Whitehead on Causality and Perception
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INTUITION .THE PHILOSOPHY of HENRI BERGSON By
THE RHYTHM OF PHILOSOPHY: INTUITION ·ANI? PHILOSO~IDC METHOD IN .THE PHILOSOPHY OF HENRI BERGSON By CAROLE TABOR FlSHER Bachelor Of Arts Taylor University Upland, Indiana .. 1983 Submitted ~o the Faculty of the Graduate College of the · Oklahoma State University in partial fulfi11ment of the requirements for . the Degree of . Master of Arts May, 1990 Oklahoma State. Univ. Library THE RHY1HM OF PlllLOSOPHY: INTUITION ' AND PfnLoSOPlllC METHOD IN .THE PHILOSOPHY OF HENRI BERGSON Thesis Approved: vt4;;. e ·~lu .. ·~ests AdVIsor /l4.t--OZ. ·~ ,£__ '', 13~6350' ii · ,. PREFACE The writing of this thesis has bee~ a tiring, enjoyable, :Qustrating and challenging experience. M.,Bergson has introduced me to ·a whole new way of doing . philosophy which has put vitality into the process. I have caught a Bergson bug. His vision of a collaboration of philosophers using his intuitional m~thod to correct, each others' work and patiently compile a body of philosophic know: ledge is inspiring. I hope I have done him justice in my description of that vision. If I have succeeded and that vision catches your imagination I hope you Will make the effort to apply it. Please let me know of your effort, your successes and your failures. With the current challenges to rationalist epistemology, I believe the time has come to give Bergson's method a try. My discovery of Bergson is. the culmination of a development of my thought, one that started long before I began my work at Oklahoma State. However, there are some people there who deserv~. special thanks for awakening me from my ' "''' analytic slumber. -
The New Faces of Realism Metaphysics, Phenomenology, Speculative Realism
Call for Papers The New Faces of Realism Metaphysics, Phenomenology, Speculative Realism University of Wuppertal, November 24-26, 2016 Confirmed Speakers Markus Gabriel (Bonn) Alexander Schnell (Wuppertal) Sacha Carlson (Paris) Georgy Chernavin (Moscow) Florian Forestier (Brussels) Hernán Inverso (Buenos Aires) Conference The conference aims to examine the new forms of realism in contemporary metaphysics, phenomenology, and speculative realism. Fundamental questions to be discussed throughout the conference include: the meaning of “realism” in phenomenologically-oriented ontology and metaphysics and in speculative realism; the possibility, scope, and limits of a non-onto- theological metaphysics–speculative, phenomenological, or otherwise–; the methodological foundations of phenomenology, especially in light of recent challenges from speculative realism, neuro- and cognitive sciences, and the different attempts to “naturalize” phenomenology; the nature of the precise disagreement between the different expressions of speculative realism and phenomenology, etc. We welcome contributions devoted to these and other related issues in so far as they are addressed from the discussion on realism as advanced in recent years by philosophers such as Graham Harman, Iain Hamilton Grant, Peter Gratton, Ray Brassier, Quintin Meillassoux, Renaud Barbaras, Tristan Garcia, Claude Romano, Markus Gabriel, Alexander Schnell, Dan Zahavi, Tom Sparrow, Michel Henry, and László Tengelyi. Although the conference focuses on the contemporary debate, we welcome papers discussing “classical” texts on realism in metaphysics and the phenomenological tradition provided that their contemporary relevance for the recent debate is explicitly shown–relevant texts from figures such as Brentano, Scheler, Hartmann, Ingarden, and Schutz easily come to mind. As a way of promoting and amplify the debate, we particularly encourage contributions that are not exclusively exegetical and that incorporate diverse perspectives and philosophical traditions. -
Mereology Then and Now
Logic and Logical Philosophy Volume 24 (2015), 409–427 DOI: 10.12775/LLP.2015.024 Rafał Gruszczyński Achille C. Varzi MEREOLOGY THEN AND NOW Abstract. This paper offers a critical reconstruction of the motivations that led to the development of mereology as we know it today, along with a brief description of some questions that define current research in the field. Keywords: mereology; parthood; formal ontology; foundations of mathe- matics 1. Introduction Understood as a general theory of parts and wholes, mereology has a long history that can be traced back to the early days of philosophy. As a formal theory of the part-whole relation or rather, as a theory of the relations of part to whole and of part to part within a whole it is relatively recent and came to us mainly through the writings of Edmund Husserl and Stanisław Leśniewski. The former were part of a larger project aimed at the development of a general framework for formal ontology; the latter were inspired by a desire to provide a nominalistically acceptable alternative to set theory as a foundation for mathematics. (The name itself, ‘mereology’ after the Greek word ‘µρoς’, ‘part’ was coined by Leśniewski [31].) As it turns out, both sorts of motivation failed to quite live up to expectations. Yet mereology survived as a theory in its own right and continued to flourish, often in unexpected ways. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that today mereology is a central and powerful area of research in philosophy and philosophical logic. It may be helpful, therefore, to take stock and reconsider its origins. -
