May 2019 CURRICULUM VITAE DONALD P. RUTHERFORD
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Jon Rick Curriculum Vitae
JON RICK CURRICULUM VITAE 204 Hill St. Department of Philosophy Chapel Hill, NC 27514 UNC Chapel Hill Phone: 917-301-6659 CB # 3125 Email: [email protected] 240 East Cameron St. Chapel Hill, NC 27599 Dept. Phone: 919-962-2280 Dept. Fax: 919-843-3929 EMPLOYMENT The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Visiting Assistant Professor, 2009-10 EDUCATION Ph.D. Philosophy, Columbia University, 2009 M.Phil. Philosophy, Columbia University, 2005 M.A. Philosophy, Columbia University, 2003 B.A. Philosophy, Columbia University, 2001 Senior Honors Thesis: ‘Might There Be Normative Internal Reasons?’ Advisor: Akeel Bilgrami, 2001 Columbia University’s Oxford/Cambridge Scholars Program, St. Peter’s College, Oxford, 1999-2000. AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy, History of Modern Moral Philosophy AREAS OF COMPETENCE Practical Reason & Value Theory, Metaethics, Philosophy of Economics FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS MELLON AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES DISSERTATION COMPLETION FELLOWSHIP, 2008-2009, National dissertation write-up fellowship WHITING FELLOWSHIP, Columbia University, 2008-2009 (declined to accept Mellon/ACLS) Dissertation write-up fellowship awarded to 11 (on average) Columbia students in the humanities WOLSTEIN FELLOWSHIP, Columbia University, 2007-2008 Awarded for scholarship in value theory TOBY STROBER MEMORIAL FELLOWSHIP, Columbia University, 2005-2006 Awarded for scholarship in moral or scientific theory JONATHAN LEIBERSON MEMORIAL PRIZE, Columbia University, 2004 Awarded for the best essay showing the applicability of moral or scientific theory to a social or historical issue. Page 1. Curriculum Vitae: Jon Rick PUBLICATIONS “Hume’s and Smith’s Partial Sympathies and Impartial Stances,” Journal of Scottish Philosophy, vol. 5.2 (October 2007). PRESENTATIONS Invited Panelist for a public discussion sponsored by the UNC Economics Club entitled, “What Defines Fairness? Theories of Justice and Inequality,” Chapel Hill, NC, December 2009. -
Department of Philosophy California State Polytechnic University, Pomona 3801 W
ALEX MADVA CURRICULUM VITAE CONTACT INFORMATION Department of Philosophy California State Polytechnic University, Pomona 3801 W. Temple Blvd. Pomona, CA 91768 Office: (909) 869-3847 Office Location: Building 1, Room 329 [email protected], [email protected] http://alexmadva.com AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Race and Feminism, Applied Ethics (esp. Prejudice and Discrimination) AREAS OF COMPETENCE Philosophy of Social Science, Phenomenology and Existentialism, Social and Political Philosophy, Introduction to Philosophy through Classic Western Literature EMPLOYMENT 2016- California State Polytechnic University, Pomona Assistant Professor 2015-2016 California State Polytechnic University, Pomona Visiting Assistant Professor 2014-2015 Vassar College Visiting Assistant Professor 2012-2014 University of California, Berkeley Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow EDUCATION 2004-2012 Columbia University (New York) 2012 (Oct) PhD, Philosophy Dissertation: The Hidden Mechanisms of Prejudice: Implicit Bias & Interpersonal Fluency (Committee: Christia Mercer (adviser), Patricia Kitcher, Taylor Carman, Tamar Szabó Gendler, Virginia Valian) 2009 MPhil, Philosophy 2005 MA, Philosophy 2000-2004 Tufts University (Medford, MA) 2004 BA, Philosophy and English, Summa Cum Laude Phi Beta Kappa Madva 1 PUBLICATIONS “Biased against Debiasing: On the Role of (Institutionally Sponsored) Self-Transformation in the Struggle against Prejudice,” (Forthcoming), Ergo. “Stereotypes, Conceptual Centrality and Gender Bias: An Empirical Investigation” (Forthcoming), with Guillermo Del Pinal and Kevin Reuter, Ratio. “A Plea for Anti-Anti-Individualism: How Oversimple Psychology Misleads Social Policy,” (November 2016), Ergo. “Stereotypes, Prejudice, and the Taxonomy of the Implicit Social Mind,” (Forthcoming), co-authored with Michael Brownstein (Assistant Professor, John Jay College of Criminal Justice), Noûs. “Why Implicit Attitudes Are (Probably) not Beliefs,” (2016), Synthese, 193, 2659–2684. -
Philosophisches Seminar Kommentiertes
