DOCSLIB.ORG

Eternalist Recurrence

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Eternalist Recurrence Eternalist Recurrence Abstract: In a world of eternal recurrence, history repeats itself infinitely many times over, without beginning or end and without any variation between epochs. In a world of eternal replication, history replicates itself, since there are infinitely many qualitatively indiscernible epochs without an initial or final epoch. But, while you survive across infinitely many epochs in a world of eternal recurrence, you inhabit only a single epoch in a world of eternal replication. In this paper, I argue that familiar forms of four-dimensionalism cannot properly distinguish the possibility of eternal recurrence from the possibility of eternal replication. I then argue that, in order to distinguish these possibilities, four-dimensionalists ought to be dynamic four-dimensionalists and, in keeping with the “moving spotlight” form of eternalism, posit fundamental non-qualitative tense properties. §1. Introduction Eternal recurrence can be a daunting prospect. In a world of eternal recurrence, your life unfolds infinitely many times over, without a first or final recurrence, and without any variation between recurrences. A perhaps less daunting but no less strange possibility concerns, not eternal recurrence, but, rather, eternal replication. In a world of eternal replication, your life unfolds exactly once, but there are also countless lives qualitatively indiscernible from your own, with no first or final replication, and without any qualitative variation between them. So, while the myriad epochs—i.e., repetitions or recurrences of history—involve the very same individuals in worlds of eternal recurrence, epochs are merely qualitative indiscernible in worlds of eternal replication. This is because, in worlds of eternal recurrence, you yourself persist across epochs, while, in worlds of eternal replication, you merely have a plurality of qualitatively indiscernible doppelgangers strewn across other epochs. Your attitudes towards eternal recurrence and eternal replication are likely somewhat different. Since you survive across epochs in worlds of eternal recurrence, you might reasonably believe the normative stakes are higher in worlds of recurrence than in worlds of replication. Regardless of whether this normative assessment is correct, this much is clear: eternal recurrence and eternal replication are distinct possibilities. In what follows, I will argue that four-dimensionalists encounter a problem in distinguishing eternal recurrence from eternal replication. For present purposes, I take four- dimensionalism to be the conjunction of eternalism—the thesis that past, present, and future entities exist—and perdurantism, according to which objects have temporal parts and persist by being partly located at distinct times. 1 Crucially, I will not assume that four- dimensionalism entails a static or reductionist view of tense. This is because, after arguing that the four-dimensionalist model of eternal recurrence presented in Lewis (1986) cannot distinguish eternal recurrence from eternal replication, I will argue that the best four- dimensionalist model of eternal recurrence requires dynamic four-dimensionalism, sometimes labeled “the moving now” theory, rather than static four-dimensionalism, which holds that our perspective on the world is dynamic even while the world itself is static. Since four- dimensionalists must distinguish eternal recurrence from mere eternal replication, I conclude that four-dimensionalists ought to be dynamic four-dimensionalists.2 1 Eternalist perdurantists include Lewis (1986), Sider (2001), Heller (1990), Hawley (2002), and Jubien (1993). Opponents of eternalist perdurantism include Bourne (2006), Merricks (2007), and Haslanger (1989). 2 Sider (2001) claims that the primary challenge with the moving spotlight view is that it is unmotivated. I take what follows to be one route for meeting Sider’s challenge. 2 §2. The Problem Lewis (1986) presents the standard four-dimensionalist model of eternal recurrence as follows: To illustrate, contrast two kinds of eternal recurrence. Some worlds exhibit one-way eternal recurrence: there is a beginning of time and then there is a first epoch, a second epoch just like the first, a third, and so on ad infinitum... Other worlds exhibit two-way eternal recurrence: there is no last epoch and no first, the epoch are ordered like the integers rather than the natural numbers. Then the corresponding inhabitants of different epochs are not only duplicates but indiscernibles. But still they don’t share all their properties, because for any two of them there are sets which contain one without the other.3 According to Lewisian eternal recurrence (hereafter, LER), eternal recurrence is accommodated by an ontological