HERBERG-ROTHE

Theory and Practice: the Inevitable Dialectics

Thinking with and beyond Clausewitz’s Concept of Theory

Since the 1990s various influential scholars have argued that Clausewitz’s theory is no longer applicable, not only in relation to contemporary conflicts, but also in general. A series of authors consequently has attempted to develop a new understanding of Clausewitz’s theory, based on the ‘trinity’, which differs fundamentally from his world- renowned formula as well as the absolute of war. This article further elaborates the ‘wondrous trinity’, the ‘floating’ (Clausewitz) and developing (Hegel) balance of Clausewitz’s three tendencies of the trinity (violence/force, fight/struggle, warring community) for a better understanding of his concept of theory, which – to some extent surprisingly – has not been developed before.

Andreas Herberg-Rothe*

even self-destructive2 to continue to use this The essential difference is that war is not an exer- theory as the basis for understanding and as a cise of the will directed at inanimate matter, as is guide to political action, given the revolutio- the case with the mechanical arts, or at matter nary changes in war and violence occurring in which is animate but passive and yielding, as is the world’s communities. Clausewitz, it is the case with the human mind in the fine arts. In proposed, was only concerned with war war, the will is directed at an animate object that between states employing regular armies, reacts. Clausewitz, On War (149)1 whereas conflict today would mainly involve non-state actors. Both claims, however, are overdrawn, with respect to both the core contents of Clause- ince the 1990s various influential authors witz’s theory and the unique characteristics of Shave argued that Clausewitz’s theory is no today’s ‘New Wars’.3 With the exception of longer applicable, not only in relation to much of Africa and some very old conflicts at contemporary conflicts, but also in general. the fringes of the former empires, existing Some have suggested that it is harmful and states, along with hierarchically organized political-religious groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, are still the decisive, if no longer the 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War second edition (Princeton, Princeton University Press, sole, actors in war. Additionally, Clausewitz has 1984). All numbers in brackets refer to this edition. Although there is a weakness in much more to say about the contemporary translating Clausewitz’s concepts on the basis of a pure rationalistic approach, it is the most prevalent translation. I’m very grateful for the recommendations and assistance of forms of warfare than the highly selective Bruno Colson, Paul Schuurman, Paul Donker, Christopher Bassford and Alan D. Beyer- interpretations by his modern critics might chen. All remaining faults are my own. suggest. However, the criticisms by Clausewitz’s

160 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JAARGANG 184 NUMMER 4 – 2015 CLAUSEWITZ’S CONCEPT OF THEORY

Paradoxically, we find the trinity at the end of Clausewitz’s first chapter, but it is his final proposition about the theory of war, because the first chapter was the last one of On War Clausewitz wrote before his death. Clausewitz’s wondrous trinity, in my interpretation, is composed of primordial violence, the struggle of the fighting forces and their affiliation to a warring community. Based on this interpreta- tion, I define war as the violent struggle/fight of communities. Each war is composed of these three tendencies – all wars differ from one another with respect to the applied violence (different means, wars with knives and mache- tes or with atomic weapons), the different forms of the struggle/fight (amateurs versus professio- nals, symmetry versus asymmetry) and the social composition of the warring community.5

The significance of the ‘trinity’ as the starting point of Clausewitz’s theory of war is indirectly acknowledged by his critics, who impute to Clausewitz the concept of ‘trinitarian war’, based on a hierarchy of populace, the army and the government. The problem with this interpretation is that Clausewitz’s indicated facts were merely one possible example for The concept of the ‘trinitarian war’ does not stem from Clausewitz, him, which is revealed as a socio-historical but was coined by Harry G. Summers, Jr., in On Strategy, an influential book in which he tried to analyze the mistakes made during the Vietnam War * Dr. Andreas Herberg Rothe is permanent lecturer at the University of Applied Sciences, Fulda. A draft of this article was presented at the conference ‘War in the history of ideas’, on 14 Octoer 2014. The conference was convened by Paul Donker and Paul Schuurmann and the Netherlands Defence Academy and supported by the British Society for the History of newest detractors are both provocative and Ideas and the University of Rotterdam. My presentation enabled me to further elaborate constructive, in that they force one to read my dialectic interpretation of Clausewitz’s wondrous trinity, the floating (Clausewitz) and Clausewitz more exactly and to extract aspects developing (Hegel) balance of opposites. See: Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle of his work that were previously underexposed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). This article is dedicated to the memory of my aca- demic teacher and Clausewitz researcher Werner Hahlweg (1912-1989). 2 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York, The Free Press, 1991); John A series of authors consequently has attempted Keegan, A History of Warfare (London, Hutchinson, 1993). to develop a new understanding of Clausewitz’s 3 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge, Cam- theory, based on the ‘trinity’ which Clausewitz bridge University Press, 1999). For a more sophisticated view than Kaldor’s, see Herfried described in the last section of his first chapter Munkler, The New Wars (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004). 4 Concerning the trinity see especially Christopher Bassford, ‘The Primacy of Policy and under the heading ‘Consequences for Theory’ the ‘Trinity’ in Clausewitz’s Mature Thought’ in: Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg- 4 (Clausewitz 1984, p. 89). In it the world-renow- Rothe (eds.), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford, Oxford University Press, ned formula of war as ‘merely the continuation 2007) pp. 74-90; Christopher Bassford, ‘Tip-Toe through the Trinity. The Strange of policy by other means’ (Ibid, p. 87) is indi- Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare’, Working paper 2006: http://www.clausewitz.com/ rectly repeated, and identified as only one of readings/Bassford/Trinity/Trinity8.htm; see also Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle. 5 See my attempt to develop a general theory of war based on Clausewitz’s wondrous tri- three basic tendencies of which each war is nity: Andreas Herberg-Rothe, ‘Clausewitz’s ‘Wondrous Trinity’ as a Coordinate System of composed. Clausewitz’s concept of the trinity is War and Violent Conflict’ in: International Journal of Violence and Conflict (IJVC) 3 (2) a very late development of his thinking. 2009, pp. 62-77 (www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/6).

