Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali Intervention by Jacob Zenn the Mali Intervention by Jacob Zenn Reports 9 AQIM’S Playbook in Mali by Pascale C

march 2013 . Vol 6 . Issue 3

Contents Cooperation or Competition:

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru After Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali Intervention By Jacob Zenn the Mali Intervention By Jacob Zenn Reports 9 AQIM’s Playbook in Mali By Pascale C. Siegel 12 Al-Shabab’s Tactical and Media Strategies in the Wake of its Battlefield Setbacks By Christopher Anzalone 16 The Upcoming Peace Talks in Southern Thailand’s Insurgency By Zachary Abuza 20 The Role of Converts in Al-Qa`ida- Related Terrorism Offenses in the United States By Robin Simcox and Emily Dyer 24 The Threat from Rising Extremism in the Maldives By Animesh Roul

28 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 32 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts A Cameroonian soldier stands in Dabanda by the car of the French family that was kidnapped on February 19. - AFP/Getty Images ince the nigerian militant group attacked schools, churches, cell phone Boko Haram1 launched its first towers, media houses, and government attack in northern Nigeria in facilities, including border posts, police September 2010, it has carried stations and prisons. Since January Sout more than 700 attacks that have 2012, however, a new militant group killed more than 3,000 people.2 Boko has attracted more attention in northern Haram primarily targets Nigerian Nigeria due to its threat to foreign government officials and security interests. Jama`at Ansar al-Muslimin About the CTC Sentinel officers, traditional and secular Muslim fi Bilad al-Sudan (commonly known as The Combating Terrorism Center is an leaders, and Christians.3 It has also Ansaru)4 announced that it split from independent educational and research Boko Haram in January 2012, claiming institution based in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy, 1 The group Boko Haram identifies itself as Jama`at Ahl West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses al-Sunna li al-Da`wa wa al-Jihad, which is Arabic for when approximately 50 fighters attacked Bauchi prison the Center’s global network of scholars and “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s and freed more than 150 Boko Haram members. An addi- practitioners to understand and confront Teachings and Jihad.” The term “Boko Haram” means tional 500 prisoners were also freed, some of whom joined contemporary threats posed by terrorism and “Western education is sinful” in the Hausa language in Boko Haram. Before 2010, Boko Haram was known as the other forms of political violence. Nigeria. “Nigerian Taliban,” among other names. See Sani Muhd 2 “Boko Haram Has Killed 3,000 People, Says Army Sani, “Attack On Bauchi Prison - Boko Haram Frees 721 Chief,” ThisDayLive, November 6, 2012; “Boko Haram Inmates,” Leadership, September 8, 2010. The views expressed in this report are those of Attacks Cripple Northern Nigeria’s Economy,” IRIN, Feb- 4 Ansaru also refers to itself as JAMBS—the acronym for the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, ruary 12, 2013. Jama`at Ansar al-Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan. In Arabic, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 3 Boko Haram’s first attack with the name Jama`at Ahl al- this means “Supporters of the Muslims in the Land of the Sunna li al-Da`wa wa al-Jihad was on September 7, 2010, Blacks.”

1 march 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 3 that Boko Haram was “inhuman” for Ansaru’s Rise security forces determined from phone killing innocent Muslims as well as for To date, Ansaru may have executed six call logs and interrogations of the Shura targeting defectors.5 Ansaru’s almost major attacks. Only the four operations Council members that Abu Muhammed exclusive focus on foreign targets may carried out after Ansaru announced its was responsible for the British and also explain why the two groups could formation on January 26, 2012, however, Italian hostages and that the hostages not coexist. can be confidently attributed to the were transferred to a house in Sokoto, group.10 north of Kebbi State.14 On March 8, Boko Haram seeks revenge against 2012, the captors shot both hostages the Nigerian government and First Operation when they saw helicopters of the UK security forces for killing its founder Ansaru may have carried out its first Special Boat Service carrying out Muhammad Yusuf and 1,000 of his operation in May 2011 when Chris surveillance on the house.15 Soon after, followers during a four-day series of McManus and Franco Lamolinara—a UK and Nigerian forces killed eight of clashes in July 2009.6 Ansaru fights to British and Italian engineer of an the captors and detained eight others restore the “lost dignity” of the Sokoto Italian construction company—were in a late effort to free the hostages. The Caliphate, which was founded in 1804 kidnapped near the border with Niger detained captors confessed that they by the Fulani shaykh Usman dan Fodio in in Kebbi State, northwest Nigeria. had “standing orders to kill the hostages northern Cameroon, northern Nigeria, A previously unknown group called immediately on sight of security agents, and southern Niger, and lasted until the “al-Qa`ida in the Lands Beyond the since we were not sure of surviving an United Kingdom and France colonized Sahel” took responsibility in a proof- encounter with the security men.”16 the region and introduced Western of-life video showing the two hostages This established a precedent that any education and Christianity in the 19th blindfolded and kneeling in front of attempt to free hostages would lead to century.7 three veiled militants.11 The video was their immediate deaths. sent to Mauritania’s Agence Nouakchott This article reviews Ansaru’s attacks on d’Information (ANI), which usually In June 2012, a Boko Haram informant foreign interests in Nigeria, the possible receives AQIM videos. Employing the alleged long-time AQIM member role of al-Qa`ida operative Mokhtar same Mauritanian negotiator that AQIM Khalid al-Barnawi coordinated the Belmokhtar8 in steering Ansaru toward used in several previous kidnappings, the kidnappings of the British and Italian kidnapping foreigners despite Boko militants reportedly demanded $6 million hostages with Abu Muhammed, and Haram’s rejection of the tactic, and and the release of prisoners in West Africa that Abu Muhammed had trained under why al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb in return for the two hostages.12 al-Barnawi at an AQIM-run camp in (AQIM) chose to collaborate more with Algeria.17 That same month, the U.S. Ansaru than Boko Haram. Finally, the On March 7, 2012, Nigerian security government designated al-Barnawi a article assesses the future of Ansaru and forces broke up a Boko Haram Shura “global terrorist” along with two other Boko Haram now that the French-led Council meeting in Kaduna led by Abu militants, Abubakar Adam Kambar, who military intervention has driven AQIM Muhammed, who defected from Boko trained under al-Barnawi at the AQIM from northern Mali and potentially Haram due to disagreements with Boko camp in Algeria, and Boko Haram’s killed Belmokhtar.9 Haram leader Abubakar Shekau.13 The leader, Abubakar Shekau.18 Nigerian security sources reported that members 5 Ansaru announced its “public formation” and break 10 In all Ansaru video statements, its leader and mem- from Boko Haram in flyers distributed in Kano on Janu- bers conceal their identities with veils and obscure their Nation, February 14, 2012; “Barnawi, Kambar: Qaeda- ary 26, 2012, which was six days after Boko Haram at- voices. Boko Haram, in contrast, shows leader Abubakar linked Militants with Boko Haram Ties,” Agence France- tacked government offices in Kano, leaving more than Shekau’s face in all of its videos. This shows that Ansaru Presse, June 21, 2012. 150 civilians dead, mostly Muslims. See “Boko Haram: does not want to reveal the identity of its leader. 14 Yusuf Alli, “Why We Killed Briton, Italian—Suspect,” Splinter Group, Ansaru Emerges,” Vanguard, February 11 The militants’ Sahelian-style veils in the Kebbi proof- The Nation, March 10, 2012. 1, 2012. of-life videos, which are also worn by the militants on 15 Ibid. 6 “Boko Haram Leader ‘Imam Abubakar Shekau’ Mes- Ansaru’s website, differ from Boko Haram members who 16 Midat Joseph et al., “Kidnappers - Why We Killed sage to President Jonathan,” Sahara Reporters, January usually wear Western-style military fatigues. See An- Briton, Italian Hostages,” Leadership, March 13, 2012; 12, 2012; Ikechukwu Nnochiri, “We Are On Revenge saru’s website at www.ansarulmuslimun.wapka.mobi/ “Exclusive: Boko Haram Targets Julius Berger, Dantata Mission, Boko Haram Suspect Tells Court,” Vanguard, index.xhtml. & Sawoe Expatriates,” Premium Times, March 12, 2012. November 25, 2011; “Suspects Charged in Nigeria Bomb- 12 Mustapha Ould Limam Chaffi was the negotiator. See 17 The U.S. designated al-Barnawi as a “global terrorist” ing,” al-Jazira, December 25, 2011; Michael Olugbode, “Exclusif...Mort des deux otages occidentaux tués au Ni- in June 2012, and in November 2012 the UK Home Office “Boko Haram Claims Killings in Borno,” ThisDayLive, geria: Une source d’AQMI livre quelques details,” Agence minister proscribed Ansaru as a terrorist organization September 22, 2010. Nouakchott d’Information, March 10, 2012. that is “anti-Nigerian government, anti-Western and 7 “Boko Haram: Splinter Group, Ansaru Emerges.” 13 There are reports that a dispute over how to spend broadly aligned with al-Qa`ida.” See “Barnawi, Kambar: 8 Belmokhtar led an AQIM brigade in the Sahel from money given to Boko Haram by AQIM or from bank rob- Qaeda-linked Militants with Boko Haram Ties.” 2007 until he was reportedly dismissed from AQIM in beries caused the conflict between Abubakar Shekau, 18 Rabi Ould Idamous, “Faltering al-Qaeda Turns to late 2012. He continued to lead loyal fighters, however, Abu Muhammed, and Khalid al-Barnawi. Shekau may Boko Haram,” Magharebia, January 27, 2012; “Terror- and he masterminded the four-day siege at the gas plant have disagreed with the use of the money to fund kidnap- ist Designations of Boko Haram Commander Abubakar at In Amenas, Algeria, in January 2013. pings of foreigners instead of attacks on Nigerian targets. Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi and Abubakar Adam Kam- 9 Chadian forces claim to have killed Belmokhtar in See Jide Ajani, “Horror in Sokoto - Al-Qaeda-Funded bar,” U.S. Department of State, June 21, 2012. Kambar northern Mali in March 2013, but this has not been con- Group Killed Hostages,” Vanguard, March 11, 2012; Yusuf was killed in a Nigerian security forces raid on his hide- firmed. Alli, “Kabiru Sokoto Names Boko Haram’s Leaders,” The out in Kano in August 2012.

2 march 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 3 of Shekau’s faction tipped off Nigerian On March 26, 2012, Nigerian security Third Operation intelligence about Abu Muhammed and forces raided a shop in Kano and Starting in June 2012, Ansaru sent other “traitorous” cells in northwestern detained the kidnapping cell’s leader, a series of e-mails to the Kaduna- Nigeria that broke from Shekau and a Mauritanian, and three Nigerian based Desert Herald newspaper and did not focus on fighting the Nigerian accomplices, who used the Mauritanian’s released English- and Hausa-language government.19 Shekau’s spokesman also shop as a base.25 Documents in the YouTube videos affirming that Ansaru denied that Boko Haram carried out the Mauritanian’s laptop, including an disapproved of Boko Haram’s killing kidnapping on the day after the hostages of Muslims. In these communications, were killed, and said, “We have never “The attack revealed that Ansaru said they would target the been involved in hostage-taking, and citizens and interests of “foreign we never ask for ransom.”20 Ansaru was able to operate Christian enemies in all parts of in Kogi State, which is Africa,” but that Ansaru’s and Boko Although Ansaru did not yet exist as a Haram’s missions were otherwise the formal organization at the time of the considered a ‘staging point’ same.29 Then, on November 26, 2012, kidnapping, some suspect that Khalid for attacking southern 40 Ansaru militants attacked the al-Barnawi later formed Ansaru.21 Special Anti-Robbery Squad prison in Additionally, when speaking before the Nigeria because it has Abuja with the “assistance of internal UK House of Commons in November direct road links to all collaborators,” according to the 2012, Home Office Minister Mark Harper military and police.30 The attack freed said that Ansaru is “also believed to be three of Nigeria’s southern senior Boko Haram commanders and responsible for the murder of British zones.” was praised in a YouTube video from national Christopher McManus and his Boko Haram leader Shekau, which was Italian co-worker Franco Lamolinara in addressed to the “Soldiers of God in March 2012.”22 the Islamic State of Mali.”31 Ansaru’s AQIM operations manual, led Nigerian freeing of Boko Haram prisoners and Second Operation special forces to carry out a rescue Shekau’s video statement suggested On January 26, 2012, the same day operation of the German engineer in May that despite the circumstances Ansaru announced its split from Boko 2012, but the captors shot the hostage surrounding Ansaru’s formation, the Haram by circulating flyers in Kano, immediately.26 AQIM warned European a German engineer was kidnapped in countries not to engage in “foolishness” 29 The graphics and quality of Ansaru’s videos are sig- Kano. In March 2012, AQIM’s official during future hostage negotiations and nificantly higher than Boko Haram’s videos, which sug- media wing, al-Andalus, took credit for for Germany to stop violating Muslims gest that Ansaru had a higher level of training in media 27 the kidnapping and demanded in a video and their holy sites. and propaganda than Boko Haram or possibly exposure sent to ANI in Mauritania that Germany to AQIM’s professional media wing, al-Andalus. See release from prison a Turkish-born This kidnapping was claimed by AQIM “World Exclusive: Another Islamic Sect Emerges...to female jihadist website administrator and carried out by an AQIM member Counter Boko Haram?” Desert Herald, June 2, 2012; “Lat- whose German husband fought with and local militants. Evidence uncovered est: Security Officials and Christians are Enemies of Is- the Taliban in Afghanistan and was from Kaduna, where Abu Muhammed lam and Muslims, We Will Target and Kill Them- Says arrested in 2007 while planning to was arrested, reportedly provided leads Spokesman of Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladi 23 bomb Ramstein Air Base. AQIM also about the cell, and AQIM referred to the Sudan, Abu Ja’afar,” Desert Herald, June 5, 2012; “Im- 28 reminded Germany about the “recent first operation in Sokoto in its claim. portant Message From Jama`atu Ansaril Muslimina fi lesson taught to the UK [Special Boat As AQIM was not known to operate in Biladis Sudan,” November 26, 2012, available at www. Service] by the mujahidin,” referring to Nigeria and Boko Haram did not engage youtube.com/watch?v=aZ-6STrj2tI; “Video of Introduc- the British and Italian hostages killed in kidnapping operations at this time, tion of Jama’atu Ansaril Muslimina fi Biladis-Sudan,” 24 in Sokoto on March 8, 2012. it is plausible that Ansaru played a role November 9, 2012, available at www.youtube.com/ in the kidnapping, especially since it watch?v=s6ATD6bLaBI. 19 “Power Tussle in Boko Haram Led to Sect Leader’s followed the group’s modus operandi. 30 Niyi Odebode et al., “Jaji, Abuja Terror Attacks: Arrest,” Leadership, March 26, 2012. Army, Police Arrest 22 Officers,” Punch NG, December 1, 20 This statement was corroborated by Boko Haram’s 2012; “Declared of Jama`atu Ansaril Muslimina Fibiladis record of receiving funds from other sources, includ- Sudan Garki II Abuja,” November 30, 2012, available at ing bank robberies and car thefts. See Ajani; “Al-Qaeda www.youtube.com/watch?v=_1m5-zV3zfU. Affiliates use Kidnapping for Revenue,” Magharebia, 31 The attack freed the wife of Kabiru Sokoto, who was March 30, 2012. 25 Aminu Abubakar, “Nigeria Detains 5 with ‘Al Qaeda- the mastermind of the Christmas Day church bombings 21 Ogala Emmanuel, “Five Things You Should Know links’ over German Kidnap,” Agence France-Presse, outside of Abuja in December 2011 that killed more than About New Extremist Sect, ANSARU,” Premium Times, March 27, 2012; Lawal Danuma, “Kidnapped German 20 people. See Wisdom Patrick et al., “Gunmen Attack February 23, 2013. Killed in JTF Raid,” Daily Trust, May 31, 2012. Police SARS Headquarters, Free 30 Suspects,” Daily In- 22 “MPs Pass Motion Outlawing Suspected Terror 26 Ibid. dependent, November 27, 2012; “Glad Tidings, O Soldiers Group,” BBC, November 22, 2012. 27 The statement in English and Arabic is available at of Allah,” Ana al-Muslim Network, December 1, 2012; 23 The prisoner was Filiz Gelowicz, and her husband is www.jihadology.net. Taiwo Adisa, “Shekau, Boko Haram Leader, Escapes Ar- Fritz Gelowicz. The statement, written in English and 28 Aminu Abubakar, “German Hostage Killed in Nige- rest in Kano - Wife Arrested - Security Operatives Probe Arabic, and video are available at www.jihadology.net. ria During Rescue Bid,” Agence France-Presse, May 31, 2 Top Politicians over Sect’s Funding,” Nigerian Tribune, 24 Ibid. 2012. March 5, 2012.

3 march 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 3 two groups were capable of supporting Sixth Operation the hostages because of Nigerian each other’s mutual objectives.32 On February 16, 2013, Ansaru assaulted media reports that British “jet fighters, a prison and then kidnapped seven soldiers, and intelligence” landed in This operation in Abuja marked the foreign engineers from a construction Abuja to prepare for a rescue mission first time Ansaru formally claimed site in northeastern Nigeria’s Bauchi and that UK and Nigerian security forces responsibility for an attack.33 State. Ansaru warned that any attempt had killed Muslims in previous attempts to free the hostages would result in to rescue “Christian hostages.”41 Fourth Operation the “same happenings” as the previous On December 19, 2012, 30 Ansaru Belmokhtar’s Role in Ansaru militants kidnapped a Frenchman from “Since the formation Since the formation of AQIM in 2006- the compound of an energy company 2007, AQIM’s Arab-Algerian southern near the border with Niger in Katsina of AQIM in 2006- zone commanders, such as Mokhtar State, northwestern Nigeria. According 2007, AQIM’s Arab- Belmokhtar, sought to expand their to the Katsina police commissioner, the operations from southern Algeria “coordination, speed, and expertise” of Algerian southern zone southwards into Mali, Chad, Niger, the operation suggested that employees commanders, such as Burkina Faso, and Nigeria to target of the company were involved in an the increasing number of foreigners “inside job.”34 Ansaru claimed the Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and energy and mining companies in kidnapping and said that it would sought to expand their the Sahel.42 One factor constraining continue to kidnap French citizens until AQIM, however, was that its northern France ended its ban on the Islamic veil operations from southern African members did not master the for women and abandoned its plans to Algeria southwards into southern Sahel’s physical and human intervene militarily in northern Mali.35 terrain as well as the Tuaregs and sub- Mali, Chad, Niger, Burkina Saharan Africans from the region.43 As Fifth Operation Faso, and Nigeria to target a result, AQIM “coached” sub-Saharan On January 19, 2013, Ansaru militants, Africans—such as Khalid al-Barnawi, possibly acting on a tip, ambushed a the increasing number of Abu Muhammed and Abubakar Adam convoy of three buses carrying 180 foreigners and energy and Kambar—in kidnappings and criminal Nigerian soldiers through Okene, Kogi activities and used sub-Saharan State, en route to Mali, killing two mining companies in the recruits as couriers between AQIM soldiers.36 Ansaru claimed the troops Sahel.” and local Islamist militant groups such “were aiming to demolish the Islamic as Boko Haram.44 An example of this Empire of Mali” and warned African countries to “stop helping Western Christian Hostages in Nigeria,” March 11, 2013, avail- countries fight Muslims.”37 The attack rescue attempts in Sokoto and Kano, able at www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_ revealed that Ansaru was able to operate and said that the kidnappings were in embedded&v=a4zLb0zTK2c. in Kogi State, which is considered a response to European “atrocities” in 41 Ansaru appears to have failed in two attempts to kid- 39 “staging point” for attacking southern Afghanistan and Mali. On March 9, nap foreign engineers from separate construction sites Nigeria because it has direct road 2013, Ansaru announced that it killed in Tella, Taraba State, on February 28, 2013, and may links to all three of Nigeria’s southern the “seven Christian foreigners” in an have been behind the kidnapping of an Italian engineer zones.38 online statement with a photo and an in southern Nigeria’s Kwara State, where kidnappings accompanying video of an armed and are uncommon. Like the German engineer in Kano, the camouflaged militant standing over Italian was working on a road construction project when 40 32 The Nigerian police claimed that only five prisoners four corpses. Ansaru said it executed taken captive. The Italian was released in June 2012, but escaped, while Ansaru alleged that the rescue operation officials did not release details about the terms of the re- freed 37 members and 286 other prisoners, who were zones, with all 36 of the country’s states and Abuja Fed- lease. See “2 Nigerian Cops Killed in Aborted Kidnap of subject to “real human rights violations,” including “ex- eral Capital Territory falling into one of the six zones. The Foreigners,” PM News, February 28, 2013; “Italian Ab- trajudicial killings,” “termites” and “a complete lack of zones do not represent ethnic or religious homogeneity ducted in Nigeria Freed,” BBC, June 1, 2012. water.” and are broadly accepted in political discourse by almost 42 “Nigeria: Deadly Twist in Islamists’ War,” United 33 “Declared of Jama`atu Ansaril Muslimina Fibiladis all Nigerians. Kogi is in the North-Central zone, although Press International, March 15, 2012; Geoff D. Porter, Sudan Garki II Abuja.” geographically Okene, Kogi, is in the southern half of “AQIM and the Growth of International Investment in 34 “French Man Kidnap: Possibly an Inside Job – Kat- Nigeria. See “Combined Forces Raid Arrests Terror Sus- North Africa,” CTC Sentinel 2:11 (2009). sina CP,” Vanguard, December 21, 2012. pects…Seizes 10 Ak47 Rifles, Smg, 3 Pistols, Anti-Tank 43 According to North Africa expert Dr. Geoff D. Por- 35 “Islamist Group Ansaru ‘Kidnapped’ French Man,” Explosives, Ieds and Ammo Near Okene, Kogi State,” ter, “One of the factors restraining the pace of AQIM’s BBC, December 24, 2012. It is unknown what happened Beegeagle’s Blog, May 16, 2012. operations in the Sahara and Sahel has been the lack of to the Frenchman, but he may have been taken across the 39 Suzan Edeh, “Bauchi Deadly Kidnapping: Gaping targets and the inability of AQIM members who are not border into Niger or Mali, where AQIM held six other Bullet Holes in Expatriates’ Live Camp,” Vanguard, Feb- from the region to move throughout the desert.” For de- French hostages. ruary 23, 2013. tails, see ibid. Also see Salima Tlemcani, “Révélations sur 36 “Islamists Ansaru Claim Attack on Mali-bound Nige- 40 It is unclear whether three of the seven hostages une organisation en déroute,” El Watan, August 1, 2007; ria Troops,” Reuters, January 20, 2013. were actually killed, since the video shows only four Yarolslav Trofimov, “Islamic Rebels Gain Strength in the 37 Ibid. bodies. The Arabic and English statements are avail- Sahara,” Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2009. 38 Nigeria is unofficially divided into six geopolitical able at www.jihadology.net and “The Killing of Seven 44 In 2007, Nigeria arrested three of its citizens who

