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The Aftermath of 7 July 2005: New Trends in Terrorism

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The Aftermath of 7 July 2005: New Trends in Terrorism The Aftermath of 7 July 2005: New Trends in Terrorism Michael Whine* The multiple bombings in London on 7 July 2005 demonstrated the emer- gence of new trends in terrorism that had also started to manifest themselves elsewhere, most notably in Australia and the United States. The first is that of the self-recruited group, composed of nationals of the target country, who draw inspiration from, but may not necessarily be under the direct operational control of, al-Qaeda. The group calling itself Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh, currently on trial in Los Angeles, is an example of this. This body of self-recruited Islamists allegedly led by an inmate at California State Prison, Sacramento, were apprehended before committing multiple bomb attacks on military recruitment centres and bases, the Israeli consulate and local synagogues.1 The Abu Bakr Group, named after its leader Abdul Nacir Benbrika, appre- hended on 8 November 2005 in Sydney and Melbourne, appears to have been another.2 The Samir Azzouz group, apprehended in Brussels, and the group * Michael Whine, Community Security Trust. 1 For useful analyses of the self-recruitment process, see, for example, ‘Between al- Andalus and a failing integration: Europe’s pursuit of a long-term counterterrorism strategy in the post-al-Qaeda era’, Egmont Paper No. 5, Royal Institute for Interna- tional Relations (IRRI-KIIB) Brussels (May 2005); ‘Radicalisation tendencies’, Annual Report of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (2004); Magnus Ran- storp, ‘Al Qa’ida – An Expanded Global Network of Terror’, RUSI Journal (June 2005); Fidel Sendagorta, ‘Jihad in Europe: The Wider Context’, 47(3) Survival (2005); ‘The Jihad: Change and Continuation’, 11(7) IISS Strategic Comments (2005). 2 Tracey Bowdon, ‘Pre-dawn raids net terrorism suspects’, The 7.30 Report, Aus- tralian Broadcasting Corporation, broadcast 8 November 2005, available at: <http:// www.abc.net.am/7.30/content/2005/s1500243.htm>; ‘Terrorism suspects to remain in high security prisons’, ABC Online (12 November 2005), available at: <http://www.abc. 107 108 MICHAEL WHINE arrested in Holland in early October 2005 appear to be connected to the Maghreb and to Abu Musab al Zarkawi.3 From what we know about the first group of London bombers, they all seem to have been recruited in the United Kingdom, but two of them possibly trained in Pakistan. Mohammad Sidique Khan, the eldest of the bombers, was almost certainly the organiser and the controller of the others. He is known to have been a figurehead for local young Muslims from his regular visits to Islamic bookshops, local madrasas and, most crucially, the classes he organ- ised in the basement gymnasium of a mosque in the Beeston area of Leeds. He is said to have met two of the others, Shehzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain, up to five years previously and may have enlisted them at some point since then. The parents of Tanweer and Hussain told the press that their sons had come under the influence of a mysterious ‘Mr K’ – almost certainly Khan.4 In November 2004, Khan and Tanweer travelled to Pakistan and stayed there for three months, returning to Britain in February 2005.5 According to testimony given to the US authorities by Mohammed Junaid Babar, a Pakistani American computer expert who was arrested following a visit to Pakistan and who has since allegedly admitted his involvement as a planner for al-Qaeda, Khan attended a terror planning meeting in Waziristan on the Pakistan-Afghan border sometime in late 2004. It has also been claimed that Khan met Hambali and other leaders of the Jemaah Islamiah in Malaysia and the Philippines in 2001.6 Yet another report notes that an earlier planning meeting took place in March in the same region, at which the chief matter of business was plans to net.au/news/newsitems/200511/s1505105.htm>; Roger Maynard, ‘Australian police foil “catastrophic” attack and seize 17’, Times Online (19 November 2005), available at: <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1864033,00html>. 3 ‘Counterterrorism Chief: suspected French terror cell had links to al-Zarkawi’, Associated Press, 14 October 2005, quoted in SITE Institute Bulletin. 4 Raymond Whitaker, Francis Elliot, Sophie Goodchild and Paul Lashmar, ‘Circles of hate: Why the search for the London bombers is still far from over’, The Independent on Sunday (31 July 2005). 5 Francis Elliot, Raymond Whitaker, Paul Lashmar and Severin Casell, ‘Revealed: British bomber had links with al-Qa’ida’, The Independent (17 July 2005), available at: <http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article299680.ece>. 6 ‘7 July bomber filmed last year’, BBC Online, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 1/hi/uk/ 4375598.stm>. .
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