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Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali Intervention by Jacob Zenn the Mali Intervention by Jacob Zenn Reports 9 AQIM’S Playbook in Mali by Pascale C

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Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali Intervention by Jacob Zenn the Mali Intervention by Jacob Zenn Reports 9 AQIM’S Playbook in Mali by Pascale C MARCH 2013 . VOL 6 . ISSUE 3 Contents Cooperation or Competition: FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru After Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali Intervention By Jacob Zenn the Mali Intervention By Jacob Zenn REPORTS 9 AQIM’s Playbook in Mali By Pascale C. Siegel 12 Al-Shabab’s Tactical and Media Strategies in the Wake of its Battlefield Setbacks By Christopher Anzalone 16 The Upcoming Peace Talks in Southern Thailand’s Insurgency By Zachary Abuza 20 The Role of Converts in Al-Qa`ida- Related Terrorism Offenses in the United States By Robin Simcox and Emily Dyer 24 The Threat from Rising Extremism in the Maldives By Animesh Roul 28 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 32 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts A Cameroonian soldier stands in Dabanda by the car of the French family that was kidnapped on February 19. - AFP/Getty Images ince the nigerian militant group attacked schools, churches, cell phone Boko Haram1 launched its first towers, media houses, and government attack in northern Nigeria in facilities, including border posts, police September 2010, it has carried stations and prisons. Since January Sout more than 700 attacks that have 2012, however, a new militant group killed more than 3,000 people.2 Boko has attracted more attention in northern Haram primarily targets Nigerian Nigeria due to its threat to foreign government officials and security interests. Jama`at Ansar al-Muslimin About the CTC Sentinel officers, traditional and secular Muslim fi Bilad al-Sudan (commonly known as The Combating Terrorism Center is an leaders, and Christians.3 It has also Ansaru)4 announced that it split from independent educational and research Boko Haram in January 2012, claiming institution based in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy, 1 The group Boko Haram identifies itself as Jama`at Ahl West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses al-Sunna li al-Da`wa wa al-Jihad, which is Arabic for when approximately 50 fighters attacked Bauchi prison the Center’s global network of scholars and “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s and freed more than 150 Boko Haram members. An addi- practitioners to understand and confront Teachings and Jihad.” The term “Boko Haram” means tional 500 prisoners were also freed, some of whom joined contemporary threats posed by terrorism and “Western education is sinful” in the Hausa language in Boko Haram. Before 2010, Boko Haram was known as the other forms of political violence. Nigeria. “Nigerian Taliban,” among other names. See Sani Muhd 2 “Boko Haram Has Killed 3,000 People, Says Army Sani, “Attack On Bauchi Prison - Boko Haram Frees 721 Chief,” ThisDayLive, November 6, 2012; “Boko Haram Inmates,” Leadership, September 8, 2010. The views expressed in this report are those of Attacks Cripple Northern Nigeria’s Economy,” IRIN, Feb- 4 Ansaru also refers to itself as JAMBS—the acronym for the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, ruary 12, 2013. Jama`at Ansar al-Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan. In Arabic, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 3 Boko Haram’s first attack with the name Jama`at Ahl al- this means “Supporters of the Muslims in the Land of the Sunna li al-Da`wa wa al-Jihad was on September 7, 2010, Blacks.” 1 MARCH 2013 . VOL 6. ISSUE 3 that Boko Haram was “inhuman” for Ansaru’s Rise security forces determined from phone killing innocent Muslims as well as for To date, Ansaru may have executed six call logs and interrogations of the Shura targeting defectors.5 Ansaru’s almost major attacks. Only the four operations Council members that Abu Muhammed exclusive focus on foreign targets may carried out after Ansaru announced its was responsible for the British and also explain why the two groups could formation on January 26, 2012, however, Italian hostages and that the hostages not coexist. can be confidently attributed to the were transferred to a house in Sokoto, group.10 north of Kebbi State.14 On March 8, Boko Haram seeks revenge against 2012, the captors shot both hostages the Nigerian government and First Operation when they saw helicopters of the UK security forces for killing its founder Ansaru may have carried out its first Special Boat Service carrying out Muhammad Yusuf and 1,000 of his operation in May 2011 when Chris surveillance on the house.15 Soon after, followers during a four-day series of McManus and Franco Lamolinara—a UK and Nigerian forces killed eight of clashes in July 2009.6 Ansaru fights to British and Italian engineer of an the captors and detained eight others restore the “lost dignity” of the Sokoto Italian construction