they were so situated that a naval gunfire and air strikes before each gDund at­ single defensive organization could oppose an as­ tack. On the night of 7-8 March the 4th Maine Divi­ sault against either separately or both simultane­ sion killed about 1000 enemy troops who hd organ­ ously. The Japanese were, therefore, well prepared ized a major infiltration. Subsequently the esistance to meet us. to our attacks diminished somewhat, and dring the The defensive organization of Iwo Jima was the next three days control was secured of all tb eastern most complete and effective yet encountered. The coastline to a distance of approximately 400 yards beaches were flanked by high terrain favorable to the south of Kitano Point at the northeastern ectremity defenders. Artillery, mortars, and rocket launchers of the island. On 16 March the northwest siore had were well concealed, yet could register on both been reached and Kitano Point isolated. Mich mop­ beaches—in fact, on any point on the island. Ob­ ping up remained to be done, particularly o a small servation was possible, both from Mount Suiribachi stubborn pocket of resistance in one of th rugged at the south end and from a number of commanding gulches running southwest to the beacfes from hills rising above the northern plateau. The rugged Kitano Point; but on 16 March all organize! resist­ volcanic crags, severe escarpments, and steep defiles ance was declared ended as of 1800, and the 4th sloping to the sea from all sides of the central Moto­ Marine Division started re-embarking. yama tableland afforded excellent natural cover and On 14 March the flag was raised official: and the concealment, and lent themselves readily to the con­ establishment of military government ras pro­ struction of subterranean positions to which the claimed. On 18 March the 5th Marine Dision re- Japanese are addicted. embarked. On 20 March the U. S. Arm>l47th In­ Knowing the superiority of the firepower that fantry Regiment of the garrison force arved. At would be brought against them by air, sea, and land, 0800 on 26 March, responsibility for the detxse and they had gone underground most effectively, while development of Iwo Jima passed to the garrisn force remaining ready to man their positions with mortars, and the Commander Forward Area, CentralPacific. machine guns, and other portable weapons the instant The capture of the island had taken 26 days i actual our troops started to attack. The defenders were combat; over 20,000 enemy troops were etroyed; dedicated to expending themselves—but expending and our casualties ashore, as reported on 1 March, skillfully and protractedly in order to exact the were 20,196, of whom 4,305 were killed in aeon. uttermost toll from the attackers. Small wonder then The diminutive size of Iwo Jima and its general that every step had to be won slowly by men inching barrenness, lack of natural facilities and reources forward with hand weapons, and at heavy costs. should lead no one either to minimize the imprtance There was no other way of doing it. of capturing it or to deprecate as unreasonale and The skill and gallantry of our Marines in this ex­ unnecessary our heavy losses in doing so. [t was ceptionally difficult enterprise was worthy of their important solely as an air base, but as such ts im­ best traditions and deserving of the highest com­ portance was great. Not only was the presure of mendation. This was equally true of the naval units air attack by our Marianas-based B-29's maerially acting in their support, especially those engaged at intensified by the availability of Iwo for ipping the hazardous beaches. American history offers no them off with fuel and for supplying tYin with finer example of courage, ardor and efficiency. fighter cover from there on, but also there \s an in­ As a whole the operation affords a striking illus­ crease in combat effectiveness of the B-29'due to tration of the inherently close relation between land, the heightened morale of personnel, heavr bomb sea and air power. The fleet with its ships and planes loads, and decrease in abortive flights. Thre was, delivered and supported the land forces. The Ma­ moreover, a substantial saving in valuable liftn the rines took an air base from which our land-based number of B-29's which would have been shodown planes could operate with effectiveness far beyond over Japan had there been no fighter cover, nd in that possible from our other bases in the rear. The [8] same general pattern marked our long progress all the late Vice Admiral W. A. Lee's Striking Force) ; the way across the vast central and western Pacific. the British Carrier Force, Vice Admiral H. B. Rawl- ings; the Logistic Supply Group (tankers and cargo ASSAULT ON OKINAWA AND ITS CAPTURE vessels which serviced the fleet under way close to Our capture of the Marianas and Philippines had the combat areas), Rear Admiral D. B. Beary; Service placed us on a strategic line some 1300 miles from Squadron Ten (the repair, surmly and service vessels the Japanese homeland and across its direct routes of all khds, based on Leyte Gulf, the Marianas, etc.), of communication to the south. The occupation of Commodore W. R. Carter; the Amphibious Support Iwo Jima had advanced this line to within 640 miles Force (comprising escort carriers, mine sweepers, of Tokyo at the eastern end. The next step directed underwater demolition teams, gun-boats, and the gun­ by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to secure a position nery ships assigned to bombardment missions), Rear in the Nansei Shoto chain, which extends in a shal­ Admiral W. H. P. Blandy; and the Gunfire and low loop from Kyushu, the southernmost of the main Covering Force (the battleships and other gunnery Japanese islands, down to Japanese held Formosa. vessels not with the fast carriers), Rear Admiral M. Okinawa, the largest and most populous island in L. Deyo. Numerous other participating task groups this chain, offered numerous sites for airfields from and units and their commanders are not mentioned which almost any type of plane could reach industrial herein. About 548,000 men of the Army, Navy, and Kyushu, only 350 miles distant, and attack the en­ Marine Corps took part, with 318 combatant vessels emy's communications to Korea, to the Chinese main­ and 1139 auxiliary vessels, exclusive of personnel land, and to the Indo-China and Singapore areas. landing craft of all types. Since Okinawa also contained several excellent naval The greater part of the intelligence information anchorages, it was chosen as the objective; the op­ required for the operation was obtained from photo­ erations against it followed immediately on those graphic coverage. Adequate small scale coverage for for the capture of Iwo Jima. mapping purposes was first obtained on 29 Septem­ From many standpoints the Okinawa operation was ber 1944 by B-29's of the XXI Bomber Command; the most difficult ever undertaken by our forces in the from then on until the conclusion of the operation, Pacific. It was defended by about 120,000 men (in­ additional photographing was done at frequent inter­ cluding native Okinawans serving with the combat vals by Army planes and planes of the Fast Carrier forces) with tanks and artillery. As possible rein­ Force. The prompt developing, printing, and inter­ forcements there were some 60,000 troops in various preting of these photos, and the early and wide dis­ other positions in the Nansei Shoto chain, plus much tribution of the prints and of the information gleaned larger forces in nearby Formosa, Kyushu, and the from them, was an important feature of the opera­ Shanghai area. Also of great importance was the tion. large native population, which afforded the enemy The island of Okinawa, which is about 65 miles an unlimited supply of labor, and which might easily long, is roughly divided into almost equal northern become a serious problem to us by clogging roads and southern parts. The northern area is generally and imposing a burden of relief. rugged, mountainous, wooded and undeveloped. The The most serious threat to us, however, lay in the southern area, which is generally rolling but fre­ very factor for which we had initiated the operation, quently broken by deep scarps and ravines, is the namely the short distance from Okinawa to the Jap­ developed part of the island, containing the greater anese homeland, where lay the main reserves of air number of towns, roads, and cultivated areas, the and naval power. Just as we would be able to strike capital city of Naha, all five of the island's airfields, Japan to better effect after securing Okinawa, the and the strongest defenses. Japanese could strike us while we were attacking The preferred plan called for our ground forces that island. Japan's naval strength had been so re­ to land on six miles of beach on the southwest shore, duced that it could not hope for success against our protected from the prevailing northeast trade winds own in a decisive action; but hit-and-run raids, or and closely bordering the island's Yontan and Ka- perhaps forlorn-hope, honor-saving attempts, were a dena airfields. Four divisions were to be landed possibility. Air attack, particularly of the suicide abreast on these beaches. With the two center divi­ variety, was the greatest menace, since the Japanese sions advancing directly across the island to the east airfields within easy range of Okinawa were too coast, and with the left and right flank divisions numerous to permit more than their partial and tem­ pivoting toward the north and south respectively, porary interdiction by our own air strikes against the Japanese forces in the southern part of the island them. Severe damage and losses, therefore, had to would be isolated by these maneuvers, and were then be expected and accepted as the price of our success. to be overcome by attack from the north. Coincident The operations for the capture of Okinawa were with the main troop attack, there was planned for under the command of Admiral R. A. Spruance, Com­ the southeast coast a demonstration, and an actual mander Fifth Fleet. Major forces participating un­ landing, if necessary. der him were: the Joint Expeditionary Force (all Planned operations preliminary to, and in support elements engaged directly in the landings), Vice of the main landings, included the following: the Admiral (now Admiral) R. K. Turner; the Expedi­ seizure of the islands of the Kerama Retto group, 20 tionary Troops (all ground forces engaged), the late miles to the southwest, in order to establish therein Lieutenant General S. B. Buckner, USA; the Fast a logistics supply and naval repair base and a sea­ Carrier Force, Vice Admiral M. A. Mitscher, (includ­ plane base; the seizure of the small island of Keise ing the battleships and other fire support vessels of Shima, about 20,000 yards from the landing beaches t 9]

-Official U. S. Navy [ io ]

—Official Coast Guard photo OKINAWA Two Japanese planes shot down while attacking invasion fleet and 11,000 yards from Naha city, and landing army floaters destroyed. The thoroughness of this task artillery there to command the lower end of Okin­ is evidenced by the safety with which bombardment awa; mine sweeping on a scale greater than in any and assault ships in great numbers closed the assault previous operation; the usual work by underwater beaches without significant loss from mines. demolition teams; and the intensive bombardments On L-minus-6 day the assault on Kerama Retto by air and naval forces. was commenced, and by L-minus-1, 31 March, these Cargo and troops were loaded and embarked on islands and also Keise Shima had been occupied the United States west coast, in the Hawaiian Islands, against minor resistance. Nets were immediately laid in the southwestern Pacific, the Marshalls, the Caro­ to protect the anchorages, and the seaplane base was lines, and Leyte. The various elements proceeded established. Tankers, ammunition ships and repair to assemble afloat at Ulithi, Guadalcanal, Saipan, and vessels were brought directly to this anchorage, Leyte. Following rehearsals the several forces de­ which assumed a progressively more important role parted for the objective in the more than 1200 ships as the principal haven for ships damaged by "kami­ of all kinds which the Joint Expeditionary Force kaze" attacks of suicide planes. contained. Movement of all forces to the objective Since L-minus-7, 25 March, Okinawa itself had was carried out without enemy interference. Opera­ been under intermittent bombing and gunfire, and tional breakdowns enroute were insignificant, a fact on L-day, 1 April, preceded by intense naval and air which speaks well for the efficiency of our material bombardment, the Tenth Army landed according to and our personnel in operation, maintenance, and schedule over the Hagushi beaches on Okinawa repair. An indispensable element in the campaign as against light enemy resistance. The assault waves, a whole was the covering operations of the Fast Car­ embarked in amphibious vehicles, hit the beach at rier Force, which are given in some detail in the next 0830, moved rapidly inland, and by 1230 had captured section of this report. both Yontan and Kadena airfields with light losses. The mine sweepers were in the van, and on L- Prior to dark the Tenth Army, with approximately minus-8 day, 24 March, commenced sweeping under 50,000 troops ashore, had gained a beachhead 4000 to cover of gunfire from battleships of the Fast Carrier 5000 yards in depth. Proceeding rapidly against Force, and continued this work up to L-day, 1 April. initially weak resistance, our troops crossed the There were 75 sweepers; and the entire coastal per­ island to the east shore, and on 4 April the Yontan- imeter of southern Okinawa was cleared of mines Kadena segment of the island was in our hands. during this pre-assault phase, in addition to the The Japanese had made no serious attempt to stop sweeping necessary for the capture of Kerama Retto us at the beaches where we had landed; as the and le Shima. Including re-sweeping, over 3000 attack progressed from day to day, it was evident square miles were swept and declared safe prior to that they had withdrawn most of their forces into L-day. Some 177 mines were swept and about 80 the southernmost part of the island, and had estab- [ 11]

lished their defenses in depth on terrain admirably of naval vessels damaged or sunk at the scene of suited for defense and delaying action tactics. The operations by air attack, mainly of the suicide vari­ enemy defenses consisted of blockhouses, pillboxes, ety. Having been experienced in previous operations, and caves, protected by double apron barbed wire this form of attack was not new, but the shorter and minefields. Here the enemy used his artillery distance from numerous air bases in Japan, and the unstintingly, and his defensive tactics were described desperate situation which would threaten the Japa­ as "artful and fantastic." nese if our assault on Okinawa were successful, In the north progress was rapid against scattered stimulated them to their greatest and most fanatical opposition; on 22 April all organized resistance in effort. the northern two thirds of the island had ceased, The time element was closely connected with the though patrolling and mopping up continued. In extent of our ship losses. By its very nature an the south our advance was stubbornly contested. amphibious invasion implies advancing a huge num­ From 4 April to 26 May our lines had advanced only ber of vessels, both combatant and noncombatant, about four miles, and it took from 26 May to 21 from a zone dominated by one's own land-based air June to cover the remaining ten miles to the forces into one hitherto dominated by the enemy's. southern tip of the island. On 21 June, after eighty- Our vessels are localized by the landing so that the two days of bitter fighting, organized resistance was enemy has not the problem of finding them, but only declared to have ended, although mopping up of two of hitting them. Thus exposed, their protection de­ small enemy pockets remained to be done. pends wholly on their own antiaircraft fire, smoke, On 18 June, while observing the attack of the and on cover from our own carrier-based air forces, Marine 8th Regimental Combat Team, Lieutenant which are to that extent diverted from offensive General Buckner, Commanding General of the Tenth missions. This precarious situation for shipping con­ Army and the Ryukyus Forces, was instantly killed tinues until progress ashore at the objective results by a shell burst. Command of the ground forces was th relief: first, by the establishment of our own air then assumed by Major General Roy S. Geiger, forces, air facilities, antiaircraft radars, and fighter- USMC, until after the capture of the island, when directors ashore in strength sufficient to dominate the he was relieved by General Joseph W. Stillwell, area; secondly, and more important, by releasing most USA, on 23 June. of the shipping so that there are fewer vulnerable The general pattern of the operation for the cap­ targets presented to an enemy that gets through. ture of Okinawa was similar to those for the capture The longer this relief is delayed by the continuance of Iwo Jima, the Marianas, the Marshalls, etc.; it of ground fighting, the higher our shipping casualties differed mainly in the. size of the air, naval, and mount. The longer the Navy must remain in support ground forces employed, the length of time required of assault troop operations, the more vulnerable it to secure it after the initial landing, and the number is to attack, and the higher is the proportion of

—Official U.S. Navy photo OKINAWA Japanese bomber crashes into sea after unsuccessful attack on fast carrier task force [12]

personnel and ship casualties. Slow progress on the On 24 March, under the command of Vice Ad­ ground is directly reflected, therefore, in naval losses. miral Lee, battleships of the task force bombarded The first enemy air attack at Okinawa occurred the southeastern coast of Okinawa. This was part of on 24 March when the mine sweepers arrived; the a diversionary move to cover up the actual location first damage was done on 26 March; and by 21 June, of our landing beaches; apparently the ruse was when organized resistance had ceased, about 250 successful. vessels of all classes, from battleships and carriers When the invasion of Okinawa began on 1 April, down to destroyers and landing ships, had been hit planes from the fast carriers began a series of almost by air attack, by far the greatest proportion of them continuous strikes and combat air patrols in direct in suicide crashes. Some 34 destroyers or smaller support of the operation. For a few days enemy air craft were sunk. Early warning of impending attacks opposition was almost nonexistent, but on 6 April proved to be the best countermeasure and for this the Japanese finally struck with fury against our purpose destroyers and other small vessels were ground and supporting forces. All units of the stationed as pickets at appropriate distances from carrier force performed admirably during the day's the concentrations of heavier shipping. These pickets attack, knocking down 248 planes, while losing only 2. took the heaviest losses themselves, but in so doing The carrier task force then proceeded northward, they undoubtedly saved many bigger and more valu­ and on 7 April attacked strong Japanese fleet units able vessels during a critical three months. which had been located in the East China Sea off Kyushu. Heavy weather handicapped our airmen, FAST CARRIER FORCE OPERATIONS IN but in spite of this they sank the battleship YAM- SUPPORT OF OKINAWA INVASION ATO, the cruiser YAHAGI, and 4 destroyers. Fires were started on 2 other destroyers, and only 3 de­ After the supporting operations for the Iwo Jima stroyers in the entire force escaped without damage. campaign were completed, Vice Admiral Mitscher While our planes were otherwise occupied in proceeded with his fast carrier task force in support striking the YAMATO and those ships, the enemy of the forthcoming Okinawa campaign. First he went resumed the heavy assaults of the previous day toward the Nansei Shoto in order to obtain photo­ against the carrier force. Combat air patrols de­ graphic coverage of that area. Planes were launched stroyed 15 planes over the force, and ships' gunfire on 1 March, and excellent photo reconnaissance was knocked down 3 more. One suicide plane penetrated obtained for use in planning the Okinawa campaign. the antiaircraft fire, however, and dropped a bomb While in this area, cruisers of the force bombarded on the carrier HANCOCK; it then crashed on her Okino-Daito-Shima on 2 March, starting numerous flight deck, killing 28 men, and badly damaging the fires and providing valuable training for the ships carrier. participating. The force then proceeded to Ulithi On 11 April the enemy resumed the air attacks on for a ten-day period of regrouping and logistic re­ the fast carrier task force. The number of Japanese plenishment. planes participating was not large, but their pilots On 14 March the task force departed from Ulithi were determined to destroy themselves by diving and proceeded toward Japan to carry out its part their planes directly on the chosen target. Fortu­ in the invasion of Okinawa. On 18-19 March, from a nately there were no direct hits, but 8 near misses position 100 miles southeast of Kyushu, air strikes caused some damage. During the day our carrier- were launched against airfields on that island in order based planes shot down 17 of these suicide planes, to eliminate future air-borne resistance to our Oki­ and ships' guifire destroyed 12 more, but they still nawa invasion forces. Fleet units at Kure and Kobe constituted a serious threat to our forces. were also attacked with considerable success. The next day the enemy shifted the weight of his On the morning of the 19th the carrier FRANK­ suicide attacks to the ships anchored at Okinawa, LIN was badly damaged by fires started when she and the combat air patrols from both fast and escort was hit by two bombs from an enemy plane. Out­ carriers had little difficulty in shooting down 151 standing rescue operations saved 850 men from the enemy planes over the islands. water, but the dead and missing totalled 772. On 15 April the carriers launched a surprise attack During that afternoon the task force retired south­ against southern Kyushu airfields, destroying 51 ward, launching additional sweeps against enemy enemy planes on the ground and setting numerous airfields to forestall an organized attack on the slowly ground installations afire. The Japanese managed to moving damaged ships and escorts. On 21 March 48 launch some planes in opposition, and 29 of these enemy planes were intercepted 60 miles from the were shot down before our aircraft returned to the force by 24 carrier-based planes. In the ensuing carriers. battle all the Japanese planes were shot down with Fighter sweeps were again launched against Kyu­ a loss of only two of our fighters. shu on 16 April in an effort to break up an obvious In a four-day period Vice Admiral Mitscher's major enemy air attack. They shot down 17 air­ forces destroyed 528 enemy planes, damaged 16 borne planes and destroyed 54 on the ground. In spite enemy surface craft, and either destroyed or damaged of this success, however, the enemy launched heavy scores of hangars, factories, and warehouses. Our air attacks during the day against our Okinawa forces own plane losses were 116. As a result of this opera­ and the fast carrier task force. All ground support tion, the enemy was unable to mount any strong air was cancelled, and every effort was concentrated attack against our forces on Okinawa for a week after on a successful defense of the task force. The final the initial landings. score for the day was 210 enemy aircraft shot down, [ 13]

against a loss of 9 of our planes. Heavy damage was the ships of the task force. Of these 6 were shot caused to the carrier INTREPID when a suicide down by ships' gunfire and 19 by combat air patrol; plane crashed on her flight deck at the height of the the remaining plane was destroyed in a damaging battle. suicide crash on ENTERPRISE. On 19 April Vice Admiral Lee commanded a divi­ On 24 May the fast carriers launched a clean-up sion of fast battleships in the bombardment of the sweep by 98 planes against airfields in southern southeastern coast of Okinawa. This action coin­ Kyushu. Except on Kanoya airfields little activity cided with the beginning of the Tenth Army's all- was found, and it was evident that the previous out offensive. The bombardment not only destroyed strikes against this area had been very effective. important military installations, but it assisted in The score for the day was 84 enemy planes destroyed, making a feint landing at that point appear authentic. while our losses were confined to 3 planes -lost to On 29 April suicide planes again attacked the task antiaircraft fire off Kanoya. force in strength, hitting and badly damaging two On 28 May the late Vice Admiral J. S. McCain destroyers. The enemy paid for them, however, with relieved Vice Admiral Mitscher as commander of 25 aircraft knocked out of the air by planes and guns the fast carrier task forces. of the task force. On 2-3 June further long-range sweeps were After several days of relative calm, enemy aircraft launched against Kyushu, but bad weather impaired returned in large numbers on 4 May to attack our their effectiveness. Only 30 enemy planes were land and amphibious forces in the Okinawa area. destroyed, while our losses were 16. By 4 June the

1—Official U.S. Navy photo OKINAWA Carrier INTREPID hit by a Japanese suicide plane on 16 April 1945

This attack was apparently part of a counter-landing bad weather had developed into a typhoon, and the operation to aid their own ground forces. The fast ships of the task force spent the next 24 hours in carrier task force was not attacked, however, and its attempting to avoid the storm's center. Serious fighters were free to defend the Okinawa area, shoot­ damage to 3 cruisers, 2 carriers, and 1 destroyer re­ ing down 98 enemy aircraft, while losing only 5 sulted. planes. Operations were resumed on 8 June when a final On 11 May another major air battle was fought attack was made on southern Kyushu. It was well over Okinawa and the ships of the task force. Carrier- executed, but previous raids had so reduced Japanese based planes shot down 69 enemy aircraft, ships' air strength in this area that only 29 planes could be gunfire accounted for 3 more, while 2 were destroyed destroyed. Only 4 of our carrier planes were lost. in suicide dives on the carrier BUNKER HILL. On 8 and 9 June cruisers and battleships from Vice This ship was badly damaged, and 373 of her person­ Admiral McCain's task force bombarded Okino Daito nel were killed, with 19 missing. and Minami Daito to the east of Okinawa. These at­ The fast Carriers moved northward on 12 May tacks terminated the supporting action of the fast and launched additional air strikes against Kyushu carrier task force, and on 10 June course was set for airfields on 13-14 May. Few planes were found and Leyte Gulf, where they anchored on 13 June for a virtually no air opposition was encountered over the period of replenishment and repair. fields. On the morning of the 14th, however, the For a period of nearly three months, the fast car­ enemy managed to launch a force'of 26 planes against riers and their escorts had operated in and near the [ M] Okinawa area, giving invaluable support to our 12 March. Possession of these islands afforded pro­ occupation forces. During this time the task force tection to our shipping through San Bernardino had destroyed 2336 enemy planes, while losing 557 Strait and obviated the need for the roundabout of its own aircraft. In addition, widespread damage route through Surigao Strait which was still subject had been inflicted upon shore installations in Japan, to air attacks from the Visayas. the Nansei Shoto, and upon important units of the The campaign to complete the reoccupation of the Japanese fleet. This remarkable record detracted Philippines resolved itself naturally into a series of considerably from the ability of the enemy to oppose amphibious landings to seize control of coastal cities our landing forces on Okinawa, thereby contributing and other strongly held Japanese positions. In March notably to our final success. three such larding were made by forces of Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet. British Carrier Operations The first of these landings was made on 10 March at Zamboanga, at the southwest tip of Mindanao, in A fast British carrier task force, under the com­ order to obtain control of the passage from the mand of Vice Admiral Rawlings, was assigned to Sulu to the Celebes Sea, secure naval and air facili­ Admiral Spruance's Fifth Fleet to assist in the air ties with which to compress the Japanese remaining support operations for the Okinawa assault. From in the central Philippines, and provide a further 26 March to 20 April, and again from 4 May to 25 steppingstone down the Sulu Archipelago for future May, planes from this force rendered valuable service operations towards Borneo. The attack group was in neutralizing the enemy air installations on Saki- under command of the late Rear Admiral F. B. Royal. shima Gunto, southwest of Okinawa. Carriers of the Light cruisers and destroyers bombarded enemy force were subjected to frequent attacks by suicide positions thee for two days while mine sweepers planes, but none of them was put out of action. made sure th approaches were clear. On 10 March Battleships and cruisers of the force bombarded the 41st Divrion was put ashore under moderate Miyako Jima on 4 May with satisfactory results. enemy artillery and mortar fire. The troops quickly overran Zamboanga City and the two airfields nearby, JOINT OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES driving the Japanese back into the hills. A further AND BORNEO landing was made on Basilan Island on 16 March without enemy opposition. The situation in the Philippines on 1 March 1945 On 18 March a similar assault force landed at found United States forces controlling all of Leyte Iloilo on the island of Panay. To clear this island and Mindoro, most of Samar except a small area in and establish radar and air facilities as well as motor the north, the central part of Luzon from Lingayen torpedo boat bases, the 40th Division was staged Gulf to Manila and certain areas to the south. Iso­ from Lingayen Gulf. Only token opposition to the lated resistance was still encountered within a few landings was offered, and naval gunfire preparation buildings in Manila and islands in the bay. Guerillas was withheld to save the lives of natives. The assault controlled substantial areas of the Visayan Islands group was commanded by Rear Admiral A. D. Struble. and Mindanao. Landings had been made on 28 Feb­ Iloilo City was secured on the 20th; the docks and ruary at Puerto Princesa on the east coast of Palawan harbor area were found practically undamaged. Sub­ with practically no opposition. Control was quickly sequent minor operations had by the end of March extended over adjacent territory, providing airfields virtually cleared Panay and nearby smaller islands. from which enemy sea traffic in waters to the west­ Troops of the Americal Division were used for the ward and southward could be observed and attacked. landing at Cebu on 26 March. Captain A. T. Sprague, Japanese concentrations still existed in many key Jr., commanded the attack group, which was sup­ cities of the Philippines and along certain of the ported by a covering group of cruisers and destroyers routes which our ships had to travel to bring up under the command of Rear Admiral R. S. Berkey. vitally needed supplies and munitions. In addition, Although the beaches were well organized for de­ though their general air strength in the area had fense, the enemy positions there were found aban­ greatly diminished, the Japanese still controlled a doned. Cebu City was captured on the next day, number of airfields which permitted harassing but considerable opposition to the advance of the attacks. troops inland developed, requiring extensive ground A series of operations was undertaken to gain con­ operations to clear the island. trol of the important straits leading into central On 17 April, after naval bombardment and air Philippine waters in order to cut off enemy reinforce­ strikes, the X Corps with two divisions landed at ments and to set the stage for the ultimate reduction Malabang (on Moro Gulf in southern Mindanao) and of remaining Japanese strongholds in the Philippines. moved overland toward Davao Gulf against light The capture of Palawan provided an effective barrier opposition. Rear Admiral A. G. Noble commanded on the west and gave us a base for naval and air the naval task group and Rear Admiral R. S. Riggs operations which controlled the Balabac Strait en­ the cruiser force which covered the landing. Coto- trance from the South China Sea to the Sulu Sea. bato and its airfield were secured on the next day. A At the same time we secured the most direct sea lane novel feature of this campaign was the successful to Manila with an amphibious assault on Lubang use of light landing craft on rivers leading inland. Island, controlling the Verde Island Passage just Davao Gulf was reached late in April and Davao City south of the capital. The islands of Burias and Ticao was captured on 4 May, followed by further extension were seized on 4 March and Romblon and Simara on of control along the shores of the Gulf. In the mean- [15] time, troops also advanced northward and effected a date air strikes neutralized enemy airfields and har­ junction on 23 May with a regimental combat team assed troop movements and shipping in Borneo, with which had been landed at Macajalar on the north emphasis on Brunei Bay targets the last three days. coast on 9 May. These operations effectively sealed Mine sweeping began on 7 June under the protection off enemy garrisons in the interior of the island of Rear Admiral Berkey's covering force of cruisers where they could be mopped up at leisure. and destroyers. The mine sweeper SALUTE struck The landing at Malabang was the last large am­ a mine and sank with many casualties. phibious assault necessary for the reoccupation of Beginning on 9 June a distant covering group of the Philippines, but a number of minor landings on cruisers and destroyers under Rear Admiral Riggs the small islands were required in order to eliminate patrolled 50 miles west of Brunei Bay to prevent their garrisons. The most important of these were: enemy surface interference. the crossing of a regimental combat team from Iloilo The attack group commander was again Rear Ad­ to Pulupandan Point on northern Negros on 29 miral Royal. On 10 June, after an hour of heavy March, to assist in clearing that island of the enemy; bombardment which caused the enemy to retreat from the landing of another at Legaspi, Luzon, on 1 April the beaches, the assault waves landed without op­ to facilitate the clearing of the Bicol Peninsula; and position and moved inland against slight resistance. landings by a third such unit at Sanga Sanga in the When the landings had been successfully executed Tawi Tawi group on 2 April and at Jolo on 8 April. and one of the two Japanese cruisers in the area had Such landings were generally supported by naval gunfire, as well as by air strikes. Landings were also made at Masbate on 3 April; on Busuanga Island, lying between Mindoro and Palawan, on 9 April; and at Tagbiliran, Bohol Island, on 11 April. Bohol was the only major island in the Philippines on which we had not yet established a firm hold. From this time until the close of hostilities, most naval operations in the Philippines involved small groups transport­ ing and covering American troops and guerrillas in shore-to-shore movements. The major units of the Seventh Fleet were occupied with the invasion of Borneo to the south. The operations against Borneo, which began in May, were designed to deny the enemy the fruits of his conquests in the Netherlands East Indies and his use of the approaches to those areas. These included the capture of Tarakan to obtain its petroleum re­ sources and to provide an airfield for support of the Balikpapan operation; the seizure of Brunei Bay to establish an advance fleet base and protect resources in that area; and the occupation of Balikpapan to —Official U.S. Navy photo establish naval air and logistic facilities and to con­ serve petroleum installations there. Vice Admiral BORNEO OPERATIONS D. E. Barbey was designated the commander of the Australian troops landing from LST 560 Borneo attack force. at Brunei Bay, 10 June 1945 The first Borneo operation was directed against the island of Tarakan, approximately 185 miles south­ west of Tawi Tawi, to overcome some 3000 Japanese been sunk off the Malay coast by a British submarine, that were estimated to be on the island, and to de­ the distant cover group was withdrawn on 11 June. velop facilities for future operations. Australian and Throughout the operation motor torpedo boats ren­ American cruisers and destroyers began shelling the dered valuable assistance strafing shore targets and island on 27 April and continued through 1 May. At patrolling the area. One hundred twenty miles to the same time the mine-sweeping group cleared the the south at Miri-Lutong a supplementary landing necessary approaches. Numerous neutralizing air was made by combined forces after a week of mine raids had been made on airfields in the area. On 1 May sweeping in which 458 mines were swept. the attack group under Rear Admiral Royal moved The operations against Balikpapan were carried in. Units of the 9th Australian Division were landed out under Rear Admiral Noble as commander of the on schedule with only small arms opposition. attack group, and Rear Admiral Riggs as commander In the second Borneo operation the 9th Australian of the cruiser covering group. In preparation for the Division, reinforced, was transported from Morotai attack heavy air strikes had been made for a month to the Brunei Bay area of northern Borneo. Three using the Army, Navy and Australian air forces with separate landings were made at Labuan Island and as many as 100 sorties a day. The target date was set on the mainland at Bintang and Cape Polompong. for 1 July. Sixteen days prior to this, mine sweeping Air support was furnished by the United States and underwater demolition activities began with Thirteenth Air Force and the Australian First Tac­ covering fire from cruisers and destroyers. This was tical Air Force. For ten days preceding the target met with intense reaction from enemy coastal guns. [ 16]

—Official U.S. Navy photo BORNEO OPERATIONS Rockets fired by LCI(R) 338 preparatory to landings at Balikpapan, 1 July 1945

Three mine sweepers were damaged by enemy fire fire support was rendered by cruisers both day and and three were sunk and one damaged by ex­ night. This support continued through 7 July. A ploding mines. There was some doubt as to whether further landing at Cape Penajam was made without the target date could be met, but finally on 24 casualties on 5 July. There was no surface or sub­ June destroyers were able to get close enough in­ surface interference with the attacking forces, and shore to smother the enemy guns before the land­ only four light harassing attacks were made by ing. An escort carrier group under the late Rear enemy planes with no damage to our ships or per­ Admiral W. D. Sample provided day and night sonnel. air cover, since land planes were based too far dis­ While the period co/ered by this report witnessed tant to assure their presence in the case of bad no single naval operatm of the size and scope of the weather. Leyte or Lingayen ladings, the numerous amphibi­ The attack force consisted of the largest number ous operations in whia the Seventh Fleet partici­ of ships used in the Southwest Pacific area since pated contributed mateally to the consolidation of the Lingayen landings. In the cover and carrier our positions in the hilippines and the wresting groups were 9 cruisers (including 2 Australian and of vital resources from he enemy in Borneo. 1 Dutch), 3 escort carriers and destroyer escorts. These numerous anphibious landings were con­ The attack group was of comparable scale. After ducted on short notic and in many instances were an intense two-hour bombardment on 1 July, the as­ so closely spaced tht for all practical purposes sault waves moved ashore. In spite of enemy artillery, they were concurrent perations. Their successful mortar and small arms fire, seventeen assault waves completion on schedule reflects great credit on the landed without a single casualty. Stiffening resist­ commanders responsible for their planning and exe­ ance was met as the troops progressed inland and cution. In addition to the landing operations, unre- [ 17] mitting and constantly mounting pressure was shu, when 5 railroad ferries were sunk and 4 others maintained on the enemy by Seventh Fleet sub­ damaged. Again, little air opposition was encoun­ marines, aircraft, and motor torpedo boats, which by tered by our planes. Simultaneously with these air June had brought to a virtual standstill all enemy strikes heavy units of the force shelled Kamaishi sea-borne and coastal transport in the Southwest and Muroran, causing damage to the steel mills and Pacific area. oil installations in those cities. Of equal importance with the offensive operations On 17 July the Third Fleet moved south and mentioned above were the large movements of men was joined by units of the British Pacific Fleet under and supplies into the Philippines, and the exten­ the command of Vice Admiral Rawlings. Admiral sive redeployment of men and equipment within the Halsey was in over-all command and, on that day, area in preparation for the staging of the projected ordered the first combined American-British bom­ landings on the Japanese home islands. The control bardment of the Japanese homeland. Battleships and protection of the large number of ships employed fired 2000 tons of shells into the coastal area north­ for this task were successfully accomplished without east of Tokyo and encountered no enemy opposition loss from enemy action, although a considerable during the operation. strain was placed on the available facilities and On the following day American and British car­ forces. rier-based planes struck at enemy fleet units concealed With the cessation of hostilities, the Commander at the Yokosuka naval base in Tokyo Bay. The Seventh Fleet was relieved of all responsibilities as NAGATO, one of two remaining Japanese battle­ senior naval officer in the Southwest Pacific area and ships, was badly damaged. Numerous shore installa­ with a reconstituted Seventh Fleet assigned the tasks tions and transportation facilities were also hit. of occupying and controlling the waters of the On 24 and 25 July the combined British and Yellow Sea, Gulf of Pohai, the coastal waters of American naval forces launched extensive air strikes China south to twenty degrees north and the navi­ against targets in the Inland Sea area. The planes gable portion of the Yangtze River; the landing concentrated on the major fleet units still afloat at and establishing of United States Army troops in the Kure naval base. Six major ships were badly Korea, and United States Marines in North China; damaged and, in all, 22 naval units totalling 258,000 the evacuation of ex-prisoners of war and internees; tons were either sunk or put out of action, sounding the support of operations of United States forces the death knell of Japanese sea power. Intensive in the China Theater; the clearance of mine fields antiaircraft fire was met, and for the first time the and opening of ports in the Seventh Fleet area; and enemy mounted aggressive, air-borne opposition. A the routing and protection of friendly shipping. The total of 113 enemy aircraft were destroyed during planning for and execution of these tasks in the the two-day attack, while only 12 British and Ameri­ initial stages were necessarily accomplished in great can planes were lost. haste and with certain improvisation. However, the A follow-up attack was made on Kure and the new organization has been perfected rapidly with Inland Sea area by the carrier-based planes on 28 attendant uniformly satisfactory progress. July. Reconnaissance indicated that the enemy fleet units had been effectively reduced by the previous FAST CARRIER FORCE PRE-INVASION strikes, but additional bombs were dropped for good OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN measure. Extensive damage was also done to mer­ chant shipping and to vital shore installations, par­ After nearly three weeks of replenishment in ticularly railroad facilities. Strong air opposition Leyte Gulf, subsequent to their support of the Oki­ was encountered once more, but our aircraft knocked nawa operation, the fast carrier forces of Admiral down 21 Japanese planes air-borne and destroyed 123 Halsey's Third Fleet, comprising the greatest mass on the ground for a total of 144 for the day, while of sea power ever assembled, proceeded northward our forces lost 36. on 1 July toward Japan. This huge armada was On 30 July the Tokyo area was harassed for the to complete the destruction of the Japanese fleet, third time in three weeks by aircraft from the fast conduct a pre-invasion campaign of destruction carriers, our airmen destroying 121 enemy planes against every industry and resource contributing to during the day, and inflicting severe damage on Japan's ability to wage war, and maintain maximum lighter enemy fleet units found in the region. Mean­ pressure on the Japanese in order to lower their will while, the fast battleships were shelling the port of to fight. Hamamatsu on the east coast of central Honshu, On 10 July the force arrived in the launching area, spreading havoc in that area. 170 miles southeast of Tokyo. On that day strikes For the first eight days of August the harassed were made against airfields and industrial plants in Japanese homeland was given a temporary respite the Tokyo area; 72 planes were destroyed on the while Admiral Halsey's fleet was riding out a heavy ground and extensive damage inflicted on other tar­ typhoon. On 9 and 10 August, however, the offensive gets. No attempt was made to conceal the location was renewed with another air attack on northern of the fleet but, in spite of this, little enemy air Honshu. It was known that the enemy had with­ opposition was encountered. drawn a large part of his air force to fields in this Admiral Halsey then moved north to attack north­ area, and the strikes were designed to destroy as ern Honshu and southern Hokkaido on 14-15 July. many of them as possible. The plan was partially Aerial strikes dealt a severe blow to critical water successful, for during the two days 397 enemy planes transportation facilities between Hokkaido and Hon­ were destroyed and 320 others damaged. Almost no C 18]

