IAC-2020-Commercial
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71st International Astronautical Congress (IAC) – The CyberSpace Edition, 12-14 October 2020. Copyright ©2020 by the International Astronautical Federation (IAF). All rights reserved. IAC-20,E6,1,x57479 Commercial Incentives for Debris Removal Services H. Brettle 1, A. Ziadlourad 1, M. Lindsay 2, J. Forshaw 1, J. Auburn 1 1 Astroscale UK, 2 Astroscale Holdings Abstract As the threat of space debris grows, so does the potential market for debris removal services. This paper assesses commercial incentives for satellite operators to pay for debris removal services and quantifies their willingness to pay. The amount of orbital debris generated in low Earth orbit has been steadily increasing over the years and whilst on- orbit collisions are rare, historical trends cannot reliably be used to infer future risk. The nature of low Earth orbit (LEO) is set to change considerably, with satellite constellations projected to launch tens of thousands of new satellites over the next decade. As the number of satellites in key orbits increases, so does the likelihood of collision, posing a risk to the sustainability of the entire orbital environment. The challenge of space debris can be considered as a tragedy of the commons, whereby individual actors damage the shared orbital environment through their contribution to space debris, even though it is not in their long-term interest to do so. Whilst governments and international frameworks may be able to shape the discussion, the missing enabler has been identifying commercial incentives that could address the problem. As technological solutions to address the threat of space debris become feasible, so must the commercial incentives for satellite operators to use such solutions. In addition to being an environmental concern, space debris also poses a direct threat to the service provision and safety of satellites for a given satellite constellation operator. In addition, ensuring that debris is removed from operational orbit can enable satellite operators to utilise more efficient orbits and optimise their satellite design for operational service. This paper presents quantitative analysis justifying action by commercial satellite operators to remove failed satellites from orbit, strengthening the business case for this new market. Firstly, we assess how debris removal services can mitigate the risk of extended satellite lifetimes. Secondly, we analyse the trade-off between satellite reliability and cost, demonstrating how the consideration of third- party debris removal services can outsource end-of-life capabilities to third-party debris removal services. Finally, we evaluate the value to satellite operators of having access to higher orbits that give them a better satellite efficiency, with debris mitigation risks offset by third-party debris removal services. Keywords: (commercial, sustainability, debris removal services, business case) Acronyms/Abbreviations As the technology for debris removal matures, so • ADR – Active Debris Removal must the business case for these services. Customers are • CAM – Collision avoidance maneuver currently reluctant to pay for debris removal services • LEO – Low Earth Orbit until either there is stricter regulation in place mandating • PMD - post-mission disposal debris removal or a clearer economic case for such • QoS – Quality of service services. The objective of this activity is to identify viable commercial business models for debris removal services. Introduction The successful development of the debris removal market requires 3 core components: viable technology Though it is still nascent, the market for debris solutions, effective regulation and policy, and a strong monitoring and removal is predicted to grow business case for satellite operators to act. There can be significantly in the next decade. The increasing number no successful market without these components. In of launch vehicle providers and decreasing costs for performing this business analysis, we present results to satellite development leads to a rise in the number of support a number of commercial incentives for debris operators in orbit. The deployment of unprecedented removal services. number of satellites in the next few decades will The following arguments demonstrate the business contribute to more crowded and dangerous orbits. case for an affordable debris removal service for large Anomalies in orbit, as a result of strong particle radiation LEO constellations. Different arguments will resonate from the Van Allen Belts or generic malfunctions, will more strongly with different satellite operators, contribute to, and result in the failure of a certain depending on their business strategy. Some arguments percentage of satellites. Debris removal services can are more quantifiable, whilst others are more subjective provide the backstop for the tail-end of the failed satellite incentives. distribution to ensure a sustainable orbital environment. IAC-20,E6,1,x57479 Page 1 of 10 71st International Astronautical Congress (IAC) – The CyberSpace Edition, 12-14 October 2020. Copyright ©2020 by the International Astronautical Federation (IAF). All rights reserved. This paper begins in Section 1 by demonstrating the reported that ‘the majority of installations on the UK value of debris removal services in mitigating the risk of Continental Shelf have exceeded their design life’ [3]. extended satellite lifetimes. Section 2 presents the trade- The difference in other sectors is that regulatory off that satellite operators face between cost and permission is required to extend asset lifetimes, in reliability, demonstrating the value of debris removal recognition of the risk it poses to the environment [4]. services in outsourcing residual risks. Section 3 The trade-off between extended revenues and space illustrates how debris removal services provide satellite sustainability poses a challenge for satellite operators: operators with a responsible way to deploy into higher de-orbiting functional satellites at the end of their design orbits and access the associated benefits, presenting life will protect the space environment but it comes at a debris removal services as an enabling service for cost of potential additional revenue from continued satellite operators. Section 4 presents a number of other operations. elements of the debris removal service value proposition Debris removal services present a solution to this including: protecting operational service (Section 4.1), trade-off, enabling satellite operators to de-orbit satellites managing regulatory risk (Section 4.2), recognition as a beyond the anticipated end of their life, even if they have responsible space actor (Section 4.3) and reducing failed or run out of fuel. In this section, we analyse the insurance premiums (Section 4.4). The main findings of value that debris removal services can provide to satellite this paper are summarised in the Conclusion (Section 5). operators, recognising the economic incentives that they face in extending satellite lifetimes, whilst ensuring that 1. Mitigate Risk of Extended Satellite Lifetimes the orbital environment is protected. We model the additional value in retaining satellites in LEO while It is common practice for operators to keep their employing active debris removal services to ensure that satellites in orbit for as long as they are operational, often post mission disposal can still be maintained. extending beyond their original design life. There are clear economic incentives to do so, given that the capital 1.1 Metrics Considered: Additional Revenue and PMD expenditure has already been sunk in the build and launch Rates phases. In geostationary orbit, nearly a third [1] of commercial communications satellites are operating Measuring the PMD rate is an established way to beyond their design lives, more than double the amount assess the proportion of satellites that have been de- in 2009. Such life extension activities are likely to orbited responsibly. For a given constellation, the PMD increase in the coming years, with TelAstra reporting that rate is defined as the percentage of satellites that are “keeping aging satellites in service is likely to become a removed from Earth’s orbit within a reasonable time trend”. In LEO, there are similar incentives to extend period (currently less than 25 years). Multiple NASA and satellite lifetimes. For example, the Iridium first ESA studies in recent years have shown that the achieved generated satellites were designed for an initial seven- reliability of post-mission disposal operations is one of year mission but many remained in orbit for over 20 the most critical factors in the growth of the LEO debris years. environment. A target PMD rate of 95% assumes that 5% However, such life extension can pose a risk to the of satellites fail and remain on orbit but that 95% are de- orbital environment, as the longer satellites continue to orbited at end-of-life. However, if satellites remain in operate, the more likely it is that they fail and remain in orbit beyond their design life, the number that fail is orbit. If left in orbit, such satellites can degrade, risking expected to rise, and therefore the PMD rate of a fragmentation events that cause further damage to the constellation may drop below the pre-defined target, as orbital environment. ESA’s Envisat had a design life of illustrated in the following figure. five years but remained operational for 10 years before unexpectedly failing. At over 8000 kg and orbiting in a 790 km sun-synchronous