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Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at Its 83Rd Session, 19–23 November 2018

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Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at Its 83Rd Session, 19–23 November 2018 A/HRC/WGAD/2018/79 Advance Edited Version Distr.: General 13 February 2019 Original: English Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its 83rd session, 19–23 November 2018 Opinion No. 79/2018 concerning Husain Ebrahim Ali Husain Marzooq, Husain Abdulla Juma Maki Mohamed, Jalila Sayed Ameen Jawad Mohamed Shubbar, Mohamed Ahmed Ali Hasan Mohsen and Hameed Abdulla Hasan al-Daqqaq (Bahrain) 1. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established in resolution 1991/42 of the Commission on Human Rights. In its resolution 1997/50, the Commission extended and clarified the mandate of the Working Group. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/251 and Human Rights Council decision 1/102, the Council assumed the mandate of the Commission. The Council most recently extended the mandate of the Working Group for a three-year period in its resolution 33/30. 2. In accordance with its methods of work (A/HRC/36/38), on 24 May 2018 the Working Group transmitted to the Government of Bahrain a communication concerning Husain Ebrahim Ali Husain Marzooq, Husain Abdulla Juma Maki Mohamed, Jalila Sayed Ameen Jawad Mohamed Shubbar, Mohamed Ahmed Ali Hasan Mohsen and Hameed Abdulla Hasan al-Daqqaq. The Government replied to the communication on 23 July 2018. The State is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 3. The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases: (a) When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him or her) (category I); (b) When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, insofar as States parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26 and 27 of the Covenant (category II); (c) When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III); (d) When asylum seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy (category IV); (e) When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law on the grounds of discrimination based on birth, national, ethnic or social origin, language, religion, economic condition, political or other opinion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, A/HRC/WGAD/2018/79 or any other status, that aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human beings (category V). Submissions Communication from the source 4. The source submits the cases of five individuals, which allegedly demonstrate a recent pattern of arbitrary detentions in Bahrain. Allegations concerning Husain Ebrahim Ali Husain Marzooq 5. Mr. Marzooq was born in 1990. He has a degree in accounting. Before his arrest and detention, he worked in the administrative department of his brother’s private construction contracting company. 6. According to the information received, on 31 June 2016, officers in plain clothes and members of the Criminal Investigation Directorate raided Mr. Marzooq’s house without a search warrant. Concealing their identities, the officers searched Mr. Marzooq’s bedroom on the second floor and reportedly confiscated his belongings, including clothes and a laptop. Several other houses were raided in a similar way, under suspicion that Mr. Marzooq was in one of them. For four consecutive days, members of the Directorate returned to Mr. Marzooq’s house without a warrant. 7. The source reports that, on 10 July 2016, around 1 p.m., Criminal Investigation Directorate officers arrested Mr. Marzooq at his friend’s house in Hamad Town, along with other young men who were also in the house. The authorities did not provide reasons for the arrest and did not produce an arrest warrant. Mr. Marzooq’s family has no information about what happened during the arrest. Family members were not able to ask him about the arrest when they visited. They saw him wearing shackles at the Al-Qalaa clinic around 3 p.m. the same day, barely able to walk. The source alleges that Mr. Marzooq was not brought promptly before a judge after his arrest. 8. The source claims that during his interrogation, which took place without the presence of his lawyer, officers tortured Mr. Marzooq to force him to sign a false confession. It is alleged that officers subjected him to electric shock and threatened him with further torture if he did not sign a confession. He was charged with 12 crimes, including being involved in a bombing that killed a teacher; the possession of explosives and weapons; communication and conspiracy with a foreign country; and receiving training from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 9. According to the source, there are conflicting reports regarding the events that led to Mr. Marzooq’s charges. According to one version of events, on 30 June 2016, a teacher was shot and killed in her car, with her children present. However, the Ministry of the Interior reportedly announced later that there had been a bombing on Sheikh Jaber Street in which the teacher was killed. The incident happened near the residence of Mr. Marzooq. 10. Mr. Marzooq allegedly met with his lawyer for the first time after the investigations had already been completed, two weeks into his detention at Dry Dock Detention Centre. All the contacts he had with his lawyer were monitored by the authorities. The source submits that Mr. Marzooq did not have effective access to legal assistance. As a consequence, it is claimed that Mr. Marzooq did not have the opportunity to prepare an adequate defence for his trial. 11. The source reports that, during the trial, witnesses confirmed that Mr. Marzooq was not present at the crime scene. His lawyer showed videos proving his innocence. The defence also referred to footage from public security cameras that could demonstrate Mr. Marzooq’s innocence. However, these videos were used against him by the prosecution, who only showed short excerpts. The defence then made multiple requests for the whole footage to be released, but the Court rejected these requests. The source also reports that the confessions made by Mr. Marzooq under duress were used against him during his trial. 12. According to the source, on 19 June 2017, Mr. Marzooq was sentenced to death and stripped of his nationality. His appeal was rejected and the original sentence was upheld on 2 A/HRC/WGAD/2018/79 22 November 2017. On 26 February 2018, the Court of Cassation also upheld the original sentence. It is reported that Mr. Marzooq is currently detained in the Jau prison in AlAzel Building. He has exhausted all domestic remedies, and his execution is imminent. 13. The source argues that, because Mr. Marzooq was arrested without a warrant, in violation of Bahraini law, 1 did not have access to effective legal assistance and was unable to defend himself, and because he was tortured to obtain a confession, his right to a fair trial under article 14 of the Covenant was violated, rendering his detention arbitrary under category III. The Bahraini authorities’ behaviour was also contrary to principle 9 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, which states that the authorities that arrest a person, keep him or her under detention or investigate the case are to exercise only the powers granted to them under the law. Furthermore, if severe physical pain was intentionally inflicted to obtain Mr. Marzooq’s confession, Bahrain is in violation of its obligations under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and if the confession thus obtained was used to convict Mr. Marzooq he was subjected to an unfair trial. Allegations concerning Husain Abdulla Juma Maki Mohamed 14. Mr. Mohamed, born in 1995, was unemployed at the time of his arrest. 15. The source indicates that, on 10 November 2015, approximately 20 riot police officers, along with other officers from the Ministry of the Interior, raided Mr. Mohamed’s house. They searched the house and arrested him, without presenting warrants or providing reasons for either the search or the arrest. It is alleged that Mr. Mohamed was not brought promptly before a judge. 16. Reportedly, officers took Mr. Mohamed to the Criminal Investigation Directorate for interrogation. Mr. Mohamed was able to call his family the next day; however, the call was cut short and only lasted for several seconds. During the two months that he was held by the Criminal Investigation Directorate, it is alleged that Directorate officers tortured him, by insulting him, beating him and subjecting him to electric shocks. The family had no knowledge of Mr. Mohamed’s whereabouts for a month after his arrest. The authorities also prohibited anyone, including Mr. Mohamed’s lawyer, from visiting him during his detention. The source states that Mr. Mohamed had no access to legal assistance and, therefore, could not effectively prepare his defence for trial. 17. According to the source, Mr. Mohamed’s family has submitted three complaints to the Ministry of the Interior since 2015 concerning his arrest, incommunicado detention, torture and denial of medical care. The Ombudsman, located within the Ministry of the Interior, has not responded to the complaints.
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