EAST CHINA SEA

% HAHA JKU

-Official U. S. Navy [ 19] air-borne opposition was encountered, and all but detect any increase in enemy installations. Light 10 of the destroyed planes were caught on the ground. naval task forces, usually consisting of 3 of the The British and Americans lost only 34 planes. older cruisers and from 5 to 7 destroyers, bombarded While these air strikes were in progress, battleships coastal positions in the Kuriles once in March, once from the Third Fleet bombarded the coastal city in May, twice in June, and once in July, and even of Kamaishjyfor a second time, inflicting further penetrated the Okhotsk Sea in search of enemy ship­ heavy damage on the steel mills in the area. ping. On 11-12 August cruisers and destroyers com­ Admiral Halsey's final blow was delivered against manded by Rear Admiral J. H. Brown, Jr., combining Tokyo on 13 August. Airfields and other military a high-speed antishipping sweep on both sides of installations were the primary targets, with 46 planes the central and northern Kuriles with bombardments being destroyed on the ground. The Japanese tried to of enemy shore installations, intercepted two enemy get through to the surface ships, but 21 planes were convoys and destroyed 10 trawlers and a subchaser. shot down in the futile attempt. The strong protective screen around the fleet was too much for the fading enemy air strength. Land-Based Air Forces On 15 August the order of Fleet Admiral Nimitz to "cease fire" was received too late to stop the With the exception of the B-29's of the Twentieth first of the day's air strikes planned for Tokyo. Air Force, the principal missions of land-based air It knocked 30 enemy planes out of the air and forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas were support of destroyed 10 more on the ground. The second strike the Iwo Jima and Okinawa operations, attacks on had also been launched, but it was recalled in time; Japanese shipping, and continued neutralization of its pilots were ordered to jettison their bombs and by-passed enemy bases. return to their carriers. During the period of this report, the greatest ex­ Since 10 July the forces under Admiral Halsey's pansion of land-based air forces took place in the command had destroyed or damaged 2804 enemy Army's Twentieth Air Force. Airfields in the Mari­ planes, sunk or damaged 148 Japanese combat ships, anas were constantly increased to accommodate great­ sunk or damaged 1598 enemy merchant ships, de­ er numbers of B-29's. When Iwo Jima became avail­ stroyed 195 locomotives, and damaged 109 more. In able for emergency landings, greater bomb loads were addition, heavy blows had been struck at industrial carried safely, and fighter support became possible. targets and war industries, effectively supplement­ From that time until the end of hostilities, strategic ing the bombing by B-29's. This impressive record bombing against vital Japanese industries and cities speaks for itself and helps to explain the sudden was constantly stepped up, coordinating with bomb­ collapse of Japan's will to resist. Naval air power, ing by fleet planes, and many thousands of mines acting in close conjunction with naval surface power were dropped in Japan's harbors and sea lanes. De­ and Army bombers, had beaten enemy land-based struction resulting from these raids, and the final air power besides inflicting critical losses on naval blows dealt with two powerful atomic bombs, un­ ships and seriously damaging many shore targets. doubtedly were a major factor in forcing Japanese capitulation. Of less spectacular nature, yet also important in CONTRIBUTORY OPERATIONS their effect on the war, were the operations of other land-based air forces against enemy shipping and Although somewhat obscured by the more spec­ by-passed islands in the Pacific. With the capture tacular amphibious assaults and carrier force opera­ and development of airfields on Okinawa, Army and tions which marked our major advances toward the Marine Corps bombers and fighters of the Tactical Japanese homeland, there were many other vital Air Force and Fleet Air Wings One and Eighteen and necessary activities which by their nature had were brought within easy range of the China coast, more the form of a continuous pressure than of Korea, Shikoku, Kyushu, and even Honshu, and were major individual operations against the enemy. Out­ enabled to bring Japanese shipping in these waters standing parts were played by the submarines (whose to a virtual standstill. Okinawa, as did Iwo Jima, achievements are summarized in a later chapter), by returned rich dividends for the investment involved the land-based air forces, and, to a lesser extent, by in its capture by hastening the war's end. the Northern Pacific forces. Support of the Iwo Jima and Okinawa campaigns, routine searches, and constant neutralizing attacks Northern Pacific Forces against the many islands of the Pacific still in the hands of enemy garrisons, were tasks which absorbed Although usually hampered by foul weather, which much of the time and effort of Army, Navy, and ran the gamut of fogs, rain, gales, snow, and floating Marine land-based aviators throughout the Pacific, ice fields, naval and air forces of the Northern and were well coordinated with the air operations Pacific continued to exert pressure against the Japa­ of the fast carrier task forces in the advance toward nese-held northern Kurile Islands, posing a constant Japan. threat to the enemy's northern flank. The last night of the war saw the first and only Army and Navy aircraft flew such searches as offensive mission carried out from Okinawa against weather permitted, bombed and rocketed Japanese Japan by the B-29's of the recently deployed Eighth shipping and bases in the Kuriles several times each Air Force, with their target the industrial city of month, and maintained photographic coverage to Kumagaya in northern Honshu. [ 20]

Antisubmarine Warfare in the Pacific On 14 August Japan declared her acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation, which in­ By 1 March Japanese submarines had been nearly volved complete disarmament and surrender of all driven out of the central Pacific by our counter- military forces and equipment as set forth by the measures. Only an occasional supply or reconnais­ heads of the states of Great Britain, the United sance submarine ventured into this area. Near the States, and China. The instrument of surrender was beginning of March Japanese submarines were en­ presented to Japanese representatives by General of countered near Iwo Jima, and during the Okinawa the Army MacArthur at Manila on 19 August 1945. campaign the Japanese made their main submarine This instrument provided that Commander in Chief, effort around that island. After the fall of Okinawa, Army Forces, Pacific should receive the surrender most of the Japanese submarines were drawn back to of the Imperial General Headquarters, its senior the homeland to aid in the defense against our ex­ commanders, and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary pected invasion. In addition to these anti-invasion forces in the main islands of Japan, minor islands employments, the enemy was building and using a adjacent thereto, Korea south of 38° North latitude, number of cargo submarines in an attempt to supply and the Philippines; whereas the Commander in by-passed positions. A considerable number of their Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet was designated to receive submarines were also employed for antisubmarine the surrender of the senior Japanese commanders work. Our submarines made many reports of sight­ and of all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces in ing hostile periscopes and torpedo wakes. A number the Japanese mandated islands, Ryukyus, Bonins, of German U-boats continued to operated out of and other Pacific islands. Penang, even after the surrender of Germany. For this purpose the Third and Fifth Fleets, which In the main the Japanese submarines were inef­ had heretofore been alternative organizational titles fective, and our antisubmarine measures, bolstered for much the same assemblage of ships, were now by the advanced techniques used in the Atlantic, took each assigned approximately equal forces and became heavy toll. In return we suffered very light losses, separate entities. Correlating the fleet assignments with the exception of the sinking—with heavy loss of with the various zones of responsibility assigned life—of the heavy cruiser INDIANAPOLIS, prob­ the various Army commands, Commander in Chief, ably by an enemy submarine, on 30 July. In March U. S. Pacific Fleet assigned naval responsibility to and April antisubmarine measures executed by the Third Fleet for the zone of the Eighth Army screening vessels, by planes from land bases and car­ (to the northward and eastward of a line crossing riers, and by regular hunter-killer groups, effectively Honshu west of Yokohama and Tokyo) ; to the Fifth checked the Japanese submarines and accounted for Fleet for the zone of the Sixth Army (the remainder several kills. It is interesting to note that several of of the Japanese home islands to the southward and these kills were made by our own submarines. westward of that line) ; to the Seventh Fleet for that Through May, June, July, and August the Japanese of the XXIV Corps (Korea south of 38° North lati­ put an increased underwater fleet around Okinawa tude), as well as any operations which might be car­ and managed to cause some damage, including the ried out in Chinese waters; and to the Commander, sinking of a destroyer escort in July. For these op­ North Pacific, local responsibility for northern erations the Japanese were building and operating Honshu and for Hokkaido. large numbers of midget submarines and human tor­ Similarly, the three amphibious forces were co­ pedoes. It is believed that the destroyer escort ordinated with the respective fleets and armies; the mentioned above was sunk by ramming a human Third Amphibious Force under the Commander torpedo. The Japanese submarine effort was rapidly Third Fleet for operations of the Eighth Army; the descending to the suicide level; but by the end of the Fifth under the Commander Fifth Fleet for opera­ war it was well under control, as the Japanese ship­ tions of the Sixth Army; and the Seventh under the yards were taking heavy damage from the air and Commander Seventh Fleet for operations of the more escorts were being released from the Atlantic XXIV Corps and of any troops which might require after the surrender of Germany. transportation to China. B-day (the date designated by Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific for the initiation of operations) was proclaimed as 15 THE SURRENDER AND OCCUPATION August 1945. At that time orders were issued to the OF JAPAN U. S. Pacific Fleet and to other forces under the command of Fleet Admiral Nimitz to cease offensive With the reduction of Okinawa in June 1945, the operations against the Japanese. campaign against the Japanese Empire was concen­ On 28 August a small force of our Army Air Force trated on the home islands, with intensified bombing technicians landed at Atsugi Airfield, 14 miles south­ by the Army Strategic Air Force from the Marianas, west of Tokyo, to prepare the way for a subsequent a rapid acceleration of attacks by the Okinawa-based large-scale air-borne landing and for the landing at Tactical Air Force, and far-ranging air attacks and the Yokosuka naval base of Marine and Navy units. bombardments by the Third Fleet. These operations Originally it had been planned that this preliminary were climaxed by the employment of the atomic air-borne force should land at Atsugi on the 26th, bomb against Hiroshima and Nagasaki and, almost and that General of the Army MacArthur should simultaneously, Russia's entry into the war to open land there personally on the 28th to discuss occupa­ a strong three-pronged attack on Japanese forces in tion arrangements with members of the Imperial Manchuria and Korea. General Staff; simultaneously, Marine and Navy [ 21 ]

units should land at the Yokosuka naval base below tress islands. Working toward a junction, the two Tokyo, as well as at points in Sagamj Bay. forces deployed. The last day of August many Amer­ The beginning of the occupation, however, was ican prisoners of war were freed and the area of delayed 48 hours by a typhoon, which also caused occupation was expanded; new forces came ashore postponement from 31 August until 2 September of from transports, some groups reaching the outskirts signing of the formal instrument of surrender, a of Tokyo. copy of which Japanese emissaries had brought back The Japanese naval base of Tateyama, across the from Manila. Nevertheless, on the morning of 27 bay from Yokosuka, was occupied by Marines on 1 August an advanced unit of the Third Fleet, guided September, as American control spread smoothly and by a group of Japanese naval officers, harbor pilots, swiftly throughout the whole area south of the and interpreters, and provided with maps and charts, capital. moved into Sagami Bay, which is just southwest of The formal surrender of the Japanese Imperial Tokyo Bay. Government, the Japanese Imperial General Head­ On 29 August Fleet Admiral Nimitz arrived from quarters, and all Japanese and Japanese-controlled Guam to break his flag in the battleship SOUTH armed forces wherever located, was signed on board DAKOTA. Aboard the MISSOURI, Admiral Hal­ the battleship MISSOURI in Tokyo Bay at 0908 on sey, Commander Third Fleet, entered Tokyo Bay and 2 September 1945. General of the Army MacArthur anchored off Yokosuka naval base. The following signed as Supreme Commander for the Allied Pow­ day General of the Army MacArthur arrived at ers, and Fleet Admiral Nimitz signed as representa­ Atsugi Airfield to set up General Headquarters at tive for the United States. Yokohama. With him came an aerial armada of Even before the formal surrender of the Japanese troop-carrying planes. At the same time about 10,000 government, the Japanese commander of Mille Atoll Marines and naval personnel landed and took pos­ in the Marshall Islands had surrendered on 22 Au­ session of the Yokosuka base and neighboring for­ gust aboard the destroyer escort LEVY, Mille being

—Official U.S. Navy photo SAGAMI BAY, 28 AUGUST 1945 Mount Fujiyama in the background [22] the first of the many Japanese island possessions to which had been hoisted over Rome and Berlin; and capitulate as a result of the Emperor's acceptance of which had been flown on the battleship MISSOURI the Potsdam Proclamation. Nine days later, on 31 while the Japanese signed their surrender there. August, on board the destoyer BAGLEY, Rear Ad­ Our access to the Japanese homeland gave oppor­ miral F. E. M. Whiting received the surrender of tunity at last for securing reliable information as to Marcus Island. conditions there, both by our own observation and The largest-scale island surrender, however, came by conversation with Japanese officials who no longer shortly after the senior Japanese Army and Navy had the incentive or the ability to deceive either officers at Truk Atoll had received word of the capit­ their enemies or their own people. It was at once ulation of the Imperial government. By the act of apparent that while the damage to their cities and signing the terms of the surrender, the Commander production centers by strategic bombing was fully of the 31st Imperial Japanese Army committed the as great as photographic reconnaissance had indi­ following islands under his control to laying down cated, the strangulation from our less obvious but their arms and awaiting United States occupation: relentlessly effective surface and submarine blockade Truk, Wake, the Palaus, Mortlock, Mille, Ponape, and from our carrier-based air attacks had been a Kusaie.^Jaluit, Maleolap, Wotje, Enderby, Mereyon, decisive factor in the enemy's collapse. Their mer­ Rota and Pagan. The affixing of the signature of the chant marine had been reduced to a fraction of its Commander of the Imperial Japanese Fourth Fleet former size; of the few remaining ships, mostly further entailed the surrender of the Japanese Navy- small ones, only half were still operable. Their food controlled bases of Namorik, Nauru, and Ocean. In situation was critical, and their remaining resources the case of both Army and Navy surrenders, the ac­ in fuel and all strategic materials were not less so. tual capitulation by individual islands was effectu­ It had been known that their few remaining carriers ated over a period of several days following; how­ and heavy naval vessels had been damaged, but it ever, their submission became only a matter of time appeared that the fury of our carrier strikes had after the Truk ceremony. forced them to withdraw all but a handful of men It was estimated that a total of 130,000 Japanese from these ships, practically abandoning them. military personnel were involved in the Truk sur­ Never before in the history of war had there been render—on Truk itself a total of 49,000 military and a more convincing example of the effectiveness of 9,000 civilians; on Babelthuap in the Palaus, 27,000 sea power than when a well-armed, highly efficient military and 12,000 civilians; on Ponape 8,900; and and undefeated army of over a million men surren­ additional large groups on Rota and Yap, with the dered their homeland unconditionally to the invader remainder spread thinly throughout the Caroline and without even token resistance. Marianas Islands. On 3 September the surrender of True, the devastation already wrought by past the Bonin Islands was received, and four days later bombings, as well as the terrible demonstration of the capitulation of 105,000 Japanese Army and Navy power by the first atomic bombs, augured nothing forces in some 60 islands of the Ryukyu group was less for the Japanese than total extinction; yet with­ signed at General Stillwell's Tenth Army Headquar­ out sea power there would have been no possession ters on Okinawa. of Saipan, Iwo Jima and Okinawa from which to Five days after the formal Japanese surrender, launch these bombings. True, the Japanese homeland General of the Army MacArthur entered Tokyo, and might have been taken by assault in one final amphib­ his troops raised the United States flag over the ious operation of tremendous magnitude, yet with­ American Embassy. It was the same flag which had out sea power such an assault could not have been flown over Washington, D. C, on 7 December 1941; attempted.

Ill—\Logistics and Bases—Pacific

Before the conclusion of the war, plans were ma­ itial landing for the establishment of firmly held turing for the invasion and occupation of the main beachheads—were to have been the responsibility of Japanese islands. Two major operations were pro­ Fleet Admira' JVimitz. jected: the first, with the code name of "Olympic", The large-sale bombardments and bombings of against southern Kyushu; after consolidation there the Third Flet that began on 10 July were actually the next—"Coronet"—into the Tokyo plain area in preparatio for operation "Olympic". In mid- which is the industrial heart of Japan. The amphib­ August, as tfe war ended, the United States Navy ious parts of these operations—involving the prep­ had in the Paine 90 per cent of its combatant ves­ aration of landing beaches by mine sweeping, under­ sels of submaine size or larger and 42 per cent of water demolition teams, bombardment and bombing; its combatant ircraft. These ships, aircraft, support the transportation of the assault troops; and the in­ auxiliaries anclanding craft included: [23]

—Official U.S. Navy photo OKINAWA Aviation mechanics work over U.S. Navy PRIVATEER engines at an Okinawa base, while ground fighting is still in progress on the island

Battleships 23 have since been established in the Atlantic and Pa­ Aircraft carriers 26 cific areas in order to maintain the fleet and air Escort carriers 64 Cruisers 52 forces in the forward areas where there was fighting Destroyers 323 to be done. As we progressed across the Pacific, is­ Escort vessels 298 lands captured in one amphibious operation were Submarines 181 converted into bases which became spring boards for Mine craft 160 Auxiliary vessels 1,060 the next advance. These bases were set up for vari­ Large landing craft ' 2,783 ous purposes depending upon the next operation. At Combat aircraft 14,847 first they were mainly air bases for the support of Transport, training and utility aircraft.... 1,286 bombers and for the use of protective fighters. This All six Marine divisions, or 100 per cent of the gradually changed to the establishment of staging Marine Corps combat strength, were also available bases for the anchoring, fueling and refitting of ar­ for Pacific operations. The "Olympic" and "Coronet" madas of transports and cargo ships, and for replen­ operations as planned would have been the largest ishing mobile support squadrons which actually amphibious operations in history. While the Third accompanied the combat forces and serviced them at Fleet provided strategic cover and support for the sea. Further advances made necessary the develop­ amphibious forces making the invasion, the Fifth ment of repair and refitting bases for large amphib­ Fleet was to have executed the amphibious phases ious forces. As we progressed further and further of the invasions of Kyushu and Honshu by trans­ across the Pacific, it became necessary to set up main porting their troops and equipment to the attack repair bases for the maintenance, repair and servicing position on shore. By the application of naval force of larger fleet units. The first of such large bases they would have established the necessary ground was set up at Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides troops in positions favorable for further maneuvers and was followed by a main repair base at Manus in to complete the destruction of Japanese ground the Admiralty Islands. It was then determined that forces. so long as ships were in condition to function in the In discharging its responsibilities for the amphib­ battle line, minor battle damage and derangements ious phase of the Kyushu or "Olympic" operation should be rectified in the forward area, thus eliminat­ the United States Navy would have employed 3033 ing the necessity of returning ships to continental combatant and noncombatant vessels of a size larger bases or even to the Hawaiian Islands. than personnel landing boats. Although the applica­ These conditions were recognized and steps were tion of our sea power in its various forms proved taken to support the entire fleet in the Marianas, sufficient to bring Japan to terms without the neces­ Philippines and Okinawa areas. A very large base, sity of invading her home islands, the possibility of capable of suporting one third of the Pacific Fleet, invasion on the scale contemplated indicates the was set up at Guam; another large base was estab­ amazing progress in matters of supply and support lished at Leyte-Samar; a third was in process of con­ that has been made in less than four years of war. struction at Okinawa when the war ended. Each of In this evolution advance bases have played a vital these bases was designed to dock ships of various role. The 1940 Navy had no properly equipped ad­ sizes, some being able to take ships of the heaviest vance bases other than Pearl Harbor. More than 400 tonnage. All of the bases could repair major battle [ 24]

damage to hull and equipment. Facilities were es­ months of the war 82 per cent of the Seabees were tablished ashore with piers, roads and machine shops, in the Pacific, the vast majority of them at work on in large measure duplicating the type of facilities bases. In the Naval Supply Depot at Guam there found at any of our navy yards. There was also pro­ were 93 miles- of road. At Okinawa alone there vided the replenishment storage necessary to restock were more than fifty naval construction battalions every type of vessel with fuel, ammunition and con­ building roads, supply areas, airfields and fleet facili­ sumable supplies as well as food. The stocks cur­ ties for what would have been one of the gigantic rently on hand at Guam would have filled a train staging areas for the final invasion of Japan. 120 miles long. The magnitude of the fuel supply In the period covered by this report almost two alone is indicated by the total of 25,026,000 barrels of million measurement tons of materiel were shipped bulk fuel which was shipped to the Pacific in June in connection with the advance base program. 1945 for military purposes. At Guam alone one mil­ An essential element in the facilities of our ad­ lion gallons of aviation gas were used daily. As vance bases were floating drydocks, which were cap­ these bases were gradually pushed forward, assault able of receivhg vessels ranging from small craft forces were brought two to five days' steaming nearer to the battleship MISSOURI. One hundred fifty the enemy. • By proper selection of the strategic two of these docks were produced. They proved

—Official U.S. Navy photo FLOATING DRYDOCK AT A PACIFIC BASE Capable of receiving vessels ranging from small crat to battleships points necessary to accomplish the advance, we were their special vale in the speed with which damaged able to by-pass and ignore many bases established by ships could be rturned to combat. the Japanese which they could no longer use because As our advanc came nearer to the Japanese islands, of their loss of command of the sea. the rear areas vVnch had been the scene of combat But for this chain of advance bases the fleet could operations in earlier months were utilized for logistic not have operated in the western reaches of the support. In the South Pacific, for example, more Pacific without the necessity for many more ships than 400 ships were staged for the Okinawa opera­ and planes than it actually had. A base to supply or tion. They received varied replenishment services, repair a fleet 5000 miles closer to the enemy multiplies including routine and emergency overhaul as re­ the power which can be maintained constantly against quired. Approximately 100,000 officers and men were him and greatly lessens the problems of supply and staged from this area alone for the Okinawa cam­ repair. The scope of the advance base program is paign, including four Army and Marine combat indicated by the fact that the personnel assigned divisions plus certain headquarters and corps troops directly to it aggregated almost one fifth of the entire and various.Army and Navy service units. Concur­ personnel of the Navy—over half a million men, rently with the movement of troops large quantities including almost 200,000 Seabees. In the concluding of combat equipment and necessary materiel were [ 25 ]

transferred forward, thus contributing automatically to the roll-up of the South Pacific area. Similarly in the Southwest Pacific area Army service troops were moved with their equipment from the New Guinea area to the Philippines in order to prepare staging facilities for troops deployed from the European Theater. The roll-up was similarly continued and progress made in reducing our installations in Aus­ tralia and New Guinea. This vast deployment of our forces throughout the Pacific required careful planning not only at the front but also in the United States. During the last six months of the war the problem of materiel dis­ tribution became of primary importance, and through­ out this period our system of logistic support had to be constantly modified to meet the rapidly chang­ ing tactical conditions. War production had shifted the emphasis from procurement to distribution; that is, while production was still of high importance, a still greater problem was that of getting well bal­ anced materiel support to designated positions at certain fixed times. Put another way, motion, not size, had become the important factor. It was, never­ theless, essential in insuring the uninterrupted flow —Official U.S. Navy photo of materiel through the pipe-line of supply to our BATTLESHIP BEING REFUELED AT SEA forces overseas that the reservoir within the United States which kept these pipe-lines full did not become too large. On 1 June 1945 a set of standards for Navy Commander, Western Sea Frontier (who coordinated inventory control was promulgated which stressed naval logistic matters on the west coast) reallocated a balance between procurement and inventory. The the Navy's share of west coast capacity among the attainment of these standards was of primary im­ various ports. Estimated tonnages were set for each portance to efficient distribution of materiel within port, both by types of commodity and by overseas the United States, and particularly on the west coast, destination to be served. which was our major base for the logistic support In the establishment and execution of this planned of the Pacific Fleet. employment of west coast facilities, Commander, It has always been a cardinal principle of our Western Sea Frontier provided one of the major Pacific logistic support policy that the west coast links between the distribution systems of the con­ be utilized to its maximum capacity. There are two tinental United States and Pacific Theater. Since the reasons for this: the source of supply must be as flow of materiel and the ships to carry it are im- close, to the point of requirement as possible so that inventories at advance bases may be kept to a mini­ mum; secondly, greater utilization of shipping can be achieved by the shortest haul possible. The in­ tegration of these two elements, supply and shipping, was a major task in 1945. When the collapse of Germany was imminent, a review in conjunction with the Army of our policy of maximum west coast utilization was necessary. It was concluded that approximately 68 per cent of the Navy's predicted logistic requirements would have to be moved from the west coast to bases in the Marianas, Philippines and Okinawa, as .well as to the mobile logistic support forces—Service Squad­ rons Six and Ten. Bases in the Admiralties, New Guinea, and the Hawaiian Sea Frontier, since they were in nonoperational areas, could be supported from the east and Gulf coasts. In May, after a joint Army-Navy study, a ceiling was set on the amount of material which could be shipped to the Pacific from the west coast by the Army and Navy; this ceiling was based on the estimated capacity of the six major west coast ports. By detailed study of the capacities of port facilities and supply activities, as well as a complete analysis of the types of commodities —Official U.S. Navy photo shipped by the Navy since the first of the year, CARRIER RECEIVING AMMUNITION AT SEA [26] mobilized when more ships have sailed to a destina­ with March and April. Ammunition shipments tion than that destination can receive, the planned doubled, because of the considerable expenditures employment of west coast ports was a matter of vital during the Okinawa campaign (where 50,000 tons concern. of 5-inch to 16-inch projectiles were fired by surface This was facilitated by the expansion of the func­ ships) and the necessity for building up a reserve tions of the Western Sea Frontier which had taken for the assault upon Japan. place in November 1944 when the necessity for By the vast system thus developed the great coastal defense had assumed relatively minor pro­ concluding operations in the Pacific were supported. portions. The expansion of function included plac­ Each month in the immediate past we shipped out ing every major activity of the three west coast naval 600,000 long tons a month into the Pacific Ocean districts under a single command, with a view to areas. The momentum generated by this materiel coordinating all essential matters of materiel and operation can be imagined. The problem presented personnel and to eliminating activities within the by the deceleration of this great tide of supply after Western Sea Frontier which did not contribute to V-J day can also be imagined. The following steps the major effort. taken in the days immediately after the surrender of While defensive operations became secondary, the Japan indicate the effort the Navy has made to re­ responsibility of the Western Sea Frontier to regu­ duce its logistic energy as rapidly as possible with­ late the movement of ships and aircraft through out damage either to the domestic economy or to frontier waters was greatly increased. The eastern the support of fleet elements still at sea. All ship­ Pacific had become a network of channels for the ments of ammunition and of advance base components passage of traffic to the forward areas. These chan­ were stopped except those required for occupational nels were the most heavily traveled military highways purposes and those specifically requested by the fleet on and above the sea. In the period covered by this commanders as necessary for further operations. report there were over 17,000 sailings of vessels large Maintenance materiel movements overseas were sub­ and small through the six million square miles of jected to careful review and reduction. Stock levels Western Sea Frontier waters. In the same period an at overseas bases of provisions, clothing, equipment, average of one aircraft arrived on or departed from medical needs, aviation requirements and spare parts the west coast each fifteen minutes on the longest items were reduced to a thirty-day minimum and a over-water flight lane in the world. sixty-day maximum. Orders prepared in advance The substantial increase in the level of Navy cancelling procurement of materials were mailed materiel movement which occurred between March in tremendous volume from the Navy Department and July 1945 fully justified the planning for an in­ on the night of 14 August. All continental public creased west coast load which had been undertaken. works construction projects, including those actually Total exports, excluding aircraft, from May through under construction and those on which it was possible July showed a 25 per cent increase over March and to begin construction, were carefully reviewed— April shipments. Items used in the construction of projects which were not required for demobilization new bases doubled during May and July as compared purposes or postwar purposes were cancelled.

IV— Submarine Operations

Submarine warfare was an important factor in the until the Japanese capitulated. During the early part defeat of the Japanese. With the end of hostilities, of 1942, while our surface forces were still weakened it is now possible to reveal in greater detail the by the Japanese initial attack of 7 December 1941, splendid accomplishments of the submarines of the submarines were virtually the only United States Pacific Fleet and the Seventh Fleet. Our submarines naval forces that could be risked in offensive opera­ are credited with almost two thirds of the total ton­ tions. Although the number of submarines available nage of Japanese merchant marine losses, or a greater at the start was so small that the 1500 ton fleet-type part than all other forces, surface and air, Army and class was augmented by older types, submarine Navy combined. Of the total number of Japanese attacks produced immediate and damaging results, naval vessels sunk, our submarines are credited with which were greatly needed at the time. They made almost one third. it more difficult for the enemy to consolidate his forward positions, to reinforce his threatened areas, ATTACKS ON MERCHANT SHIPPING and to pile up in Japan an adequate reserve of fuel oil, rubber, and other loot from his newly conquered Our submarines, operating thousands of miles from territory. Their operations thus hastened our ulti­ their bases and deep within enemy-controlled waters, mate victory and resulted in the saving of American began their campaign of attrition on Japanese ship­ lives. ping immediately following the attack on Pearl Har­ Sinkings of enemy merchant ships rose from 134 bor, and continued to fight with telling effectiveness ships totalling 580,390 tons in 1942 to 284 ships [ 27]

Japanese Merchant Shipping of 1000 or more gross tons Sunk 1941-1945 Inclusive

63% 37%

Sunk by U.S. Submarines SunK by all other means, alone Army and Navy combined

—Official U.S. Navy totalling 1,341,968 tons in 1943. Then in 1944, when Okinawa in April soon made the East China Sea submarine coordinated attack groups reached the untenable to the Japanese. Causing heavy damage, peak of their effectiveness, the merchant fleet of our submarines were very active during April and Japan suffered its worst and most crippling blow— May in the Yellow Sea and along the east and south 492 ships of 2,387,780 tons were sunk or destroyed in coasts of the main Japanese islands. In June the submarine torpedo and gun attacks. The figures landlocked sea of Japan was penetrated in force. The given above, which are based on evaluated estimates, submarines had excellent hunting, and in a series of include only ships of 1000 tons and larger. It should coordinated attacks did tremendous damage to the be borne in mind that our submarines sank or de­ remnants of the Japanese merchant fleet. One of stroyed, chiefly by gunfire, large numbers of smaller the intruders, BARB, even landed a party on the vessels, particularly during the latter part of the war, coast of Honshu, and successfully blew up a bridge when few large enemy ships still remained afloat. and the speeding train that was crossing it. By the In 1945, because of the tremendous attrition on end of the war, the Japanese merchant fleet was Japanese shipping by our earlier submarine opera­ virtually nonexistent. tions and the destructive sweeps by our fleets and carrier air forces, enemy merchantmen sunk by sub­ ATTACKS ON NAVAL VESSELS marines dropped to 132 ships totalling 469,872 tons. The advance of our bases had further driven Japanese While United States submarines were effectively ships back to the coast lines and shallow waters of eliminating the Japanese merchant fleet, they were also carrying out damaging attacks on Japanese naval Japan and the Asiatic mainland. Our submarines units. During the course of the war, the following followed the enemy shipping into these dangerous principal Japanese combatant types were sent to the waters and made many skillful and daring attacks, bottom as a result of these attacks: such as the one in April when TIRANTE entered 1 battleship a patrolled anchorage in Quelpart Island to blow up 4 carriers 4 escort carriers a 10,000 ton tanker and two 1,500 ton escort vessels, 3 heavy cruisers which were peacefully lying at anchor. Further 9 light cruisers south, persistent submarine patrolling plus air sweeps 43 destroyers had, by the end of March, stopped almost all enemy 23 submarines traffic along the sea lanes of the East Indies and the 189 minor combatant vessels and naval coast of Indo-China. auxiliaries, including 60 escort vessels. For a time, Japanese shipping continued to ply in Details of these sinkings will be found in Appendix the East China and Yellow Seas, but the invasion of A. While the loss of the heavier naval units was [ 28] critical to the Japanese, especially as the strength of sometimes operating alone, our submarines rescued our surface fleet increased, the surprisingly high more than 500 aviators during the course of the war. losses of enemy destroyers and escort vessels to Fifty-two United States submarines were lost submarine attack are particularly noteworthy. Our from all causes during the war, forty-six due to submarines, refusing to accept the role of the hunted, enemy action, six due to accidents and stranding. even after their presence was known, frequently These losses were due to continued penetration deep attacked their arch-enemies under circumstances of within the enemy zone of defense, far from our bases, such great risk that the failure of their attack on the and, until the last phase of the war, far beyond the enemy antisubmarine vessel placed the submarine areas where our surface ships and aircraft could in extreme danger of loss. So successful, however, operate. Because of the nature of submarine opera­ were these attacks that the Japanese developed a tions and the general necessity of submarines operat­ dangerous deficiency of destroyer screening units ing alone, the personnel loss in most instances was in their naval task forces, and their merchant ship­ the entire ship's company. As heavy as were the ping was often inadequately escorted. losses in submarine personnel and equipment, sub­ marine training and building programs supplied SPECIAL MISSIONS replacements so effectively that our submarine force at the end of the war far exceeded its pre-Pearl Among the special missions performed by sub­ Harbor strength—and was the most powerful and marines were reconnaissance, rescue, supply and effective in the world. The Japanese capitulation lifeguard duties. An outstanding result of effective found our submarines on station searching for the submarine reconnaissance was the vital advance in­ remnants of the Japanese Navy and merchant marine, formation furnished our surface and air forces prior and on the alert to rescue downed aviators off the to the Battle for Leyte Gulf, information which con­ coast of Japan. tributed materially to that victory. Our submarines Submarines of the Pacific Fleet have been com­ in a number of instances rescued stranded personnel manded by Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, Jr., since and performed personnel evacuation duties, notably from Corregidor. The supplies and equipment de­ February 1943. Rear Admiral James Fife, Jr., has livered by submarines to friendly guerrilla forces in commanded the Seventh Fleet submarines, including the Philippines did much to keep alive the spirit of a number of British and Dutch submarines, since resistance in those islands. December 1944. When our air forces came into positions from No account of submarine warfare in the Pacific which they could intensify their attacks on Japanese- would be complete without mention of the splendid held territory, United States submarines were called contribution of the submarines of our Allies. These upon to carry out lifeguard operations to rescue craft, operating in the southwest Pacific, contributed aviators forced down at sea in enemy waters. Some­ materially to the destruction of Japanese naval and times assisted by friendly aircraft, Which provided merchant shipping, and inflicted losses over and above fighter cover and assisted in locating survivors, and those previously listed.