4 march 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 3 strategy’s effectiveness was the January responsibility for the kidnapping, Belmokhtar’s kidnapping style by 7, 2011, kidnapping of two Frenchmen even though one of its members was infiltrating foreign energy companies from a restaurant in the French and reportedly involved. and targeting European employees Hausa-speaking capital city of Niamey, whose countries were susceptible to Niger. The two men were scouted by In 2011, AQIM may have moved from ransoms and political demands.51 a Nigerian Boko Haram member who recruiting sub-Saharan Africans to provided their location to other Hausa, overseeing them form their own groups If not for the French-led military Arabic and French-speaking members with indigenous ideologies that appealed operation in northern Mali, the to sub-Saharan Africans in a way that relationship between Belmokhtar and AQIM’s ideology did not.47 The two sub- the two sub-Saharan groups would “Evidence suggests that Saharan African groups, Ansaru and the likely have continued, although Ansaru and MUJAO may Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), likely conducted their “AQIM’s support may have have been among the elite first kidnapping operations in May 2011 units Belmokhtar trained and October 2011, respectively, while helped Boko Haram evolve MUJAO announced its formation in a from a Taliban-inspired for attacking Western video statement in December 2011 and interests in the Sahel.” Ansaru through flyers distributed in religious movement under Kano in January 2012. The two groups Yusuf into a full-fledged were independent of AQIM in name, but MUJAO’s military commander militant movement under of Belmokhtar’s Veiled Brigades.45 The was long-time AQIM kidnapping Shekau. There were several hostages were both killed the following mastermind Oumar Ould Hamaha, day when French military helicopters an Arab from northern Mali and a factors, however, that fired on the kidnappers as their relative of Belmokhtar’s, and Ansaru likely compelled AQIM vehicle convoy approached the Malian is suspected of being led by Khalid al- border.46 Boko Haram never claimed Barnawi, who fought under Belmokhtar to coordinate kidnapping in Mauritania and Algeria in the mid- operations in Nigeria with had trained with AQIM (then called the GSPC) in Alge- 2000s and carried out kidnappings 48 ria from 2005 to 2007 and were planning to attack U.S. in Niger. Both Ansaru and MUJAO Ansaru, rather than with government buildings in Nigeria. See “Five Nigerians adopted names reflecting their desired Boko Haram.” on Terror Charges,” BBC, November 23, 2007. AQIM areas of operations, Biladis Sudan (Black featured sub-Saharan recruits in an August 2010 video Africa) and Gharb Afriqqiya (West Africa), with members speaking West African languages, such as respectively, and considered themselves Hassaniya Arabic of Mauritania, Fulani, Tuareg dialects, to be the “ideological descendants” of both groups may have become more Guinean Portuguese, and Hausa, the common language Usman dan Fodio and other pre-colonial independent with the development of southern Niger and northern Nigeria. See “Summary West African Islamic leaders who of their own media wings, ideologies, and Analysis of al-Qa’idah in the Islamic Maghreb’s New “fought the colonial invaders,” although and in Ansaru’s case leadership in Video Release ‘On The Occasion of Ramadan Fighting in practice Ansaru operated in northern Nigeria outside of AQIM’s area of is Ordained for You,’” Jihadology.net, August 22, 2010. Nigeria and MUJAO operated in Mali, operations. According to Nigerian 49 A Beninese national of Yoruba ethnicity, Abdoulah Ab- Senegal, Algeria and Mauritania. intelligence documents, an “Algerian doulah, was reportedly a courier between AQIM and terrorist group” and Boko Haram had Boko Haram in Nigeria and involved in recruiting AQIM Evidence suggests that Ansaru and members from French-speaking West African countries. MUJAO may have been among the comes from a letter sent to a Kano radio station “com- See “Ansar Dine Pursues Peace Talks, Mujao Names elite units Belmokhtar trained for mending the jihad of our brothers that killed an Ameri- New Chief,” LeMag, January 3, 2012; “Mali: un Béni- attacking Western interests in the can envoy and some non Muslims” after the attack on the 50 nois à la tête d’une unité combattante, une katiba, dans Sahel. Ansaru, for example, followed U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, which le Nord,” Radio France Internationale, December 28, was linked to Belmokhtar and Libyan jihadists. See “An- 2012. Belmokhtar used cigarette smugglers to establish 14, 2011. other Islamist Sect Surfaces In Kano, Threatens To Bomb contacts with African fighters. See Rabi Ould Idamous, 47 “Brainstorming the Geopolitics of AQIM’s Moorish Radio Station,” Sahara Reporters, September 16, 2012. “Faltering al-Qaeda Turns to Boko Haram,” Magharebia, Appeal,” The Moor Next Door blog, August 25, 2009. 51 Although the United Kingdom or the hostages’ fami- January 27, 2012. 48 Most reports, including from the U.S. State Depart- lies reportedly paid AQIM $1 million to release the two 45 Nathalie Guibert, “Comment sont morts les otages ment, say that al-Barnawi is from Borno State, Nige- hostages in the Kebbi kidnapping and Germany released français du Niger,” Le Monde, January 6, 2012. ria, although Radio France Internationale and Agence the female jihadist website administrator and recruiter 46 A French investigation concluded that the Nigerian Nouakchott d’Information have reported that al-Barnawi from prison early, Ansaru did not free the hostages in was from Boko Haram’s base city, Maiduguri, and his is Nigerien. See Emmanuel. either case. In addition, MUJAO reportedly received $18 phone call logs showed that he was an intermediary 49 “New Qaeda Spin-Off Threatens West Africa,” million in June 2012 for the release of three hostages that it between Boko Haram and AQIM in Nigeria, Niger and Agence France-Presse, December 22, 2011; “Sénégal: Les kidnapped in southwestern Algeria in October 2011. See Mali. See “Two French Hostages in Niger Killed in Res- Islamistes ‘sont à nos portes,” Jeune Afrique, August 7, Isa Saidu, “Before Killing Briton, Italian...‘Kidnappers cue Attempt,” BBC, January 8, 2011; “Une piste nigériane 2012; “Route de Kati: Des présumés membres du Mujao Received N207 Million Ransom,’” Daily Trust, March dans l’enquête sur la mort des deux otages français en- arrêtés,” Journaldumali.com, March 7, 2013. 12, 2012; “German Terrorism Convict Granted Early Re- levés au Niger,” Radio France Internationale, November 50 Another possible link between Ansaru and AQIM lease,” Associated Press, April 24, 2012.

5 march 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 3 a “long-term partnership,” whereby Why Ansaru, Not Boko Haram? subsequent statements from Shekau the Algerian group would provide AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel showed that Boko Haram identified Boko Haram with installments of offered “consolation” to Boko Haram with al-Qa`ida’s ideology, but that Boko $250,000 and select Boko Haram after the clashes with Nigerian security Haram was “waging jihad in the country members for training in kidnapping forces in July 2009 left Boko Haram called Nigeria.”58 and bomb-making so the Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf and 1,000 members could kidnap “white” of his followers dead.54 In February From July 2009 until Boko Haram expatriates in Nigeria and transfer the 2010, Droukdel also offered to provide launched its first attack in September hostages to hideouts in the desert in Boko Haram with “men, arms and 2010, many Boko Haram members exchange for more money and arms ammunition” to “defend” Nigerian retreated to Nigeria’s borderlands from the Algerians.52 These Boko Muslims against the “Christian with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, and Haram members may have been Abu minority”55 in Nigeria.56 In July 2010, solicited, according to one report, as Muhammed and other Nigerians before the one year anniversary of much as 40%59 of their funding from involved in the kidnappings in Kebbi in the July 2009 clashes, Yusuf’s former abroad.60 From September 2010 until May 2011 and the Algerian group may deputy, Abubakar Shekau, emerged August 2011, Boko Haram attacks have been Belmokhtar’s men. from hiding and “sent condolences” escalated as President Goodluck from the mujahidin in Nigeria to key Jonathan, a Christian from the south, The discovery that hundreds of al-Qa`ida leaders, including Usama bin was inaugurated in Abuja in April Nigerian militants were in northern Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the amir 2011, and with Boko Haram’s first Mali and that Ansaru flyers were found of AQIM, and warned the United States vehicle-borne suicide bombings at the in Belmokhtar’s compound in Gao the that “jihad has just begun.”57 This and Federal Police Headquarters and UN day after he fled the city suggests that Headquarters in Abuja in June and 61 Belmokhtar’s connection to Ansaru was MUJAO could be explained by confidential letters written August 2011. In August 2011, Nigeria still strong at the time of the French- by AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel to other Islamist led military intervention in February militants in Mali, which were uncovered in Timbuktu by Usama bin Ladin through AQIM. Boko Haram, howev- 53 2013. the Associated Press. Droukdel wrote, “Better for you to er, never formally affiliated with AQIM or al-Qa`ida cen- be silent and pretend to be a ‘domestic’ movement…There tral. In November 2011, a Boko Haram spokesman said 52 While racism may have alienated some sub-Saharan is no reason for you to show that we have an expansion- that, “It is true we have links with al-Qa`ida. They assist Africans from AQIM and MUJAO’s Arab leadership, ary, jihadi, al-Qaida or any other sort of project.” For the us and we assist them. Any Muslim group that is strug- these reports do not seem to indicate that MUJAO would confidential letters, see “Al-Qaida’s Saharan Playbook,” gling to establish an Islamic state can get support from have completely separated from AQIM because of rac- Associated Press, February 15, 2013. al-Qa`ida if they reach out to them.” For all these details, ism. Locals reported that “light-skinned” Arabs, Tu- 54 “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Condolence, Sup- see Abu Muslim al-Jazaari, “The Platform of Tawhid and aregs, and sub-Saharan Africans from Niger, Nigeria, port and Comfort for our Brothers and People in Nigeria Jihad,” Jihadology.net, March 2011; “The Brigades of Mali and other countries fought together with AQIM in 20/08/09,” available at www.ansar1.info/showthread. Tawhid in Nigeria,” Arrahmah.com, August 22, 2009; northern Mali up to the time of the French-led military php?t=11556; “North Africa Qaeda Offers to Help Nigeri- “From Your Mujahideen Brothers In Nigeria,” Ansar1. intervention. Oumar Ould Hamaha also claimed that an Muslims,” February 1, 2010, available at www.ansar1. info, April 2, 2011; “Periodical Review July 2010 – No. 2,” all militants fought in “the name of Islam, not Arab or info/showthread.php?t=32243. ICT’s Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, August 2010; Tuareg, or black or white,” and in a statement MUJAO 55 Nigeria is split fairly evenly between a predominantly “Islamist Sect Website Claims Nigerian Bombings,” said that the “Muslim brothers from all battalions have Muslim north and a predominantly Christian south. Agence France-Presse, December 28, 2010; “Nigeria Sect the same goal—jihad.” Belmokhtar’s “racism” may be 56 “North Africa Qaeda Offers to Help Nigerian Mus- ‘Spokesman’ Claims Al-Qaeda Links,” Agence Presse- explained by a statement attributed to him from August lims.” France, November 24, 2011; Tobi Soniyi, “Ashafa Admit- 2009 that he “wanted to attract black African recruits 57 In early 2011, other jihadists, such as the Algerian ted Al-Qaeda Link, Ex-SSS Boss Tells Court,” ThisDay- because they would agree more readily than Arabs to be- Abu Muslim al-Jazaari, urged Nigerians to follow the Live, April 4, 2012. coming suicide bombers and because poor economic and Islamic doctrines of “Unity and Jihad” and al-Qa`ida 58 Imam Imam, “Jos Bombings - Group Claims Respon- social conditions made them ripe for recruitment.” See leaders, such as Abu Yahya al-Libi. As early as August sibility,” ThisDay, December 27, 2010. Lydia Polgreen and Scott Sayare, “French Capture Stra- 2009, Nigerians on jihadist forums began calling for 59 Slain Boko Haram leader Muhammad Yusuf’s family tegic Airport in Move to Retake North Mali,” New York “sustaining the dignity of the Sokoto jihad” and unifying said in 2011 that 40% of the sect’s funding comes from Times, January 26, 2012; “New Qaeda Spin-Off Threatens with the “brothers of Chechnya, the unrelenting gladia- outside Nigeria. See “Suspects Charged in Nigeria Bomb- West Africa”; “Exclusive: Boko Haram Targets Julius tors of Afghanistan, the fierce brothers of Iraq, the troops ing,” al-Jazira, December 25, 2011. Berger, Dantata & Sawoe Expatriates”; “Boko Haram of Muwahhidin in Somalia and the Brigades of Unity 60 Adam Nossiter, “Islamist Group With Possible Qaeda Gets N40million Donation From Algeria,” Sahara Re- [Tawhid] in Nigeria.” In April 2011, just as Boko Haram’s Links Upends Nigeria,” New York Times, August 17, 2011; porters, May 13, 2012. insurgency was underway, the “mujahidin brothers in Will Connors, “Al Qaeda Ties Seen for Nigeria Group,” 53 A picture of the flyer is available at www.lexpress. Nigeria” also promised to “spearhead the call to global Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2011; Hugo Odiogor, “Boko fr/actualite/monde/afrique/exclusif-au-mali-dans-la- jihad against the apostates and their allies,” “open up Haram: Battling Scourge of Migration and Terrorism in maison-du-djihadiste-mokhtar-belmokhtar_1218712. a dungeon for Obama,” and “raise the banner for al- West Africa,” Vanguard, February 23, 2013. html. See Lars Inge Staveland, “New Islamist Group Qa`ida in the West Africa Province” for the brothers in 61 The attack in Abuja mirrored AQIM’s attacks the May Be Affiliated With Al-Qa’ida,” Aftenposten, Febru- Ghana, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Nigeria, Togo, Benin and next day against Algeria’s premier military academy at ary 22, 2013; “Dozens of Boko Haram Help Mali’s Rebel Niger. These postings seem to reflect both Shekau’s and Cherchell on August 27, 2011, and also AQIM’s attack on Seize Gao,” Agence France-Presse, April 9, 2012; Drew Ansaru’s future statements. Separately, an al-Qa`ida in the UN Headquarters in Algiers in 2007 and al-Qa`ida Hinshaw, “Timbuktu Training Site Shows Terrorists’ West Africa cell connected to al-Qa`ida central in Paki- in Iraq’s (AQI) attack on the UN Headquarters in Bagh- Reach,” Wall Street Journal, February 1, 2013. AQIM’s stan was reported in Kano in the mid-2000s, and Boko dad in 2003. The attack in Abuja was an anomaly to the reason for not publicizing its relationship to Ansaru or Haram members in Algeria reportedly connected with Shekau faction’s targeting strategy, in which interna-

6 march 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 3 and Niger confirmed that increasing that Ansaru was in closer operational AQIM’s leadership, which broke away numbers of Boko Haram members range to AQIM and Belmokhtar’s from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) were receiving weapons from AQIM militants. Ansaru may have also avoided in Algeria in the late 1990s because it and traveling to Niger for training establishing cells in northeastern killed many Algerian civilians during with AQIM.62 Nigeria because Boko Haram threatened the country’s civil war. Instead, to kill defectors.65 AQIM’s leadership focused on targeting AQIM’s support may have helped Boko the Algerian government and security Haram evolve from a Taliban-inspired Third, even when Boko Haram targeted forces in rural areas and international religious movement under Yusuf into a churches and government offices, the interests, including the United Nations, full-fledged militant movement under casualties often included more Muslim and kidnapping Westerners. Shekau. There were several factors, civilians than Christians or government however, that likely compelled AQIM employees.66 This may have alienated Finally, AQIM leader Abdelmalek to coordinate kidnapping operations in Droukdel reportedly dismissed Nigeria with Ansaru, rather than with ern Kaduna in one week; Ansaru’s common references Belmokhtar as a result of him “straying Boko Haram. to Christian “massacres” of Muslims in Middle Belt cit- from the right path,” in the words of one ies (southern Kaduna was the scene of some of the worst Malian official, and focusing on criminal 67 First, Boko Haram has always said post-election violence in 2011); Ansaru’s possible Hausa- activities and kidnappings. This may that it does not carry out kidnappings Fulani composition, which are ethnic groups that have have facilitated Belmokhtar’s support and, at least until February 2013, did come into frequent conflict with Christians in the Middle of Khalid al-Barnawi—who also feuded not carry out kidnappings or target Belt; Ansaru’s attack on the Nigerian military convoy with members of AQIM in Algeria over 68 Western personnel or institutions— passing through Kogi State en route to a base in Kaduna kidnappings in Nigeria —at the expense with the exception of the attack on the from where the soldiers went to Mali; Ansaru’s connec- of Shekau, who had a closer historical UN Headquarters in Abuja in August tion to Kaduna-based Boko Haram Shura Council mem- connection to Droukdel. 63 2011. This would have made it difficult ber Abu Muhammed in the Kebbi kidnapping in May for Belmokhtar to coordinate with Boko 2011; and Ansaru’s possible following of Kaduna-based Conclusion Haram since his operations almost cleric, shaykh Ahmad Gumi, who has been Nigeria’s Even if France and its West African exclusively targeted Western personnel most vocal critic against the country’s military deploy- allies have driven AQIM out of northern and facilities. ment to Mali. On the same day that Ansaru targeted the Mali, Ansaru and Boko Haram are likely military convoy in Kogi, Gumi said in a sermon in Ka- self-sustainable and able to continue Second, Boko Haram was based in duna: “If the Christian leadership of Nigeria is plunging attacks. Ansaru relies mostly on its northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State, us into Mali for the same reason of hatred and prejudice proven kidnapping expertise, and Boko which borders Niger but is more than against Islamists, this is the warning they should heed, Haram on assassinations and attacks 69 1,000 miles from northern Mali, because Islam is unconquerable...” See “Sheikh Again on soft targets. Both Ansaru and Boko where some of AQIM’s brigades were Defends His Stand On Troops Deployment To Mali,” Haram will also likely recruit militants based. In contrast, Ansaru was based Sahara Reporters, January 20, 2013; “Christian Militants who fought and obtained new skills in northwestern Nigeria, which is only In Southern Kaduna Threaten Fulani Herdsmen, Give from warfare in Mali. The Boko Haram 64 300 miles from Mali. This suggests Seven Days Evacuation Notice,” Sahara Reporters, June attack on an army barracks in Monguno, 5, 2012; “Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladi Sudan Borno State, on March 3, 2013, in which tional targets have never been attacked. See “Nigerian threatens Southern Kaduna Militant Group, Akhwat the militants mounted weapons on four- Islamists Vow ‘Fiercer’ Attacks,” Agence France-Presse, Akwop,” Desert Herald, June 11, 2012. wheel-drive vehicles, and the discovery June 15, 2011; “18 Dead in Algeria Military School Bomb- 65 Ansaru members may also have been ethnic Hausa- of improvised fighting vehicles in a raid ing: Ministry,” Agence France-Presse, August 27, 2011. Fulanis from northwestern Nigeria who resented Borno- on a Boko Haram hideout in Maiduguri, 62 “Lutte contre le terrorisme: le Nigeria et le Niger ren- based and Kanuri-led Boko Haram. According to cap- Borno State, on March 9, 2012, suggest forcent leur cooperation,” Radio France Internationale, tured Boko Haram members, Abubakar Shekau, who that Boko Haram has already learned August 11, 2011. is ethnically Kanuri, favored Kanuris of Borno State, new methods of fighting from the 70 63 The UN Headquarters attack in Abuja on August 26, while Nigeriens, Chadians, Cameroonians and Nigerian Islamist militants in Mali. 2011, was the only one of Boko Haram’s more than 700 non-Kanuris were always chosen to carry out suicide attacks until 2013 against a target that was not Nigerian. bombings with the punishment of death for those who In claiming the attack, a Boko Haram spokesman said, refused. Kanuris are the dominant ethnic group in Borno “The U.S. government has been collaborating with the State, whereas Hausas and Fulanis are predominant eth- Nigerian government to clamp down on our members nic groups throughout the rest of northern Nigeria. See nationwide.” See Adam Nossiter, “Islamic Group Says It Yusuf Alli, “How Bombers are Chosen, by Boko Haram Vanguard, May 13, 2012. Was Behind Fatal Nigeria Attack,” New York Times, Au- Suspect,” The Nation, February 9, 2012; “Boko Haram: 67 “Al-Qaeda’s N. Africa Branch Reshuffles Leader- gust 28, 2011; “Boko Haram Spokesman Denies Link to Six Killed in Factional Clash,” ThisDayLive, February ship,” Agence Presse-France, October 15, 2012. Nigerian Kidnap,” Reuters, March 10, 2012. 3, 2012. 68 “Barnawi, Kambar: Qaeda-linked Militants with 64 The author suspects that Ansaru may be based in the 66 Boko Haram’s coordinated attacks on government Boko Haram Ties.” Middle Belt, possibly Kaduna, based on the following: offices in Kano on January 20, 2012, killed 180 people, 69 “Boko Haram Upgrading Weapons from IEDs to Ansaru’s repeated e-mail statements to Kaduna-based including more than 150 Muslim civilians. In addition, RPGs, Police Says,” Punch NG, July 15, 2012. Desert Herald newspaper, one of which threatened the Boko Haram’s attacks on churches in Kaduna on Eas- 70 “20 Boko Haram Islamists Killed in Borno,” Van- southern Kaduna-based Christian militia group “Akh- ter 2012 killed mostly Muslim motorcycle taxi riders, guard, March 3, 2013; Maina Maina, “JTF Kills 52 Boko wat Akwop,” which, one week before Ansaru’s e-mail, women, and children outside of the church. See “More Haram Militants, Arrests 70, Recovers Arms in Borno,” had threatened to expel all Fulani herdsmen from south- Muslims are Killed than Christians – Joji, Arewa Chief,” Daily Post, March 9, 2013.

