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Following the merger, al-Qa`ida has groups. Moreover, Pakistani police prioritized attacks in Saudi Arabia A Profile of ’s were unable to differentiate between the and other Gulf states20 in an attempt Lashkar-i-Jhangvi groups. In many cases, one militant had to make itself regionally relevant. For overlapping allegiances and belonged to al-Qa`ida, this is the logical extension By Arif Jamal multiple groups at one time. of its development to date in Yemen. Al-Qa`ida first wanted to rebuild in lashkar-i-jhangvi (lj) is one of the This article will discuss the LJ’s Yemen, and then it aimed to make itself world’s most secretive terrorist foundation, ideology, and organizational relevant within the country. Now that it groups. Little information exists on structure. It will also show why the LJ has accomplished both goals, it is taking the organization, even though it is an is blamed for a disproportionate number the next step by expanding regionally. al-Qa`ida affiliate that is regularly of terrorist incidents in Pakistan. blamed for terrorist attacks in Pakistan. This process has followed a familiar Although the LJ was formed as the The Creation of the LJ pattern: each new phase of activity armed wing of Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan To understand the formation of the LJ, it begins with al-Qa`ida announcing (SSP), it has morphed into the collective is necessary to outline the creation and its rather ambitious goals and then armed wing of various ideology of Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan. working to meet those goals. The attack terrorist groups. Statements about the In 1984, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, on Muhammad bin Nayif was an early LJ from the Pakistani government and a firebrand and astute Deobandi cleric attempt to accomplish this, but it is media suggest that the group is the most from the Punjabi town of Jhang and unlikely to be the last. AQAP currently deadly Islamist terrorist organization a member of Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam feels little pressure in Yemen. It has in the world outside the Indian- (JUI), founded Anjuman-i-Sipah-i- both the time and space to plot and controlled state of Jammu and Kashmir. Sahaba Pakistan (ASSP). Inspired by launch attacks throughout the region This description, however, is not the Islamist and jihadist policies of from its base in the country. This is completely accurate, and it has served not to say that the organization will no both the handlers of jihadist groups in longer carry out attacks in Yemen, but the Pakistani military as well as other “During the mid-1990s, rather that these attacks are no longer Islamist terrorist groups who benefit by the SSP decided to create its top priority. Al-Qa`ida has reached blaming the LJ for most terrorist attacks the point where it is no longer satisfied in Pakistan outside the tribal areas. an underground terrorist with local activity. It has its sights set group that would take on something bigger. The LJ does exist as a dangerous organization, but not in the form often orders from SSP leaders Gregory D. Johnsen, a former Fulbright portrayed by the Pakistani media and but operate independently. Fellow in Yemen, is currently a Ph.D. government. Most terrorist attacks candidate in Near Eastern Studies at blamed on the LJ were in fact carried out This group became Princeton University. He is also the co- by several Deobandi1 terrorist groups, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi.” author of the Yemen blog, Waq al-Waq. of which the LJ is only one. Research into 40 terrorist incidents in Pakistan between September 11, 2001 and September 2007 show that police and General Zia-ul-Haq, Jhangvi created other sources were quoted in various the group to fight the growing influence newspapers often attributing a terrorist of the Iranian revolution among both attack to multiple Deobandi terrorist Sunni and Shi`a youth. Jhangvi dreamed groups. During this period, it was of uniting all Sunni sects under one not uncommon for the same terrorist banner to oppose Shi`a Muslims and act to be blamed on the SSP, the LJ, Iran; his goal was to establish a Sunni Harkat-ul--al-Islam, , state in Pakistan and later in the rest of or another Deobandi group.2 Different the world. authority figures blamed different For almost a year, the ASSP failed to attract attention to its cause. Its 1 are a sub-sect of the Hanafi sect, which in members spent their time writing graffiti turn is one of the four major Sunni schools of jurispru- such as “Kafir, kafir—Shi`a kafir” (Shi`a are dence in Islam. The other major sub-sect of the Hanafi infidels), and the group largely stuck to sect are the Barelvis who represent more mystical Islam. promoting this slogan. A shrewd cleric, Deobandis can also be described as the politicized Hanafi Jhangvi soon understood that he would sub-sect as they came into being in mid-19th century Brit- not succeed unless he found supporters ish India. Their principal objective at that time was to in Islamabad. By 1985, he had renamed purify Islam of the accumulated bid`a or religious inno- the group “Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan” 20 AQAP has not yet been found responsible for attacks vation to gain freedom from the British colonial power. (Soldiers of the Companions of the in other Gulf states. Its statements and some circumstan- 2 This information is based on the author’s accumulation Prophet) and became a regular visitor to tial evidence, however, imply that it is plotting such op- of press reports from Pakistani newspapers and media Islamabad. In Islamabad, he frequented erations. during the stated period.

