No. 171 14 July 2015
russian analytical digest
www.css.ethz.ch/rad www.laender-analysen.de
THE POLITICS OF THE PUTIN REGIME
■■ANALYSIS Potemkin Conservatism: an Ideological Tool of the Kremlin 2 By Witold Rodkiewicz & Jadwiga Rogoża, Warsaw ■■ANALYSIS A Devout Ally or an Enfant Terrible? Explaining the Sources and Forms of Ramzan Kadyrov’s Influence. 5 By Emil Souleimanov, Prague ■■OPINION POLL Russian Attitudes towards Patriotism 8 “Can Ramzan Kadyrov Be Trusted?” 9
Institute for European, Research Centre Center for German Association for Russian, and Eurasian Studies Institute of History for East European Studies Security Studies East European Studies The George Washington University of Zurich University University of Bremen ETH Zurich RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 171, 14 July 2015 2
ANALYSIS
Potemkin Conservatism: an Ideological Tool of the Kremlin By Witold Rodkiewicz & Jadwiga Rogoża, Warsaw Abstract This article considers the Putin regime’s turn to a conservative ideology. It interprets this move as a politi- cal strategy to stabilise the regime and prevent any political mobilisation around a liberal agenda in Russia. It concludes, however, that the gap between these conservative slogans and the regime’s actual conduct will undermine its credibility in the eyes of Russian society in the long-term.
Introduction a plethora of grassroots initiatives that aimed at creat- At the outset of his third presidential term, Vladimir ing mechanisms for holding the government account- Putin openly declared that henceforth he would be able to the public, with their discontent with Putin’s guided in his policies by ‘conservative values’. How- return to the Kremlin expressed in massive street pro- ever, in reality the Kremlin has been treating its own tests in 2011–2012. conservative ideology in a purely instrumental man- Another reason why Putin raised the banner of con- ner. Its resort to conservatism has been aimed solely servatism was his belief that the susceptibility of part of at enhancing the legitimacy of the regime by claiming the population to liberal ideas stems from an ideolog- that it reflects Russian tradition. While it is the Krem- ical void, which arose in the aftermath of the collapse lin’s genuine intention to maintain a strong, central- of communism. Therefore, the authorities believed it ised state authority, the conservative social and moral necessary to present society with an attractive ideologi- rhetoric is in fact being used as just another ‘political cal alternative that could fill this void, and thus prevent technology’, i.e. a tool for manipulating public opin- the spread of liberal attitudes and beliefs. This offer was ion, both at home and abroad. The invocation of this aimed primarily at Putin’s traditional social base—the ideology means neither that the current rulers of Rus- poorer inhabitants of the provinces, employed in the sia really adhere to conservative values, nor that that public sector, industry and agriculture. they have a long-term programme to implement them. We are in fact dealing with another kind of ‘Potemkin The Characteristics of the Kremlin’s village’, the aim of which is to divert public attention ‘Conservatism’ from Russia’s real socio-political and economic prob- When deciding to make use of conservatism for shor- lems, and to provide the authorities with arguments to ing up his regime, Putin invoked its radical version that implement repressive internal policies and an anti-West- had previously existed on the margins of Russian polit- ern foreign policy. ical and intellectual life. It was extremely anti-Western and anti-liberal, and called for the revival of the empire. The Roots and Genesis of the Kremlin’s As a result, the nationalist-conservative discourse has ‘Conservative Project’ moved from the periphery to the centre of the Russian Conservative themes are not entirely new in the Krem- public debate. lin’s ideological armoury. They first appeared when Vlad- A characteristic feature of the Kremlin’s ‘conserva- imir Putin came to power at the turn of 2000; recur- tism’ is its predominantly negative agenda. It defines ring again after 2003. At that time, however, they did clearly those phenomena and values that should be com- not dominate the Kremlin’s ideological message, but batted, while its positive programme remains vague and rather coexisted alongside other ideological currents. It inchoate. Its most distinctive feature is its rejection of was only during Vladimir Putin’s last presidential cam- the political, social and cultural models of the modern paign in 2011–2012 that conservative themes were given West. It preaches that Russia and the West represent a central place in his rhetoric, later coming to dominate fundamentally discrepant civilisations. These discrep- the Kremlin’s official narrative and become the main ancies are a consequence of the West’s abandonment of ideological foundation of the regime. the values of Christian civilization, its rejection of tra- The Kremlin’s resort to conservative ideology was a ditional identities and its acceptance of moral relativism. reaction to the emergence of an urban middle class that Such characterization of the West allows the Kremlin has articulated demands for systemic reforms: economic to position Russia as a defender and mainstay of Euro- liberalisation, political pluralism, reduction of state pean civilisation. interference in social life, more leeway for grassroots On the positive side, the Kremlin’s version of con- civic initiatives. The activation of this group resulted in servatism advocates maintaining political and social sta- RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 171, 14 July 2015 3