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An increase in the number of recruits Shekau’s approval of a Boko Haram and Boko Haram still revere Boko from other West African countries or cell’s kidnapping of a seven-member Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf, Nigerians with experience in Mali could French family in northern Cameroon on and their members may move fluidly also enable Ansaru and Boko Haram February 19, 2013, shows that Shekau between groups and form partnerships to carry out attacks or kidnappings no longer prohibits targeting foreign to target mutual enemies: the Nigerian in southern Nigeria or in Nigeria’s interests and that some Boko Haram government, France and the West. cells are shifting toward Ansaru’s They may also collaborate on refining strategy.73 Moreover, Shekau’s warning their tactics as well as expanding their “Shekau’s approval of that Boko Haram will attack Cameroon areas of operations to locate new targets a Boko Haram cell’s if it continues to arrest Boko Haram and eliminate Western and Christian members could signify an expansion influence from Nigeria and the region.75 kidnapping of a seven- of the insurgency while also deterring member French family in other countries, such as Niger and Chad, Jacob Zenn is an analyst of African and from cracking down on Boko Haram Eurasian affairs for The Jamestown northern Cameroon on cells operating on their territory. Foundation, and is a Senior Regional February 19, 2013, shows Analyst of Courage Services, INC. He Finally, if Ansaru and Boko Haram authored “Northern Nigeria’s Boko that Shekau no longer are strained for resources as a result Haram: The Prize in al-Qaeda’s Africa prohibits targeting foreign of AQIM’s retreat from northern Strategy,” which was published by The Mali, the two groups may look past Jamestown Foundation in November 2012, interests and that some their differences and cooperate. Since and conducted field research in Nigeria, Boko Haram cells are Ansaru announced its formation in Niger, Chad and Cameroon in June 2012. January 2012, Boko Haram has tried He speaks Arabic, French and Swahili. shifting toward Ansaru’s to distance itself from the perception strategy.” that it kills Muslim civilians.74 Ansaru

ligence Report Identifies Training, Operational Base,” The Sun, October 27, 2012; “Shekau, Boko Haram Leader, neighboring countries of Benin, Niger, Denies Ceasefire in Beheading Video,” Vanguard, March Chad, and Cameroon in revenge for 6, 2013. these countries’ support of the French- 73 Abubakar Shekau claimed the kidnapping in a Hausa 71 led intervention. Shekau’s personal and Arabic language video statement dated March 15, exposure to the war in Mali or, if he 2013, but released on March 18, 2013, in which he said, did not take refuge in Gao, his contacts “We have a mission of establishing Shari`a in this coun- to militants who returned to Nigeria try and the rest of the world. We are the ones holding “Boko Haram Calls JTF a Liar,” ThisDay, March 12, 2013; from Mali could cause him to adopt a hostage the seven French nationals because the leaders Abdulsalam Muhammad, “60 Killed in Kano Bus Park 72 more regional view of the insurgency. of Cameroon and Nigeria have also detained our brethren Bombing,” Vanguard, March 19, 2013. both women and children under dehumanizing condi- 75 The father of the family that was kidnapped in northern 71 Just as Nigeriens would help Boko Haram attack Ni- tions. These seven French people will not be released un- Cameroon worked for an energy company in Yaounde, ger and Cameroonians would help Boko Haram attack til when we see our detained brethren released...” While Cameroon, although it is not known whether this was Cameroon, ethnically Yoruba Boko Haram members the kidnapping seems to contradict the Boko Haram merely a coincidence. If the father was targeted due to his like Abdoulah Abdoulah could help Boko Haram es- spokesman’s claim after Ansaru’s first kidnapping that occupation, this suggests that the kidnappers from Boko tablish cells for attacking southern Nigeria. See Maud Boko Haram does not engage in hostage-taking, Boko Haram followed Ansaru’s strategy to target foreign en- Descamps, “Boko Haram tente d’enrôler la jeunesse,” Haram’s demands for prisoners, not money, in exchange gineers, and that the kidnappers may have been tipped Europe1, February 28, 2013; “Niger Police Arrest Five for the French family is consistent with the spokesman’s off, as was the case in other Ansaru kidnappings. Sepa- Suspected Boko Haram Members,” Vanguard, Septem- statement that Boko Haram does not ask for ransoms. rately, a Boko Haram cell uncovered in Sokoto on March ber 27, 2012; “Ansar Dine Pursues Peace Talks, Mujao Shekau’s wife was also arrested in northern Nigeria in 13, 2013, in which Boko Haram Shura Council member Names New Chief.” 2012, and Shekau’s demand for the release of imprisoned Habibu Yusuf, also known as “Asalafi,” was captured, 72 A March 1, 2013, video of Shekau that was distributed women in exchange for the French family may relate to shows that Boko Haram cells are operating in Ansaru’s to journalists in northern Nigeria shows six camouflaged his wife, who the security forces may be keeping captive main area of operations in northwestern Nigeria. Simi- militants in a forest sitting with Shekau speaking in what to pressure Shekau. See Ola Audu, “Boko Haram Threat- larly, Ansaru’s kidnapping in Bauchi State shows that seems to be the Kanuri language (not Hausa or Arabic). ens JTF Spokesperson, Demands Prisoners Exchange for Ansaru is operating in Boko Haram’s main area of opera- This contrasts with Boko Haram’s November 27, 2012, French Nationals,” Premium Times, March 18, 2013. tions in northeastern Nigeria. If, as reported, “Asalafi” video, in which Shekau is training with militants in a 74 Since Ansaru’s formation, Boko Haram has repeat- was a follower of Khalid al-Barnawi, this could be anoth- desert and speaking in Arabic. This could signal that edly stated that it only targets the Nigerian government er sign of collaboration and fluidity between Boko Haram Shekau has returned to Borno State from northern Mali. and security forces, Christians and informants and said and Ansaru members. See “FG Places N50m Bounty on In addition, in Boko Haram’s March 15, 2013, video, that the Nigerian Joint Task Force is to blame for the Boko Haram Leader,” Punch NG, November 24, 2012; Shekau claimed to be standing next to weapons stolen deaths of civilians. The Boko Haram suicide attack at a “How We Weakened Boko Haram, Killed Bomb Expert, from the Nigerian security forces during an attack on bus station in a Christian area of Kano on March 18, 2013, Others By Ihejirika,” Guardian [Lagos], March 16, 2013; the Monguno army barracks on March 13, 2013, which, in which an estimated 25 to 60 people were killed, shows “Nigeria: Taking the Hostage Road,” Africa Confidential, if true, would mean that he is likely in Borno State. See that Boko Haram still carries out mass casualty attacks, March 15, 2013; “Boko Haram, Ansaru Target Lagos, “Uncovered: Boko Haram Base Traced to Mali – Intel- but tries to kill mostly Christians. See Michael Olugbode, Others,” Punch NG, February 23, 2013.

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AQIM’s Playbook in Mali Strategic Disagreement because “our previous experience9 Droukdel’s letter revealed a proved that applying Shari`a this By Pascale C. Siegel fundamental strategic disagreement way, without taking into account both with his own operators and with the environment into consideration an internal document recovered by the Ansar Eddine in northern Mali. For will lead to people rejecting religion Associated Press in Timbuktu in January Droukdel, AQIM must strive to retain and engender hatred toward the 2013 sheds new light on al-Qa`ida in its base and freedom of operation in mujahidin.”10 the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) strategy northern Mali, or, as he wrote, to “gain in northern Mali.1 The document was a region under control and a people 3. The destruction of the Timbuktu purportedly part of a confidential letter fighting for us and a refuge for our shrines11 will lead to “negative from Abdelmalek Droukdel (also known members that allows us to move forward repercussions” because “internally we as Abu Mus`ab `Abd al-Wadud), the with our program”5 even though it is are not strong and there is a potential amir of AQIM, to his lieutenants in the “very probable, perhaps certain, that for an external intervention.”12 Sahara and to the Islamist militant a military intervention will occur, group Ansar Eddine’s2 leader, Iyad whether directly or indirectly.”6 4. The application of “the hadd (religious ag Ghaly (also known as Shaykh Abu punishment)…and the fact that you Fadl).3 The document was not dated, Droukdel believed that AQIM’s prevented women from getting out and but several references indicate that primary concern should be to outlive children from playing, and searched Droukdel may have authored the letter a Western-backed intervention by the houses of the population…[are] in early July 2012.4 cultivating enough local support so contradictory to the policy of Salaf (our that it could blossom again after the forebearers).”13 The letter revealed a deep strategic military operation concluded. “If we fracture between AQIM’s leadership can achieve this positive thing even in 5. “The decision to go to war with the and its lieutenants on the ground, as limited amount, then, even if the project MNLA [National Movement for the Droukdel saw a military intervention as fails later it will be just enough that we Liberation of Azawad],14 after becoming all but inevitable and therefore wanted will have planted the first, good seeds, close and almost completing a deal to focus the group’s strategy on outliving in a fertile soil and put pesticides and with them, which we thought would be it. The letter further highlighted major fertilizer on it, so that the tree will grow positive, is a major mistake.”15 internal dysfunction between AQIM’s more quickly,” he wrote.7 leadership and its subordinates in the Sahara. Finally, it showed a deep On the basis of his strategic assessment, commitment to success and a worrisome Droukdel contended that the tactics 9 It is unclear to which “previous experience” Droukdel plan for the future. developed and implemented by his was referring. He may have been referring to the expe- lieutenants in northern Mali—Nabil rience of the Algerian civil war (1992-2002) where the Makhloufi (amir of the Sahara region), Islamists’ violent excesses fueled popular discontent Abu Zeid (amir of the Brigades of Tariq against them and enabled the Algerian government to Ibn Ziyad), and Mokhtar Belmokhtar significantly degrade their capabilities. He also may 1 For the original document in Arabic with the Associ- (amir of the Veiled Brigades)—and the have been referring to the experience of al-Qa`ida in Iraq ated Press’ English translation, see “Mali-Al-Qaida’s Sa- policies pursued by Ansar Eddine were (AQI) between 2003 and 2008, where the group’s tactics hara Playbook,” Associated Press, undated, available at wrong and would lead to failure. He led Sunni Arab leaders to distance themselves from AQI www.apne.ws/YuuVAC. Also see Rukmini Callimachi, strongly criticized every major decision and cooperate with the United States to curb the group’s “In Timbuktu, Al-Qaida Left Behind a Manifesto,” Asso- his lieutenants have made since taking power. ciated Press, February 14, 2013. over northern Mali. He argued that: 10 “Mali-Al-Qaida’s Sahara Playbook,” p. 5. 2 Ansar Eddine, which means “Defenders of the Faith,” 11 In early July 2012, Ansar Eddine began the destruc- is a homegrown Islamist movement led by renowned Tu- 1. The declaration of an “Islamic tion of several 15th century mausoleums and shrines, areg rebel leader Iyad ag Ghaly. The group seeks to im- State of Azawad” was premature including the tombs of Sidi Mahmoud, Sidi Moctar, and pose a stringent version of Shari`a across Mali and does because “establishing a just Islamic Alpha Moya in Timbuktu. The shrines are part of the not purport to have global jihadist ambitions. regime ruling people by the Shari`a UNESCO world heritage sites. Their destruction pro- 3 Professor Matthieu Guidère, an AQIM specialist at of the People’s Lord is [a] very big voked international outrage. See Ishaan Tharoor, “Tim- the University of Toulouse in France, authenticated the duty that exceeds the capabilities of buktu’s Destruction: Why Islamists are Wrecking Mali’s document. Based on the language used and the reference any organization or movement [now Cultural Heritage,” Time, July 2, 2012. 8 system included in the material, he assessed the docu- operating in Azawad].” 12 “Mali-Al-Qaida’s Sahara Playbook,” p. 5. ment to be legitimate. 13 Ibid. 4 The letter referred to the destruction of the Timbuktu 2. The “extreme speed with which you 14 The MNLA is a Tuareg nationalist-secular politico- shrines, which took place on June 30 and July 1, 2012. It applied Shari`a Law…in an environment military movement located in northern Mali, seeking the also referred to Ansar Eddine’s decision to go to war with ignorant of religion” was “wrong,” independence of northern Mali (Azawad). Tuaregs have the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad long been disgruntled with the government of Bamako (MNLA), which took place in June 2012. Lastly, it men- and have regularly rebelled against the central govern- tioned the fighting between the MNLA and Ansar Ed- 5 “Mali-Al-Qaida’s Sahara Playbook.” ment. The latest offensive, initiated by the MNLA in dine in the present tense, yet by July 17, 2012, the MNLA 6 Ibid., p. 3. January 2012, led to the overthrow of the Bamako gov- had fled all major cities, thereby indicating that the letter 7 Ibid., p. 4. ernment in March 2012. was probably written before July 17. 8 Ibid., p. 9. 15 “Mali-Al-Qaida’s Sahara Playbook,” p. 8.

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Organizational Dysfunction Droukdel did not conceal his frustration to the strategic disagreements over It was not the first time that Droukdel when he castigated his subordinates for Mali, those concerns possibly weighed argued for a “gentler, kinder” AQIM. providing unconvincing explanations on Droukdel’s decision.27 He made similar statements in a short through media channels, rather than audio message released on May 23, through internal channels, for these Proposed Alternative Policy 2012. In that speech, he boasted that actions. He wrote: “And with all the In addition to his stern criticisms and Mali offered a “historic opportunity” reasons our brother gave via their disapproval of the current strategy to establish an Islamic state, but also statements through the media (we have pursued by his lieutenants and allies, warned that such opportunity might not until now received any clarification Droukdel reiterated his call for a be wasted if the wrong policies were from you despite how perilous the different vision and policy. To make implemented.16 He then advised his operation was!), we can see that all the most of this historic opportunity, lieutenants to “gradually introduce these reasons are not good enough to Droukdel recommended the time-tested Shari`a laws, not hasten to punish declare a war [against the MNLA].”21 al-Qa`ida strategy of co-opting local people, provide security and services, It is unclear whether Droukdel was grievances and advised his subordinates and consult elders and leaders amongst angry because his subordinates were to adopt a flexible strategy of alliances. the people.”17 not heeding his advice or because of the Throughout his letter, Droukdel wrote technical difficulties in communicating about the value of “lessons learned” “Droukdel believed effectively between northern Mali and and extolled the virtues of adapting Kabylia, the mountainous region to to local circumstances. In the Mali that AQIM’s primary the east of Algiers where he is believed context, showing flexibility translated concern should be to to be based, due to security forces’ into seeking an alliance with all of the surveillance efforts. Both issues could organizations that represent Azawad outlive a Western-backed be factors. society, including Ansar Eddine and the intervention by cultivating MNLA. It is time, he wrote, Relations have always been difficult enough local support so between Droukdel, whose operational to extend bridges to the various that it could blossom again base is in Kabylia, and the amirs operating sectors and parts of Azawad in the Algerian south and the Sahel who society—Arab and Tuaregs and after the military operation have been fairly independent. In August Zingiya (Blacks)—to end the concluded.” 2012, for example, Droukdel mandated situation of political and social and Necib Tayeb, head of AQIM’s judicial intellectual separation between committee, to conduct a reconciliation the mujahidin and these sectors, mission between the three AQIM particularly the big tribes, and the leaders in the Sahara at the time: Abu main rebel movements with their Droukdel’s lieutenants and allies in Zeid, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and Nabil various ideologies, and the elite the Sahara must not have felt bound Makhloufi.22 According to the Algerian of Azawad society, its clerics, its by his advice, and instead acted in Press Service, his mission was to “unite groupings, its individuals, and its contradiction with their hierarchy’s the amirs of AQMI [AQIM] in the Sahel… noble forces.28 wishes. On May 26, 2012, the MNLA to end the differences and conflicts that and Ansar Eddine announced the have opposed the southern branches to Droukdel suggested an alliance of breakaway Islamic State of Azawad.18 the northern branches.”23 His mission convenience to combine forces to gain A week later, fighting began between failed, however, as the Algerian police widespread support as well as share the the MNLA and Islamist factions allied intercepted Tayeb in Ghardaïa on his risk with partners. He explained that with Ansar Eddine. Shari`a tribunals way to Mali.24 After the failed mission, were quickly established and began Droukdel reportedly dismissed Mokhtar this will have three fundamental dispensing harsh punishments such as Belmokhtar from his position.25 At benefits. First, we would not alone amputating limbs for crimes of theft.19 the time, AQIM sources cited in the bear the fault of the possible failure Finally, in late June and early July, the Mauritanian press indicated that

Islamists destroyed ancient Islamic Belmokhtar had been fired for not 27 Mokhtar Belmokhtar claimed responsibility for the Sufi shrines in Timbuktu because they abiding by the leadership’s decisions January 17, 2013, brazen attack against the BP gas com- 20 26 depicted “false idols.” and recommendations. Although plex at In Amenas in eastern Algeria. In a video com- neither Belmokhtar nor Droukdel have muniqué signed by “Those Who Sign With Blood,” the publicly tied his dismissal specifically brigade that Belmokhtar created in December 2012 after 16 “AQIM Congratulates Ansar al-Din for Conquests in being fired by Droukdel, he claimed responsibility for Azawad, Cautions it to Avoid Clashes with the MNLA,” 21 “Mali-Al-Qaida’s Sahara Playbook,” p. 8. the operation in the name of al-Qa`ida central: “We, at Sahara Media, May 21, 2012. 22 “Algérie: Un émir d’AQMI, Necib Tayeb, a été arrêté al-Qa`ida, are responsible for this blessed operation.” 17 Ibid. près de Ghardaïa,” Jeune Afrique, August 21, 2012. He made no reference to Droukdel or AQIM, positioning 18 “Islamic State Declared in Northern Mali,” Associated 23 Ibid. himself as a rival to AQIM. See “Belouar dans un nouvel Press, May 26, 2012. 24 Ibid. enregistrement: ‘Nous sommes prêtes à négocier avec 19 “Crimes de guerre au Nord-Mali,” L’Association Mali- 25 “Pro-Droudkel et Pro-Hattab face-à-face,” Le Temps l’Algérie et l’Occident à condition que cesse la guerre au enne des Droits de l’Homme, July 2012. d’Algérie, October 20, 2012. Mali,’” Sahara Media, January 20, 2013. 20 Tharoor. 26 Ibid. 28 “Mali-Al-Qaida’s Sahara Playbook,” p. 3.

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and the expected blockade. Rather changed the nature of AQIM’s activity in Conclusion if it happens—God forbid though Azawad, and required the establishment As the French-led military forces it is very probable—all the main of a “new framework regulating retake northern Mali, Droukdel’s eight parties would bear responsibility the organizations’ relationship,” in month old letter should resonate as before the people and everyone particular between AQIM and Ansar an ominous warning as it points to a will consider the matter objectively Eddine.37 He showed flexibility in long-term strategic plan to outlive the and responsibility. Second, the way he envisioned relations with intervention and sets the stage for a administration of the region and Ansar Eddine. Droukdel proposed two potentially successful return. Clearly, standing up to the international, organizational frameworks, one in under Droukdel’s leadership, AQIM has foreign, and regional challenge is a which AQIM’s operations in northern no intention of relinquishing northern large duty that exceeds our military Mali would be under Ansar Eddine’s Mali. and financial and structural command-and-control and another in capability for the time being. So it which AQIM would “loan” fighters The French-led intervention and is wise then for us not to bear the to Ansar Eddine for its operations in its immediate aftermath appear to burden alone in this phase.29 northern Mali.38 These fighters would validate at least part of Droukdel’s be under the command of Ansar Eddine analysis. The MNLA turned against He further preached a policy of and gain citizenship in the country of its former allies and picked up arms moderation and accommodation Azawad.39 to fight alongside the intervening force, designed to win over the people. “And while scenes of popular elation in Gao a wise policy in this stage is not to push Droukdel’s proposal, however, made and Timbuktu showed that the jihadists’ people away and make sure to integrate it clear that of the radical Islamist harsh rule antagonized many.42 Yet everybody,” he said.30 Practically, organizations operating in Mali, AQIM there are two reasons why AQIM might Droukdel recommended proceeding was the one in charge of international get a second chance at implementing its cautiously with the following policies: operations. Under both scenarios, plan for the country. Ansar Eddine would be confined to 1. Put aside rivalries with other operations in northern Mali, whereas First, the disruption of AQIM’s networks movements, including Ansar Eddine AQIM would operate internationally.40 in the Sahara, including the confirmed and the MNLA and work toward a peace Droukdel was the artisan of the death of Abu Zeid and the uncertain deal with the MNLA.31 rapprochement between the Salafist fate of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, might give Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) Droukdel an opening to reshape the 2. Seek full integration of AQIM’s and al-Qa`ida in 2006, which resulted regional leadership with more obedient fighters into Azawad’s civil (tribes) in the creation of AQIM in 2007. He is commanders who might implement his and political (movements) society.32 the one who successfully transformed policies.43 the GSPC from an Algerian movement 3. Proselytize al-Qa`ida’s version of focused on local grievances into a global Second, if the international community Islam to local populations.33 movement ideologically and doctrinally is unable to address the deep grievances aligned with al-Qa`ida, dedicated that led to the rebellion in 2012, 4. Adopt a moderate rhetoric that to establishing a worldwide Islamic resentment may allow for the return of reassures and calms and avoid caliphate and focused on attacking the AQIM-linked fighters. provocations and repeated threats.34 far enemy (e.g., the West).41 These two scenarios indicate that AQIM is more Pascale Combelles Siegel runs Insight 5. Downplay the al-Qa`idist, jihadist interested in pursuing the global jihad Through Analysis, a consultancy firm nature while playing up the local nature than ruling Azawad. They also show, specializing in strategic influence in support of the movement.35 however, that AQIM’s leadership is of peace, stabilization, and counterterrorism also willing and capable of adapting operations. She monitors political unrest in the 6. Stay away from declaring or enforcing to new circumstances and exploiting Middle East, North and West Africa, with a takfir (excommunicating Muslims).36 them for the mutual benefit of both focus on al-Qa`ida. Before that, she analyzed organizations. local perceptions of social, political, and These policies are designed to advance military issues in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ms. AQIM’s goals in pursuit of the global Siegel also analyzed Iraqi insurgent jihad. Droukdel readily admitted propaganda for the U.S. Army, where she that the creation of an Islamic state participated in the design of a “Divide and in Azawad posed a “true dilemma,” Prosper” communication campaign concept for the U.S. government. 29 Ibid., p. 4. 37 Ibid., p. 6. 30 Ibid., p. 10. 38 Ibid. 42 “Mali MNLA Tuareg Rebels say Control Kidal, Isla- 31 Ibid., p. 7. 39 Ibid. mists Gone,” Reuters, January 28, 2013; “Mali: Thou- 32 Ibid., p. 4. 40 Ibid. sands Celebrate Liberation of Gao,” Channel 4, January 33 Ibid., p. 5. 41 Liess Boukra, “Du Groupe salafiste Pour le Combat 27, 2013. 34 Ibid., p. 9. (GSPC) à la Qaida au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI),” Afri- 43 “France Confirms the Death of a Qaeda Leader in 35 Ibid. can Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Mali,” New York Times, March 23, 2013; “Belmokhtar 36 Ibid., p. 10. June 2010, p. 51. Death Unconfirmed,” Magharebia, March 4, 2013.