Philosophisches Seminar Kommentiertes Vorlesungsverzeichnis Sommersemester 2013 Stand: 05.03.2013 Inhalt: Übersicht 6 Vorlesungen 6, 17 Hauptseminare 7, 22 Propädeutikum 6, 21 Proseminare 10, 36 Hauptseminare 7, 47 Kolloquien 14, 49 Fachdidaktik 14, 50 Ethisch-Philosophisches Grundlagenstudium – EPG 15, 51 Kommentare 17 Hinweise und Abkürzungen 5 Dozenten: Aleksan, Gilbert EPG I: Einführung in die antike Ethik 51 Aleksan, Gilbert EPG I: Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft 52 Álvarez-Vázquez, Javier PS: Historisch-genetische Theorie der Kognition 36 Arnold, Florian EPG I: Fichtes Bestimmungen des Gelehrten 52 Arnold, Thomas PS: Edmund Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie 36 Corall, Niklas EPG I: Moralkritik von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit 53 Cürsgen, Dirk V: Kants praktische Philosophie 17 Dangel, Tobias HS: Phänomenologie des Geistes II 22 Dangel, Tobias PS: Platon, Sophistes 37 Diehl, Ulrich PS: Kants Konzeption der Würde. Interpretation und Dis- kussion 37 Dierig, Simon PS: Einführung in Descartes’ Philosophie 39 Dilcher, Roman EPG I: Platon, Gorgias 54 Dilcher, Roman PS: Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik 39 Enßlen, Michael EPG II: Das deutsche Atombombenprojekt 59 Flickinger, Brigitte EPG I: Soziale Gerechtigkeit – eine künstliche Tugend? 54 Franceschini, Stefano EPG II: Spinozas Reflexion über den Mensch 59 Freitag, Wolfgang HS: Grundlegende Texte zur philosophischen Semantik 40 Freitag, Wolfgang Kolloquium 49 Freitag, Wolfgang PS: Einführung in die (analytische) Philosophie der Zeit 22 Freitag, Wolfgang V: Sprachliche Bedeutung: -
CURRICULUM VITAE January, 2018 DANIEL GARBER
CURRICULUM VITAE January, 2018 DANIEL GARBER Position: A. Watson Armour III University Professor of Philosophy Address: Department of Philosophy 1879 Hall Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544-1006 Address (September 2017-July 2018) Institut d’études avancées 17, quai d’Anjou 75004 Paris France Telephone: 609-258-4307 (voice) 609-258-1502 (FAX) 609-258-4289 (Departmental office) Email: [email protected] Erdös number: 16 EDUCATIONAL RECORD Harvard University, 1967-1975 A.B. in Philosophy, 197l A.M. in Philosophy, 1974 Ph.D. in Philosophy, 1975 TEACHING EXPERIENCE Princeton University 2002- Professor of Philosophy and Associated Faculty, Program in the History of Science 2005-12 Chair, Department of Philosophy 2008-09 Old Dominion Professor 2009- Associated Faculty, Department of Politics 2009-16 Stuart Professor of Philosophy Garber -2- 2016- A. Watson Armour III University Professor of Philosophy University of Chicago 1995-2002 Lawrence Kimpton Distinguished Service Professor in Philosophy, the Committee on Conceptual and Historical Studies of Science, the Morris Fishbein Center for Study of History of Science and Medicine and the College 1986-2002 Professor 1982-86 Associate Professor (with tenure) 1975-82 Assistant Professor 1998-2002 Chairman, Committee on Conceptual and Historical Studies of Science (formerly Conceptual Foundations of Science) 2001 Acting Chairman, Department of Philosophy 1995-98 Associate Provost for Education and Research 1994-95 Chairman, Conceptual Foundations of Science 1987-94 Chairman, Department of Philosophy Harvard College 1972-75 Teaching Assistant and Tutor University of Minnesota, Spring 1979, Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy Johns Hopkins University, 1980-1981, Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy Princeton University 1982-1983 Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, 1985-1986, Member École Normale Supérieure (Lettres) (Lyon, France), November 2000, Professeur invitée. -
Locke, God, and Materialism (Preprint)
Locke, God, and Materialism Stewart Duncan Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 1. INTRODUCTION Early modern philosophers discussed several versions of materialism. One distinction among them is that of scope. Should one be a materialist about animal minds, human minds, the whole of nature, or God? Hobbes eventually said ‘yes’ to all four questions, and Spinoza seemed to several of his readers to have done the same. Locke, however, gave different answers to the different questions. Though there is some debate about these matters, it appears that he thought materialism about God was mistaken, was agnostic about whether human minds were material, and was inclined to think that animal minds were material.1 In giving those answers, Locke