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Arab embassies, particularly those of the SSP achieved tremendous growth was Maulana Alam Tariq, the brother of Iraq and Saudi Arabia.3 He failed to in both numbers and influence during Maulana Azam Tariq, the latter of whom convince Iraqi diplomats that his group its early years. By 1990, it had plotted later became the head of the SSP and an could fight an Iraqi proxy war against to assassinate Iranian diplomats along elected member of parliament.12 The LJ Iran in Pakistan, but he did succeed with Pakistani Shi`a Muslims. The SSP was named after the SSP’s martyred in winning over the Saudis to do the tried to kill Iranian diplomats in Lahore, founder, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. same.4 Karachi and Multan.9 SSP members such as Riaz Basra10 and Shaykh Haq The LJ established a training camp in At the time, there were not many Nawaz Jhangvi (not to be confused Afghanistan’s Sarobi district. They also Wahhabis among the Pakistani with its founder) gained notoriety trained in the Harkat-ul-Mujahidin population, so the Saudis patronized after they succeeded in killing Iranian (HuM) training camp “Khalid Bin Deobandi parties and groups as their diplomats.11 Their operations did not Walid” in Afghanistan. Among the LJ’s proxies. Nevertheless, none of these come without resistance. For example, leaders, Riaz Basra13 emerged as one of groups were prepared to fight a proxy war the SSP’s founder, Maulana Haq Nawaz the most ruthless terrorist operatives. against Iran in Pakistan. The Saudis were Jhangvi, was gunned down in 1990, He was allegedly responsible for most particularly interested in establishing allegedly by Shi`a militants. Moreover, anti-Shi`a terrorist attacks. Basra was Sunni terrorist infrastructure—such a group of Shi`a militants created their also responsible for making threatening as military training camps—along the own terrorist group in the mid-1990s— phone calls to police officers charged Pakistan-Iran border so that terrorists known as Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan with investigating the LJ’s terrorist could carry out attacks inside Iran to (SMP)—and began retaliating against acts.14 The calls were effective, and incite the Sunni population against the Deobandi Muslims in Pakistan. The police officers became reluctant to Shi`a regime; after conducting attacks, SMP assassinated various Deobandi investigate the LJ’s terrorist acts out they could flee back across the border clerics. of fear of reprisals. When authorities to their sanctuaries in Pakistan. The would interrogate an SSP or LJ terrorist, Saudis even invited some Kashmiri The SSP’s killings of Iranians in Pakistan they concealed their identities with face commanders from Indian-controlled brought tremendous embarrassment and masks to prevent possible LJ retaliation, Kashmir to Saudi Arabia and offered pressure on the Pakistani government. a trend that continues to this day. The them large sums of money to abandon General Zia-ul-Haq had died, and an LJ made it a policy to assassinate police jihad in Kashmir and establish terrorist elected government was in power in officers who investigated terrorist acts or infrastructure in Baluchistan on Islamabad. The Benazir Bhutto-led interrogated their members. One of the the Iranian border.5 None of these government began to apply pressure on most significant of these assassinations commanders, however, accepted the the SSP. The SSP at the time was also was the senior superintendant of police role as a proxy army for the Saudis.6 playing a role in electoral politics and in Gujranwala, Ashraf Marth, who wanted to use parliament to further was gunned down in May 1997 after he The SSP, however, did accept the its agenda. Yet it could not accomplish investigated the LJ’s infrastructure.15 role, and became one of the first this because its involvement in terrorist Investigations into the SSP and LJ were terrorist groups to establish sizeable operations barred it from becoming a halted after his death.16 infrastructure in Baluchistan.7 The legitimate political party. Saudi money gave the SSP a “shot in The SSP continued to kill Shi`a the arm” and allowed it to establish Therefore, during the mid-1990s the Muslims under the name of the LJ terrorist infrastructure.8 As a result, SSP decided to create an underground during the second half of the 1990s.17 terrorist group that would take 3 Personal interviews, Arab diplomats, late 1980s. orders from SSP leaders but operate 12 Personal interviews, SSP leaders, Jhang, Pakistan, 4 One reason for this