commitment to an infinite number of numerically distinct temporal regions, each of which is a distinct epoch. On the resulting view, worlds of eternal recurrence are infinite in their temporal extent. In addition, the epochs within these worlds are mereologically disjoint yet qualitatively indiscernible from one another. Intuitively, LER envisions the epochs of eternal recurrence as something like infinitely many cut-out paper dolls: each epoch is connected and qualitatively indiscernible from those preceding and following it. Although initially promising, LER faces a serious problem: it cannot distinguish worlds of eternal recurrence from qualitatively indiscernible worlds of eternal replication, where individuals do not persist across epochs. To get a sense of the difference between eternal recurrence and eternal replication, consider Lewis’ own description of worlds of one- way eternal replication where individuals are epoch-bound. (Note, however, that, while Lewis describes this possibility as “one-way eternal recurrence,” the possibility in question concerns replication as understood here. This reflects no deep controversy, merely a lack of Lewis’s attention to the question of present interest.) Suppose, for instance, that ours is a world of one-way eternal recurrence with a first epoch but not last. One of the epochs is ours. Which epoch? There seem to be many possibilities, one of which is the actual one. Perhaps our epoch is in fact the seventeenth; but we might instead have lived in the 137th epoch. So it seems that there is a possible world that is qualitatively just like ours—the same infinite sequence of epochs, all exactly alike, and exactly like the epochs of our world—but that represents de re, concerning us, that we live in the 137th epoch rather than the seventeenth.4 While the various possibilities Lewis notes here are possibilities involving eternal replication (i.e., they are possibilities involving epoch-bound individuals), it should be clear enough that Lewis and other four-dimensionalists ought to accommodate the possibility of eternal recurrence as well. Failure to do so would not only render Nietzsche’s most notable though- experiment to traffic in impossibilities, but do violence to our intuitive modal judgment that 3 Lewis (1986: 63). 4 Lewis (1986: 227). 3 we could relive our lives infinitely many times over or that we could be co-actual with infinitely many doppelgangers.5 For this reason, four-dimensionalists owe an account of what distinguishes eternal recurrence from eternal replication within their preferred ontology of time. With this in mind, I will now present the problem as it occurs within the four- dimensionalist framework. The problem of distinguishing eternal recurrence from eternal replication arises for the following reason: if four-dimensionalism is true, then two worlds—one exhibiting eternal recurrence, the other exhibiting eternal replication—cannot differ qualitatively. Any difference between these worlds must be non-qualitative, concerning either the identity of individuals or some other non-qualitative feature of the world. For endurantists, the difference between eternal recurrence and mere replication is readily explicable: mereological features of the world are non-qualitative, and the worlds in question differ mereologically. Specifically, in worlds of recurrence, objects are temporally extended across myriad epochs, but, in worlds of replication, individuals are wholly located within a unique epoch. Now, since four-dimensionalism entails perdurantism, four-dimensionalists cannot hold that worlds of eternal recurrence and eternal replication differ in their mereological structure as endurantists suggest.6 In order to distinguish between eternal recurrence and replication, the four- dimensionalist might naturally claim that worlds of eternal recurrence and replication differ in terms of the identity of the mereological fusions identified with ordinary individuals. In worlds of eternal recurrence, an ordinary individual, Fred, is identical to the fusion of a plurality of mereological atoms drawn from infinitely many epochs, and Fred’s recurrence is explained by virtue of Fred being partly located at a plurality of epochs.7 In worlds of eternal replication, Fred is identical to the fusion of individuals drawn from only a single epoch. In this way, the non-qualitative difference between eternal recurrence and eternal replication concerns the haecceities of various fusions. In worlds of eternal recurrence, the haecceities of ordinary individuals like Fred are borne by trans-epoch fusions, while, in worlds of replication, the same haecceities are borne by epoch-bound fusions.8 This strategy for distinguishing eternal recurrence from eternal replication requires commitment to what Salmon (1988)
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Experience and the Passage of Time∗
