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Mapping the Jihadist Threat: the War on Terror Since 9/11
Campbell • Darsie Mapping the Jihadist Threat A Report of the Aspen Strategy Group 06-016 imeless ideas and values,imeless ideas contemporary dialogue on and open-minded issues. t per understanding in a nonpartisanper understanding and non-ideological setting. f e o e he mission ofhe mission enlightened leadership, foster is to Institute Aspen the d n T io ciat e r p Through seminars, policy programs, initiatives, development and leadership conferences the Institute and its international partners seek to promote the pursuit of the pursuit partners and its international promote seek to the Institute and ground common the ap Mapping the Jihadist Threat: The War on Terror Since 9/11 A Report of the Aspen Strategy Group Kurt M. Campbell, Editor Willow Darsie, Editor u Co-Chairmen Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Brent Scowcroft To obtain additional copies of this report, please contact: The Aspen Institute Fulfillment Office P.O. Box 222 109 Houghton Lab Lane Queenstown, Maryland 21658 Phone: (410) 820-5338 Fax: (410) 827-9174 E-mail: [email protected] For all other inquiries, please contact: The Aspen Institute Aspen Strategy Group Suite 700 One Dupont Circle, NW Washington, DC 20036 Phone: (202) 736-5800 Fax: (202) 467-0790 Copyright © 2006 The Aspen Institute Published in the United States of America 2006 by The Aspen Institute All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 0-89843-456-4 Inv No.: 06-016 CONTENTS DISCUSSANTS AND GUEST EXPERTS . 1 AGENDA . 5 WORKSHOP SCENE SETTER AND DISCUSSION GUIDE Kurt M. Campbell Aspen Strategy Group Workshop August 5-10, 2005 . -
AWAN Tres ABBAS
M426 - ABBAS TEXT M/UP 18/5/06 11:40 AM Page 207 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gary's Jo CHAPTER 15 Transitional Religiosity Experiences: Contextual Disjuncture and Islamic Political Radicalism Akil N. Awan On 7 July 2005, four young indigenous British Muslims, three of Pakistani provenance and the fourth a Jamaican convert to Islam, became Britain’s first domestic suicide bombers. A fortnight later, eliciting an unsettling sense of déjà-vu, a second abortive wave of attacks on the London transport network followed, the culprits this time being British asylum seekers hailing from the troubled horn of Africa. These ‘martyrdom operations’ (as they are alluded to in the idiom of Islamist- Jihadist discourse), until now, only experienced vicariously through theatres of conflict such as Iraq and Israel, shocked us all, leaving many of us reeling at the prospect of this new threat posed by a small (but as of yet unknown) propor- tion of Britain’s 1.6 million-strong Muslim community. The events of July 2005 were exceptional only in the sense that this was the first time British Muslims had perpetrated terrorist acts of this magnitude on home soil; however, they were not entirely without precedent. British Muslims have been drawn to radical Islamism in the past and have included, inter alia, Richard Reid, the ‘shoe bomber’ of December 2001; the five members of the ‘Tipton Taliban’ captured by coalition forces in Afghanistan in January 2002; Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, responsible for conveying US journalist Daniel Pearl to his death in Pakistan in February 2002; the group of Britons granted asylum from North African who were responsible for a failed chemical attack on the London Underground in November 2002; Asif Mohammed Hanif and Omar Khan Sharif, who con- ducted suicide bomb attacks in Tel Aviv in May 2003; and eight British Pakistanis from Luton, who were found to be in possession of a large quantity of explosive material in March 2004. -
Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7Th July 2005
Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 HC 1087 Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 11th May 2006 for the Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 11th May 2006 HC 1087 London: The Stationery Office £8.50 Contents Preface Page 1 The morning of 7 July Page 2 The immediate aftermath Page 7 Why did they do it? Page 13 Were they directed from abroad? Page 20 How did they do it? Page 22 Conclusion Page 26 Annex A Page 28 The evolution of the modern international terrorist threat Annex B Page 31 Radicalisation in context Annex C Page 33 Timeline of the evolution of the modern international terrorist threat Annex D Page 36 Timeline of the four individuals PREFACE The 7 July bombings were an act of indiscriminate terror. They killed and maimed the old and the young; Britons and non-Britons; Christians, Muslims, Jews, those of other religions and none. The authors of this account extend their deepest condolences to the bereaved, sympathy to the injured and admiration to them and others involved in the rescue efforts and wider response. Ten months on, Londoners and those who visit London have shown their resilience by calmly continuing with their lives as before. This narrative summarises what the police, intelligence and security agencies have so far discovered about the bombers and how and why they came to do what they did. -
Al Qaeda’S Command- And-Control Structure
Testimony of Steven Emerson Before the United States House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence April 9, 2008 Steven Emerson Executive Director Investigative Project on Terrorism www.investigativeproject.org email:[email protected] Introduction: The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan was successful in obliterating much of al Qaeda’s command- and-control structure. Due to a robust and successful counter-terrorist policy made up of good intelligence gathered by the FBI, asset forfeitures and designations by the Department of the Treasury, and other good work by the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies within the intelligence community, the U,S. has fortunately not been hit with another attack since 9-11. Moreover, in the six and a half years since the those horrible, al Qaeda’s direct orchestration of acts of terrorism on the operational level has been somewhat constrained. This is not to say that al Qaeda has not been involved in terrorist attacks and plots since 2001 (training and guidance provided by al Qaeda in the 2005 London transit bombings and foiled 2006 Heathrow plot prove otherwise), but the group’s leaders have relied largely on the power of self- anointed franchises and recognized the power of spreading its message and ideology via the Internet. Extremist Muslims throughout the world have responded to this message and have sought to execute a number of attacks. While most have been stopped, some have been successful, killing hundreds and injuring thousands more, resulting in propaganda coups for al Qaeda and its leadership. Parallel to franchising the al Qaeda ideology, the group has successfully regenerated its operational capabilities in the sanctuary of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. -
For Caliph and Country Exploring How British Jihadis Join a Global Movement
For Caliph and Country Exploring how British jihadis join a global movement RACHEL BRYSON 1 2 Contents Executive Summary 5 Policy Recommendations 9 Findings British Jihadis in a Global Network 13 Trends Among British Jihadis 23 Appendix Methodology 34 Note Research for this report was conducted in November and December 2016 and then subsequently analysed. 3 4 1.0 Executive Summary This report explores what connects jihadis from across the UK and how they made their journey into jihadism. For more than 30 years, British jihadis have been fighting under the banner of an extreme Islamist ideology in conflicts from Algeria to the Philippines. For half of that time, the streets of the UK have been seen as a legitimate target, as witnessed most recently in both London and Manchester. Ideologues made their home in Britain, having been rejected from Muslim-majority countries because the ideas they expounded were considered dangerous. From the UK, they influenced many. In the last five years, the conflict in Syria alone has attracted over 800 British fighters.1 1 “Who are Britain’s Jihadists?”, BBC News, 10 October 2016. www. bbc.co.uk/news/uk-32026985. 55 Their ideology justifies the use of violent jihad to Our sample was diverse – from the very wealthy achieve its aims. Its proponents believe in imposing to the very poor; those raised in Muslim households to their interpretation of Islam on others as state law, with converts; ‘straight-laced,’ straight-A students, to drug no tolerance for alternatives. They believe in brutally dealers – but there were some significant trends that punishing apostates and subjugating women. -
Critical Reflection on the Explanation of Western Homegrown Religious Terrorism (Part II) by Lorne Dawson
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 15, Issue 2 Bringing Religiosity Back In: Critical Reflection on the Explanation of Western Homegrown Religious Terrorism (Part II) By Lorne Dawson Abstract An unusual feature of the social scientific study of religious terrorism is the erasure of religiosity as a significant motivational factor. This article delineates and criticizes the presence of this peculiar interpretive preference, demonstrating that it is methodologically unsound and theoretically and empirically unhelpful. In Part I of the article, published by the same author under the same title in the February 2021 issue of Perspectives on Terrorism, the foundations of the critique were established. In this article, Part II, three types of arguments commonly used to minimize the role of religiosity in motivating religious terrorism are examined. These arguments are identified by the primary interpretive errors they rely on. Some arguments (1) mistakenly treat the religious background and knowledge of homegrown jihadists as a sound indicator of their religiosity; others (2) inappropriately apply a modern Western normative conception of religion to homegrown jihadists; and some arguments (3) rely on an overly dichotomized conception of the relationship of social processes and ideology in the process of radicalization. The critique argues the need to develop a more refined conception of the role of ideology, and more specifically religiosity, in the determination of the actions of religious terrorists. Keywords: Al-Qaeda, extremism, ideology, Islamic State (IS), jihadism, radicalization, religion, religious terrorism, salafism Introduction Is the primary motivation for religious terrorism political or religious? This issue continues to be a source of controversy in the study of religious terrorism. -
A Linguistic Turn of Terrorism Studies Jørgen Staun DIIS Working Paper
A Linguistic Turn of Terrorism Studies Jørgen Staun DIIS Working Paper 2009:02 JØRGEN STAUN PhD, Project Researcher, DIIS www.diis.dk/jst - [email protected] DIIS WORKING PAPER 2009:01 © Copenhagen 2009 Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark Ph: +45 32 69 87 87 Fax: +45 32 69 87 00 E-mails: [email protected] Web: www.diis.dk Cover Design: Carsten Schiøler Layout: Mikkel Krak Printed in Denmark by Vesterkopi as ISBN: 978-87-7605-302-4 Price: DKK 25.00 (VAT included) DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge from www.diis.dk DIIS WORKING PAPER 2009:02 CONTENTS Introduction 3 Culture and terrorism 4 State of art 5 Radicalisation is a process of securitization 7 The prominence of language 8 Terror is a mode of communication 10 Terror is what is defined as being terror 11 Speech acts – an institutional approach to language-games 13 Communication-links 14 The importance of text 15 Literature 16 1 DIIS WORKING PAPER 2009:02 2 DIIS WORKING PAPER 2009:02 INTRODUCTION did he and his fellow bombers, Tanweer, “Your democratically elected governments continu- Hussain and Lindsay, all second generation ously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over British nationals, seemingly well integrated the world. And your support of them makes you di- and normal British youths, decide to be- rectly responsible, just as I am directly responsible come, what Khan describes as “soldiers” for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and give up their own lives and altogether and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our kill 56 and wound over 700 people on that targets. -
Chapter 20 the Role of Intelligence in the Prevention of Terrorism (Early
Chapter 20 The Role of Intelligence in the Prevention of Terrorism (Early Warning – Early Response) Kenneth A. Duncan This chapter outlines how intelligence has adapted to the ever-changing threat of terrorism, and the crucial role “warning” has played and will continue to play in countering and mitigating this threat. To better understand warning’s capabilities and limitations, it also explores the nature of intelligence as well as the factors underlying warning’s collection, analysis, production, dissemination, and reception. It traces the relationship between intelligence and law enforcement agencies as it evolved as part of the US government’s organizational response to terrorism from the late 1960s onward, highlighting both its strengths and weaknesses. Finally, it discusses problems arising from the often-troubled relationship between intelligence producers and consumers – from policymakers to the general public – which can lead to obstacles in turning an early warning into an early response. Keywords: 9/11, early warning, homeland security, intelligence, prevention, public warning, TIPOFF, United States. HANDBOOK OF TERRORISM PREVENTON AND PREPAREDNESS 645 “The terrorism threat is constantly evolving in response to social, political, and technological change, as well as adapting in response to counterterrorism pressure’. Daniel Byman 1 Introduction: Understanding Intelligence At the main entrance to CIA’s headquarters building in Langley, Virginia. is an inscription from the Gospel of St. John: “The truth shall make you free,” which reflects Intelligence Officers’ belief that their role is to “speak truth to power.” But contrary to this common view regarding intelligence assessments, nothing could be further from the truth. Intelligence and warning are not about the objective truth at all. -
Inside the Crevice
Inside the Crevice Islamist terror networks and the 7/7 intelligence failure PARLIAMENTARY BRIEFING PAPER Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed August 2007 © INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT Suite 301, 20 Harewood Avenue, London, NW1 6JX www.globalcrisis.org.uk Sponsored by Garden Court Chambers 57- 60 Lincoln’s Inn Fields, London WC2A www.gardencourtchambers.co.uk THE IPRD The Institute for Policy Research & Development (IPRD) is an independent think- tank for interdisciplinary security studies, analyzing international terrorism, military interventions, as well as national and international conflicts, in the context of global ecological, energy and economic crises. Founded in April 2001 in Brighton, a UN “Peace Messenger” City for 20 years, the Institute now runs from the heart of London as an informal, non-profit international network of specialist scholars, experts and analysts. The opinions published by the Institute do not necessarily represent those of the members of the IPRD Board. IPRD International Academic Advisory Board Dr M Shahid Alam , Professor, Department of Economics, Northeastern University, Boston Dr Ruth Blakeley , Lecturer, Department of Politics & International Relations, University of Kent Dr Brett Bowden , Research Fellow, Centre for International Governance & Justice, Australian National University; former Lecturer in Political Science, Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales Dr Johan Galtung , Professor of Peace Studies, University of Hawaii; founder, Journal of Peace Research and International -