bility, the revival of national identity, the cultivation of Russian elite, under the slogan of ‘nationalisation of the patriotism, as well as a return to the traditional model of elites’. The Kremlin has initiated a series of laws which the family, state paternalism and social corporatism. In have tightened supervision over the foreign assets and particular, it emphasizes the need to maintain a strong, business activities of Russian officials and employees hierarchical and centralised state power in Russia. The of state corporations, increasing the elite’s dependence epitome of this should be a charismatic leader, whose on the Kremlin. Official propaganda pictures the elites’ authority has a special, quasi-sacred character, despite contacts and business ties with the West as an instru- the formal maintenance of democratic (electoral) mech- ment of their subordination to foreign political centres. anisms of its legitimacy. One of the goals of the new ‘project’ is to demon- This ideology presents society as being rooted in strate that Putin’s policies enjoy the support of the major- Russian tradition and naturally wedded to conserva- ity of the general public, and that the people are opposed tive values. It calls for the cultivation of the traditional to the ideas of liberal reforms. To this end, it juxtaposes model of a large family with many children, as well as the ‘corrupt’ elites and ‘demoralised’ middle class with the reinstatement of the Orthodox Church (and other the ‘ordinary people’, the latter being allegedly faith- traditional religions) as a source of moral principles. The ful to traditional values, and therefore immune to anti- Kremlin’s ‘conservatism’ contrasts ordinary Russian peo- Putin slogans. ple with the elites. The Kremlin thus appeals to genu- ine social sentiments which combine anti-elitism, anti- ‘Conservatism’ as an Instrument of Foreign Americanism and xenophobia. At the same time, Putin’s Policy vision of the state model envisages the role of society as Putin’s ‘conservatism’ was devised not only with a Rus- limited to passive participation in the processes initi- sian audience in mind, but also to be used as a tool of ated by the authorities. foreign policy. In Kremlin’s view, ideology has become an important element of international rivalry, which is The ‘Conservative Project’ in Domestic acquiring a civilisational dimension, involving a choice Politics between different socio-political models. Therefore, the The Kremlin’s reaction to the political and social chal- Kremlin saw the need to come up with an ideological lenges was not limited to the ideological sphere, but also formula that would legitimise Russia’s aspirations to the included a number of legislative and administrative steps. role of an influential great power. Conservative ideology, The Kremlin has taken comprehensive counter-reform- attractive to those political forces that are opposed to ing measures, leading to the further centralisation of Western post-modern liberalism and are hostile to the power, restrictions on political activity and civil rights, United States and the European Union, clearly fitted intensified harassment of the opposition and greater the bill. Invoking this ideology, Russian diplomacy and power of the repressive apparatus. Under the banner of propaganda has been consistently promoting a narrative a ‘conservative project’, it extended the scope of repres- wherein Russia is presented as the main defender of a sion beyond the political sphere, and used it against stable international order, traditional state sovereignty, people who were not direct political opponents of the and civilisational and political pluralism throughout regime. It has penalised behaviours that go beyond the the world. traditional (as the Kremlin defines it) canon of lifestyle Another part of the Kremlin’s ‘conservative project’ and worldview. The broadly defined opposition has also is the concept of the so-called Russian World (Russkii been subjected to a propaganda campaign equating any mir). The concept envisages the existence of a separate, criticism of the government with opposition to Russia as multiethnic and multireligious Russian civilisation such, or even with treason. It has also strove to discredit shared by a community of people, who identify them- the opposition by arguing that liberal democratic ideol- selves not merely with Russian language and culture, but ogy leads naturally and inevitably to the spread of non- also with the traditions of the Russian Empire and the traditional lifestyles