JAARGANG 184 NUMMER 4 – 2015 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 161 HERBERG-ROTHE

construct, based on the fundamentals of the basic concepts aside or changed their meaning: ‘wondrous trinity’. Strictly speaking, the if war has a dual nature, the absolute form can concept of the ‘trinitarian war’ does not stem no longer be the ideal form of war. And second, from Clausewitz, as it fundamentally contra- although Clausewitz had already embarked on dicts the concept of the ‘wondrous trinity’. This the influence of policy/politics, from this term actually wars coined by Harry G. Sum- moment on he needed a conceptualization mers, Jr, who, when a U.S. Army Colonel in the which provided unity to the various manifesta- early 1980s, wrote an influential book in which tions of war. Policy/politics asserted not only an he tried to analyze the mistakes made during influence on war, but provided the basis for its the Vietnam War by drawing on an example unity, which led to a holistic understanding of Clausewitz mentions in the ‘wondrous trinity’,6 policy/politics in Clausewitz’s thinking. Policy/ flipping Clausewitz’s central point on its head politics was the whole which provided the logic in the process. Whereas Clausewitz proposed of war, war itself was viewed as just a part of that the task of theory is to maintain a floating policy/politics.7 But the note of 1827 was not balance between the three tendencies, in the end of Clausewitz’s intellectual develop- trinitarian warfare these tendencies are ment: this is the dialectical nature of war embo- incorporated into a hierarchy, which contra- died in the trinity and the dialectical relation dicts Clausewitz’s own proposition. between offense and defence.8

In my view, Clausewitz’s intellectual crisis Despite the remarkable progress in the under- continuously evolved during his analyses of war standing of Clausewitz’s theory of war, what campaigns between 1820 and 1827, when he has not yet been accomplished – to some extent wrote the books about Prussia and its great surprisingly – is a thorough discussion of catastrophy, the disaster of Napoleon’s Russian Clausewitz’s concept of theory itself. Contrary campaign and the campaign which ended at to propositions made by his critics as well as Waterloo. Clausewitz finished the last book in his adherents, Clausewitz’s concept of theory is 1827-28, but he ended his crisis with a sudden much more sophisticated than one would rupture in a July 1827 note. In it he wrote that expect. In congruence with his notion of the he wanted to rework his whole book according trinity as his final theory and his conceptualiza- to two principles: the dual nature of war and tion of the trinity as a floating balance between the primacy of policy. He exemplified the dual opposites, this article tries to give arguments nature of war with the difference between its for the assumption that Clausewitz’s concept of absolute form (the tendency to total warfare, a theory is an application of his understanding of fight for life and death, an existential war) and dialectics, his floating (Clausewitz) and develo- a limited war. The significance of this note is ping (Hegel) balance of opposites. Clausewitz embodied in the concept of the dual nature of did not give an explicit definition of theory, but war, because this insight put two of his former implicitly revealed his understanding of theory when treating the relation between theory and practice throughout his life and work. 6 Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy. A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Presi- dio Press, 1982); Beatrice Heuser, Clausewitz lesen! (Munich, Oldenbourg Wissen- First I will emphasize the fundamental problem schaftsverlag, 2005) pp. 66-69. how a theory whose subject always changes 7 For such an approach see Paul Schuurman, ‘War as a System. A Three-stage Model for the Development of Clausewitz’s Thinking on Military Conflict and its Constraints’ in: could be designed. Based on Clausewitz’s whole Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 37, Nov. 6-7, pp. 926-948. I disagree with Schuurman in work I try to systematize his very different assuming that Clausewitz’s testament is in fact the trinity as well as the dialectical rela- references to the relation between theory and tion between defence and offense; see Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle. practice. This can be summarized as the five 8 I have further elaborated on the concept of a floating and developing balancing with functions of theory according to Clausewitz: a. regard to Clausewitz’s understanding of strategy. See Andreas Herberg-Rothe, ‘Clause- witz’s Concept of Strategy. Balancing Purpose, Aims and Means’ in: Journal of Strategic describing the nature of war, b. elaborating the Studies, Vol 37, 6-7, December 2014, pp. 903-925. difference between theory and practice, c. (www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2013.853175). giving recommendations for military practice,

