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HERBERG-ROTHE Theory and Practice: the Inevitable Dialectics Thinking with and beyond Clausewitz’s Concept of Theory Since the 1990s various influential scholars have argued that Clausewitz’s theory is no longer applicable, not only in relation to contemporary conflicts, but also in general. A series of authors consequently has attempted to develop a new understanding of Clausewitz’s theory, based on the ‘trinity’, which differs fundamentally from his world- renowned formula as well as the absolute of war. This article further elaborates the ‘wondrous trinity’, the ‘floating’ (Clausewitz) and developing (Hegel) balance of Clausewitz’s three tendencies of the trinity (violence/force, fight/struggle, warring community) for a better understanding of his concept of theory, which – to some extent surprisingly – has not been developed before. Andreas Herberg-Rothe* even self-destructive2 to continue to use this The essential difference is that war is not an exer- theory as the basis for understanding and as a cise of the will directed at inanimate matter, as is guide to political action, given the revolutio- the case with the mechanical arts, or at matter nary changes in war and violence occurring in which is animate but passive and yielding, as is the world’s communities. Clausewitz, it is the case with the human mind in the fine arts. In proposed, was only concerned with war war, the will is directed at an animate object that between states employing regular armies, reacts. Clausewitz, On War (149)1 whereas conflict today would mainly involve non-state actors. Both claims, however, are overdrawn, with respect to both the core contents of Clause- ince the 1990s various influential authors witz’s theory and the unique characteristics of Shave argued that Clausewitz’s theory is no today’s ‘New Wars’.3 With the exception of longer applicable, not only in relation to much of Africa and some very old conflicts at contemporary conflicts, but also in general. the fringes of the former empires, existing Some have suggested that it is harmful and states, along with hierarchically organized political-religious groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, are still the decisive, if no longer the 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War second edition (Princeton, Princeton University Press, sole, actors in war. Additionally, Clausewitz has 1984). All numbers in brackets refer to this edition. Although there is a weakness in much more to say about the contemporary translating Clausewitz’s concepts on the basis of a pure rationalistic approach, it is the most prevalent translation. I’m very grateful for the recommendations and assistance of forms of warfare than the highly selective Bruno Colson, Paul Schuurman, Paul Donker, Christopher Bassford and Alan D. Beyer- interpretations by his modern critics might chen. All remaining faults are my own. suggest. However, the criticisms by Clausewitz’s 160 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JAARGANG 184 NUMMER 4 – 2015 CLAUSEWITZ’S CONCEPT OF THEORY Paradoxically, we find the trinity at the end of Clausewitz’s first chapter, but it is his final proposition about the theory of war, because the first chapter was the last one of On War Clausewitz wrote before his death. Clausewitz’s wondrous trinity, in my interpretation, is composed of primordial violence, the struggle of the fighting forces and their affiliation to a warring community. Based on this interpreta- tion, I define war as the violent struggle/fight of communities. Each war is composed of these three tendencies – all wars differ from one another with respect to the applied violence (different means, wars with knives and mache- tes or with atomic weapons), the different forms of the struggle/fight (amateurs versus professio- nals, symmetry versus asymmetry) and the social composition of the warring community.5 The significance of the ‘trinity’ as the starting point of Clausewitz’s theory of war is indirectly acknowledged by his critics, who impute to Clausewitz the concept of ‘trinitarian war’, based on a hierarchy of populace, the army and the government. The problem with this interpretation is that Clausewitz’s indicated facts were merely one possible example for The concept of the ‘trinitarian war’ does not stem from Clausewitz, him, which is revealed as a socio-historical but was coined by Harry G. Summers, Jr., in On Strategy, an influential book in which he tried to analyze the mistakes made during the Vietnam War * Dr. Andreas Herberg Rothe is permanent lecturer at the University of Applied Sciences, Fulda. A draft of this article was presented at the conference ‘War in the history of ideas’, on 14 Octoer 2014. The conference was convened by Paul Donker and Paul Schuurmann and the Netherlands Defence Academy and supported by the British Society for the History of newest detractors are both provocative and Ideas and the University of Rotterdam. My presentation enabled me to further elaborate constructive, in that they force one to read my dialectic interpretation of Clausewitz’s wondrous trinity, the floating (Clausewitz) and Clausewitz more exactly and to extract aspects developing (Hegel) balance of opposites. See: Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle of his work that were previously underexposed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). This article is dedicated to the memory of my aca- demic teacher and Clausewitz researcher Werner Hahlweg (1912-1989). 