famously suggested the possibility that God might have ‘superadded’ thought to the matter of our bodies, giving us the power of thought without immaterial thinking minds. He thus opened up the possibility of materialism about human minds, without adopting the sort of general materialist metaphysics that Hobbes, for example, had proposed. This paper investigates Locke’s views about materialism, by looking at the discussion in Essay IV.x. There Locke—after giving a cosmological argument for the existence of God— argues that God could not be material, and that matter alone could never produce thought.2 In 1 On Locke on animals’ minds, see Lisa Downing, ‘Locke’s Choice Between Materialism and Dualism’ [‘Locke’s Choice’], in Paul Lodge and Tom Stoneham (ed.), Locke and Leibniz on Substance (New York: Routledge, 2015), 128-45; Nicholas Jolley, Locke’s Touchy Subjects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 33-49; and Kathleen Squadrito, ‘Thoughtful Brutes: The Ascription of Mental Predicates to Animals in Locke’s Essay’, Diálogos 58 (1991), 63-73. -
Conflicts Between Science and Religion: Epistemology to the Rescue
Conflicts Between Science and Religion: Epistemology to the Rescue Moorad Alexanian Department of Physics and Physical Oceanography University of North Carolina Wilmington Wilmington, NC 28403-5606 (Dated: April 23, 2021) Both Albert Einstein and Erwin Schr¨odinger have defined what science is. Einstein includes not only physics, but also all natural sciences dealing with both organic and inorganic processes in his definition of science. According to Schr¨odinger, the present scientific worldview is based on the two basic attitudes of comprehensibility and objectivation. On the other hand, the notion of religion is quite equivocal and unless clearly defined will easily lead to all sorts of misunderstandings. Does science, as defined, encompass the whole of reality? More importantly, what is the whole of reality and how do we obtain data for it? The Christian worldview considers a human as body, mind, and spirit (soul), which is consistent with Cartesian ontology of only three elements: matter, mind, and God. Therefore, is it possible to give a precise definition of science showing that the conflicts are actually apparent and not real? I. INTRODUCTION In 1950, Albert Einstein gave a remarkable lecture to the International Congress of Surgeons in Cleveland, Ohio. Einstein argued that the 19th-century physicists’ simplistic view of Nature gave biologists the confidence to treat life as a purely physical phenomenon. This mechanistic picture of Nature was based on the casual laws of Newtonian mechanics and the Faraday-Maxwell theory of electromagnetism. These causal laws proved to be wanting, especially in atomistic phenomena, which brought about the advent of quantum mechanics in the 20th-century. -
Tobias Anthony Myers
TOBIAS ANTHONY MYERS 724 Williams St. Connecticut College New London, CT 06320 Department of Classics 860-439-5293 Campus Box 5447 [email protected] 270 Mohegan Avenue New London, CT 06320 RESEARCH INTERESTS Homeric Studies; Greek and Latin Literature; Ancient Magic and Religion; History of Ideas ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT Assistant Professor of Classics, Connecticut College, 2013 - present Lecturer in the Core Curriculum, Columbia University, 2011 - 2013 EDUCATION PH.D. (with distinction) in Classics, Columbia University, 2011 Dissertation Title: Models of Reception in the Divine Audience of the Iliad Sponsor: Deborah Steiner; Readers: Helene Foley, Elizabeth Irwin, Laura Slatkin, Katharina Volk M.Phil. in Classics, Columbia University, 2008 M.A. in Classics, Columbia University, 2005 B.A. in Classics, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2004 PUBLICATIONS MONOGRAPHS Homer’s Divine Audience: The Iliad’s Reception on Mount Olympus (forthcoming from Oxford University Press) The Mirror in the Song: Self-Knowledge and the Odyssey (in progress) Time and Eternity in Homer, Plato and Augustine (in progress) ARTICLES “Odysseus Through the Looking Glass” (in progress) “The Shepherd Sings the Witch: Magic and Narrative in Vergil’s Second Eclogue” (in progress) “The Adulterers’ Tales” (in progress) “Simaitha’s Daemones.” In Locating the Daimonic: Daimones, Spaces and Places in the Greek World, ed. by Sophie Lunn-Rockliffe and Emmanuela Bakola (volume under contract with Ashgate Publishing) “Ō Poimēn: Addresses and the Structure of the Theocritean Bucolic Milieu.” Classical Philology 111: 1 (Jan. 2016), 19-31 “ ‘What If We Had a War and Everybody Came?’: War as Spectacle and the Duel of Iliad 3.” In War as Spectacle: Ancient and Modern Perspectives on the Display of Armed Conflict, ed. -
