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U.S. Set to Keep Kill Lists for Years ‘Disposition Matrix’ Secretly Crafted Blueprint Would Guide Hunt for Terrorists

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U.S. Set to Keep Kill Lists for Years ‘Disposition Matrix’ Secretly Crafted Blueprint Would Guide Hunt for Terrorists ABCDE WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2012 THE PERMANENT WAR U.S. set to keep kill lists for years ‘Disposition matrix’ secreTLY CRAFTED Blueprint would guide hunt for terrorists by Greg Miller Over the past two years, the Obama ad- and carrying out strikes is “a necessary part ministration has been secretly developing a of what we do. We’re not going to wind up new blueprint for pursuing terrorists, a next- in 10 years in a world of everybody holding generation targeting list called the “disposi- hands and saying, ‘We love America.’ ” tion matrix.” That timeline suggests that the Unit- The matrix contains the names of ter- ed States has reached only the midpoint of rorism suspects arrayed against an account- what was once known as the global war on ing of the resources being marshaled to track terrorism. Targeting lists that were regarded them down, including sealed indictments as finite emergency measures after the at- and clandestine operations. U.S. officials tacks of Sept. 11, 2001, are now fixtures of said the database is designed to go beyond the national security apparatus. The rosters existing kill lists, mapping plans for the “dis- expand and contract with the pace of drone position” of suspects beyond the reach of strikes but never go to zero. drones. Meanwhile, a significant milestone Although the matrix is a work in prog- looms: The number of militants and civil- ress, the effort to create it reflects a reality ians killed in the drone campaign over the setting in among the nation’s counterterror- past 10 years will soon exceed 3,000 by some ism ranks: The United States’ conventional estimates, surpassing the number of people wars are winding down, but al-Qaeda killed in the Sept. the government expects to 11 attacks. continue adding names to The Obama adminis- kill or capture lists for years. tration has highlighted its Among senior Obama successes against the terror- administration officials, ist network, including the there is a broad consensus death of Osama bin Laden, that such operations are ROB JENSEN/U.S. AIR FORCE VIA GETTY IMAGES as signature achievements likely to be extended at least The United States operates that argue for President another decade. Given the multiple drone programs. Obama’s reelection. The ad- way al-Qaeda continues to washingtonpost.com ministration has taken ten- Tracking the drone war: For metastasize, some officials 6 a detailed look at a database tative steps toward greater said no clear end is in sight. of individual drone strikes, transparency, formally ac- including numbers, locations and “We can’t possibly kill related news reports, go to knowledging for the first everyone who wants to harm apps.washingtonpost.com/ time the United States’ use foreign/drones. us,” a senior administration Video: To see a video about of armed drones. official said. Generating lists D the targeted killing program, Less visible is the ex- go to washingtonpost.com. WEDNESDAY, OCTOBERgp 24, 2012 KLMNO PAGE 2 OF 7 REUTERS A houseA house was destroyed was bydestroyed a U.S. drone strikeby a inU.S. the eastern drone province strike of Hadramoutin the eastern in September. province In Yemen, of the Hadramout number of militants in September. on the list has ranged In Yemen, from 10 to the 15, officials said, and is not likely to slip into the single digits soon, even though there have been 36 U.S. airstrikes this year. YemenYemen number of militants on the list has ranged from 10 to 15, officials said, and is not likely to slip into the single digits soon, even though there have been 36 U.S. airstrikes this year. tent to which Obama has institutionalized gram and return to its pre-Sept. 11 focus on the highly classified practice of targeted gathering intelligence. killing, transforming ad-hoc elements into The U.S. Joint Special Operations Com- a counterterrorism infrastructure capable mand, which carried out the raid that killed of sustaining a seemingly permanent war. bin Laden, has moved commando teams Spokesmen for the White House, the Na- into suspected terrorist hotbeds in Africa. tional Counterterrorism Center, the CIA and A rugged U.S. outpost in Djibouti has been other agencies declined to comment on the transformed into a launching pad for coun- matrix or other counterterrorism programs. terterrorism operations across the Horn of Privately, officials acknowledge that the Africa and the Middle East. development of the matrix is part of a series JSOC also established a secret target- of moves, in Washington and overseas, to ing center across the Potomac River from embed counterterrorism tools into U.S. poli- Washington, U.S. officials said. The elite cy for the long haul. command’s targeting cells have tradition- White House counterterrorism adviser ally been located near the front lines of its John O. Brennan is seeking to codify the missions, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. administration’s approach to generating But JSOC created a “national capital region” capture/kill lists, part of a broader effort to task force that is a 15-minute commute from guide future administrations through the the White House so it could be more direct- counterterrorism processes Obama has em- ly involved in deliberations about al-Qaeda braced. lists. CIA Director David H. Petraeus is push- The developments were described by ing to expand the agency’s fleet of armed current and former officials from the White drones, U.S. officials said. The proposal, House and the Pentagon, as well as intelli- which would need White House approval, gence and counterterrorism agencies. Most reflects the agency’s transformation into a spoke on the condition of anonymity because paramilitary force, and makes clear that it of the sensitivity of the subject. does not intend to dismantle its drone pro- These counterterrorism components WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2012 KLMNO PAGE 3 OF 7 have been affixed to a legal foundation for targeted killing that the Obama administra- tion has discussed more openly over the past year. In a series of speeches, administration officials have cited legal bases, including the congressional authorization to use military force granted after the Sept. 11 attacks, as well as the nation’s right to defend itself. Critics contend that those justifications have become more tenuous as the drone campaign has expanded far beyond the core group of al-Qaeda operatives behind the strikes on New York and Washington. Crit- ics note that the administration still doesn’t confirm the CIA’s involvement or the identi- ties of those killed. Certain strikes are now under legal challenge, including the killings last year in Yemen of U.S.-born al-Qaeda op- erative Anwar al-Awlaki and his 16-year-old son. Counterterrorism experts said the reli- ance on targeted killing is self-perpetuating, yielding undeniable short-term results that may obscure long-term costs. “The problem with the drone is it’s like your lawn mower,” said Bruce Riedel, a for- mer CIA analyst and Obama counterterror- secret prisons ended a program that had ism adviser. “You’ve got to mow the lawn all become a source of international scorn, but the time. The minute you stop mowing, the it also complicated the pursuit of terrorists. grass is going to grow back.” Unless a suspect surfaced in the sights of a drone in Pakistan or Yemen, the United An evolving database States had to scramble to figure out what to The United States now operates multi- do. ple drone programs, including acknowledged “We had a disposition problem,” said U.S. military patrols over conflict zones in a former U.S. counterterrorism official in- Afghanistan and Libya, and classified CIA volved in developing the matrix. surveillance flights over Iran. Strikes against The database is meant to map out con- al-Qaeda, however, are carried out under tingencies, creating an operational menu secret lethal programs involving the CIA that spells out each agency’s role in case a and JSOC. The matrix was developed by the suspect surfaces in an unexpected spot. “If NCTC, under former director Michael Leit- he’s in Saudi Arabia, pick up with the Sau- er, to augment those organizations’ separate dis,” the former official said. “If traveling but overlapping kill lists, officials said. overseas to al-Shabab [in Somalia], we can The result is a single, continually evolv- pick him up by ship. If in Yemen, kill or have ing database in which biographies, locations, the Yemenis pick him up.” known associates and affiliated organiza- Officials declined to disclose the identi- tions are all catalogued. So are strategies for ties of suspects on the matrix. They pointed, taking targets down, including extradition however, to the capture last year of alleged requests, capture operations and drone pa- al-Qaeda operative Ahmed Abdulkadir trols. Warsame off the coast of Yemen. Warsame Obama’s decision to shutter the CIA’s was held for two months aboard a U.S. ship WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2012 KLMNO PAGE 4 OF 7 before being transferred to Justice Depart- United States adapt to al-Qaeda’s morphing ment custody and charged in federal court structure and its efforts to exploit turmoil in New York. across North Africa and the Middle East. “Warsame was a classic case of ‘What A year after Defense Secretary Leon E. are we going to do with him?’ ” the former Panetta declared the core of al-Qaeda near counterterrorism official said. In such cases, strategic defeat, officials see an array of the matrix lays out plans, including which emerging threats beyond Pakistan, Yemen U.S. naval vessels are in the area and which and Somalia — the three countries where charges the Justice Department should pre- almost all U.S.
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