Muhammad Abubakar Rimi
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Click here for Full Issue of EIR Volume 21, Number 50, December 16, 1994 Interview: Muhammad Abubakar Rimi I Nigeria is a sovereign nation, $ld will not take orders from anyb<>dy Mr. Rimi is Nigeria's minister of communications. He was (SDP) in the situation of a two-party system. Abiola was very interviewed by Lawrence Freeman and Uwe Friesecke in lucky, because he did not have very strong rivals for the Abuja on Oct. 12. office he was vying for. Secondly, the only person who was similarly close to clinching the nomination of the party was EIR: How seriously did the International Monetary Fund's Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe, who is currently our for structural adjustment program of the 1980s affect the devel eign minister, and who became Abiola's running mate, the opment of the communications industry in Nigeria? vice presidential candidate. : Rimi: It has affected it seriously, because it has brought For a number of reasons, when the convention of the about inflation, which means that you need more nairas to party took place in April, a number � partymembers decided buy the foreign exchange needed for the importation of nec to vote for Abiola, and Abiola won ihe party nomination. essary equipment and other facilities. The structural adjust When the elections came, he defeated his rival, Tofa, ment program has not been very successful in this country. of the National Republican Convention (NRC). But Gen. The IMF is blaming the government, and the government is Ibrahim Babangida decided, for reaSons best known to him blaming the IMF; but their suggestions and ideas have not self, to cancel the elections. I say that, because as of this really significantly improved the economy generally, and moment, Nigeria has not been told why the elections were certainly this has negative effects on the telecommunications cancelled. Babangida has not made that point clear. But when sector. the election was cancelled, there wete a lot of protests. I have to tell you that I was one of Abiola'$ very strong supporters. EIR: You've been involved in Nigerian politics. You were I was responsible for Abiola's victQry in quite a number of governor of Kano from 1979 through 1983. A strike which areas in the northern part of the country. In my state, Kano, was called earlier this summer by the oil workers just ended. where the NRC candidate comes from, we were able to defeat One of the demands they made was that Chief M.K. Abiola him down to the lowest level of his:wards. And in Nigerian should be made the President of Nigeria and replace the politics, it is not very easy for somebody like Abiola, coming current commander-in-chief. What do you think about the from Ogan, another state, to defeat a native of Kano state in so-called June 12 Movement? Kano. Rimi: I think the June 12 Movement has been very negative. However, when the election was, annulled before the final It has been negative because it has been selfish, one-sided, results were announced by the National Electoral Commis and totally unrealistic. The story of June 12 is a long one, but sion, there were a lot of protests, demonstrations, court cas to summarize: Chief Abiola, a Nigerian businessman, very es, and so on. There was a sense of�nsecurity developing in wealthy, decided to go into politics and to contest the elec the country. People were moving ar0und fromtheir places of tions. At the time he decided to come into politics, quite a residence and business, going baok to their home areas, number of eligible politicians who could contest for the high where they felt they would be more secure in the event of any office of President in Nigeria, had been disqualified by the upheaval following the nullification!of the election. Babangida government, and there was a paucity of compe We felt at that time that something had to be done. We tent, qualified, and suitable Nigerians for that high office, could not allow a crisis to develop to the extent of either a because the government had deliberately decided to deny rebellion or the military taking over by force, or a crisis that others the opportunity of contesting the elections. I'm one of would lead to civil war. We had experienced a civil war those who were banned at that time. before, and we didn't want to repeat it. Therefore, people like Abiola found it very easy to come Therefore, the idea of an interim government was moot into politics and into the limelight politically, and he was ed, first by the Babangida governm�nt, that it was prepared able to get the nomination of the Social Democratic Party to discuss an idea of an interim government with the two EIR December 16, 1994 Strategic Studies 63 © 1994 EIR News Service Inc. All Rights Reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part without permission strictly prohibited. but the government closed its eyes to that, because it wanted to hold the discussions and it �new that without allowing some of us to come into the discu�sions, probably the discus sions would not be successful, bdcause the parties had insist ed that we must come in. There/ were 10 or so people from the government side, and we held a series of meetings in the presidential palace. I came up with a suggestion for an interim national gov ernment, which would be largel� civilian. In fact, our deci sion was that, apart from the mimster of defense, there would be no military man in the interiIri government. That govern l ment should be headed by a ci ilian, and it should stay in office for a period of not more th�n six months, during which new political parties would be fonned, elections would be organized, and the new govern�ent would take over. In this particular proposal, in this particular situation, the existing democratic institutions 'r0uldI stay. That is, the local government councils that are i� place, the state governors and their state assemblies, the national assembly, the senators and the members of the House bf Representatives, despite the confusion and the controversibs over the presidential elec tion. So what we were trying to do, was to organize a new presidential election, not all the other elections. The others Nigerian Minister o/Communications Muhammad Abukar Rimi: had already taken place. "The West has no right whatsoever to dictate to Nigeria who will So, it was agreed. Babangida reluctantly left office on lead the Nigerian government, or what kind 0/ government Nigeria Aug. 26, The following aay, Chief Shonekan, who will have." 1993. was then head of government dJrng the Babangida regime, took over as the new head of the interim government, and a parties, the SDP and the NRC. And if that was accepted, new cabinet was appointed, ne appointments were made, then, since Babangida had announced that he would leave and the government started to work. office at the end of August 1993, the interim government But then, the June 12 supporters kept on attacking the would take over before new elections were organized. The government, saying that it was illegitimate and illegal, and idea was that Babangida would go, his administration would that it must leave office for Abibla. But you see, there was l come to an end, the cancellation of Abiola's election would no way the interim governmen could have left office for have stood, and there would be a temporary government Abiola, because Abiola's election was cancelled. The results that would run the affairs of the country for a few months. in the first place were not finalizJd and officially announced, The basic thrust of that government would be economic and, having cancelled the electiohs, there was no way Abiola activities and maintenance of law and order, and the organi could have been brought back to be President. At the same zation of new elections. Basically, this was what the interim time, there was also the controversial issue of the NRC re government was supposed to do. The parties discussed, at acting, that as soon as the electioJ was cancelled, they accept their various caucuses, this proposal from the government. ed the cancellation, and they we e not going to accept Abiola The SDP had its own deliberations, and the NRC had its as President of the country; otherwise, their own candidate, own. too, must be President. If AbiolJ had been installed as Presi Then, there was this tripartite meeting between the Ba dent, then, as a reaction, there �ould have been violence- bangida government, the Social Democratic Party, and the very, very negative. National Political Convention. Each party was asked to bring In any case, Babangida, whoI cancelled the election, had 13 people. I was one of the 13 from the SDP. The idea of left. His government had beeni out of office. The interim was that each party had 8 principal officers: chainnan, government did not conduct any elections; therefore, it could 13 l secretary, treasurer, publicity officer, and so on. Eight of not be held responsible for annulling the elections. them, the principal officers, not their assistants or deputies, Despite all this, the disagree ents continued. The crisis plus five people who were considered party elders in their intensified, and I think the militfirY decided that the interim own individual right. That is how some of us came in; we government could not control thd situation, and if things were were not party officials. In fact, some of us were under a ban, left unchecked, the chances werd that some military hotheads 64 Strategic Studies EIR December 16, 1994 would have bounced out of the barracks to overthrow the governmenthas a point to make, thal it was calling on Abiola interim national government, and you wouldn't know what and those who supported June 12, ito exercise patience, to the consequences of that kind of action would be.