Marx, Process, and the Metaphysics of Production: the Relations of Change
Running head: MARX AND PROCESS 1 Marx, Process, and the Metaphysics of Production: The Relations of Change ---------------------- ------- ABSTRACT: In this essay I offer a reading of Karl Marx which deviates from traditionalapproaches. I should like to explicate the metaphysics of process in Marx‟s philosophy. This work will make explicit a Marxianconcept of change and transformation in the flow of history—as Marx‟s vision of history is adynamic unfolding. On my view, Marx‟s underlying structure which serves to support his metaphysics of process is production. In The German Ideology(1845-1846) Marx writes, “The way men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part” (Tucker, 1978, p. 150). It is from the departure of real human relations that we see Marx beginning his analyses. I contend that that these relations (human production) have ontological primacy. As I see Marx as a philosopher of change, I contend that the modern process philosopher is better suited to understand the metaphysics of Marx—and therefore the dynamics of production—in pursuit of the revolutionary struggle. MARX AND PROCESS 2 Marx, Process, and the Metaphysics of Production In this essay I will offer a reading of Karl Marx which deviates from more traditional philosophical approaches. -
Form and Object a Treatise on Things by Tristan Garcia Part of the Speculative Realism Series
Form and Object – Translators' Q&A Page | 1 Form and Object A Treatise on Things by Tristan Garcia Part of the Speculative Realism series Translators' Q&A with Mark Allan Ohm & Jon Cogburn Asked by Graham Harman, Speculative Realism series editor Graham – This was a monumental translation project, done surprisingly quickly. What led you to take on such a weighty piece of work? Mark – In the spring semester of 2012, Jon taught a course on speculative realism in which we read your work, Meillassoux’s After Finitude, and the essays from the early issues of Collapse. We discovered Garcia’s work via your blog and ATMOC. I began corresponding with Raphaël Millière, a brilliant young philosopher at the ENS, who helps run the workshop. We translated some shorter essays to see if we would be capable of a lengthier project. Garcia gave a lecture at ATMOC on Meinong, the English translation of which I’d like to publish at some point. The importance of Meinong’s work cannot be underestimated. What surprised me most about the work being done at ATMOC was that they were (and still are) working across several philosophical traditions. The latter half of the 20th century bequeathed the Anglophone world a very one- sided picture of “French Theory.” The soixante-huitards were like our noble savages. Many important voices were silenced, due perhaps to institutional and sociological pressures, as well as individual and collective decisions about what works to translate. In many ways this Romantic image of French philosophy continues today. In any case, we decided to propose the book translation to Edinburgh, and that summer all of my waking hours were devoted to drinking coffee, smoking cigarettes, listening to copious amounts of walls of noise, and translating the book. -
The Meaning of Hermeneutics and Symbolism
PARRHESIA WWW.PARRHESIAJOURNAL.ORG ISSUE 1 201 INTRODUCTION The meaning of hermeneutics is not something exclusive to hermeneutics; it is not something the hermeneutical enterprise dominates, masters, or even manages. Rather, hermeneutics must understand itself as an activity at the behest of meaning, which it is incapable to exhaust or contain. The meaning of hermeneutics therefore does not belong to hermeneutics, but, on the contrary, hermeneutics belongs to meaning. Its meaning is that which, in one way or another, always pursues and persecutes human beings, who, as interpreting or symbolic animals, is thus limited to a realization of what humans already do—whether explicitly or implicitly; actively or passively—in their individual and collective lives: a search for meaning.1 Now, philo-sophers love and pursue a forever-elusive wisdom, even though, according to Plato, just by the fact of pursuing it, we are guided by it, at least with Socrates and Nicolas of Cusa, to the point of docta ignorantia. In parallel with this and likewise in the search for meaning, be it existential or hermeneutical, meaning. Rather, its evident result is meaninglessness, since, without the felt disquietude of the latter there would not have been any search whatsoever. This search may even lead us to the understanding that human meaning consists in assuming and accepting ontico-literal, effective, patent meaninglessness, so as to thrust it open to ontologico-symbolic, affective, latent meaning. Resignation appears here as the possibility of re- signation [re-signación] (Vattimo) and of as-signment [a-signación], given that the resigned acceptance of the absence of absolute, powerful, and explicit meaning makes possible the acknowledgement of the humanness of our interpretations as such and the assignment to life and the universe of a plurality of linguistic, symbolic, relative or relational, meanings. -