162 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JAARGANG 184 NUMMER 4 – 2015 CLAUSEWITZ’S CONCEPT OF THEORY , M. S prenkle M. , US A rmy US P hoto A basically wrong translation has contributed to the most influential interpretation of Clausewitz’s trinity as ‘trinitarian warfare’ by its adherents, for example former US Secretary of State Colin Powell

based on theory and historical examples; d. or systems, but to concentrate on the changes highlighting theory as a kind of practice itself and developments in warfare itself. Although (here Clausewitz is comparable to Antonio the Howard/Paret translation (which we use Gramsci and Michel Foucault) and finally e. throughout our interpretation) is the most differentiating and analyzing what is composed prevalent, we have to mention the most of tendencies and different parts. Finally I will decisive failure in this work. Concerning the conceptualize the tasks Clausewitz ascribes to ‘wondrous trinity’ at the end of chapter one the the theory of war as the inevitable dialectics of translation implies a hierarchy between the theory and practice in the social sciences. three tendencies by saying: ‘and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, War as a dynamic phenomenon which make it subject to reason alone.’ In German, however, Clausewitz does not use the Clausewitz’s theory is fundamentally based on term ‘reason alone’, but ‘pure reason’ (reiner a dynamic understanding of war. A central Verstand). This basically wrong translation has theme in his later work is the question of contributed to the most influential interpreta- ‘whether a conflict of living forces as it deve- tion of Clausewitz’s trinity as ‘trinitarian lops and is resolved in war remains subject to warfare’ by its adherents (for example Colin general laws, and whether these can provide a Powell) as well as its critics (Harry Summers useful guide to action’ (149-150). The heart of and Martin van Creveld). In trinitarian warfare the matter is: what would a theory look like if – which is by no means Clausewitz’s concept – its subject constantly changes? The only there is a hierarchy between the three tenden- approach to a solution might be not to analyze cies of the trinity, primordial violence and fixed points, the unalterable substance of war hatred, the play of chance and probability,

JAARGANG 184 NUMMER 4 – 2015 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 163 HERBERG-ROTHE

which belongs to the army and its commander, sinus and co-sinus functions. Clausewitz’s and finally the primacy of politics. Contrary to mentioning of Euler in On War, a book about a the concept of trinitarian warfare, Clausewitz is subject which seems to be quite different from clearly stating: ‘Our task therefore is to develop the developments in mathematics, indicates a (floating) balance between these three how impressed Clausewitz and his tendencies, like an object suspended between contemporaries were by this progress (112, three magnets’ (89). 146). One could even identify some concepts of Clausewitz such as the point of no return The task, as Clausewitz writes, would be to (Hochpunkt or Wendepunkt) in a sinus curve as develop a theory about an ever-changing its highest point. subject. The only possibility to develop such a theory would be to concentrate on change, Mathematical models can serve the purpose of movement and development itself. There is an better understanding a theory, but they should example which vividly demonstrates such a by no means been regarded as a whole theory possibility, namely a simple sinus and co-sinus in the social sciences. Nevertheless, a simple function. Clausewitz’s work therefore is an sinus and co-sinus curve enables us to get an unfinished symphony, as Jon Sumida and idea how a theory which subjects are move- Antulio Echevarria have argued. The unfin- ment, development, changing compositions, ished character of this symphony does not fluctuations, variations and so on, should be imply however that one could emulate any- designed.9 thing one would want to state as a general Despite his critiques of theory as a system, proposition. The first chapter remains the key Clausewitz of course was trying to develop a set to understanding the whole work. In my view of rules as a theory which could be used in On War builds a whole universe of thinking practice. His critique for example of the system about war. But in order to explicitly reveal the of Bülow was aimed towards a dogmatic structure of this universe we need to analyze application of the necessities of a closed the influences of the contemporary theories system. Although Clausewitz sometimes and ways of thinking on Clausewitz during his overemphasizes his critique of dogmatic lifetime. systems, he does not exclude any kind of systematical rules, tendencies or even laws in In a sinus and in the overlapping co-sinus war, most vividly expressed in his notion that curves everything constantly changes, but this although war does not have a particular logic, change is subject to laws of movement and there is a grammar of its own like the grammar development. Of course I don’t want to argue in speech (here Clausewitz is referring to the that Clausewitz’s understanding of theory is concept of grammar of his friend for nearly two directly related to a sinus or co-sinus curve. decades, Wilhelm von Humboldt).10 Nevertheless we know that Clausewitz mentions Johann Gottlieb Euler, one of the The most important influences on Clausewitz greatest mathematicians of his time, twice in were the rationalist currents of the Enlighten- On War. Euler nearly invented the mathematical ment, idealism, romanticism, and the findings concept of a function and further elaborated of the natural sciences. It was from Kiesewetter, a follower of Kant, that Clausewitz learned about rationalism at an early age at the Berlin

9 Andreas Herberg-Rothe, ‘Clausewitz’s ‘Wondrous Trinity’ as a Coordinate System of War war academy. During Clausewitz’s later time in and Violent Conflict’ in: International Journal of Violence and Conflict (IJVC) 3 (2) 2009, Berlin (1818-1830), the idealism of Fichte and pp. 62-77. (www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/6). especially Hegel was the dominant current of 10 Concerning the relation of Clausewitz and Humboldt see my comparison between thought in intellectual circles. In 1829 Clause- Clausewitz and Hegel, in which I also treat the relation to Wilhelm von Humboldt, witz also spent a number of weeks reading the too: Andreas Herberg-Rothe, ‘Clausewitz und Hegel. Ein heuristischer Vergleich‘, in: Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte. Jahrgang 10, Heft Goethe-Schiller correspondence. He also 1/2000, S. 49–84. attended the lectures of the romantic philo-