and moral decay. Finally, one of the Soviet Union. The primary aim of cultivating this con- government’s most effective tactics has been to brand any cept appears to be the weakening of the national iden- disagreement with the annexation of Crimea as being tities of citizens of post-Soviet states and fostering their anti-Russian and unpatriotic (Putin has described oppo- ties with, and loyalty to, the Russian state. The Krem- nents of the annexation as “national traitors”)—which lin has also invoked this idea in its propaganda to legit- puts any pro-Western agenda beyond the pale of offi- imise the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and cial political competition. the ‘hybrid war’ against Ukraine, pointing to the reli- An important element of the ‘conservative project’ gious, historical and ethnic ties which these territories is the introduction of disciplining measures against the have with Russia. RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 171, 14 July 2015 4
The ‘Conservative Project’: an Effective Tool lin’s authority in the eyes of that part of the Russian elite, Or a Self-Delusional Mirage? which had been expecting a gradual liberalisation of the The Kremlin’s adoption of a new ‘conservative’ ideol- system. The Kremlin’s sharp anti-Western policy shift ogy, and its implementation of this conservative politi- and the annexation of Crimea are definitely not in its cal project, seems in the short term to have brought the interest. Its concerns have been further heightened by Kremlin its desired results. In contrast, however, the the Kremlin’s efforts to redistribute the largest assets. long-term consequences may be unfavourable for the Therefore, in the long run, forcing through the ‘conser- authorities. vative project’ carries the risk of destabilising the regime, For the time being the implementation of the ‘conser- by antagonising many groups within the elite and the vative project’ has inhibited the erosion of legitimacy of affluent social strata, worsening their economic condi- the regime. It has consolidated most of the elite around tion, and undermining their sense of security. President Putin, suppressing the burgeoning symptoms In addition, the Kremlin can hardly count on active of dissatisfaction with the direction in which the regime mass support for its ideological project. The deeply has been developing. The project has also expanded the rooted passivity of Russian society means that even those Kremlin’s mechanisms for monitoring the elites and initiatives that are supported by society rarely motivate delegitimised any action which the opposition takes grassroots activity in accordance with the instructions against it. It also helped to increase public support for of the Kremlin. Many of the conservative demands put Putin and justify the repressive measures taken against forward by the Kremlin diverge from the real needs and members of the elite and the middle class. aspirations of broader social groups. An equally effective means of mobilising public sup- The impact of the Kremlin’s conservative ideol- port for the Kremlin has been the aggressive, anti-West- ogy may also be weakened by the fact that the rul- ern foreign policy. The annexation of Crimea proved par- ing clan itself sees this ideology in purely instrumen- ticularly efficacious, raising President Putin’s approval tal terms. Many of the ‘conservative’ declarations are ratings and consolidating both the Russian public and in fact feigned and used for propaganda purposes; the the elites around the Kremlin. The invocation of conser- Kremlin’s actions do not affect the oligarchic nature of vative ideology has also helped to broaden Russia’s sup- Putin’s system, nor do they translate into an increase in port in Europe among the radical, populist and Euros- the influence of ‘the people’ on the mechanisms govern- ceptic right. It also reinforced the Kremlin’s attempts to ing the state. The extreme materialism and ostentatious establish a tactical alliance with conservative Christian consumerism of the ruling elite stand in stark contrast circles. The ‘conservatism’ proclaimed by the Kremlin to the conservation values proclaimed by the regime, has also been an effective tool against the ‘soft power’ of something which has not escaped public attention. Due the European Union in post-Soviet societies. to its instrumental nature, the Kremlin’s ideology can- On the other hand, among the mainstream of West- not build a lasting and genuine relationship between the ern public opinion, the donning of the conservative government and society, which would protect the gov- mask by the Kremlin has contributed significantly to a ernment against a loss of support caused by the deteri- loss of sympathy towards Russia, and in particular to oration of economic conditions in Russia. its current authorities. In the long run, this conservative ideology will not solve the problem of the fragile legitimacy of the Krem-
About the Authors Witold Rodkiewicz is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW). Jadwiga Rogoża is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW).