Conciencia Y Paralelismo En Spinoza
Discusión Conciencia y paralelismo en Spinoza Luis Ángel García Muñoz Departamento de Filosofía Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes [email protected] En su obra más representativa, la Ethica ordine geometrico demostrata (específi camente en su segunda parte), Spinoza sugiere que todo individuo, sea humano, animal o un objeto extenso cualquiera, está animado en cierto grado (E IIP13s). Y por si fuera poco, que los indi- viduos inferiores como animales u objetos extensos tienen mente. Este asunto, potencialmente agresivo para el sentido común, es tratado por Edwin Curley, quien trata de ofrecer una distinción entre los hombres y los demás individuos con la fi nalidad de expli- car el sistema de Spinoza sin caer en sugerencias tan problemáticas. Esta distinción se encuentra en su libro Spinoza’s Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation publicado en 1969, en el que defi ende que, en Spinoza, todos los individuos que están en Dios tienen mente. Pero los hombres se distinguen de los demás individuos (rocas, animales, etc.) porque sólo los primeros, además de tener mente, tienen conciencia. Lo que caracteriza a la conciencia en Spinoza, se- gún Curley, es la posesión de ideas de ideas o bien de proposiciones de proposiciones.1 Así, aunque todos los individuos, en Spinoza tengan mente, los hombres se distinguen de los demás individuos porque sólo ellos poseen ideas de ideas o proposiciones de proposiciones. 1 Esta caracterización de la conciencia es adoptada por Curley al haber reinterpretado la teoría de las ideas en Spinoza y al haber encontrado en ellas ‘un elemento de afi rmación’ que permite equipararlas con las proposiciones. -
Platonism at the Origins of Modernity Archives Internationales D’Histoire Des Idées
PLATONISM AT THE ORIGINS OF MODERNITY ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D’HISTOIRE DES IDÉES INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 196 PLATONISM AT THE ORIGINS OF MODERNITY Studies on Platonism and Early Modern Philosophy Edited by Douglas Hedley • Sarah Hutton Board of Directors: Founding Editors: Paul Dibon† and Richard H. Popkin† Director: Sarah Hutton (University of Wales, Aberystwyth) Associate Directors: J.E. Force (University of Kentucky, Lexington, USA); C. Laursen (University of California, Riverside, USA) Editorial Board: M. Allen (Los Angeles); J.-R. Armogathe (Paris); J. Henry (Edinburgh); J.D. North (Oxford); M. Mulsow (New Brunswick); J. Popkin (Lexington); G.A.J. Rogers (Keele); Th. Verbeek (Utrecht) Platonism at the Origins of Modernity Studies on Platonism and Early Modern Philosophy Edited by Douglas Hedley and Sarah Hutton A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN 978-1-4020-6406-7 (HB) ISBN 978-1-4020-6407-4 (e-book) Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. www.springer.com Printed on acid-free paper All Rights Reserved © 2008 Springer No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Contents List of Contributors .....................................................................................vii 1. Introduction ......................................................................................... 1 Sarah Hutton 2. Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464): Platonism at the Dawn of Modernity ................................................................... -
Leibniz's Metaphysics
Cambridge University Press 0521403014 - Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development - Christia Mercer Frontmatter More information Leibniz’s Metaphysics Its Origins and Development This is the first systematic study of the development of Leibniz’s philoso- phy. By placing his vast writings in their proper intellectual context and by analyzing unnoticed early works, Christia Mercer shows that Leibniz de- veloped his philosophy much earlier than previously believed and for rea- sons that have not been recognized. Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development offers a major reassessment of Leibniz’s thought. It will en- gage philosophers, historians, and scholars of religious studies. For too long, the history of early modern philosophy has been a tale of tidy progress according to which Leibniz developed his metaphysics pri- marily in reaction to the old scholasticism and the new Cartesianism. Leib- niz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development shows that this story is in- accurate. By uncovering a German school of conciliatory eclectics who trained the young Leibniz, Mercer places his early texts in an entirely new light. By excavating Leibniz’s long-hidden views about substance, God, and method, Mercer exposes for the first time the underlying assumptions and ultimate goals of his philosophy. It becomes clear that Leibniz’s relation to Descartes, Spinoza, and other major seventeenth-century thinkers is sig- nificantly different than previously thought. This study will compel schol- ars to reconsider many of their assumptions -
Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects (2018)
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS This PDF is available at http://nap.edu/25196 SHARE Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects (2018) DETAILS 202 pages | 6 x 9 | PAPERBACK ISBN 978-0-309-47969-1 | DOI 10.17226/25196 CONTRIBUTORS GET THIS BOOK Emily Grumbling and Mark Horowitz, Editors; Committee on Technical Assessment of the Feasibility and Implications of Quantum Computing; Computer Science and Telecommunications Board; Intelligence Community Studies Board; Division on FIND RELATED TITLES Engineering and Physical Sciences; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine SUGGESTED CITATION National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018. Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/25196. Visit the National Academies Press at NAP.edu and login or register to get: – Access to free PDF downloads of thousands of scientific reports – 10% off the price of print titles – Email or social media notifications of new titles related to your interests – Special offers and discounts Distribution, posting, or copying of this PDF is strictly prohibited without written permission of the National Academies Press. (Request Permission) Unless otherwise indicated, all materials in this PDF are copyrighted by the National Academy of Sciences. Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects PREPUBLICATION COPY – SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects Emily Grumbling and Mark Horowitz, Editors Committee on Technical Assessment of the Feasibility and Implications of Quantum Computing Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Intelligence Community Studies Board Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences A Consensus Study Report of PREPUBLICATION COPY – SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION Copyright National Academy of Sciences. -
Consciousness, Ideas of Ideas and Animation in Spinoza's Ethics
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Groningen University of Groningen Consciousness, ideas of ideas and animation in Spinoza’s Ethics Marrama, Oberto Published in: British Journal for the History of Philosophy DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2017.1322038 IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below. Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Publication date: 2017 Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database Citation for published version (APA): Marrama, O. (2017). Consciousness, ideas of ideas and animation in Spinoza’s Ethics. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 25(3), 506-525. https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2017.1322038 Copyright Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Take-down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum. Download date: 12-11-2019 British Journal for the History of Philosophy ISSN: 0960-8788 (Print) 1469-3526 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbjh20 Consciousness, ideas of ideas and animation in Spinoza’s Ethics Oberto Marrama To cite this article: Oberto Marrama (2017) Consciousness, ideas of ideas and animation in Spinoza’s Ethics, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 25:3, 506-525, DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2017.1322038 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2017.1322038 © 2017 The Author(s).