V—Atlantic Operations

The operations of the United States Navy in the European operations in which United States naval Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters culminated in task forces participated. In the British control areas the victory of the Allied nations in Europe. The Commander U. S. Naval Forces in Europe assured success of the joint antisubmarine campaign and proper liaison between the Admiralty and the Tenth the tremendous achievements in shipbuilding' were Fleet organization in my Headquarters, which was essential preludes to the landings in Normandy and responsible for convoy and routing of United States southern France and the great land offensive, which shipping and the development of plans, weapons, and in three months carried the Allied Expeditionary tactics to be employed in antisubmarine operations. Forces to the German frontier and brought total In the final month of the European war, German victory on German soil six months later. This vic­ submarines made a last determined effort, in great tory was possible because ships were available and strength, to reach the eastern coast of the United their protection by the Navy effective. States. That attempt was thwarted by a powerful task force of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet, which, during ANTISUBMARINE OPERATIONS an engagement lasting several days, destroyed five U-boats. The United States Navy's final successful In the antisubmarine campaign our Atlantic Fleet action agahst German submarines occurred on 6 had responsibility for Atlantic areas under United May, only two days before V-E day, when a U-boat States operational command, and the British Ad­ was sunk off Block Island by the destroyer escort miralty was responsible for North Atlantic and ATHERTON with the frigate MOBERLY assisting. [29]

The development of new techniques, the intensive was relieved in January'1945 by Rear Admiral A. R. training of antisubmarine crews, and the persistence McCann. with which the U-boats were hunted offensively all To the Tenth Fleet were assigned the following played vital parts in the surrender campaign. Ger­ tasks: man submarines began to surface and surrender (a) Destruction of enemy submarines. shortly after V-E day, and U. S. Atlantic Fleet (b) Protection of Allied shipping in the East­ escort vessels brought several of them to United ern, Gulf, and Caribbean Sea Frontiers. States east coast ports. (c) Support of other antisubmarine forces of A review of antisubmarine and convoy operations our own and of the other Allied nations operat­ since 1939 illustrates clearly these major naval con­ ing in the Atlantic areas. tributions to victory in Europe. The summarized (d) Exercise of control of convoys and ship­ statistics on the Battle of the Atlantic are as follows: ping that were United States responsibilities. (e) Correlation of United States antisub­ German Allied New Net marine training and materiel development. Subs. Shipping Construction Gains or Year Sunk Sunk U.S. British Total Losses To accomplish these tasks the Tenth Fleet was organized into four principal divisions: Operations;

(Number) - • - (In thousands of tons) Antisubmarine Measures (materiel, training, analysis 1939 (4 mos.) 9 810 101 231 332 —478 and statistics, and operational research) ; Convoy and 1940 22 4,407 439 780 1,219 —3,188 Routing; and a Scientific Council composed of dis­ 1941 35 4,398 1,169 815 1,984 —2,414 tinguished civilian scientists. 1942 85 8,245 5,339 1,843 7,182 —1,063 The Tenth was a fleet without a ship. However, 1943 237 3,611 12,384 2,201 14,585 + 10,974 1944 241 1,422 11,639 1,710 13,349 + 11,927 this highly specialized command coordinated and 1945 (4 mos.) 153 458 3,551 283 3,834 +3,376 directed our naval forces- in the Battle of the At­ lantic, making available the latest intelligence to Totals 782 23,351 34,622 7,863 42,485 +19,134 the Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet and to other fleet and sea frontier commanders who From the foregoing statistical summary the chief directed the actual operations at sea, and supplying features of the Battle of the Atlantic are clear: antisubmarine training and operating procedures to (a) Until the closing months of 1942 the Ger­ our forces afloat. The Tenth Fleet correlated the man submarines were continuing to reduce the antisubmarine developments of the various technical available total of Allied tonnage; bureaus of the Navy Department and the fleet train­ (b) Antisubmarine operations resulted in the ing schools concerned with antisubmarine activities. sinking of an average of 12 German submarines In addition, it worked closely with the General Staff per month after 1 January 1943, or a total of of the United States Army and with the British 480 in the two years 1943-44; Admiralty and Canadian Naval Headquarters to avoid (c) American shipyards alone produced an duplication and confusion, and to insure that maxi­ average of a million tons per month of new mum effort would be directed against the German merchant ships after 1 January 1943, or a total underseas fleet. The effective work of the Tenth of 24,000,000 tons in two years. Fleet contributed outstandingly to the success of In the 12 months from 1 June 1944, 135 convoys United States naval operations in the Battle of the arrived in United Kingdom ports from overseas with Atlantic. a total of 7157 merchant ships totalling more than 50,000,000 gross tonnage. The escort of this ship­ U. S. NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE ping and the provision of trained naval armed guard crews aboard the merchant vessels were among the During the spring and summer of 1945 the United primary tasks performed by the United States Navy States Naval Forces in Europe were faced with a in the prosecution of the war in Europe. The Navy's series of varied responsibilities. Until the surrender antisubmarine campaign with the British-United of Germany the Navy was actively engaged in coastal States integrated convoy system was in great part offensive operations and in supporting afloat the responsible for the vital shipping necessary for the United States Army's build-up of men and supplies, Allied land offensive which broke into the Fortress which included assistance in areas as far inland as of Europe in 1944 and overwhelmed the Germans the Rhine; with the capitulation of the enemy came ashore in 1945. the establishment of United States naval commands in Germany to aid in the military occupation and government of that country and in the enforcement TENTH FLEET of the surrender terms. United States naval com­ ponents also assumed duties with the Allied Military On 15 June 1945 the Tenth Fleet was dissolved. Missions to Denmark and Norway similar to those This effective organization was established 20 May already established in France, Belgium and Holland. 1943 under my direct command, with Headquarters With the end of the war in Europe, the Navy speeded in the Navy Department, to exercise unity of control up the process of closing out the multitude of bases over United States antisubmarine operations in that and other facilities which had been established part of the Atlantic Ocean under United States earlier in the war in the United Kingdom, on the strategic control. The first Chief of Staff of the Continent, and in the Mediterranean Theater of Tenth Fleet was Rear Admiral Francis S. Low, who Operations. [30]

Rhine River Crossing were used and supported by extensive naval bom­ bardment. The actual landings on He d'Oleron took The crossing of the Rhine River in March 1945 place on 30 April and all enemy resistance ceased will be remembered as one of the spectacular achieve­ there on 2 May. With the general capitulation of the ments of the American forces during the closing enemy on 8 May, the remaining German pockets at months of the European war. In this operation the La Rochelle, Lorient, St. Nazaire, etc., were occupied United States Navy had the honor of taking part by French forces accompanied by American naval as a floating segment of General of the Army Eisen­ observers. hower's forces. LCVP's and LCM's, which had been While the Rhine crossings and the attacks on the used with great success in the coastal Normandy German pockets were going on, the Navy was con­ invasion; were again employed to carry our troops tinuing its less publicized but equally important on rivers. The naval crews assigned to the operation task of assisting the Army's build-up of troops and began training in England in October 1944 and held materiel through its port operations, both along the their final practice maneuvers on the Continent later English Channel and in the southern French ports. in the winter. Considerable ingenuity and improvisa­ Men and munitions poured onto the Continent tion were necessary to overcome technical difficulties, through Marseilles, Toulon, Cherbourg, Le Havre the craft employed having been constructed for salt and Rouen. At the great port of Antwerp alone water use and not as river craft* in the fresh water almost 20,000 tons of supplies were unloaded daily. of the swift-flowing Rhine. Five LCVP units of From the United States Navy's airfield at Dunkes- 24 craft each were formed in England and later well in Devon, patrol planes of Fleet Air Wing moved to the Continent and placed under the opera­ Seven maintained a constant search of shipping lanes tional control of United States Army commanders for enemy submarines. When the surrender of Ger­ and administrative control of Vice Admiral Alan G. many came on 8 May, the German High Command Kirk, Commander, U. S. Naval Forces France; of was ordered to instruct its U-boats at sea to surface, these, three actually participated in the crossings. radio their position, jettison their ammunition, fly The first LCVP unit went into action with the a black flag and proceed by fixed routes to prescribed United States First Army at the Remagen bridge­ ports. The first U-boat to comply with this order head on 11 March 1945, assisting, under heavy gun­ surrendered on 9 May to a PB4Y-1 plane of Fleet fire, in the erection of treadway and heavy pontoon Air Wing Seven on patrol off Lands End, England. bridges, in ferrying troops, and in patrolling the river. At Oppenheim on 23 March another LCVP U. S. Naval Forces Germany unit carried portions of General Patton's Third Army across the Rhine, and the following day made a sec­ With the disintegration of the enemy armies and ond crossing under heavy enemy fire at Boppard. the movement of Allied forces deeper into Germany, Another crossing had been planned at St. Goar, but the organization of the United States naval command because of enemy resistance the operation was staged for Germany was put into effect. Vice Admiral instead at Oberwesel, where, on 26 March, other units Robert L. Ghormley, as Commander, U. S. Naval of the Third Army were ferried across. Still another Forces Germany, became responsible for all United crossing was made at Mainz. The LCVP units also States naval forces operating in Germany. As head served with the United States Ninth Army in its of the Naval Division of the United States Group of crossing of the Rhine south of Wesel, which oc­ the Allied Control Council, Vice Admiral Ghormley curred almost simultaneously with the Third Army's acted as General of the Army Eisenhower's adviser advance. in all naval matters and conferred with the other Allied naval commanders in Germany on such ques­ U. S. Naval Forces France tions as repairs of shipping and disposition of enemy naval vessels. In June Vice Admiral Ghormley estab­ A second major operation in which the United lished his headquarters in Frankfurt. On 1 July he States Navy played an important part during the assumed operational control of all naval forces on last days of Nazi resistance was that directed against the Continent assigned to occupation duties or to the German-held pockets in western France. Vice the support of the Army in the European Theater Admiral Kirk was placed in operational command of of Operations. These included, in addition to the the French naval task force which was assembled forces in Germany, the United States Naval Com­ for the attack. The United States Navy supplied ponents of the Military Missions to Norway, Den­ fuel, training facilities, a repair unit, aircraft, and mark, Holland and Belgium, the United States Naval 24 LCVP's. The operation, which was directed Group France, and the Naval Division of the Allied against the enemy forces in the He d'Oleron and at Control Commission for Austria. the mouth of the Gironde River, began with a general Under Admiral Ghormley's command in Germany naval bombardment at 0750 on 15 April. For five days was Rear Admiral A. G. Robinson, who, as Com­ the naval task force assisted the French ground mander of U. S. Ports and Bases Germany, was forces with naval bombardment and aerial reconnais­ charged with the operation of the ports of Bremen sance in the assault on Royan and the Point de and Bremerhaven in the American-controlled Weser Grave area at the mouth of the Gironde. By 20 April River Enclave. Rear Admiral Robinson's headquar­ this section was cleared of the enemy and the assault ters were established in Bremen on 15 May. This on the He d'Oleron began the following day. Twenty- task force began operating at once, supervising the four United States LCVP's manned by French, crews disposition of captured and surrendered naval per- [31] sonnel, clearing the port areas for incoming shipping, hower was dissolved. On 14 July control of the and seizing prize merchant ships which had been American, British and French military and naval captured there. Of these the liner EUROPA was forces reverted to their respective national com­ by far the most important. A modern ship in rela­ mands. For the American forces General of the tively good condition, she was converted into a troop Army Eisenhower remained the Supreme Com­ transport almost immediately; although somewhat mander with a composite United States Army-Navy- hampered by lack of facilities and skilled labor, the Air European Theater Staff. Commander, U. S. Europa was commissioned as U. S. Navy APA-177 Naval Forces in Europe in London retained adminis­ and manned by naval personnel. She sailed from trative control of all remaining United States naval Bremerhaven on 11 September to Southampton to forces in the theater. On 16 August Admiral Hewitt embark her first load of almost 5000 returning Amer­ relieved Admiral Harold R. Stark, as Commander, ican troops. Twelfth Fleet and Commander, U. S. Naval Forces Bremen and Bremerhaven, as the two United States in Europe. naval controlled ports in Germany, had an important role to play in the occupation of the country. They Redeployment served as important supply and evacuation ports for the United States occupation forces; tfieir shipyards When the fighting in Europe ceased, the United and repair facilities, under United States naval con­ States Army was faced with the gigantic task of trol, were used for the repair of German and Allied redeploying millions of its forces. Some of its men ships in the area. were to be sent home for discharge; others were to Another United States naval command whose work be ordered to the Far East. During the summer of was accelerated by the surrender of Germany was 1945, through its various port parties and naval de­ the U. S. Naval Technical Mission Europe, under tachments, the Navy cooperated closely with the Commodore H. A. Schade. This organization, which Army in speeding troop movement. Over 53,000 is under the operational control of the Chief of Naval men were embarked from northern French ports in Operations, is the agency for the collection of intel­ May, and in June more than 210,000. The July figures ligence information from the surrendered nations for approached 350,000. The southern French ports of the use of the United States Navy. Working closely Marseilles and Toulon were also used for this work. with the Army G-2 Staff Division and with Allied From Le Havre and Antwerp many shipments of war Intelligence Services, the U. S. Naval Technical materiel no longer needed in this theater were sent Mission Europe has uncovered a vast amount of data back to the United States. concerning German wartime industrial and scientific Similarly the United States Navy developed its developments, the status of experiments on secret own redeployment program, transferring to the weapons, etc. United States or to the Pacific forces and materiel no longer required for naval activities in Europe. U. S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters Hundreds of amphibious ships and craft which had been used for assault operations and for the support In March 1945 the U. S. Eighth Fleet, which had of the Army build-up were no longer needed and been under the command of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt were returned to the United States. Nearly all United since March 1943, was dissolved; in April the naval States naval advanced bases, supply and repair facil­ forces and bases in the Mediterranean Theater were ities, etc., in Britain and the Mediterranean were placed under the administrative control of Com­ now unnecessary and their closing proceeded at a mander, U. S. Naval Forces in Europe. These forces, rapid rate. commanded by Vice Admiral W. A. Glassford as In Great Britain the summer months of 1945 saw Commander, U. S. Naval Forces Northwest African the closing of the amphibious bases at Falmouth, Waters, thereby became a task force of the Twelfth Plymouth, Dartmouth, Portland-Weymouth and Fleet. Southampton. With the end of the submarine menace Although the over-all strength was reduced, small the planes of Fleet Air Wing Seven, based at Dun- naval detachments were maintained in Italy to sup­ keswell, Devon, were returned to the United States. port the United States Army there, to assist United In France, Italy and in North Africa the operation States merchant shipping, and to continue United of most of the liberated ports was rapidly returned States naval representation on the Allied Commission to the national authorities. Port detachments were for Italy. maintained at Le Havre, Marseilles and Naples to aid in the Army's redeployment program. When the Changes in Command command of U. S. Naval Forces France was abolished as a separate task force on 1 July, a naval task group, In the Azores United States naval forces were under Commander, U. S. Naval Forces Germany, was engaged chiefly in patrolling routes used for Army substituted therefor. In the Mediterranean, United aircraft being returned to the United States. Com­ States naval activities were likewise reduced. Naval mander, U. S. Naval Forces in Europe assumed ad­ Operating Base Oran was closed out and a naval ministrative control of the Azores forces in July detachment took its place in July. During the same 1945. month the office of Commander, Moroccan Sea Fron­ A little over two months after the signing of the tier was abolished. The naval facilities at Port German surrender at Rheims, the Supreme Allied Lyautey, Casablanca, Dakar and Agadir were organ­ Military command under General of the Army Eisen­ ized as a naval task group. The naval advanced base [32] at Bizerte was decommissioned and reductions were air units and shore-based patrol squadrons for the effected at Palermo and Naples. Pacific Fleet. Typical of the changing nature of the carrier training program was the decommissioning U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET of all composite squadrons, which had produced such effective results against the U-boats, and the commis­ During the entire war combat vessels, auxiliaries, sioning of air groups for the large new carriers of and landing craft were built and trained in large the MIDWAY class. These new air groups are ap­ numbers on the east coast of the United States for proximately one and one-half times the size of a duty in the Pacific. With the capitulation of Ger­ normal carrier air group. many, the U. S. Atlantic Fleet was able to increase The surrender of Japan, occurring when the At­ and intensify the redeployment of ships, men, and lantic Fleet redeployment program was at its height, supplies to the Pacific. By 1 June Atlantic convoys necessitated rapid readjustments. Many ships, which were stopped, and all available escort ships and were on their way to the Pacific or had just reached tankers thus released were made ready for opera­ the forward areas, were ordered to return to the east tions against the Japanese. Large numbers of land­ coast ports. Instructions were promulgated indicat­ ing craft were returned from Europe and overhauled ing the status of vessels in the postwar Atlantic for Pacific duty. The further necessity of provid­ Fleet, and an appraisal of berthing areas for the ing refresher training for the crews of these ships Atlantic Fleet Reserve ships was pressed to com­ and craft devolved upon the Atlantic Fleet Opera­ tional Training Command. The Battle of the At­ pletion. Similarly the program for revising, absorb­ lantic had been chiefly a war against submarines; ing or decommissioning shore-based Atlantic Fleet now all training was concentrated upon meeting the activities was accelerated. In the South Atlantic a requirements of the Pacific war for accurate antiair­ similar process had long since begun. In March 1945 craft firing and shore bombardment. During the the Rio-Trinidad convoys were discontinued. Then period covered by this report the Operational Train­ on 15 April the Fourth Fleet became a task force ing Command, Atlantic Fleet, trained some 995 ships of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet, with Vice Admiral W. R. for duty in the Pacific, of which 358 were new ships Munroe as task force commander and Commander, receiving the normal shakedown and 637 were ships South Atlantic Force. The roll-up of forces con­ which had been engaged in some phase of the Euro­ tinued, and on 13 August Vice Admiral Munroe pean war. hauled down his flag; the remaining naval activities Similarly, the Air Force Atlantic Fleet turned in the South Atlantic were placed under the Com­ with increased intensity to the training of carrier mandant, Naval Operating Base Rio de Janeiro.

VI—Ships, Aircraft & Personnel

Fighting men are not effective, individually or type. Twenty-nine mine-sweeping vessels were de­ collectively, unless they are imbued with high morale. livered. It was necessary to place particular emphasis Morale may be defined as a state of mind wherein upon the production of repair ships of all types. The there is confidence, courage and zeal among men large numbers of these delivered during this period, united together in a common effort—a "conviction together with existing ships of the type, performed of excellence." One factor largely responsible for indispensable services in the forward areas in return­ the extremely high morale of the men of the naval ing quickly to service many of the ships damaged services has been their confidence in the excellence in the Okinawa operation. of the ships and planes provided them. To meet changing conditions of war during this period, it was necessary to undertake a number of SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM conversions of ships from one type to another. No­ table among these was the conversion of certain patrol During the period 1 March to 1 October 1945 the craft to control vessels for amphibious operations; following combatant ships were completed: 4 air­ frigates and certain patrol craft to weather station craft carriers (one of which was MIDWAY, the first ships; a large number of personnel landing ships of the three 45,000 ton carriers under construction), to gunboats for close inshore support of amphibious 8 escort carriers, 3 light cruisers, 6 heavy cruisers, operations; a number of destroyer escorts to fast 53 destroyers, 2 destroyer escorts and 24 submarines. transports; certain destroyers and destroyer escorts During this same period over 300 auxiliary ships to radar picket ships; and a number of destroyers were completed by the Navy and the Maritime Com­ to high-speed mine sweepers. mission, among them six of the most modern air- During the later phases of. the war, as Japanese conditioned hospital ships in existence. The landing sea power waned, a review was made of the Navy's craft and district craft construction programs were shipbuilding program to bring it in line with esti­ continued, with the delivery of large numbers of each mated operational requirements. On 10 August 1945 [33] the Secretary of the Navy approved the termination of contracts for the NAVY SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM construction of 56 combatant ships NEW CONSTRUCTION COMPLETED and 39 vessels of other types. Fol­ DURING 1942,1943,1944 a NINE MONTHS 1945 lowing the surrender of Japan, a NUMBER TONS complete review was made of the 50,000 3,500,000 status of the construction and con­ 1 1 version program of auxiliaries, land­ 3,000,009 ing craft, district craft and small 40,000 . boats, in consequence of which the to­ 2,500,000 tal number of cancellations was raised to the following: 30,000 2,000,000 Combatant Ships 56 Auxiliaries 94 Landing Ships 2 • 1,500,000 Patrol Craft 44 • 20,000 District Craft 121 Small Landing Craft, .over 8,000 — 1.000,000 The effect of these cancellations is 10,000 shown graphically in Plate 6. mm— - 500,000 Every effort has been made to keep the ships of the fleet fitted with the latest available equipment to meet rapidly changing combat conditions. Improved radar sets, aircraft and —Official U.S. Navy antiaircraft weapons, fire-control systems for guns, Grumman's Bearcat and Goodyear's F2G (to which and fire-fighting equipment have been installed. The no popular name has yet been given) both high­ improvement of the offensive and defensive qualities speed, highly maneuverable and fast climbing planes. of our ships by such alterations has been going on The latter was the first naval fighter to use the new since the beginning of the war; as the war drew to Pratt and Whitney 3000 horsepower engine. a close, most ships of the fleet had reached a point The Grumman Wildcat, which was a new fighter at which no additional weights could be added with­ at the time of Pearl Harbor, had an approximate out compensatory weight removals. The problem of speed of 300 miles an hour and mounted four .50- applying the latest technological developments to caliber machine guns. The Hellcats and Corsairs, our ships has thus become more difficult; neverthe­ which were both carrier and shore-based on V-J day, less such application has been accomplished on an have speeds of more than 400 and 425 miles an hour, extensive scale by the cooperation of all concerned, respectively, and mount six .50-caliber machine guns, both afloat and ashore. or proportionate numbers of 20-millimeter cannon, in addition to rockets. Bombs weighing up to 2000 AIRCRAFT pounds could also be carried by these planes when Comparisons between standard Navy aircraft types at the beginning of the war and the end vividly illus­ trate the outstanding technical ad­ NAVY SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM vances accomplished in less than four MAIN PROPULSION HORSEPOWER years of fighting. At the war's end we INSTALLED IN COMPLETED VESSELS had the best airplanes of every kind, H.P. JANUARY 1942 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1945 H.P. both ashore and afloat, but newer and 70.000,000 70.000,000 better planes were on the production SMi lines and would soon have taken their 60.000,000 60.000.000 place against the enemy. Among these were the Grumman Tigercat, a twin- 50,000.000 50.000,000 engine, single-seat fighter plane with heavy firepower and bomb-carrying 40.000.000 40.000.000 characteristics. Although this plane had arrived in the Pacific, it never got 30,000,000 —JMBI 30.000.000 into actual combat. Three other fight­ er planes, faster and possessing higher 20,000.000 20.000,000 tactical performance than standard existing types, had satisfactorily 10.000,000 passed the long period of experi­ 10,000,000 ments and flight tests and were in production. These included the Ryan J^''LiJ-iy-'°!"''l'H.|.|.H.H«|.:.'''N!'! .v ,v. y»|. |.|,|,|-M.!«M«!. Fireball, the Navy's first fighter plane to use jet propulsion. The others were -Official U. S. Navy [34]

standard dive-bomber when the war began, and delivered heavy blows against the enemy before it was re­ tired as a first line plane. Its top speed was 230 miles an hour; it car­ ried 1000 pounds of bombs, and mounted two .30-caliber and two .50- caliber machine guns. Our torpedo bomber at the start of the war was the Douglas Devastator, a plane which had a speed of about 150 miles an hour and was very light­ ly armed. The Grumman Avenger, and later modifications of this plane by General Motors, gave us a plane with a speed of more than 250 miles an hour, capable of carrying 2000 pounds of bombs or a torpedo, four machine guns and rockets. One modi­ fication of the Avenger was a carrier- based night bomber to operate with night fighters. Development and research in the

-Official U.S. Navy dive-bomber and torpedo bomber field during the war yielded designs by they were assigned fighter-bomber missions. These Consolidated, Douglas and Martin. A few produc­ planes played the leading role in our tactical de­ tion models had been turned out by Consolidated and velopment of fighter-bombing, a World War II Douglas and several experimental models by Martin innovation. Other technical developments, prima­ when V-J day came. rily air-borne radar, helped to bring into existence The standard scout-observation plane based aboard the Navy's night-fighting force. The Wildcat, greatly battleships aid cruisers became the Curtiss Seahawk, improved by various modifications by General Motors replacing the Chance Vought Kingfisher and Curtiss to give it greater speed and climb, continued to be Seagull. The Seahawk and Kingfisher played no small used on the escort carriers. part in air-sea rescues. Our dive-bomber, the Helldiver, has a speed of The Consolidated Catalina, the veteran twin-engine more than 250 miles an hour, can carry 2000 pounds of patrol plane, was in operation at the start of the war bombs, and is equipped with eight rocket launchers, and has proved to be one of the most valuable all- two 20-millimeter cannon and two .30-caliber machine purpose planes. Planes of the sixth modification— guns. These characteristics were developed through or sixth major change—giving it greater range and five modifications. The Douglas Dauntless was the speed are now wkh the fleet. The Martin Mariner, a larger, heavier plane, has taken over many of the patrol duties formerly handled by the Catalinas. Both of U. S. NAVY these planes also have performed out­ PLANNED TONNAGE standing service, in air-sea rescue AUGUST 1945-JULY 1947 work. BEFORE V-J OAY For our four-engine, land-based TONS AFTER V-J DAY TONS search plane, we have replaced the CUMULATIVE 2,500,000 2,500,000 Consolidated Liberator with the Con­ solidated Privateer, a plane with a range of well over 3000 miles, heavy 2,000,000 2,000,000 armament and a wealth of new navi­ gational, radio and radar equipment, 1,500,000 enabling it to fly long hours of recon­ naissance over trackless oceans. These planes, which carry bombs and depth 1,000,000 charges, have made impressive records against isolated Japanese ships, small convoys, submarines and enemy-held 500,000 islands in their search areas. Our newest twin-engine search plane is the Lockheed Harpoon, which took over [_A_LS_Lg-L- |D|J|F|M|A|M| J J_J„1_A_L__LP I N I P_l_J_LfJ-M_LA__L.HI \ •> \ •> \ the duties of the Lockheed Ventura. 1945 1946 1947 It carries bombs and rockets and has ten .50-caliber machine guns with —Official U.S. Navy [ 35] which to protect itself. The range of the Harpoon a liquid-cooled, has caused us to devote primary is in excess of 2000 miles and its speed is more than attention to the development of air-cooled engines, 300 miles an hour. and hence, has contributed substantially to the air­ The Naval Air Transport Service utilizes as its craft program of the country. It can be claimed standard transport planes the Martin Mars, Douglas without exaggeration that the air-cooled aircraft Skymasters (R5D) and Skytrains (R4D), and Con­ engine of today would not have been developed effec­ solidated Coronado flying boats, while Marine Corps tively had it not been for the Navy's continued air transport groups use the Curtiss Commandos in interest. large numbers. Established on 1 December 1943. the Other technological advances in naval aircraft have Naval Air Transport Service routes extend over ap­ included the development of jet-assisted take off proximately 80,000 miles, covering three quarters of (which made it possible for seaplanes to carry much the globe. In addition to carrying freight and pas­ heavier loads), the largest helicopter yet flying, and sengers, the Service flew whole blood daily from the radio-controlled target drones and missiles. PERSONNEL ON BOARD 4,000,000i_| | I | I U I I I | I I I I I | I I I II | M I I I | I 1 I I I | I I I 1 I 14,000.00 0 OUTSIDE U.S. 42" 45% 39% 45% 45% 51% 62% 66%

4 627,700

3,O00.000 3,000,000 ASHORE NSIDE TRAINING 4 525,100 ASHORE OUTSIDE U S AFLOAT 2.000,000 4 554,500 2.000,000 4 1,663,500

1.000,000 1,000.000

Li-Jo A J 0 A J 0 A J 0 J A 1942 1943 1944 1945

-Official U.S. Navy west coast to combat areas in the Pacific and evacu­ PERSONNEL ated wounded during the Okinawa campaign. Improved cooling and other changes have increased The personnel strength of the United States Navy the horsepower of standard combat engines 10 per on 2 September 1945 was as follows: cent with little or no increase in weight. Thus it has been possible to translate added power into in­ Navy Only Male Female Total creased climb and speed. New superchargers made Officers (including warrants) 316,675 8,399 325,074* it possible to hold high take-off horsepower to higher Nurses 10,968 10,968 Officer Candidates 62,913 12 62,925$ altitudes than was possible before. The adoption of Enlisted 2,935,695 73,685 3,009,380 water injection for engines to give pilots greater speed in emergencies also became general for all TOTAL. . . ..3,315,283 93,064 3,408,347 combat-types. *Includes 4,038 male officers and 196.female officers whose separa­ Our requirement for the utmost in reliability and tions are pending. our long-held conviction that an air-cooled power ^Includes 5,129 personnel in enlisted ratings who are taking plant installation was less vulnerable to damage than officer candidate training. £36]

PERSONNEL OUTSIDE U. S

AFLOAT ASHORE

100,000 200,000 « * > i M | i I TT NORTH ATLANTIC 100,000 J A J 0 J 1943 1944 1945

600,000 i i i i "i' CENTRAL J A J 0 J PACIFIC OKINAWA 1943 1944 1945 500,000 200,000, M i I I | I I | I | | | | AFRICA 400.000 MEDITERRANEAf^ S. FRANCE 100,000' 1 300,000

J A J 0 J 1943 1944 1945 200,000

200,000 MJM I I | I I 100,000 GULF CARIBBEAN 100.000 PANAMA J A J 0 J 1943 1944 1945 Qtmsm 1 300,000 T" 1 1 | 1 ! | 1 1 1 I 1 1 I " J A J 0 J SOUTHWEST IS43 1944* 1945 PACIFIC

200,000 HOLLANDIA LEYTE f^ 200,000 \ - 100,000 100,000 - j J1 J A J 0 J J A J 0 J 1943 1944 1945 193 1944 1945

—Official U. S. Navy [ 37]

