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Government Complicity in Organized Crime BUREAU FOR AFRICA July 2019 STRENGTHENING RULE OF LAW APPROACHES TO ADDRESS ORGANIZED CRIME Government Complicity in Organized Crime The United Stated Agency for International Development (USAID) and Management Systems International (MSI) are hosting a series of roundtable discussions to better understand key dynamics between the rule of law and organized crime. Building on the first roundtable in November 2018, which focused on rule-of-law capacity issues, the consequences of crim- inal justice responses to organized crime, and the complicity of criminal justice actors and senior leaders, the second roundtable in March 2019 examined government complicity in organized crime in greater depth. It brought together roughly 40 participants from USAID, the interagency, donors, research organizations, and implementing partners. This white paper captures key points from the discussion. Spectrum of Government Complicity in Organized Crime Government complicity in organized crime Partial state involvement may entail more occurs along a spectrum (see Figure 1). systemic complicity of higher-level officials, Political actors within the state may be which is confined to some institutions passive participants at one end, or active or parts of the government, such as the protagonists within organized criminal military or members of parliament from networks at the other end. Lower-level a certain region in the country. Full complicity may involve isolated bribes or state involvement may entail the highest more regular payments to customs officials, officials of the state running organized police officers, or judges, but the corruption criminal activities, as in Guinea-Bissau, is not systemic in those organizations, which has been labeled a narco-state and is not directed from higher-level offices. (Van Riper 2014). FIGURE 1 Spectrum of Government Complicity in Organized Crime This white paper was produced for review by USAID. It was written by Phyllis Dininio, MSI, A Tetra Tech Company, and draws from remarks by the following panelists: Arturo Aguilar, Seattle International Foundation; Crawford Allan, TRAFFIC; Edgardo Buscaglia, Columbia University; and David Kaplan, Global Investigative Journalism Network. It was written under the direction of Brooke Stearns Lawson in USAID’s Bureau for Africa DISCLAIMER This report is made possible by the support of the American people through USAID. The contents are the sole responsibility of MSI and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. The extent of government complicity in power in the country, which they may seek organized crime is largely determined by to tap for political or personal gain. Yet this the quality of governing institutions, and relationship between profits in the criminal especially the rule of law (Buscaglia and van market and higher-level corruption may Dijk 2003). A strong rule of law enforces weaken where legitimate business opportu- laws impartially and upholds systems nities are more plentiful and the economy of accountability and justice, whereas a is diversified. In those settings, organized weak rule of law provides uneven or little crime groups will likely represent a smaller enforcement of laws and is vulnerable to element in government. manipulation. When the rule of law is weak, criminal organizations are more likely to As transnational organized crime has offer bribes, and government officials are increased in scale along with licit commerce more likely to accept them or engage in in the last 20 years, government complic- criminal activities themselves, since they ity has become a greater concern. The perceive the risk of doing so to be low. ascendance of transnational crime groups partnering with states poses a significant Countries with a weak rule of law are threat to democracy and stability—one found in the “partly free” and “not free” that the international focus on terrorism categories of Freedom House as democ- racies in the “free” category depend on a has overshadowed. 1 strong rule of law to function effectively. Government Higher levels of government complicity in organized crime are thus more likely to Complicity Scenarios be found in weak democracies or author- Strategies for tackling government com- itarian regimes. plicity depend on the extent of complicity The degree of criminal infiltration also in and opposition to organized crime at reflects the scale and scope of the criminal different levels of government (Stearns activity. As criminal activities become more Lawson and Dininio 2013). Table 1 lays out visible and complex, it becomes neces- four scenarios for reform: sary to co-opt higher levels of the state apparatus, essentially moving from low-level • The best scenario for reform is found in bribery of customs or law enforcement the top left quadrant (shaded green to officials to higher-level officials. For connote “proceed,” following a stoplight example, cocaine trafficking via containers metaphor), where complicity is confined or transport planes involves more com- to low-level officials, and high-level plex and risky arrangements that require officials oppose organized crime. In this higher-level facilitation than does trafficking scenario, an array of government policies via individual mules. can support anti-crime efforts. • The next best scenario is found in the Higher-level complicity is also more likely bottom left quadrant (shaded light where illicit money is concentrated in fewer yellow to connote “proceed with a little hands and represents a greater share of caution”), where complicity is confined national income (Dininio 2014). For crim- to low-level officials, but opposition to inal organizations, high profits make high organized crime is weak. Mobilizing polit- facilitation payments more affordable. For ical pressure for anti-crime reform may senior officials, high profits in illicit markets provide the best lever for advancing a represent a notable source of wealth and broad anti-crime agenda in this scenario. 1 For the scores, see Freedom House, “Freedom in the World Countries,” Freedom in the World 2019, https://freedomhouse. org/report/countries-world-freedom-2019. Rule of Law and Organized Crime White Paper #2 2 Government Complicity in Organized Crime Table 1 Implications of Government Complicity and Opposition to Organized Crime • The second worst scenario is found in Where high-level officials are complicit the top right quadrant (shaded dark yel- in organized crime (represented by the low to connote “proceed with significant right-hand column in Table 1), a flashpoint is caution”), where some high-level officials typically needed to mobilize the population are complicit and some oppose organized against powerful interests. One kind of crime. Reforms are possible but may flashpoint is electoral fraud, such as the face strong backlash, and careful analysis 2003 parliamentary elections in Georgia of stakeholder interests and resources that prompted protesters to take to the is necessary to identify possible entry streets in what became known as the Rose points. For example, political economy Revolution. Another kind of flashpoint analysis can help identify possible is the assassination of anti-crime fighters, incentives for key stakeholder buy-in and such as the 1992 murders of the anti-mafia openings that may present opportunities prosecutors Giovanni Falcone and Paolo for engagement. Borsellino in Italy, which prompted protests • The worst scenario is found in the that pushed forward the Clean Hands bottom right quadrant (shaded red to campaign. Revelations of criminal linkages connote “stop”), where high-level officials are another kind of flashpoint, such as those are complicit and relatively few high-level uncovered by the International Commission officials oppose organized crime. Direct Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) in interventions with government are 2015, which unleashed months of protests therefore not advisable, although support and led to the resignation and conviction for civil society efforts to advocate for of the president and vice president (see anti-crime measures may be warranted. text box). As these examples suggest, flashpoints have the power to alter the PHOTO status quo when large numbers of people Local administra- mobilize to demand reform. tors, who belong to Social pressure is also an important ele- association Avviso Pubblico or Public ment of reforms where high-level officials Warning, attend a are not complicit in organized crime (rep- march against mafia resented by the left-hand column in Table violence in Polistena, Calabria, Italy June 1). In these cases, social pressure exerted The banner reads: both publicly and behind closed doors can “Administrators help to maintain a government’s focus on at gunpoint.” Reuters/ Tony Gentile interventions and provide a deterrent to the involvement of higher-level officials in Rule of Law and Organized Crime White Paper #2 3 Government Complicity in Organized Crime organized crime. Alongside pressure from • Foster international mutual legal assis- civil society, pressure from international tance to exchange information and organizations and donor governments can evidence about the modus operandi of buttress the political will of government specific transnational organized crime officials to implement effective policies. groups in infiltrating the state that can be used in prosecutions; Anti-Complicity Initiatives • Enforce the public disclosure of public As noted in the first white paper in this officials’
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