    Experience and the Passage of Time∗ Bradford Skow 1 Introduction Some philosophers believe that the passage of time is a real phenomenon. And some of them find a reason to believe this when they attend to features of their conscious experience. In fact this “argument from experience” is supposed to be one of the main arguments for passage. What exactly does this argument look like? Is it any good? There are in fact many different arguments from experience. I am not sure I understand them all. In this paper I want to talk about the three most interesting arguments that I do understand.1 I am going to argue that all three of them fail. ∗Published in Philosophical Perspectives 25: Metaphysics (2011), pp.359-387. 1I will not say anything about A. N. Prior’s “Thank Goodness That’s Over” argument (Prior 1959) because it is not an argument from experience (even though it is often said to be). Here is Prior’s argument: I can be glad that my ordeal is over without being glad that my ordeal is earlier than this thought or that my ordeal is earlier than 12 noon. But the latter two propositions are the propositions that some opponents of passage (the ones Prior knew) identified with the proposition that my ordeal is over. Prior concluded that the object of my propositional attitude is a proposition that only proponents of passage believe in. Phenomenal experience does not play an important role in this argument. True, there is some distinctive phenomenal “feel” that (sometimes? usually? always?) occurs when I am glad about something.
    [Show full text]
  • Parts of Persons Identity and Persistence in a Perdurantist World
    UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO Doctoral School in Philosophy and Human Sciences (XXXI Cycle) Department of Philosophy “Piero Martinetti” Parts of Persons Identity and persistence in a perdurantist world Ph.D. Candidate Valerio BUONOMO Tutors Prof. Giuliano TORRENGO Prof. Paolo VALORE Coordinator of the Doctoral School Prof. Marcello D’AGOSTINO Academic year 2017-2018 1 Content CONTENT ........................................................................................................................... 2 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................... 4 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 5 CHAPTER 1. PERSONAL IDENTITY AND PERSISTENCE...................................................................... 8 1.1. The persistence of persons and the criteria of identity over time .................................. 8 1.2. The accounts of personal persistence: a standard classification ................................... 14 1.2.1. Mentalist accounts of personal persistence ............................................................................ 15 1.2.2. Somatic accounts of personal persistence .............................................................................. 15 1.2.3. Anti-criterialist accounts of personal persistence ................................................................... 16 1.3. The metaphysics of persistence: the mereological account .........................................
    [Show full text]
  • Duration, Temporality and Self
    Duration, Temporality and Self: Prospects for the Future of Bergsonism by Elena Fell A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy at the University of Central Lancashire 2007 2 Student Declaration Concurrent registration for two or more academic awards I declare that white registered as a candidate for the research degree, I have not been a registered candidate or enrolled student for another award of the University or other academic or professional institution. Material submitted for another award I declare that no material contained in the thesis has been used in any other submission for an academic award and is solely my own work Signature of Candidate Type of Award Doctor of Philosophy Department Centre for Professional Ethics Abstract In philosophy time is one of the most difficult subjects because, notoriously, it eludes rationalization. However, Bergson succeeds in presenting time effectively as reality that exists in its own right. Time in Bergson is almost accessible, almost palpable in a discourse which overcomes certain difficulties of language and traditional thought. Bergson equates time with duration, a genuine temporal succession of phenomena defined by their position in that succession, and asserts that time is a quality belonging to the nature of all things rather than a relation between supposedly static elements. But Rergson's theory of duration is not organised, nor is it complete - fragments of it are embedded in discussions of various aspects of psychology, evolution, matter, and movement. My first task is therefore to extract the theory of duration from Bergson's major texts in Chapters 2-4.