Further Reading An extended version of this analysis is available in OSW Policy Brief 48, available from:
ANALYSIS
A Devout Ally or an Enfant Terrible? Explaining the Sources and Forms of Ramzan Kadyrov’s Influence. By Emil Souleimanov, Prague Abstract Boris Nemtsov’s assassination in February and the shooting incident in Grozny in April raised questions about the “controllability” of the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, whose influence has long stretched beyond the boundaries of the North Caucasian republic. This article explores the forms and sources of Kadyrov’s increas- ingly self-confident policies, both within Chechnya and on the federal level. It points to Kadyrov’s special relationship with Vladimir Putin and his economic and security dependence on Moscow as key factors shap- ing Kadyrov’s loyalty to the Russian state. The article concludes that given this dependence, Kadyrov and his de facto paramilitary units—kadyrovtsy—are likely to be used by Moscow as a vigilant force both within Russia against prospectively vocal domestic opposition, and outside Russia in its hybrid wars with neighbors. Therefore, despite growing tension between the Chechen leader and his neighboring North Caucasian repub- lics, on the one hand, and the Chechen leader and part of the federal siloviki on the other hand, as well as his increasingly controversial moves on the federal scene, Putin will continue with his strategic wager on Kadyrov.
n late April, a hitherto unprecedented conflict emerged law enforcement, Kadyrov asserted that “the times, like in Ibetween Chechnya’s head, Ramzan Kadyrov, and the the [early] 2000[s], are gone. Someone wanted to fabricate authorities of the neighboring Stavropol province that soon a result—they took a [random] Chechen and killed him acquired federal proportions. Following an incident in Gro- […] This is not going to happen again […] I’m officially zny, in which a Chechen suspect was killed by Stavropol telling you: if without my knowledge [someone] appears policemen, Kadyrov made bold statements emphasizing his on your territory, no matter from Moscow or Stavropol, exlusive authority over Chechnya’s territory. The conflict just shoot on sight. They’ve got to take us seriously”. In so again drew attention to the Chechen strongman’s increas- doing, Kadyrov clearly hinted at the practice of infamous ingly influential and uncontrollable standing in Russia, to indiscriminate zachistki, carried out by the Russian mil- the nature of his special relationship with Vladimir Putin, itary in the early 2000s, which swept Chechnya, leaving and his possible ousting by the Russian president. hundreds of Chechen males of conscript age either “disap- The incident took place in downtown Grozny on peared” or extrajudicially executed. Thirdly, in an attempt April 19. A group of Stavropol policemen chased an to challenge the lawfulness of the Stavropol policemen’s ethnic Chechen suspect, Djambulat Dadayev, who was endeavor, Kadyrov repeatedly emphasized that Dadayev, killed after his alleged refusal to submit to the Stavropol an ordinary and unconvicted Chechen was killed “on rich siloviki. According to local sources, Dadayev was sus- people’s orders”. “How is that possible”, Kadyrov’s argu- pected of attempting to murder a Stavropol-based Dages- ment went on, “that a group from the Stavropol region, tani businessman, Magomed Tazirov, who had been hos- SOBR [Special Rapid Response Unit], OMON, all the pitalized earlier with severe firearm injuries. Following structures of Khankala are deployed for money? This the shooting, OMON [Special Purpose Mobile Unit]— simply doesn’t make sense”. Fourthly, Chechnya’s inves- the elite Chechen forces formally subordinated to the tigative committee office speedily filed a formal charge republic’s Ministry of Interior, but de facto under Kady- to the Stavropol police. According to Grozny, the latter rov’s personal command—encircled the Stavropol police- severely misused its authority, having opened fire with men. It was only the fact that Russian troops arrived to automatic weapons in the “densely populated area” and the site from the nearby Khankala military base that pre- without informing local authorities. vented the tension