2 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York, The Free Press, 1991); John A series of authors consequently has attempted Keegan, A History of Warfare (London, Hutchinson, 1993). to develop a new understanding of Clausewitz’s 3 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge, Cam- theory, based on the ‘trinity’ which Clausewitz bridge University Press, 1999). For a more sophisticated view than Kaldor’s, see Herfried described in the last section of his first chapter Munkler, The New Wars (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004). 4 Concerning the trinity see especially Christopher Bassford, ‘The Primacy of Policy and under the heading ‘Consequences for Theory’ the ‘Trinity’ in Clausewitz’s Mature Thought’ in: Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg- 4 (Clausewitz 1984, p. 89). In it the world-renow- Rothe (eds.), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford, Oxford University Press, ned formula of war as ‘merely the continuation 2007) pp. 74-90; Christopher Bassford, ‘Tip-Toe through the Trinity. The Strange of policy by other means’ (Ibid, p. 87) is indi- Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare’, Working paper 2006: http://www.clausewitz.com/ rectly repeated, and identified as only one of readings/Bassford/Trinity/Trinity8.htm; see also Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle. 5 See my attempt to develop a general theory of war based on Clausewitz’s wondrous tri- three basic tendencies of which each war is nity: Andreas Herberg-Rothe, ‘Clausewitz’s ‘Wondrous Trinity’ as a Coordinate System of composed. Clausewitz’s concept of the trinity is War and Violent Conflict’ in: International Journal of Violence and Conflict (IJVC) 3 (2) a very late development of his thinking. 2009, pp. 62-77 (www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/6). JAARGANG 184 NUMMER 4 – 2015 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 161 HERBERG-ROTHE construct, based on the fundamentals of the basic concepts aside or changed their meaning: ‘wondrous trinity’. Strictly speaking, the if war has a dual nature, the absolute form can concept of the ‘trinitarian war’ does not stem no longer be the ideal form of war. And second, from Clausewitz, as it fundamentally contra- although Clausewitz had already embarked on dicts the concept of the ‘wondrous trinity’. This the influence of policy/politics, from this term actually wars coined by Harry G. Sum- moment on he needed a conceptualization mers, Jr, who, when a U.S. Army Colonel in the which provided unity to the various manifesta- early 1980s, wrote an influential book in which tions of war. Policy/politics asserted not only an he tried to analyze the mistakes made during influence on war, but provided the basis for its the Vietnam War by drawing on an example unity, which led to a holistic understanding of Clausewitz mentions in the ‘wondrous trinity’,6 policy/politics in Clausewitz’s thinking. Policy/ flipping Clausewitz’s central point on its head politics was the whole which provided the logic in the process. Whereas Clausewitz proposed of war, war itself was viewed as just a part of that the task of theory is to maintain a floating policy/politics.7 But the note of 1827 was not balance between the three tendencies, in the end of Clausewitz’s intellectual develop- trinitarian warfare these tendencies are ment: this is the dialectical nature of war embo- incorporated into a hierarchy, which contra- died in the trinity and the dialectical relation dicts Clausewitz’s own proposition. between offense and defence.8 In my view, Clausewitz’s intellectual crisis Despite the remarkable progress in the under- continuously evolved during his analyses of war standing of Clausewitz’s theory of war, what campaigns between 1820 and 1827, when he has not yet been accomplished – to some extent wrote the books about Prussia and its great surprisingly – is a thorough discussion of catastrophy, the disaster of Napoleon’s Russian Clausewitz’s concept of theory itself. Contrary campaign and the campaign which ended at to propositions made by his critics as well as Waterloo. Clausewitz finished the last book in his adherents, Clausewitz’s concept of theory is 1827-28, but he ended his crisis with a sudden much more sophisticated than one would rupture in a July 1827 note. In it he wrote that expect. In congruence with his notion of the he wanted to rework his whole book according trinity as his final theory and his conceptualiza- to two principles: the dual nature of war and tion of the trinity as a floating balance between the primacy of policy.

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