Data concerning the number of personnel on board checked this tendency, but the real advantages of and the deployment of personnel overseas through­ modern medical procedures, techniques, and knowl­ out the war is presented in graphic form in Plates edges were experienced during World War II. Navy 7 and 8. medical statistics show that of the wounded who sur­ After nearly four years of procuring personnel, the vived until they could receive medical care, about 98 Navy is now faced with the task of ensuring the out of 100 lived. The most recent tabulations indicate orderly return to civilian life of three million men an estimated rate for casualty deaths of 8.7 for the and women. By January of 1946 one of every three first six months of 1945 in terms of total naval persons in the wartime Navy will have been sepa­ strength as against 4.3 per thousand in 1944. This is rated. By the end of January half the total per­ primarily a reflection of Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and the sonnel, and by the end of March two thirds, will have attacks of the Japanese "kamikaze" pilots. The total been demobilized. It is expected that the rest of the death rate from all causes was 6.7 per thousand for temporary personnel will be discharged by 1 Sep­ 1944 in terms of total naval strength as against 6.0 tember 1946. per thousand in 1943. According to preliminary data Guided by national policy, as determined by the the total death rate from all causes for the first six Congress, careful consideration is being given to the months of 1945 was estimated at 11.9 per thousand. size of the Navy that will be required when de­ Over-all cases of sickness and injuries, exclusive of mobilization is completed. Roughly the current esti­ battle injuries, were at the rate of 495.4 per thousand mate provides for an active Navy which will be 30 average strength in 1944 as against a corresponding per cent of our present war strength. figure of 602.8 in 1943. Two statistical trends in naval The Navy's need for officers after the war is gov­ morbidity are worthy of note as indicative of the erned by the size of the fleet which the Congress effect of combat. The first is the average per cent determines is necessary to defend the United States of total strength in hospitals, which increased from and Western Hemisphere, and to discharge our inter­ 1.7 per thousand in 1941 to 2.1 per thousand in 1944 national agreements and obligations. We know that and 2.5 per thousand for the first six months of 1945. the Navy will need more officers and men than it Among other things this shows the effect of the now has in the Regular Navy—approximately 30,000 longer convalescent periods required for recovery more officers and a total of about 500,000 men. One and rehabilitation of war casualties from such of the best sources of the additional officers required injuries as penetrating wounds and fractured bones. is the Reserve and Temporary officers now on duty. Thus, even though the over-all casualty rate has been The program for their selection and transfer is well maintained at a relatively low figure, the total hos­ under way. On 16 August 1945 the Secretary of the pital population has been gradually increasing be­ Navy addressed a message to the service requesting cause of the trend toward a longer average number that Reserve and Temporary USN officers desiring of sick days per patient. The second significant trend to transfer to the Regular Navy submit their appli­ was that of mental disease case incidence, which in­ cations. The legislation upon which the program is creased from 9.5 per thousand of total naval strength dependent has been introduced in Congress. in 1941 to 11.8 per thousand in 1943 and 14.2 per thou­ The Navy is extremely proud of the work done by sand in 1944. These statistics demonstrate clearly the the Women's Reserve. It is our plan to keep a increase in tempo of modern war with its grueling, WAVES component in the Naval Reserve. Further, unfamiliar horrors. This was the .motivating factor if Congress approves, we will seek to retain on active which has caused the Medical Department of the duty a reasonable number of WAVES who wish to Navy consistently to emphasize its neuropsychiatric remain and who may be needed in certain specialties. services. We know from experience that they can be useful Statistically the wartime rates indicated above after the war in such specialties as communications, compare favorably with past experience in the Navy, the Medical Corps, and certain types of naval aviation even though the war years have necessitated the duty. maintenance of a large number of naval personnel in foreign waters or on foreign shores where they are HEALTH subjected to many endemic diseases and infections which are rarely encountered in times of peace. During the spring and summer of 1945 the Medical When final statistics are computed on medical care Department applied the medical experience of earlier during the war years, there is every indication, upon operations in its support of the Navy's assault upon the basis of preliminary figures, that medical science the inner defenses of Japan. Improvements in medi­ will be shown to have assumed an importance in the cal care of naval personnel included a more effective preservation of the health and lives of our fighting .chain of evacuation, of which large-scale use of air­ men never before equalled in the history of the craft formed an important part, the provision for a United States Navy. smoother and more rapid flow of medical supplies While the Navy Medical Department was actively to the fighting fronts, and the development of an engaged throughout the year in giving medical sup­ intensive program of preventive medicine, which port to amphibious operations in the Pacific, it was kept illnesses throughout the Navy and Marine Corps also providing medical care for thousands of Navy at a low level. men aboard the ships, submarines, and planes that In past wars, disease and infection have caused were daily carrying the war into enemy skies and more deaths and disability in armed forces than enemy waters. Good organization, careful training, actual combat itself. World War I significantly and judicious dispersal of medical personnel and [38] supplies made it possible for "the Medical Depart­ ing hospitalization, medical or dental attention, are ment to meet all demands made upon it in spite of cared for until fit for release, if desired by the indi­ heavy casualties aboard some vessels. These activi­ vidual, or until arrangements have been made for ties included careful classification of the wounded continued treatment outside of the Navy. in terms of the urgency of their cases; the use of voluntary crewmen as stretcher bearers, thus re­ THE MARINE CORPS leasing hospital corpsmen to assist in caring for the wounded; and the existence of the blood banks Prior to 1 March 1945 the Marine Corps had or­ aboard many of the vessels making available whole ganized and deployed as planned all combat units blood for the more serious cases. within the authorized strength of 478,000. In addition The Medical Department's second line of defense to the six divisions, four air wings and supporting after the support given in actual battle areas has been units of the Fleet Marine Force, there were 11,000 its system of fleet, advance base, base and naval hos­ Marines serving in detachments included within the pitals, its dispensaries, and its hospital ships. Scat­ complements of combatant naval vessels, and another tered throughout the world, they have provided many 28,000 providing security for naval shore establish­ thousands of beds and the other medical facilities to ments both within and outside of the United States give patients complete and definitive care. and at advance bases. The remainder of the Corps In order to give adequate support to the operational was employed in logistic establishments and in portion of the Medical Department, numerous techni­ training activities necessary for the continuous sup­ cal and administrative services have been required. port of field units. Medical research has been one of these. New drugs, Since practically all of the Marine Corps' efforts new applications of earlier discoveries, and new tech­ during the war were directed toward the Pacific niques have been developed through untiring re­ Theater, the victory in Europe resulted in a negli­ search and observation. Perhaps the most advertised gible change in commitments. Consequently it was of these is penicillin, which has been found capable not possible to effect a reduction of the size of the of stopping infection, even where the sulfa drugs Corps at that time. are powerless. Prevention and care of burns, use of When it became apparent that the authorized blood plasma, transportation of whole blood by air strength was inadequate to provide for the increasing to^battle areas, and proper methods for healing frac­ numbers who were hospitalized or convalescent, and tures are some of the problems receiving attention to maintain the desired rehabilitation program, the to the end that the Navy Medical Department will President, on 29 May 1945, raised the troop ceiling not only stay abreast of the developments in medical of the Ccrps to 503,000. Although the rate of pro­ science but may maintain its position as a leader. curement vas increased to provide this new strength, Rehabilitation programs for casualties are being the surrender of Japan occurred as the Corps attained conducted at a number of hospital centers scattered a strength of 484,631, and plans for partial demobiliza­ throughout the United States. The essential purpose tion were put into effect at once. of the program is to develop a clear-cut integrated In order to provide immediate replacements for procedure for the rehabilitation of men for return to Marines serving overseas who were entitled to early duty or to civilian life. This part of the program, in­ release from the service, training activities, other volving as it does the best possible medical, surgical, than recnit depots, sea-schools, and certain special­ and neuropsychiatric care, may be regarded as a ist schools, were suspended as soon as demobilization policy of the Navy. Special facilities in various naval was directed. Upon completion of their recruit train­ hospitals are made available to those casualties re­ ing, enlisted men now receive their advanced train­ quiring them. A second part of the program provides ing in the organizations to which they are assigned. for the close cooperation of the Medical Department This is in accordance with former peacetime prac­ with specialized rehabilitation agencies which are tices within the Corps. Training overhead was further designed to assist men to make the necessary adjust­ reduced by initiating a program of restricting future ments and receive the proper training to fit them for officer training to candidates who appear to be post­ useful employment in civilian life." Considerable war Regular officer material. emphasis has been placed upon the development of a Demobilization of personnel is being effected at the neuropsychiatric program, and efforts are made by maximum rate consistent with the availability of the psychiatrists to reach casualties needing their facilities and with the immediate commitments of services as quickly as possible after they are affected, the Corps, particularly the Fleet Marine Force. Con­ so that permanent injuries are avoided. Moreover, current with this demobilization is the reorganization psychiatrists assist naval offenders, who have been of the regular component of the Corps to meet imprisoned, in making readjustments. As a result, planned postwar requirements. Preparation is being many men who were formerly serious disciplinary made for the transfer of qualified Reserve and Tem­ problems are now returned to full active duty. porary officers to the Regular service in such num­ With the coming of peace, the previously prepared bers as may be authorized. When Japan surrendered plans of the Medical Department for handling the there were 71,460 Marines serving under current medical aspects of demobilization have been put into four-year regular enlistments. Recruiting of Regu­ effect. Every precaution is being taken to see that lars for four-year enlistments has been resumed, the men returned to civilian life are in sound physical with the priority in opportunity to enlist in the condition, particularly in regard to infectious dis­ Regular service being afforded to those who served eases and defects of a serious nature. Those requir­ in the war. [39]

On V-J day there were 1000 Women's Reserves creased and their task of supervising the handling serving in or en route to Hawaii, and at that time and loading of explosives for return to the United their further assignments to overseas duty were can­ States was expected to extend over a period of several celled. Women's Reserves are being demobilized as months. expeditiously as possible, and essentially in accord­ While the activities of Temporary Reservists, who ance with the same policies that apply to the men, serve without pay and are principally engaged in port but with lower critical scores. security work, were being discontinued along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts and the inland waterways THE COAST GUARD systems after V-E day, enrollments on the west coast did not relax with the heavy movements to the On 1 September 1945 Coast Guard personnel Pacific of personnel and supplies which continued totalled 170,480, including 9,624 in the SPARS. Since up to the surrender of Japan. By 1 September 1945, its total postwar military strength is planned at 34,- however, there were less than 12,000 Temporary Re­ 500, the Coast Guard has taken prompt action looking servists assigned to active duty out of a onetime total toward the ultimate demobilization of its wartime of 52,333. Some of these were pilots, who under forces. All enlistments in the Reserve and Women's limited control exercised by the Coast Guard had Reserve (SPARS) have been discontinued and future handled 120,000 pilotage assignments in 39 ports dur­ enlistments will be in the Regular Coast Guard only ing the 1945 fiscal year. and limited to 17-year olds. Legislation is being re­ In July 1945, 64 fixed and 17 mobile LORAN quested to permit the acceptance of a limited number (Long Range Navigation) stations were being oper­ of Reserve officers and enlisted men in the Regular ated by the Coast Guard. This advanced method of Coast Guard. establishing navigational positions by electronics In addition to the 1677 Coast Guard craft in active had been installed promptly on Iwo Jima and Oki­ service at the end of the 1945 fiscal year, Coast Guard nawa and provided LORAN lines of position over personnel on 1 August 1945 were manning 326 Navy the Japanese mainland, making for successful bomb­ craft and 254 Army vessels, about 50,000 Coastguard- ing missions. Forty-five RACON (Radar Beacon) men serving on Navy and 6,000 on Army craft. Only stations which give, within 120 miles of the station, 84 Reserve vessels remained in service out of a total the distance and bearing of an airplane or ship, had of 2,089 which had been taken over early in the been installed and were being operated by the Coast war, principally to combat the submarine menace Guard on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and in along the coasts. There had also been 908 other Alaska. While certain aids to navigation in the At­ vessels acquired during the war through purchase, lantic area used primarily for war purposes, such as charter or gift, and all but 252 of these had been swept channel markings, were being removed, there disposed of. was an accelerated demand for aids to navigation throughout the Pacific area to facilitate the forward Following the defeat of Germany, port security movement of our armed forces. Meanwhile studies measures on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts were re­ are being made of the possibility of designing light­ laxed. The examination of vessels leaving and enter­ ships which could be operated without regular crews ing ports was discontinued, as were identification on board. card requirements and licenses for individual vessel movements. Certain restricted areas on these coasts Some 1627 new vessels, aggregating 9,009,216 gross were abolished along with anti-sabotage water pa­ tons, which had been constructed during the fiscal trols and guards on cargo vessels and waterfront year 1945, had been certificated by the Coast Guard facilities. By the end of the 1945 fiscal year, only 34 under the marine inspection laws. Annual inspec­ ports had Coast Guard port protection as against 117 tions on 9720 vessels were completed during the year. ports a year earlier; the total personnel engaged in The passing of the peak of the emergency ship con­ such activities had declined from 23,817 to 16,304. struction relieved a number of field inspectors who After V-E day, three port protective programs were transferred from the east coast and Great Lakes were intensified—fire fighting, supervision over ex­ to Pacific ports for temporary duty. plosive handling, and anti-oil pollution. The training Merchant Marine Hearing Units continued to of personnel in fire prevention and fire fighting tech­ operate in all important United States ports while niques was followed by a program coordinated with others functioned in Europe, Suez, Ceylon, the south the Army to improve and strengthen fire protection and southwest Pacific and the Canal Zone. They measures at ports of embarkation. Thirty Navy fire- promptly investigated marine casualties and acted boats, Coast Guard manned, were assigned to forward as government liaison officers in merchant marine areas in the Pacific. Supervisory activities over the affairs. proper handling and stowage of explosives were ex­ The Coast Guard maintained nine air stations along tended to naval ammunition depots having port facil­ the coasts of the United States, under the operational ities, as well as to naval bases in the Pacific and to control of the various sea frontiers, with a total of European ports handling explosives and ammunition 165 planes. These have served as task units in the then being deployed to the Pacific. Finally, an inten­ conduct of air-sea rescue. Assistance was rendered sive educational campaign against oil pollution in in 686 plane crashes and 786 lives were saved during American, ports was begun. With the surrender of the fiscal year; 5357 emergency medical cases were Japan the size of the Coast Guard's munition han­ transported and 149 obstructions to navigation and dling details in the Pacific was considerably in­ derelicts were sighted for removal. y £ 40.]. VII—Naval Research and Development Touring ^florid ^sffar II

In December 1941 the United States faced seasoned ment, handling characteristics) and by advanced enemies, who not only had long been preparing for training methods and equipment. war but who had actually been waging it for several Perhaps the greatest technological advances of the years. Within the limited facilities and means avail­ entire war have been made in the field of electronics, able throughout the years of peace, the United States both within the naval laboratories and in collabora­ Navy had, however, equipped itself with weapons tion with the Office of Scientific Research and De­ the equal of, or superior to, those of other navies velopment. Pre-existing radar sets were developed and had laid the groundwork for still further devel­ and new models created for ship and air-borne search, opment. During the war the science and industry of fire control, and for accurate long-range navigation. this country and our allies were mobilized to apply Identification and recognition equipment were de­ existing scientific knowledge to the perfection of these weapons and the development of new and more veloped for use in conjunction with radar systems. deadly means of waging war. As a result the United New and highly efficient short-range radio telephones Spates Navy was able to maintain the technical ad­ are now in use for tactical communication. In the vantage over the navies of our enemies, which contrib­ successful antisubmarine campaign in the Atlantic, uted so materially to the outcome of World War II. small radio-sono-buoys were used; these, when dropped from aircraft, listened for the noise made The means of accomplishing this were not so much directed towards making new discoveries, as towards the exploitation of the skills and techniques which civilian scientists had already cultivated in years of peace. When war appeared imminent, the War and Navy Departments and the National Academy of Sciences gave close attention to the most profitable manner of utilizing the strength of American science in military and naval research. It was decided to attempt a solution involving the maximum flexibility and initiative, in which the fundamental principle would be cooperation between science and the armed forces, rather than to bring the scientists into mili­ tary and naval laboratories, as was done in England. The principle proved thoroughly sound. The ar­ rangement adopted was the establishment by execu­ tive order of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, which had as its scientific and tech­ nical working bodies the National Defense Research Council, the Medical Research Council, and later the Office of Field Service. To assure full integration of the potentialities of these organizations with the Navy's own research and development program and the needs of the service, the late Secretary Knox, in July 1941, established the office of Coordinator of Research and Development. Throughout the war, the development of new weapons and devices has been accelerated by the teamwork between the users, the scientists, the engineer-designers and the producers. ^ The devices and weapons resulting from the re­ search and development program have been put to use in every phase of naval warfare. Particular ex­ amples, cited because of their complexity and diversi­ fication, are amphibious warfare, carrier warfare, sub­ marine and antisubmarine warfare. In each of these cases, our combat effectiveness has been materially increased by improvements in communications, navi­ •—Official U.S. Navy photo gational devices, fire control, detection equipment, RADAR firepower, aircraft performance (range, speed, arma­ Antennae of an ESSEX-class carrier [41 ] by a submarine and automatically relayed the infor­ the victories of the Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadal­ mation to the searching plane. Great strides have canal. Over 26,000 sets of air-borne radar equipment been made in electronic antisubmarine detection were produced from the Naval Research Laboratory's equipment. Underwater echo-ranging gear and lis­ redesign of British air-borne equipment. Ours was tening equipment have been improved in quality and the first navy to install radar in submarines. Simi­ extended in function since the outbreak of the war. larly, a highly efficient super-sonic echo-ranging gear Countermeasures have been developed for jamming for submarine and antisubmarine warfare had been enemy radar and communication systems, disrupting completely developed, and was installed before the the control signals for his guided missiles, and war began. The success of all these electronic de­ counteracting his measures to jam our own equip­ vices can be traced back to intensive early develop­ ment. ment of new types of vacuum tubes. The foundation for our shipboard radar systems Initially, from want of experience against an had been laid before the war. The earliest observa­ enemy attacking with the persistence demonstrated tions of radio phenomena of the kind that are ex­ by the Japanese, our antiaircraft batteries were in­ ploited by radar were made at the Naval Research adequate. Particularly was this true in the case of Laboratory by groups working with Dr. A. H. Taylor automatic weapon batteries, consisting at that time and Dr. R. N. Page, and the military possibilities of the .50-caliber and 1.1-inch machine guns. The were immediately grasped by these scientists and by main antiaircraft batteries in the fleet, consisting of Rear Admiral H. G. Bowen, then Director of the 5-inch and 3-inch main batteries were controlled by Laboratory. Because of this, at the outset of the directors employing optical range information. Al­ war, our Navy alone had on its ships a search radar though antiaircraft fire-control radar was under de­ specifically designed for shipboard use. We had velopment, no installations were operative in the already incorporated in these radars the technical fleet. development of using a single antenna for transmis­ By the time Japan surrendered, our defenses had sion and reception. Radar of this type contributed to been revolutionized. The fleet was equipped with ac­ curate antiaircraft fire-control radar. Our antiair­ craft gun defenses consisted of multiple power- driven 40-millimeter mounts, 20-millimeter mounts, and 5-inch twin and single mounts, many of which were controlled by small intermediate range radar- fed gun directors. The VT, or proximity influence fuse, initially sponsored by the Navy and by the Office of Scientific Research and Development, marked a radical change from previous methods of detonating a projectile and vastly increased the effectiveness of antiaircraft defenses. At the end of the war, the 8-inch rapid-fire turret had been developed and was ready for introduction to the fleet. Completely automatic in action, it can be used against ship, aircraft, or land targets. The guns are loaded from the handling rooms automatically and are automatically laid. When the threat of the German magnetic mines became known in 1939, the Navy immediately mobil­ ized scientific talent and industrial capacity to pro­ duce a countermeasure. Several methods of demag­ netizing our ships were developed. These were applied before Pearl Harbor to all combatant vessels, and later to all other vessels, and were of material assistance in maintaining the safety of our vital shipping lanes. At the same time, acoustic and mag­ netic firing devices were developed and produced in quantity for our mines and depth charges. Electric torpedoes were developed to supplement the air- steam torpedo, which at the outbreak of war was our weapon of underwater attack. Rockets and rocket launchers were developed, with the assistance of California Institute of Tech­ nology and other agencies, for use on board ships and aircraft. Appropriate types of rockets were de­ veloped for use against submarines, for the support of amphibious landings, and for aircraft. These —Official U.S. Navy photo allowed heavy firepower to be concentrated in light RADAR craft. Vertical chart in plot room Fighter-plane speed was greatly increased during [42]

Training was enormously expedited by the intro­ duction of a great variety of synthetic training de­ vices. These endeavored to offer trainees an approxi­ mation of battle experience and to develop the reac­ tions of a veteran before actual combat. As an exam­ ple, it is now possible for the entire crew of a sub­ marine to rehearse approaches and torpedo attacks against enemy task forces in trainers on dry land, which provide simulated visual observation of the enemy, simulated radar and sonar information, and in which all of the complex battle gear and fire-con­ trol mechanisms operate as they do in a real sub­ marine. Certain developments, whose progress was most promising, were not completed in time for extensive combat use. These are primarily guided missiles and pilotless aircraft, utilizing remote control by elec­ tronic apparatus. These new developments will play a major role in warfare of the future, carrying new explosives over greatly increased ranges. In the early days of research leading towards the application of atomic energy for military purposes, the Naval Research Laboratory was the only govern­ —Official U.S. Navy photo ment facility engaged in this type of work. At the ELECTRIC TORPEDO Laboratory there was developed a liquid thermal diffusion process for separation of uranium isotopes. Submarine crew, reprovisioning at an advance base, Enriched chemicals, as well as basic designs and stow new electrically-driven weapon below decks operating practices, were later supplied to the Army and used in one of the Oak Ridge plants manufactur­ ing the atomic bomb. the war. At the end an experimental model ready The complexity of modern warfare in both methods for combat use had a speed of over 550 miles per and means demands exacting analysis of the measures hour. This plane was powered with turbo-jet en­ and countermeasures introduced at every stage by gines, little known before 1941. Development of the ourselves and the enemy. Scientific research can not conventional aircraft engine had also progressed; only speed the invention and production of weapons, whereas initially the maximum size was 1000 horse­ but also assist in insuring their correct use. The ap­ power, improved types of 3000 horsepower are now plication, by qualified scientists, of the scientific in use. Torpedo bombers, scout bombers, patrol method to the improvement of naval operating tech­ bombers, and scout observation planes have all been niques and material, has come to be called operations rapidly developed during the period. Carrier-borne research. Scientists engaged in operations research aircraft with increased speed, range, and armament are experts who advise that part of the Navy which carried the battle to the Japanese homeland, and pa­ is using the weapons and craft—the fleets themselves. trol aircraft with high speed, long range, and greater To function effectively they must work under the offensive power aided in supplying the information direction of, and have close personal contact with the necessary to the success of those operations. De­ officers who plan and carry on the operations of war. velopment of the arresting gear, launching catapults, During the war we have succeeded in enlisting the and handling equipment of our surface ships kept services of a group of competent scientists to carry pace with the increasing weights of planes, and out operations research. This group was set up as a allowed more planes per ship to be carried than had flexible organization able tp reassign personnel quick­ been possible in peacetime. ly when new critical problems arose. Fiscal and ad­ Our aircraft were a focus for developments in ministrative control of the group was originally vest­ many fields. Radar opened new possibilities for ed in the Office of Scientific Research and Develop­ search, night combat, and operations under poor ment. The group as a whole was assigned to the Navy visibility conditions. Aircraft guns were increased for functional control, and in the course of time was in size from the .30-caliber World War I weapon to attached to my Headquarters. 20-millimeter, 37-millimeter, and 75-millimeter gUns. The initial impulse toward the formation of such Air-borne rockets up to 11.75 inches in diameter a group arose in April 1942, during the early days of radically increased the striking power of conven­ the antisubmarine war. With the cooperation of the tional aircraft, with little penalty on performance. Antisubmarine Division of the National Defense Re­ Rocket power was also used on seaplanes for assist­ search Committee, seven scientists were recruited by ance in take-off with heavy loads and in high seas, Columbia University and assigned to the Antisub­ making possible the rescue of many downed aviators marine Warfare Unit, Atlantic Fleet. and thereby reducing our combat losses. Develop­ During the year 1942 the group was considerably ment of the "fire bomb" further extended the tactical increased in size, and in July 1943, at a strength of versatility of aircraft. approximately forty members, it was incorporated £43]

into the staff of the Tenth Fleet as the Antisubma­ rine Warfare Operations Research Group. Subse­ quently the administrative responsibility for the group was transferred from Columbia University to the Office of Field Service, without alteration in relationships with the Navy. In October 1944, with the decline of the submarine menace, the group was transferred to the Readiness Division of my Head­ quarters and renamed the Operations Research Group. At the close of the war it consisted of seven­ ty-three scientists, drawn from a wide variety of backgrounds. Many of the members were attached, •S-?lli.l:s as the need arose, to the staffs of fleet and type com­ manders overseas, and at operating bases in war theaters. So far as possible they were afforded the opportunity of observing combat operations at first hand. Operations research, as it has developed, falls into two main categories: theoretical analysis of tactics, strategy and the equipment of war on the one hand; and statistical analysis of operations on the other. Each type of naval operation had to be analyzed the­ oretically to determine the maximum potentialities of the equipment involved, the probable reactions of —Official U.S. Navy photo the personnel, and the nature of the tactics which would combine equipment and personnel in an opti­ JET-ASSISTED FIGHTER PLANE mum manner. Action reports, giving the actual re­ U.S. Navy carrier plane takes off for one sults obtained in this type of operation, were studied of the last strikes against Japan In a quantitative manner in order to amplify, correct, and correlate closely the theoretical analysis with what was actually happening on the field of battle. scientific knowledge and utilized to devise improved The knowledge resulting from this continued cross­ countermeasures. check of theory with practice made it possible to Submarine and antisubmarine operations are close­ work out improvements in tactics which sometimes ly complementary. Methods developed for attack increased the effectiveness of weapons by factors of have as a counterpart methods for defense based on three or five, to detect changes in the enemy's tactics the principles underlying both. In the subgroup de­ in time to counter them before they became danger­ voted to submarine warfare, theoretical and opera­ ous, and to calculate force requirements for future tional studies were carried out on coordination of operations. attack by groups of submarines; torpedo fire control; The late war, more than any other, has involved effectiveness of rescue of downed aviators; causes the interplay of new technical measures and oppos­ of loss of United States submarines; the relative ing countermeasures. For example, the German merits of various types of torpedoes under differing U-boats had to revise their tactics and equipment circumstances; and enemy countermeasures to our when we began to use radar on our antisubmarine radar search equipment. aircraft; and we, in turn had to modify our tactics Research on air problems has been devoted in the and radar equipment to counter their changes. In main to perfection of tactics designed to minimize this see-saw of techniques the side which countered flak hazard to naval aircraft attacking gtm-defended quickly, before the opponent had time to perfect targets, and to analysis of accuracy and effectiveness the new tactics and weapons, had a decided advan­ of aerial weapons, primarily against sea-borne tar­ tage. Operations research, bringing scientists in to gets. Bombs, rockets, and torpedoes are designed for analyze the technical import of the fluctuations be­ distinct uses, conditioned by the accuracy of launch­ tween measure and countermeasure, made it pos­ ing and by their lethal effectiveness. Studies of the sible to speed up our reaction rate in several criti­ peculiarities of these weapons have led to recom­ cal cases. mendations for tactics and training procedures. Likewise, in their struggle to counteract our im­ Studies were carried out by other subgroups on proved convoy escort tactics, the U-boats introduced defense of task forces against suicide attacks, on the the acoustic torpedo, which steers for a ship by effectiveness of antiaircraft fire, and on problems of listening to the sound it makes under water. Our naval gunfire as a support for amphibious landings. development of countermeasures was based on studies The Operations Research Group, to be renamed the by the Operations Research Group into the pattern Operations Evaluation Group as more closely descrip­ of sound produced in the sea by ships' propellers and tive of its function, will be continued as part of the on the probable reaction of the torpedo to various naval organizaiton at appropriate peacetime strength. decoy devices. In this and other cases, information The assistance and cooperation of industry and derived from intelligence sources was interpreted by science have been indispensable. Without this assist­ the members of the group in the light of their own ance, many of the weapons which have come into [44]

being as the result of intensive wartime research and individual resourcefulness the scientists in the axis development otherwise never would have been com­ countries were as competent as our own. Where pleted and introduced into the fleet. American science outdistanced the axis powers was It had often been predicted that in a national emer­ in the superior administration of the over-all effort gency the totalitarian countries would have a great so that the available scientific manpower of the coun­ technical advantage over the democracies because of try could function with the maximum effectiveness. their ability to regiment scientific facilities and man­ The leadership for what may be broadly termed the power at will. The results achieved by Germany, civilian emergency scientific effort was provided by Italy and Japan do not bear out this contention. the same individuals during the entire war period. Studies made since the close of the war indicate that These individuals deserve special mention among in none of these countries was the scientific effort those responsible for the superb administrative effi­ as effectively handled as in the United States. The ciency which characterized the American conduct of rapid, effective and original results obtained in bring­ the war throughoit. Dr. Vannevar Bush as the Di­ ing science into our war effort are proof of the responsiveness of our form of government to meeting rector of the Offici of Scientific Research and Devel­ emergencies, the technical competence of American opment carried th.over-all administrative and tech­ scientists, and the productive genius of American nical responsibilityfor that organization. Under him industry. . , Dr. James B. Conat as Chairman of the National Defense Research bmmittee; Dr. Alfred N. Richards It would be unfair to others to single out by name as Chairman of th Committee on Medical Research, individual scientists who made important scientific and Dr. Karl T. (mpton as the head of the Office and technical contributions to the improvement of of Field Services aninistered the scientific and tech­ old or the development of new weapons. There were nical activities otue Office of Scientific Research thousands of such contributions. It is generally con­ and Development, r. Frank B. Jewett as the Presi­ ceded that with respect to originality of ideas and dent of the Natiori Academy of Sciences and of its

'^•KL

—Offifial U.S. Navy photo [45] working body the National Research Council, and enemy. This resulted in "crash designs" and pro« Dr. Jerome C. Hunsaker as the Chairman of the duction that required considerably more personnel, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics di­ weight and space, than the more seasoned designs rected the activities of these organizations during that might have been produced had time been avail­ this period. The coordination of the work of these able. Thus, the rapid expansion and development of groups with the Navy was handled by the Office of new weapons and devices during the war was often the Coordinator of Research and Development headed at the cost of factors of major importance, such as by Rear Admiral J. A. Furer. the reserve buoyancy and stability of the ships in I wish to pay particular tribute to the group of which they were installed. Those wartime designs, scientists, industrialists and officers of the Army and while they have well served their purpose against the Navy who, under the direction of Major General enemy, have nevertheless created problems of refine­ L. R. Groves, USA, achieved the final outstanding ment and improvement in the ultimate design of technical success of the war—the development of a equipment, which must be so resolved that a minimum practical atomic bomb and the method of using it of personnel, weight and space will be required to from aircraft. attain the desired effect. These problems must be Sufficient progress in the technical development energetically attacked in the coming years of peace. and use of improved weapons and associated equip­ Only by continuing vigorous research and develop­ ment has been made during the war to emphasize the ment can this country hope to be protected from necessity for continued progress. Working under any potential enemies and maintain the position the stress of an emergency, the factor of primary im­ which it now enjoys in possessing the greatest effec­ portance was immediate effectiveness against the tive naval fighting force in history.

VIII— Conclusion

In my previous reports, I have touched upon the contemplated the war against Japan continuing far effective cooperation between our Allies which has into 1947. Even the latest plans were based upon the been of such fundamental and signal importance in Japanese war lasting a year after the fall of Germany. accounting for the success of our combined under­ Actually Japan's defeat came within three months takings. This cooperation has continued and been of Germany's collapse. The nation can be thankful extended in the period since my last report. that the unrelenting acceleration of our power in the I have spoken before of the full measure of coop­ Pacific ended the war in 1945. eration and support rendered by the ground, air and The price of victory has been high. Beginning service forces of the Army in a partnership of ac­ with the dark days of December 1941 and continuing complishment, which neither Navy nor Army could until September 1945, when ships of the Pacific Fleet have carried out singly. For that cooperation, undi­ steamed triumphant into Tokyo Bay, the Navy's minished throughout the war, and to the whole­ losses were severe. The casualties of the United hearted support from the great body of citizens who States Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard reached performed the countless and varied tasks which made the totals of 56,206 dead, 80,259 wounded, and 8,967 up our war effort, I reaffirm my appreciation. missing. Many of these gallant men fell in battle; Just as the Navy depended upon its sister services many were lost in strenuous and hazardous opera­ and upon the multitude of activities which produced tions convoying our shipping or patrolling the seas the implements of war, so also did the Navy rely for and skies; others were killed in training for the success upon the Reserves and the Regulars, the men duties that Fate would not permit them to carry out. and the women who constituted in its mutually sup­ All honor to these heroic men. To their families and porting elements—the Fleet, the Shore Establish­ to those who have suffered the physical and mental ment, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard and the anguish of wounds, the Navy includes its sympathy Seabees—each of which contributed its full share to in that of the country they served so well. victory. It is my sincere hope—and expectation—that the The end of the war came before we had dared to United States will hereafter remain ever ready to expect it. As late as August 1943 strategic studies support and maintain the peace of the world by being drawn up by the British and United States planners ever ready to back up its words with deeds.

it ik & ti & [46]

l JAPANESE ATTACK PEARL HARBOR .. . 7 DECEMBER 1941 2. JAPANESE ATTACK PHILIPPINE ISLANDS .8 DECEMBER 1941 3 BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA .7-8 MAY 1942 4 BATTLE OF MIDWAY .3-6 JUNE 1942 5 SOLOMON ISLANDS CAMPAIGN .AUGUST 1942-JUNE 1944 6 ALEUTIANS CAMPAIGN .AUGUST 1942-AUGUST1943 7 GILBERT ISLANDS OPERATION .NOVEMBER 1943 a MARSHALL ISLANDS OPERATION .FEBRUARY 1944 9 HOLLANDIA OPERATION .APRIL 1944 10 MARIANAS ISLANDS OPERATION .JUNE-AUGUST 1944 ill SEA OF II. WESTERN CAROLINES OPERATION t .SEPTEMBER 1944 l JAPAN I2L LEYTE LANDINGS - BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF. • OCTOBER 1944 t3. LINGAYEN GULF LANDINGS . .JANUARY 1945 14 IWO JIMA OPERATION .FEBRUARY-MARCH 1945 15. OKINAWA OPERATION .APRIL-JUNE 1945 STOKYO 16. BORNEO OPERATION .MAY-JULY 1945 17 PRE-INVASION OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN . .JULY-AUGUST 1945 18 SIGNING OF JAPANESE SURRENDER .2 SEPTEMBER 1945

Jll jCHICHI JfivIA | FOOCHOW OKINAWA JIMA IHAHA JIMA JKlllllll IWO JIMA MARCUS CANTON } FORMOSA

BAY OF MARIANAS LUZON ////A 11 JAKino BENGAL / SOUTH: : |0| 11 I ..SAIPAN CHINA PHILIPPINE TINIAN J?ANDAMAN • GUAM ISLANDS ISLANDS J 1SAMAR• mill .LEYTEf 1ULITHII \ rMINDANAO ^CEYLON NlfcOBAR- PELELIU PALAU fRUK ISI-ANDS* ^ISLANDS! PROLINE -CELEBES 1' 16 1 SEA .MdROTAl^llIIUII'mil^- , ;LANDS HALMAHERA\\^F_JI iORNEC LBIAK' ^HOLLANDIA v//. V 'NEW IRELANI f RAB/! GUINEA LAcr JAVA l>nflES-ST-R- \?

AUSTRALIA [47]

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^y£^"

** ,MIDWAY % !

PEARL HARBOR -I—**•

JOHNSTON

MARSHALL ISLANDS PALMYRA

.HOWLAND

PHOENIX ISLANDS SOLOMON SLANDS KEY

SANTA CRUZ Japanese position prior to 7Dec. 1941 ISL/SNDS SAMOA ISLANDS 7 Dec 1941 to I Jan. 1942 h*\ Japanese aggression ** t Jan. 1942 to 7Aug 1942 FIJI o- ISLANDS " Status — I March 1944

NEW Status—/March 1945 ALEDONIA Status —14 August 1945

—Official U. S. Navy [48] APPENDIX A Status of major combatant ships of Japanese Navy at the conclusion of hostilities

Ships Date Commissioned Final Disposition Ships Date Commissioned Final Disposition BATTLESHIPS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS- -Concluded FUSO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 25 October 1944 in KASAGI Not commissioned Under camouflage at Sase­ Surigao Straits, P.I. by bo; fitting out discon­ U.S. destroyers tinued HARUNA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 28 July 1945 at KATSURAGI October 1944 HEAVILY DAMAGED Kure by U.S. carrier 24-28 July 1945 at Kure planes by U.S. carrier planes HIYEI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 13 November 1942 RYUHO November 1942 HEAVILY DAMAGED off Savo Is., Solomons by 19 March 1945 at Kure U.S. fleet units and air­ by U.S. carrier planes craft RYUJO .ior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 24 August 1942 off HYUGA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 28 July 1945 at Mai ait a Is., Solomons by Kure by U.S. carrier U.S. carrier planes planes SHINANO ovember 1944 SUNK 29 November 1944. ISE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 28 July 1945 at S. of Honshu by U.S. Kure by U.S. carrier submarine planes SHOHO ecember 1941 SUNK 7 May 1942 in Coral KIRISHIMA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 15 November 1942 Sea by U.S. carrier planes off Savo Is., Solomons by SHOKAKU ior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 19 June 1944 off U.S. fleet units Yap by U.S. submarine KONGO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 21 November 1944 SORYU ior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 4 June 1942 off Mid­ off Foochow, China by way by U.S. carrier U.S. submarine planes and submarine MUSASHI August 1942 SUNK 25 October 1944 in TAIHO larch 1944 SUNK 19 June 1944 off Sibuyan Sea, P.I. by Yap by U.S. submarine U.S. carrier planes UNRYU 1944 SUNK 19 December 1944 MUTSU Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 8 June 1943 in Hiro­ in E. China Sea by U.S. shima Bay by accidental submarine explosion ZUIHO ior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 25 October 1944 NAGATO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 HEAVILY DAMAGED 18 N.E. of Luzon by U.S. July 1945 at Yokosuka carrier planes by U.S. carrier planes ZUIKAKU •rior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 25 October 1944 YAMASHIRO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 15 October 1944 in N.E. of Luzon by U.S. Surigao Straits, P.I. by carrier planes U.S. fleet units YAMATO December 1941 SUNK 7 April 1945 off Kyushu by U.S. carrier ESCOIT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS planes CHUYO November 1942 SUNK 4 December 1943 S.E. of Honshu by U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS submarine KAIYO November 1943 SUNK 24 July 1945 in AKAGI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 4 June 1942 off- Midway by U.S. carrier Beppu Bay, Japan by planes U.S. carrier planes JINYO December 1943 SUNK 17 November 1944 AMAGI August 1944 HEAVILY DAMAGED 24-28 July '1945 at Kure in S. Yellow Sea by U.S. by U.S. carrier planes submarine OTAKA 1942 SUNK 18 . August 1944 CHITOSE January 1944 SUNK 25 October 1944 N.E. of Luzon by U.S. N.W. of Luzon by U.S. carrier planes submarine 1942 SUNK 16 September 1944 CHIYODA October 1943 SUNK 25 October 1944 UNYO N.E. of Luzon by U.S. in S. China Sea by U.S. carrier planes and fleet submarine units HAYATAKA May 1942 HEAVILY DAMAGED 9 HEAVY CRUISERS (JUNYO) December 1944 off Naga­ saki; out of action at AOBA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 28 July 1945 at Sasebo Kure by U.S. carrier HIRYU Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 5 June 1942 off Mid­ planes way by U.S. carrier ASHIGARA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 8 June 1945 S.E. of planes Singapore by British sub­ HITAKA July 1942 SUNK 20 June 1944 in marine (HIYO) Philippine Sea by U.S. ATAGO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 23 October 1944 off carrier planes Palawan, P.I. by U.S. HOSHO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 OUT OF ACTION, lightly submarine damaged, in Japan area CHIKUMA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 25 October 1944 E. KAGA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 4 June 1942 off of Samar, P.I. by U.S. Midway by U.S. carrier carrier planes and fleet planes units [«]

Ships Date Commissioned Final Disposition Ships Date Commissioned Final Disposition HEAVY CRUISERS—Concluded LIGHT CRUISERS—Concluded CHOKAI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 24 October 1944 in NAKA Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 17 February 1944 Sibuyan Sea, P.I. by S.W. of Truk by U.S. U.S. carrier planes carrier planes KURUTAKA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 11 October 1942 off NATORI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 18 August 1944 E. Savo Is., Solomons by of Samar, P.I. by U.S. U.S. fleet units submarine HAGURO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 16 May 1945 off NOSHIRO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 26 October 1944 Penang by British car­ N.W. of Panay, P.I. by rier planes and destroyers U.S. carrier planes KAKO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 10 August 1942 off OI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 19 July 1944 in S. New Ireland by U.S. China Sea by U.S. sub­ submarine marine KINUGASA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 14 November 1942 OYODO February 1943 SUNK 28 July 1945 at off Savo Is., Solomons by Kure by U.S. carrier U.S. carrier planes planes KUMANO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 25 November 1944 SAKAWA November 1944 In Japan off W. Luzon by U.S SENDAI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 2 November 1943 carrier planes W of Bougainville, Solo­ MAYA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 23 October 1944 off mons by U.S. fleet units Palawan, P.I by U.S. TAMA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 25 October 1944 submarine N.E. of Luzon by U.S. MIKUMA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 6 June 1942 off submarine Midway Is. by U.S. TATSUTA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 14 March 1944 S. of carrier planes Yokohama by U.S. sub­ MOGAMI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 25 October 1944 in marine Mindanao Sea, P.I. by TENRYU Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 18 December 1942 U.S. fleet units and air­ in Bismarck Sea by U.S. craft submarine MYOKO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 OUT OF ACTION at YAHAGI December 1943 SUNK 7 April 1945 off Singapore; heavily dam­ Kyushu by U.S. carrier aged 13 December 1944 planes S.W of Saigon by U.S YUBARI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 27 April 1944 S. of submarine Palau by U.S. submarine NACHI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 5 November 1944 YURA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 25 October 1942 off in Manila Bay by U.S Santa Isabel, Solomons carrier planes by U.S. planes SUZUYA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 25 October 1944 E. of Samar, P.I. by U.S. TRAINING CRUISERS carrier planes TAKAO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 OUT OF ACTION at KASHII Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 12 January 1945 in Singapore; heavily dam­ S. China Sea by U.S. aged 23 October 1944 off carrier planes Palawan, P.I. by U.S. KASHIMA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 In Japan submarine TONE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 28 July 1945 at KATORI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 17 February 1944 at Kure by U.S. carrier air­ Truk by U.S. fleet units craft and carrier planes LIGHT CRUISERS DESTROYERS ABUKUMA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 26 October 1944 off AKATSUKI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 13 November 1942 Negros, P.I. by B-24's off Savo Is., Solomons by and fleet units U.S. cruiser AGANO October 1942 SUNK 16 February 1944 AKEBONO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 13 November 1944 N. of Truk by U.S. sub­ . in Manila Bay by U.S marine carrier planes ISUZU Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 7 April 1945 N. of AKIGUMO 1942 SUNK 11 April 1944 off Soembawa, N.E.I., by Zamboanga, Mindanao U.S. submarines by U.S. submarine JINTSU Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 13 July 1943 N. of AKIKAZS Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 3 November 1944 Kolombangara, Solo­ ;n S. China Sea by U.S. mons by U.S. fleet units submarine KINU Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 26 October 1944 AKISHIMO 1944 SUNK 13 November 1944 S.W. of Masbate, P.I by in Manila Bay by U.S. U.S. carrier planes carrier planes KISO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 13 November 1944 AKITSUK1 1942 SUNK 22 December 1944 in Manila Bay by U.S off Omai Saki, Honshu carrier planes by U.S. submarine KITAGAMI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 HEAVILY DAMAGED AMAGIRI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 23 April 1944 in 24-28 July 1945 off Kure Makassar Strait by mine by U.S. carrier planes AMATSUKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 DESTROYED 6 April KUMA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 11 January 1944 off 1945 off Amoy by B-25's Penang by British sub­ ARARE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 5 July 1942 off marine Kiska by U.S. submarine NAGARA Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 7 August 1944 W ARASHI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 6 August 1943 in of Kyushu by U.S. sub­ Vella Gulf, New Georgia marine by U.S. destroyers [ 50]

Ships Date Commissioned Final Disposition Ships Date Commissioned Final Disposition DESTROYERS—Continued DESTROYERS—Continued ARASHIO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 3 March 1943 in HATSUHARU Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 13 November 1944 Huon Gulf, New Guinea in Manila Bay by U.S. by U.S. Army bombers carrier planes ARIAKE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 28 July 1943 off HATSUKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 2 November 1943 Cape Gloucester, New W. of Bougainville Is Britain by B-25's by U.S. fleet units ASAGAO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 HEAVILY DAMAGED 22 HATSUME 1945 Not manned; in Japan August 1945 near Moji; HATSUSHIMO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 30 July 1945 in in Japan Miyazu Bay ASAGIRI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 28 August 1942 off HATSUYUKI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 17 July 1943 off Santa Isabel, Solomons Kahili, Bougainville by by Marine bombers U.S. Navy and Marine ASAGUMO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 25 October 1944 in planes Surigao Strait by U.S. HATSUZAKURA 1945 Not manned; in Japan fleet units HATSUZUKI 1942 SUNK 25 November 1944 ASAKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 23 August 1944 off S.W. of Manila by U.S. Cape Bolinao, Luzon by submarine U.S. submarine HAYANAMI 1943 SUNK 7 June 1944 S.E. of ASANAGI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 22 May 1944 N.W. Sibutu Passage, P.I. by of Bonin Is. by U.S. sub­ U.S. submarine marine HAYASHIMO 1944 SUNK 26 October 1944 ASASHIMO 1943 SUNK 7 April 1945 off S.E. of Mindoro, P.I. by Kyushu by U.S. carrier U.S. carrier planes planes HAYASHIO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 24 November 1942 ASASHIO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 3 March 1943 in in Huon Gulf, New Huon Gulf, New Guinea Guinea by B-17's by U.S. Army bombers HAYATE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 11 December 1941 AYANAMI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 15 November 1942 off Wake Is. by shore off Savo Is., Solomons by batteries U.S. fleet units HIBIKI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 HEAVILY DAMAGED 29 ENOKI 1945 HEAVILY DAMAGED 24 March 1945 at Hime- July 1945 near Maizuru; jima; in Japan in Japan HINOKI 1944 HEAVILY DAMAGED 5 FUBUKI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 11 October 1942 off January 1945 off Manila; Savo Is., Solomons by in Japan U.S. fleet units HOKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 6 July 1944 in S. FUJINAMI 1943 SUNK 27 October 1944 S. Celebes Sea by U.S. sub­ of Mindoro, P.I. by U.S. marine carrier planes IKAZUCHI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 13 April 1944 S.W. FUMITSUKI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 17 February 1944 at of Guam by U.S. sub­ Truk by U.S. carrier marine planes INAZUMA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 14 May 1944 off FUYO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 20 December 1943 Tawi Tawi, P.I. by U.S. off Manila by U.S. sub­ submarine marine ISOKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 7 April 1945 off FUYUTSUKI 1944 HEAVILY DAMAGED at Kyushu by U.S. carrier Moji by mine; decom­ planes missioned ISONAMI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 9 April 1943 in Bu- HAGI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 DAMAGED; in Japan ton passage, Celebes by HAGIKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 6 August 1943 in U.S. submarine Vella Gulf, New Georgia IWANAMI 1944 SUNK 4 December 1944 in by U.S. destroyers S. China Sea by U.S. HAKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 23 January 1943 off submarine Steffen Strait, Bismarcks KABA 1944 HEAVILY DAMAGED 24 by U.S. submarine July 1945 in Inland Sea; HAMAKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 7 April 1945 off in Japan Kyushu by U.S.- carrier KAEDE 1944 HEAVILY DAMAGED 31 planes January 1945 S. of For­ HAMANAMI 1944 SUNK 11 November 1944 mosa; in Japan in Ormoc Bay by U.S. KAGERO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 8 May 1943 in carrier planes Blackett Strait, New HANATSUKI 1945 LIGHTLY DAMAGED; Georgia by mines and in Japan aircraft HARUKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 HEAVILY DAMAGED 21 KAKI 1944 Not manned; in Japan January 1945 at Bako; KAMIKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 Operational; at Singapore in Japan KARUKAYA Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 10 May 1944 off HARUSAME Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 8 June 1944 N.W. Manila Bay by U.S. sub­ of Manokwari, New marine Guinea by B-25's KASHI 1944 HEAVILY DAMAGED 21 HARUTSUKI 1945 In Japan January 1945 at Takao; HASU Prior 7 Dec. 1941 HEAVILY DAMAGED 16 in Japan January 1945 off Hong­ KASHIWA Not commissioned In Japan kong; at Tsingtao KASUMI Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 7 April 1945 off HATAKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 15 January 1945 in Kyushu by U.S carrier Takao Harbor planes [51]

Ships Date Commissioned Final Disposition Ships Date Commissioned Final Disposition DESTROYERS—Continued DESTROYERS—Continued KAWAKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 6 August 1943 in MOCHIZUKI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 24 October 1943 E. Vella Gulf, New Georgia of New Britain by U.S by U.S. destroyers Navy patrol bomber KAYA 1944 HEAVILY DAMAGED 27 MOMI 1944 SUNK 5 January 1945 December 1944 off Min S.W of Manila Bay by doro; in Japan U.S. carrier planes KAZEGUMO 1942 SUNK 8 June 1944 off MOMO 1944 Uncertain Davao, Mindanao, P.I MURAKUMO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 12 October 1942 off New Georgia Is. by U.S by U.S. submarine carrier planes KEYAKI 1945 Not manned; in Japan MURASAME Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 6 March 1943 in KIKUTSUKI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 4 May 1942 off Tu Kula Gulf, New Georgia iagi, Solomons by U. S. by U.S. fleet units carrier planes MUTSUKI Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 25 August 1942 off KIRI 1944 HEAVILY DAMAGED 12 Santa Isabel, Solomons December 1944 near by B-17's Leyte; in Japan NAGANAMI 1942 SUNK 11 November 1944 KISARAGI Prior 7 Dec' 1941 SUNK 11 December 1941 in Ormoc Bay by U.S. off Wake Is by shore carrier planes batteries NAGATSUKI Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 6 July 1943 in Kula KISHINAMI 1943 SUNK 20 November 1944 Gulf, New Georgia by in Luzon Strait by U.S. U. S. fleet units submarine (?) NAMIKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 HEAVILY DAMAGED 8 KIYONAMI 1943 SUNK 20 July 1943 in September 1944 in Vella Gulf, New Georgia Kuriles; in Japan by U.S. Army and Navy NARA 1945 HEAVILY DAMAGED 30 planes June 1945 in Shimonoseki KIYOSHIMO 1944 SUNK 26 December 1944 Strait; in Japan off Mindoro, P.I. by U.S NASHI 1945 SUNK 28 July 1945 at Kure PT's and Army planes NATSUGUMO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 11 October 1942 off KURETAKE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 30 December 1944 Savo Is., Solomons by in Luzon Strait by U.S. U.S. fleet units submarine NATSUSHIO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 8 February 1942 off KURI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 At Tsingtao Makassar, Celebes by -U.S. submarine KUROSHIO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 8 May 1943 in NATSUZUKI 1945 HEAVILY DAMAGED 16 Blackett Strait, New June 1945 near Matsure; Georgia by mine in Japan KUSUNOKI 1945 At Maizuru; not manned NENOHI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 4 July 1942 off KUWA 1944 SUNK 3 December 1944 in Agattu, Aleutians by Ormoc Bay by U.S. de­ U.S. submarine stroyers NIRE 1945 HEAVILY DAMAGED 22 MAIKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 17 February 1944 June 1945 at Kure; in N.W. of Truk by U.S. Japan fleet units and carrier NIIZUKI 1943 SUNK 6 July 1943 in Kula planes Gulf, New Georgia by MAKI 1944 HEAVILY DAMAGED 9 U.S. fleet units December 1944 off Me- NOKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 20 February 1945 jima Is.; in Japan N.E. of Saigon by U.S. MAKIGUMO 1942 SUNK 1 February 1943 off submarines Guadalcanal Is. by mine NOWAKE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 25 October 1944 in PT boat, or aircraft Surigao Strait by U.S. MAKIN AMI 1942 SUNK 25 November 1943 fleet units N.W. of Buka Is., Solo­ NUMAKAZE Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 18 December 1943 mons by U.S. destroyers in E. China Sea by U.S. MATSU 1944 SUNK 4 August 1944 N.W. submarine of Bonin Is. by U.S. fleet OBORO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 12 August 1942 S. units of Honshu by U.S. sub­ MATSUKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 9 June 1944 E. of marine Bonin Is. by U.S. sub­ OINAMI Not commissioned marine OITE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 18 February 1944 MICHISHIO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 25 October 1944 in at Truk by U.S. carrier Surigao Strait by U.S. planes destroyers OKIKAZE Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 10 January 1943 off MIKATSUKI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 28 July 1943 off Honshu by U.S. sub­ Cape Gloucester. New marine Britain by B-25's OKINAMI 1944 SUNK 13 November 1944 MINAZUKI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 6 June 1944 S. of in Manila Bay by U.S. Sibutu passage, P.I by carrier planes U.S. submarine ONAMI 1943 SUNK 25 November 1943 MINEGUMO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 6 March 1943 in N.W. of Buka Is., Solo­ Kula Gulf, New Georgia mons by U.S. destroyers by U.S. fleet units OSHIO Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 20 February 1943 MINEKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 10 February 1944 N. of Admiralty Is. by E. of Formosa by U.S. U. S. submarine submarine OTAKE 1945 At Maizuru; not manned [32"]

Ships Date Commissioned Final Disposition Ships Date Commissioned Final Disposition DESTROYERS—Continued DESTROYERS—Continued OYASHIO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 8 May 1943 m TAKANAMI 1942 SUNK 30 November 1942 Blackett Strait, New off Savo Is., Solomons by Georgia by mines and U.S. fleet units aircraft TAKE 1944 In Inland Sea SAGIRI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 24 December 1941 TAMANAMI 1943 SUNK 7 July 1944 S.W. of off Kuching, Borneo by Manila by U.S. sub­ Dutch submarine marine SAKURA 1945 SUNK 11 July 1945 near TANIKAZE Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 9 June 1944 in Si- Osaka butu passage, P.I by SAMIDARE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 26 August 1944 off U.S.submarine Palau by U.S. carrier TERUTSUKI 1942 SUNK 12 December 1942 off New Georgia Is. by planes and submarine U.S. PT boats Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 18 November 1943 SANAE TOKITSUKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 3 March 1943 in in Celebes Sea by U.S Huon Gulf, New Guinea submarine by U.S. Army bombers SUNK 21 September 1944 SATSUKI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 TSUBAKI 1945 HEAVILY DAMAGED 24 in Manila Bay by U.S. July 1945 near Okayama; carrier planes in Japan SAWAKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 DECOMMISSIONED; in TSUGA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 15 January 1945 off Japan Pescadores Is. by U.S. SAZANAMI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 14 January 1944 carrier planes S.E. of Yap Is. by U.S TSUTv 1945 In Inland Sea submarine UME 1944 SUNK 31 January 1945 SHU 1945 Operational; in Japan area S.W. of Takao by B-25's SHIGEZAKURA 1945 SUNK 18 July 1945 at UMIKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 1 February 1944 Yokosuka by U.S. car­ S.E. of Truk by U.S. rier planes submarine SHIGURE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 24 January 1945 URAKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 9 June 1944 in Si- N.W. of Borneo by U.S butu passage, P.I. by submarine U.S. submarine SHIKINAMI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 12 September 1944 URANAMI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 26 October 1944 S. China Sea by U.S. S.W. of Masbate, P.I. submarine by U.S. carrier planes Prior 7 Dec. 1941 HEAVILY DAMAGED 14 SHIMAKAZE 1943 SUNK 11 November 1944 USHIO in Ormoc Bay by U.S. November 1944 at Man­ ila; in Japan carrier planes Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 7 July 1944 in Sea SHIMOTSUKI 1944 SUNK 25 November 1944 USUGUMO W of Borneo by U.S. of Okhotsk by U.S. sub­ marine submarine Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 11 December 1944 SHINONOME Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 18 December 1941 UZUKI off Miri, Borneo by mine off Leyte by U.S. PT boats SHIOKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 HEAVILY DAMAGED 31 January 1945 S. of WAKABA Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 24 October 1944 S. Formosa; in Japan of Mindoro by U.S. car­ rier planes SHIRAKUMO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 16 March 1944 S.E. of Hokkaido by WAKATAKE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 30 March 1944 at Palau by U.S. carrier U.S. submarine planes SHIRANUHI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 27 October 1944 in P.I. by U.S. carrier planes WAKATSUKI 1943 SUNK 11 November 1944 in Ormoc Bay by U.S. SUNK 20 June 1944 in SHIRATSUYU Prior 7 Dec. 1941 carrier planes Philippine Sea by U.S. Prior 7 Dec. 1941 Converted to target ship; carrier planes YAKAZE in Japan area SHIRAYUKI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 3 March 1943 Huon SUNK 25 October 1944 in Gulf, New Guinea by YAMAGUMO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 Surigao Strait by U.S. U.S. Army bombers destroyers SUGI Prior 7 Dec. 1941 HEAVILY DAMAGED 21 January 1945 at Takao; YAMAKAZE Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 25 June 1942 off Yokohama by U., S. sub­ in Japan marine SUMIRE 1945 At Maizuru; not manned YANAGI 1945 HEAVILY DAMAGED 15 SUZUKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 26 January 1944 N.W. of Ponape by U.S. July 1945 at Ominato by U.S. fleet units submarine YAYOI Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 11 September 1942 SUZUNAMI 1943 SUNK 11 November 1943 at Rabaul by U.S. car­ off Normanby Is. by B-17's rier planes SUZUTSUKI 1942 HEAVILY DAMAGED 7 YOITSUKI 1945 HEAVILY DAMAGED 2 April 1945 S. of Kyushu; June 1945 N. of Hime- jima; in Japan decommissioned ;in Japan TACHIBANA 1945 SUNK 15 July 1945 at YUDACHI Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 13 November 1942 Ominato by U.S. fleet off Savo Is., Solomons by units U.S. fleet units TACHIKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 17 February 1944 at YUGIRI Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 25 November 1943 Truk by U.S. carrier N.W. of Buka Is., Solo­ planes mons by U.S. destroyers [ 53]

Ships Dare Commissioned Final Disposition Ships Date Commissioned Final Disposition DESTROYERS—Concluded SUBMARINES—Continued YUGUMO Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 6 October 1943 1-20 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 1 October 1943 N. N.W. of Vella Lavella. of Kolombangara Is. by Solomons by U.S. de­ U.S. destroyer stroyers 1-21 Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 5 February 1944 in YUGURE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 20 July 1943 in S. Marshalls by U.S. de­ Vella Gulf, New Georgia stroyer escorts by U.S. Navy bombers 1-22 Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 19 November 1942 YUKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 Converted to target ship; off San Cristobal Is. by in Japan U.S. destroyer YUKIKAZE Prior 7 Dec. 1941 HEAVILY DAMAGED 30 1-23 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 26 April 1942 off July 1945 at Miyazu; in Johnston Is. by U.S. sub­ Japan marine YUNAGI Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 25 August 1944 off 1-24 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 27 July 1943 S.W. N.W. Luzon by U.S of New Hanover by U.S submarine submarine YUZUKI Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 13 December 1944 1-25 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK October/November in Leyte area by U.S. 1943 in Central Pacific carrier planes 1-26 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 25 October 1944 in Leyte Gulf by U.S. de- SUBMARINES a stroyer escort 1-27 February 1942 SUNK 12 February 1944 1-1 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 29 January 1943 off S.W. of Maldive Is. by Guadalcanal by New British destroyers Zealand corvettes 1-28 February 1942 SUNK 17 May 1942 S. of 1-2 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 7 April 1944 E. of Truk by U.S. submarine Admiralty Is by U.S. 1-29 February 1942 SUNK 26 July 1944 in Lu­ destroyer zon Strait by U.S. sub­ 1-3 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 9 December 1942 marine off Guadalcanal by U.S. 1-30 March 1942 SUNK May/June 1942 in PT boat Western Pacific 1-4 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 21 December 1942 S. of Rabaul by U.S 1-31 May 1942 SUNK 13 June 1943 N. of submarine Kiska by U.S. destroyer 1-5 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 10 June 1944 N.W 1-32 April 1942 SUNK 24 March 1944 E. of of Bismarck Is. by U.S Marshall Is. by U.S. fleet destroyer units 1-6 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 4 July 1944 E. of 1-33 June 1942 SUNK May/June 1942 in Saipan by U.S. fleet Western Pacific by acci­ units dent 1-7 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 22 June 1943 off 1-34 August 1942 SUNK 13 November 1943 Kiska by U.S. destroyer in Malacca Straits by Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 31 March 1945 S.W. British submarine - 1-8 of Okinawa by U.S. de­ 1-35 August 1942 SUNK 23 November 1943 stroyers off Tarawa by U.S. de­ Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 10 June 1943 N.E. stroyers 1-9 of Attu by U.S. patrol 1-36 September 1942 In Japan craft 1-37 March 1943 SUNK 18 November 1944 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 18 July 1944 N. of E. of Samar by U.S. de­ 1-10 Truk by U.S. destroyer stroyer and carrier planes escort 1-38 January 1943 SUNK 13 November 1944 May 1942 SUNK 17 February 1944 N.E. of Oahu by U.S. 111 E. of Marshall Is. by fleet units U.S. destroyer 1-39 April 1943 SUNK 24 December 1943 1-12 May 1944 SUNK May 1945 in South off Guadalcanal by U.S. Pacific destroyer 1-13 December 1944 SUNK 16 July 1945 E. of 1-40 July 1943 SUNK March/April 1944 Honshu by U.S. carrier in Central Pacific aircraft 1-41 September 1943 SUNK 16 September 1944 1-14 March 1945 Captured at sea 27 August E. of Honshu by U.S. 1945; in Japan; decom­ submarine missioned 1-42 November 1943 SUNK 23 March 1944 S.W. 1-15 Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK October/Novembet of Palau by U.S. sub­ 1942 in South Pacific marine 1-16 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 19 May 1944 N.E 1-43 November 1943 SUNK 15 February 1944 of Solomons by U.S. de­ N.W. of Truk by U.S. stroyer escort submarine 1-17 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 19 August. 1943 off 1-44 1944 SUNK 18 April 1945 E. of New Caledonia by Allied Okinawa by U.S. de­ surface craft and planes stroyers 1-18 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 25 December 1942 1-45 December 1943 SUNK 29 October 1944 E. off Kumusi R., New of Dinegat Is. by U.S. Guinea by U.S. PT boat destroyer escort 1-19 Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 26 November 1943 1-46 February 1944 SUNK December 1944 in W. of Makin Is. by U.S. Western Pacific destroyers 1-47 July 1944 Operational; in Japan area [54]

Ships Date Commissions Final Disposition Ships Date Commissioi Final Disposition SUBMARINES— SUBMARINES- 1-48 September 1944 SUNK 23 January 1945 off 1-176 July 1942 SUNK 17 May 1944 N.E. Ulithi by U.S. destroyer of Buka by U.S. de­ escorts stroyers 1-49 May 1944 In Japan 1-177 December 1942 SUNK November 1944 in 1-52 December 1943 SUNK 24 June 1944 in South Pacific Atlantic Ocean by U.S. 1-178 December 1942 SUNK June 1943 in Cen­ carrier planes tral Pacific 1-53 February 1944 HEAVILY DAMAGED 30 1-179 June 1943 SUNK February 1944 in March 1945; in Japan South Pacific 1-54 March 1944 SUNK 28 October 1944 E. 1-180 June 1943 SUNK 26 April 1944 off of Leyte Gulf by U.S. Kodiak, Alaska by U.S. destroyer destroyer 1-55 April 1944 SUNK 27 July 1944 E. of 1-181 May 1943 SUNK 16 January 1944 off Saipan by U.S. destroyer St. George Channel, Bis- escort marcks, by U.S. Navy 1-56 June 1944 SUNK 5 April 1945 W. of planes Okinawa by U.S. de­ 1-182 May 1943 SUNK 9 September 1943 stroyer in Surigao Strait by U.S. 1-58 September 1944 Operational; in Japan submarine 1-121 Prior 7 Dec 1941 Operational; in Japan 1-183 October 1943 SUNK 29 April 1944 off 1-122 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 10 June 1945 in- Bungo Channel, Japan Japan Sea by U.S. sub­ by U.S. submarine marine 1-184 October 1943 SUNK 21 June 1944 E. of 1-123 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 29 August 1942 E. Saipan by U.S. fleet of Guadalcanal Is. by units U.S. destroyer 1-185 September 1943 SUNK 17 June 1944 N.W. 1-124 Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 20 January 1942 off of Guam by U.S. de­ Port Darwin by Allied stroyers surface craft 1-201 February 1945 In Japan 1-153 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 DECOMMISSIONED; in 1-202 February 1945 In Japan Japan 1-203 June 1945 In Japan January 1945 SUNK 15 July 1945 N.W. 1-154 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 DECOMMISSIONED; in 1-351 Japan of Borneo by U.S. sub­ marine 1-155 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 DECOMMISSIONED; in Japan 1-361 May 1944 SUNK 30 May 1945 in Japanese waters 1-156 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 In Japan 1-362 May 1944 SUNK 27 November 1944 1-157 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 In Japan in Camotes Sea by U.S. destroyers 1-158 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 Operational; in Japan 1-363 July 1944 Operational; in Japan 1-364 June 1944 SUNK October 1944 in 1-159 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 Operational; in Japan South Pacific 1-160(60) Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 17 January 1942 in 1-365 August 1944 SUNK 29 November 1944 Sunda Straits by British S.E. of Tokyo Bay by destroyer U.S. submarine 1-162 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 In Japan 1-366 August 1944 Operational; in Japan 1-367 August 1944 Operational; in Japan 1-164 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 17 May 1942 S. of 1-368 August 1944 SUNK 26 February 1945 Kyushu by U.S. sub­ S. of Iwo Jima by U.S. marine destroyer escort 1-165 Prior 7 Dec 1941 DECOMMISSIONED 1-369 October 1944 DECOMMISSIONED September 1945; in Japan September 1945; in Japan 1-166 Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 17 July 1944 off 1-370 September 1944 SUNK 26 February 1945 Penang by British sub­ N.W. of Iwo Jima by marine U.S. carrier planes 1-168 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 3 September 1943 1-371 October 1944 SUNK January 1945 in *. off New Hebrides by Truk area U. S. destroyer 1-372 November 1944 SUNK 18 July 1945 at 1-169 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 4 April 1944 at Truk Yokosuka by carrier planes 1-170(70) Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK 10 December 1941 1-373 April 1945 SUNK 14 August 1945 in off Pearl Harbor by U.S. E. China Sea by U.S. carrier plane submarine 1-171 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 1 February 1944 W. 1-400 December 1944 Captured at sea 27 August of Buka by U.S. de­ 1945; in Japan; decom­ stroyer missioned 1-172 Prior 7 Dec 1941 SUNK October/November 1-401 January 1945 Captured at sea 29 August 1942 in South Pacific 1945; in Japan; decom­ 1-173(73) Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 27 January 1942 off missioned Midway by U.S. sub­ 1-402 July 1945 DECOMMISSIONED marine September 1945; in Japan 1-174 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 12 April 1944 N. of 1-501 July 1945 At Singapore Truk by U.S. Navy 1-502 July 1945 At Singapore bomber 1-503 July 1945 In Japan 1-175 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 30 April 1944 S. of 1-504 July 1945 In Japan Truk by U.S. destroyers 1-505 July 1945 At Batavia [55]

Ships Dare Commissioned Final Disposition Ships Date Commissioned Final Disposition SUBMARINES—Continued SUBMARINES—Continued 1-506 July 1945 At Surabaya RO-65 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 28 September 1942 RO-30 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK April 1942 in West­ at Kiska by B-24's ern Pacific RO-66 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 17 December 1941 RO-31 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 DECOMMISSIONED W. of Wake Is. by col­ during 1944; in Japan lision RO-32 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK April 1942 in West­ RO-67 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 4 April 1945 in In­ ern Pacific land Sea by mine RO-33 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 29 August 1942 RO-68 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 DECOMMISSIONED Sep­ S.E. of New Guinea by tember 1945; in Japan Australian destroyer RO-100 September 1942 SUNK 25 November 1943 RO-34 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 7 April 1943 N.W. off Bougainville Is. by of San Cristobal Is. by U.S. fleet units U.S. destroyer RO-101 October 1942 SUNK 1 July 1943 E. of RO-35 March 1943 SUNK October 1943 in Rendova Is., Solomons Solomons by U.S. destroyer RO-36 May 1943 SUNK 13 June 1944 E. of RO-102 November 1942 SUNK 4 April 1943 S. of Saipan by U.S. destroyer Santa Isabel Is. by U.S. RO-37 June 1943 SUNK 22 January 1944 E. destroyer of Solomons by U.S. de­ RO-103 October 1942 SUNK 29 May 1943 off stroyer New Hebrides by U.S. RO-38 July 1943 SUNK February/March patrol craft 1944 in Central Pacific RO-104 February 1943 SUNK 23 May 1944 N. of RO-39 September 1943 SUNK 3 February 1944 off Bismarck Is. by U.S. Wotje, Marshalls by U.S destroyer escort destroyer RO-105 March 1943 SUNK 31 May 1944 N. of RO-40 June 1943 SUNK February/March Bismarck Is. by U.S. fleet 1944 in Central Pacific units RO-41 November 1943 SUNK 31 March 1945 E. RO-106 December 1942 SUNK 22 May 1944 N. of of Okinawa by U.S. de­ Bismarck Is. by U.S. stroyer destroyer escort RO-42 August 1943 SUNK 10 June 1944 N.E. RO-107 December 1942 SUNK May/June 1943 in of Kwajalein by U.S South Pacific destroyer escort RO-108 April 1943 SUNK 26 May 1944 N. of RO-43 December 1943 SUNK 14 February 1945 Bismarck Is. by U.S. N.E. of Luzon by U.S. destroyer escort submarine RO-109 April 1943 SUNK 29 April 1945 S.E. of RO-44 September 1943 SUNK 16 June 1944 E. of Okinawa by U.S. fleet Eniwetok by U.S. de­ units stroyer escort RO-110 July 1943 SUNK 11 February 1944 RO-45 January 1944 SUNK 20 April 1944 W. of off Vizagapatam, India Saipan by U.S. sub­ by Allied sloops marine RO-111 July 1943 SUNK 16 June 1944 off RO-46 February 1944 SUNK 9 April 1945 S.E. of Truk by U.S. Navy PBY Okinawa by U.S. de- RO-112 September 1943 SUNK 11 February 1945 - stroyers N. of Luzon by U.S. RO-47 January 1944 SUNK 23 March 1945 in submarine Philippine Sea by U.S. RO-113 October 1943 SUNK 13 February 1945 destroyer N. of Luzon by U.S. RO-48 March 1944 SUNK 14 July 1944 W. of submarine Saipan by U.S. fleet November 1943 SUNK 16 June 1944 W. of units RO-114 RO-49 1944 SUNK 24 February 1945 Guam by U.S. destroyers off Bungo Channel, Japan RO-115 November 1943 SUNK 10 February 1945 by U.S. submarine N. of Luzon by U.S. RO-50 July 1944 Operational; in Japan submarine RO-55 September 1944 SUNK 14 February 1945 RO-116 January 1944 SUNK 24 May 1944 N. of N.E. of Luzon by U.S. Bismarck Is. by U.S. submarine destroyer escort RO-56 November 1944 SUNK May 1945 in Kuriles RO-117 January 1944 SUNK 17 June 1944 N.W. RO-57 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 DECOMMISSIONED of Truk by U.S. Navy RO-58 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 DECOMMISSIONED PBY RO-59 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 DECOMMISSIONED RO-500 September 1943 DECOMMISSIONED RO-60 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 29 December 1941 September 1945; in Japan February 1944 at Kwajalein by ground- RO-501 SUNK 13 May 1944 in Atlantic Ocean by U.S. RO-61 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK 31 August 1942 in destroyer November 1944 Aleutians by U.S de­ HA-101 DECOMMISSIONED stroyer and plane September 1945 RO-62 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 DECOMMISSIONED HA-102 December 1944 DECOMMISSIONED September 1945; in Japan September 1945 area HA-103 February 1945 In Japan RO-63 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 DECOMMISSIONED HA-104 December 1944 DECOMMISSIONED September 1945; in Japan September 1945 area HA-105 February 1945 In Japan RO-64 Prior 7 Dec. 1941 SUNK May 1045 in Hiro­ HA-106 December 1944 DECOMMISSIONED shima Bay September 1945 [ 56

Ships Date Commissioned Final Disposition Ships Date Commissioned Final Disposition - SUBMARINES—Continued SUBMARINES—Concluded HA-107 February 1945 In Japan HA-205 1 July 1945 In Japan HA-108 May 1945 In Japan HA-207 August 1945 In Japan HA-109 March 1945 In Japan HA-208 August 1945 In Japan HA-111 July 1945 In Japan HA-209 August 1945 In Japan HA-201 May 1945 In Japan HA-210 August 1945 In Japan HA-202 May 1945 In Japan HA-215 Not commissioned In Japan HA-203 June 1945 DECOMMISSIONED HA-216 August 1945 In Japan September 1945 HA-217 June 1945 In Japan HA-204 June 1945 DECOMMISSIONED HA-218 July 1945 In Japan September 1945

APPENDIX B Major combatant ships added to Unied States Fleet 7 December 1941—1 October 945

