Signal Strength: Occupied the Telecommunications Sector and the Israeli Occupation
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Flash Report SIGNAL STRENGTH: OCCUPIED THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR AND THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION July 2018 Introduction 2 Separate and Unequal: The Occupied Structure of Palestinian Telecommunications 2 Codifying Dependency: Telecommunications under the Oslo Framework 3 De-Development by Military Violence 4 Telecommunications as a Site of Surveillance and Control 5 A Captive Market for Israeli Cellular Providers 6 Mobile Telephony and the Settlement Enterprise 8 Corporate Complicity 10 Altice 10 Cellcom Israel 12 Bezeq – The Israel Telecommunication Corp. 13 Partner Communications 14 Annex I: Pension Funds Invested in Altice 15 Annex II: Pension Funds Invested in Bezeq 16 Introduction Separate and Unequal: The Occupied Structure of Palestinian Communications technology is often associated Telecommunications with a high degree of mobility and relative free- dom from territorial constraints. However, under Israeli-occupied Palestinian infrastructure is char- Israel’s prolonged occupation of Palestinian and acterized by forced integration into Israeli systems Syrian land, the sphere of telecommunications alongside dependency on and segregation from has become a privatized site of control and a cor- said systems. porate instrument of territorial expansion. Previous research by Who Profits detailed the As this flash report demonstrates, all major Israeli ways in which these elements converge in the telecommunications providers are commercially electricity sector to create a subservient Pales- involved in the Israeli occupation. These compa- tinian electric network that is the site of chronic nies build infrastructure and maintain property structural violence.1 In the case of electricity, in- and equipment in illegal Israeli settlements, often tegration into the Israeli national grid was top- on privately owned Palestinian land. They all pro- down, far-reaching and ethnically segregated, re- vide services to the Israeli military and to all Is- sulting in a Palestinian system that is both wholly raeli settlers, and some provide specially designed dependent on its Israeli counterpart and inferior services. Moreover, they use the Israeli control of to it. This dependency was geographically an- the occupied Palestinian territory to impose their chored in the strategic placement of electricity services on the Palestinian captive market, capi- substations and meters out of Palestinian reach, talizing on the structural vulnerability of a de-de- either in key settlements or within the Green Line, veloped and dependent Palestinian telecommuni- which in turn has meant that the system itself can cations network. be (and routinely is) weaponized by Israel to mete out collective punishment against Palestinians.2 This flash-report examines four central dimen- sions of telecommunications under occupation: The same holds true in the case of Palestinian the de-development of the Palestinian telecom- telecommunications infrastructure. Palestinian munications sector under the framework of the internet and landline and mobile telephony are Oslo Accords and by means of military violence; “forced to be segregated from yet dependent on telecommunications as a space of mass sur- Israeli networks.”3 As will be detailed below, this veillance for the Israeli security apparatus; the dependency is built into the physical infrastruc- exploitation of the Palestinian captive cellular market; and the role of Israeli cellular infrastruc- 1 “Greenwashing the Occupation: The Solar ture in the expansion of the illegal settlement Energy Industry and the Israeli Occupation” Who enterprise. Profits, whoprofits.org, January 2017 2 Jabary Salamanca, Omar, “Hooked on Finally, Who Profits provides an overview of the electricity: the charged political economy of elec- main Israeli and international telecommunica- trification in the Palestinian West Bank”. Working tions corporations complicit in the occupation. paper (February 2014) presented in the sympo- sium “Political Economy and Economy of the Polit- Prior to publication, Who Profits contacted all ical” at Brown University companies profiled in this flash-report. To date, 3 Tawil-Souri, Helga, “Digital Occupation: no responses were received. Gaza’s High-Tech Enclosure” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. XLI, No. 2 (Winter 2012), pp. 27–43. 