    [Show full text]
  • Travelling in Time: How to Wholly Exist in Two Places at the Same Time
    Travelling in Time: How to Wholly Exist in Two Places at the Same Time 1 Introduction It is possible to wholly exist at multiple spatial locations at the same time. At least, if time travel is possible and objects endure, then such must be the case. To accommodate this possibility requires the introduction of a spatial analog of either relativising properties to times—relativising properties to spatial locations—or of relativising the manner of instantiation to times—relativising the manner of instantiation to spatial locations. It has been suggested, however, that introducing irreducibly spatially relativised or spatially adverbialised properties presents some difficulties for the endurantist. I will consider an objection according to which embracing such spatially relativised properties could lead us to reject mereology altogether in favour of a metaphysics according to which objects are wholly present at every space-time point at which they exist. I argue that although such a view is coherent, there are some good reasons to reject it. Moreover, I argue that the endurantist can introduce spatially relativised or adverbialised properties without conceding that objects lack spatial parts. Such a strategy has the additional advantage that it allows the endurantist not only to explain time travel, but also to reconcile our competing intuitions about cases of fission. The possibility of travelling back in time to a period in which one’s earlier self or one’s ancestors exist, raises a number of well-worn problems (Grey, 1999; Chambers, 1999; Horwich, 1975 and Sider, 2002). In this paper I am concerned with only one of these: how is it that an object can travel back in time to meet its earlier self, thus existing at two different spatial locations at one and the same time? Four-dimensionalists have an easy answer to this question.
    [Show full text]
  • Presentism/Eternalism and Endurantism/Perdurantism: Why the Unsubstantiality of the First Debate Implies That of the Second1
    1 Presentism/Eternalism and Endurantism/Perdurantism: why the 1 unsubstantiality of the first debate implies that of the second Forthcoming in Philosophia Naturalis Mauro Dorato (Ph.D) Department of Philosophy University of Rome Three [email protected] tel. +393396070133 http://host.uniroma3.it/dipartimenti/filosofia/personale/doratoweb.htm Abstract The main claim that I want to defend in this paper is that the there are logical equivalences between eternalism and perdurantism on the one hand and presentism and endurantism on the other. By “logical equivalence” I mean that one position is entailed and entails the other. As a consequence of this equivalence, it becomes important to inquire into the question whether the dispute between endurantists and perdurantists is authentic, given that Savitt (2006) Dolev (2006) and Dorato (2006) have cast doubts on the fact that the debate between presentism and eternalism is about “what there is”. In this respect, I will conclude that also the debate about persistence in time has no ontological consequences, in the sense that there is no real ontological disagreement between the two allegedly opposite positions: as in the case of the presentism/eternalism debate, one can be both a perdurantist and an endurantist, depending on which linguistic framework is preferred. The main claim that I want to defend in this paper is that the there are logical equivalences between eternalism and perdurantism on the one hand and presentism and endurantism on the other. By “logical equivalence” I mean that one position is entailed and entails the other. As a consequence of this equivalence, it becomes important to inquire into the question whether the dispute between endurantists and perdurantists is authentic, given that Savitt (2006) Dolev (2006) and Dorato (2006) have cast doubts on the fact that the debate between presentism and eternalism is about “what there is”.
    [Show full text]
  • Unity of Mind, Temporal Awareness, and Personal Identity
    UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE THE LEGACY OF HUMEANISM: UNITY OF MIND, TEMPORAL AWARENESS, AND PERSONAL IDENTITY DISSERTATION submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in Philosophy by Daniel R. Siakel Dissertation Committee: Professor David Woodruff Smith, Chair Professor Sven Bernecker Associate Professor Marcello Oreste Fiocco Associate Professor Clinton Tolley 2016 © 2016 Daniel R. Siakel DEDICATION To My mother, Anna My father, Jim Life’s original, enduring constellation. And My “doctor father,” David Who sees. “We think that we can prove ourselves to ourselves. The truth is that we cannot say that we are one entity, one existence. Our individuality is really a heap or pile of experiences. We are made out of experiences of achievement, disappointment, hope, fear, and millions and billions and trillions of other things. All these little fragments put together are what we call our self and our life. Our pride of self-existence or sense of being is by no means one entity. It is a heap, a pile of stuff. It has some similarities to a pile of garbage.” “It’s not that everything is one. Everything is zero.” Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche “Galaxies of Stars, Grains of Sand” “Rhinoceros and Parrot” ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v CURRICULUM VITAE vi ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION xii INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER I: Hume’s Appendix Problem and Associative Connections in the Treatise and Enquiry §1. General Introduction to Hume’s Science of Human Nature 6 §2. Introducing Hume’s Appendix Problem 8 §3. Contextualizing Hume’s Appendix Problem 15 §4.