Type Dare Type Dare &> No. Name Commissioned Total Remarks #» No. Nane Commissioned Total Remarks BATTLESHIPS LIGFT CRUISERS—Conclu BB 57 SOUTH DAKOTA 20 March 1942 CL 67 TOPEK/ 28 Dec. 1944 58 INDIANA 30 April 1942 80 BILOXI 31 Aug. 1943 59 MASSACHU­ 81 HOUSTO 20 Dec. 1943 SETTS 12 May 1942 82 PROVIDHCE 15 May 1945 60 ALABAMA 16 Aug. 1942 86 VICKSBRG 12 June 1944 61 IOWA 22 Feb. 1943 87 DULUT 18 Sept. 1944 62 NEW JERSEY 23 May 1943 89 MIAMI 28 Dec. 1943 63 MISSOURI 11 June 1944 90 ASTOR] 17 May 1944 64_J5/OSGONSIN~ 16 April 1944 91 OKLAHfA CITY 22 Dec 1944 92 LITTLEOCK 17 June 1945 HEAVY CRUISERS 95 OAKLAD 17 July 1943 96J3ENO . 28 Dec 1943 CA 68 BALTIMORE 15 April 1943 97 FLINT 31 Aug 1944 69 BOSTON 30 June 1943 98 TUCSOl 3 Feb. 1945 70 CANBERRA 14 Oct. 1943 101 AMSTEDAM 8 Jan. 1945 71 QUINCY 15 Dec. 1943 102 PQRTSMJTJH _ 25 June 1945 72 PITTSBURG 10 Oct. 1944 103 WILKES ARRE 1 July 1944 73 SAINT PAUL 17 Feb. 1945 104 ATLAN1 2 Dec. 1944 74 COLUMBUS 8 June 1945 105 DAYTON 7 Jan. 1945 75 HELENA 4 Sept. 1945 33 130 BREMERTON 29 April 1945 131 JALJ- RIVER 1 July 1945 132 MACON 26 Aug. 1945 ARCRAFT CARRIERS 135 LOS ANGELES 22 July 1945 CV 9 ESSEX 136 CHICAGO 10 Jan. 1945 31 Dec. 1942 10 YORKTWlV 13 15 April 1943 11 INTREPO 16 Aug. 1943 12 HORNE' 29 Nov. 1943 LARGE CRUISERS 13 FRANKIN 31 Jan.1944 8 May 1944 CB 1 ALASKA 17 June 1944 14 TICONDROGA 2 GUAM 17 Sept 1944 15 RANDOPH 9 Oct. 1944 16 LEXINGON 17 Feb. 1943 17 BUNKE1HILL 25 May 1943 18 WASP 24 Nov. 1943 LIGHT CRUISERS 19 HANCOCK 15 April 1944 CL 51 ATLANTA 24 Dec. 1941 Sunk 20 BENNIISGTON 6 Aug. 1944 52 JUNEAU 14 Feb. 1942 Sunk 21 BOXER 16 April 1945 53 SAN DIEGO 10 Jan. 1942 31 BON HOMME 54 SAN JUAN 28 Feb. 1942 RICHARD 26 Nov. 1944 55 CLEVELAND 15 June 1942 36 ANTIET\M 28 Jan.1945 56 COLUMBUS 29 July 1942 38 SHANGH-LA 15 Sept. 1944 57 MONTPELIER 9 Sept. 1942 39 LAKE 58^J_lENYE.R„. 15 Oct. 1942 CHAMLAIN 3 June 1945 60 SANTA FE 24 Nov. 1942 17 62 BIRMINGHAM 29 Jan. 1943 63 MOBILE 24 March 1943 LARGE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 64 VINCENNES 21 Jan. 1944 65 PASADENA 8 June 1944 CVB 41 MIDWAY 10 Sept. 1945 66 SPRINGFIELD 9 Sept. 1944 [57]

Type Dare Type Dare &No. Name Commissioned Total Remarks &>No. Name Commissioned Total Remarks LIGHT AIRCRAFT CARRI ESCORT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS-—Concluded CVL 22 INDEPEN CVE 65 WAKE ISLAND 7 Nov. 1943 DENCE 14 Jan. 1943 66 WHITE PLAINS 15 Nov. 1943 23 PRINCETON 25 Feb. 1943 Sunk 67 SOLOMONS 21 Nov. 1943 24 BELLEAU 68 KALININ BAY 27 Nov. 1943 WOOD 31 March 1943 69 KASAAN BAY 4 Dec. 1943 25 COWPENS 28 May 1943 70 FANSHAW BAY 9 Dec. 1943 26 MONTEREY 17 June 1943 71 KITKUN BAY 15 Dec. 1943 27 LANGLEY 31 Aug. 1943 72 TULAGI 21 Dec. 1943 . 28 CABOT 24 July 1943 73 GAMBIER BAY 28 Dec. 1943 Sunk 29 BATAAN 17 Nov. 1943 74 NEHENTA BAY 3 Jan. 1944 30 SAN JACINTO 15 Dec. 1943 75 HOGGATT BAY 11 Jan. 1944 76 KADASHAN BAY 18 Jan. 1944 ESCORT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 77 MARCUS ISLAND 26 Jan 1944 CVE 6 BATTLER To U.K. 10-31-42 78 SAVO ISLAND 3 Feb. 1944 7 ATTACKER To U.K. 9-30-42 79 OMMANEY BAY 11 Feb. 1944 8 HUNTER Sunk To U.K. 1-9-43 80 PETROF BAY 18 Feb. 1944 9 BOGUE 26 Sept. 1942 81 RUDYERD BAY 25 Feb. 1944 10 CHASER To U.K. 4-9-43 82 SAGINAW BAY 2 March 1944 11 CARD 8 Nov. 1942 83 SARGENT BAY 9 March 1944 12 COPAHEE 15 June 1942 84 SHAMROCK 13 CORE 10 Dec. 1942 BAY 15 March 1944 14 FENCER To U.K. 3-1-43 15 STALKER To U.K. 12-21-42 85 SHIPLEY BAY 21 March 1944 16 NASSAU 20 Aug. 1942 86 SITKOH BAY 28 March 1944 17 PURSUER To U.K. 6-14-43 87 STEAMER BAY 4 April 1944 18 ALT AM AHA 15 Sept. 1942 88 CAPE ESPER- 19 STRIKER To U.K. 4-28-43. ANCE 9 April 1944 20 BARNES 20 Feb. 1943 89 TAKANIS BAY 15 April 1944 21 BLOCK ISLAND 8 March 1943 Sunk 90 THETIS BAY 21 April 1944 22 SEARCHER To U.K. 4-7-43 91 MAKASSAR 23 BRETON 12 April 1943 STRAIT 27 April 1944 24 RAVAGER To U.K. 4-25-43 92 WINDHAM BAY 3 May 1944 25 CROAT AN 28 April 1943 93 MAKIN ISLAND 9 May 1944 26 SANGAMON 25 Aug. 1942 ex-AO 28 94 LUNGA POINT 14 May 1944 27 SUWANEE 24 Sept. 1942 ex-AO 33 95 BISMARCK SEA 20 May 1944 Sunk 28 CHENANGO 19 Sept. 1942 ex-AO 31 96 SALAMAUA 26 May 1944 29 SANTEE 24 Aug. 1942 ex-AO 29 97 HOLLANDIA 1 June 1944 30 CHARGER 3 March 1942 ex-BAVG 4 98 KWAJALEIN 7 June 1944 31 PRINCE WIL­ 99 ADMIRALTY IS LIAM 9 April 1943 LANDS 13 June 1944 32 SLINGER To U.K. 8-11-43 100 BOUGAINVILLE 18 June 1944 33 ATHELING To U.K. 7-31-43 101 MATANIKAN 24 June 1944 34 EMPEROR To U.K. 8-6-43 102 ATTU 30 June 1944 35 AMEER To U.K. 7-19-43 103 ROI 6 July 1944 36 BEGUM To U.K. 8-2-43 104 MUNDA 8 July 1944 37 TRUMPETER To U.K. 8-4-43 105 COMMENCE­ 38 EMPRESS To U.K. 8-13-43 MENT BAY 27 Nov. 1944 39 KHEDIVE To U.K. 8-25-43 106 BLOCK ISLAND 30 Dec. 1944 40 SPEAKER To U.K. 11-20-43 107 GILBERT 41 NABOB To U.K. 9-7-43 ISLANDS 5 Feb. 1945 42 PREMIER To U.K. 11-3-43 KULA GULF 43 SHAH To U.K. 9-27-43 108 12 May 1945 44 PATROLLER To U.K. 10-22-43 109 CAPE GLOUCESTER 45 RAJAH To U.K. 1-17-44 5 March 1945 46 RANEE To U.K. 11-8-43 11CLSALERNO BAY 19 May 1945 47 TROUNCER To U.K. 1-31-44 111 VELLA GULF 9 April 1945 48 THANE To U.K. 11-19-43 112 SIBONEY 14 May 1945 49 QUEEN To U.K. 12-7-43 113 PUGET SOUND 18 June 1945 50 RULER To U.K. 12-22-43 115 BAIROKO 16 July 1945 51 ARBITER To U.K. 12-31-43 117 SAIDOR 4 Sept. 1945 52 SMITER To U.K. 1-20-44 110 (33 Leased) 53 PUNCHER To U.K. 2-5-44 > BAVG2 AVENGER To U.K. 3-2-42 54 REAPER To U.K. 2-18-44 3 BITER To U.K. 5-6-42 55 CASABLANCA 8 July 1943 5 DASHER To U.K. 7-2-42 56 LISCOME BAY 7 Aug. 1943 Sunk 6 TRACKER To U.K. 1-31-43 57 ANZIO 27 Aug. 1943 4 (4 Leased) 58 CORREGIDOR 31 Aug. 1943 59 MISSION BAY 13 Sept. 1943 60 GUADALCANAL 25 Sept. 1943 DESTROYERS 61 MANILA BAY 5 Oct. 1943 DD 445 FLETCHER 30 June 1942 62 NATOMA BAY 14 Oct. 1943 446 RADFORD 22 July 1942 63 ST. LO 23 Oct. 1943 Sunk 447 JENKINS 31 July 1942 64 TRIPOLI 31 Oct. 1943 448 LA VALLETTE 12 Aug. 1942 [ 58]

Type Date Type Dare & No. Name Commissioned Total Remarks &>No. Name Commissioned Total RemarksR DESTROYERS—Continued DESTROYERS—Continued DD 449 NICHOLAS 4 June 1942 DD 536VE3M 20 Sept. 1943 450 O'BANNON 26 June 1942 537 IE SULLI- 451 CHEVALIER 20 July 1942 Sunk VA.1SIS 30 Sept. 1943 455 HAMBLETON 22 Dec. 1941 Now DMS 20 538 CEPHEN POT­ 456 RODMAN 27 Jan. 1942 Now DMS 21 TER 21 Oct. 1943 458 MACOMB 26 Jan. 1942 Now DMS 23 539 INGEY 25 Nov. 1943 459 LAFFEY 31 March 1942 Sunk 540 WINING 1 Dec. 1943 460 WOODWORTH 30 April 1942 541 AR1STELL 30 Dec. 1943 461 FORREST 13 Jan. 1942 Now DMS 24 544 OYD 8 May 1943 462 FITCH 3 Feb. 1942 Now DMS 25 545 RADFORD 12 June 1943 463 CORRY 18 Dec. 1941 Sunk 546 ROWN 10 July 1943 464 HOBSON 22 Jan 1942 Now DMS 26 547COWELL 23 Aug. 1943 465 SAUFLEY 29 Aug. 1942 55CCAPPS 23 June 1943 466 WALLER 1 Oct. 1942 55nAVID W. TAY- 467 STRONG 7 Aug. 1942 Sunk LOR 18 Sept. 1943 468 TAYLOR 28 Aug. 1942 552 VANS 11 Dec. 1943 469 DE HAVEN 21 Sept. 1942 Sunk 553 )HN D. HEN­ 470 BACHE 14 Nov. 1942 LEY 2 Feb.1944 471 BEALE 23 Dec 1942 554 RANK 30 July 1943 472 GUEST 15 Dec. 1942 555 IAGGARD 31 Aug. 1943 473 BENNETT 9 Feb. 1943 556 IAILEY 30 Sept. 1943 474 FULLAM 2 March 1943 557 pHNSTON 27 Oct. 1943 Sunk 475 HUDSON 13 April 1943 558 HWS 18 Nov. 1943 476 HUTCHINS 17 Nov. 1942 559 USTGSHAW 4 Dec 1943 Sunk 477 PRINGLE 15 Sept. 1942 Sunk 560 KyRRISON 18 Dec 1943 Sunk 478 STANLY 15 Oct. 1942 ' 561 RICKETT 15 Jan. 1944 479 STEVENS 1 Feb. 1943 562 OBINSON 31 Jan. 1944 . 480 HALFORD 10 April 1943 563 DSS 21 Feb. 1944 481 LEUTZE 4 March 1944 564 BWE 13 March 1944 483 AARON WARD 4 March 1942 Sunk 565 SALLEY 31 March 1944 484 BUCHANAN 21 March 1942 566 SODDARD 15 April 1944 485 DUNCAN 16 April 1942 Sunk 567 \ATTS 29 April 1944 486 LANSDOWNE 29 April 1942 568 VREN 20 May 1944 487 LARDNER 13 May 1942 569 IULICK 27 Oct. 1942 488 McCALLA 27 May 1942 570 CIARLES AUS- 489 MERVINE 17 June 1942 Now DMS 31 BURNE 24 Nov. 1942 490 QUICK 3 July 1942 Now DMS 32 571 O.AXTON 8 Dec. 1942 491 FARENHOLT 2 April 1942 572 DYSON 30 Dec. 1942 492 BAILEY 11 May 1942 573 HARRISON 25 Jan. 1943 493 CARMICK 28 Dec. 1942 Now DMS 33 574 JOHN RODGERS 9 Feb. 1943 494 DOYLE 27 Jan. 1943 Now DMS 34 575 McKEE 31 March 1943 495 ENDICOTT 25 Feb. 1943 Now DMS 35 576 MURRAY 20 April 1943 496 McCOOK 15 March 1943 Now DMS 36 577 SPROSTON 19 May 1943 497 FRANKFORD 31 March 1943 578 WICKES 16 June 1943 498 PHILIP 21 Nov. 1942 579 WILLIAM D. 499 RENSHAW 5 Dec. 1942 PORTER 6 July 1943 Sunk 500 RINGGOLD 24 Dec. 1942 580 YOUNG 31 July 1943 501 SCHROEDER 1 Jan. 1943 581 CHARRETTE 18 May 1943 502 SIGSBEE 23 Jan. 1943 582 CONNER 8 June 1943 507 CONWAY 9 Oct. 1942 583 HALL 6 July 1943 508 CONY 30 Oct. 1942 584 HALLIGAN 19 Aug. 1943 Sunk 509 CONVERSE 20 Nov. 1942 585 HARADEN 16 Sept. 1943 510 EATON 4 Dec 1942 586 NEWCOMB 10 Nov. 1943 511 FOOTE 22 Dec 1942 587 BELL 4 March 1943 512 SPENCE 8 Jan. 1943 Sunk 588 BURNS 3 April 1943 513 TERRY 26 Jan. 1943 589 IZARD 15 May 1943 514 THATCHER 10 Feb. 1943 590 PAUL HAMIL­ 515 ANTHONY 26 Feb. 1943 TON 25 Oct. 1943 516 WADSWORTH 16 March 1943 591 TWIGGS 4 Nov. 1943 Sunk 517 WALKER 3 April 1943 592 I.OWORTH 3 April 1944 518 BROWNSON 3 Feb. 1943 Sunk 593 IILLEN 4 May 1944 519 DALY 10 March 1943 594 HRT 4 Nov. 1944 520 ISHERWOOD 12 April 1943 595 MTCALF 18 Nov. 1944 521 KIMBERLY 24 May 1943 596 SIELDS 8 Feb. 1945 522 LUCE 21 June 1943 Sunk 597 TLEY 22 Feb, 1945 526 ABNER READ 5 Feb. 1943 Sunk 598 AN CROFT 30 April 1942 527 AMMEN 12 March 1943 599 ARTON 29 May 1942 Sunk 528 MULLANY 23 April 1943 600 OYLE 15 Aug. 1942 529 BUSH 10 May 1943 Sunk 601 G.AMPLIN 12 Sept. 1942 530 TRATHEN 28 May 1943 602 IEADE 22 June 1942 531 HAZELWOOD 18 June 1943 603 URPHY 27 July 1942 532 HEERMAN 6 July 1943 604 iVRKER 31 Aug. 1942 533 HOEL 29 July 1943 Sunk 605 CLDWELL 10 June 1942 534 McCORD 19 Aug. 1943 606 CGHLAN 10 July 1942 535 MILLER 31 Aug. 1943 607 RAZIER 30 July 1942 [59]

Type Dare Type Date S>_Vb. Name Commissioned Total Remarks &> No. Name Commissioned Total Remarks DESTROYERS—Continued DESTROYERS—Continued DD 608 GANSEVOORT 25 Aug. 1942 DD 681 HOPEWELL 30 Sept. 1943 609 GILLESPIE 18 Sept. 1942 682 PORTERFIELD 30 Oct. 1943 610 HOBBY 18 Nov. 1942 683 STOCKHAM 11 Feb. 1944 611 KALK 17 Oct. 1942 684 WEDDERBURN 9 March 1944 612 KENDRICK 12 Sept. 1942 685 PICKING 21 Sept. 1943 613 LAUB 24 Oct. 1942 686 HALSEY POW­ 614 MAC KENZIE 21 Nov. 1942 ELL 25 Oct. 1943 615 Mc LAN AH AN 19 Dec. 1942 687 UHLMANN 22 Nov. 1943 616 NIELDS 15 Jan. 1943 688 REMEY 30 Sept. 1943 617 ORDRONAUX 13 Feb. 1943 689 WADLEIGH 19 Oct. 1943 618 DAVISON 11 Sept. 1942 Now DMS 37 690 NORMAN 619 EDWARDS 18 Sept. 1942 SCOTT 5 Nov. 1943 620 GLENNON 8 Oct. 1942 Sunk 691 MERTZ 19 Nov. 1943 621 JEFFERS 5 Nov. 1942 Now DMS 24 692 ALLEN M.SUM­ 622 MADDOX 31 Oct. 1942 Sunk NER 26 Jan. 1944 623 NELSON 26 Nov. 1942 693 MOALE 28 Feb. 1944 624 BALDWIN 30 April 1943 694 INGRAHAM 10 March 1944 625 HARDING 25 May 1943 Now DMS 28 695 COOPER 27 March 1944 Sunk 626 SATTERLEE 1 July 1943 696 ENGLISH 4 May 1944 627 THOMPSON 10 July 1943 Now DMS 38 697 CHARLES S. 628 WELLES 16 Aug. 1943 SPERRY 17 May 1944 629 ABBOT 23 April 1943 698 AULT 31 May 1944 630 BRAINE 11 May 1943 699 WALDRON 8 June 1944 631 ERBEN 28 May 1943 700 HAYNSWORTH 22 June 1944 632 COWIE 1 June 1942 Now DMS 39 701 JOHN W. 633 KNIGHT 23 June 1942 Now DMS 40 WEEKS 21 July 1944 634 DORAN 4 Aug. 1942 Now DMS 41 702 HONK 28 Aug. 1944 635 EARLE 1 Sept. 1942 Now DMS 42 703 WALLACE L. 636 BUTLER 15 Aug. 1942 Now DMS 29 LIND 8 Sept. 1944 637 GHERARDI 15 Sept. 1942 Now DMS 30 704 BORIE 21 Sept. 1944 638 HERNDON 20 Dec. 1942 705 COMPTON 4 Nov. 1944 639 SHUBRICK 7 Feb. 1943 706 GAINARD 23 Nov. 1944 640 BEATTY 7 May 1942 Sunk 707 SOLEY 7 Dec. 1944 641 TILLMAN 4 June 1942 708 HARLAN R. 642 HALE 15 June 1943 DICKSON 17 Feb. 1945 643 SIGOURNEY 29 June 1943 709 HUGH PURVIS 1 March 1945 644 STEMBEL 16 July 1943 710 GEARING 3 May 1945 645 STEVENSON 15 Dec. 1942 711 EUGENE A. 646 STOCKTON 11 Jan. 1943 GREENE 8 June 1945 647 THORN 1 April 1943 712 GYATT 2 July 1945 648 TURNER 15 April 1943 Sunk 713 KENNETH D. 649 A. W. GRANT 24 Nov. 1943 BAILEY 31 July 1945 650 CAPERTON 30 July 1943 714 WILLIAM R. 651 COGSWELL 17 Aug. 1943 RUSH 19 Sept. 1945 652 INGERSOLL 31 Aug. 1943 722 BARTON 30 Dec 1943 653 KNAPP 16 Sept. 1943 723 WALKE 21 Jan. 1944 654 BEARSS 12 April 1944 724 LAFFEY 8 Feb. 1944 655 JOHN HOOD 7 June 1944 725 O'BRIEN 25 Feb. 1944 656 VAN VALKEN- 726 MEREDITH 14 March 1944 Sunk BURGH 2 Aug. 1944 727 DE HAVEN 31 March 1944 728 657 BADGER 23 July 1943 MANSFIELD 14 April 1944 729 658 COLAHAN 23 Aug. 1943 L. K. SWENSON 2 May 1944 730 659 DASHIELL 20 March 1943 COLLETT 16 May 1944 731 660 BULLARD 9 April 1943 MADDOX 2 June 1944 732 HYMAN 16 June 1944 661 KIDD 23 April 1943 733 662 BENNION 14 Dec. 1943 MANNERT L. 663 H. L. EDWARDS 26 Jan. 1944 ABELE 4 July 1944 Sunk 664 R. P. LEARY 23 Feb. 1944 734 PURDY 18 July 1944 665 BRYANT 4 Dec. 1943 741 DREXLER 14 Nov. 1944 Sunk 666 BLACK 21 May 1943 742 FRANK KNOX 11 Dec. 1944 743 667 CHAUNCEY 31 May 1943 SOUTHERLAND 22 Dec. 1944 744 668 C. K. BRONSON 11 June 1943 BLUE 20 March 1944 745 669 COTTEN 24 July 1943 BRUSH 17 April 1944 746 670 DORTCH 7 Aug. 1943 TAUSSIG 20 May 1944 747 671 GATLING 19 Aug. 1943 SAMUEL N. 672 HEALY 3 Sept. 1943 MOORE 24 June 1944 673 HICKOX 10 Sept. 1943 748 HARRY HUB­ 674 HUNT 22 Sept. 1943 BARD 22 July 1944 675 LEWIS HAN­ 752 ALFRED F. CUN­ COCK 29 Sept. 1943 NINGHAM 23 Nov. 1944 676 MARSHALL 16 Oct. 1943 753 JOHN R. 677 McDERMUT 19 Nov. 1943 PIERCE 29 Dec. 1944 678 McGOWAN 20 Dec. 1943 754 FRANK E. 679 McNAIR 30 Dec. 1943 EVANS 3 Feb. 1945 680 MELVIN 24 Nov. 1943 755 JOHN A. BOLE 3 March 194S [60] Type Dare Ty>e Dare §> No. Name Commissioned Total Remarks &lo. Name Commissioned Total Remarks DESTROYERS—Continued DESTROYERS—Concluded DD 756 BEATTY 31 March 1945 DU 876 ROGERS 26 March 1945 757 PUTNAM 12 Oct. 1944 ' 877 PERKINS 5 April 1945 758 STRONG 8 March 1945 878 VESOLE 23 April 1945 759 LOFBERG 26 April 1945 879 LEARY 7 May 1945 770 LOURY 23 July 1944 880 DYESS 21 May 1945 774 HUGH W. HAD- 881 BORDELON 5 June 1945 LEY 25 Nov. 1944 882 FURSE 10 July 1945 775 WILLARD 883 NEWMAN K. KEITH 27 Dec. 1944 PERRY 26 July 1945 776 JAMES C. 884 FLOYD B. . OWENS 17 Feb. 1945 PARKS 31 July 1945 777 ZELLARS 25 Oct. 1944 885 JOHN R. CRAIG 20 Aug. 1945 778 MASSEY 24 Nov. 1944 386 ORLECK 6 Sept. 1945 779 DOUGLAS H. 387 BRINKLEY FOX 26 Dec. 1944 BOSS 14 Sept. 1945 780 STORMES 27 Jan. 1945 388 STICKELL 26 Sept. 1945 781 ROBERT K. 352 HUNTINGTON 3 March 1945 782 ROWAN 31 March 1945 LIGHT MINE LAYERS 783 GURKE 12 May 1945 784 Mc KEAN 9 June 1945 D1V 23 ROBERT H. 785 HENDERSON 4 Aug. 1945 SMITH 4 Aug. 1944 ex-DD 735 786 RICHARD B. 24 THOMAS E. ANDERSON 28 Sept. 1945 FRASER 22 Aug. 1944 ex-DD 736 792 CALLAGHAN 27 Nov. 1943 Si 25 SHANNON 8 Sept. 1944 ex-DD 737 793 CASSIN YOUNG 31 Dec. 1943 26 HARRY E. 794 IRWIN 14 Feb. 1944 BAUER 22 Sept. 1944 ex-DD 738 795 PRESTON 20 March 1944 27 ADAMS 10 Oct. 1944 ex-DD 739 796 BENHAM 20 Dec 1943 28 TOLMAN 27 Oct. 1944 ex-DD 740 797 CUSHING 17 Jan. 1944 29 HENRY A. 798 MONSSEN 12 Feb. 1944 WILEY 31 Aug. 1944 ex-DD 749 799 JARVIS 3 June 1944 30 SHEA 30 Sept. 19.44 ex-DD 750 800 PORTER 24 June 1944 31 J. WILLIAM 801 COLHOUN 8 July 1944 Si DITTER 28 Oct. 1944 ex-DD 751 802 GREGORY 29 July 1944 32 LINDSEY 20 Aug. 1944 ex-DD 771 803 LITTLE 19 Aug. 1944 Si 33 GWIN 30 Sept. 1944 ex-DD 772 804 ROOKS 2 Sept. 1944 34 AARON WARD 28 Oct. 1944 ex-DD 773 805 CHEVALIER 9 Jan. 1945 12 806 HIGBEE 27 Jan. 1945 807 BENNER 13 Feb. 1945* DESTROYER ESCORTS 808 DENNIS J. BD: 1 BAYNTUN To U.K. 2-13-43 BUCKLEY 2 March 1945 2 BAZELY To U.K. 2-18-43 829 MYLES C. FOX 20 March 1945 3 BERRY To U.K. 3-15-43 830 EVERETT F. 4 BLACKWOOD To U.K. 3-27-43 LARSON 6 April 1945 12 BURGES To U.K. 6-2-43 . 831 GOODRICH 24 April 1945 46 DRURY To U.K. 4-12-43 832 HANSON 11 May 1945 (6 Leased) 833 HERBERT J. THOMAS 29 May 1945 DESTROYER ESCORTS 834 TURNER 12 June 1945 DE 5 EVARTS 15 April 1943 835 CHARLES P. 21 April 1943 CECIL 29 June 1945 7 GRISWOLD 28 April 1943 836 GEORGE K. 8 STEELE 4 May 1943 MAC KENZIE 13 July 1945 9 CARLSON 10 May 1943 837 SARSFIELD 31 July 1945 10 BEBAS 15 May 1943 838 ERNEST G 11 CROUTER 25 May 1943 SMALL 21 June 1945 I3_BiEENNQN 20 Jan. 1943 839 POWER 13 Sept. 1945 14 DOHERTY 6 Feb.1943 857 BRISTOL 17 March 1945 15 AUSTIN 13 Feb. 1943 858 FRED T. BERRY 12 May 1945 16 EDGAR G. 859 MORRIS 9 June 1945 CHASE 20 March 1943 860 McCAFFERY 26 July 1945 17 EDWARD C. 861 HARWOOD 29 Sept. 1945 DALY 3 April 1943 862 VOGELGESANG 28 April 1945 18 GILMORE 17 April 1943 863 STEINAKER 26 May 1945 19 BURDEN R. 864 HAROLD J. HASTINGS 1 May 1943 ELLISON 23 June 1945 20 LE HARDY 15 May 1943 865 CHARLES R. 21 HAROLD C. WARE 21 July 1945 THOMAS 31 May 1943 866 CONE 17 Aug. 1945 22 WILEMAN 11 June 1943 867 STRIBLING 28 Sept. 1945 23 CHARLES 873 HAWKINS 10 Feb. 1945 ROGER 874 DUNCAN 25 May 1945 GREER 25 June 1943 875 HENRY W. 24 WHITMAN 3 July 1943 TUCKER 12 March 1945 25 WINTLE 10 July 1943 [61 ]

Type Dare Type Dare & No. Name Commissioned Total Remarks 8> No. Name Commissioned Total Remarks DESTROYER ESCORTS— Continued DESTROYER ESCORTS--Continued DE 26 DEMPSEY 24 July 1943 DE 98 SEYMOUR To U.K. 12-23-43 27 DUFFY 5 Aug. 1943 99 CANNON 26 Sept. 1943 ToBrazil 12-19-44 28 EMERY 14 Aug. 1943 100 CHRISTOPHER 23 Oct. 1943 ToBrazil 12-19-44 29 STADTFELD 26 Aug. 1943 101 ALGER 12 Nov. 1943 To Brazil 3-10-45 30 MARTIN 4 Sept. 1943 102 THOMAS 21 Nov. 1943 31 SEDERSTROM 11 Sept. 1943 103 BOSTWICK 1 Dec. 1943 32 FLEMING 18 Sept. 1943 104 BREEMAN 12 Dec. 1943 33 TISDALE 11 Oct. 1943 105 BURROWS 19 Dec. 1943 34 EISELE 18 Oct. 1943 106 SENEGALAIS To French 1-2-44 35 FAIR 23 Oct. 1943 107 ALGERIEN ToFrench 1-23-44 36 MANLOVE 8 Nov. 1943 108 TUNISIEN To French 2-11-44 37 GREINER 18 Aug. 1943 109 MAROCAIN ToFrench 2-29-44 38 WYMAN 1 Sept. 1943 110 HOVA ToFrench3-18-44 39 LOVERING 17 Sept. 1943 111 SOMALI To French 4-9-44 40 SANDERS 1 Oct. 1943 112 CARTER 2 May 1944 41 BRACKETT 18 Oct. 1943 N 113 CLARENCE L. 42 REYNOLDS 1 Nov. 1943 EVANS 25 June 1944 43 MITCHELL 7 Nov. 1943 129 EDSALL 10 April 1943 44 DONALDSON 1 Dec. 1943 130 JACOB JONES 29 April 1943 45 ANDRES 15 March 194 131 HAMMANN 17 May 1943 47 DECKER 3 May 1943 132 ROBERT E. 48 DOBLER 17 May 1943 PEARY 31 May 1943 49 DONEFF 10 June 1943 133 PILLSBURY 7 June 1943 50 ENGSTROM 21 June 1943 134 POPE 25 June 1943 51 BUCKLEY 30 April 1943 135 FLAHERTY 26 June 1943 52 BENTINCK To U.K. 5-19-43 136 FREDERICK C. 53 CHARLES DAVIS 14 July 1943 Sunk LAWRENCE 31 May 1943 Now APD 37 137 HERBERT C. 54 DANIEL T. JONES 21 July 1943 GRIFFIN 9 June 1943 Now APD 38 138 DOUGLAS L. 55 BYARD , To U.K. 6-18-43 HOWARD 29 July 1943 56 DONNELL 26 June 1943 Now IX 182 139 FARQUHAR 5 Aug. 1943 57 FOGG 7 July 1943 140 J.R.Y. BLAKELY 16 Aug. 1943 58 CALDER To U.K. 7-15-43 141 HILL 16 August 1943 59 FOSS 23 July 1943 142 FESSENDEN 25 Aug. i943 60 GANTNER 29 July 1943 Now APD 42 143 FISKE 25 Aug. 1943 Sunk 61 DUCKWORTH To U.K. 8-4-43 144 FROST 30 Aug. 1943 62 GEORGE W. 145 HUSE 30 Aug. 1943 INGRAM 11 Aug. 1943 Now APD 43 146 INCH 8 Sept. 1943 63 IRA JEFFERY 15 Aug. 1943 Now APD 44 147 BLAIR 13 Sept. 1943 64 DUFF To U.K. 8-23-43 148 BROUGH 18 Sept. 1943 65 LEE FOX 30 Aug. 1943 Now APD 45 149 CHATELAIN 22 Sept. 1943 66 AMESBURY 31 Aug. 1943 Now APD 46 150 NEUNZER 27 Sept. 1943 67 ESSINGTON To U.K. 9-7-43 151 POOLE 29 Sept. 1943 68 BATES 12 Sept. 1943 Now APD 47 152 PETERSON 29 Sept. 1943 69 BLESSMAN 19 Sept. 1943 Now APD 48 153 REUBEN JAMES 1 April 1943 70 JOSEPH E. 154 SIMS 24 April 1943 Now APD 50 CAMPBELL 23 Sept. 1943 Now APD 49 155 HOPPING 21 May 1943 Now APD 51 71 AFFLECT To U.K. 9-29-43 156 REEVES 9 June 1943 Now APD 52 . 72 AYLMER To U.K. 9-30-43 157 FECHTELER 1 July 1943 Sunk 73 BALFOUR To U.K. 10-7-43 158 CHASE 18 July 1943 Now APD 54 74 BENTLEY To U.K. 10-13-43 159 LANING 1 Aug. 1943 Now APD 55 75 BRICKERTON To U.K. 10-17-43 160 LOY 12 Sept. 1943 Now APD 56 76 BLIGH To U.K. 10-22-43 161 BARBER 10 Oct. 1943 Now APD 57 77 BRAITHWAITE To U.K. 11-13-43 162 LEVY 13 May 1943 78 BULLEN To U.K. 10-25-43 163 McCONNELL 28 May 1943 79 BYRON To U.K. 10-30-43 164 OSTERHAUS 12 June 1943 80 CONN To U.K. 10-31-43 165 PORKS 23 June 1943 81 COTTON To U.K. 11-8-43 166 BARON 5 July 1943 82 CRANSTOWN To U.K. 11-13-43 167 ACREE 19 July 1943 83 CUBITT To U.K. 11-17-43 168 AMICK 26 July 1943 84 CURZON , To U.K. 11-20-43 169 ATHERTON 29 Aug. 1943 85 DAKINS To U.K. 11-23-43 170 BOOTH 19 Sept. 1943 86 DEANE To U.K. 11-26-43 171 CARROLL 24_Oct. 1943 87 EKINS To U.K. 11-29-43 172 COONER 21 Aug. 1943 88 FITZROY To U.K. 10-16-43 173 ELDRIDGE 27 Aug. 1943 89 REDMILL To U.K. 11-30-43 174 MARTS 3 Sept. 1943 To Brazil 3-20-45 90 RETALICK To U.K. 12-8-43 175 PENNEWILL 15 Sept. 1943 To Brazil 8-1-44 91 HALSTEAD To U.K. 11-3-43 176 MICKA 23 Sept. 1943 92 RIOU To U.K. 12-14-43 177 REYBALD 29 Sept. 1943 To Brazil 8-15-44 93 RUTHERFORD To U.K. 12-16-43 178 HERZOG 6 October 1943 To Brazil 8-1-44 94 COSBY To U.K. 12-20-43 179 McANN 11 Oct. 1943 To Brazil 8-15-44 95 ROWLEY To U.K. 12-22-43 180 TRUMPETER 16 Oct. 1943 96 RUPERT To U.K. 12-24-43 181 STRAUB 25 Oct. 1943 97 STOCKHAM To U.K. 12-28-43 182 GUSTAFSON 1 Nov. 1943 [62]