2 | The Telecommunications Sector and the Israeli Occupation ture of the Palestinian communication network separate and independent communication sys- and crafted into the economic protocols annexed tems and infrastructures” and establish its own to the Oslo Accords. It is continually enforced telecommunication policies, and agreed to “re- through Israeli restrictive import policies and tight frain from any action that interferes” with Pales- control over bandwidth and spectrum allocations, tinian communication systems. This recognition, and intensified through military violence. Finally, however, was severely undermined by Israel’s the occupation of the Palestinian telecommuni- veto power in the Joint Technical Committee cations structure yields tremendous profits for (JTC).7 Article 36 specified that all telecommuni- Israeli and international corporations, with corre- cation infrastructure, equipment and installation sponding losses to Palestinian companies and to work in Area C (which represents 59% of West the Palestinian GDP that are no less massive. Bank land) required prior Israeli approval, and that the allocation of radio frequencies had to be Codifying Dependency: Telecommunications “agreed upon by Israel in the JTC.”8 Needless to under the Oslo Framework say, Israel has systematically abused its power in order to impede and stunt the development of The terms of Israel’s control, though long present the Palestinian telecommunications sector. on the ground, were reorganized and codified in the Oslo Accords and the economic protocols Oslo cemented the dependency on private Israe- annexed to them. Specifically, the sphere of tele- li providers and the Israeli Ministry of Commu- communications was addressed in Article 36 of nication, which persists to this day. Continued Annex III of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agree- Israeli constraints on the bandwidth of micro- ment on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (“Oslo wave links mean that Paltel - The Palestine Tele- II”— 28.9.1995). communication Company (hereinafter: Paltel) is forced to route all calls between the West Bank Prior to Oslo, telecommunications in the oPt was and Gaza, and many intra-Gaza and West Bank under full and direct Israeli control, administered calls, through Israeli providers, who collect a first by the Israeli Ministry of Communication percentage surcharge on all interconnection rev- (IMoC) and later by its state-owned telephony enues from calls between Palestinian landlines corporation Bezeq,4 which were slow to service and cellular phones as well as calls between cel- Palestinians, so much so that when control was lular phones of Palestinian operators and Israeli formally handed over to the Palestinian Author- operators. Moreover, Israel does not allow Paltel ity in 1995, only a little over 2% of all Palestinian to have its own international gateway, requiring households had fixed telephone lines, compared that Palestinian operators go through an Israe- with almost 30% of Israeli households.5 The use of li-registered company to access international mobile phones was restricted under military or- links.9 Israeli telecommunication corporations ders, as was the use of landline telephony for fax or email communication.6 7 The JTC is a bilateral technical platform tasked with key regulatory coordination between Under Oslo II, Israel formally recognized the Pal- the PA and Israel. A 2016 report by the World estinian side had “the right to build and operate Bank noted that “the JTC has only met a few times since 2000 and remains dysfunctional.” 4 Bezeq was privatized in 2005. 8 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement 5 Tawil-Souri 2012 on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Annex III, 6 Israeli military orders no. 951:1983 and Article 36, C(1) no. 1279: 1989, idf.il. 9 “The Telecommunication Sector in the 3 | The Telecommunications Sector and the Israeli Occupation Paltel’s main switch in North Gaza demolished on the first day of Israel’s military assault | January 2009 | Photo: Paltel Group, Gaza Directorate are thus able to collect termination fees for both each time, revealing the ease with which the Is- domestic and international calls.10 raeli occupying power can incapacitate the Pales- tinian network. De-Development by Military Violence For example, during the 2008-9 Israeli military as- The structural impediments to Palestinian devel- sault on Gaza, Paltel reported total losses of an opment presented above allow for little more than estimated 13.2 million USD.11 Its main switch in the semblance of a functioning, autonomous Pal- North Gaza was completely demolished on the estinian communications network. Yet even this first day of the assault, the MSAN (Multi-Service semblance is routinely subjected to Israeli military Access Node) in Al-Atatra neighborhood was like- attacks, complementing systemic policies of de-de- wise destroyed, the fiber optic cable that connect velopment with concrete physical devastation. Gaza to the outside world was damaged at mul- tiple locations and the outside network (such as In recent years, large-scale Israeli military assaults aerial cables and distribution boxes) suffered -ex on the besieged Gaza Strip (2008-9, 2012 and tensive damage. Buildings and warehouses were 2014)