Social Implications of Fearing Terrorism. a Report on Australian Responses to the Images
Edith Cowan University Research Online "Exploding Media Myths : Misrepresenting Australia?" - Forum Conferences, Symposia and Campus Events 2009 Social Implications of Fearing Terrorism. A report on Australian responses to the images Anne Aly Edith Cowan University Lelia Green Edith Cowan University Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/cexplodingmyth Part of the Communication Technology and New Media Commons This Report is posted at Research Online. https://ro.ecu.edu.au/cexplodingmyth/1 Social implications of fearing terrorism. A report on Australian responses to the images and discourses of terrorism and the other: Establishing a metric of fear An Australian Research Council Discovery Project Incorporating the recommendations of a community workshop held at UNSW in November 2008 Published by: Edith Cowan University 2 Bradford Street, Mt Lawley, Western Australia, 6050 Editors: Dr Anne Aly Professor Lelia Green Professor Mark Balnaves Copyright © 2009 Anne Aly and Lelia Green All rights reserved ISBN: 978-0-7298-0683-1 A website containing publications arising from this project can be accessed at: www.explodingmediamyths.org.au/publications.html This research was supported under Australian Research Council's Discovery Projects funding scheme (project DP0559707). The views expressed herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Australian Research Council. Contents FOREWARD EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ -
100 Islamic Radicalism in Britain Isaac Kfir* Dame Eliza Manningham
Islamic Radicalism in Britain Isaac Kfir* Abstract The paper explores some of the reasons behind the rise in Islamic radicalism in the United Kingdom. The author seeks to suggest some ideas as to how the government and British society best deal with this worrying trend. Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller announcement that the British security services are stretched to the limit in dealing with Islamic terror plots emphasised the great challenge of combating Islamist 1 militancy in the UK. Dame Manningham-Buller, the head of MI5, claimed that her organisation has identified 200 terrorist networks involving at least 1,600 people and 30 “Priority 1” plots to kill. It followed a statement by a senior Foreign Office counter-terrorism expert who when asked if al-Qa’ida was seeking nuclear technology to attack the West and Britain replied “No doubt at all… We know the aspiration is there, we know the attempt to get material is there, we know the attempt to get technology is there.” 2 Sir Ian Blair, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, commenting on the transatlantic airline bomb plot stated that "the apparent speed with which young, reasonably affluent, some reasonably well educated British-born people” became not only radicalise but also willing to commit mass murders through suicide attacks in worrying.3 Significantly Manningham-Buller made it clear Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No.3&4, Fall & Winter 2007 100 that due to the nature of al-Qa'ida, the challenge faced by the security forces is substantial as seen with the Barot case, where the plot maybe forged in one part of the globe, approved in another and executed somewhere else.4 Overall, it is apparent that Britain is a key target of Islamic terrorism. -
Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics
Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics Edited by Klejda Mulaj HURST & COMPANY, LONDON 10 Al Qaeda From the Near to the Far Enemy and Back (1988-2008) Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou All hopes to the contrary notwithstanding, it seems as though the one argument that the Arabs are incapable of understanding isforce, - Hannah Arendt' By the mid-to-late 2000s, Al Qaeda had essentially completed the mission it set out to achieve twenty years earlier. For all practical purposes and against all odds, the subsequent phases that have been discerned in the conflict with its foes were in effect just additional opportunities for the group's existing global gains; it has outlived the George W, Bush administration, has engi- neered further political decrepitude in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and threatens to conduct potential new attacks on Western targets, The conven- tional wisdom, rehearsed from 2004 on, held that it was the transformation of Al Qaeda that had been the key reason for its survival and resurgence. Close examination of the group's history reveals that the strength of Al Qaeda lies, in point of fact, not so much in its post-September 11 mutation-a logical evasive step which many other terrorist or insurgent groups had enacted • 'Peace or Armistice in the Near East', Review of Politics, January 1950, p. 56. 207 VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS AL QAEDA: FROM THE NEAR TO THE FAR ENEMY AND BACK previously-but more in its inherent adaptability and its faculty to innovate and setting it in motion dramatically under the local leadership of Abu Musab constantly.