company—were in a late effort to free the hostages. The Caliphate, which was founded in 1804 kidnapped near the border with Niger detained captors confessed that they by the Fulani shaykh Usman dan Fodio in in Kebbi State, northwest Nigeria. had “standing orders to kill the hostages northern Cameroon, northern Nigeria, A previously unknown group called immediately on sight of security agents, and southern Niger, and lasted until the “al-Qa`ida in the Lands Beyond the since we were not sure of surviving an United Kingdom and France colonized Sahel” took responsibility in a proof- encounter with the security men.”16 the region and introduced Western of-life video showing the two hostages This established a precedent that any education and Christianity in the 19th blindfolded and kneeling in front of attempt to free hostages would lead to century.7 three veiled militants.11 The video was their immediate deaths. sent to Mauritania’s Agence Nouakchott This article reviews Ansaru’s attacks on d’Information (ANI), which usually In June 2012, a Boko Haram informant foreign interests in Nigeria, the possible receives AQIM videos. Employing the alleged long-time AQIM member role of al-Qa`ida operative Mokhtar same Mauritanian negotiator that AQIM Khalid al-Barnawi coordinated the Belmokhtar8 in steering Ansaru toward used in several previous kidnappings, the kidnappings of the British and Italian kidnapping foreigners despite Boko militants reportedly demanded $6 million hostages with Abu Muhammed, and Haram’s rejection of the tactic, and and the release of prisoners in West Africa that Abu Muhammed had trained under why al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb in return for the two hostages.12 al-Barnawi at an AQIM-run camp in (AQIM) chose to collaborate more with Algeria.17 That same month, the U.S. Ansaru than Boko Haram. Finally, the On March 7, 2012, Nigerian security government designated al-Barnawi a article assesses the future of Ansaru and forces broke up a Boko Haram Shura “global terrorist” along with two other Boko Haram now that the French-led Council meeting in Kaduna led by Abu militants, Abubakar Adam Kambar, who military intervention has driven AQIM Muhammed, who defected from Boko trained under al-Barnawi at the AQIM from northern Mali and potentially Haram due to disagreements with Boko camp in Algeria, and Boko Haram’s killed Belmokhtar.9 Haram leader Abubakar Shekau.13 The leader, Abubakar Shekau.18 Nigerian security sources reported that members 5 Ansaru announced its “public formation” and break 10 In all Ansaru video statements, its leader and mem- from Boko Haram in flyers distributed in Kano on Janu- bers conceal their identities with veils and obscure their Nation, February 14, 2012; “Barnawi, Kambar: Qaeda- ary 26, 2012, which was six days after Boko Haram at- voices. Boko Haram, in contrast, shows leader Abubakar linked Militants with Boko Haram Ties,” Agence France- tacked government offices in Kano, leaving more than Shekau’s face in all of its videos. This shows that Ansaru Presse, June 21, 2012. 150 civilians dead, mostly Muslims. See “Boko Haram: does not want to reveal the identity of its leader. 14 Yusuf Alli, “Why We Killed Briton, Italian—Suspect,” Splinter Group, Ansaru Emerges,” Vanguard, February 11 The militants’ Sahelian-style veils in the Kebbi proof- The Nation, March 10, 2012. 1, 2012. of-life videos, which are also worn by the militants on 15 Ibid. 6 “Boko Haram Leader ‘Imam Abubakar Shekau’ Mes- Ansaru’s website, differ from Boko Haram members who 16 Midat Joseph et al., “Kidnappers - Why We Killed sage to President Jonathan,” Sahara Reporters, January usually wear Western-style military fatigues. See An- Briton, Italian Hostages,” Leadership, March 13, 2012; 12, 2012; Ikechukwu Nnochiri, “We Are On Revenge saru’s website at www.ansarulmuslimun.wapka.mobi/ “Exclusive: Boko Haram Targets Julius Berger, Dantata Mission, Boko Haram Suspect Tells Court,” Vanguard, index.xhtml. & Sawoe Expatriates,” Premium Times, March 12, 2012. November 25, 2011; “Suspects Charged in Nigeria Bomb- 12 Mustapha Ould Limam Chaffi was the negotiator. See 17 The U.S. designated al-Barnawi as a “global terrorist” ing,” al-Jazira, December 25, 2011; Michael Olugbode, “Exclusif...Mort des deux otages occidentaux tués au Ni- in June 2012, and in November 2012 the UK Home Office “Boko Haram Claims Killings in Borno,” ThisDayLive, geria: Une source d’AQMI livre quelques details,” Agence minister proscribed Ansaru as a terrorist organization September 22, 2010. Nouakchott d’Information, March 10, 2012. that is “anti-Nigerian government, anti-Western and 7 “Boko Haram: Splinter Group, Ansaru Emerges.” 13 There are reports that a dispute over how to spend broadly aligned with al-Qa`ida.” See “Barnawi, Kambar: 8 Belmokhtar led an AQIM brigade in the Sahel from money given to Boko Haram by AQIM or from bank rob- Qaeda-linked Militants with Boko Haram Ties.” 2007 until he was reportedly dismissed from AQIM in beries caused the conflict between Abubakar Shekau, 18 Rabi Ould Idamous, “Faltering al-Qaeda Turns to late 2012.
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