164 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JAARGANG 184 NUMMER 4 – 2015 CLAUSEWITZ’S CONCEPT OF THEORY

sopher Heinrich Steffens during the winter of 1824-25, and in 1827 those of the naturalist Alexander von Humboldt, which were the start of a new flourishing of the natural sciences in Germany.11 Clausewitz took aspects of all the thoughts of his contemporaries and used them in his theory of war to the extent that they helped him to reflect on his own experiences of armed conflict. Clausewitz’s own position floats within the field formed by the four currents of thought. Each of them stimulated him, but his own position cannot be traced back solely to any one of them.12

Clausewitz’s understanding of the tasks of theory Clausewitz didn’t provide any definition of theory, but sought to determine the tasks and functions a theory should serve. For example he Clausewitz uses the concept of theory in connection with his argues that a conflict of living forces, as can be attempt to identify the nature or essence of war seen in war, remains bound to general rule (or laws). His task would be to examine whether these rules and laws might provide a useful 1. The nature of war guidance for action. Additionally, he writes, it Clausewitz uses the concept of theory in should be clear that this subject, like all others connection with his attempt to identify the that don’t transcend our comprehension, can nature or essence of war. This usage of the be illuminated by the search of a mindful understanding of theory predominantly can be intellect and made clear in its inherent logic found in his famous first chapter where he and argument (German edition, pp. 303-304). characterizes war as a duel (in German Clause- Based on this short description it becomes witz uses the term Zweikampf, which is not obvious that Clausewitz’s concept of theory totally the same as a duel), and in his ‘formula’, must be understood as the attempt to find but most clearly in his ‘result for theory’ at the general rules or laws of war despite its ever- end of chapter one, the wondrous trinity, changing character, which additionally should which should not be confused with ‘trinitarian provide useful guidance for political and warfare.’ Additionally in the first chapter we military action. In addition he speaks about the find the concept of ‘absolute war’, which attempt to reveal the inherent ‘logic’ of war. In Clausewitz also uses in book eight where he another part of his masterpiece he demands states that theory has the obligation to put that theory should judge each war in the first emphasis on this absolute form of war as a place with regard to its character and its guideline for action in general (German edition, general tendencies given by the probability of 959). the scale of measurement of the influence of policy (German edition, 959).13 11 Carl von Clausewitz, Schriften, Studien, Aufsätze, Briefe. Edited by Werner Hahlweg, II We could give a lot more quotes by Clausewitz vol. (Göttingen, VandenHoeck & Ruprecht, 1966 and 1990). Here vol. II: on Steffens, 470 with regard to his understanding of theory, but and 535; on Humboldt, 534; on the Goethe-Schiller correspondence, 550. See also Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976). based on On War as a whole, I will propose five 12 For details see Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle. different conceptualizations of how theory 13 Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege 19th edition. Edited by Werner Hahlweg (Bonn, should be understood in his work. Dümmler, 1991).

JAARGANG 184 NUMMER 4 – 2015 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 165 HERBERG-ROTHE

2. The difference between theory and practice Clausewitz the most sophisticated one to date, I Only at first sight there seems to be a similar disagree with Raymond Aron concerning the understanding of theory in relation to the understanding of theory as an ‘unreal’ concept interactions to the extreme, which he labels as of war.15 If his theory would have nothing in the concept of war in chapter one (76-77). But common with empirical and real wars, this contrary to the understanding of theory as would imply a really problematic understan- explained above, Clausewitz now wants to ding of theory by Clausewitz. emphasize the significant difference between theory and practice, of theory as nothing else Two different attempts of solving the problem than a law derived from books or abstraction of the concept of the absolute of war have been (77 ff). Although Clausewitz sometimes uses the pursued in the history of interpreting Clause- same term in relation to the absolute of witz. One of these historical lines of interpreta- tion argues that the tendency to the absolute is caused by the context of warfare, the political Clausewitz rejected the idea that war and societal conditions or policies which lead would have an inherent logic, but also to total war. Some argue that in congruence with Clausewitz’s world-renowned formula, it argued that war has its own grammar depends on political decisions or political relations whether a war tends to be limited or total. To his credit, John Keegan maintains that warfare (especially in book VIII of On War), the the tendency for total war depending on the difference is obvious. In the first understanding societal conditions is a historical force in the Clausewitz uses the theory of war in order to development of warfare since the French enable that action is guided by these principles Revolution.16 This interpretation could be of his theoretical construction. Exactly the described as follows: the tendency to an opposite understanding is elaborated in the absolute, total form of warfare is not inherent latter. Here Clausewitz emphasizes the great to warfare, is not an inherent logic in itself, but difference – sometimes even the chasm – which dependent on policy and politics and political separates theory in its abstract form and war in and societal relations which are to be judged as reality. The second understanding of theory can totalitarian or antagonistic to that of the be found in those parts of On War where the adversary. The second line of interpretation ‘absolute of war’ is labeled as nothing else than would acknowledge that for Clausewitz war is a mere concept in the abstract, which Clause- an instrument of policy, but that due to the witz contrasts with the concepts of probability violent form of this particular means and the and contingency, or the frictions in real war. unforeseeable inherent logic of war as a Some authors compare this understanding of struggle between action and counter-action, war with Max Weber’s concept of an ideal- war is also characterized by an imminent type.14 Although I find his interpretation of tendency to escalate, which cannot always be controlled by policy. In my view, the tension in Clausewitz’s theory between the escalating 14 Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London, Pimlico, 2002). tendencies within war and those escalating 15 Raymond Aron, Den Krieg denken (Frankfurt, Propyläen Verlag, 1980). One of the most tendencies outside of it, the context,17 cannot sophisticated masterpieces of Clausewitz’s interpretation. I do not recommend the En- glish translation of Aron’s book. be decided dogmatically. There are passages in 16 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1995). Nevertheless it On War and even in his final first chapter in must be noted that Keegan systematically only quotes a bisect formula, that war is the which Clausewitz seems to argue in favor of continuation of policy/politics, but deletes the second part of the sentence, a continua- one of the two interpretations, but there are tion of policy by applying ‘other means’ than that of policy, politics itself. others where he seems to do just the opposite. 17 See for example: ‘Wenn es also, um zur Hauptsache zurückzukehren, auch wahr ist, daß bei der einen Art Krieg die Politik ganz zu verschwinden scheint, während sie bei der anderen Art sehr bestimmt hervortritt, so kann man doch behaupten, daß die eine so Although Clausewitz explicitly rejected the idea politisch sei wie die andere (...)’ (Vom Kriege, Germ. Edt., p. 211). that war would have an inherent logic, he