Science and Mind in Contemporary Process Thought
Science and Mind in Contemporary Process Thought Science and Mind in Contemporary Process Thought Edited by Jakub Dziadkowiec and Lukasz Lamza Science and Mind in Contemporary Process Thought Series: European Studies in Process Thought Edited by Jakub Dziadkowiec and Lukasz Lamza This book first published 2019 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2019 by Jakub Dziadkowiec, Lukasz Lamza and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-3697-1 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-3697-5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword .................................................................................................. vii Part I: Towards a Science of Process Introduction to Part I .................................................................................. 2 Bogdan Ogrodnik Chapter 1 .................................................................................................... 6 Formal Representation of Space Michael Heather and Nick Rossiter Chapter 2 .................................................................................................. 19 An Inductively Formulated Process Metaphysics Lukasz Lamza Chapter 3 ................................................................................................. -
Cvsp 202 Fall 2013–2014
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT Civilization Sequence Program CVSP 202 FALL 2013–2014 LECTURE 1 (10th September 2013) ‘Philosophical Background’ [Dr. Nader El-Bizri] [email protected] The ancient Greek legacies in philosophy, in particular the thoughts and experiences of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, influenced the intellectual history of the Abrahamic monotheistic traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, from late antiquity to the 13th century (This document offers simplified and adapted highlights about some of the main concepts of this ancient Greek philosophical background). * * * * * * * PLATO [ca. 427–347 BC] أﻓﻼطﻮن / Πλάτων ‘The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato’ [Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (1929)] The ‘Simile of the Cave’ (Plato’s Republic 514a-521b) Imagine a group of people who lived chained in a cave all their lives, and facing a blank wall on which shadows are projected from objects situated in front of a fire behind them. They ascribe forms to these shadows, and this is the closest they get to reality and truth. Unlike them, the philosophers are freed prisoners from the cave who understand that the shadows on the wall do not make up reality, and who also grasp the true form of the real and its source of illumination, rather than being fixated on mere shadows and appearances. They generally believe that their duty is to free the chained others by giving them knowledge in order to distinguish truth/reality from appearances. A Theory of Forms Prior to Socrates and Plato (in Pre-Socratic times), there were two main Ancient Greek conceptions of reality in the 6th and 5th centuries BC. -
The Mind–Body Problem and Whitehead's Non-Reductive Monism
Anderson Weekes The Mind–Body Problem and Whitehead’s Non-reductive Monism Abstract: There have been many attempts to retire dualism from active philosophic life, replacing it with something less removed from sci- ence, but we are no closer to that goal now than fifty years ago. I pro- pose breaking the stalemate by considering marginal perspectives that may help identify unrecognized assumptions that limit the main- stream debate. Comparison with Whitehead highlights ways that opponents of dualism continue to uphold the Cartesian ‘real distinc- tion’between mind and body. Whitehead, by contrast, insists on a con- ceptual distinction: there can no more be body without mind than mind without body (at least at the level of ultimate constituents). Key to this integration is Whitehead’s understanding that mind, at its most rudimentary, is simply the intrinsic temporality of a physical event. Thus, the resulting form of ‘panpsychism’ is more naturalistic than commonly supposed, and it solves both the composition problem (tra- ditionally fatal to panpsychism) and the ‘hard problem’. I. Introduction In this paper I look at the ideas of the mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) in light of the contemporary debate on the ‘hard problem’of physically explaining consciousness. Consciousness studies is a burgeoning business, but one still marked by partisan controversy. If we look closely, however, we can find consensus behind the controversy. There is, for example, well attested agreement on the structure of the problem space.Onealso Correspondence: Email: [email protected] Journal of Consciousness Studies, 19, No. 9–10, 2012, pp. -
Whitehead's Panpsychism As the Subjectivity of Prehension