    [Show full text]
  • Taking Tense Seriously’ Dean W
    W. Zimmerman dialectica Vol. 59, N° 4 (2005), pp. 401–457 The A-Theory of Time, The B-Theory of Time, and ‘Taking Tense Seriously’ Dean W. Zimmerman† ABSTRACT The paper has two parts: First, I describe a relatively popular thesis in the philosophy of propositional attitudes, worthy of the name ‘taking tense seriously’; and I distinguish it from a family of views in the metaphysics of time, namely, the A-theories (or what are sometimes called ‘tensed theories of time’). Once the distinction is in focus, a skeptical worry arises. Some A- theorists maintain that the difference between past, present, and future, is to be drawn in terms of what exists: growing-block theorists eschew ontological commitment to future entities; pre- sentists, to future and past entities. Others think of themselves as A-theorists but exclude no past or future things from their ontology. The metaphysical skeptic suspects that their attempt to articulate an ‘eternalist’ version of the A-theory collapses into merely ‘taking tense seriously’ – a thesis that does not imply the A-theory. The second half of the paper is the search for a stable eternalist A-theory. It includes discussion of temporary intrinsics, temporal parts, and truth. 1. Introduction Sadly, the great metaphysician J. McT. E. McTaggart is now remembered mainly for what must be his worst argument: the infamous argument for ‘the unreality of time’. But even this ‘philosophical “howler” ’ (as C. D. Broad rightly called it1) includes enough insightful analysis to have made it a natural starting point for most subsequent work on the metaphysics of time.
    [Show full text]
  • Endurantism Vs. Perdurantism
    International Journal of Database Management Systems ( IJDMS ) Vol.4, No.3, June 2012 CONCEPTUAL MODELLING AND THE QUALITY OF ONTOLOGIES : ENDURANTISM VS. PERDURANTISM Mutaz M. Al-Debei 1, Mohammad Mourhaf Al Asswad 2, Sergio de Cesar 3 and Mark Lycett 4 1Department of Management Information Systems, The University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan [email protected] 2Department of Information Systems and Computing, Brunel University – West London, London, UK {mohammad.alasswad,Sergio.deCesare,mark.lycett}@brunel.ac.uk ABSTRACT Ontologies are key enablers for sharing precise and machine-understandable semantics among different applications and parties. Yet, for ontologies to meet these expectations, their quality must be of a good standard. The quality of an ontology is strongly based on the design method employed. This paper addresses the design problems related to the modelling of ontologies, with specific concentration on the issues related to the quality of the conceptualisations produced. The paper aims to demonstrate the impact of the modelling paradigm adopted on the quality of ontological models and, consequently, the potential impact that such a decision can have in relation to the development of software applications. To this aim, an ontology that is conceptualised based on the Object-Role Modelling (ORM) approach (a representative of endurantism) is re-engineered into a one modelled on the basis of the Object Paradigm (OP) (a representative of perdurantism). Next, the two ontologies are analytically compared using the specified criteria. The conducted comparison highlights that using the OP for ontology conceptualisation can provide more expressive, reusable, objective and temporal ontologies than those conceptualised on the basis of the ORM approach.
    [Show full text]
  • Endurantism Or Perdurantism?
    The embodied self: Endurantism or perdurantism? Saskia Heijnen Contents Contents ...................................................................................................................................... 1 Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 2 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 2 1. Endurantism versus perdurantism in metaphysics .............................................................. 5 1.1 Particulars ......................................................................................................................... 5 1.2 Persisting particulars ......................................................................................................... 7 1.3 Temporal parts: a closer look ......................................................................................... 10 1.4 Wholly present: a closer look ......................................................................................... 14 1.5 Perdurantism and endurantism in action ........................................................................ 17 1.5.1 Fusion ....................................................................................................................... 17 1.5.2 Fission ...................................................................................................................... 19 2. Endurantism versus
    [Show full text]
  • Temporal Parts and Spatial Location
    Temporal parts and spatial location Damiano Costa Abstract. The literature offers us several characterizations of temporal parts via spatial co-location: by these accounts, temporal parts are roughly parts that are of the same spatial size as their wholes. It has been argued that such definitions would fail with entities outside space. The present paper investigates the extent to which such criticism works. Keywords: temporal parts, spatial location, events, four-dimensionalism, perdurance. § 0. Introduction Temporal parts of an entity – according to current vulgate – incorporate “all of that entity” for as long as they exist (Heller 1984; Sider 2001; Olson 2006). For example, a temporal part of Sam incorporates “all of Sam” for as long as it exists. One immediate consequence of this fact is that some “smaller parts” of Sam, like his brain and hearth, do not count as temporal parts of Sam, because they do not incorporate “all of Sam” at a certain time. A suitable definition for temporal parts must exclude such “smaller parts”. In this regard, two approaches have been put forward, a mereological one (Simons 1987; Sider 1997; Parsons 2007) and a spatial one (Thomson 1983; Heller 1984; McGrath 2007). On the one hand, the mereological approach says that such “smaller parts” of Sam are not temporal parts because they don’t overlap every part of Sam at a certain time. On the other hand, the spatial approach roughly says that such “smaller parts” of Sam are not temporal parts because a temporal part is of the same spatial size as its whole for as long as that part exists.
    [Show full text]
  • Objects, Events, and Property-Instances
    Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication Volume 13 Events and Objects in Perception, Cognition, and Language Article 2 2019 Objects, Events, and Property-Instances Riccardo Baratella University of Tubingen̈ Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/biyclc Part of the Metaphysics Commons, and the Philosophy of Language Commons This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Recommended Citation Baratella, Riccardo (2019) "Objects, Events, and Property-Instances," Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication: Vol. 13. https://doi.org/10.4148/1944-3676.1121 This Proceeding of the Symposium for Cognition, Logic and Communication is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences at New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication December 2019 Volume 13: Events and Objects in Perception, Cognition, and Language pages 1-16 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4148/1944-3676.1121 RICCARDO BARATELLA University of Tübingen OBJECTS,EVENTS, AND PROPERTY-INSTANCES ABSTRACT: The theory of events as property-instances has been considered one of the most widely accepted metaphysical theories of events. On the other hand, several philosophers claim that if both events and objects perdure, then objects must be iden- tified with events. In this work, I investigate whether these two views can be held together. I shall argue that if they can, it de- pends on the particular theory of instantiation one is to adopt.
    [Show full text]
  • Objects in Time : Studies of Persistence in B-Time
    Objects in Time : Studies of Persistence in B-time Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias 2009 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Hansson Wahlberg, T. (2009). Objects in Time : Studies of Persistence in B-time. Department of Philosophy, Lund University. Total number of authors: 1 General rights Unless other specific re-use rights are stated the following general rights apply: Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Read more about Creative commons licenses: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. LUND UNIVERSITY PO Box 117 221 00 Lund +46 46-222 00 00 Objects in Time Studies of Persistence in B-time Tobias Hansson Wahlberg Lund University Department of Philosophy 1 Objects in Time: Studies of Persistence in B-time Tobias Hansson Wahlberg © 2009 Tobias Hansson Wahlberg Cover picture: Sydney Harbour Bridge. © Hansson Wahlberg Printed by Media-Tryck, Lund, November 2009. ISBN 978-91-628-7972-3 2 For Lena, Idun and Hannes 3 4 Contents Acknowledgements .................................................................................
    [Show full text]