166 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JAARGANG 184 NUMMER 4 – 2015 CLAUSEWITZ’S CONCEPT OF THEORY

nevertheless made the proposition that war has its own grammar – and I think that this inherent grammar of war might even have become the logic of some wars we have observed in history. An explanatory example of this tendency might be World War One, whereas the previous strand of interpretation would apply to World War Two: the totalitarian politics of the German Reich did in fact lead to total warfare of annihilation and to the coun- ter-action of the Western allies to fight for unconditional and therefore total surrender of the German Nazi empire. It seems to me that the three escalatory tendencies are neither necessarily exclusively militarily nor politically determined and it is quite well possible to think of politicians who partake in the escala- tion game as much as soldiers and their generals. Perhaps one could suggest that the logic of escalation has different grammars, i.e. With respect to the linguistic turn outlined by Clausewitz’s close different levels, including a political and a friend Wilhelm von Humboldt, one solution of the relation of war military level. and policy/politics would be that there is a grammar of war and a grammar of policy, which are both bound by societal developments It has to be acknowledged that Clausewitz mentions the concept of a grammar only once in On War. Nevertheless, I would like to respect to the linguistic turn outlined by von emphasize the significance of this reference. A Humboldt, one solution of the relation of war great deal of philosophy since Kant could be and policy/politics would be that it is not a characterized as an attempt to replace the logic relation of logic and grammar and not of a embodied in natural law through the grammar different logic, but one in which there is a of speech and language, or more generally, the grammar of war and a grammar of policy, technique of action and speech, the rules of the which are both bound by societal developments game as a closed system. The famous linguistic (this was the solution of Marx, Engels and turn of the twentieth century in general can be Lenin). This is also the solution of Foucault, characterized by the replacement of what is who replaces the content of policy by techni- judged as good and just by an appropriate, just ques of political action and power.18 method, the substitution of substance, essence by grammar, semantics by syntax, content by structure and system, and finally meaning by discourse in both Foucault and Habermas (despite their differences). 18 See my critique of Foucault in, Herberg-Rothe, Andreas, Das Raetsel Clausewitz. Politi- As already mentioned, although Clausewitz sche Theory des Krieges im Widerstreit (Munich, Fink, 2001). Foucault tries to reverse Clausewitz’s formula by arguing that policy/politics is the continuation of war by other uses the concept of grammar only once in an means. Although my critique of Foucault was excessive in my Raetsel Clausewitz book, I isolated paragraph in On War with no direct still think that Foucault’s reversal of Clausewitz could be applied meaningfully only to connection to his other conceptualization, the some historical tendencies, not in general. Foucault’s 1977 lectures, in which he develo- usage of this concept is symptomatic for his ped the reversal of Clausewitz, showed the problematic consequences of his approach. time. It was Clausewitz’s close friend, Wilhelm If power is everything and everywhere, there is only one possibility to escape this ubi- quitous power: pure resistance for the sake of resistance. Foucault might have not reali- von Humboldt, who established grammar in zed that the counter-movements of modernity are the product of modernity itself. See this sense of a linguistic turn, in my view in a the modernity and violence chapter in: Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Der Krieg (Frankfurt, direct but hidden quarrel with Hegel. With Campus, 2003).

JAARGANG 184 NUMMER 4 – 2015 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 167 HERBERG-ROTHE

3. Recommendations for practice friction in the kind of war Napoleon waged and A third function of theory is related to strategy in particular the military genius of the French and war plans, practically relevant experiences leader. Hegel even generalized the genius of and considerations of Clausewitz: how war Napoleon after the battle of Jena by saying that should effectively be fought in order to achieve he not only witnessed Napoleon passing by in the intended purpose and goals. In this sense the city streets, but also the incorporation of he speaks of the theory of great power wars the absolute spirit of the world’s history. and characterizes this kind of theory as Sometimes Napoleon’s genius was reduced to a strategy. The theory of war is related to the series of fortunate contingencies which worked usage of the means for the purpose it has to in his favour. For example, neither Napoleon serve. Clausewitz gives an example for this nor his enemies knew before the battle of Jena understanding of theory by saying that theory and Auerstedt where the other side would be in would be related to the decisive points in the terrain. But the difference was that Napo- warfare in which one can achieve a preponde- leon always knew where his own army was rance of one’s own physical power and advanta- located – and this knowledge was of paramount ges (German edition, p. 1047). importance for his conduct of war (I owe this Terence Holmes has vividly argued that clarification to Jan Willem Honig).20 Clausewitz’s understanding of the concept of Nevertheless Alan Beyerchen is absolutely right theory can not be reduced only to the contrast in emphasizing the inevitable difference between theory and friction in the sense of the between war plans and their execution. As unpredictability of non-linear systems, as Alan legitimate and justified the critique of Terence Beyerchen has argued in his epochal article Holmes on the concept of friction as an overar- about linear and non-linear theory in Clause- ching subject in Clausewitz’s thinking (what witz’s masterwork. Clausewitz, on the contrary, Beyerchen never intended to imply) at first sight of course gives a lot of indications how to might be, he himself might be underestimating overcome this ‘terrible friction’. If Clausewitz the problematic of action and resistance or, to would not have been convinced of the principal be more precise, counter-action as the decisive possibility to conduct warfare in accordance cause for the departure of real war from the with a war plan, designed in advance, his original war plan. That’s because Clausewitz theory would be a pure abstraction. This already says in chapter one that in war both approach is not dependent on the question sides aim to win it. But in general – in his times whether the application of his practical advice at least – there is the systematical problem that has been successful – I would even doubt that. only one of both sides will be victorious, with But without doubt we know that till the end of the other side losing the war. And the adversary his life Clausewitz outlined numerous war may lose the war not because of friction, but plans against France and Russia. So, Clausewitz due to our own efforts and vice versa, and due didn’t project his plans in knowing that after to the fact that war is not only the application the first shot in war everything changes to a of force to which the terrible friction would degree where every plan would be useless, as apply only, but also a real fight, a struggle of Beatrice Heuser understands his concept of two adversaries. Consequently I would propose theory.19 Clausewitz emphasizes the terrible to supplement Clausewitz’s definition of war at friction in war in order to find ways to over- the beginning of chapter I. Whereas he just come it. For some time of his life Clausewitz states that war is an act of force to compel our saw a model for this approach to overcome enemy to do our will, I would add: ‘and the forcible counter-action not to be compelled to do the will of the adversary.’ This interaction of 19 See Heuser, Reading Clausewitz; Terence Holmes, ‘Planning versus Chaos in Clause- action and counter-action in war is directly witz’s On War’ in: The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 129-151, February 2007; Alan Beyerchen, ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War’ in: Inter- leading to Clausewitz’s ‘consequences for national Security, 17:3 (Winter, 1992) pp. 59-90. theory’, his concept of the trinity. (see Herberg- 20 Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle, chapter Jena, Moscow, Waterloo. Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle).

168 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JAARGANG 184 NUMMER 4 – 2015 CLAUSEWITZ’S CONCEPT OF THEORY

In our times we witness a growing number of a single war in a classical and traditional way. wars, where neither side is losing, nor win- But they have not lost one, either. ning. This phenomenon could be observed in the recent wars in Gaza and the 2006 Lebanon 4. Theory as a kind of practice itself War. This development might be related to Clausewitz frequently explains an additional globalization and the resulting problem that function of theory in connection with his an adversary can no longer be resolutely numerous analysis of historical examples of crushed in a way that would imply his total wars and military campaigns. These historical defeat. Such tendencies are visible in guerrilla examples are not directly a kind of theory but and partisan warfare, in which the partisans are used by Clausewitz in order to develop a win if they don’t lose decisively. Although this theory. Historical experiences for Clausewitz proposition does not apply to be a law of war, are indirectly a kind of theory for purposes of but only a tendency in partisan warfare, in education, a kind of ‘intellectualization’ of war. current warfare it seems to become more Here Clausewitz follows in the footsteps of his frequent. The most important reason for this teacher Scharnhorst at the war academy in development is that our adversary does not Berlin. It became a landmark of Scharnhorst, as need to win the war in a military manner; he soon as he worked for the king of Prussia in just has to ensure by all means that he denies 1801, to provide students at the institute for us the victory. In a globalized world policy, the young officers with historical examples to be media, the discourse and the legitimacy of studied in-depth, instead of teaching them applying force play an ever more important theories. For Clausewitz, historical examples role in the conduct of war. Current examples were a different kind of theory, based on reality are Afghanistan and Iraq, but since the Yom instead of abstraction. Clausewitz was fully Kippur War in 1973, the Israelis have not won aware of the ‘lessons of history’, but solely in

Emile Simpson explains his views on war and theory to students at the Perse School in Cambridge; as author of War from the Ground up, Simpson transformed the insights of Gramsci and Foucault into the theory of the conduct of war with his notion of a strategic narrative S chool P erse P hoto

JAARGANG 184 NUMMER 4 – 2015 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 169 HERBERG-ROTHE

order to ‘educate the mind’ and not to provide parable. With regard to this function of theory positive or dogmatic advice. Clausewitz follows in the footsteps of Kant, who was popularized by Clausewitz’s teacher at Based on these analysis Clausewitz does not the war academy, Kiesewetter. Clausewitz uses excerpt direct rules for concrete action action of the concept of theory very often in the sense of the commander. These example just serve the critique, which in Kant’s theory exactly has the function to educate the commander, to provide meaning of differentiation and laying down the experiences and knowledge of failures in the boundary lines of a concept. Clausewitz past not only for the military, but for policy as additionally – via Kiesewetter – borrows from well. Although policy does not conduct war Kant the differentiation between formal and directly, it involves judging the course of action materiel logic.22 and making an estimation what the army could achieve and what not. To this kind of theory also Summarizing one could say that there are five belongs Clausewitz’s approach to connect different functions Clausewitz ascribes to theory: warfare with the historical, societal and political relations of its own times or a historical epoch of • Theory has the task to reveal the nature or the past. Clausewitz emphasized this understan- essence of war (this could be seen as an ding with the notion that theory must be an approach in the path laid down by Plato). enlightened judgment based on experience and Theory serves the task of comparing different knowledge, but by no means any kind of wars with one another, which leads to dogmatic application of rules (German edition, p. similarities of a number of wars and the 290). Theory, in Clausewitz’s approach, has the construction of an ideal type, as Max Weber task to educate the mind of the military and later on understood this kind of theory; political leaders, not to provide systems and • Additionally, Clausewitz maintains that ‘positive’ doctrines for them. Perhaps one could theory has to reflect the difference between relate this understanding of theory to the notion theory and practice, which inevitably leads to of Antonio Gramsci that theory is a kind of the question how theory and practice are practice in itself, as well as Foucault’s position related to one another, when obviously they that knowledge and the ability to construct a are not identical; discourse are not opposite to practice, but that • Clausewitz gives numerous recommendations knowledge and the performance of a discourse for military action in war, based on his own are a kind of power itself. Emile Simpson war experiences, historical analysis and his transformed this insight of Gramsci and Foucault theoretical approach to war plans. In Book II into the theory of the conduct of war with his of On War, in which he treats the theory of notion of a strategic narrative.21 war separately, in fact he is mainly concerned with the art of warfare and not theory in the 5. Theory as critique (Kant) overall meaning we have tried to elaborate. Finally, Clausewitz maintains that theory has The theory of war as an art of warfare is only the task to differentiate all those aspects which one dimension of a theory in a wider sense; are tied together in war, but which are incom- • Theory serves the purpose to educate and cultivate the mind of the political and military leaders as well as that of the army. Within this field of a different understanding 21 Emile Simpson, War from the Ground up. Twenty-first Century Combat as Politics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). of what theory means, one could say that 22 For this interpretation see especially Antulio Echevarria, Clausewitz and Comtemporary theory is a kind of practice itself in the sense War (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). Kiesewetter’s description of the proposition of the concept developed by Gramsci as well of Kant is as follows: ‘Jene [formale Wahrheit] besteht in der Uebereinstimmung einer as Foucault; Vorstellung mit den logischen Gesetzen des Denkens, diese [materiale Wahrheit] in der • Finally, theory is an instrument for gaining Uebereinstimmung einer Vorstellung mit dem Gegenstande.’ In: Kiesewetter, Grundriss einer allgemeinen Logik (Berlin, 1806) II, §112, p. 49; Clausewitz, Carl von, Schriften, (new) knowledge about a subject, by differen- Studien, Aufsätze, Briefe. ed. by Werner Hahlweg, vol. II, pp. 23-28. tiating between those aspects which were

170 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JAARGANG 184 NUMMER 4 – 2015 CLAUSEWITZ’S CONCEPT OF THEORY , J. S nyder J. , F orce US A ir US P hoto Theory, Clausewitz finds, serves the task of comparing different wars with one another, which leads to similarities of a number of wars and the construction of an ideal type

previously tied together. It’s main task is subject occurs in reality. Such a comparison critique in the sense Kant and Kiesewetter was founded by Aristotle and his concept of a understood that concept. mediation between contrasts and transferred to the social sciences as an ideal type by Max Conclusion: the inevitable dialectics Weber. This ideal type is the result of such a comparison; In my view, the above revealed differentiations • Whereas in the first two steps the interactions of Clausewitz’s understanding of theory are between theory and practice are treated in simultaneously the basics of every social general, in the third one we need to be aware sciences theory. This can be systematically of and reflect on the difference between justified if we generalize the above developed theory and practice, but also on practically concept. Based on the difference and unity of relevant recommendations based on theory theory and practice we just need to elaborate for our practice and performance; the following approach (which is in one aspect • In the fourth step we will nevertheless not the same as that of Clausewitz by introdu- recognize that any kind of theory itself is a cing the difference between Plato and Aristotle kind of practice. The foundations of such an in order to resolve Clausewitz’s problem of the approach can be detected in the thesis about absolute of war): Feuerbach by Karl Marx and they were subsequently developed by Gramsci’s empha- • Every theory needs some kind of explanation sis on theory as practice until Foucault’s about its subject and what the nature or conceptualization of knowledge and theory as essence of this subject might be. I would label a particular form of power; this as an approach in the footsteps of Plato; • After we have arrived at this stage, we finally • The next step is to look at the varieties of the must be aware of the boundaries of our subject, which includes a comparison theory and relate it to other theories in the between the different forms in which the social sciences.

JAARGANG 184 NUMMER 4 – 2015 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 171 HERBERG-ROTHE

Clausewitz neither develops a pure deductive witz’s Puzzle and Herberg-Rothe, Lyotard und nor a pure inductive conception of theory. His Hegel (Vienna, Passagen, 2005). Clausewitz has task is to develop a theory which maintains a given a clear indication of his final solution in floating balance between differences (this his result for theory, the wondrous trinity and would be the approach of constructivism in the his notion that theory has the task to maintain footsteps of Heinz v. Förster, Lyotard and a floating balance between the three tendencies Derrida) or the contrasts and conflicting of the wondrous trinity.23 What Clausewitz did tendencies of the wondrous trinity, as Clause- not achieve due to his untimely death was to witz emphasizes at the end of chapter one of compose a theory of war based on the On War. The question remains how to design a wondrous trinity as a starting point; his useful theory for an ever-changing subject, or a observations in other parts of the book (which chameleon as Clausewitz writes. Additionally, were, in their respective context, right in the question is how to design a theory related particular circumstances) and his dialectical to action and counter-action and symmetrical construction of defence and offense (which are and asymmetrical counter-action. Clausewitz in a broader sense synonyms for self-preserva- describes symmetrical counter-action as a tion and self-transgression.24 This proposition situation in which both parties in the conflict puts in sharp light the need of retaining a do or intend the same, whereas asymmetrical floating balance in theory, just as Clausewitz counter-action is the attempt to eradicate the wrote at the end of chapter one: ‘Our task intentions and actions of the adversary not by therefore is to develop a theory that maintains doing the same, but – just to clarify this a balance between these three tendencies like difference – by waiting, for example. Clause- an object suspended between three magnets.’ witz at length explains these different dimensi- ons of counter-action in his approach to the By developing a floating balance between25 different meanings of defence. In fact, Clause- rationality (Kant, Kiesewetter and the Enlight- witz reveals his method immanently in his ment) and romanticism (Goethe) as well as dialectically structured treatment of defence between idealism (Clausewitz was influenced and offense, laying the basis for a different kind by Fichte and Hegel)26 and naturalism (Alexan- of dialectics, a mediation of Kant and Hegel (for der von Humboldt) and influenced by Wilhelm such an approach see Herberg-Rothe, Clause- von Humboldt’s concept of grammar, Clause- witz is not only the theoretician of war, but even more the theoretician of a new understan-

23 We find such a floating balance between contrasts later on in the work of Sigmund ding of dialectics, which might be one which Freud, who distinguishes between Es, Ich and Über-Ich. What he calls Ich (or Ego) has even surpasses that of Kant and Hegel with the explicit function of mediating Es and Über-Ich. In fact, Ich is exactly the floating and respect to the basics of such a dialectics (of developing balance between Es and Über-Ich. course not with respect to its elaboration). The 24 I strongly oppose all efforts to understand Clausewitz’s theory only on the basis of his problem is that he only intrinsically applied the notion that defense is the stronger form of war, as Jon Sumida has argued in Decoding Clausewitz. A New Approach to On War (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2008). In basics of such a new kind of dialectics – there- fact, Clausewitz always highlighted the interaction of defense and offense and its dia- fore it remains our task to explicitly exemplify lectical nature which made war up as a whole. Clausewitz says that defense is the stron- the intrinsic dialectical nature of his theory. ger form of war with the negative purpose and offense the weaker form with the posi- Clausewitz developed the seeds of such a tive purpose. Sumida leaves out everything besides the notion that defense is the theory – no less, but also no more. Hans stronger form of war. It is the same method like that of John Keegan, who always cor- rectly quotes Clausewitz by emphasizing that war is the continuation of policy/politics, Rothfels noticed the intrinsic nature of such but deletes the second ‘with other means’ part of Clausewitz’s sentence. dialectics when he made the following proposi- 25 The ‘between concept’ in my approach stems from Plato and Aristotle, but also from Eric tion in relation to Clausewitz: ‘And if we are Voegelin and Hannah Arendt; see Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Lyotard und Hegel. Dialektik ever to succeed in creating a political theory von Philosophie und Politik (Vienna, Passagen, 2005), chapter one. worthy of the name, this will only be possible 26 For Hegel see my article ‘Clausewitz und Hegel. Ein heuristischer Vergleich‘ in: Forschun- gen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte, Jahrgang 10, Heft 1/2000, pp. in a similar way, by means of an equally 49–84. harmonious combination of conflicting 27 Hans Rothfels, Politik und Krieg (Berlin, 1992) Preface. elements.’27 n

172 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JAARGANG 184 NUMMER 4 – 2015