Whitehead's Panpsychism as the Subjectivity of Prehension Leemon B. McHenry LEEMON B. McHENRY is Visiting Scholar in the Department of Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90024. 1. Introduction Whitehead's concept of prehension is undeniably the master principle of his process metaphysics. It is the central function of a creative universe whereby the many past occasions become a novel one. In my view, the concept of pre hension is Whitehead's most original and distinctive contribution to metaphy sics. It is also the very idea that prevents most contemporary philosophers from understanding or appreciating his thought. In this paper, I wish to explore the idealist context in which the concept of prehension becomes intelligible. While I do not deny that important influences from physics and biology helped Whitehead frame his idea, I contend that pre hension only makes sense as a concept of panpsychistic idealism. Here I use the term 'idealism' not in the sense of nature dependent on mind, but rather nature understood fun.damentally as sentient experience. 1 This appears to be White head's intention when, introducing the term 'prehension' for the first time in Science and the Modern World, he says: For Berkeley's mind, I substitute a process of prehensive unification. In order to make intelligible this concept of the progressive realization of natural occurrences, considerable' expansion is required, and confrontation with its actual implications in terms of concrete experience. (SMW 69) Whitehead also draws analogies with Leibniz's monads and Spinoza's modes in order to clarify how his novel idea of prehension squares with the notion of individual perspectives interlocked in a system of internal relations. -
Naturalizing Phenomenology, Phenomenologizing Nature
Radical Orthodoxy: Theology, Philosophy, Politics, Vol. 1, Number 3 (September 2013): 504-15. ISSN 2050-392X Naturalizing Phenomenology, Phenomenologizing Nature Ben Schewel ne of the great paradoxes of modern thought has been the relationship between nature and life. For there is no place for life or mind in the materialistic image of the world of external nature deriving from 17th century philosophical and scientific O thought. Yet, clearly life and mind do exist, in that we ourselves are alive, both biologically and mentally. From Cartesian dualism, Deistic materialism, and Romantic cosmology, to contemporary cognitive science, complex systems theory, and enactment theory, we seem incapable of surmounting the tension between naturalism and the fact of life and mind. Though perhaps too simplistic, there is much truth to seeing the course of Anglophone and Continental philosophies determined largely by diverging responses to the question of life, mind, and nature: either a) we put our trust in modern science and the naturalistic habit of mind, believing that a sufficient explanation of the relations between these three spheres will ultimately emerge through sufficiently disciplined and sustained inquiry, or b) we abandon the anachronistic desire to mold philosophy in science’s image, seeking instead to retrieve and explore the patterns of intelligibility internal to human life, as such patterns forever underlie scientific inquiry and modes of intelligibility. Not surprisingly, the first approach has thus far determined the dominant Radical Orthodoxy 1, No. 3 (September 2013). 505 Anglophone approach to mind, cognitive science, and the latter the dominant Continental approach, phenomenology. Yet recently, an increasing number of thinkers have sought to combine the two approaches, to open cognitive science to the descriptive sensitivity of phenomenology, and to ground phenomenology in the rigorous scientific disciplines of cognitive science. -
Form and Object Speculative Realism
Form and Object Speculative Realism Series Editor: Graham Harman Since its first appearance at a London colloquium in 2007, the Speculative Realism movement has taken continental philosophy by storm. Opposing the formerly ubiquitous modern dogma that philosophy can speak only of the human-world relation rather than the world itself, Speculative Realism defends the autonomy of the world from human access, but in a spirit of imaginative audacity. Editorial Advisory Board Jane Bennett Nathan Brown Levi Bryant Patricia Clough Mark Fisher Iain Hamilton Grant Myra Hird Adrian Johnston Eileen A. Joy Books available Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making by Graham Harman Onto-Cartography: An Ontology of Machines and Media by Levi R. Bryant Form and Object: A Treatise on Things by Tristan Garcia, translated by Mark Allan Ohm and John Cogburn Adventures in Transcendental Materialism: Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers by Adrian Johnston Form and Object: A Treatise on Things by Tristan Garcia, translated by Mark Allan Ohm and John Cogburn The End of Phenomenology: Metaphysics and the New Realism by Tom Sparrow Forthcoming series titles Romantic Realities: Speculative Realism and British Romanticism by Evan Gottlieb Fields of Sense: A New Realist Ontology by Markus Gabriel After Quietism: Analytic Philosophies of Immanence and the New Metaphysics by John Cogburn Visit the Speculative Realism website at www.euppublishing.com/series/specr Form and Object A Treatise on Things Tristan Garcia Translated by Mark Allan Ohm and Jon Cogburn For Patrick,