from escalating into violence. Soon thereafter, the federal authorities weighed The incident evoked fierce reactions from Ramzan in, when the head of the Investigative Committee of Kadyrov. Firstly, the Chechen authorities were quick to Russia, General Alexander Bastrykin, personally and claim that Dadayev was killed despite his surrender to without any explanation annulled the charges filled the Stavropol policemen, something that the latter and by its Chechen branch. In addition, with the Krem- eyewitnesses have questioned, who point to Dadayev’s lin remaining silent on the incident, the federal Min- attempt to drive away by directing his car at the Stav- istry of Interior denounced Kadyrov’s statements. In ropol police cars. Secondly, a day after the incident, and the meanwhile, Kadyrov somewhat backed off, try- in front of the promptly summoned chiefs of Chechen ing to downplay the conflict, and repeatedly referred RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 171, 14 July 2015 6
to himself as “Putin’s devoted soldier”, ready to resign include the liquidation of Kadyrov’s personal enemies. at anytime. For instance, the mighty Yamadayev brothers in down- This incident is not unique, as Ramzan Kadyrov has town Moscow and Dubai. According to some, Sulim been frequently involved in similar conflicts with the elites Yamadayev’s murder in Dubai in 2009 by Kadyrov’s of Chechnya’s neighboring republics, typically with the cousin, Adam Delimkhanov, and a six-man group of Ingush and Dagestani authorities. Kadyrov’s personal ani- his aides, would have been impossible without the assis- mosity towards Yunus-bek Yevkurov, the leader of Ingush- tance of the Russian secret services, based in the Russian etia, often revolving around the Ingush authorities’ alleg- embassy in the United Arab Emirates. Commentators edly relaxed stance on local insurgents and their support have suggested that Yamadayev’s assassination bears a networks is particularly well-known and long-standing. striking resemblance to the killing of Zelimkhan Yandar- Many observers have admitted that the driving force behind biyev, Ichkeria’s ex-president, in Doha in 2004, an act that Kadyrov’s animosity towards Yevkurov, a decorated officer was certainly executed by Russia’s secret services. Local of the Russian Army, has been the Chechen leader’s grudge sources also remind us that a number of killers—includ- towards and envy of his Ingush counterpart. In the past, ing Lechi Bogatyrov, wanted by Interpol for the murder Kadyrov has personally insulted Yevkurov, which has infu- of Lechi Israpilov in Vienna; Ramzan Tsitsulayev, wanted raited many in both Ingushetia and Russian military circles. by federal authorities for racketeering; and Shaa Turlayev, Likewise, since around the mid-2000s, Kadyrov has wanted by federal and international authorities for the been involved in a series of incidents with the Dages- assassination of the Yamadayev brothers, Umar Israilov, tani authorities over their alleged violations of Dages- and Saigidpasha Umakhanov—have been overtly based tan’s Chechen minority’s human rights, particularly in in Chechnya under Kadyrov’s protection, without fed- the Novolaksky (formerly Aukhovsky) district on Chech- eral authorities even attempting to apprehend them. Inter- nya’s borders. Quite intriguingly, as early as the mid-2000s, estingly, a group of kadyrovtsy, accused by the Moscow the kadyrovtsy episodically carried out what they claimed police of abducting a local businessman in 2011, subject- to be counterinsurgent incursions into Dagestani terri- ing him to severe torture and racketeering, were released tory, which many in Dagestan considered a sign of Gro- upon Kadyrov’s intervention, even though Bastrykin was zny’s barely concealed territorial aspirations. Back then, personally in-charge of the case. These numerous inci- the Dagestani authorities were not consulted in advance dents over the recent decade are said to have antagonized of the ongoing incursions of the kadyrovtsy. The neigh- the federal siloviki, who have come to see Putin’s protégé, boring republic’s complaints were trivialized by Kadyrov, Kadyrov, as an immense threat to the nation’s security. who claimed that Chechen counterinsurgents