failure is that Iraqi diplomats were independently. This group became December 2001. Maulana Alam Tariq resurfaced to take sensitive after the Z.A. Bhutto government raided the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. over the leadership of the SSP when his brother was as- Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad in the mid-1970s and uncov- sassinated outside Islamabad. He lost the power struggle, ered arms and ammunition. The weapons were allegedly LJ Splinters from the SSP however, to Maulana Ludhianvi. for Baluch rebels. The Iraqis did not want a replay of the As part of the SSP’s strategy, the LJ was 13 Riaz Basra was killed on May 14, 2002. Lahori suc- same incident. The Saudis, on the other hand, emerged established in the mid-1990s with the ceeded him. as close allies of the Pakistani military, which was man- objective of executing terrorist attacks 14 Many police officers told the author that they had re- aging the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan with U.S. and against Shi`a Muslims and Iranian ceived threatening phone calls from individuals calling Saudi money. nationals. Its early leaders included Riaz from public phones and claiming to be Riaz Basra. 5 Personal interview, Kashmiri Salafi-jihadi commander Basra, Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaq. 15 Ashraf Marth was gunned down in the city of Gujran- who had participated in several discussions with Saudis, The real leader of the group, however, wala as he came out of his official residence to go to his September 17, 2000. office. 6 Ibid. istan, April 1990. 16 Personal interview, senior police officer who investi- 7 During visits to Baluchistan since the mid-1980s, the 9 These incidents were widely reported in the Pakistani gated the murder, Islamabad, Pakistan, July 2003. author observed that the SSP had a visible presence in media during the time. 17 The SSP never claimed responsibility for these kill- most villages along the Pakistan-Iran border. One of the 10 Riaz Basra was involved in hundreds of sectarian ter- ings; the purpose of creating the LJ was so that the SSP SSP’s favorite tactics was to write anti-Shi`a and anti- rorist attacks, including the murder of Iranian diplomat could deny involvement in terrorist attacks. This infor- Iran graffiti on the trains that went in and out of Iran. Sadiq Ganji in December 1990. mation is based on the author’s various interviews and 8 Personal interviews, Arab diplomats, Islamabad, Pak- 11 Ibid. investigations into the SSP and LJ.

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To gain resources from the Pakistani Minister Nawaz Sharif’s efforts to rein in his crucial vote in favor of General military, the SSP/LJ also joined the terrorists, Musharraf’s interior minister, Musharraf’s candidate for the office of jihad in Kashmir. The date of this Lt. General Moinuddin Haider, visited prime minister, Mir Zafarullah Jamali, decision is not known, but according Afghanistan in March 2001 to extradite who won by one vote. Later, Maulana to one interview the LJ had lost more some LJ terrorists back to Pakistan. Tariq boasted that only his support than 100 fighters in the Kashmir The refused. They also refused sustained General Musharraf’s prime conflict by the late 1990s.18 By joining to sign any extradition treaty with minister in power. When Member of the jihad in Kashmir, SSP/LJ militants the National Assembly Maulana Azam received significant military training “The post-9/11 situation Tariq was assassinated in October 2003 and expertise from different Deobandi just outside Islamabad, the Musharraf terrorist groups, particularly from forced the SSP/LJ and regime refused to support another Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam and Jaysh-i- other Deobandi jihadist SSP candidate in the by-elections; Muhammad. These factors raised the it was exasperated with the group’s profile of the SSP/LJ significantly and groups to forge closer blackmailing. the group curried favor with Pakistan’s cooperation.” military establishment.19 Post-9/11 Period In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks Post-Coup Period on September 11, the LJ faced another General Pervez Musharraf’s October Pakistan. This came as a surprise to the dilemma: whether or not to support 1999 military coup posed one of the military; they expected the Taliban to be General Musharraf’s decision to join the biggest challenges to the SSP/LJ. more compliant considering they helped United States in its “war on terrorism.” The organization was faced with the install the regime to power in Kabul. Like