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Al-Shabab’s Tactical and Pressure on Three Fronts: North, South and neighborhood in north Mogadishu in Media Strategies in the West March 2012.11 Al-Shabab, bolstered by initial military Wake of its Battlefield victories and the continued corruption Kenya, citing the increased number of Setbacks and ineptness plaguing the Somali kidnappings carried out in its territory Transitional Federal Government close to the border with Somalia, sent By Christopher Anzalone (TFG), launched major frontline military forces inside the Juba region assaults against AMISOM and TFG of southern Somalia in mid-October in 2009-2010, the somali militant group positions in the divided city of 2011.12 The Kenyan government also al-Shabab controlled most of central Mogadishu in August 2010 during its launched a major security sweep in the and southern Somalia south of the “Ramadan Offensive.”4 Its offensive Eastleigh district of its own capital, autonomous region of Puntland. Since failed, however, resulting in heavy Nairobi, targeting suspected al-Shabab the February 2011 military offensives insurgent losses and the inability to “sympathizers.”13 Eastleigh, which by the African Union Mission in capture the areas of Mogadishu under is sometimes referred to as “Little Somalia (AMISOM), Somali government AMISOM and TFG control.5 A second Mogadishu,” has long been an important troops, and Somali Sufi militia forces, “Ramadan Offensive” launched one hub for al-Shabab recruitment and al-Shabab has suffered a series of year later could not turn the tide in al- is home to extremist preachers and significant territorial and strategic Shabab’s favor.6 By mid-August 2011, groups, such as the Kenyan Muslim setbacks.1 Pressures on the insurgent al-Shabab had announced a “strategic Youth Center.14 movement increased when Kenya and withdrawal” from Mogadishu and Ethiopia, together with client Somali began a guerrilla war in the city against In late November 2011, Ethiopian militias, invaded its southern and AMISOM and the TFG.7 troops entered western Somalia with western strongholds in October and the goal of pushing back al-Shabab November 2011. The Kenyan military’s Despite having withdrawn most of forces from its border.15 The re-entry of goal from the onset of its campaign its forces from the capital, al-Shabab the Ethiopian military into the country inside Somalia was to seize the vital port operated in outlying districts and opened a third front, to the west, city of Kismayo, one of al-Shabab’s most exerted influence within Mogadishu.8 against al-Shabab, which was already important economic centers.2 Kenya It also continued to execute deadly faced with offensives by AMISOM and seized control of that city in October attacks deep inside the city, including the TFG in the north and Kenya and its 2012. Ethiopian troops and their Somali vehicle bombings at the Somali militia allies in the south. In addition allies quickly captured the Ethiopia- Ministry of Education and a military to battlefield setbacks, al-Shabab was Somalia border town of Beledweyne, and base in October 2011.9 Al-Shabab’s faced with renewed pressure on its within two months had also captured persistent ability to send insurgents economic resources. Having lost the the city of Baidoa in western Somalia.3 and suicide bombers into the city did Bakara Market in Mogadishu in August not stop AMISOM and TFG forces from 2011, the insurgents suffered from Kenya These setbacks necessitated a shift capturing its bases in Mogadishu’s targeting their logistical and economic in al-Shabab’s military strategy. This northern outskirts.10 The city and networks in the south, where it received article assesses the trajectory of both the surrounding districts, however, significant revenues from taxing local al-Shabab’s military and political would not fully fall to AMISOM and merchants and traders as well as from strategies, explains how defections the TFG until four months later when the trade in charcoal around the Horn have weakened the group, and reviews they captured the Suuqa Hoolaha of Africa and the Arab Gulf states.16 its information and media operations during the past two years in the midst 4 “Somali Fighters Attack Capital,” al-Jazira, August 27, 11 Mahmoud Mohamed, “Mogadishu Liberated from of its relatively rapid territorial losses. 2010. al-Shabaab: Somali Security Officials,” Sabahi, March 5, 5 Ibid. 2012. 6 “Islamic Militants Launch Ramadan Offensive in Fam- 12 “Kenyan Troops Move into Somalia,” Associated ine-stricken Somalia,” CNN, August 1, 2011. Press, October 16, 2011; “Kenyan Troops Advance in So- 7 “Al-Shabab Vows to Use Guerilla Tactics in Somalia,” malia, Pursuing Al-Shabab,” Voice of America, October Voice of America, August 12, 2011; “Somali: Al-Shabab 17, 2011. 1 For a political map of Somalia showing territorial Militants Return to Mogadishu,” Xinhua, August 12, 13 “Kenya to Target al-Shabab Sympathisers in Nairobi,” control in March 2010, see www.newsecuritybeat.org/ 2011. BBC, October 20, 2011. wp-content/uploads/2012/07/somalia_map.jpg. For a 8 Geoffrey York, “Fear of Al-Shabab Brings Mogadishu 14 Christopher Anzalone, “Kenya’s Muslim Youth Cen- political map showing territorial control as of Febru- to a Standstill,” Globe and Mail, September 16, 2011; “So- ter and Al-Shabab’s East African Recruitment,” CTC Sen- ary 2013, see http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ malia’s Al Shabaab Warns of More Attacks,” Reuters, tinel 5:10 (2012). commons/9/9f/Somalia_map_states_regions_districts. October 4, 2011. 15 “Somalia Confirms Ethiopian Troop Presence,” Voice png. 9 Abdi Sheikh and Mohamed Ahmed, “Rebels Kill Scores of America, November 20, 2011; Mohamed Ahmed, “So- 2 Jeffrey Gettleman, “Kenyan Forces Enter Somalia to in Somali Capital Blast,” Reuters, October 4, 2011; Josh mali Rebels Pull Out as Ethiopian Troops Return,” Reu- Battle Militants,” New York Times, October 16, 2011. Kron, “Militants Strike at Troops at Base in Somali Capi- ters, November 21, 2011. 3 “Ethiopian Troops Capture Beledweyne from Somalia tal,” New York Times, October 29, 2011. 16 Gabe Joselow, “Kenyan Military Targeting al-Shabab Militants,” BBC, December 31, 2011; “Somalia Al-Shabab 10 “TFG/AMISOM Secure Remaining Al Shabaab Finances,” Voice of America, November 6, 2011; John Militant Base of Baidoa Captured,” BBC, February 22, Strongholds in Mogadishu,” AMISOM, press release, Ngirachu, “Al Shabaab Militia’s Tight Grip on ‘Desert’ 2012. October 2011. Charcoal Trade,” The East African, November 13, 2011;

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Continuity with the Past: Refocusing on primary insurgent target, in addition forces and preventing the transition Guerrilla Warfare to non-Somali and Somali government to a more stable security and political Shortly after al-Shabab’s “strategic forces, were al-Shabab’s militia enemies environment in areas recently liberated withdrawal” from Mogadishu in August such as the Somali Sufi fighters of from insurgent control. Spies remain a 2011, Hasan Dahir Aweys, who was then Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama (People of the concern for al-Shabab, particularly as a member of al-Shabab’s leadership, said Prophetic Tradition) umbrella group, it began to lose increasing amounts of in an interview with Somali Channel who are labeled “apostates” in al- territory to its enemies. When captured, that the movement would adopt a Shabab’s written statements, videos, suspected spies were quickly executed.24 guerrilla warfare strategy since it was radio broadcasts, and other media Similar guerrilla-style attacks were also unable to match AMISOM’s military productions.21 frequently used by al-Shabab during superiority.17 Instead of continuing to 2007 and 2008, the first two years of launch massive and costly frontline Assassinations of enemy military its insurgency against Ethiopian forces, assaults on enemy positions, al-Shabab’s officers, militia commanders, and Somali the TFG, and AMISOM.25 frontline fighting force, Jaysh al-`Usra government officials have long been an (Army of Hardship/Difficulty), has important staple in al-Shabab’s military In May and June 2012, al-Shabab since focused primarily on launching strategy, and the movement continues also reintroduced its “daily news hit-and-run style attacks on AMISOM, to target such officials with varying report” format when releasing public TFG/Somali government, Kenyan, and statements. In its early years as an Ethiopian forces and their allies. underground guerrilla movement, al- “Rather than make a ‘final Shabab released groups of statements Rather than make a “final stand” in stand’ in Mogadishu, in this format, in which a number of Mogadishu, Beledweyne, Baidoa, and its daily military actions and activities other strategic urban centers, al- Beledweyne, Baidoa, were briefly reported together in a Shabab withdrew from these cities and other strategic single statement.26 This more simplified without offering much resistance, version of publishing allowed the although it promised to continue urban centers, al-Shabab insurgents to streamline the process operating militarily in these areas.18 withdrew from these cities of collecting and publishing their print Facing defections, al-Shabab chose statements, which made it easier to to save their always limited number without offering much produce statements while engaging in a of fighters for a protracted guerrilla resistance.” more covert insurgency. Whether this is war.19 It refocused its military strategy because of new technological challenges on executing guerrilla-style attacks on is unknown. enemy checkpoints and other positions and planting improvised explosive degrees of success.22 In May 2012, an Regardless, this shift shows continuity devices in supposedly “liberated” areas al-Shabab ambush tried unsuccessfully not only between al-Shabab’s military under AMISOM, Somali government, to assassinate Somali President Shaykh operations in the field, which have Kenyan, and Ethiopian control.20 A Sharif Shaykh Ahmad in the Afgooye 23 corridor south of Mogadishu. Such 24 Representative al-Shabab statements include: “Assas- “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea assassinations, while they cannot sination of a Spy in the Junaqal District in Mogadishu,” Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2002 (2011),” turn the tide of battle in al-Shabab’s April 28, 2012; “Targeting a House of Spies in the Taleeh United Nations, 2011, pp. 147-161. favor, are capable of disrupting enemy district,” May 4, 2012; “Targeting a Group of Apostate 17 “Al-Shabab Vows to Use Guerilla Tactics in Soma- Spies with a Car Bomb,” March 24, 2012; and “Assas- lia.” 21 Representative al-Shabab statements include: “Kill- sination of Two Spies near the Bakara Market,” April 18 “The Christian Ethiopian Army is Occupying Baidoa ing Seven Apostates with an IED on Factories Street in 28, 2012. For more on al-Shabab’s previous targeting of City,” al-Shabab, February 26, 2012. Mogadishu,” February 26, 2012; “Targeting an Apostate spies, see Christopher Anzalone, “Al-Shabab’s Setbacks 19 “Defections Put Militant al-Shabab on the Run in Officer in Beledweyne with a Hand Grenade,” March 15, in Somalia,” CTC Sentinel 4:10 (2011). Somalia,” BBC, June 8, 2012; Abdi Guled, “Al Shabab 2012; “Killing a Number of Apostates with a Bomb near 25 Representative al-Shabab statements include: “Claim- Defectors Describe Hunger and Isolation with Somali the Bakara Market,” April 20, 2012; and “News Report ing the Assassination of Shaker Shafi‘i, an Officer in the Terrorist Group,” Toronto Star, July 11, 2012; Dominic for the Day of 26 Shawwal 1433,” September 16, 2012. Intelligence Department,” September 6, 2007; “Claiming Wabala, “200 al Shabaab Militias (sic) Surrender,” The 22 Representative al-Shabab statements include: “As- the Assassination of Two Representatives of the Apos- Star [Nairobi], September 8, 2012. sassination of a Member of the Apostate Intelligence tate Government,” May 11, 2007; “Explosion in Baidoa 20 Representative al-Shabab statements include: “Kill- Services in Mogadishu,” March 1, 2012; “Martyrdom Reaps (Kills) Tens of Ethiopians and Apostates,” De- ing Two from the Ethiopian Forces with an IED in the Operation Inside the Presidential Palace of the Apostate cember 6, 2007; “Assassination of a Leader of Apostate Central Beledweyne,” February 7, 2012; “Setting Off 4 Government,” March 16, 2012; “Assassination of an Of- Army Forces in Hiraan, ‘Ali Farah,” April 30, 2008; and Bombs Against the Crusaders Inside the Maslah Military ficer from the Apostate Militias in the District of Laba “Assassination of a Police Commander, ‘Ali ‘Aduween, Camp,” March 4, 2012; “Targeting a Military Helicopter Daqah,” April 4, 2012; and “Killing a Burundian Officer with the Detonation of a Landmine under His Convoy in with a Surface-to-air Missile,” March 7, 2012; “Targeting in a Special Operation,” May 14, 2012. the North Mogadishu,” August 9, 2008. the Presidential Palace with Mortars for a Second Con- 23 Abdi Sheikh and Feisal Omar, “Somali President Es- 26 In 2007, al-Shabab released a number of reports secutive Night,” March 22, 2012; “Ambush Targeting capes Rebel Ambush on Convoy,” Reuters, May 29, 2012; under the title “Harvest of the Jihad in Somalia” and Ethiopian Forces in the Region of Bay and Bakool,” April “Targeting the Convoy of the Apostate Sharif in Several in 2008 as part of two sustained military campaigns 11, 2012; and “Ambush on the Ethiopians near Bardaale Ambushes between Mogadishu and Afgooye,” al-Sha- dubbed “No Peace without Islam” and “Our Terrorism city,” May 19, 2012. bab, June 1, 2012. is Praiseworthy.”

13 march 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 3 shifted back to the movement’s declining power allowed them to break further labeled Hammami a narcissist underground guerrilla roots, but also in free. He said that Hisbul Islamiyya was interested in public attention and its media operations. open to negotiations over the future of acclaim.35 Al-Shabab also denied Somalia.30 Attempting to put an end the frequent reports in Western Defections to these reports, al-Shabab responded media that Hammami was a “grand As its fortunes began to turn during rapidly with a written statement from strategist, recruiter and fundraiser” the summer of 2011, al-Shabab was its military spokesman, Abu Mus`ab. for the group. They accused Hammami faced with an increasing number of He denied that Mu`allim was an active defections, which continued into 2012.27 member of Hisbul Islamiyya, claiming “As al-Shabab lost Exact numbers of defectors, from those that he had “escaped” to Kenya when the who surrendered directly to AMISOM group joined ranks with al-Shabab.31 territory in the south and and the Somali government to those west, its media department who simply abandoned their posts, are Al-Shabab was also forced to deal in a not available. Both Somali and foreign public fashion with the separation of released a series of media outlets have, however, reported Omar Hammami (also known as Abu videos documenting the on hundreds of al-Shabab fighters Mansur al-Amriki), once the insurgents’ surrendering.28 Defections impacted its most recognizable foreign fighter. After movement’s past and ability to respond militarily to offensives briefly denying his initial March 2012 present implementation by AMISOM, Somali government, claim that al-Shabab threatened his Kenyan and Ethiopian troops, and anti- life due to “differences” over matters of law and order over Shabab militias. of “Shari`a and strategy,” al-Shabab previously bandit and had to address Hammami’s claims more In September 2012, al-Shabab suffered forcefully when the American continued thief infested parts of the defections from at least a segment of to make allegations against them in country.” Hisbul Islamiyya, a once independent, the first part of his autobiography, more Somalia-focused guerrilla group which was released in May 2012, and in a second video posted to YouTube in “As its fortunes began to which he alleged that al-Shabab treated of spreading societal discord (fitna) at a foreign fighters poorly.32 Hammami time of great trial for the mujahidin and turn during the summer of also made active use of his Twitter other Muslims in Somalia.36 Hammami 2011, al-Shabab was faced spokesman “Abu American,” who many was replaced by a different English- analysts suspect is actually Hammami speaking foreign fighter, Abu Ahmad with an increasing number himself, in launching allegations against al-Amriki, in another video dedicated of defections.” al-Shabab and its allies.33 to the group’s foreign fighters.37

Al-Shabab, in a lengthy official Perhaps in part to counter Hammami’s statement released in December 2012, allegations with regard to foreign fighting against AMISOM and the TFG. denied Hammami’s many allegations fighters, al-Shabab’s media department, Hisbul Islamiyya was forced to merge and said that he “does not, in any way, the al-Kataib Media Foundation, with al-Shabab in December 2010 after shape, or form, represent the views” released the third installment of its losing to it militarily on the battlefield of foreign fighters in Somalia.34 They martyrology video series “Profit of in a conflict that lasted throughout that the Sale” on February 1, 2013. The 29 year. A reported Kenya-based Hisbul 30 “Somalia: Hizbul Islam Group Withdraws Allegiance, video identified a number of al-Shabab Islamiyya spokesman, Muhammad says ‘Al Shabaab is Weakened,’” Garowe Online, Sep- martyrs, including the late British- Mu`allim, recently told reporters that tember 25, 2012. Lebanese fighter Bilal al-Berjawi, who his group’s past allegiance to al-Shabab 31 “Statement Regarding the Conference in which it was was killed in a reported U.S. drone 38 had been forced and was “by mouth Announced that Hizbul Islam Withdrew from the Union strike in January 2012. Featuring al- only,” and that al-Shabab’s rapidly with Harkat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen,” al-Shabab, Sep- Berjawi so prominently in a major video tember 28, 2012. may have been an attempt by al-Shabab 39 27 “Defections Put Militant al-Shabab on the Run in 32 Clint Watts, “Hammami’s Twitter War with Shabaab to counter these rumors. Somalia”; “Somali Government Displays Al Shabaab & MYC in Somalia & Kenya,” Selected Wisdom blog, Jan- Defected Fighters,” Shabelle Media Network, October uary 14, 2013; Christopher Anzalone, “The End of a Ro- Shabab, December 18, 2012. 22, 2011; Mohammed Yusuf, “Some Al-Shabab Defec- mance? The Rise and Fall of an American Jihadi: Omar 35 Ibid. tors Still a Security Threat,” Voice of America, February Hammami’s Relationship with Somalia’s Al-Shabab,” 36 Ibid. 6, 2013. al-Wasat blog, March 17, 2012. For an overview of Ham- 37 Mujahidin Moments, al-Shabab, February 2013. The 28 “200 al-Shabaab Militants Surrender Outside Jowhar,” mami’s political and religious ideology, which is argu- video features Swahili-speaking foreign fighters in addi- Sabahi, September 23, 2012; Michael Mubangizi, “200 ably even more global than that of at least a segment of tion to Abu Ahmad al-Amriki. al-Shabab Defect—AMISOM,” The Observer [Kampala], al-Shabab, see Christopher Anzalone, “The Evolution of 38 Ian Cobain, “British ‘al-Qaida Member’ Killed in US September 23, 2012; Patrick Mayoyo, “Shabaab Fighters an American Jihadi: The Case of Omar Hammami,” CTC Drone Attack in Somalia,” Guardian, January 22, 2012. Surrender,” The Nation [Nairobi], September 5, 2012. Sentinel 5:6 (2012). 39 That being said, al-Berjawi was allegedly involved 29 “Al Shabaab Takes Over Region from Hizbul Islam,” 33 Ibid. in a power struggle with al-Shabab’s amir, Ahmed Go- Shabelle Media Network, December 14, 2010. 34 “Abu Mansur al-Amriki: A Candid Clarification,” al- dane (also known as Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr), and was

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Highlighting the Benefits of Insurgent Rule extensive footage of a meeting held made similar political statements with As al-Shabab lost territory in the in 2011 near Baidoa between al- its choices for locations of communal Eid south and west, its media department Shabab leaders, including spokesman al-Fitr prayers. One gathering was held released a series of videos documenting ‘Ali Rage, and clan leaders, possibly in the outskirts of Mogadishu despite the movement’s past and present from the Rahanweyn clan group, which the insurgents’ withdrawal from most implementation of law and order over predominates in that area.45 Locals and of the city earlier that month.49 previously bandit and thief infested parts of the country. Al-Shabab also “Despite these setbacks, al- Broadcasting its ability to continue claimed to have completed a number governing has been a priority for al- of new public works projects despite Shabab’s leaders and media Shabab even as its setbacks mounted its battlefield setbacks. These projects operatives understand during the past two years. It has included the construction of roads continued to organize programs aimed and bridges and the distribution of that, to a significant degree, at training preachers and educating aid to the needy.40 Al-Shabab also the appearance of power merchants and craftsmen as well as released videos in which Somali distributing aid.50 The group has also civilians discussed their happiness can be nearly as effective as continued to focus on pushing forward with insurgent rule and concern over actual power.” an education program in areas under the return of foreign troops and their its control that conforms to its rigid Somali “lackeys.”41 In addition to these interpretation of Islam.51 projects, al-Shabab undertook other public works initiatives including clan leaders interviewed for the video Insurgent outreach to the country’s agricultural programs, opening centers said that they welcomed insurgent powerful clans continues, and al- for people with special needs, restoring rule since it brought stability, which Shabab claims to have received support dams, and distributing food aid.42 in turn allowed for the rejuvenation of from a number of clan leaders from the economy and increased safety for the Huber, Gaaljecel and Rahanweyn, In a major video production titled Under residents.46 During celebrations in as well as other clans and sub-clans.52 the Shade of Shari`a, an English-speaking Kismayo organized by al-Shabab to Insurgent officials have also sought al-Shabab “journalist” recounted mark the formalization of its affiliation to mediate clan disputes and hold his 2011 trip to the city of Baidoa in with al-Qa`ida in early February 2012, localized Shari`a court sessions aimed western Somalia.43 Contrasting the a local clan leader from Juba, Isma`il at resolving disagreements between period of insurgent rule in the city Harun, praised the “mujahidin” when locals and complaints against al-Shabab to the days of corruption during the he appeared alongside al-Shabab’s itself.53 tenure of the TFG, he and al-Kataib governor of Kismayo, Hasan Ya`qub, cameramen went to great lengths to and political bureau official Hussein show the economic benefits allegedly `Ali Fiidow.47 brought to the city by al-Shabab’s implementation of its interpretation The locations of al-Shabab’s official of Shari`a.44 The video included celebrations following the formalization of its alliance with al-Qa`ida were a victim of group infighting, betrayed by Godane and chosen for their symbolic political and 49 “The Muslims Perform the ‘Eid Prayer in the Islamic his supporters. For an overview of these reports, see propaganda value. Despite AMISOM’s Regions,” al-Shabab, August 31, 2011. Clint Watts, “Continued Debate on al-Qaeda in Soma- advance beyond Mogadishu and the 50 Representative al-Shabab statements include: “Char- lia: Zawahiri, Godane, Robow,” Selected Wisdom blog, Kenyans’ drive toward Kismayo, the itable Association Distributes Alms in Bur Hakaba City,” March 22, 2012. insurgent movement hosted large May 4, 2012; “Closing of a Shari‘a Session for Tailors in 40 Distribution of Zakat to Some of the Regions in the Islamic celebrations in Kismayo, Baidoa and Baardeere City,” April 28, 2012; “Conclusion of an Edu- Governorate of Juba, al-Shabab, January 2013; Restoration Lafoole, which were attended by a cational Session for Merchants in Waajed City,” May 11, Project of Some of the Roads and Bridges in the Governorate number of its senior leaders, including 2012; “Third Round of Graduates from the ‘Abdullah of Juba, al-Shabab, October 2012. Rage, Ya`qub, Fiidow, and `Abd al- ‘Azzam Academy for Preachers,” February 27, 2011. 48 41 The Atmosphere in the Port of Kismayo, al-Shabab, Au- Qadir Mu’min. Less than a month 51 “Office of Education Holds a Meeting with Officials gust 2012; Tour of the Beaches in the Region of Lower Sha- later, Baidoa fell to Ethiopian forces, of the Educational Institutions,” al-Shabab, February 6, belle—City of Baraawe, al-Shabab, February 2013; Under and Kenya took control of Kismayo in 2012. the Shade of Shari`a, al-Shabab, July 2012. October. In late August 2011, al-Shabab 52 Under the Shade of Shari`a and Bay`a of the Gaaljecel 42 Representative al-Shabab statements include: “Agri- Clan to Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen, al-Shabab, No- cultural Report,” March 18, 2012; “Sponsorship of 3 Dis- 45 Ibid. vember 2012; “Huber Clan Gives Bay‘a to Harakat al- abled People in the Administrative District of Lafoole,” 46 Ibid. Shabab al-Mujahideen,” al-Shabab, June 23, 2012. February 14, 2012; “Restoring a Number of Dams in the 47 The Year of Unity 1433, al-Shabab, April 2012. 53 “Daawo Sawirada: Shirkii Dib U Heshiisiinta Beeli- Region of Middle Shabelle,” May 8, 2012; “Medical Con- 48 Representative al-Shabab statements include: “Huge hii Galguduud ku Dagaalamay Oo Wejigiisii 2-aad lasoo voy for the Displaced of Baidoa City,” March 10, 2012; Celebrations in Lower Shabelle to Welcome the Bay‘a Gaba Gabeeyay,” Somali Memo, December 20, 2012; and “Distribution of Food Aid to Those in Need in the with Al-Qaeda,” February 14, 2012; “Celebrations in “Completion of the Reconciliation Between 2 Clans in Region of Juba,” April 27, 2012. Baidoa City in Support of the Bay‘a with Al-Qaeda,” Feb- Harardhere,” al-Shabab, April 28, 2012; “Grievances 43 Under the Shade of Shari`a. ruary 18, 2012; “Joyful Celebrations in Kismayo for the Court in the region of Middle Shabelle Issues Dozens of 44 Ibid. Unity with Al-Qaeda,” February 20, 2012. Rulings,” al-Shabab, March 10, 2012.

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Conclusion The Upcoming Peace Talks While there have been various attempts Al-Shabab, in the midst of battlefield to negotiate an end to the conflict in defeats and political setbacks, has sought in Southern Thailand’s southern Thailand since 2004, this over the past year to respond militarily Insurgency marks the first time that there has while continuing to assert its claim to been optimism that the talks between political legitimacy as an insurgent By Zachary Abuza the Royal Thai Government and the governing authority. It has shifted back shadowy insurgents will achieve to guerrilla tactics and has adopted a since 2004, insurgents in southern progress. There are many reasons to more flexible form of collecting and Thailand have fought to achieve an question this optimism, however. The releasing reports from the frontlines. It independent state for the region’s Royal Thai Army (RTA) chief, General has continued its attempts to exercise 1.8 million Muslim ethnic Malays. Prayuth Chan-ocha, and many analysts governing authority over areas under The conflict, which is the most lethal have expressed skepticism that Taib its control as well as highlighting small in Southeast Asia today, has left and the BRN have any command-and- and medium scale public works projects, approximately 5,500 people dead and control over the horizontal network of although this has become increasingly nearly 10,000 wounded.1 Although it insurgents.5 Moreover, few political difficult with its loss of the major urban has settled into a stalemate, a recent analysts see any meaningful concessions centers. political development has given rise from the government on the issues of to hope that peace is possible. On devolution of power and autonomy. Despite these setbacks, al-Shabab’s February 28, 2013, the chairman of Nonetheless, this marks the first time leaders and media operatives the Thai National Security Council that a Thai administration has been understand that, to a significant degree, (NSC), Lieutenant-General Paradorn willing to publicly commit itself to the the appearance of power can be nearly Pattanatabut, and a representative notion that the conflict can only be as effective as actual power. Therefore, of the separatist Barisan Revolusi resolved through the implementation of they have a keen interest in maintaining Nasional (BRN), Ustaz Hassan Taib, meaningful political reforms. Although the ability to project the image of a signed an agreement to begin formal the talks may not result in a durable movement that is both well-rooted in peace talks.2 The agreement, which peace immediately, they do lay the local social structures and capable of garnered significant media attention, foundation for a negotiated political launching regular, successful attacks was the result of Malaysian3 mediation agreement. against its enemies—both domestic and following nearly a year of back-channel foreign. talks that were started by ousted Thai This article provides background on Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the the insurgency in southern Thailand, Christopher Anzalone is a doctoral brother of current Thai Prime Minister examines the recent political agreement, student in the Institute of Islamic Studies Yingluck Shinawatra.4 and then explains how the negotiations at McGill University where he studies will likely proceed. modern Muslim sociopolitical movements, including transnational jihadist groups, 1 The majority of the statistics in this article are drawn Background Shi`a Islam, and Islamist visual cultures. from the author’s incident database. The author’s data is The current iteration of the insurgency based on open source reporting and as such is lower than in southern Thailand is now in its official figures; not all casualties are reported in the -me 10th year, although the origin of the dia, and many people reported as wounded later die. The insurgency dates back to the 1909 Anglo- author indicates when official data is used. The author Siamese Treaty that demarcated the does not have access to official data on a regular basis, border between Thailand and Malaysia and when he does it tends to be aggregate numbers. By and left three provinces, of which carefully coding open source data, the author was able 80% of the population is comprised to do much more detailed statistical analysis on victim of Muslim Malays, in Thailand— types, location of attacks, trends in how people were Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani. Thailand killed, size of improvised explosive devices, and more. spent much of the century trying to This database will henceforth be cited as “Abuza, Inci- assimilate the Malay into Buddhist dent Database.” Also, for confirmation of the number of Thai society. Low-level insurgencies casualties since 2004, see “Bomb Kills Two, Wounds 12 smoldered from the early-1970s to the in Thai South,” Agence France-Presse, March 2, 2013. mid-1990s, yet the insurgents were 2 The text of the agreement can be found at “Text of the divided on ideological grounds (ethno- Agreement between Thailand and the BRN,” Bangkok nationalists, Islamists, or those tied Post, February 28, 2013. to the Malayan Communist Party) and 3 The role of Malaysia in the negotiations is important, differences over their ultimate political since the insurgents in southern Thailand allegedly stage some of their attacks from across the border in Malay- 5 The insurgent movement is spread across three-and- sia. For more on Malaysia’s role, see “Malaysia to Assist a-half provinces in southern Thailand. Beneath the field Dialogue Process for Peace in Southern Thailand,” Thai commanders (juwae) are fairly autonomous cells. There is News Agency, March 1, 2013. no evidence that it is a “top-down” insurgency. See “Deep 4 “Thaksin and Army Chief Differ Over Peace Move,” South Attacks Won’t Cease: Prayuth,” The Nation, March Bangkok Post, March 3, 2013. 4, 2013.

16 march 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 3 objectives (independence, union with Violence peaked in mid-2007, when While there are months where the Malaysia or autonomy). the Thai army surged the region with violence spikes, the rate of violence some 60,000 troops, and the number is surprisingly consistent, as if Violence during this period remained in of incidents and casualties fell steadily the insurgents have calculated the the countryside, and insurgents rarely through the first half of 2008.8 Yet by appropriate frequency of attacks to targeted civilians. The Thai government the end of 2008, violent incidents had assure their immediate goals of driving exploited the insurgents’ inability risen. Since January 2009, the violence the Buddhist population out of the to work together, and quelled the has remained steady.9 region and discrediting the government insurgency by the mid-1990s through a and weakening public institutions. To mixture of general amnesties, economic Between January 2009 and February date, Thai security forces have been development programs, burgeoning 2013, an estimated 1,473 people have unable to stop the violence. been killed and 3,241 have been “The newly-announced wounded, an average of approximately While the exact number of insurgents 30 deaths per month and 65 wounded is unknown, in an August 2012 order peace talks are significant per month.10 The victims since the of battle, the RTA estimated that there because it is the first of start of 2009 include approximately are 9,600 militants.17 According to open 118 soldiers, 68 police, 227 rangers source reporting, there have been 127 seven Thai governments and defense volunteers, 128 village insurgents killed and 315 captured since since 2004 to publicly headmen or their deputies, 885 early 2009.18 civilians, 39 teachers and four monks.11 acknowledge the need for Security forces including RTA regulars, There are a number of insurgent a political solution to the police, paramilitary rangers and village organizations besides the BRN. The defense volunteers represent 28% of BRN-Coordinate (BRN-C), which split most violent conflict in those killed and 38% of those wounded from the BRN in the 1980s, is a madrasa- since 2009.12 Approximately 158 based movement under the leadership the heart of economically- teachers have been killed, a category of of Masae Useng and Sapaeing Basor, vibrant Southeast Asia.” targets that puts additional pressure on to which much of the violence is the Thai state as they lead to prolonged attributed.19 The Gerakan Mujahidin closures of schools.13 There have been Islam Pattani (GMIP) began as a gun more than 40 beheadings, including the smuggling group that supplied the economic growth on both sides of most recent one in August 2012.14 Acehnese independence movement, the the border, and the establishment Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), and then of a durable interagency institution, While most of those killed are the became an extortion and enforcement the Southern Border Province victims of shootings, since January arm for local politicians in southern Administrative Committee (SBPAC).6 2009 there have been 595 improvised Thailand.20 The group changed course While moderate and more mainstream explosive device (IED) attacks, an when two of Thailand’s few veterans dissident groups such as the Pattani average of 12 per month.15 Most IEDs are from the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s United Liberation Organization (PULO) small, in the 11 pound range, although took command.21 Other cells emerged accepted amnesty and surrendered 50-100 pound IEDs are not unusual.16 out of New-PULO. The media often in large numbers, by the mid-1990s IEDs are typically hidden alongside or reports on the Runda Kampulan Kecil hardliners went underground where buried under the road to target passing (RKK), but this is inaccurate because they indoctrinated and recruited a new security details, although they are there is no RKK “organization”—the generation of insurgents. frequently employed in the cities, often RKK refers to small group guerrilla concealed in motorcycles. Insurgents tactics that militants from groups such The insurgency that erupted in use grenades when they acquire them, as the BRN-C acquired through training January 2004 is both quantitatively and engage in frequent arson attacks. in Indonesia.22 and qualitatively different than its There have been no suicide bombers in predecessors. While it began at a low southern Thailand. level, the movement grew following the implementation of a series of failed counterinsurgency policies, while the Thai government remained largely in 17 “10,000 Named in Insurgency Handbook,” Bangkok 7 denial about the insurgents’ goals. April 28, 2004. Post, August 25, 2012. 8 Abuza, Incident Database. 18 Abuza, Incident Database. 6 For more on the history of the conflict, see Zachary 9 Ibid. 19 “Pattani Blast During Sukampol Visit to South,” The Abuza, Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern 10 Ibid. Nation, March 23, 2013. Thailand (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 11 Ibid. 20 “Muslim Group Linked to Attacks in Thailand,” 2009). 12 Ibid. Straits Times, March 25, 2002. 7 Then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his 13 Ibid. 21 Ibid.; “Thailand Islamic Insurgency,” GlobalSecurity. senior cabinet members attributed the violence to drug 14 Ibid. org, undated. gangs and other smugglers. See Seth Mydans, “Thai 15 Ibid. 22 This statement is based on the author’s interviews and Security Forces Kill Scores of Rebels,” New York Times, 16 Ibid. research trips to southern Thailand. Also see ibid.

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Many insurgent leaflets and night On the insurgents’ side, it may be an base in the pocket of an insurgent that letters are simply signed “Warriors acknowledgement that violence is not they had killed three days earlier.31 of Pattani,” which highlights the bringing them closer to their desired Sixteen militants were killed, and four horizontal nature of the insurgency. goals. On September 14, 2012, a senior were later arrested.32 Militants who What is more important than the names juwae, Wae Ali Copter Waeji, of the GMIP once could attack at will are presently of the groups is how they are organized. surrendered with 90 of his men, signing confronted by a more professional and According to a Thai journalist, the a letter in which they acknowledged that better equipped security force whose their current strategy (i.e., violence) was counterinsurgency operations have 28 “Critically, two of the not achieving their objectives. While there have not been the subsequent “The insurgents have an senior-most insurgents, mass defections from the insurgency Masae Useng and that Thai authorities expected, that may incentive to maintain a have more to do with the fact that there certain level of violence to Sapaeing Basor, will send is no blanket amnesty for those who representatives to the surrender, and the Emergency Decree pressure the government that governs most of the deep south to make concessions under talks.” gives authorities little discretion in dropping charges against suspects who fear of renewed attacks.” have been indicted for particular acts of violence.29 Indeed, since September’s RTA said that there are approximately mass defection, only 13 insurgents have 35 regional commanders, known as surrendered to authorities, according to improved in the past few years.33 By juwae, who run operations at the district Thai media reports. 2012, authorities had increased their level.23 The RTA asserts that there are security presence in the south, especially roughly 20 individuals above the juwae, Wae Ali Copter Waeji and two of the in the cities and along the major roads.34 who meet roughly every two months to 90 who surrendered face criminal As a result of increased patrols and set broad policy.24 This grouping, which charges, while the others were forced checkpoints, insurgents do not have as includes members of many different into a six month re-education program much freedom of movement. Moreover, organizations, is known as the Dewan run by the military. The deputy prime they have not staged mass simultaneous Pimpinan Usat.25 minister for security affairs at the attacks, which were common at the time, General Yutthasak Sasiprapa, height of the insurgency in the first half The Agreement acknowledged that the amnesty process of 2007. The February 28, 2013, agreement needed to be amended if the government stated that the Thai government is wanted to encourage defections, while How Negotiations Will Proceed “willing to engage in peace dialogue 4th Army Commander Lieutenant Formal talks are set to begin on March with people [the BRN] who have General Udomchai Thammasaroratch 28, 2013.35 The Thai negotiators will different opinions and ideologies from requested the Ministry of Justice be from the NSC headed by Lieutenant the state as one of the stakeholders in formally amend the legal process and General Paradorn Pattanatabut. solving the Southern Border Provinces reduce or drop punishments of those Malaysia has appointed Dato Sri Ahmad problem under the framework of the who have surrendered.30 To date, no Zamzamin bin Hashim, the former Thai Constitution while Malaysia would formal process has been amended, and director of the Malaysian External act as facilitator.”26 therefore many insurgents are likely Intelligence Organization, as the unwilling to surrender. facilitator. While Taib will represent This is a tacit acknowledgement that the BRN, it is important to note that the despite soaring military budgets since There is also a sense of hubris that could Thai government acknowledges that the 2006—Bt3-4 billion ($110-135 million) be prodding the insurgents to the table. BRN is only one of many groups involved for security operations in the south Militants suffered their single worst loss in the conflict. Indeed, the February 28 alone—large earmarks for development since 2004 on February 13, 2013, when agreement described them as “one of the in the south, and some 60,000 security a group of 50-60 insurgents launched stakeholders.” To that end, the Thai side forces deployed in the deep south, an attack on a Thai Marine base in has encouraged the BRN to invite other the insurgency cannot be defeated Narathiwat Province’s Bacho district. militarily.27 The Marines expected the attack, as they recovered a map of their military 31 “16 Die in Attack on Thai Marine Base,” Bangkok Post, 23 Personal interview, Thai journalist, Yala Province, February 13, 2013; “Four Rebel Raid Suspects Nabbed,” Thailand, July 3, 2010. get,” MCOT, October 31, 2012. Bangkok Post, February 15, 2013. 24 Ibid.; “10,000 Named in Insurgency Handbook.” 28 “91 Rebel Defectors Surrender,” Bangkok Post, Sep- 32 Ibid. 25 Ibid.; “Pattani Blast During Sukampol Visit to South.” tember 12, 2012; “Talks with RKK ‘Separatists in South,” 33 This observation is based on the author’s visit to Nara- 26 “Text of the Agreement between Thailand and the The Nation, September 12, 2012. thiwat, Yala and Pattani Provinces in southern Thailand BRN.” 29 “Isoc to Plot Amnesty Strategy in South,” Bangkok in July 2012. 27 SBPAC had requested Bt3.974 billion ($133 million) Post, February 22, 2013. 34 Ibid. for its operations in the south. See “Army Chief: Pro- 30 “More Insurgents Ready to Defect,” Bangkok Post, 35 “Thai Government, Southern Insurgents set March longed Southern Violence not Linked to Military Bud- September 18, 2012. 28 for Talks,” MCOT, March 6, 2013.

18 march 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 3 militants to the talks.36 To date, the BRN continue despite the upcoming peace will have to work out what the term has not made their 15 person list public. talks. As southern-based journalist entails for us and for them. Certainly The Thai NSC, however, announced Don Pathan noted, “According to it won’t mean an autonomous zone or that representatives from a total of Malaysian and BRN-C sources, Hasan another state. Allowing these border nine groups will attend—the BRN, has not received the DPP’s [Dewan provinces to elect their own governors New PULO, PULO 88, BRN-Congress, Penilian Party] blessing.”43 One BRN-C might be in the picture.”47 Yet Thailand BRN-C, Barisan Islam Pembangunan member told Pathan: “We knew Hasan has for years equivocated on even Pattani, as well as the GMIP, Gerakan was up to something but nobody took making Malayu an official language in Mujahidin Pattani and Ulama Pattani.37 him seriously because he doesn’t have the deep south for fear that it would fuel Critically, two of the senior-most any clout with the militants on the separatism. insurgents, Masae Useng and Sapaeing ground. But nobody thought he would Basor, will send representatives to the go as far as to enter an agreement with In early March 2013, Thai security talks.38 the Thais.”44 In short, the BRN could be agencies approved a proposal to replace trying to leverage a leadership position the draconian Emergency Decree that There are a number of challenges at the table by entering into talks, just governs most of the deep south with going into the negotiations. The first as PULO has tried to do repeatedly the Internal Security Act in five more is that violence has continued since since 2004.45 the February 28 agreement. Based on “A successful peace process open source reporting, in the 25 days On the other hand, the persistent following the agreement, there have been violence leading up to the peace talks that started through eight bombings, one grenade attack, could also be part of the militants’ Thaksin’s back-channel and 20 separate shootings that left four strategy, and does not necessarily mean police, four rangers, nine headmen, that the talks will fail. The insurgents negotiations would put two village defense volunteers and six have an incentive to maintain a certain pressure on the military civilians dead.39 The RTA is concerned level of violence to pressure the that the BRN has no command-and- government to make concessions under and royalist stalwarts to control over local insurgent cells, with fear of renewed attacks. accede and grant amnesty General Prayuth describing them as an “old-guard outfit.”40 The BRN split into The second issue is that it is unclear to the polarizing former three factions in the 1980s, and most what the insurgents can realistically prime minister.” of the current violence is perpetrated hope to gain from negotiations. For the by the BRN-C and groups such as the Thai state, granting independence to GMIP. The NSC chief acknowledged militant groups operating in southern this is a problem but spoke of the BRN’s Thailand is not an option. Indeed, districts.48 While the ISA continues to role as elders: “it’s important that we General Prayuth warned that even give security forces blanket immunity, talk with spiritual leaders who, after autonomy was unacceptable to the RTA: a practice that has long been an all, were militants before. These are the “It is impossible to give up [territory] to irritant to the Malay, Article 21 of people who can communicate with their anyone. Everything must be discussed at the ISA gives authorities much more operative cells.”41 the negotiation table, under the law and discretion in dropping existing charges constitution.”46 The RTA remains the and implementing a more meaningful Paradorn asked Taib “if he could send a kingmaker in Thai politics and Prime amnesty program.49 Yet days later, the signal to militant operatives in the three Minister Yingluck Shinawatra has southern border provinces to reduce the spent the past 18 months assuring them 47 The irony that Bangkok just completed its guberna- 42 level of their insurgent activities,” but that she will not push forward policies torial election while every other province has their gov- all parties on the Thai side acknowledged that threaten their interests. Even ernor appointed by the Ministry of Interior is not lost that the insurgency is not a top-down Yingluck’s NSC chief acknowledged on observers. Yet there is little political support by any movement, and instead consists of many that autonomy is not on the table: “We party to amend the constitution to change that. See “BRN groups and highly autonomous cells. to Send Peace Signal”; Chularat Saengpassa, “Democrats Therefore, they anticipate violence to 43 According to Don Pathan, “There is general agree- Ride to Victory on Loyal Voters,” The Nation, March 4, ment that the BRN-C is ruled by a council known as the 2013. 36 “NSC Reveals Talk with BRN,” Bangkok Post, March Dewan Penilian Party, or DPP, not by a single individual 48 The ISA is already in place in Songkhla’s four dis- 6, 2013. leader.” See Don Pathan, “It’s Unclear who Speaks for tricts of Chana, Nathawi, Saba Yoi and Thepha, as well 37 “NSC to Insist Rebel Groups Curb Violence,” Bangkok who in Thailand’s Deep South,” The Nation, March 13, as Pattani’s Mae Lan district. See “Security Agencies to Post, March 23, 2013. 2013; “Pattani Blast During Sukampol Visit to South.” Flesh Out ISA Expansion Plan,” Bangkok Post, February 38 “Core Rebel Bosses, Pulo to Join Peace Talks,” Bang- 44 Ibid. 22, 2013. kok Post, March 26, 2013. 45 See, for example, the NSC’s and 4th Army’s conde- 49 Article 21 offers amnesty to militants if they confess 39 Abuza, Incident Database. scension of PULO President Kasturi Mahkota’s call for and agree to a mandatory six-month retaining/rehabili- 40 “Thaksin, Prayuth Divided over BRN’s Influence,” southern “autonomy” and bid for media exposure at tation course run by ISOC. The proposal came out of the Bangkok Post, March 4, 2013. “Malaysia Key to South Fight, NSC Chief Says,” Bangkok NSC, but seems to have broader bureaucratic support, 41 “BRN to Send Peace Signal,” Bangkok Post, March 7, Post, February 27, 2013. including from the Justice Ministry and the RTA. Only 2013. 46 “Paradorn to Endorse Pact with BRN on Talks,” two militants have gone through the Article 21 process 42 “NSC Reveals Talk with BRN.” Bangkok Post, March 6, 2013. since it was introduced by the Democrats in December

19 march 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 3 cabinet extended the Emergency Decree peace talks, with only one delegate on The Role of Converts in Al- through the next quarter, without the 15-member panel.54 Qa`ida-Related Terrorism taking up the issue of expanding the territory under the ISA.50 This decision Conclusion Offenses in the United was made only days before the peace The newly-announced peace talks are States talks were to begin, sending a negative significant because it is the first of signal to the militants. The Emergency seven Thai governments since 2004 By Robin Simcox and Emily Dyer Decree is a major source of contention to publicly acknowledge the need for and an issue that likely engenders broad a political solution to the most violent with al-qa`ida’s ability to carry out support for the insurgents’ cause, while conflict in the heart of economically- attacks in the United States seemingly at the same time making uncertain the vibrant Southeast Asia. diminishing, there will be increased legal proceedings against any potential focus on the threat posed by individuals insurgent who surrenders. For the militants, who have never been not in contact with its leadership, a mass-based organization and are but inspired by its ideology. At least Finally, there is considerable suspicion clearly not losing the struggle, there part of this threat is from converts to on the part of the military that the talks is no great incentive to negotiate. The Islam who might become radicalized are a political façade that have nothing rate of violence has plateaued to an to commit violence. Between 1997 to do with resolving the conflict in the “acceptable” level, and there is not and 2011, 171 individuals were either south. The governing Pheu Thai Party widespread pressure on them to settle. convicted of al-Qa`ida related offenses has tried to push a highly contentious To date, many insurgent cells seem (AQROs) within the U.S. civilian or national reconciliation bill through reluctant to halt the violence. Taib military court system or committed a parliament since coming to power in and the BRN seem to be leveraging a suicide attack on U.S. soil. Converts mid-2011.51 The bill is controversial, position for themselves. Can they bring to Islam comprised almost a quarter of and the potential for judicial action the younger militants to the table? For these individuals, or 40 out of the 171 or a coup is so real that even with a now, that seems unlikely unless the convicted.1 parliamentary majority the Pheu Thai Thai government is willing to make Party has repeatedly backed down. critical concessions. In fact, in three of the years between What makes it so divisive is that the 2007 and 2011, and in eight of the centerpiece of the bill is an amnesty for Zachary Abuza is professor of political years between 1997 and 2011,2 converts former politicians, including Thaksin science and international relations at committed a higher proportion of Shinawatra, now a fugitive from Thai Simmons College. His most recent book is AQROs than non-converts. Tracking justice. A successful peace process that Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in the backgrounds of these converts—and started through Thaksin’s back-channel Southern Thailand and its Implications how they differ from non-converts— negotiations would put pressure on the for Southeast Asian Security. is beneficial in obtaining a greater military and royalist stalwarts to accede understanding of the terrorism threat and grant amnesty to the polarizing to the United States. former prime minister, something neither can countenance.52 This article assesses the differing trends between convert and non-convert As Don Pathan noted, “The role of the offenders in the United States in 10 Army is still unclear, but a meaningful specific fields: gender, age, nationality, buy-in from the military has yet to ancestry, place of residence, education, be secured” in large part because of occupation, terrorist training, combat questions over what this will mean for experience and links to designated Thaksin’s return.53 Indeed, the RTA terrorist organizations (DTOs). The appeared to be cut out of the upcoming article then draws conclusions from the data gathered, and suggests how the 2009. See “Security Agencies Float New Peace Process threat may develop in the future. for South,” MCOT, February 22, 2013. 50 “NSC Seeks to Extend Emergency Law,” Bangkok Post, Context and Methodology March 4, 2013. For more on the RTA’s position and resis- The data extracted for this article comes tance to lifting the Emergency Decree, see “Prayuth: In- from a larger study into al-Qa`ida surgents Must Stop Violence First,” Bangkok Post, March terrorism trends over a 15-year period. 14, 2013. That study, Al-Qa`ida in the United 51 Attayuth Bootsripoom, “Government Unlikely to States: A Complete Analysis of Terrorism Push Forward with Amnesty Law,” The Nation, March Offenses, examined all 171 individuals 11, 2013; “Activists Cast Doubt on Successful Talks,” Bangkok Post, March 23, 2013. 1 All converts were convicted in the U.S. court system. 52 Thitanan Pongsudhirak, “Thailand’s Stalemate and There is yet to be an example of a convert who committed Uneasy Accommodation,” Bangkok Post, February 15, 54 The NSC at first said that there would be no RTA a suicide attack on U.S. soil. 2013. presence. See “Army to Join March 28 Peace Talks with 2 These years were: 1998, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 53 Pathan. BRN,” Thai News Agency, March 14, 2013. 2008, 2010 and 2011.

20 march 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 3 who committed AQROs and provided media database with exhaustive records compared to 24 for non-converts, while a statistical breakdown of key trends.3 of local and national press sources, and the median age of converts (31.2) was This article provides the condensed academic texts.5 slightly older than that of non-converts findings from that larger report, yet (29.1). The most common age at the time focuses more specifically on the role of The Findings of offense for all 171 individuals was converts to Islam. Gender between 20 and 24 (33%). In the 171 cases, 97% of non-converts To determine which cases to include in were men and 3% women. In the case of One explanation as to why convert the study, the authors started with the converts, however, only 90% were men offenses commonly fell outside this age largest possible number of individuals while 10% were women. Overall, eight range is that at least seven offenders who could have been interpreted as women committed AQROs, and half of were already over 24-years-old by the connected to al-Qa`ida or inspired these were converts. time they had converted to Islam. by al-Qa`ida. Each of these cases was analyzed, with a strict methodological Women converts occasionally acted Nationality definition of terms and a high burden in support roles to male plotters. For The vast majority of converts (95%) of proof in the criteria for inclusion. example, October Lewis wired money were U.S. citizens, significantly higher There were hundreds of perpetrators to her ex-husband, knowing that it than the 54% of U.S. citizens among all who may have appeared to be inspired would be used in his efforts to join the AQRO perpetrators. The remaining 5% by al-Qa`ida, yet when the information Taliban.6 Nadia Rockwood provided of converts were British (for example, in the actual trial was analyzed closely, false statements to the Federal Bureau the “shoe bomber,” Richard Reid11) or their primary motivation was nationalist of Investigation (FBI), having denied Australian (for example, David Hicks, or for financial gain. Therefore, the delivering a letter containing a list of who was found guilty in a military 171 figure relates to cases that could targets for assassination, composed by court of providing material support confidently be called al-Qa`ida or al- her husband Paul Rockwood, to another to al-Qa`ida in Afghanistan12). By Qa`ida-inspired terrorism.4 individual.7 contrast, 45% of non-converts were U.S. citizens. In both the larger report and in One exception was Aafia Siddiqui, an this article, all data was gathered al-Qa`ida associate convicted in 2010 When disaggregated further, 83% by analyzing official government for attempting to murder U.S. officers of converts were born in the United documentation, court records and court and employees in Afghanistan, and for States, significantly higher than the transcripts when available. Additional assaulting the FBI agent, U.S. Army 21% among non-converts. Of all U.S.- data was acquired using an online officer, and interpreter who tried to born individuals, 54% were converts. stop her.8 Colleen LaRose also played Examples of U.S.-born converts include 3 Robin Simcox and Emily Dyer, Al-Qaeda in the United a more active role in conspiring to Hassan Abu-Jihaad, who provided States: A Complete Analysis of Terrorism Offenses (Lon- kill Lars Vilks, a Swedish cartoonist, classified information concerning 9 don: Henry Jackson Society, 2013). This study is avail- in February 2011. Jamie Paulin- the movements of a U.S. Navy battle 13 able at www.henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/ Ramirez was charged alongside Colleen group, and Daniel Maldonado, who uploads/2013/02/Al-Qaeda-in-the-USAbridged-ver- LaRose and pleaded guilty in March received military training at a camp in sion-LOWRES-Final.pdf. 2011 to providing material support to Somalia where members of al-Qa`ida 10 14 4 Government agencies and non-governmental orga- terrorists. were present. nizations give widely differing figures as to the total number of terrorism or al-Qa`ida-inspired convictions Age Ancestry in the United States. This is largely due to problems of Converts were significantly older at Nearly two-thirds of converts were of classification. A deputy attorney general acknowledged the time of charge than non-converts. African American (40%) or American in 2006 that some individuals in “terrorism or terrorism- Converts were most commonly aged 32, White Caucasian (25%) ancestry, while related cases” since September 11, 2001 actually had no the only non-convert to have either of established links to terrorism. A Department of Justice’s 5 Simcox and Dyer. these ancestries was Tarik Shah, who inspector general also criticized his department’s clas- 6 “October Martinique Lewis Pleads Guilty to Money was the son of one of Malcolm X’s aides sifications, with cases initially filed as terrorism-related Laundering Charges in ‘Portland Cell’ Case,” U.S. De- and pleaded guilty to conspiring to 15 simply not updated if no evidence of terrorist motivation partment of Justice, September 26, 2003. provide material support to al-Qa`ida. was found. As a result, a recent Department of Justice list 7 “Alaska Man Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements of 494 terrorism-related convictions from 9/11 included in Domestic Terrorism Investigation,” U.S. Department 11 “Richard Reid Pleads Guilty,” CNN, October 4, 2002. members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom- of Justice, July 21, 2010. 12 “Australian Gitmo Detainee Gets 9 Months,” Washing- bia and the Tamil Tigers alongside jihadist-related crimes 8 “Aafia Siddiqui Found Guilty in Manhattan Federal ton Post, March 31, 2007. and other cases which are only exceptionally loosely tied Court of Attempting to Murder U.S. Nationals in Af- 13 “Former Member of U.S. Navy Sentenced to 10 Years to terrorism. See “F.B.I. Killed Plot In Talking Stage, A ghanistan and Six Additional Charges,” U.S. Department in Federal Prison for Disclosing Classified Information,” Top Aide Says,” New York Times, June 24, 2006; “Terror of Justice, February 3, 2010. U.S. Department of Justice, April 3, 2009. Conviction Rate High in US, with Questions,” Associ- 9 U.S.A. v. Colleen R. LaRose, Eastern District of Penn- 14 U.S.A. v. Daniel Joseph Maldonado, Southern District ated Press, September 3, 2011; “Introduction to National sylvania, 2011. of Texas, 2007. Security Division Statistics on Unsealed International 10 “Colorado Woman Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to 15 “Bronx Martial Arts Instructor Pleads Guilty to Con- Terrorism and Terrorism-Related Convictions,” U.S. De- Provide Material Support to Terrorists,” U.S. Federal spiring to Support Al Qaeda,” U.S. Department of Jus- partment of Justice, 2011. Bureau of Investigation, March 8, 2011. tice, April 4, 2007.

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African American converts included Instead, converts comprised all of the Terrorist Training Abdulhakim Muhammad, who used offenders in Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas Converts were less likely to have a rifle to shoot two U.S. soldiers at and Washington, D.C., and half the received terrorist training25 than non- a military recruiting center in Little offenders in Washington, Pennsylvania, converts. A quarter of converts had Rock, Arkansas,16 and Barry Walter Tennessee and Texas.21 The highest received terrorist training, compared to Bujol, who was convicted in November convert presence was in Oregon, where 51% of non-converts. converts (all in a cell seeking to assist the Taliban post-9/11) made up four While a higher proportion of non- “Converts did not differ out of the five offenders (80%), and in converts received training in 2000 greatly to non-converts in Virginia, with four out of nine offenders (33% vs. 20%), a higher proportion of (44%). A disproportionately high converts received training in 2001 (40% their level of education. number of converts lived in the western vs. 16%). This suggests that the events In both categories, 52% of United States (36%) compared to non- of 9/11 disproportionately inspired converts (16%). converts to receive terrorist training individuals had attended abroad. Converts were most likely to some form of college.” Education have trained in Afghanistan. Converts did not differ greatly to non- converts in their level of education. In Combat Experience both categories, 52% of individuals had Proportionally, converts and non- 2011 for attempting to aid al-Qa`ida in attended some form of college. Converts, converts were equally as likely to have the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and who however, had a higher proportion of had combat experience (18% in both had been e-mailing its influential cleric, college graduates or above (28% vs. categories). Of converts with combat Anwar al-`Awlaqi.17 21%), and proportionally more converts experience, the majority (71%) had were known to have achieved a college fought in Afghanistan, such as Wadih American White Caucasian converts degree than non-converts (20% vs. 8%). el-Hage (convicted for his role in the included Randall Royer, a member of a 1998 East Africa embassy bombings).26 Virginia cell seeking to assist Lashkar- Occupation Non-converts were also most likely to i-Tayyiba (LeT),18 and Zachary Chesser, Of converts, 63% were employed have fought in Afghanistan (52%), yet who attempted to travel to Somalia to or attending school at the time of there was a broader range of locations, join al-Shabab as a foreign fighter on offense (55% employed, with 35% including Pakistan, Somalia and Iraq. two occasions.19 Three of the four female in skilled22 employment, and 8% converts were also American White receiving an education). Skilled convert Converts were more likely than non- Caucasians. employees included Paul Rockwood, a converts (54% vs. 33%) to have received meteorological technician.23 terrorist training and then to have moved Place of Residence on to actual combat. Converts with both Within the United States, the highest Of non-converts, 55% were employed or training and combat experience included proportion of offenders lived in New receiving an education (40% employed, Randall Royer, who fought in Bosnia and York (14%) at the time of charge or with 15% in skilled employment, and 15% Pakistan.27 attack, followed by Florida (11%) and receiving an education). Non-converts New Jersey (9%). Converts, however, were also more likely to be unemployed Links to Designated Terrorist Organizations tended to be based elsewhere, with only than converts (30% vs. 23%). This did Converts were significantly less two convert offenders residing in New not, however, necessarily mean that likely to be connected to DTOs28 than York, one in New Jersey and none in they were impoverished. For example, 20 Florida. “American Taliban” John Walker Lindh 25 Terrorist training was defined as attendance at a camp was technically unemployed, yet he specifically designed and organized to train “mujahidin” 24 16 “Accused Gunman Sentenced in 2009 Arkansas came from an affluent background. fighters, and which was formally run by al-Qa`ida or al- Shooting,” Los Angeles Times, July 26, 2011. Qa`ida-inspired groups. These were all abroad, with the 17 “Texas Man Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison for At- 1997. He had not been living there, however, for the five exception of a training camp established in Bly, Oregon, tempting to Provide Material Support to al Qaeda,” U.S. years up to his eventual arrest, and so he was not classi- in 2000. Despite its lack of success, the Oregon camp Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 24, 2012. fied as a Florida resident in the study. constituted inclusion because the primary trainer, Ous- 18 “Randall Todd Royer and Ibrahim Ahmed al-Hamdi 21 The exact numerical breakdown is as follows: Alaska sama Kassir, had trained in Afghanistan himself and was Sentenced for Participation in Virginia Jihad Network,” (two offenders); Arizona, Arkansas, Tennessee, Wash- well connected to the broader jihadist network. U.S. Department of Justice, April 9, 2004. ington, and Washington, D.C. (one offender in each 26 U.S.A. v. Wadih El Hage et al., Southern District of 19 “Virginia Man Pleads Guilty to Providing Material state/district); Pennsylvania (two offenders); and Texas New York, 2000. Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Encour- (three offenders). 27 Chris Heffelfinger, Radical Islam in America: Salafism’s aging Violent Jihadists to Kill U.S. Citizens,” U.S. Depart- 22 Skilled employment was defined as a job where for- Journey from Arabia to the West (Dulles, VA: Potomac ment of Justice, October 20, 2010. mal educational or a technical qualification and/or expe- Books Inc., 2011), p. 97; U.S.A. v. Randall Todd Royer, 20 A convert who had significant links to Florida was rience was required. Eastern District of Virginia, 2004. Jose Padilla, who was convicted in August 2007 for 23 “Terrorism Case Baffles Remote Alaska Town,” Los 28 A DTO is defined as being on either the U.S. Depart- conspiring to provide and providing material support to Angeles Times, July 23, 2010. ment of State’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations or al-Qa`ida and conspiring to murder, kidnap, and maim 24 “Profiles of John Walker Lindh, Osama bin Laden,” the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Specially Desig- people abroad. Padilla lived in Florida between 1990 and CNN, July 20, 2002. nated Nationals and Blocked Persons List.

22 march 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 3 non-converts (38% vs. 63%). Of the Mass Casualty Operatives of Muslims in the United States are relatively small number of converts Overall, 21% of all individuals were mass converts to Islam.32 In comparison, only who were connected to a DTO, 60% casualty operatives (MCOs): individuals 4% of the UK Muslim population are were connected to al-Qa`ida, 27% to who committed an AQRO and were considered converts, making the British the LeT, 13% to AQAP, 7% to al-Shabab part of a major plot. This included any figure disproportionately high.33 and 7% to the Pakistan-based Harkat- kind of planned or premeditated attack ul-Mujahidin (HuM). Only two converts that led to multiple deaths; a terrorism In terms of process, there tended to had connections to more than one DTO: conspiracy that led to a successful, be several years between conversion John Walker Lindh (al-Qa`ida and mass casualty attack; an attempted to Islam and the criminal’s decision to HuM) and David Hicks (al-Qa`ida and mass casualty attack that took place commit a terrorist offense. Among the the LeT). without the state’s knowledge yet led cases, offenses committed immediately to no fatalities; a plot with operational after conversion were rare. Exceptions Of the larger number of non-converts involvement from al-Qa`ida or another to this included LaRose and Ramirez, who were connected to a DTO, 63% DTO; or a plot in which components for were connected to al-Qa`ida, 12% to a bomb were purchased or assembled the LeT, 10% to al-Shabab and 1% without an undercover investigation “The data suggests that to AQAP. While there were no non- taking place. These plots included the it is not necessarily converts connected to HuM, there were “millennium bomb” plot, the “shoe a variety of organizations that only bomb” plot and the suicide attacks of socioeconomic factors that had non-converts connected to them: 9/11. may inspire some converts Makhtab-al-Khidamat, the al-Haramain Foundation, the Armed Islamic Group, There was a lower proportion of to Islam to commit individual converts (11%) involved in AQROs. Converts who “There tended to be several the 10 most serious terrorism plots were convicted of AQROs years between conversion against the United States than there were in the total number of overall were by no means all offenses (23%).30 Convert MCOs to Islam and the criminal’s socially disenfranchised, decision to commit a included two members of al-Qa`ida: Wadih el-Hage and Richard Reid. impoverished individuals terrorist offense.” Both had received terrorist training. There has only been one convert MCO who turned to extremism since 2003 (Abdulhakim Muhammad), out of desperation.” however, and he did not receive terrorist Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jemaah training. Islamiya, al-Gama`a al-Islamiyya, Ansar al-Islam, al-Ittihad al-Islami Comparison and Process who committed offenses in the same and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. There Out of the 171 individuals who were year that they converted. It was more were also six individuals connected to either convicted of AQROs within the common, however, for the individuals multiple groups. U.S. civilian or military court system or in this study to commit offenses between who committed a suicide attack on U.S. three to seven years after conversion. This shows that while converts were soil between 1997 and 2011, 23% were This was the case with almost half of all less likely to have been connected to converts to Islam. This number is high the convicted converts. This suggests DTOs than non-converts, those who in comparison to the United Kingdom, that there was rarely an inevitability were often had connections to al- where only 15% of individuals who of converts committing offenses, and Qa`ida, displaying the seriousness committed Islamism-related offenses factors other than religion pushed of some of these cases. For example, were converts.31 The U.S. statistic, individuals toward committing terrorist Bryant Neal Vinas consulted with however, is exactly in line with the acts. senior al-Qa`ida members, providing proportion of converts residing in the them with information as part of a plot United States. According to 2007 data to attack New York’s Long Island Rail from the Pew Research Center, 23% Road system.29 30 The 10 major plots were: the East African embassy bomb attacks in 1998; the “millennium bomb” plot in 2000; the “shoe bomb” plot in 2001; the suicide attacks of 32 “Converts to Islam,” Pew Research Center, July 21, 9/11; the Camp Pennsylvania murders in 2003; the Uni- 2007. versity of North Carolina plot in 2006; the “underwear 33 The number of converts in the United Kingdom has bomb” plot in 2009; the New York City subway plot in not been statistically measured by the government. This 2009; the Florence Army Recruitment Center shootings figure is based on research conducted by the interfaith in 2009; and the Times Square car bomb plot in 2010. group Faith Matters, which suggested there could be as 31 Data extracted from Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart & many as 100,000 converts in the United Kingdom. See 29 “U.S. Citizen Admits al Qaeda Ties,” Wall Street Jour- Houriya Ahmed, Islamist Terrorism: The British Connec- “The Islamification of Britain: Record Numbers Embrace nal, July 23, 2009. tions (London: Henry Jackson Society, 2011) Muslim Faith,” Independent, January 4, 2011.

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Conclusion 2012. On February 7, 2012, a bloodless The data suggests that it is not The Threat from Rising coup toppled the Maldives’ first necessarily socioeconomic factors that Extremism in the Maldives democratically-elected government.7 may inspire some converts to Islam to commit AQROs. Converts who were By Animesh Roul Since Islam was introduced in the convicted of AQROs were by no means all Maldives in the 12th century, religious socially disenfranchised, impoverished the indian ocean archipelago state of practices in the country have been individuals who turned to extremism the Maldives is best known for its moderate. Yet in the past decade, out of desperation. Instead, they were scenic and secluded tourist resorts. the country has grown increasingly likely U.S.-born young men with a good An estimated 400,000 people live religiously conservative. This became education who had since found regular on approximately 1,200-2,000 small especially evident following the work. islands, grouped into 26 atolls.1 The implementation of political reforms and tourism industry accounts for 30% the transition to multiparty democracy The fact that American Muslims are of its gross domestic product, with in 2008, which gave a greater voice generally affluent has been identified an estimated 900,000 foreigners to religious conservatives and those as one reason limiting incidents of visiting the country each year.2 In the calling for the rigid implementation of homegrown extremism. Yet this study’s past decade, however, the Maldives Shari`a (Islamic law) in the Maldives.8 findings should serve as a reminder that has experienced political uncertainty other factors—such as ideology or the and growing religious extremism. This article examines religious suffering of Muslims abroad—can be conservatism and extremist violence just as significant as poverty in placing In 2008, the Maldives held its first in the Maldives, as well as cases of individuals on a path to radicalization. democratic presidential elections. Maldivians joining jihadist groups. It Mohamed Nasheed defeated Maumoon finds that religious conservatism is on The data should also have an impact Abdul Gayoom, who had ruled the the rise in the Maldives, which could on the response from European country for 30 years, winning 54% result in more violence and affect the policymakers. While enhancing the of the vote.3 During the election country’s lucrative tourism industry. socioeconomic prospects of Europe’s campaign, Gayoom and his supporters Muslim communities remains accused Nasheed, a Sunni Muslim, of A Move Toward Religious Conservatism worthwhile, the data suggests that it spreading Christianity in the Maldives.4 For hundreds of years, Sunni Muslims will not be a panacea to preventing In December 2011, after three years in the Maldives have largely practiced radicalization at home. in power, Nasheed and his Maldivian a more liberal form of the religion. Yet Democratic Party (MDP) faced massive during Maumoon Abdul Gayoom’s three- Robin Simcox is a Research Fellow at the protests by opposition parties, religious decade autocratic rule, the Egyptian- Henry Jackson Society. He previously was groups and their thousands of supporters trained religious scholar enacted a a Research Fellow at the Centre for Social in the capital Male.5 Called the “Defend number of measures that, at least Cohesion, a think-tank studying extremism Islam” protests, the organizers accused inadvertently, encouraged more hard and terrorism in the United Kingdom. He the Nasheed administration of defiling line Islamist elements in the country. In has written for the Wall Street Journal, Islam, arguing that Nasheed promoted 1994, the Protection of Religious Unity Los Angeles Times, New Republic, Western ideals and culture and restricted Act was passed, which restricted the Weekly Standard and the Guardian. the spread of more austere Islamic freedom to practice any other religion Mr. Simcox has an MSc in U.S. Foreign practices.6 The protests continued into besides Islam.9 In 1996, Gayoom Policy from the Institute for the Study of constituted the Supreme Council for Americas, University of London, and a BA 1 Simon Denyer, “Deposed Maldives President Says Islamic Affairs (which was renamed in History from the University of Leeds. Coup has Fueled Radical Islam,” Washington Post, April the Ministry of Islamic Affairs in 2008) 19, 2012. charged with overseeing religious Emily Dyer is a Research Fellow at the 2 Neil Merrett, “Maldives Ranked World’s 22nd ‘Most affairs in the country. This body of Henry Jackson Society. She previously Miserable Place’ by Business Insider,” Minivan News, clerics pressured the government to worked as a Higher Executive Officer February 25, 2013; Tom Wright, “Islamism Set Stage for carry out moral and cultural policing 10 for the Preventing Extremism Unit at Maldives Coup,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2012. of alleged “anti-Islamic activities.” In the UK Department for Education, where 3 During his 30-year rule, Gayoom, an autocrat, held 2008, it asked the police to ban night she wrote several papers on extremism elections, winning six of them, yet he never before faced clubs and discotheques for New Year’s within educational settings. Ms. Dyer an opponent. See Randeep Ramesh, “Maldives Human Eve celebrations, saying that they were 11 has a BA in International Relations from Rights Activist Wins Presidential Election,” Guardian, contrary to Islam. the University of Birmingham, where she October 29, 2008. produced a First class dissertation on 4 Vikas Bajaj and Sruthi Gottipati, “Maldives’ Former 7 Jim Yardley, “Amid Outcry, President of Maldives Islamic feminism in Iran, and has traveled Leader Calls for Early Elections,” New York Times, Febru- Steps Down,” New York Times, February 7, 2012. widely within Syria. ary 10, 2012. 8 Wright. 5 Ibid. 9 “2010 Report on International Religious Freedom – 6 Wright. The “Defend Islam” banners displayed slo- Maldives,” United Nations, November 17, 2010. gans such as “We stand united for Islam and the nation,” 10 “Ministry Asks Police to Ban Discos,” Minivan News, “No idols in this holy land,” “No to the Zionist murder- December 31, 2008. ers,” and “No to El Al (Israeli) Airlines.” 11 Ibid.

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By the end of Gayoom’s time in office are influenced by what is happening in resorts, the only places where it is in 2008, the dress code for women the world. They go to Pakistan, study served in the country.25 It is widely had grown increasingly conservative, in madrasas and come back with extreme considered the greatest force behind the and more and more men grew out religious ideas.”19 Maldives’ movement toward religious their beards.12 Whereas women conservatism. Most recently, Islamic used to dress in bright colored Azra Naseem, a Maldivian academic Affairs Minister Saeed, a leading clothes, they increasingly wear black and author, argues that grassroots member of the Adhaalath Party, has robes and headscarves today.13 On radicalization is happening at a started a campaign against Christians more conservative islands such as fast rate.20 Naseem said that the and what he termed “Freemasons,” Himandhoo, women wear black abayas contemporary Maldivian political alleging that they want to “wipe and face veils.14 Ahmed Naseem, the environment favors radical and Maldivian foreign minister until the political Islam taking root in “In the past decade, the coup in 2012, said that the Maldives Maldivian society, especially when “had no one wearing headscarves 10 political parties and civil society Maldives has experienced years ago,” but it is common now.15 From increasingly take refuge in religion.21 an increase in religious imposing a ban on Christian missionary In May 2010, for example, the Ministry radio to apprehending migrant service of Islamic Affairs published a new set conservatism, and this has providers for allegedly preaching and of regulations under the Protection of coincided with a number practicing their own religion, Gayoom’s Religious Unity Act of 1994. The new regime initiated an era of state-backed legislation prohibited “talking about of violent attacks on liberal religious intolerance and radicalization religions other than Islam in Maldives, activists and other citizens in the Maldives.16 and propagating such religions,” as well as reinforcing that it is illegal “to who have expressed Another factor contributing to use any kind of medium to propagate outspoken support extremism has been the role of foreign any religion other than Islam.”22 Some madrasa education.17 The offer of free newly added regulations also made it for moderate religious education in madrasas in Pakistan and “illegal to show or spread sound bites of practices.” Saudi Arabia is widely acknowledged programs on religions other than Islam, as a core means of radicalizing and any such literature, drawings, Maldivians locally, with well-meaning advertisements, music, and songs,” as parents sending their children off well as use “any Internet website, blog, out” Islam from the Maldives.26 In on scholarships to “study Islam.”18 newspaper, or magazine to publish such February 2013, Saeed warned that Students who unwittingly attended material.”23 “various Christian organizations and more radical madrasas may have returned missionaries are strongly involved and home to the Maldives, preaching A major force behind more austere active in our society. They are working their newly-acquired views. After the religious practices in the Maldives is within us and outside, trying to create Maldives suffered its first terrorist the Adhaalath Party (Justice Party). It doubts on Islam within the hearts of attack in 2007, Gayoom himself warned has controlled the Ministry of Islamic young people.”27 of this problem, stating, “Maldivians Affairs, with Shaykh Shaheem Ali Saeed as its current minister. The party There are also two religious conservative 12 John Lancaster, “Islamism Comes to Paradise,” Slate, supports the strict implementation non-governmental organizations known May 28, 2007. of Shari`a, and it has outspokenly as Jamiyyathu Salaf (JS) and the Islamic 13 Mahwish Hafeez, “Growing Islamic militancy in Mal- argued that music and singing are haram Foundation of Maldives (IFM). These 24 dives,” Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Paki- (forbidden) in Islam. The party has two groups, both considered Salafist, stan, 2006. called for an end to the sale of alcohol work with the country’s political parties 14 Ibid.; Lancaster. at the country’s hundreds of luxury to further the cause of Islamism in the 28 15 Wright. Maldives. The leader of the IFM, for 16 “Christians Expelled from Maldives,” Christianity To- 19 “Maldives Cracks Down on Islamic Extremists,” Ra- day, September 7, 1998. For information on the depor- dio Australia, October 22, 2007. 25 “Maldives Shuts Down Spa Resorts Over ‘Anti-Islam- tation of migrant workers suspected of preaching and 20 Personal interview, Azra Naseem, Maldivian author ic’ Activities,” Associated Press, December 30, 2011. conversions, see “Prospects of Religious Freedom Ap- and academic, November 6, 2012. 26 “Islamic Ministry Claims Christians, Freemasons pear Grim in Islamic Maldives,” Compass Direct/World 21 Ibid. Secretly Working to ‘Eradicate’ Islam in the Maldives,” Watch Monitor, August 10, 2010; “Maumoon Abdul 22 “New Religious Unity Regulations: English,” Minivan Minivan News, February 12, 2013. Gayoom - the Father of Maldivian Extremism,” Dhivehi News, May 9, 2010. 27 Ibid. Observer, October 10, 2007. 23 Ibid. 28 The links between political parties and religious NGOs 17 Other observers point to the role of Saudi Arabia and 24 “No One Has the Right to Criticise the Rulings of like IFM and JS are clear as they work together in orga- the Gulf States, which built religious facilities in the coun- the Islamic Sharia - Adhaalath,” Miadhu, March 1, 2013; nizing preaching events in the Maldives. Even the outgo- try that some allege further intolerance. These facilities “Adhaalath Party Requests Education Ministry Can- ing Nasheed-led MDP party worked with these religious include the Islamic Studies Institute, a seven-story-high cel Inter-School Singing Competition,” Minivan News, NGOs through the Islamic Affairs Ministry to carry out school in Male built by Saudi Arabia. See Lancaster. April 12, 2012; “Adhaalath was Formed to Work Against religious activities. For details on the Salafist nature of 18 Wright; Denyer; personal interview, JJ Robinson, edi- the Anti-Religious Activities of MDP - Imran,” Miadhu, the IFM and JS, see JJ Robinson, “Islamic Foundation tor, Minivan News, March 2, 2013. January 29, 2013. Calls for Death Sentence if Apostate Fails to Repent,”

25 march 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 3 example, is former Guantanamo Bay Islamic history prior to the 12th century.35 In addition to the attack on Rasheed, prisoner Ibrahim Fauzee. In May 2002, Another official at the museum said extremists have directly targeted liberal Fauzee was arrested in Karachi while that the group “deliberately targeted the intellectuals, writers and activists. On living in a suspected al-Qa`ida safe Buddhist relics and ruins of monasteries January 3, 2011, assailants attempted house.29 He was eventually released exhibited in the pre-Islamic collection, to kill Aishath Velezinee, an activist from Guantanamo Bay and repatriated destroying most items beyond repair.”36 fighting for the independence of the to the Maldives in 2005, where he country’s justice system, by stabbing established the IFM in 2009.30 The Ministry of Islamic Affairs has, her in the back in broad daylight.45 at least indirectly, encouraged such In November 2010, Aishath acted as These parties and organizations were extremism. It has, for example, initiated a whistleblower when she said that all part of the “Defend Islam” protests crackdowns on media outlets for anti- some members of the Judicial Service in December 2011, which unleashed a Islamic content.37 The Communications Commission were conspiring with key chain of events that culminated in the Authority of the Maldives, on the order of political figures to hijack the judiciary fall of Nasheed’s government.31 the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, blocked and bring down the country’s first the blog of prominent free speech and democratically-elected government.46 Extremist Incidents religious freedom campaigner Khilath Authorities never identified the motive Intolerance toward other religious Rasheed (also known as Hilath) in behind the attack. and cultural symbols were manifested November 2011.38 The communications during the annual summit meeting of the authority was told by the Ministry of On June 4, 2012, extremists again South Asian Association for Regional Islamic Affairs that the blog contained attacked Khilath Rasheed. In this Cooperation (SAARC) in November anti-Islamic material.39 In a country incident, however, Rasheed almost died 2011, when Islamist protestors damaged where the constitution says that every after extremists cut his throat open monuments gifted to the Maldives by citizen is a Sunni Muslim, Rasheed’s with a box cutter.47 After the attempt on SAARC member countries.32 Protestors claim of being a Sufi was viewed as a his life, Rasheed named three political targeted a Pakistani monument that was possible reason for the site’s closure.40 leaders—Islamic Affairs Minister given to the Male government because One month later, in December, 10 men Mohamed Shaheem Ali Saeed, Adhaalath it depicted objects of worship which, attacked Rasheed, throwing stones at Party President Imran Abdulla and according to the protestors, were “anti- him during a peaceful rally he organized Jumhooree Party lawmaker Ibrahim Islam” as they negated “the oneness in Male.41 One of the stones fractured his Muttalib Shaheem—as being indirectly of God.”33 Protests eventually led to skull.42 A few days after the incident, responsible for the attempt on his life.48 the removal of both Bhutan’s and Sri Rasheed was arrested and jailed for In July 2012, Rasheed wrote, Lanka’s monuments as well.34 24 days due to his participation in the rally.43 Rasheed said that he was When they were slashing my On February 7, 2012, a group of Islamist arrested for “disrupting the religious throat, they uttered the words radicals vandalized archaeological unity of the Maldives, and was a threat “Mee Shaheem, Imran, Muttalib faraathun artifacts that were mostly ancient Hindu to society.”44 hadhiyaa eh,” meaning “Compliments and Buddhist relics in the National from Shaheem, Imran and Museum. According to the museum’s Muttalib.” Even though the three director, the vandals destroyed “99%” 35 “Footage Leaked of Museum Vandals Destroying Pre- politicians may not have directly of the evidence of the Maldives’ pre- Islamic Artifacts,” Minivan News, January 14, 2013. ordered the three attackers to 36 Ibid. murder me, their calls for killing Minivan News, May 30, 2010; Mohamed Naahee, “Re- 37 It asked the authorities to remove the “irreligious” me somehow had a psychological ligious NGO Jamiyyathul Salaf Recommends Beheading, SAARC monuments to pacify religious protestors. See influence on the three attackers Firing Squad over Lethal Injection,” Minivan News, Feb- Shahidul Islam Chowdhury, “Maldives Removes Idola- to the extent that they did attack 49 ruary 26, 2013. trous Monuments from SAARC Countries,” New Age, me. 29 “Ibrahim Fauzee – The Guantanamo Docket,” New January 15, 2012; Johnstone, “Hithadhoo Court Orders York Times, undated; “Maldives Offers to Take Two Removal of SAARC Monuments on Religious Grounds.” 45 “ICJ Says Velezinee Attack Politically Motivated,” Guantanamo Bay Prisoners,” Agence France-Presse, 38 “Slashed Journalist Claims Attack was Targeted As- Haveeru Online, January 6, 2011. May 16, 2010. sassination by Islamic Radicals,” Minivan News, July 2, 46 “Velezinee’s Insider Account of How JSC Hijacked 30 Ibid. 2012. Judicial Independence,” Dhivehi Sitee, September 10, 31 “Mass Protests in Defence of Islam Across the Mal- 39 Eleanor Johnstone, “Blog Crack-Down ‘is Just the 2012. dives,” Sun Online, December 23, 2011. Beginning,’ Warns Censored Blogger,” Minivan News, 47 “Slashed Journalist Claims Attack was Targeted As- 32 “PPM to Participate in Mass Protest Against ‘Irreli- November 21, 2011. sassination by Islamic Radicals.” gious’ SAARC Monuments,” Haveeru Online, Novem- 40 Ibid. 48 For details, see www.hilath.com/?p=16661. ber 26, 2011; Sudha Ramachandran, “Intolerance Grows 41 JJ Robinson, “Prison Conditions ‘Unchanged Since 49 He further wrote, “Now how could that happen? An in the Maldives,” Asia Times Online, November 23, 2011. Gayoom’s Time’: Detained Blogger,” Minivan News, MDP Member of Parliament has confirmed to a Maldiv- 33 JJ Robinson, “Vandalism of Pakistani Monument January 11, 2012; Eleanor Johnstone, “Moosa Calls for In- ian writer (who is a friend of mine) that after the attack on Damaging to Maldives’ Image: Foreign Ministry,” Mini- vestigation of Protesters who Called for Religious Toler- me, Muttalib commented in Parliament House in front of van News, November 16, 2011. ance,” Minivan News, December 14, 2011. other Parliament Members: ‘Buneemennu Velezinee aai 34 Eleanor Johnstone, “Hithadhoo Court Orders Re- 42 Ibid. Hilath maraalaanamey. E othee Hilath maraalaafa’ which moval of SAARC Monuments on Religious Grounds,” 43 Ibid. means something to the effect: ‘See I told you we’ll mur- Minivan News, January 19, 2012. 44 Ibid. der Velezinee and Hilath. We have already murdered

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Rasheed has since fled the country.50 and Chinese tourists.57 The attack was Counterterrorism analysts at the time aimed at the tourism industry, the suggested that the video was an attempt On October 1, 2012, Afrasheem Ali, a lifeline of the country’s economy. Three to attract financing and recruits for liberal religious scholar and lawmaker, men—Mohamed Sobah, Moosa Inaz jihadist activity in the Maldives.65 was stabbed to death at his home.51 and Ahmed Naseer—were sentenced to He was stabbed four times in the back 15 years in jail.58 The men confessed to Even before the Sultan Park bombing of the head after he returned home their roles in the incident and admitted in 2007, a number of Maldivians had from appearing on a weekly television their goal was to “target, attack and engaged in violent jihadist activities. In show.52 Considered an Islamic moderate, injure non-Muslims to fulfill jihad.”59 April 2006, a Maldivian national, Ali Afrasheem was outspoken in his Terrorism charges were laid against 16 Jaleel, and a small group of jihadists controversial positions on issues such suspects, but many of them had already from the Maldives attempted to travel as the permissibility of playing music fled to Pakistan and Sri Lanka.60 to Pakistan to train for violent jihad and praying next to the deceased.53 in Afghanistan or Iraq.66 They were Authorities said that his murder was After the Sultan Park bombing, detained, however, and returned to the well-planned, although they denied that authorities attempted to search the Dar- Maldives.67 Jaleel later managed to travel it was religiously motivated.54 ul-Khair mosque on Himandhoo Island as to Pakistan, where he and two others part of the investigation. Upon arriving launched a suicide attack at the Inter- Most recently, a reporter for the at the mosque on October 7, 2007, some Services Intelligence (ISI) headquarters MDP-aligned Raajje TV station, 90 masked and helmeted members in Lahore in May 2009.68 An al-Qa`ida Ibrahim “Aswad” Waheed, was beaten of the mosque confronted police, video featuring Jaleel’s martyrdom was unconscious with an iron bar while wielding wooden planks and refusing subsequently circulated as propaganda riding on a motorcycle near the beach to let the police enter.61 Eventually the material.69 area of Male on February 23, 2013.55 Maldivian army took over from the Authorities were still investigating the police, and established control of the Jaleel allegedly had connections in motive for the crime, but were confident mosque facility. The stand-off resulted the United States. According to the that it was a “targeted attack.”56 in a number of injuries, and one police Federal Bureau of Investigation, Reaz officer had his fingers cut off.62 Qadir Khan, a naturalized U.S. citizen These incidents, which have all residing in Portland, Oregon, conspired occurred in the past few years, reveal an One month after the stand-off, a video to provide material assistance to Jaleel environment in which moderate voices appeared on the al-Qa`ida-linked al- in his suicide attack in Lahore.70 As have been targeted in the Maldives. In Ekhlaas web forum posted by a group stated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in addition to this violence, there is also called Ansar al-Mujahidin.63 The video, the District of Oregon, evidence that a jihadist undercurrent which flashed the message “Your may exist in the country. Brothers in the Maldives are Calling According to the indictment, from You,” contained footage recorded December 14, 2005 through June The Sultan Park Bombing and the Role of inside the Dar-ul-Khair mosque 2, 2009, Khan conspired with Maldivians in Jihadist Groups during the confrontation with police.64 an individual named Ali Jaleel Unlike its larger South Asian neighbors, and others to provide material the Maldives has only experienced one 57 “Bomb Blast Injures 12 Tourists in Maldives,” Reuters, support and resources and to terrorist attack perpetrated by Islamist September 30, 2007. conceal the nature of such support terrorists. A bomb exploded in Sultan 58 Ali Naafiz, “Sultan Park Bombing Suspect Arrested in and resources, knowing they Park in Male on September 29, 2007. Sri Lanka,” Haveeru Online, October 15, 2011. would be used in a conspiracy The explosion wounded at least 12 59 “Sultan Park Suspects On Run In Pakistan,” Mini- to kill, maim, or kidnap persons foreigners, including British, Japanese van News, November 8, 2007; “Maldives Suspects ‘in abroad. Jaleel was a Maldivian Pakistan,’” BBC, November 8, 2007. In August 2010, national who resided outside the Hilath.’” See ibid. the Maldivian government commuted the sentences of United States. Jaleel died while 50 Rasheed is presently living in France (self exile). He Ahmed Naseer and Mohamed Sobah to three year sus- said he is hoping to return to the Maldives when democ- pended sentences under observation. Targets the Maldives,” available at www.youtube.com/ racy and a more tolerant atmosphere prevail. See person- 60 Two suspects, Mohamed Ameen and Abdul Latheef watch?v=HZipCV7-EXk. al interview, Khilath Rasheed, February 2013. Ibrahim, were arrested subsequently on their return 65 Makan. 51 “MP Afrasheem Stabbed to Death,” Haveeru Online, from Pakistan. Ameen was arrested in Sri Lanka in mid- 66 “Oregon Resident Charged with Conspiring to Pro- October 2, 2012. October 2011 after he traveled to the country from Paki- vide Material Support to Terrorists in Connection with 52 “Moderate Islamic MP Stabbed to Death,” The Times, stan on a fake passport. In August 2012, Latheef Ibrahim Suicide Bombing of ISI Headquarters in Pakistan,” U.S. October 3, 2012. was arrested after arriving in the Maldives on a flight Federal Bureau of Investigation, March 5, 2013. 53 Mohamed Naahee, “Afrasheem’s Murder was Well from Pakistan. 67 Ibid. Planned, Worth MVR 4 Million, Claims Police Commis- 61 “Policeman’s Hand Severed In Himandhoo Mosque 68 Ibid. sioner,” Minivan News, December 4, 2012. Raid,” Minivan News, October 7, 2007. 69 “Terrorists Attack Lahore ISI Office,” The Nation, 54 Ibid. 62 Ibid. May 28, 2009. For the video featuring Ali Jaleel, see 55 Neil Merrett, “Police Reject Claims that Assault of 63 Ajay Makan, “Video Raises Fears of al Qaeda Expan- www.liveleak.com/view?i=e1a_1257529338. Raajje TV Journalist was Politically Motivated,” Minivan sion to Maldives,” Reuters, November 19, 2007. 70 “Oregon Resident Charged with Conspiring to Pro- News, March 13, 2013. 64 “Ansar Al Mujahideen Targets the Maldives,” Threats vide Material Support to Terrorists in Connection with 56 Ibid. Watch, November 18, 2007; “Ansar Al Mujahideen Suicide Bombing of ISI Headquarters in Pakistan.”

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participating in the suicide attack and other citizens who have expressed on the Inter-Services Intelligence outspoken support for moderate Recent Highlights in (ISI) Headquarters in Lahore on religious practices. Terrorist Activity May 27, 2009, according to the indictment.71 The country has already suffered February 1, 2013 (TURKEY): A suicide one terrorist attack targeting foreign bomber attacked the U.S. Embassy in Khan, who has not been convicted, is tourists, and a number of Maldivians Ankara, killing a Turkish security currently awaiting trial in the United have traveled to Pakistan’s tribal areas guard outside the facility. Turkish States. to receive jihadist training. Moreover, authorities blamed the attack on the evidence exists that jihadists tried to Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party- There is also evidence that three form a terrorist group in the country in Front, an outlawed Marxist-Leninist jihadists from the Maldives “planned to 2007-2008.77 group that was involved in attacks on create a terrorist group in the Maldives U.S. targets in Turkey in the early 1990s. [in 2007-2008] and to send the group’s If the country continues down its The United States announced that it was members to Pakistan for military current path, extremist incidents may launching its own investigation. – New training,” as stated by the Maldivian rise, with violence targeted against the York Times, February 1 news website Haveeru Online.72 They country’s more liberal citizens. There were identified as Yoosuf Izadhy, Easa is also the risk that extremists could February 1, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A Ali, and Hasnain Abdullah Hameedh.73 target the country’s tourism industry. suicide bomber killed at least 23 people At least one of these individuals did The loss of this revenue source would outside a Shi`a mosque in Hangu District in fact travel to Pakistan, as Yoosuf be devastating to the Maldives. in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. Izadhy was arrested in Pakistan’s South – CNN, February 1; BBC, February 1 Waziristan Agency in March 2009, Animesh Roul is the Executive Director along with eight other Maldivians.74 and Co-founder of Society for the Study of February 1, 2013 (MALI/NIGERIA): A Peace and Conflict, a Delhi-based policy report in the Wall Street Journal suggested Underscoring the threat, former research think-tank. He holds a Master that hundreds of Boko Haram group Maldivian President Mohamed Nasheed of Philosophy degree from the School of militants trained in Mali’s Timbuktu, warned in 2009 that “Maldivian people International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru learning to repair Kalashnikovs and are being recruited by Taliban and University, New Delhi and has a master’s launch shoulder-fired weapons. The they are fighting in Pakistan. It’s a degree in Modern Indian History. Mr. report, which was based on interviews serious issue.”75 When asked how many Roul specializes in counterterrorism, with locals in Timbuktu, said that Maldivians had traveled to Pakistan for radical Islam, terror financing, armed Nigerian Boko Haram fighters trained this purpose, Nasheed put the number conflict and issues relating to arms control in the city for about 10 months, at “a few hundred.”76 In a country of less and proliferation in South Asia. He has working with the local al-Qa`ida- than 400,000 people, such numbers written for Terrorism Monitor, the CTC linked militant group Ansar Eddine. are not insignificant. Sentinel, Jane’s Intelligence Review and “The presence of Nigerian trainees CBW Magazine among others. here [Timbuktu] validates recent Conclusion fears among regional and Western Despite its reputation as an idyllic intelligence officials that parts of the paradise popular among Western Sahara have become incubators where tourists, political and religious al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or developments in the Maldives should AQIM, is training Africans to fight be monitored closely. In the past jihad,” the article said. Islamist decade, the Maldives has experienced militants controlled Timbuktu for an increase in religious conservatism, much of 2012, but in January 2013 and this has coincided with a number French forces regained control of the of violent attacks on liberal activists city. – Wall Street Journal, February 1

71 Ibid. February 2, 2013 (PAKISTAN): 72 “Al-Qaeda Associates Active in Maldives: State De- Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) partment Cable,” Haveeru Daily, December 6, 2010; JJ militants attacked a Pakistani Army Robinson, “Leaked Cable from 2008 Reveals US Con- base in Lakki Marwat District of cerns about Maldivian National’s ‘Unspecified Links to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, al-Qaida,’” Minivan News, December 7, 2010. killing at least nine army soldiers and 73 Ibid. four paramilitary soldiers. During the 74 “Maldives-Based al-Qa`ida Associates Plan to Create attack, 10 civilians were also killed. a Terrorist Group in the Maldives – WikiLeaks,” Miad- According to a TTP spokesman, hu, December 8, 2010; “9 Armed Maldivians Arrested in the attack was in retaliation for the Waziristan,” Miadhu, April 2, 2009. killings of two Taliban commanders 75 Sumon K. Chakrabarti, “Taliban in Pak Recruiting in U.S. drone strikes. – New York Times, our Youth: Maldives,” CNN-IBN, February 8, 2012. February 2 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid.

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February 3, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide February 5, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide reportedly members of Tehrik-i- bomber in a vehicle filled with bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle Taliban Pakistan, while two were explosives attacked the police attacked an Iraqi Army checkpoint allegedly members of al-Qa`ida. headquarters in Kirkuk. After the in Taji, 12 miles north of Baghdad, – Dawn, February 8 explosion, militants wearing police killing at least three people. It was the uniforms tried to storm the building. second suicide attack in two days in February 8, 2013 (MALI): Former U.S. According to one police officer, “I saw the town. – Reuters, February 5 Ambassador to Mali Vicki Huddleston the three suicide bombers running said that France paid $17 million in into the police building. They were February 6, 2013 (SYRIA): A car bomb ransom to free hostages seized from throwing hand grenades at us. We exploded in a military intelligence a French uranium mine in Niger in opened fire on them and killed them compound in Palmyra in eastern Syria, September 2010, money that allowed immediately.” At least 30 people were causing at least a dozen casualties groups such as al-Qa`ida in the killed in the assault. – CNN, February 4; among security personnel. – Reuters, Islamic Maghreb to “buy weapons Reuters, February 3; New York Times, February 3 February 6 and recruit.” In February 2011, three of the hostages, including a February 4, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide February 6, 2013 (SOMALIA): An Frenchwoman, were freed. According bomber attacked a government- improvised explosive device struck to the Associated Press, Huddleston’s supported militia in Taji, 12 miles north a vehicle carrying Ethiopian soldiers allegations “strengthened the view of Baghdad. The explosion killed at in Baidoa, reportedly killing two of that the Mali rebellion was funded least 22 people. According to Reuters, them. – Garowe Online, February 7 largely by ransoms paid in recent “It was the seventh suicide bombing in years.” French officials have denied a month in Iraq, indicating insurgents February 7, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A new paying ransoms. – AP, February 9 are intent on stepping up violence a report in Pakistan’s The News International year after U.S. troops pulled out of claims that Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan February 8, 2013 (MALI): A suicide the country, where Shi’ite, Sunni and (TTP) and the Islamic Movement of bomber on a motorcycle attacked a ethnic Kurdish factions still struggle Uzbekistan (IMU) have created a joint military checkpoint in Gao in northern over how to share power.” – Reuters, special unit with the prime mission Mali, wounding one Malian soldier. February 4 to attack prisons and free jailed The Movement for Unity and Jihad in militants. The unit, called Ansar al- West Africa (MUJAO), a group linked February 4, 2013 (SOMALIA): Al- Aseer (Supporters of Prisoners), is to al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb, Shabab said that they opened a new reportedly led by Adnan Rasheed, took responsibility. The incident Twitter account in English, less than who himself escaped from prison in marked the first suicide bombing two weeks after Twitter suspended April 2012 after 200 Taliban militants in northern Mali since the start of its previous account. According to attacked the Central Jail in Bannu, the French-led military offensive in the BBC, “The new al-Shabab account where he was held. Rasheed was in January 2013. – Voice of America, February has 280 followers, compared to the prison for trying to assassinate former 8; AFP, February 8 previous account which had more Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. than 20,000 followers. It was closed – The News International, February 7 February 8, 2013 (NIGERIA): on 25 January, about a week after it Suspected gunmen from the Boko announced the killing of a French spy, February 7, 2013 (SOMALIA): Al- Haram group killed at least nine Denis Allex, it was holding hostage.” Shabab fighters ambushed Ethiopian women vaccinating children against – BBC, February 4 troops between El Barde and Hudur, polio in Kano in northern Nigeria. resulting in an unspecified number of – Guardian, February 8 February 5, 2013 (BULGARIA): The casualties. – Garowe Online, February 7 Bulgarian government completed February 9, 2013 (MALI): A suicide its six-month inquiry into the bus February 8, 2013 (IRAQ): Two car bomber in military fatigues detonated bombing that killed five Israelis in bombs exploded at a vegetable market explosives near a checkpoint at the Burgas, Bulgaria, in July 2012. The in the Shi`a city of Hilla, Babil entrance to Gao, wounding one soldier. inquiry found that two suspects— Province, killing 15 people. – Reuters, Authorities said that the bomber was who held Australian and Canadian February 8 Arab and a suspected member of the passports—were directly linked to Movement for Unity and Jihad in West the militant wing of Iranian Hizb February 8, 2013 (IRAQ): Two car Africa (MUJAO). A suicide bomber Allah. The report also found that bombs exploded at a bus stop near attacked the same checkpoint the “initial investigations—including a street market in a Shi`a area of previous day. – AP, February 10 the discovery of the bomber’s head Baghdad, killing at least 16 people. at the scene of the attack—suggested – Reuters, February 8 February 10, 2013 (GLOBAL): the strike may have been a suicide Muhammad al-Zawahiri, the brother bombing. But officials now believe February 8, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A of al-Qa`ida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri, the device may have been remote- suspected U.S. drone killed nine told a reporter that “if America does controlled, or accidentally detonated alleged militants in South Waziristan not stop (its) violations or attacks, by the bomber.” – BBC, February 5 Agency of the Federally Administered there will not be just one Ayman Tribal Areas. Seven of the dead were al-Zawahiri, but all Muslims will

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(become like) Ayman al-Zawahiri.” no casualties. – Deutsche Welle, February 13; that they had killed all seven hostages Muhammad, who denies he is a BBC, February 13 in response to attempts by the United member of al-Qa`ida, was freed from Kingdom and Nigeria to free them. prison following the revolution that February 14, 2013 (GLOBAL): The The statement included screen shots unseated Hosni Mubarak. He was in U.S. Treasury Department announced of a video purportedly showing a jail for 13 years on militancy charges. that it was freezing any assets of number of dead hostages. – AP, February According to USA Today, Muhammad Yahya Abu al-Hamman, identified as 17; Vanguard, February 23; Reuters, March 9 al-Zawahiri, who is 61-years-old, “is the leader of al-Qa`ida in the Islamic portrayed by Egyptian newspapers as Maghreb’s Sahel branch. – Reuters, February 17, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): a leader of some of Egypt’s Salafis, who February 14 Afghan authorities captured follow a radical ideology.” Muhammad Pakistani Taliban leader Maulvi Faqir defended his brother in the interview, February 14, 2013 (RUSSIA): A Muhammad in Nangarhar Province in saying that the al-Qa`ida leader “is suicide bomber in a vehicle killed at eastern Afghanistan. According to the trying to defend against part of the least four police officers in Dagestan, New York Times, “Muhammad, believed aggression. We didn’t attack the located in Russia’s North Caucasus to be in his 40s, fled to Afghanistan in United States first, but they attacked region. As stated by the Associated 2010 after an offensive by Pakistan’s us.” Muhammad publicly supported Press, “Russia’s North Caucasus military on his stronghold in the the Islamist insurgency in Mali and and Dagestan in particular has for Bajaur tribal agency...Muhammad said that those who refuse to support years been plagued by Islam-inspired continued to attack Pakistani forces it are traitors to their religion, insurgency which spread throughout in Bajaur after taking refuge in according to the Associated Press. the area after two separatist wars in the isolated valleys of Kunar and – USA Today, February 10 Chechnya.” – RFE/RL, February 14; AP, Nuristan Provinces in northeastern February 14 Afghanistan.” – New York Times, February February 10, 2013 (THAILAND): A 19 car bomb killed five soldiers in Yala February 14, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A Province in southern Thailand. – Voice suicide bomber in an explosives- February 17, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide of America, February 10 laden vehicle killed seven people at a bomber killed Ali Aouni, the head of Frontier Corps checkpoint in Hangu Iraq’s intelligence academy, outside February 11, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa his home in Tal Afar. The explosion bomber in a vehicle killed at least Province. – The News International, February also killed three of his bodyguards. eight people at a military checkpoint 14 – Global Post, February 16 in Mosul, Ninawa Province. – RFE/RL, February 11 February 16, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A February 17, 2013 (IRAQ): At least suicide bomber in an explosives-laden eight car bombs tore through Baghdad, February 11, 2013 (SOMALIA): An al- water tanker targeted Shi`a Muslims killing 28 people in Shi`a districts Shabab suicide bomber in a vehicle at a crowded marketplace in Hazara, in the city. The Islamic State of Iraq targeted a senior police official in on the outskirts of Quetta. The claimed responsibility. According Galkayo, wounding the official and explosion killed 83 people. According to Reuters, “Insurgents are stepping killing four people. – Voice of America, to a Quetta police official, the water up attacks at a time when [Prime February 11; AFP, February 11 tanker carried between 1,760-2,200 Minister Nuri al-Maliki] is facing two pounds of explosives. The sectarian months of protests by thousands of February 12, 2013 (YEMEN): Al- militant group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi Sunni Muslims in western provinces, Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility. – CNN, February who accuse his government of (AQAP) reportedly said that a drone 17 marginalising their sect.” – Reuters, strike last month killed the group’s February 18 top religious cleric, Shaykh Adel al- February 16, 2013 (SOMALIA): A car Abab, in Shabwa Province. “A drone bomb exploded at a restaurant near February 19, 2013 (CAMEROON): strike had targeted Sheikh Adel al- Mogadishu’s Liido beach, causing Boko Haram kidnapped seven Abab’s vehicle but he escaped and an unknown number of casualties. French tourists, including four fled to a mountainous region where – Garowe Online, February 16 children, in northwest Cameroon. a raid by another drone killed him According to Agence France-Presse, immediately,” a source close to AQAP February 16, 2013 (NIGERIA): The “A Western diplomat in the region told Agence France-Presse. – AFP, Nigerian militant group Ansaru, told AFP that six armed kidnappers February 12 which broke from Boko Haram, on three motorbikes abducted a attacked a local prison in Bauchi couple, their four children and an February 13, 2013 (THAILAND): State, and then targeted a worker’s uncle in the northern [Cameroon] At least 60 insurgents attacked a camp for construction company village of Dabanga near the Nigerian military base in Narathiwat Province Setraco, kidnapping seven foreign border.” Boko Haram later claimed in southern Thailand. The military, workers from the United Kingdom, responsibility. On February 26, Boko which reportedly knew of the attack Greece, Italy and Lebanon. The Haram released a video showing the in advance, killed at least 16 of the militants shot and killed one guard kidnapped family, saying that if the militants. The military said it suffered at the camp. On March 9, Ansaru said group’s demands are not met, “we

30 march 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 3 will kill these hostages.” Boko Haram February 24, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): February 26, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): demanded that Nigeria and Cameroon A suicide bomber in an explosives- A suicide bomber slid underneath release jailed members of the group. laden vehicle attacked a police a bus filled with Afghan soldiers in – Telegraph, February 19; Premium Times, March checkpoint in Pul-i-Alam on the main Kabul, wounding six soldiers and four 18; CNN, February 26 highway between Kabul and Logar civilians. According to the Guardian, Province, killing one policeman. “The man, wearing a black overcoat, February 21, 2013 (UNITED – Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, February approached the bus purposefully in KINGDOM): A UK court found three 24 heavy morning snow as soldiers were men guilty of planning a terrorism boarding, set down his umbrella and campaign in the United Kingdom, February 24, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): went under the chassis as if to fix raising money for terrorism and A suicide bomber in an explosives- something, according to a witness.” recruiting others for a terrorist laden vehicle attacked the National He then detonated his explosives. act. The men, Irfan Naseer, Irfan Directorate of Security compound – Guardian, February 27 Khalid and Ashik Ali, were based in Jalalabad, killing two Afghan in Birmingham and planned to use intelligence agents. – Canadian February 26, 2013 (MALI): A suicide eight suicide bombers, armed with Broadcasting Corporation, February 24 bomber in a vehicle detonated guns, to cause “carnage” in the United explosives at a checkpoint run by the Kingdom. According to the Telegraph, February 24, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): National Movement for the Liberation “Naseer, a pharmacy student, had A suicide bomber in a vehicle was of Azawad (MNLA) in Kidal, killing at planned to extract ammonium nitrate— shot to death before he could trigger least six MNLA fighters. The MNLA is used as [the] main explosive—from his explosives in Kabul’s diplomatic a Tuareg separatist group that is now sports injury cold packs…They also enclave of Wazir Akbar Khan. – Dawn, working with the French military in considered other forms of attack such February 24; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, northern Mali. – Voice of America, February [as] putting poison in hand cream to February 24 27 rub on car and door handles or even putting blades on the front of a vehicle February 24, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): February 28, 2013 (LIBYA): Libyan and driving it into a crowd of people.” A suicide bomber detonated an Prime Minister Ali Zidan demanded – Telegraph, February 21 explosives vest while being searched at that militias evacuate their buildings the entrance to the police headquarters and headquarters, promising that February 21, 2013 (SYRIA): A suicide for Baraki Barak district in Logar the government would be decisive in bomber in a vehicle killed at least Province, wounding one policeman. dealing with armed groups that have 53 people near Syria’s ruling party – Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, February hijacked the country. He said that headquarters in Damascus. – AP, 24 Libya “will not be lenient and we February 22 will not permit hijacking of Tripoli February 26, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): or Benghazi or any other city.” – AP, February 21, 2013 (KENYA): Gunmen The U.S.-led military coalition in February 28 shot and killed seven people—five Afghanistan said that it mistakenly men and two women—in an attack on reported a decline in Taliban attacks February 28, 2013 (TURKEY): A a mosque in northeastern Kenya near for the year 2012. According to a report Turkish news agency reported that the Somali border. – BBC, February 21 in Fox News, “The U.S.-led coalition police have arrested 11 people with had incorrectly reported a 7 percent suspected links to al-Qa`ida, as February 22, 2013 (IRAQ): Gunmen decline in Taliban attacks last year. In well as seizing 55 pounds of plastic wearing Iraqi army uniforms shot and fact, there was no change in the number explosives, in simultaneous raids killed seven members of a government- of attacks on international troops from in Istanbul and Tekirdag Province. backed militia in Tuz Khurmato, 105 2011 to 2012…A spokesman for the The police reportedly recovered miles north of Baghdad. – Reuters, U.S.-led coalition said the mistakes photographs of the U.S. Consulate, a February 22 were noticed ‘during a quality control synagogue and a church in Istanbul. check.’” – Fox News, February 26; BBC, – AP, February 28 February 22, 2013 (MALI): Two suicide February 26 bombers in separate vehicles targeted February 28, 2013 (PAKISTAN): civilians as well as members of the February 26, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): Militants bombed four boys’ schools National Movement for the Liberation Taliban militants poisoned members in Mohmand Agency of the Federally of Azawad (MNLA) near Tessalit in of a government-backed militia at an Administered Tribal Areas. There northern Mali, killing three people. outpost in Ghazni Province. After the were no casualties. According to a There was no immediate claim of militia members became incapacitated, Pakistani official, Taliban attacks responsibility. The MNLA is a Tuareg the militants shot and killed them. have now destroyed more than 100 separatist group that is now working The attack left 10 militia members and schools in Mohmand Agency. – Dawn, with the French military in northern seven of their civilian friends dead. The February 28 Mali. – AFP, February 22; Voice of America, Afghan Taliban claimed responsibility, February 22 but said that the men were shot and killed in their sleep and that no poison was involved. – Guardian, February 27

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February 28, 2013 (THAILAND): CTC Sentinel Staff For the first time since the start of the current insurgency in southern Editor-in-Chief Thailand in 2004, Thailand’s Erich Marquardt government said that it will hold Senior Editor, CTC formal peace talks with a major Muslim rebel group in March. According to Editorial Board Reuters, “The talks follow a shift in COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. Thailand’s stance last year when it Department Head acknowledged the conflict’s ‘political Department of Social Sciences (West Point) nature’ for the first time after years of relying on military action… COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. in the southern provinces.” Since Deputy Department Head 2004, the insurgency in southern Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Thailand has claimed more than 5,000 lives. According to Reuters, MAJ Bryan Price, Ph.D. “Resistance to Buddhist rule from Director, CTC Bangkok has existed for decades in the predominantly Muslim provinces in the south, waning briefly in the 1990s before resurfacing violently in January 2004.” – Reuters, February 28

February 28, 2013 (MALI): Algerian television reported that French forces Contact in Mali have killed Abdelhamid Combating Terrorism Center Abu Zeid, a leading commander in U.S. Military Academy al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall (AQIM). The station said that Abu West Point, NY 10996 Zeid was killed three days earlier in Phone: (845) 667-6383 the region of Tigargara in northern Email: [email protected] Mali. On March 23, France confirmed Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ “with certainty” that Abu Zeid was killed during a French offensive at the * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 end of February. – Reuters, February 28; Reuters, March 23; New York Times, March 23

support The Combating Terrorism Center would like to express its gratitude to its financial supporters, for without their support and shared vision of the Center products like the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about how to support the Combating Terrorism Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association of Graduates at 845-446-1561.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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