were in fact Undoubtedly, it is Kadyrov’s special relationship with doing the Dagestani siloviki’s job of fighting the terror- Putin—and the Russian president’s personal backing— ists for them. Economic interests and power aspirations that has granted the Chechen leader impunity against all also seem to have played a role, as evidenced by Kadyrov’s odds. Its roots date back to the late 1990s, when Ram- ongoing conflict with the mayor of the Dagestani city zan’s father and predecessor as Chechnya’s head, Akhmat of Khasavyurt, Saigidpasha Umakhanov, over economic Kadyrov, turned to Moscow in the early months of the control over Dagestan’s key Western city. Kadyrov’s long- renewed Russian invasion, handing over the city of Gud- standing attempts to turn the North Caucasus into his ermes to the advancing federal troops. Akhmat Kadyrov’s own power base have become notorious. Over time, Kady- side-switching has commonly been explained by his ideo- rov’s expansionism, his disrespect of neighboring repub- logical frictions with Shamil Basayev and his Salafi-jihad- lics’ authority, and his occasional undiplomatic remarks ist entourage. Yet, in fact, the Kadyrov family had been directed against neighboring republics’ elites, coupled with involved in a blood feud following the failed attempt to the kadyrovtsy’s infamous impudence, have all generated assassinate him by jihadists in 1998, with the mufti’s sev- significant antagonism between the Chechen authorities, eral bodyguards, all members of the Kadyrov family, dead. particularly its siloviki, on the one hand, and the authori- From then on, and in order to survive, the Kadyrovs were ties and law enforcement agencies of Dagestan, Ingushetia, to unconditionally stick with Moscow, becoming fierce and increasingly also the federal siloviki, on the other hand. proponents of Russia’s counterinsurgency. This eventually In all these cases, the Kremlin has tacitly sided with led Putin to make a strategic wager on the Kadyrov fam- Kadyrov, which explains the Chechen leader’s unscru- ily. This move has been since the mid-2010s widely criti- pulous manners with regard to his neighbors. Moreover, cized by scholars, politicians and observers in Russia and the Russian authorities have ignored—and in some cases beyond, who have pointed to the “kadyrovisation” of the most likely assisted—in a series of politically motivated Chechen regime as the next, and essentially faulty, stage assassinations carried out, as most observers have come of Moscow’s relatively successful policy of Chechenization. to coalesce, on Kadyrov’s orders. Notable examples According to this line of argument, due to these develop- RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 171, 14 July 2015 7
ments—as evidenced by Kadyrov’s recent ruthlessness— trolled by Rosneft, a Russian state-owned oil company, the Chechen leader has grown to become uncontrollable with the Chechen authorities effectively excluded from by Moscow, as he possesses substantial military, economic, this stable and significant source of money. Over the and political resources. In a scenario in which Moscow course of recent years, Kadyrov has built for himself sought to oust Kadyrov, then a new armed conflict may a reputation as a caring father of a nation—this repu- commence between Chechnya and federal authorities. tation has been contingent upon his personal ties with This opinion neglects a number of important factors. Putin, which has enabled him to acquire considerable Since the late 2010s, the threat posed by Chechen jihad- financial resources for Chechnya’s reconstruction and ists has decreased considerably, not least owing to the relatively developed welfare provision. massive deployment of violence by the kadyrovtsy against, However, as of yet, the Kremlin is not interested in inter alia, the insurgents’ relatives and supporters. How- ousting Kadyrov. First and foremost, Putin is notori- ever, the use of brute force against a wide spectrum of ously grateful to those who have been personally loyal the Chechen populace initially supportive of the insur- to him, closing his eyes to their occasional flaws. The gents has earned Kadyrov and his troops thousands of Chechen leader has on many occasions proved