most jihadist groups, the LJ decision of continuing to kill Shi`a hardliners led by Basra again chose to Muslims, which would have destabilized The links between the SSP and the LJ oppose General Musharraf’s decision. Musharraf’s military regime, or remain once again came into the open when The hardliners in other Deobandi peaceful under the new government. the SSP ran a campaign in February jihadist groups such as Harkat-ul- 2001 to save LJ terrorist Shaykh Haq Jihad-al-Islam, Jaysh-i-Muhammad, The hardliners such as the LJ’s Basra— Nawaz Jhangvi, who was to be hanged and Harkat-ul-Mujahidin also opposed even though they supported the military for murdering an Iranian diplomat. the Pakistani military. coup—wanted to continue their mission Jhangvi confessed to the crime in spite of killing Shi`a in Pakistan. A smaller of pressure by the SSP to plead “not The post-9/11 situation forced the SSP/ group led by the LJ’s Qari Abdul Hayye guilty.” Jhangvi refused to lie before the LJ and other Deobandi jihadist groups wanted to restrain their sectarian court and was hanged. The SSP resorted to forge closer cooperation, such as in violence to achieve their larger interests to widespread violence across the the killing of the Wall Street Journal’s Daniel of building an organization that could country, with SSP workers storming the Pearl.21 The unity among Deobandi eventually take power in the country streets in several urban centers. They terrorist groups led to unprecedented by cooperating with the military. These destroyed public and private property. violence in Pakistan. Most terrorist acts differences caused a split in the group in in Pakistan since 9/11 have been carried 2000. One faction was led by hardliner Despite this violence, relations between out by Deobandi or quasi-Deobandi Riaz Basra. The other, more moderate the Musharraf regime and the SSP terrorist groups, together or alone, but faction was led by Qari Abdul Hayye remained positive. The Musharraf the LJ has almost always been blamed. (also known as Qari Asadullah, or regime, for example, rewarded the SSP Talha), who was the amir of the training by helping to elect SSP chief Maulana If the government were to blame camp at Sarobi. Azam Tariq to the National Assembly jihadist groups such as Harkat-ul- in the 2002 elections.20 Maulana Jihad-al-Islam and Jaysh-i-Muhammad The Basra group maintained the policy Tariq returned the favor by casting for violence in Pakistan, it would bring of killing Shi`a even after General a bad name to the jihad in Kashmir, and Musharraf took power. Government 20 The 2002 general elections were rigged and ma- eventually discredit the government’s support, however, was not forthcoming. nipulated in several ways, before and during the elec- often-used policy of using jihadists The killings of Shi`a in the early toral process, to bring in Islamists to counter the demo- as an instrument of policy. It is much period of General Musharraf’s regime cratic political forces, particularly the Pakistan Muslim easier for the Pakistani government to destabilized the government, and it League (Nawaz) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). scapegoat the LJ for most terrorist acts ultimately cracked down on the LJ’s Although General Musharraf’s regime had formally in Pakistan outside of the tribal areas. activities. In what was a replay of Prime banned the SSP and LJ before the 2002 general elections, the group was allowed to function freely under a differ- 18 Personal interview, an SSP leader, , Paki- ent name. As the democratic candidates were disquali- 21 A prominent case of cooperation among Deobandi ter- stan, April 2001. fied to run for elections, Islamists were encouraged to rorist groups was the kidnapping and murder of Wall 19 Since the 1970s, the military has used various Isla- unite and replace them. The bulk of the Islamists were Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl. Terrorists from mist groups to achieve political goals, and in this case the elected under the umbrella of Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal several groups were involved in the operation. Along military used militant Islamist parties to destabilize the (MMA). The SSP refused to join the MMA and decided with Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam and Jaysh-i-Muhammad democratically-elected government of Prime Minister to contest elections as a separate party and sent Maulana terrorists, Qari Ataur Rehman (also known as Naeem Nawaz Sharif in the post-Kargil period. Azam Tariq to parliament. Bukhari) of the LJ was implicated in Pearl’s murder.