Type Date Type Dare &No. Name Commissioned Total Remarks & No. Name Commissioned Total Remarks DESTROYER ESCORTS—Continued DBTROYER ESCORTS— Continued DE 183 SAMUEL S. DE 259 WILIAM C. MILES 4 Nov. 1943 RLLER 2 July 1943 184 WESSON 11 Nov. 1943 260 CAANA 9 July 1943 185 RIDDLE 17 Nov. 1943 261 DDNNE 16 July 1943 186 SWEARER 23 Nov. 1943 262 C/JFIELD 22 July 1943 187 STERN 1 Dec. 1943 263 DEDE 29 July 1943 188 O'NEILL 6 Dec. 1943 264 ELEN 5 Aug. 1943 189 BRONSTEIN 13 Dec. 1943 265 C1UES 10 Aug. 1943 190 BAKER 23 Dec 1943 266 C_>EL. To U.K. 8-24-43 191 COFFMAN 27 Dec 1943 267 COKE To U.K. 8-30-43 192 EISNER 1 Jan. 1944 268 DARES To U.K. 8-31-43 193 GARFIELD 269 DOIETT To U.K. 9-10-43 THOMAS 24 Jan. 1944 270 FOEY To U.K. 9-16-43 194 WINGFIELD 28 Jan. 1944 271 GALIES To U.K. 9-20-43 195 THORNHILL 1 Feb. 1944 272 GOLD To U.K. 9-25-43 196 RINEHART 12 Feb. 1944 273 GRID ALL To U.K. 9-30-43 197 ROCHE 21 Feb. 1944 274 GADHSTER To U.K. 9-30-43 198 LOVELACE 7 Nov. 1943 275 GODALL To U.K. 10-11-43 199 MANNING 1 Oct. 1943 276 GODSON To U.K. 10-16-43 200 NEUENDORF 18 October 1943 277 GOE To U.K. 10-22-43 201 JAMES E.CRAIG 1 Nov. 1943 278 KETS To U.K. 10-28-43 202 EICHEN- 279 KEPTHORNE To U.K. 10-31-43 BERGER 17 Nov. 1943 280 KIGS1AILL To U.K. 11-6-43 203 THOMASON 10 Dec. 1943 301 LA^E, 5 Feb. 1944 204 JORDAN 17 Dec. 1943 302 LYtfAN 19 Feb. 1944 205 NEWMAN 26 Nov. 1943 Now APD 59 303 CFJWLEY 25 March 1944 206 LIDDLE 6 Dec. 1943 Now APD 60 304 RAL 8 April 1944 207 KEPHART 7 Jan. 1944 Now APD 61 305 H/XORAN 27 May 1944 208 COFER 19 Jan. 1944 Now APD 62 306 CWNOLLY 8 July 1944 209 LLOYD 11 Feb. 1944 Now APD 63 307 FINEGAN 19 Aug. 1944 210 OTTER 21 Feb. 1944 316 HiJVESON 12 Oct. 1943 211 HUBBARD 6 March 1944 Now APD 53 317 JOCE 30 Sept. 1943 212 HAYTER 16 March 1944 Now APD 80 318 KIKPATRICK 23 Oct. 1943 213 WILLIAM T. 319 LDPOLD 18 Oct. 1943 Sunk POWELL 28 March 1944 320 MEIGES 26 Oct. 1943 214 SCOTT 20 July 1943 321 MGLEY 30 Oct. 1943 215 BURKE 20 Aug. 1943 Now APD 65 322 NEvVELL 30 Oct. 1943 216 ENRIGHT 21 Sept. 1943 Now APD 66 323 PRDE 13 Nov. 1943 ) 217 COOLBAUGH 15 Oct. 1943 324 F_LGOUT 15 Nov. 1943 218 DARBY 15 Nov. 1943 325 LtWE 22 Nov. 1943 219 J. DOUGLAS 326 TIOMAS J. BLACKWOOD 15 Dec. 1943 QRY 27 Nov. 1943 220 FRANCIS M. 327 BRITER 30 Nov. 1943 ROBINSON 15 Jan. 1944 328 FINJ 13 Dec. 1943 221 SOLAR 15 Feb. 1944 329 KRietlMER 13 Dec. 1943 222 FOWLER 15 March 1944 330 O'RILLY 28 Dec. 1943 223 SPANGEBERG 15 April 1944 331 KO. HALE 3 Feb. 1944 239 STURTEVANT 16 June 1943 337 DA_E W. 240 MOORE 1 July 1943 JETERSON 17 Feb. 1944 241 KEITH 19 July 1943 338 MRTIN H. RAY 28 Feb. 1944 242 TOMICH 26 July 1943 339 JON C. 243 J. RICHARD UTLER 31 March 1944 WARD 5 July 1943 340 O'FLFJERTY 8 April 1944 244 OTTERSTETTER 6 Aug. 1943 341 RATOND 15 April 1944 245 SLOAT 16 Aug. 1943 246 SNOWDEN 23 Aug. 1943 342 RICARD W. 247 STANTON 7 Aug. 1943 SESENS 26 April 1944 248 SWASEY 31 Aug. 1943 343 ABRCROMBIE 29 April 1944 249 MARCHAND 8 Sept. 1943 344 ABRRENDER 11 May 1944 Stricken 250 HURST 30 Aug. 1943 345 ROERT 251 CAMP 16 Sept. 1943 BLAZIER 18 May 1944 252 HOWARD D. 346 EDVIN A. CROW 27 Sept. 1943 IOWARD 25 May 1944 253 PETTIT 23 Sept. 1943 347 JESE RUTHER 254 RICKETTS 5 Oct. 1943 FRD 31 May 1944 255 SELLSTROM 12 Oct. 1943 348 KE 5 June 1944 256 SEID 11 June 1943 349 GEJTRY 14 June 1944 257 SMARTT 18 June 1943 350 TRAV 20 June 1944 258 WALTER S. 351 MA.RICE J. BROWN 25 June 1943 NANUEL 30 June 1944 [63]

Type Dare Type Dare &> No. Name Commissioned Total Remarks & No. Name Commissioned Total Remarks DESTROYER ESCORTS—Cont DESTROYER ESCORTS—Continued DE 352 NAIFEH 4 July 1944 DE 419 ROBERT F. 353 DOYLE C. KELLER 17 June 1944 BARNES 13 July 1944 420 LELAND E. 354 KENNETH M. THOMAS 19 June 1944 WILLET 19 July 1944 421 CHESTER T. 355 JACCARD 26 July 1944 O'BRIEN 3 July 1944 356 LLOYD E. 422 DOUGLAS A. AGREE 1 Aug. 1944 MUNRO 11 July 1945 357 GEORGE E 423 DUFILHO 21 July 1944 DAVIS 11 Aug. 1944 424 HAAS 2 Aug. 1944 358 MACK 16 Aug. 1944 438 CORBESIER 31 March 1944 359 WOODSON 24 Aug. 1944 439 CONKLIN 21 April 1944 360 JOHNNIE 440 McCOY HUTCHINS 28 Aug. 1944 REYNOLDS 2 May 1944 361 WALTON 4 Sept. 1944 441 WILLIAM 362 ROLF 7 Sept. 1944 SEIVERLING 1 June 1944 363 PRATT 18 Sept. 1944 442 ULVER M. 364 ROMBACK 20 Sept. 1944 MOORE 18 July 1944 365 McGINTY 25 Sept. 1944 443 KENDALL C. 366 ALVIN C. CAMPBELL 31 July 1944 444 COCKRELL 7 Oct. 1944 GOSS 26 Aug. 1944 445 GRADY 367 FRENCH 9 Oct. 1944 11 Sept. 1944 446 CHARLES E. 368 CECIL P. BANNON 1 Nov. 1944 DOYLE 16 Oct. 1944 447 ALBERT T. 369 THADDEUS HARRIS 29 Nov. 1944 PARKER 25 Oct. 1944 448 CROSS 8 Jan. 1945 370 JOHN L. 449 HANNA 27 Jan. 1945 WILLIAMSON 31 Oct. 1944 450 JOSEPH E. 371 PRESLEY 7 Nov. 1944 CONNOLLY 28 Feb. 1945 372 WILLIAMS 11 Nov. 1944 508 GILLIGAN 12 May 1944 382 RAMSDEN 19 Oct. 1943 509 FORMOE 5 Oct. 1944 383 MILLS 12 Oct. 1943 510 HEYLIGER 24 March 1945 384 RHODES 25 Oct. 1943 516 LAWFORD To U.K. 11-3-43 385 RICKEY 30 Oct. 1943 517 LOUIS To U.K. 386 SAVAGE 29 Oct. 1943 11-18-43 518 LAWSON To U.K. 11-25-43 387 VANCE 1 Nov. 1943 519 PAISLEY To U.K. 11-29-43 388 LANSING 10 Nov. 1943 520 LORING To U.K. 389 DURANT 16 Nov. 1943 12-5-43 521 HOSTE 390 CALCATERRA 17 Nov. 1943 To U.K. 12-14-43 522 MOORSOM To U.K. 12-20-43 391 CHAMBERS 22 Nov. 1943 523 MANNERS 392 MERRILL 27 Nov. 1943 To U.K. 12-27-43 524 MOUNSEY To U.K. 393 HAVERFIELD 29 Nov. 1943 12-31-43 525 INGLIS To U.K. 1-12-44 394 SWENNING 1 Dec. 1943 526 INMAN To U.K. 1-24-44 395 WILLIS 10 Dec. 1943 527 O'TOOLE 22 Jan. 1944 396 JANSSEN 18 Dec. 1943 528 JOHN J. 397 WILHOITE 16 Dec. 1943 POWERS 29 Feb. 1944 398 COCKRILL 24 Dec. 1943 529 MASON 20 March 1944 399 STOCKDALE 31 Dec. 1943 530 400 HISSEM 13 Jan.1944 JOHN M. 401 HOLDER 18 Jan. 1944 Scrapped BERMING- HAM 8 April 1944 402 RICHARD S 531 EDWARD H BULL 26 Feb. 1944 ALLEN 16 Dec. 1943 403 HOWARD M 532 TWEEDY 12 Feb. 1944 ROWELL 9 March 1944 533 HOWARD F. 404 EVERSOLE 21 March 1944 Sunk CLARK 25 May 1944 405 DENNIS 20 March 1944 534 SILVERSTEIN 14 July 1944 406 EDMONDS 3 April 1944 535 LEWIS 5 Sept. 1944 407 SHELTON 4 April 1944 Sunk 536 BIVIN 31 Oct. 1944 408 STRAUS 6 April 1944 537 RIZZI 26 June 1945 409 LA PRADE 20 April 1944 563 SPRAGGE To U.K. 410 JACK MILLER 13 April 1944 1-14-44 564 STAYMER To U.K. 411 STAFFORD 19 April 1944 12-30-43 565 THORN- 412 WALTER C BOROUGH To U.K. WANN 2 May 1944 12-31-43 566 TROLLOPE To U.K. 1-10-44 413 SAMUEL B 567 TYLER To U.K. 1-14-44 ROBERTS 28 April 1944 Sunk 568 TORRINGTON To U.K. 1-18-44 414 LE ROY WILSON 10 May 1944 569 NARBROUGH To U.K. 1-21-44 415 LAWRENCE 570 WALDEGRAVE To U.K. 1-25-44 TAYLOR 13 May 1944 571 WHITAKER To U.K. 1-28-44 416 MELVIN R. 572 HOLMES To U.K. 1-31-44 NAWMAN 16 May 1944 573 HARGOOD To U.K. 2-7-44 . 417 OLIVER 574 HOTHAM To U.K. 2-8-44 MITCHELL 14 June 1944 575 AHRENS 12 Feb 1944 418 TABBERER 23 May 1944 576 BARR 15 Feb. 1944 Now APD 39 [«]

Type Dare Type Dare &No. Name Commissioned Total Remarks 8> No. Name Commissioned Total Remarks DESTROYER ESCORTS—Continued ESTROYER ESCORTS—Concluded DE 577 ALEXANDER DE 746 HVEMINGER 30 May 1944 J. LUKE 19 Feb. 1944 747 HGHT 30 June 1944 578 ROBERT I 748 LLS 8 Aug. 1944 PAINE 28 Feb. 1944 749 RBERTS 2 Sept. 1944 579 RILEY 13 March 1944 750 fcCLELLAND 19 Sept. 1944 580 LESLIE L. B. 763 QTES 15 Dec. 1943 KNOX 22 March 1944 764 CANDY 7 Feb. 1944 581 McNULTY 13 March 1944 765 E\RL K. OLSEN 10 April 1944 582 METIVIER 7 April 1944 766 S.ATER 1 May 1944 583 GEORGE A. 767 SWALD 12 June 1944 JOHNSON 15 April 1944 768 BERT 12 July 1944 584 CHARLES J. 769 EAL A. SCOTT 31 July 1944 KIMMEL 20 April 1944 770 IUIR 30 Aug. 1944 585 DANIEL A.JOY 28 April 1944 771 STTON 22 Dec 1944 586 LOUGH 2 May 1944 789 'ATUM 22 Nov. 1943 Now APD 81 587 THOMAS F. 790 DRUM 30 Nov. 1943 NICKEL 9 June 1944 791 AKLOY 13 Dec. 1943 588 PFEIFFER 15 June 1944 792 XLAINES 27 Dec. 1943 Now APD 84 589 TINSMAN 26 June 1944 793 IUNELS 3 Jan. 1944 Now APD 85 633 FOREMAN 22 Oct. 1943 794 IOLLIS 24 Jan. 1944 Now APD 86 634 WHITEHURST 19 Nov. 1943 795 GJNASON 1 Feb. 1944 635 ENGLAND 10 Dec. 1943 Now APD 41 796 AAJOR 12 Feb. 1944 636 WITTER 29 Dec. 1943 Now APD 58 797 VEEDEN 20 Feb. 1944 637 BOWERS 27 Jan. 1944 Now APD 40 798 VARIEN 29 Feb. 1944 638 WILLMARTH 13 March 1944 799 SCROGGINS 30 March 1944 639 GENDREAU 17 March 1944 800 JACK W. WILKE , 7 March 1944 640 FIEBERLING 11 April 1944 498 (86 Leased) 641 WILLIAM C. COLE 12 May 1944 HIGH SPEED TRANSPORTS 642 PAUL G. BAKER 25 May 1944 APD 69 YDKES 18 Dec. 1944 ex-DE 668 643 DAMON M. 70 RVLIC 29 Dec. 1944 ex-DE 669 CUMMINGS 29 June 1944 71 0)UM 12 Jan. 1945 ex-DE 670 644 VAMMEN 27 July 1944 72 J/CK C. ROBIN- 665 JENKS 19 Jan. 1944 ON 2 Feb. 1945 ex-DE 671 666 DURIK 24 March 1944 73 B5SETT 23 Feb. 1945 ex-DE 672 667 WISEMAN 4 April 1944 74 J Nov. 1943 Sunk ROBERTS 8 March 1945 ex-DE 235 683 HENRY R. 95 WILLIAM M. KENYON 30 Nov. 1943 HOBBY 4 April 1945 ex-DE 236 684 DE LONG 31 Dec. 1943 96 RAY K. 685 COATES 24 Jan.1944 EDWARDS 11 June 1945 ex-DE 237 686 EUGENE E. 97 ARTHUR L. ELMORE 4 Feb. 1944 BRISTOL 25 June 1945 ex-DE 281 693 BULL 12 Aug. 1943 Now APD 78 ' 98 TRUXTUN 9 July 1945 ex-DE 282 694 BUNCH 21 Aug. 1943 Now APD 79 99 UPHAM 23 July 1945 ex-DE 283 695 RICH 1 Oct. 1943 Sunk 100 RINGNESS 25 Oct 1944 ex-DE 590 696 SPANGLER 31 Oct. 1943 101 KNUDSON 25 Nov. 1944 ex-DE 591 697 GEORGE 20 Nov. 1943 102 REDNOUR 30 Dec. 1944 ex-DE 592 698 RABY 7 Dec. 1943 103 TOLLBERG 31 Jan.1945 ex-DE 593 699 MARSH 12 Jan. 1944 104 WILLIAM J. 700 CURRIER 1 Feb. 1944 PATTISON 27 Feb.1945 ex-DE 594 701 OSMUS 23 Feb. 1944 105 MYERS 26 March 1945 ex-DE 595 702 EARL V. JOHN­ 106 WALTER B SON 18 March 1944 COBB 25 April 1945 ex-DE 596 703 HOLDON 1 May 1944 107 EARL B. HALL 15 May 1945 ex-DE 597 704 CRONIN 5 May 1944 108 HARRY L. CORL 5 June 1945 ex-DE 598 705 FRYBARGER 18 May 1944 109 BELET 15 June 1945 ex-DE 599 706 HOLT 9 June 1944 110 J7LIUS A 707 JOBB 4 July 1944 RAVEN 28 June 1945 ex-DE 600 708 PARLE 29 July 1944 111 ViLSH 11 July 1945 ex-DE 601 709 BRAY 4 Sept. 1944 Now APD 139 112 HNTER 739 BANGUST 30 Oct. 1943 MARSHALL 17 July 1945 ex-DE 602 740 WATERMAN 30 Nov. 1943 113 ERHEART 26 July 1945 ex-DE 603 741 WEAVER 31 Dec. 1943 114 GRKA 7 Aug. 1945 ex-DE 604 742 HILBERT 4 Feb. 1944 115 RGERS BLOOD 22 Aug. 1945 ex-DE 605 743 LAMONS 28 Feb. 1944 116 FANCOVICH 6 Sept. 1945 ex-DE 606 744 KYNE 4 April 1944 117 JOEPH M. 745 SNYDER 5 May 1944 AJMAN 25 April 1945 ex-DE 674 [65 ]

Type Dare Type Dare & No. Name Commissioned Total Remarks & No. Name Commissioned Total RemarksR HIGH SPEED TRANSPORTS--Concluded SUBMARINES—Continued APD118 DON O. WOOD 28 May 1945 ex-DE 721 SS 261 MINGO 12 Feb. 1943 119 BEVERLY W. 262 MUSKALLUNGE 15 March 1943 REID 25 June 1945 ex-DE 722 263 PADDLE 29 March 1943 120 KLINE 18 Oct. 1944 ex-DE 687 264 PARGO 26 April 1943 121 RAYMON W. 265 PETO 21 Nov. 1942 HERNDON 3 Nov. 1944 ex-DE 688 266 POGY 10 Jan, 1943 122 SCRIBNER 20 Nov. 1944 ex-DE 689 267 POMPON 17 March 1943 123 DIACHENKO 8 Dec. 1944 ex-DE 690 268 PUFFER 27 April 1943 124 HORACE A. 269 RASHER * 8 June 1943 BASS 21 Dec. 1944 ex-DE 691 270 RATON 13 July 1943 125 WANTUCK 30 Dec. 1944 ex-DE 692 271 RAY 27 July 1943 126 GOSSELIN 31 Dec. 1944 ex-DE 710 272 REDFIN 31 Aug. 1943 127 BEGOR 14 March 1945 ex-DE 711 273 ROBALO 28 Sept. 1943 Sunk 128 CAVALLARO 13 March 1945 ex-DE 712 274 ROCK 26 Oct. 1943 129 DONALD W. 275 RUNNER 30 July 1942 Sunk WOLF 14 April 1945 ex-DE 713 276 SAWFISH 26 Aug. 1942 130 COOK 25 April 1945 ex-DE 714 277 SCAMP 18 Sept. 1942 Sunk 131 WALTER X. 278 SCORPION 1 Oct. 1942 Sunk YOUNG 1 May 1945 ex-DE 715 279 SNOOK 24 Oct. 1942 Sunk 132 BALDUCK 7 May 1945 ex-DE 716 280 STEELHEAD 7 Dec. 1942 133 BURDO 2 June 1945 ex-DE 717 281 SUNFISH 15 July 1942 134 KLEINSMITH 12 June 1945 ex-DE 718 282 TUNNY 1 Sept. 1942 135 WEISS 7 July 1945 ex-DE 719 283 TINOSA 15 Jan. 1943 136 CARPELLOTTI 30 July 1945 ex-DE 720 284 TULLIBEE 15 Feb. 1943 Sunk 55 285 BALAO 4 Feb. 1943 286 BILLFISH 20 April 1943 SUBMARINES 287 BOWFIN 1 May 1943 SS 212 GATO 31 Dec. 1941 288 CABRILLA 24 May 1943 213 GREENLING 21 Jan. 1942 289 CAPELIN 4 June 1943 Sunk 214 GROUPER 12 Feb. 1942 290 CISCO 10 May 1943 Sunk 215 GROWLER 20 March 1942 Sunk 291 CREVALLE 24 June 1943 216 GRUNION 11 April 1942 Sunk 292 DEVILFISH 1 Sept. 1944 217 GUARDFISH 8 May 1942 293 DRAGONET 6 March 1944 218 ALBACORE 1 June 1942 Sunk 294 ESCOLAR 2 June 1944 Sunk 219 AMBER JACK 19 June 1942 Sunk 295 HACKLEBACK 7 Nov. 1944 220 BARB 8 July 1942 297 LING 8 June 1945 221 BLACKFISH 22 July 1942 298 LIONFISH 1 Nov. 1944 222 BLUEFISH 24 May 1943 299 MANTA 18 Dec. 1944 223 BONEFISH 31 May 1943 Sunk 300 MORAY 26 Jan. 1945 224 COD 21 June 1943 301 RONCADOR 27 March 1945 225 CERO 4 July 1943 302 SABALO 19 June 1945 226 CORVINA 6 Aug. 1943 Sunk 304 SEAHORSE 31 March 1943 227 DARTER 7 Sept. 1943 Sunk 305 SKATE 15 April 1943 229 FLYING FISH 10 Dec. 1941 306 TANG 15 Oct. 1943 Sunk 230 FINBACK 31 Jan. 1942 307 TILEFISH 28 Dec. 1943 231 HADDOCK 14 March 1942 308 APOGON 16 July 1943 232 HALIBUT 10 April 1942 309 ASPRO 31 July 1943 233 HERRING 4 May 1942 Sunk 310 BATFISH 21 Aug. 1943 234 KINGFISH 20 May 1942 311 ARCHERFISH 4 Sept. 1943 235 SHAD 12 June 1942 312 BURRFISH 14 Sept. 1943 236 SILVERSIDES 15 Dec. 1942 313 PERCH 7 Jan. 1944 237 TRIGGER 31 Jan. 1942 Sunk 314 SHARK 12 Feb. 1944 Sunk 238 WAHOO 15 May 1942 Sunk 315 SEALION 8 March 1944 239 WHALE 1 June 1942 316 BARBEL 3 April 1944 Sunk 240 ANGLER 1 Oct. 1943 317 BARBERO 29 April 1944 241 BASHAW 25 Oct. 1942 318 BAYA 20 May 1944 242 BLUEGILL 11 Nov. 1943 319 BECUNA 27 May 1944 243 BREAM 24 Jan. 1944 320 BERGALL 12 June 1944 244 CAVALLA 29 Feb. 1944 321 BESUGO 19 June 1944 245 COBIA 29 March 1944 322 BLACKFIN 4 July 1944 246 CROAKER 21 April 1944 323 CAIMAN 17 July 1944 247 DACE 23 July 1943 324 BLENNY 27 July 1944 248 DORADO 28 Aug. 1943 Sunk 325 BLOWER 10 Aug. 1944 249 FLASHER 25 Sept. 1943 326 BLUEBACK 28 Aug. 1944 250 FLIER 18 Oct. 1943 Sunk 327 BOARFISH 23 Sept. 1944 251 FLOUNDER 29 Nov. 1943 328 CHARR 23 Sept. 1944 252 GABILAN 28 Dec. 1943 329 CHUB 21 Oct. 1944 253 GUNNEL 20 Aug. 1942 330 BRILL 26 Oct. 1944 254 GUNARD 18 Sept. 1942 331 BUGARA 15 Nov. 1944 255 HADDO 9 Oct. 1942 332 BULLHEAD 4 Dec. 1944 256 HAKE 30 Oct. 1942 333 BUMPER 9 Dec. 1944 257 HARDER 2 Dec. 1942 Sunk 334 CABEZON 30 Dec. 1944 258 HOE 16 Dec. 1942 335 DENTUDA 30 Dec. 1944 259 JACK 6 Jan. 1943 336 CAPITAINE 26 Jan. 1945 260 LAPON 23 Jan. 1943 337 CARBONERO 7 Feb. 1945 [66]

Type Dare Type Dare &No. Name Commissioned Total R(Remarks & No. ame Commissioned '. Remarks SUBMARINES—Continued SUBMARINES—Cone SS 338 CARP 28 Feb. 1945 SS 396 RONJIL. 22 April 1944 339 CATFISH 19 March 1945 397 SCA3ARDFISH 29 April 1944 340 ENTEMEDOR 6 April 1945 398 SEGNDO 9 May 1944 341 CHIVO 28 April 1945 398 SE CAT 16 May 1944 342 CHOPPER 25 May 1945 400 SE DEVIL 24 May 1944 343 CLAMAGORE 28 June 1945 401 SE.DOG 3 June 1944 344 COBBLER 8 Aug. 1945 402 SEA?OX 13 June 1944 345 COCHINO 25 Aug. 1945 403 ATLE 21 June 1944 361 GOLET 30 Nov. 1943 Sunk 404 SPIEFISH 30 June 1944 362 GUAVINA 23 Dec. 1943 405 SEAOWL 17 July 1944 363 GUITARRO 26 Jan.1944 406 SE/POACHER 31 July 1944 364 HAMMERHEAD 1 March 1944 407 SE/ROBIN 7 Aug. 1944 365 HARDHEAD 18 April 1944 408 SENET 22 Aug. 1944 366 HAWKBILL 17 May 1944 409 PIPR 23 Aug. 1944 367 ICEFISH 10 June 1944 410 THEADFIN 30 Aug. 1944 368 JALLAO 8 July 1944 411 SPIEFISH 9 March 1944 369 KETE 31 July 1944 Sunk 412 TRPANG 22 May 1944 370 KRAKEN 8 Sept. 1944 413 SP'' 3 Aug. 1944 371 LARGARTO 14 Oct. 1944 Sunk 414 SRNGER 18 Oct. 1944 372 LAMPREY 17 Nov. 1944 415 ST.KL.EBACK 29 March 1945 373 LIZARDFISH 30 Dec. 1944 417 TECTrl 6 Oct. 1944 374 LOGGERHEAD 9 Feb. 1945 418 THRNBACK 13 Oct. 1944 375 MACABI 29 March 1945 419 TliRONE 25 Oct. 1944 376 MAPIRO 30 April 1945 420 TRANTE 6 Nov. 1944 377 MENHADEN 22 June 1945 421 TSL\_LTA 16 Nov. 1944 378 MERO 17 Aug. 1945 422 TORO 8 Dec 1944 381 SAND LANCE 9 Oct. 1943 423 TORSK 16 Dec. 1944 382 PICUDO 16 Oct. 1943 424 QUILLBACK 29 Dec. 1944 383 PAMPANITO 6 Nov. 1943 475 ARGONAUT 15 Jan. 1945 384 PARCHE 20 Nov. 1943 476 RUVNER 6 Feb. 1945 385 BANG 4 Dec. 1943 477 COGGER 14 Feb. 1945 386 PILOTFISH 16 Dec. 1943 478 CU'LASS 17 March 1945 387 PINTADO 1 Jan. 1944 479 DIBLO 31 March 1945 388 PIPEFISH 22 Jan. 1944 480 MDREGAL 14 April 1945 389 PIRANHA 5 Feb. 1944 481 REUIN 28 April 1945 390 PLAICE 12 Feb. 1944 482 HEX 14 May 1945 391 POMFRET 19 Feb. 1944 483 SEA LEOPARD 11 June 1945 392 STERLET 4 March 1944 484 OBAX 11 July 1945 393 QUEENFISH 11 March 1944 485 SIRAGO 13 Aug. 1945 394 RAZORBACK 3 April 1944 203 395 REDFISH 12 April 1944

All other classes of Vessels that have been completed 7 December 1941—1 October 1945

(Figures for September 1945 estimated)

SUMMARY MINE CRAFT PATROL CRAFT—Concl'd Class Number of Vessels Type Number Total Type Number Total MINE CRAFT 875 ACM 8 PT 694 PATROL CRAFT 1,828 AM 219 BPT 58 AUXILIARIES 1,541 AMb 21 PY 10 DISTRICT CRAFT AMc 50 PYc 24 (Self Propelled) 1,372 BAM 20 SC 444 DISTRICT CRAFT CM 3 1828 (Non-Self Propelled) 1,441 YMS 474 LARGE LANDING CRAFT 4,094 BYMS 80 AUXILIARIES SMALL LANDING CRAFT 79,125 875 AD 7 SMALL BOATS 19,366 PATIOL CRAFT AE 14 PC 315 AF 30 TOTAL 109,642 PCE 51 - AG 40 PCE (R) 13 AGC 13 Note; Figures include New Construction Vessels built, Vessels PCS 59 AGP 15 Converted, and Vessels Acquired, no conversion required. PF 96 AGS 3 PG 41 AH 9 Lend-Lease Vessels included. PGM 23 AK 147 [67]

Type Number Total Type Number Total Type Number Total Type Number Total AUXILIARIES—C DISTRICT CRA1 DISTRICT CRAFT (NSP) SxMALL LANDING CRAFT AKA 95 YAG 27 —Concluded —Concluded AKN 3 YCF 2 YG 10 LCM (3) 8631 AKS 12 YDG 9 YHB 5 LCM (2) 31 AN 45 YDT 2 YNg 17 LCS (S) (1) 150 AO 64 YF 83 YO 52 LCS (S) (2) 408 AOG 63 YFB 33 YOG 38 LCP (L) 1755 AP 99 YG 15 YOS 15 LCP (R) 2635 APA 203 YH 2 YR 42 LCVP 23398 APB 6 YHB 16 YRD (H) 8 LCV 2279 APc 100 YHT 1 YRD (M) 8 LVT (1) 1174 APH 3 YMT - 11 YS 17 LVT (A) (1) 510 APL 42 YN 11 YSP 6 LVT (2) 2962 AR 8 YNT 1 YSR 29 LVT (A) (2) 450 ARB 12 YO 109 YTT 3 LVT (3) 2964 ARG 12 YOG 42 YW 23 LVT (4) 8350 ARH 1 YP 497 1441 LVT (A) (4) 1799 ARL 34 YSD 53 LVT (A) (5) 125 ARS 36 YSR 1 LCP (N) 12 ARS (T) 3 YT 4 LARGE LANDING CRAFT LCR (L) 9981 ARV 2 BYT 3 LCI (L) 921 LCR (S) 8150 ARV (A) 2 PYT 2 LCS (L) (3> 130 45-ft. Artil­ ARV (E) 2 YTB 169 LCT (5) 470 lery Light­ AS 10 YTL 208 LCT (6) 965 ers 6 ASR 6 YTM 32 LSD 22 26-ft. Out­ AT 11 YW 39 LSM 481 board Land­ ATA 48 1372 LSM (R) 58 ing Craft 4 ATF 54 LST 1041 Army Storm ATR 100 DISTRICT CRAFT (NSP) LSV 6 Boats 6 AV 8 4094 Army Assault AVP 27 Boats 226 AW 4 YC 400 BAK 4 YCF 89 Landing Craft SMALL LANDING CRAFT BARS 6 YCK 51 Electric 287 BAT 11 YCV 14 LCC (1) 54 Landing Craft IX 127 YF 610 LCC (2) 45 Inflatable 3 1541 YFT 4 LCM (6) 2730 79,125

APPENDIX C Losses of United States Naval Vessels from all causes 7 December 1941—1 October 1945

Name of Ship Location Date Name of Ship Location Date BATTLESHIPS HEAVY CRUISERS—Concluded ARIZONA Pearl Harbor 7 Dec 1941 QUINCY Off Savo I., Solomons 9 Aug. 1942 OKLAHOMA Pearl Harbor 7 Dec. 1941 VINCENNES Off Savo I., Solomons 9 Aug. 1942 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS LIGHT CRUISERS HORNET 08 38 S, 166 43 E 26 Oct. 1942 ATLANTA 10 34 S, 161 04 E 13 Nov. 1942 LEXINGTON 1512S, 155 27E 8 May 1942 HELENA Kula Gulf, Solomons 6 July 1943 PRINCETON 15 21 N, 121 31 E 24 Oct. 1944 JUNEAU 10 34 S, 161 04 E 13 Nov. 1942 WASP 12 25 S, 164 08 E 15 Sept. 1942 YORKTOWN 30 36 N, 176 34 W 7 June 1942 DESTROYERS AARON WARD 9 10 S, 160 12 E 7 April 1943 ESCORT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS ABNER READ 10 47 N, 125 22 E 1 Nov. 1944 BARTON Off Guadalcanal I., BISMARCK SEA Off Iwo Jima 21 Feb. 1945 Solomons 13 Nov. 1942 BLOCK ISLAND 31 13 N, 23 03 W 29 May 1944 BEATTY 37 10 N, 6 00 E 6 Nov. 1943 GAMBIER BAY 11 31 N, 126 12 E 25 Oct. 1944 BENHAM Off Savo I., Solomons 15 Nov. 1942 LISCOME BAY 02 54 N, 172 30 E 24 Nov. 1943 BLUE 9 17 S, 160 02 E 22 Aug. 1943 OMMANEY BAY Off Panay I., P.I. 4 Jan. 1945 BORIE North of Azores 1 Nov. 1943 SAINT LO 11 13 N, 126 05 E 25 Oct. 1944 BRISTOL 37 19 N, 6 19 E 13 Oct. 1943 BROWNSON Off New Brita n 26 Dec. 1943 HEAVY CRUISERS BUCK 40 00 N, 14 30 E 9 Oct. 1943 ASTORIA Off Savo I., Solomons 9 Aug. 1942 BUSH 27 16 N, 127 48 E 6 April 1945 CHICAGO 11 25 S, 160 56 E 30 Jan. 1943 CALLAGHAN 26 30 N, 127 30 E 29 July 1945 HOUSTON Off Java, N.E.I. 1 March 1942 CHEVALIER Off Vella Lavella, INDIANAPOLIS NE of Leyte I., P.I. 29 July 1945 Solomons 6 Oct. 1943 NORTHAMPTON Off Savo I., Solomons 30 Nov. 1942 COLHOUN Off Okinawa, Ryukyus 6 April 1945 [68]

Name of Ship Location Dare Name ohijy Location Dare DESTROYERS—Concluded SUBMARINES COOPER Ormoc Bay, P.I. 3 Dec. 1944 ALBACORE Japanese home waters Nov. 1944 CORRY 49 31 N, 1 11 W 6 June 1944 AMBERJAC Off New Britain Feb. 1943 CUSHING Off Savo I., Solomons 13 Nov. 1942 ARGONAUT Off New Britain 10 Jan. 1943 DE HAVEN 9 09 S, 159 52 E 1 Feb. 1943 BARBEL Off Borneo Feb.1945 DREXLER Off Okinawa, Ryukyus 28 May 1945 BONEFISH Japanese home waters May 1945 DUNCAN Off Savo I., Solomons 12 Oct. 1942 BULLHEAD Java Sea Aug. 1945 EDSALL S of Java, N.E.I. 1 March 1942 CAPELIN Celebes Sea Dec. 1943 GLENNON 50 32 N, 1 12 W 8 June 1944 CISCO South Pacific Ocean Oct.-1943 GWIN 7 41 S, 157 27 E 13 July 1943 CORVINA Marshall Islands Nov. 1943 HALLIGAN 26 10 N, 127 30 E 26 March 1945 DARTER Palawan Passage, P.I. 24 Oct. 1944 HAMMANN 30 36 N, 176 34 W 6 June 1942 DORADO Canal Zone, Panama Oct. 1943 HENLEY 7 40 S, 148 06 E 3 Oct. 1943 ESCOLAR Japanese home waters Oct. 1944 HOEL 11 46 N, 126 33 E 25 Oct. 1944 FLIER Off Borneo Aug. 1944 HULL 12 00 N, 129 00 E 18 Dec. 1944 GOLET Japanese home waters June 1944 INGRAHAM 42 34 N, 60 05 W 22 Aug. 1942 GRAMPUS Off New Britain Feb. 1943 JACOB JONES 38 42 N, 74 39 W 28 Feb. 1942 GRAYBACK Ryukyu Islands Feb. 1944 JARVIS Off Guadalcanal I., GRAYLING Philippine waters Aug. 1943 Solomons 9 Aug. 1942 GRENADIER Malayan waters April 1943 JOHNSTON 11 46 N, 126 09 E 25 Oct. 1944 GROWLER Philippine waters Nov. 1944 LAFFEY Off Savo I., Solomons 13 Nov. 1942 GRUNION Aleutian waters July 1942 LANSDALE 37 03 N, 3 51 E 20 April 1944 GUDGEON Marianas Islands May 1944 LEARY 45 00 N, 22 00 W 24 Dec 1943 HARDER Philippine waters Aug. 1944 LITTLE 26 24 N, 126 15 E 3 May 1945 HERRING Kurile Islands May 1944 LONGSHAW 26 11 N, 127 37 E 18 May 1945 KETE Ryukyu Islands March 1945 LUCE 26 35N, 127 10 E 4 May 1945 LAGARTO South China Sea June 1945 MADDOX Off Sicily 10 July 1943 PERCH Java Sea Feb. 1942 MAHAN Ormoc Bay, P.I. 7 Dec. 1944 PICKEREL Japanese home waters May 1943 MANNERT L. ABELE 26 26 N, 177 43 E 12 April 1945 POMPANO Japanese home waters Sept. 1943 MEREDITH (DD 434) Off San Cristobal I., R-12 Off Key West, Fla. 12 June 1943 Solomons 15 Oct. 1942 ROBALO Off Borneo July 1944 MEREDITH (DD 726) 49 33 N, 1 06 W 8 June 1944 RUNNER Japanese home waters June 1943 MONAGHAN 12 00 N, 129 00 E 18 Dec. 1944 S-26 Gulf of Panama 24 Jan. 1942 MONSSEN 9 04 S, 159 54 E 13 Nov. 1942 S-27 Amchitka L, Aleutians 19 June 1942 MORRISON 27 10 N, 127 58 E 4 May 1945 S-28 Off Oahu, T.H. 4 July 1944 O'BRIEN 12 28 S, 164 08 E 15 Sept. 1942 S-36 Straits of Makassar, PARROTT Norfolk, Virginia 2 May 1944 N.E.I. 20 Jan. 1942 PEARY Port Darwin, Australia 19 Feb. 1942 S-39 Off Rossell I., SWPacific 14 Aug. 1942 PERKINS Off New Guinea 29 Nov. 1943 S-44 Kurile Islands Oct. 1943 PILLSBURY Bali Strait, N.E.I. 1 March 1942 SCAMP Japanese home waters Nov. 1944 POPE Java Sea 1 March 1942 SCORPION East China Sea Jan. 1944 PORTER 8 32 S, 167 17 E 26 Oct. 1942 SCULPIN Gilbert Islands Dec 1943 PRESTON Off Savo I., Solomons 15 Nov. 1942 SEALION Cavite, P.I. 10 Dec 1941 PRINGLE 27 25 N, 126 59 E 16 April 1945 SEAWOLF Off Morotai L, N.E.I. Oct. 1944 REID 9 50 N 124 55 E 11 Dec. 1944 SHARK (SS 14) Molucca Sea Feb. 1942 REUBEN JAMES 51 59 N, 27 05 W 31 Oct. 1941 SHARK (SS S4) Off Hong Kong, China Oct. 1944 ROWAN 40 07 N, 14 18 E 11 Sept. 1943 SNOOK Off Hainan I., S. China SIMS Coral Sea 7 May 1942 Sea April 1945 SPENCE 12 00 N, 129 00 E 18 Dec 1944 SWORDFISH Ryukyu Islands Jan. 1945 STEWART Surabaya, Java, N.E.I. 2 March 1942 TANG Formosa Strait Oct. 1944 STRONG Kula Gulf, Solomons 5 July 1943 TRIGGER Ryukyu Islands March 1945 STURTEVANT Off Key West, Fla. 26 April 1942 TRITON Admiralty Islands March 1943 TRUXTON Placentia Bay, TROUT Ryukyu Islands Feb. 1944 Newfoundland 18 Feb. 1942 TULLIBEE Off Palau I. April 1944 TUCKER Off Espiritu Santo I., WAHOO Japanese home waters Oct. 1943 New Hebrides 4 Aug. 1942 TURNER Off Ambrose Light, New York 3 Jan. 1944 MINELAYERS TWIGGS 26 08 N, 127 35 E 16 June 1945 GAMBLE Off Iwo Jima 18 Feb. 1945 WALKE Off Savo I., Solomons 15 Nov. 1942 MIANTONOMH Off Le Havre, France 25 Sept. 1944 WARRINGTON 27 00 N, 73 00 W 13 Sept. 1944 MONTGOMEY Ngulu Lagoon, South WILLIAM D. PORTER 27 06 N, 127 38 E 10 June 1945 Pacific 17 Oct. 1944 WORDEN Amchitka I., Aleutians 12 Jan. 1943 MINESWEEPERS DESTROYER ESCORT VESSELJLSS BITTERN At Cavite, P.I. 10 Dec 1941 EVERSOLE 10 10 N, 127 28 E 28 Oct. 1944 BUNTING San Francisco Bay 3 June 1942 FECHTELER 36 07 N, 02 40 W 5 May 1944 CROW Puget Sound 3 Sept. 1943 FISKE 47 10 N, 32 40 W 2 Aug. 1944 EMMONS Off Okinawa, Ryukyus 6 April 1945 FREDERICK C. DAVIS 43 52 N, 40 15 W 24 April 1945 FINCH At Corregidor, P.I. 10 April 1942 HOLDER Mediterranean Sea 11 April 1944 HORNBILL San Francisco Bay 30 June 1942 LEOPOLD 58 44 N, 25 50 W 9 March 1944 HOVEY Lingayen Gulf, P.I. 6 Jan. 1945 OBERRENDER Off Okinawa, Ryukyus 9 May 1945 LONG 16 12 N, 120 11 E 6 Jan. 1945 RICH 49 31 N, 1 10 W 8 June 1944 OSPREY 50 12 N, 1 20 W 5 June 1944 SAMUEL B. ROBERTS Off Samar I., P.I. 25 Oct. 1944 PALMER Lingayen Gulf, P.I. 7 Jan. 1945 SHELTON 2 32 N, 129 13 E 3 Oct. 1944 PENGUIN At Guam 8 Dec. 1941 UNDERHILL 19 20 N, 126 42 E 24 July 1945 PERRY Off Palau I. 13 Sept. 1944 [69]

Name of Ship Location Date Name of Ship Location Dare MINESWEEPERS— Concluded MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS PORTENT 41 23 N, 12 43 E 22 Jan. 1944 PT 22 North Pacific 11 June 1943 QUAIL Corregidor, P.I. 5 May 1942 PT 28 Dora Harbor, Alaska 12 Jan. 1943 SALUTE 5 07 N, 115 04 E 8 June 1945 PT 31 Subic Bay, P.I 19 Jan. 1942 SENTINEL Off Licata, Sicily 12 July 1943 PT 32 Sulu Sea 13 Mar. 1942 SKILL 40 20 N, 14 35 E 25 Sept. 1943 PT 33 Off Pt. Santiago, P.I. 15 Dec. 1941 SKYLARK 26 20 N, 127 41 E 28 March 1945 PT 34 Off Cauit Island, P.I. 9 April 1942 SWALLOW Off Okinawa, Ryukyus 22 April 1945 PT 35 At Cebu, P.I. 12 April 1942 SWERVE 41 31 N, 12 28 E 9 July 1944 PT 37 Off Guadalcanal I.. TANAGER At Corregidor, P.I. 4 May 1942 Solomons 1 Feb. 1943 TIDE 49 37 N, 1 05 W 7 June 1944 PT 41 Lake Lanao, Mindanao, VALOR 41 28 N, 70 57 W 29 June 1944 P.I. 15 April 1942 WASMUTH Aleutian Islands 29 Dec. 1942 PT 43 Off Guadalcanal I.. Solomons 10 Jan. 1943 PT 44 In South Pacific 12 Dec. 1942 SUBMARINE CHASERS PT 63 Off New Ireland 18 June 1944 PT 67 PC 496 37 23 N, 9 52 W 4 June 1943 Off Tufi, New Guinea 17 March 1943 PT 68 PC 558 38 41 N, 13 43 E 9 May 1944 New Guinea 1 Oct. 1943 PT 73 PC 1129 Off Luzon, P.I. 31 Jan. 1945 Philippines 15 Jan. 1945 PT 77 PC 1261 Off France 6 June 1944 Off Talin Pt., Luzon, P.I 1 Feb. 1945 PT 79 PC 1603 26 25 N, 127 56 E 21 May 1945 Off Talin Pt., Luzon, P.I 1 Feb. 1945 PT107 SC 521 11 03 S, 164 50 E 10 July 1945 Off New Ireland 18 June 1944 PT 109 SC 694 Off Palermo, Sicily 23 Aug. 1943 In Blackett Straits, SC 696 Off Palermo, Sicily 23 Aug. 1943 Solomons 2 Aug. 1943 SC 700 Vella Lavella, Solomons 10 March 1944 PT 110 Off New Guinea 26 Jan. 1944 SC 709 Cape Breton, Nova Scotia PT111 Off Guadalcanal L, 21 Jan. 1943 Solomons 1 Feb. 1943 PT112 Off Guadalcanal I., SC 740 15 32 S, 147 06 E 17 June 1943 SC 744 Tacloban Bay, P.I. 27 Nov. 1944 Solomons 10 Jan- 1943 PT 113 SC 751 21 56 S, 113 53 E 22 June 1943 Off Buna, New Guinea 8 Aug. 1943 SC 984 In New Hebrides • 9 April 1944 PT117 Rendova Harbor, SC 1019 22 28 N, 84 30 W 22 April 1945 Solomons 1 Aug. 1943 SC 1024 35 12 N, 74 57 W 2 March 1943 PT 118 Vella Lavella, Solomons 7 Sept. 1943 SC 1059 In Bahama Islands 12 Dec. 1944 PT 119 Off Tufi, New Guinea 17 March 1943 SC 1067 Off Attu, Aleutians 19 Nov. 1943 PT121 5 S, 151 E 27 March 1944 PT 123 Off Guadalcanal I., GUNBOATS Solomons 1 Feb. 1943 PT 133 Off New Guinea 15 July 1944 PGM 7 Bismarck Sea 18 July 1944 PT135 5 29 S, 152 09 E 12 April 1944 PGM 17 Off Okinawa 4 May 1945 PT136 Vitiaz Strait, New PGM 18 26 13 N, 127 54 E 8 April 1945 Guinea 17 Sept. 1943 ASHEVILLE South of Java, N.E.I. 3 March 1942 PT145 New Guinea 4 Jan. 1944 ERIE 12 03 N, 68 58 W 12 Nov. 1942 PT147 New Guinea 19 Nov. 1943 LUZON At Corregidor, P.I. 5 May 1942 PT153 Solomons 4 July 1943 MINDANAO Off Corregidor, P.I. 2 May 1942 PT158 Off Munda Pt., Solomons 5 July 1943 OAHU At Corregidor, P.I. 4 May 1942 PT164 In Rendova Harbor, PLYMOUTH 37 22 N, 74 25 W 5 Aug. 1943 Solomons ST. AUGUSTINE 38 00 N, 75 05 W 6 Jan. 1944 1 Aug. 1943 PT 165 WAKE At Shanghai, China 8 Dec. 1941 23 45 S, 166 30 E 23 May 1943 PT 166 PE 56 Portland, Maine 23 April 1945 Solomons 20 July 1943 PT172 Off Vella Lavella, Solomons 7 Sept. 1943 COAST GUARD VESSELS PT 173 23 45 S, 166 30 E 23 May 1943 PT193 00 55 S, 134 52 E 25 June 1944 CG 58012 41 53 N, 70 30 W 2 May 1943 PT200 41 N, 71 W 22 Feb. 1944 CG 83415 Off France 21 June 1944 PT202 43 23 N, 6 43 E 16 Aug. 1944 CG 83421 26 14 N, 79 05 W 30 June 1943 PT218 43 23 N, 6 43 E 16 Aug. 1944 CG 83471 Off France 21 June 1944 PT219 Off Attu, Aleutians Sept. 1943 ACACIA Caribbean Sea 15 March 1942 PT 239 Solomons 14 Dec. 1943 ALEXANDER PT247 6 38 S, 156 01 E 5 May 1944 HAMILTON Off Iceland 29 Jan. 1942 PT251 Off Bougainville I., BEDLOE Off Cape Hatteras 14 Sept. 1944 Solomons 26 Feb. 1944 BODEGA Gulf of Mexico 20 Dec. 1943 PT279 Off Bougainville I., CATAMOUNT Off Ambrose Light, New Solomons 11 Feb.1944 York 27 March 1943 PT 283 Off Bougainville I., DOW Caribbean Sea 15 Oct. 1943 Solomons 17 March 1944 ESCANABA 60 50 N, 52 00 W 13 June 1943 PT300 Off Mindoro I., P.I. 18 Dec. 1944 JACKSON Off North Atlantic Coast 14 Sept. 1944 PT301 Off New Guinea 7 Nov. 1944 NATSEK Belle Island Strait 17 Dec. 1942 PT311 43 N, 9 E 18 Nov. 1944 VINEYARD SOUND Vineyard Sound 14 Sept. 1944 PT320 Off Leyte, P.I. 5 Nov. 1944 WILCOX Off Cape Hatteras 30 Sept. 1943 PT321 San Isidoro Bay, P I 11 Nov. 1944 PT322 Off New Guinea 23 Nov. 1943 SEAPLANE TENDERS PT323 10 33 N, 125 14 E 10 Dec. 1944 PT337 Hansa Bay, New Guinea 7 March 1944 GANNET Off Bermuda 7 June 1942 PT338 12 06 N, 121 23 E 28 Jan. 1945 LANGLEY South of Java, N.E.I. 27 Feb. 1942 PT339 Off Biak, New Guinea 27 May 1944 THORNTON 24 24 N, 128 58 E 5 April 1945 PT346 Off New Britain 29 April 1944 [ 70]

Name of Ship Location Date Name of Ship Location Dare MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS—Concluded TANK LANDING CRAFT- Concluded PT347 Off New Britain 29 April 1944 LCT 30 Off northern France 6 June 1944 PT353 5 S, 151 E 27 March 1944 LCT 35 Off Anzio, Italy 15 Feb. 1944 PT363 Kaoe Bay, Halmahera, LCT 36 Off Naples, Italy 26 Feb. 1944 N.E.I. 25 Nov. 1944 LCT 71 53 38 N, 146 5 W 11 Sept. 1943 PT368 Off Halmahera, N.E.I. 11 Oct. 1944 LCT 147 Off northern France June 1944 PT371 2 05 N, 127 51 E 19 Sept. 1944 LCT 154 37 8 N, 10 58 E 31 Aug. 1943 PT493 In Surigao Strait, P.I. 25 Oct. 1944 LCT 175 4 27 N, 133 40 E 21 Feb. 1945 PT509 English Channel 9 Aug. 1944 LCT 182 Solomons 7 Aug. 1944 PT555 Off Cape Couronne. LCT 185 Off Bizerte, Tunisia 24 Jan. 1944 Mediterranean 23 Aug. 1944 LCT 196 Off Salerno, Italy 27 Sept. 1943 LCT 197 Off northern France 6 June 1944 TANK LANDING SHIPS LCT 200 Off northern France June 1944 LCT 208 Off Algeria 30 June 1943 LST 6 In Seine River, France 18 Nov. 1944 LCT 209 O"^ northern France 10 June 1944 LST 43 Pearl Harbor 21 May 1944 LCT 215 G-i Salerno, Italy 1943 LST 69 Pearl Harbor 21 May 1944 LCT 220 At Anzio, Italy 13 Feb. 1944 LST 158 Off Licata, Sicily 11 July 1943 LCT 241 Off Salerno, Italy 15 Sept. 1943 LST 167 At Vella Lavella 25 Sept. 1943 LCT 242 Off Naples, Italy 2 Dec. 1943 LST 179 Pearl Harbor 21 May 1944 LCT 244 Off northern France June 1944 LST 203 Near Nanumea, Union LCT 253 On passage to Tarawa 21 Jan. 1945 Islands 1 Oct. 1943 LCT 293 In English Channel 11 Oct. 1944 LST 228 In Azores 20 Jan. 1944 LCT 294 Off northern France 6 June 1944 LST 282 Off southern France 15 Aug. 1944 LCT 305 Off northern France 6 June 1944 LST 313 At Gela, Sicily 10 July 1943 LCT 311 Off Bizerte, Tunisia 9 Aug. 1943 LST 314 49 43 N, 00 52 W 9 June 1944 LCT 315 At Eniwetok Atoll 23 March 1944 LST 318 Off Caronia, Sicily 9 Aug. 1943 LCT 319 At Kiska 27 Aug. 1943 LST 333 37 59 N, 4 01 E 22 June 1943 LCT 332 Off northern France 6 June 1944 LST 342 9 03 S, 158 11 E 18 July 1943 LCT 340 36 49 N, 11 5 E 20 Feb. 1944 LST 348 40 57 N, 13 14 E 20 Feb. 1944 LCT 342 Off Salerno, ta/y 29 Sept. 1943 LST 349 Off Ponzo, Italy 26 Feb. 1944 LCT 362 Off northenFrance 6 June 1944 LST 353 Pearl Harbor 21 May 1944 LCT 364 Off northern ranee 6 June 1944 LST 359 42 N,19 W 20 Dec. 1944 LCT 366 53 1 N, 152 T 9 Sept. 1943 LST 376 Off northern France 9 June 1944 LCT 413 Off northern ranee June 1944 LST 396 8 18 S, 156 55 E 18 Aug. 1943 LCT 458 Off northern "ranee 7 June 1944 LST 447 26 9 N, 127 18 E 6 April 1945 LCT 459 Off western lance 9 Oct. 1944 LST 448 Off Vella Lavella, LCT 486 Off northern rrance 7 June 1944 Solomons 1 Oct. 1943 LCT 496 English Chanel 2 Oct. 1943 LST 460 11 ION, 121 11 E 21 Dec. 1944 LCT 548 At Portsmouth, England Nov. 1944 LST 472 Off Mindoro, P.I. 15 Dec. 1944 LCT 555 Off northern France 6 June 1944 LST 480 At Pearl Harbor 21 May 1944 LCT 572 Off northern France June 1944 LST 493 50 20 N, 4 09 W 12 April 1945 LCT 579 Off Palau 4 Oct. 1944 LST 496 Off northern France 11 June 1944 LCT 582 In Azores 22 Jan. 1944 LST 499 Off northern France 8 June 1944 LCT 593 Off northern France 6 June 1944 LST 507 50 29 N, 2 52 W 28 April 1944 LCT 597 Off northern France 6 June 1944 LST 523 Off northern France 19 June 1944 LCT 612 Off northern France 6 June 1944 LST 531 50 29 N, 2 52 W 28 April 1944 LCT 703 Off northern France 6 June 1944 LST 563 Southwest of Mexico 22 Dec. 1944 LCT 713 Off northern France June 1944 LST 577 8 1 N, 130 22 E 11 Feb. 1945 LCT 714 Off northern France June 1944 LST 675 Off Okinawa 4 April 1945 LCT 777 Off northern France 6 June 1944 LST 738 Off Mindoro, P.I. 15 Dec 1944 LCT 823 Off Palau 27 Sept. 1944 LST 749 11 10 N, 121 HE 21 Dec. 1944 LCT 961 Pearl Harbor 21 May 1944 LST 750 Off Negros, P.I. 28 Dec. 1944 LCT 963 Pearl Harbor 21 May 1944 LST 808 Off le Shima 20 May 1945 LCT 983 Pearl Harbor 21 May 1944 LST 906 At Leghorn, Italy 18 Oct. 1944 LCT 984 20 N,157 W 15 May 1944 LST 921 In English Channel 14 Aug. 1944 LCT 988 20 N,157 W 15 May 1944 LCT 1029 At Iwo Jima 2 March 1945 MEDIUM LANDING SHIPS LCT 1075 Off Leyte, P.I. 10 Dec. 1944 LCT 1090 Off Luzon, P.I. 26 March 1945 LSM 12 Off Okinawa 4 April 1945 LCT 1151 1 N, 138 36 E 26 Jan. 1945 LSM 20 10 12 N, 125 19 E 5 Dec. 1944 LCT 1358 Off California 4 May 1945 LSM 59 Off Okinawa 21 June 1945 LSM 135 Off Okinawa 25 May 1945 LSM 149 In Philippines 5 Dec. 1944 INFANTRY LANDING CRAFT LSM 190 26 35 N, 127 10 E 4 May 1945 LSM 194 Off Okinawa 4 May 1945 LCI 1 At Bizerte, Tunisia 17 Aug. 1943 LSM 195 Off Okinawa 3 May 1945 LCI 20 Off Anzio, Italy 22 Jan. 1944 LSM 318 10 56 N, 124 38 E 7 Dec. 1944 LCI 32 Off Anzio, Italy 26 Jan. 1944 LCI 82 Off Okinawa 4 April 1945 LCI 85 Off northern France 6 June 1944 TANK LANDING CRAFT LCI 91 Off northern France 6 June 1944 LCT 19 Off Salerno, Italy 14 July 1943 LCI 92 Off northern France 6 June 1944 LCT 21 Off Oran 1 Jan. 1943 LCI 93 Off northern France 6 June 1944 LCT 23 At Algiers 3 May 1943 LCI 219 Off northern France 11 June 1944 LCT 25 Off northern France 6 June 1944 LCI 232 Off northern France 6 June 1944 LCT 26 41 4 N, 13 30 E 25 Feb. 1944 LCI 339 Off New Guinea 4 Sept. 1943 LCT 27 Off northern France 6 June 1944 LCI 365 Off Luzon, P.I. 10 Jan. 1945 LCT 28 In Mediterranean 30 May 1943. LCI 416 Off northern France 9 June 1944 [71]

Name of Ship Location Date Name of Ship Location Date INFANTRY LANDING CRAFT- -Concluded DISTRICT PATROL CRAFT—Concluded LCI 459 Off Palau 19 Sept. 1944 YP 73 In Kodiak Harbor, LCI 468 13 28 N, 148 18 E 17 June 1944 Alaska 15 Jan. 1945 LCI 474 Off Iwo Jima 17 Feb. 1945 YP 74 54 23 N, 164 10 W 6 Sept. 1942 LCI 497 Off northern France 6 June 1944 YP 77 Off Atlantic Coast 28 April 1942 LCI 553 Off northern France 6 June 1944 YP 88 At Amchitka, Aleutians 28 Oct. 1943 LCI 600 In Ulithi, Carolines 12 Jan. 1945 YP 94 56 32 N, 154 22 W 18 Feb. 1945 LCI 684 In Southwest Pacific 1945 YP 95 At Adak, Aleutians 1 May 1944 :i 974 16 6 N, 120 14 E 10 Jan. 1945 YP 97 Philippines March 1942 Off Leyte, P.I. 24 Oct. 1944 YP128 Off Monterey, California 30 June 1942 YP183 On west coast of Hawaii 12 Jan. 1943 SUPPORT LANDING CRAFT YP205 18 30 N, 65 00 W 1 Nov. 1942 YP235 In Gulf of Mexico 1 April 1943 Off Luzon, P.I. 16 Feb. 1945 YP270 25 30 N, 122 06 W 30 June 1942 27 20 N, 127 10 E 22 April 1945 YP277 East of Hawaii 23 May 1942 Off Luzon, P.I. 14 Feb. 1945 YP279 Off Townsville, Australia 5 Sept. 1943 Off Okinawa 12 April 1945 YP281 16 53 S, 177 18 W 9 Jan. 1944 Off Luzon, P.I. 14 Feb. 1945 YP284 Off Guadalcanal I., LCS 127 Off California ' 5 March 1945 Solomons 25 Oct. 1942 YP331 24 56 N, 81 58 W 23 May 1944 TUGS YP336 In Delaware River 23 Feb. 1943 YP345 Southeast of Midway 31 Oct. 1942 ATR15 49 N, 00 26 W 19 June 1944 YP346 In South Pacific 9 Sept. 1942 ATR98 44 05 N, 24 08 W 12 April 1944 YP383 8 22 N, 79 29 W 24 Nov. 1944 GENESEE At Corregidor, P.I. 5 May 1942 YP387 39 N, 75 W 20 May 1942 GREBE In South Pacific 2 Jan. 1943 YP389 Off Cape Hatteras 19 June 1942 NAPA At Bataan, P.I. 8 April 1942 YP405 In Caribbean Sea 20 Nov. 1942 NAUSET 40 38 N, 14 38 E 9 Sept. 1943 YP422 Off New Caledonia 23 April 1943 NAVAJO Off New Hebrides 11 Sept. 1943 YP426 31 59 N, 80 48 W 16 Dec. 1943 PARTRIDGE Off northern France 11 June 1944 YP438 At Port Everglades, Fla. 20 March 1943 SEMINOLE Off Tulagi I., Solomons 25 Oct. 1942 YP453 In the Bahamas 15 April 1943 SONOMA At Leyte, P.I. 24 Oct. 1944 YP481 At Charleston, S.C. 25 April 1943 YP492 Off east Florida 8 Jan. 1943 TANKERS YP577 Great Lakes 23 Jan. 1943 KANAWHA 9 10 S, 160 12 E 7 April 1943 MISCELLANEOUS DISTRICT CRAFT MISSISSINEWA 10 6 N, 139 43 E 20 Nov. 1944 INECHES 21 1 N, 160 6 W 23 Jan. 1942 YA 52 Philippines 1942 NEOSHO Coral Sea 7 May 1942 YA 59 Philippines 1942 PECOS 14 30 S, 106 30 E 1 March 1942 YA 65 Philippines 1942 SHEEPSCOT Off Iwo Jima 6 June 1945 YAG 2 Philippines 1942 YAG 3 Philippines 1942 YAG 4 Philippines 1942 TROOP TRANSPORTS YAG 17 36 57 N, 76 13 W 14 Sept. 1944 APC 21 Off New Britain 17 Dec. 1943 YC 178 Philippines 1942 APC35 Off New Georgia, YC 181 Philippines 1942 Solomons 22 Sept. 1943 YC 523 Off Portsmouth, N.H. 24 Feb. 1944 BARRY Off Okinawa 25 May 1945 YC 537 Philippines 1942 BATES Off Okinawa 25 May 1945 YC 643 Philippines 1942 COLHOUN 9 24 S, 160 1 E 30 Aug. 1942 YC 644 Philippines 1942 DICKERSON Off Okinawa 2 April 1945 YC 646 Philippines 1942 EDWARD RUTLEDGE Off Morocco 12 Nov. 1942 YC 64/ Philippines 1942 GEORGE F. ELLIOTT Off Guadalcanal I., YC 648 Philippines 1942 Solomons 8 Aug. 1942 YC 649 Philippines 1942 GREGORY Off Guadalcanal I., YC 652 Philippines 1942 Solomons 5 Sept. 1942 YC 653 Philippines 1942 HUGH L. SCOTT Off Morocco 12 Nov. 1942 YC 654 Philippines 1942 JOHN PENN Off Guadalcanal I., YC 664 Guam 1942 Solomons 13 Aug. 1943 YC 665 Guam 1942 JOSEPH HEWES Off Morocco 11 Nov. 1942 YC 666 Guam 1942 SEDSTOWN Off Algiers 9 Nov. 1942 YC 667 Guam 1942 1TTLE Solomons 5 Se.pt. 1942 YC 668 Guam 1942 c CAWLEY 8 25 S, 157 28 E 30 June 1943 YC 669 Philippines 1942 c KEAN 6 31 S, 154 52 E 17 Nov. 1943 YC 670 Guam 1942 _*OA 7 1 N, 134 30 E 12 Sept.194 4 YC 671 Guam 1942 SUSAN B. ANTHONY 49 32 N, 00 48 W 7 June 1944 YC 672 Guam 1942 TASKER H. BLISS Off Morocco 12 Nov. 1942 YC 673 Guam 1942 THOMAS STONE 37 31 N, 00 00 E 7 Nov. 1942 YC 674 Guam 1942 WARD 10 51 N, 124 32 E 7 Dec. 1944 YC 683 Philippines 1942 YC 685 Guam 1942 YC 693 Alaska Feb. 1945 DISTRICT PATROL CRAFT YC 714 Philippines 1942 YP 16 Philippines Dec. 1941 YC 715 Philippines 1942 YP 17 Philippines Dec. 1941 YC 716 Philippines 1942 YP 26 In Canal Zone 19 Nov. 1942 YC 717 Guam 1942 YP 47 Off Staten Island, New YC 718 Guam 1942 York 26 April 1943 YC 857 Off Cape Cod, Mass. 12 Nov. 1943 YP 72 At Adak, Aleutians 22 Feb. 1943 YC 869 Off Imperial Beach, Calif., 23 March 1943 [72

Name of Ship Location Date Name of Ship _. _, Dare MISCELLANEOUS DISTRICT CRAFT INFANTRY LAN LCI 459 luded —Continued 6 June 1944 LCI 468 YC 886 Guantanamo 3 Feb. 1943 5 Feb. 1944 LCI 474 t YC 887 Guantanamo 3 Feb. 1943 26 Feb. 1944 LCI 497 YC 891 Off Key West, Fla. 18 April 1943 ^1 Sept. 1943 LCI 553 YC 898 Off Key West, Fla. 29 Sept. 1942 June 1944 LCI 600 T YC 899 Off Key West, Fla. 29 Sept. 1942 YO Jj. Aug. 1943 LCI 684 YC 912 In North Pacific 13 Jan. 1945 YO 42 T I Feb. 1945 CI 974 YC 961 At Biorka Island May 1945 YO 64 -> • Aug. 1944 1 YC 970 In Puget Sound, Wash. 14 Aug. 1943 YO 156 065 , Alasksan. 1944 YC 1272 Near San Pedro June 1945 YO 157 __ oiLKa, Alaska ^-i^ YC 1278 Off Atlantic coast 10 March 1943 YO 159 Off New Hebrides 14 Jan. _ YCF 23 En route to Eniwetok March 1945 YPD 22 Philippines 1942 YCF 29 En route to Eniwetok March 1945 YPK 6 Philippines 1942 YCF 36 En route to Eniwetok March 1945 YPK 7 Philippines 1942 YCF 37 En route to Eniwetok March 1945 YR 43 In Gulf of Alaska 28 March 1945 YCF 42 34 47 N, 75 5 W Dec 1944 YRC 4 Philippines 1942 YCF 59 Off Delaware Jan. 1945 YSP 41 Philippines 1942 YCK 1 Wake Island 1942 YSP 42' Philippines 1942 YCK 2 45 47 N, 58 57 W 5 Nov. 1943 YSP 43 Philippines 1942 YCK 8 Off Key West, Fla. 13 Dec. 1943 YSP 44 Philippines 1942 YD 19 Philippines 1942 YSP 45 Philippines 1942 YD 47 Philippines 1942 YSP 46 Philippines 1942 YD 56 Philippines 1942 YSP 47 Philippines 1942 YD 60 Philippines 1942 YSP 48 Philippines 1942 YDG 4 Off New Caledonia 1 Oct. 1943 YSP 49 Philippines 1942 YF 86 Philippines 1942 YSP 50 Philippines 1942 YF 177 Philippines 1942 YSR 2 fPhilippines 1942 YF 178 Philippines 1942 BANAAG Philippines 1942 YF 179 Philippines 1942 IONA Philippines 1942 YF 180 Philippines 1942 MERCEDES Philippines 1942 YF 181 Philippines 1942 VAGA At Corregidor, P.I. 5 May 1942 YF 212 Philippines 1942 YT 198 Off Anzio, Italy 18 Feb. 1944 YF 223 Philippines 1942 YT 247 14 14 N, 158 59 W 5 April 1944 1942 YF 224 Philippines SHAHAKA 27 21 N, 13 29 W 9 May 1944 1942 YF 230 Philippines YTM 467 Marshall or Gilbert Is- 1942 YF 317 Philippines lands March 1944 20 June 1943 YF 401 35 7 N, 69 W YW 50 Gufjm 1942 YF 415 42 24 N, 70 36 W 11 May 1944 YW 54 Philippines 1942 YF 487 In Caribbean 18 July 1943 YW 55 Guam 1942 YF 575 Off Atlantic City, N. J. 6 May 1943 YW 58 Guam 1942 YF 579 At San Francisco 20 Sept. 1943 YF 724 Off Farallones 22 March 1945 CARGO VESSELS YF 725 Off Farallones 22 March 1945 En route Pearl Harbor 8 March 1945 ALUDRA 11 26 S, 162 E 23 June 1943 YF 926 DEIMOS 11 26 S, 162 E 23 June 1943 SAN FELIPE Philippines 1942 1942 POLLUX Off Newfoundland Coast 18 Feb. 1942 SANTA RITA Philippines 1942 SERPENS At Guadalcanal I., Solo­ ROSAL Philippines 1942 mons 29 Jan. 1945 CAMIA Philippines 1942 DAPDAP Philippines 1942 MISCELLANEOUS AUXILIARIES RIVERA Philippines 1942 Philippines AILANTHUS In Aleutian^ 26 Feb. 1944 MAGDALENA 1942 YACAL Philippines ASPHALT At Saipan 6 Oct. 1944 10 April 1942 DEWEY DRYDOCK At Bataan, P. I. CANOPUS At Bataan, P.I. 10 April 1942 31 Jan. 1943 YFD 20 Off California CYTHERA Off Atlantic Coast May 1942 27 Sept. 1944 YG 39 10 10 N, 79 51 W EXTRACTOR In Marianas 1 Jan. 1945 1942 YM 4 Philippines MACAW At Midway Channel 12 Feb. 1944 Guam 1942 YM 13 MOONSTONE Off Delaware Capes 16 Oct. 1943 In Boston Harbor 11 Jan. 1945 YMS 14 MOUNT HOOD At Manus, Admiralty Is­ Off Palau 24 Sept. 1944 YMS 19 lands 10 Nov. 19 43 6 N, 5 54 E . 1 Sept. 1944 YMS 21 MUSKEGET In Atlantic Ocean 10 Oct. 19^ 43 23 N, 6 43 E 16 Aug. 1944 YMS 24 NIAGARA In Solomons 23 May 19 41 23 N, 12 45 E 25 Jan. 1944 YMS 30 PIGEON At Corregidor, P.I. 3 May 19 1 19 S, 116 49 E 26 June 1945 YMS 39 PONTIAC Off Halifax, Nova ScOtia 30 Jan. 1945 14 Feb. 1945 YMS 48 14 25 N, 120 34 E PORCUPINE At Mindoro, P.I 28 Dec. 1944 YMS 50 Off Java, N.E.I. 18 June 1945 REDWING 37 22 N, 9 55 E 28 June 1943 YMS 70 In Leyte Gulf, P.I. 17 Oct. 1944 RESCUER In Aleutians 1 Jan. 1943 YMS 71 4 58 N, 119 47 E 3 April 1945 ROBERT BARNES Guam Dec. 1941 YMS 84 Off Balikpapan, Borneo 9 July 1945 RONAKI Off eastern Australia 18 June 1943 Pearl Harbor 7 Dec. 1941 YMS103 26 13 N, 127 54 E 8 April 1945 UTAH At Corregidor, P.I. 5 May 1942 YMS127 ex FISHERIES Near Seattle, Wash. May 1944 At Corregidor, P.I 5 May 1942 YMS133 ex MARY ANN Off Oregon Coast 20 Feb. 1943 At Corregidor, P.I. 5 May 1942 YMS304 ex PERRY Off northern France 30 July 1944 En route to Pearl Harbor 28 Dec. 1941 YMS350 DCH 1 Off Cherbourg 2 July 1944 In the above list the dates are those of the effective loss; that is, YMS365 1 18 S, 116 50 E 26 June 1945 the date of the attack or damage which resulted in loss, rather than YMS378 49 33 N, 1 13 W 1944 that of sinking.