his loy- avengers, who have postponed their retaliation for bet- alty to Putin whom he, according to some local observers, ter times in order to save their relatives’ lives now. If the has—after his father’s assassination in 2004—come to Russians cease to back Kadyrov, the Chechen leader and view and admire as his step-father. Kadyrov has largely his family may turn into targets of retaliation. Kadyrov crushed Chechnya’s once-formidable insurgency, which is certainly aware of this fact. Putin—who owes his political career to the manage- Consequently, in the hypothetical event of military ment of the violent conflict in the North Caucasus— confrontation between Grozny and Moscow, the kady- certainly appreciates. Besides, Kadyrov has developed rovtsy may be not as loyal to the Chechen leader as one into a villain of epic proportions, whom the Kremlin would assume, prioritizing their own personal survival may at some point be eager to use. Within Russia, the and that of their family members over Kadyrov’s polit- Chechen armed units allocated to the enfant terrible ical agenda. Interestingly, following the liquidation of of federal politics may be deployed as a sort of vigilant the Yamadayev brothers, their units, the yamadayevtsy, force against the prospectively vocal opposition move- were relatively easily incorporated into the kadyrovtsy in ment, an all the more important task given the Russian the late 2000s, after Kadyrov’s paramilitaries threatened authorities’ paranoid fear of “color revolutions” and the to target the former’s relatives. It is likely that when fac- expected decline of the nation’s economy. Beyond Rus- ing a similar situation, the kadyrovtsy, a similarly orga- sia’s borders, too, the kadyrovtsy may serve a use, as evi- nized and motivated force, would hardly be willing to denced by their deployment in both overrunning Crimea risk their own and their relatives’ lives for the sake of and in the fighting in eastern Ukraine. In both internal their leader. In addition, given the scope of Kadyrov’s and external cases, the deployment of Kadyrov, a feared enemies within and outside Chechnya, Kadyrov may person with a feared military force, may help Moscow to be assassinated by the Russian security services in the distance itself from using controversial violence on the event of his disloyalty, with responsibility ascribed to ground, while letting its proxy do the dirty job. the Chechen leader’s various enemies. It is, thus, fairly safe to assume that, provided Kady- Even more so, the Chechen regime, heavily depen- rov remains personally loyal to Putin and does not cross dent on direct money transfers from Moscow, would any red lines, the Russian president will not be inter- barely survive a month without federal financial injec- ested in ousting him, tolerating his protégé’s occasional tions. As of now, the North Caucasian republic’s budget eccentricity. As of yet, in light of the current and pro- is largely made up of federal money; its share oscillates spective advantages of Kadyrov for these aims, Putin around 90 per cent of the total Chechnya’s budget. Mos- hardly has an incentive to dispose of the Chechen leader. cow has gone the extra mile to ensure Grozny’s economic An insignificant small incident with Stavropol police- dependence on the federal center. For instance, despite men would surely not be regarded by the Russian pres- the Chechen leader’s numerous attempts to change the ident as such a red line. situation, profits from the sale of Chechen oil are con-
About the Author Emil Aslan Souleimanov is Associate Professor of Russian and East European Studies at Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic. He has recently authored The Individual Disengagement of Avengers, Nationalists, and Jihadists(Pal - grave Macmillan, 2014, with Huseyn Aliyev) and “Asymmetry of Values, Indigenous Forces, and Incumbent Success in Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Chechnya”, Journal of Strategic Studies (forthcoming in 2015, with Huseyn Aliyev). RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 171, 14 July 2015 8
OPINION POLL
Russian Attitudes towards Patriotism
Figure 1: With Which of the Following Opinions on Patriotism Do You Agree Most of All?