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From the LJ to the TTP The Failure of Salafi-Jihadi terrorist plots in the Levant, it does not Today, the LJ is still involved in terrorist appear responsible or interested in the attacks in Pakistan. Little is known Insurgent Movements in few Islamist insurgent movements that about the group’s current activities, and the Levant have arisen in the region.5 it is not completely clear how the two factions of the LJ—the Basra group and By Bilal Y. Saab This article assesses why the Levant the Qari Hayye group—have evolved. has been a less attractive place for Both factions likely still exist, although it is remarkable that the Levant, a global Salafi-jihadis and a more different leaders are in charge. The sub-region plagued by internal and challenging environment for them to Basra group, for example, is now part external crisis conditions that are mobilize and conduct operations. It of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and generally conducive to terrorism and attributes these failures to the existence contributes to its jihadist operations. LJ political violence, has been free from of well-established mainstream Islamic operatives probably help facilitate the any insurgent1 Islamist group with movements in the Levant that see the TTP’s terrorist acts in Punjab Province, verifiable material ties to al-Qa`ida’s violent and extreme Salafi-jihadis where the LT/SSP has an established central leadership.2 The two ambitious as a threat to their interests; the base.22 attempts by Arab Salafi-jihadis to create distinct historical and socio-political insurgent forces in the Levant occurred circumstances in the Levant that make it In fact, a similar paradigm is now in Lebanon in May-September 2007 less hospitable to Salafi-jihadi ideology; occurring with the TTP. The Pakistani when Fatah al-Islam3 violently emerged the relative success of the region’s government blames the TTP for nearly in the northern part of the country, and security and intelligence services to every terrorist attack in Pakistan, some on August 15, 2009 in Gaza when Jund prevent the Salafi-jihadi threat from of which likely had little to do with the Ansar Allah4 declared war on Hamas. inflating; the subduing effect of Iran’s organization. Yet just like the LJ, it is These two attempts sought to radically dominant influence in the Levant; and easy to scapegoat the TTP rather than change the existing socio-political finally the lack of material support from reveal the true extent of jihadist violence orders in Lebanon and Gaza through the al-Qa`ida’s central leadership to Salafi- in Pakistan and the many groups and use of religiously-inspired insurgent jihadi insurgent groups in the region. actors involved. violence. Both attempts failed, however. Although al-Qa`ida has been tied to Al-Qa`ida’s Lack of Allies in the Levant Arif Jamal is a visiting scholar at New York Other than Jund al-Sham6 and Fatah al- University and author of Shadow War: Islam (and the now crushed Jund Ansar The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir. 1 The emphasis on the word “insurgent” is deliber- Allah), al-Qa`ida does not have allies ate and used to differentiate from the word “terrorist.” in the Levant that could effectively While there are a number of analytical and practical dif- help project its influence and ideology ferences between an insurgent group (or insurgencies) into the region and to serve its various and a terrorist group (or cell), this article only focuses on strategic objectives.7 four: one, insurgent groups enjoy a certain level of sup- port from a segment of society, whereas terrorist groups Jund al-Sham’s lack of organizational usually work alone and do not need indigenous sup- coherence, discipline, and fighting port; two, insurgent groups are usually bigger and bet- capabilities make it an unreliable partner ter armed than terrorist groups; three, insurgent groups for al-Qa`ida in the Levant.8 Far from work overtly, whereas terrorist groups operate most ef- fectively in a clandestine fashion; four, insurgent groups 5 No hard evidence on direct material ties between these find it essential to seize territory for the realization of two groups and al-Qa`ida’s central leadership has ever their revolutionary objectives, while terrorist groups emerged, even though they appear to share the same generally do not. ideological agenda. 2 Very few comprehensive studies have been written on 6 Jund al-Sham is a title claimed by several Sunni Islamic al-Qa`ida’s presence and influence in the Levant. For a extremist entities, all or none of which may be connected. commendable paper on the subject, see Hassan Mneim- These entities mostly operate in Lebanon, Syria and Jor- neh, The Jihadist International: Al-Qa`ida’s Advance in the dan, and their goals include the establishment of an Is- Levant (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Insti- lamic throughout the Levant. tute, April 8, 2009). 7 For instance, without the Taliban in Pakistan and 3 Fatah al-Islam is a militant Sunni Islamist group that Afghanistan or the Salafist Group for Preaching and is inspired by al-Qa`ida’s ideology. Its members are Combat in Algeria, al-Qa`ida would have found it ex- mostly Arabs from various Middle Eastern countries. It tremely difficult, if not impossible, to expand and oper- emerged in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp ate in South Asia or the Maghreb. More examples where in Lebanon in November 2006. Its goals are unclear but al-Qa`ida relied on local support to expand its influence include the establishment of an Islamic state in northern and pursue its goals in various regions around the world Lebanon. include al-Shabab in Somalia, al-Qa`ida in Iraq, and the 4 Jund Ansar Allah was founded in southern Gaza in Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines. November 2008 as an armed Sunni Islamist group with 8 There are three groups—Hizb al-Tahrir, Jaysh al-Is- 22 Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Net- strong Salafi-jihadi credentials. Its goals include the es- lam, and Jaysh al-Umma—in the Palestinian Territories work,” CTC Sentinel 2:4 (2009). tablishment of an Islamic state in Gaza. that claim to be inspired by al-Qa`ida’s ideology, but they

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