April 2015 80% 7% 13%
October 2014 82% 8% 11%
February 2014 84% 7% 9%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Patriotism is a profoundly personal feeling, everybody should determine for themselves what is patriotic and what is not patriotic Difficult to say The state should define what is patriotic and what is not patriotic
Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, 17–20 April 2015, N = 1600
Figure 2: With Which of the Following Opinions on the State Program for the Patriotic Educa- tion of Russian Citizens Do You Agree Most of All?
Such a program is indispensable, because at present, in the face of foreign and domestic threats, the state should educate patriots who are prepared to defend 49% the interests of the country
Such a program is indispensable, but it can easily become a sinecure for bureaucrats, not leading to actual results
Such a program is not necessary, as more important problems (corruption, low standard of living and so 8% forth) have to be solved first; if these problems are solved, people will be patriotic 19%
8% Such a program is not necessary, as patriotism is a private matter for everyone and the state should not interfere no matter what 16%
Difficult to say
Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, 17–20 April 2015, N = 1600
Figure 3: Do You Consider Yourself a Russian Patriot?
April 2015 78% 11% 11%
October 2013 69% 13% 19%
December 2010 70% 11% 19%
December 2007 78% 9% 12%
October 2000 77% 7% 16%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Yes Difficult to say No
Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, 17–20 April 2015, N = 1600
“Can Ramzan Kadyrov Be Trusted?”
Figure 1: What Do You Think, Can Ramzan Kadyrov Be Trusted? (in %)
March 2015 17 38 24 15 6
December 2006 6 27 32 22 14
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Definitely yes Probably yes Difficult to say Probably not Definitely not
Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, 20–23 March 2015, N = 1600
Figure 2: Which Feelings Does Ramzan Kadyrov Evoke? (in %)
Respect 21 Sympathy
Cannot say anything bad about him 14 25 Neutral feelings, indifference
Cannot say anything good about him
Irritation 21 7 Dislike 8 3 2 Difficult to say
Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, 23–26 January 2015, N = 1600
Table 1: What Are the Consequences of the Work of Ramzan Kadyrov as President of Chechnya? (Several Answers Possible) (in %) April 2007 April 2009 November 2011 January 2015 March 2015 The Kadyrov clan has 27 26 30 38 35 established full control over Chechnya Full pacification of and 18 20 13 26 33 peaceful life in Chechnya Growth of conflict between 15 8 11 9 10 the Kadyrov clan and other Chechen clans Growth of anti-Russian 7 2 6 3 3 sentiment in Chechnya Gradual isolation of 11 11 10 3 3 Chechnya from Russia, loss of control over Chechnya by the federal center Growth of chaos and disor- 6 5 5 4 3 der in Chechnya Difficult to say 35 32 34 22 20 Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, April 2007 to 20–23 March 2015, N = 1600
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Editors: Stephen Aris, Matthias Neumann, Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perović, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder, Aglaya Snetkov The Russian Analytical Digest is a bi-weekly internet publication jointly produced by the Research Centre for East European Studies [Forschungs stelle Osteuropa] at the University of Bremen (
Any opinions expressed in the Russian Analytical Digest are exclusively those of the authors. Reprint possible with permission by the editors. Editors: Stephen Aris, Matthias Neumann, Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perović, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder, Aglaya Snetkov Layout: Cengiz Kibaroglu, Matthias Neumann, Michael Clemens ISSN 1863-0421 © 2015 by Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Bremen and Center for Security Studies, Zürich Research Centre for East European Studies • Publications Department • Klagenfurter Str. 3 • 28359 Bremen •Germany Phone: +49 421-218-69600 • Telefax: +49 421-218-69607 • e-mail: [email protected] • Internet: