How have the US administrations since 9/11 discursively legitimised violent counterterrorism and what effects has its practice had in ?

MA Thesis Global Conflict in the Modern Era Théophile Hughes s1912429 Supervisor: Lukas Milevski Words: 13840

1 Table of Contents 1) Introduction ...... 3 2) Literature review/Theoretical positioning ...... 4 2.1) ...... 4 2.2) and Drone Warfare ...... 6 3) Methodology ...... 9 4) Discursively legitimising violent counterterrorism after 9/11 ...... 13 4.1) The Bush Administration ...... 14 4.1.1) Framing the 9/11 attacks ...... 14 4.1.2) US(A) vs. “them” and the threat of terrorism ...... 15 4.2) The Obama Administration ...... 19 4.2.1) Terrorism and War ...... 20 4.2.2) American exceptionalism and Civilisation vs. Barbarism ...... 22 4.2.3) The threat of terrorism ...... 24 4.3) The Trump Administration ...... 26 4.3.1) Civilisation vs. Barbarism and American Exceptionalism ...... 26 4.3.2) The threat of terrorism and the need to act ...... 27 5) US violent counterterrorism in practice: the case of Yemen ...... 29 5.1) Context of US’ military involvement in Yemen: a brief overview ...... 30 5.1.1) Yemeni politics and the GWOT ...... 30 5.1.2) The Saudi-led, US-supported war in Yemen ...... 31 5.2) Violent US counterterrorism in Yemen since 9/11: objectives and means ...... 33 5.2.1) Objectives ...... 33 5.2.2) Means ...... 33 5.3) Effects of US military involvement in Yemen...... 39 5.3.1) US support for the Saudi-led war vs. US counterterrorism objectives ...... 39 5.3.2) Violent US counterterrorism in Yemen: a model for counterterrorism? ...... 41 5.3.3) Broader implications ...... 46 6) Conclusion ...... 51 7) Appendix ...... 52 7.1) George W. Bush ...... 52 7.2) Barrack Obama ...... 53 7.3) Donald Trump ...... 54 8) Bibliography...... 55

2 1) Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of the events that took place on the 11th of September, 2001, the US administration led by George W. Bush declared the Global (GWOT). In the name of fighting terrorism, the US has since launched two fully fledged wars, has declared using military force in 6 countries,1 has troops in combat in 14 countries2 and is currently actively involved in abetting the use of violence to “fight terror” in 80 countries.3 This essay critically engages with the legitimacy and efficacy of the use of violence to counter the incidence and prevalence of terrorism. Indeed, despite the US’ efforts, it has failed to achieve the main objectives of the GWOT, namely: making Americans safe from terrorism, preventing the incidence of terrorism, defeating specific terrorist organisations – such as Al Qaeda and the – and reducing the conditions that fuel terrorism.4 On the contrary, non-state terrorist organisations have grown as has the number of non-state terrorist attacks.5 Further, as the incidence and threat of terrorism has grown, that the US has sent over 2.5 million of its citizens into harm’s way to fight terrorism and that nearly 7000 have died as a result, the US has also failed to protect Americans from terrorism.6 Accordingly, this paper questions the extent to which the US’ use of violence has been effective at reducing terrorism. In order to do so, it compares and contrasts the language used by the US administrations since 9/11 to legitimise violent counterterrorism, with the effects of violent US counterterrorism in Yemen.

The research question this paper seeks to answer is: how have the US administrations since 9/11 discursively legitimised violent counterterrorism and what effects has its practice had in Yemen? After outlining the relevant literature and the methodology, the essay analyses how the terrorism discourses of successive US administrations justify and naturalise the notion that the use of violence is a legitimate and

1 The White House, (2016), “Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the ’ Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations”, https://fas.org/man/eprint/frameworks.pdf 2 Savell, S. (2019), “This Map Shows Where in the World the U.S. Military Is Combatting Terrorism”, Smithsonian Magazine, January 2019 https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/map-shows-places-world- where-us-military-operates-180970997/ 3 ibid. 4 Bush Administration, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, pp. 11-12 5 Institute for Economics & Peace (2018), “Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the impact of terrorism”, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf 6 Goepner, E. (2016), “Measuring the Effectiveness of America’s War on Terror”, Parameters, 46(1), pp. 107- 108

3 effective method to reduce terrorism. The following chapter contrasts this with the effects of violent US counterterrorism in Yemen. Finally, the paper discusses the broader implications of the Yemen case study with regards to the rift between the discursive legitimisations of violent counterterrorism and its effects in practice. The research concludes that, contrary to the official discourses, the US’ practice of violent counterterrorism has been strategically ineffective and morally condemnable.

2) Literature review/Theoretical positioning

2.1) Terrorism

The literature on the topic of terrorism is extensive and diverse. It comprises thousands of publications, leading journals and contributors from many different subject- areas within the social sciences. Terrorism literature includes discussions on – among others – the definition of terrorism,7 the different types of terrorism,8 the causes of terrorism,9 the appropriate responses to terrorism10 and the scale and scope of the terrorist threat.11 These issues are highly contentious and remain hot topics of scholarly debate.12

Terrorism literature lacks an agreed definition on the concept of terrorism as well as a cohesive theory and methodology for studying and producing knowledge about terrorism.13 Further, terrorism studies have typically been characterised by an over-reliance

7 Schmid, A. (2010), “Frameworks for conceptualising terrorism”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(2), pp. 197-221 8 Rapoport, D. (2001), “The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism”, Current History, 100(650), pp. 419-424 9 See for example: Crenshaw, M. (1981), “The Causes of Terrorism”, Comparative Politics, 13 (4), pp. 379-399 and Bjørgo, T. (2005), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward, (Abingdon: Routledge) 10 Bjørgo, T. (2013), Strategies for Preventing Terrorism, (London: Palgrave MacMillan), Cronin, A. (2009), How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Hoffman, B. (2009), “A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 21(3), pp. 359-377 11 Mueller, J. (2005), “Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration”, International Studies Perspectives, 6(2), pp. 208-234; Mueller, J. and Stewart, M. (2012), “The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to September 11”, International Security, 37(1), pp. 81–110 12 Ranstorp, M. (2009), “Mapping terrorism studies after 9/11”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), pp. 13-33; Gunning, J. (2007), “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies”, Government and Opposition, 42(3), pp. 363-393; Jackson, R.; Toros, H.; Jarvis, L. and Heath-Kelly, C. (2017), “Introduction: 10 years of Critical Studies on Terrorism, Critical Studies on Terrorism”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 10(2), pp. 197-202 13 Crenshaw, M. (2000), “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st century”, Political Psychology, 21(2), p. 405; Crenshaw, M. (2014), “Terrorism Research: The Record”, International Interactions, 40(4), p. 557

4 on secondary data, a lack of collaboration and a large proportion of one-time contributors.14 However, a recent study that investigates the persistence of these issues in terrorism studies from 2007 to 2016 found that the use of primary data has increased significantly.15 Nonetheless, collaboration remains low and most authors are one-time contributors.16

In 2007, Richard Jackson founded the Critical Studies on Terrorism (CTS) journal in virtue of the shortcomings he and other scholars identified in the literature broadly falling under the wide-encompassing label of “traditional terrorism studies” (TTS).17 CTS scholars argue that TTS literature often defends ahistorical, decontextualized and state-biased understandings of terrorism.18 Further, they argue that TTS produces and reproduces unsubstantiated claims about the causes and threat of non-state terrorism and the nature of the terrorist other.19 Indeed, CTS scholars criticise the institutional bias of much of TTS literature, as they argue that it perpetuates status-quo understandings about the causes and appropriate responses to non-state terrorism in a way that legitimises the elaboration and pursuit of violent counterterrorism policies.20 Moreover, CTS scholars are critical of the un-reflexive way in which traditional approaches label acts committed by non-state actors as “terrorism” and fail to account for the terrorist nature and effects of state-led or state- sponsored violence.21 Crucial to the research conducted here, CTS scholars and others have produced a significant array of studies that contest the notion that terrorism is solely the prerogative of non-state actors.22

14 Silke, A. (2003), The Road Less Travelled: Recent Trends in Terrorism Research, (London: Routledge); Ranstorp, M. (2009), “Mapping terrorism studies after 9/11”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), p. 15 15 Schuurman, B. (2018), “Research on Terrorism, 2007–2016: A Review of Data, Methods, and Authorship”, Terrorism and Political Violence, pp. 1-16 16 ibid. 17 Ditrych, O. (2014), Tracing the Discourses on Terrorism, (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan), p. 114; Silke, A. (2009), “Contemporary terrorism studies: issues in research”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), p. 36 18 Jackson, R. (2007), “The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies”, European Political Science, 6(3), pp. 244-251 19 Jackson, R. (2009), “Knowledge, power and politics”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), pp. 66-83 20 Raphael, S. (2009), “In the service of power: Terrorism studies and US intervention in the global South”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), pp. 49-65 21 Blakeley, R. (2008), “The elephant in the room: A response to John Horgan and Michael J. Boyle”, Critical Terrorism Studies, 1(2), pp. 151-165 22 See for example: Blakeley, R. (2009), State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South (London Routledge); Blum, W. (2003), Killing Hope: US Military & CIA Interventions since World War II, (London: Zed

5 Scholars do not agree on a single established definition of terrorism.23 Nonetheless, there is a general consensus that terrorism is a tactic that involves the use or threat of violence against civilians, to intimidate a wider audience in the pursuit of political objectives.24 However, important questions remain regarding the perpetrators of terrorism. In their definitions, the CIA25 and the Oxford English Dictionary26 assert that terrorist violence is perpetrated by non-state actors. However, following Jackson, this essay takes the position that it does not follow reason for a “tactic” to be solely in the remit of non-state actors.27 Jackson elaborates this argument succinctly “(g)iven that terrorism is a violent tactic in the same way that ambushes are a tactic, it makes little sense to argue that some actors (such as states) are precluded from employing the tactic of terrorism (or ambushes).”28 Similarly, Afxentiou argues the “descriptive basis for terrorism is the violent act itself, its forms and effects, rather than the actor perpetrating it.”29 Furthermore, there exists extensive documentation of the historical and continued role of states in conducting and sponsoring acts of violence aimed at intimidating and coercing civilian populations.30 Accordingly, this essay adopts the view that terrorism, as a tactic, can be and is employed by both state and non-state actors.

2.2) Targeted Killings and Drone Warfare

The use of in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives has become common in the 21st century. Indeed, Jeremy Scahill details how in the aftermath of 9/11, certain Bush administration officials successfully sought to repeal the ban on assassinations

Books) and Gareau, F. (2004), State Terrorism and the United States: From Counterinsurgency to the War on Terrorism, (London: Zed Books) 23 Silke, A. (2009), “Contemporary terrorism studies: issues in research”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), p. 34 24 Jackson, R. (2009), “Knowledge, power and politics”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), p. 75 25 CIA, Definition of Terrorism, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/terrorism- faqs.html?tab=list-3 26 Oxford English Dictionary definition: “terrorism”, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/terrorism 27 Jackson, R. (2009), “Knowledge, power and politics”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), p. 75 28 ibid. 29 Afxentiou, A. (2018), “A history of drones: moral(e) bombing and state terrorism”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11(2), p. 303 30 Blakeley, R. (2007), “Bringing the State back into Terrorism Studies”, European Political Science, 6(3), pp. 228-235; Grosscup, B. (2006), Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment, (Malaysia: Strategic Information Research Development)

6 put forth during the Carter administration.31 One of the consequences of the acceptance of targeted killings as an official US policy in the War on Terror is the development and use of armed drones. The first in the War on Terror occurred in , in 2002.32 According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, the Bush administration oversaw 57 drone strikes, the Obama administration oversaw 563 strikes and the Trump administration has been carrying out drone strikes at a higher rate than the Obama administration.33

In virtue of these developments, the topic of targeted killing garnered an increase of scholarly interest in the post-9/11 era. The academic debates about the use of drones to carry out targeted killings centre around the legal, strategic and moral implications of this practice. Indeed, a great deal has been written about the use of killer drones in relation to International Human Law and International Human Rights Law.34 Many publications have also discussed the extent to which drone warfare is compatible with Just War Theory.35 However, as Rothe and Collins argue, the focus on the theoretical and legal implications of drone warfare tends to obscure the effects that these policies have on the individuals who live in the areas that are surveilled and bombarded by drones.36 They argue that attempts to provide legal justifications for drone warfare serve to legitimise human rights violations.37 Accordingly, this essay steers clear from legal debates surrounding drone warfare and focuses on the strategic and moral consequences of the use of armed drones in the context of counterterrorism.

Military and government officials have in part attributed the US’ increasing reliance on drone strikes to conduct counterterrorism to the precision and strategic value of

31 Scahill, J. (2013), Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield, (New York: Nation Books), p. 20-37 32 Sifton, J. (2017), “A Brief History of Drones”, The Nation, 7 February 2012, https://www.thenation.com/article/brief-history-drones/ 33 Purkiss, J. and Serle, J. (2017), “Obama’s covert drone war in numbers: ten times more strikes than Bush”, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 17 January 2017 https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-17/obamas-covert-drone-war-in-numbers-ten- times-more-strikes-than-bush; Ackerman, S. (2018), “Trump Ramped Up Drone Strikes in America’s Shadow Wars”, The Daily Beast, https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-ramped-up-drone-strikes-in-americas-shadow- wars 34 See Blakeley, R. (2018), “Drones, state terrorism and international law”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11(2), p. 322 35 See for example: Braun, M. and Brunstetter, D. (2013) “Rethinking the Criterion for Assessing Cia-targeted Killings: Drones, Proportionality and Jus Ad Vim”, Journal of Military Ethics, (12)4, pp. 304-324 36 Rothe, D. and Collins, V. (2014), “The Normality of Political Administration and State Violence: Casuistry, Law, and Drones”, Critical Criminology, 22(3), pp. 373–388 37 ibid.

7 drones.38 For example, the Obama administration’s press secretary, Jay Carney described the use of drones to carry out violent counterterrorism as “exceptionally precise, exceptionally surgical and exceptionally targeted”.39 Defenders of the use of armed drones to conduct violent counterterrorism have also argued that drones enable more rational and effective decision making.40 This argument seeks to legitimise drones as a more ethical alternative to traditional approaches to violent counterterrorism.

However, an increasing amount of literature contests the legitimisation and normalisation of drone warfare. For example, Espinoza argues convincingly against the notion that drone warfare is humane and neutral.41 Her analysis exposes the racist and orientalist underpinnings of the US’ policy and practice of drone surveillance and killing in the context of the War on Terror. Furthermore, by retracing the historical links between the development of aerial bombing as a state instrument for producing terror and current violent counterterrorism policies, others have compellingly contended that drone warfare and violent US counterterrorism more widely are modern practices of state terrorism.42

Studies on the effects of drones have been very useful for this research. Reports published by the International Human Rights and Conflict Resolutions Clinic and the Global Justice Clinic,43 Human Rights Watch44 and the Open Society Justice Initiative45 are crucial for understanding the effects of drone warfare on local populations. These reports found that drones used for counterterrorism kill many innocent civilians, are a source of terror for

38 Espinoza, M. (2018), “State terrorism: orientalism and the drone programme”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11(2), pp. 378-379 39 Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 31 January 2012, Obama White House https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/31/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay- carney-13112 40 Allinson, J. (2015), “The Necropolitics of Drones”, International Political Sociology, 9(2), pp. 114-115 41 Espinoza, M. (2018), “State terrorism: orientalism and the drone programme”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11(2), pp. 376-393 42 Satia, P. (2014), “Drones: A History from the British Middle East”, Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism and Development, 5 (1), pp. 1-31; Afxentiou, A. (2018), “A history of drones: moral(e) bombing and state terrorism”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11(2), pp. 301-320; Blakeley, R. (2018), “Drones, state terrorism and international law”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11(2), pp. 321-341; Grosscup, B. (2006), Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment, (Malaysia: Strategic Information Research Development) 43 Cavallero, J.; Sonnenberg, S.; and Knuckey, S. (2012), Living under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in , (Stanford: International Human Rights and Conflict Resolutions Clinic); (New York: Global Justice Clinic) 44 Human Rights Watch, (2013), "Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda”: The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen 45 Singh, A. (2015), Death by Drone, (New York: Open Society Foundations)

8 the locals, generate hatred towards the US government and are fundamentally counterproductive as they fuel support and recruiting for anti-US militants. This thesis contributes to this literature by looking into the effects of drone warfare and other forms of violent US counterterrorism in Yemen and comparing these with the presidential discourses used to legitimise violent counterterrorism.

3) Methodology

The overarching research question is: how have the US administrations since 9/11 discursively legitimised violent counterterrorism and what effects has its practice had in Yemen? This question can be separated into the two following questions: how have the US administrations since 9/11 discursively legitimised violent counterterrorism? What effects has violent US counterterrorism had in Yemen? This thesis dedicates a chapter to each of the two questions.

One way that humans use language is to produce understanding and understandings typically govern deliberated action.46 The official leaders of democratic states are individuals elected by a population to govern over a delimited national territory. Therefore, an investigation into the actions of democratic states requires an investigation into the language used to legitimise and provide a rationale or “grid of intelligibility” for these actions.47 Indeed, it is through the use of linguistic constructions – discourse – that state representatives can describe, frame and justify the political projects they seek to carry out.48 The aim of critical discourse analysis (CDA) is to describe the relation between political, social and discursive practices.49 Therefore, CDA can be used to analyse how foreign policies are legitimised and portrayed as proper whereas others are dismissed and excluded.50

46 Hall, S. (1997), “Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Discourse”, in S. Hall (eds.), Representation: cultural representations and signifying practices, p. 72 47 Milliken, J. (1999), “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods”, European Journal of International Relations, 5(2), pp. 225-254 48 ibid., p. 236 49 Jackson, R. (2009), “Knowledge, power and politics”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), p. 67 50 Milliken, J. (1999), “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods”, European Journal of International Relations, 5(2), p. 236

9 Moreover, CDA provides a theoretical basis for assessing the implications of adopting one mode of representation over another.51

Scholars concerned with the analysis of political discourse place emphasis on the intricate relation between power and knowledge.52 As language, through discourse, creates “knowledge” about the world and that different social groups hold different interests regarding the depiction of social reality, the creation of meaning in the public sphere is politically contested as different groups seek to establish their “truth” over the “truths” of others.53 Accordingly, many analytical works have described how those with the most power tend to play a larger role in framing and thus creating socio-political reality than those with less power.54 Hence, CDAs of terrorism discourse focus primarily on the discourses produced by different types of elites, due to their predominant role in the production and dissemination of “knowledge” about terrorism and counterterrorism.

Scholars have analysed the dominant discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism from many different angles. CDAs of terrorism discourse vary in the types of discourse they analyse and the particular focus of their analysis. Analyses of terrorism discourse typically assess the texts produced by mainstream media outlets,55 leading academics,56 state representatives57 or all of these at once.58 The focus of these studies varies. For example,

51 Campbell, D. (1993), Politics Without Principles: Sovereignity, Ethics and the Narratives of the Gulf War, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 7-8 52 See for example: Van Dijk, T. (2008), Discourse and Power, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) and Nola, R. (1998), “Knowledge, discourse, power and genealogy in Foucault”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 1(2), pp. 109-154 53 Hodges, A. and Nilep, C. (2007), Discourse, war and terrorism, p. 2 54 See for example: Foucault, M. (1969), L’Archéologie du Savoir, (Paris: Editions Gallimard); Gramsci, A. (1971), Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds. Hoare, Q. and Smith, G., (New York: International Publishers Co.) and Herman, E. and Chomsky, N. (1989), Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, (New York: Pantheon Books) 55 Silberstein, S. (2002), War of Words: Language, Politics and 9/11, (London: Routledge) 56 Schmid, A. and Jongman, A. (1988), Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature, (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company); Jackson, R. (2009), “The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments”, Political Studies Review, 7(2), pp. 171-184 57 Lazar, A. and Lazar M. (2004), “The discourse of the New World Order: ‘out-casting’ the double face of threat”, Discourse and Society, 15(2-3), pp. 223-242; Jackson, R. (2006), “Genealogy, Ideology, and Counter- Terrorism: Writing wars on terrorism from Ronald Raegan to George W. Bush Jr”, Studies in Language and Capitalism, 1(1), pp. 163-193 58 Jackson, R. (2005), Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism, (Manchester: Manchester University Press)

10 scholars have analysed how the use of binaries,59 legal jargon60 or ideological evocation61 depict terrorism and counterterrorism.

This thesis contributes to the literature by analysing and comparing the language used by the W. Bush, Obama and Trump administrations to legitimise violent counterterrorism. Presidential discourses shape national identity, give meaning to situations and provide justifications for policy decisions.62 Accordingly, Miliken notes that there is an ethical aspect involved in analysing how a discourse naturalises and legitimises certain policies and practices.63 Indeed, this process denaturalises discourses and the policies they legitimise, opening them to critical scrutiny and destabilisation.64 The aim of the discourse analysis conducted here is not to criticise the discursive framings used to legitimise violent counterterrorism,65 rather, it is to reveal how US presidents since 9/11 have discursively legitimised violent counterterrorism. By analysing how violent counterterrorism policies are discursively legitimised and contrasting this with the effects of the practice of violent counterterrorism in Yemen, this thesis contributes to the literature on discourse analysis by underlining the rift between the positive justifications for violence and the negative effects of its practice, in the context of US counterterrorism.

Therefore, in order to answer the first part of the research question, the first chapter analyses how the W. Bush, Obama and Trump administrations discursively legitimised the use of violent counterterrorism. It compares their terrorism and counterterrorism discourses and demonstrates their reliance on similar myths and narratives about the threat of terrorism, the terrorist other and the US’ role in the world. This part also highlights the main discursive differences between the administrations in their respective legitimisations of violent counterterrorism. To carry out this analysis, the first part uses the existing

59 Coe, K.; Domke, D.; Graham, E.; Lockett John, S.; Pickard, V. (2004), “No Shades of Gray: The Binary Discourse of George W. Bush and an Echoing Press”, Journal of Communication, 54(2), pp. 234-252 60 Birdsall, A. (2018), “Drone Warfare in Counterterrorism and Normative Change: US Policy and the Politics of International Law”, Global Society, 32(3), pp. 241-262 61 Barnett, M. (2016), “American Exceptionalism and the Construction of the War on Terror: An Analysis of Counterterrorism Policies Under Clinton, Bush and Obama”, Working Paper Series, Syracuse University, pp. 1- 29 62 Esch, J. (2010), “Legitimising the “War on Terror”: Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric”, Political Psychology, 31(3), pp. 357-391 63 Milliken, J. (1999), “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods”, European Journal of International Relations, 5(2), p. 236 64 ibid. 65 That is done elsewhere, see for example: Jackson, R. (2005) “Security, Democracy, and the Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism”, Democracy and Security, 1(2), pp. 147-171

11 literature on the discursive legitimisation of violent counterterrorism of post-9/11 US administrations as well as presidential speeches and quotes from administration officials. These include: Bush’s key speeches on terrorism and counterterrorism in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, central counterterrorism speeches from Obama’s presidency, and a wide array of Trump’s public addresses from the 2016 campaign and his ongoing presidency. The source of the presidential speeches is the University of California, Santa Barbara’s “American Presidency Project”.66 Links to the transcripts of the cited speeches are in the appendix.

To answer the second part of the research question, this paper investigates the causal links between the US’ military involvement in Yemen, the incidence of terrorism and the influence and strength of non-state terrorist groups in the country. In order to achieve this, the second part begins by outlining the context of violent US counterterrorism in Yemen, the official objectives and means of the US’ military involvement in Yemen from 9/11 to March 2019 and contrasts these with the observable effects. Given the diversity of the contributing actors and factors to the situation in Yemen, it is difficult to precisely evaluate the manner and extent to which US involvement affects the characteristics and actions of non-state terrorist groups. However, with reference to reports on non-state terrorist groups as well as studies that compile many local testimonies, it is possible to identify general trends and draw conclusions about the effects of violent US counterterrorism in Yemen.

The materials used to assess the effects of the US’ military involvement in Yemen are a selection of interviews, academic papers, NGO reports, media reports and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s (TBIJ hereafter) database on reported US operations in Yemen. The research is limited by the opaqueness of US operations in Yemen. Indeed, as violent US counterterrorism in Yemen is covert, the US government does not publish a comprehensive summary of all of its actions. However, TBIJ frequently updates its data, conducts its own verifications and investigations, is transparent about its reporting and uses corroborating

66 University of California, Santa Barbara, The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/presidents

12 sources to supplement its data.67 Accordingly, it is a trustworthy source of information on covert US military activity. Hence, this thesis relies on TBIJ’s database as its main source of descriptive information about the US’ covert operations in Yemen.

Seawright and Gerring note that selecting a typical case that represents a broader set of cases can produce insights into a wider phenomenon.68 Accordingly, as the US’ reliance on airstrikes – from warplanes and armed drones – and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) raids to carry out its counterterrorism operations in Yemen is characteristic of its practice of violent counterterrorism elsewhere, the conclusions drawn by the analysis conducted in the second part can provide insights into the effects of violent US counterterrorism beyond the case of Yemen. However, as the US carries out violent counterterrorism operations to differing degrees and in different contexts around the world, the conclusions drawn from the analysis of US counterterrorism in Yemen should not be uncritically used to surmise all of the outcomes of violent US counterterrorism everywhere. Nonetheless, this paper argues that certain analyses – such as: the use of armed drones to surveil and bombard suspected terrorists tends to terrorise local populations – can and should be understood as extending beyond the case of Yemen.

4) Discursively legitimising violent counterterrorism after 9/11

Although there are differences between the terrorism discourses of the Bush, Obama and Trump (BOT) administrations, these discourses all present violent counterterrorism as an appropriate, necessary, strategically effective and morally righteous method for reducing the threat and incidence of terrorism. Further, the BOT administrations’ legitimisations of violent counterterrorism rely on the same core narratives of the “War on Terror”. The first consists of a series of binaries and political myths that make up the “us vs. them” narrative and the second narrative is that terrorism poses a grave and imminent threat to the US and its allies. Although this paper focuses on the counterterrorism discourses of the BOT administrations, the core narratives that make up

67 Cavallero, J.; Sonnenberg, S.; and Knuckey, S. (2012), Living under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan, (Stanford: International Human Rights and Conflict Resolutions Clinic); (New York: Global Justice Clinic), pp. 53-54 68 Seawright, J. and Gerring, J. (2008), “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options”, Political Research Quarterly, 61(2), p. 299

13 the US’ War on Terror discourse predate 9/11.69 Indeed, the “War on Terror” quip and the key features of the discourse originate from the Raegan administration.70 The Clinton and Bush Sr. administrations used similar rhetoric to justify their use of violent counterterrorism.71 However, in order to achieve analytical depth in the space available, the focus here is on the post-9/11 legitimisation of violent counterterrorism.

4.1) The Bush Administration

4.1.1) Framing the 9/11 attacks

The day of the 9/11 attacks, then US president George W. Bush declared that the United States had been a victim of a terrorist attack. In the days following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration astutely bifurcated from framing the attacks as “despicable acts of terror” to an “act of war”.72 This made the subsequent declaration of a “war on terror” a natural and logical step to make. Thus, framing the attacks as an act of war discursively legitimises violent counterterrorism as appropriate and necessary.

Portraying 9/11 as an “assault on America” and “a national tragedy” enabled the Bush administration to instil and reify a public sense of victimhood.73 This is not to deny that the events were tragic, but for the interest of this research, it is important to highlight that the particular framing was used to legitimise and normalise the US’ pursuit of violent policies in the aftermath of the attacks. Indeed, by discursively victimising the US and its citizens, the Bush administration was able to blame “the terrorists” for the violence that the US unleashed in response to the 9/11 attacks. This rhetorical justification is perfectly captured in then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s assertion:

We did not start the war; the terrorists started it when they attacked the United States, murdering more than 5,000 innocent Americans (…) So let there be no doubt;

69 Winkler, C. (2006), In the Name of Terrorism, Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era, (Albany: State University of New York Press) 70 Jackson, R. (2006), “Genealogy, Ideology, and Counter-Terrorism: Writing wars on terrorism from Ronald Raegan to George W. Bush Jr”, Studies in Language and Capitalism, 1(1), pp. 163-193 71 Tsui, C. (2012), “The Myth of George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy Revolution”, E-International Relations, 2 December 2012, https://www.e-ir.info/2012/12/02/the-myth-of-george-w-bushs-foreign-policy-revolution- reagan-clinton-and-the-continuity-of-the-war-on-terror/ 72 Jackson, R. (2005), “Security, Democracy, and the Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism”, Democracy and Security, 1(2), p. 150 73 ibid., p. 151

14 responsibility for every single casualty in this war, be they innocent Afghans or innocent Americans, rests at the feet of Taliban and al Qaeda.74

This portrayal of America as the irreproachable victim of horrific violence morally repudiates any blame the US may have to share either for the attack itself or for the violent response that the framings of the attacks legitimised. Further, this framing serves to discursively legitimise violent counterterrorism as appropriate, necessary and morally righteous.

4.1.2) US(A) vs. “them” and the threat of terrorism

Foreign policy and the portrayal of enemies are important elements of a state’s – and by extension, a population’s – discursive self-identification. The use of war discourse to produce and solidify a positive self-identity in opposition to a demonised other is an old and recurring phenomenon.75 Accordingly, the portrayal of the “good” self at war against the “bad” other is a central element of the Bush administration’s justification for the use of violence.

The Bush administration discursively situated the 9/11 attacks into pre-existing myths about the US and its historical role in the world. Bottici observes that myths are used to construct simplified representations of the world wherein a community identifies itself and can ascribe significance to political and social events.76 In the aftermath of 9/11, the events were located within the myth of American exceptionalism and the meta-narrative of “Civilisation vs. Barbarism”.77 Barnett notes that “American exceptionalism represents three unique but complementary ideas that America is God’s “chosen nation,” has a unique mission to spread its values, and is a force of good against evil.”78 Hence, an important part of the myth of American exceptionalism rests on the notion that America has a “calling”, a

74Rumsfeld, D. (2001), “Text: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld”, , 29 October 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/rumsfeldtext_102901.html?noredirect=on 75 Graham, P.; Keenan, T. and Dowd, A. (2004), “A call to arms at the End of History: A discourse-historical analysis of George W. Bush’s declaration of war on terror”, Discourse & Society, 15(2-3), pp. 199-221 76 Bottici, C. (2007), A Philosophy of Political Myth, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 201-245 77 Esch, J. (2010), “Legitimising the “War on Terror”: Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric”, Political Psychology, 31(3), pp. 357-391 78 Barnett, M. (2016), “American Exceptionalism and the Construction of the War on Terror: An Analysis of Counterterrorism Policies Under Clinton, Bush and Obama”, Working Paper Series, Syracuse University, p. 3

15 duty to act to defend its values: freedom, democracy and justice.79 The Bush administration tapped into this myth in its portrayal of the historic duty that 9/11 placed on America’s shoulders.

Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom -- the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time -- now depends on us. Our nation -- this generation -- will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail. (20 September 2001) (emphasis added)

By situating 9/11 within the myth of American Exceptionalism, the Bush administration legitimised the GWOT as being part of America’s supposed historic moral duty to protect “the advance of human freedom”. Moreover, the assertion that the US “will not fail” in its mission legitimises violent counterterrorism as a strategically effective method for pursuing the objectives of the GWOT.

The Bush administration also used myth of Civilisation vs. Barbarism extensively to legitimise violent counterterrorism:

This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. (20 September 2001)

The civilized world is rallying to America's side. They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered, can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. And you know what -- we're not going to allow it. (20 September 2001)

By discursively portraying the GWOT as being part of a momentous struggle between civilisation and barbarism, the Bush administration legitimised violent counterterrorism as a necessary and morally righteous response to the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, an implication of the above quotes is that if the US failed to respond in a decisive way, the entire “civilized world” would suffer the calamitous consequences.

79 Judis, J. (2005), “The Author of Liberty: Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy”, Dissent, 54(4), pp. 54-61

16 Jackson notes that a subplot to the “Civilisation vs Barbarism” meta-narrative is the “good” vs “evil” narrative.80 The Bush administration relied heavily on this binary to discursively legitimise the use of violence to defend the “good” self against the “evil” other.

Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. (11 September 2001) (emphasis added)

Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil (11 September 2001) (emphasis added)

Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature, and we responded with the best of America (11 September 2001) (emphasis added)

These characterisations of the terrorist other are directly opposed to the Bush administration’s positive self-representation:

Americans are generous and kind, resourceful and brave (14 September 2001)

One month after great suffering and sorrow, America is strong and determined and generous (11 October 2001)

Americans are the most generous people on Earth (12 October 2001)

The Bush administration’s discourse dehumanises the terrorist other and reduces this threatening other to a fundamentally evil and morally corrupt caricature.81 Jackson notes that Bush officials routinely referred to terrorists as “evil doers”, “the evil ones” who “embrace death”.82

The terrorists’ only influence is violence, and their only agenda is death. (24 May 2004)

According to this discourse, terrorist acts are the reflection of their assumed inherently evil nature. Furthermore, Jackson notes how on numerous occasions, Bush administration officials used medical language to depict the terrorist other as a perverse impurity. “The terrorists” were described as “parasites”, “a scourge” and “cancer”.83 Jackson

80 Jackson, R. (2005) “Security, Democracy, and the Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism”, Democracy and Security, 1(2), p. 151 81 ibid. p. 153 82 ibid.; ibid. p. 162 83 ibid. p. 154

17 observes that this essentialisation to evil and dehumanisation disqualifies “the terrorists” as moral beings. It implies the need to treat “the scourge terrorism” in a ruthless way.84 Therefore, the discourse legitimises the use of violence to defeat this fundamentally evil and threatening other as necessary, morally virtuous and urgent.

Furthermore, evilification of the terrorist other depoliticises the 9/11 attackers and legitimises violent counterterrorism as strategically effective. In the aftermath of 9/11, then leader of Al Qaeda, , stated that the attacks were a reaction to the US’ role in Palestinian oppression and its military presence in Islamic holy lands.85 However, the Bush administration made no reference to the potential political motivations behind the attacks. Instead, the Bush administration preferred to depict the attackers as irrational, freedom- hating, evil enemies that cannot be negotiated with.

[T]hose who embrace death to cause the death of the innocent, cannot be ignored, cannot be appeased. They must be fought. (20 October 2001)

By depicting “the terrorists” as evil, depoliticised and irrational individuals who “must be fought”, President W. Bush presented violence as the only feasible way of confronting the threat of terrorism. Accordingly, this discursive portrayal of the terrorist other legitimises violent counterterrorism as necessary, morally righteous and strategically effective.

In the build up to the 2003 US-led invasion of , the Bush administration repeatedly claimed that terrorists were seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction that could potentially enable them to carry out catastrophic attacks, killing millions.86 Indeed, backed up by academics,87 Bush officials claimed that 21st century terrorism was a new type of terrorism. So-called “religious terrorists” were discursively portrayed as particularly irrational and violent.88 Accordingly, the “new” terrorism narrative presented Al Qaeda and

84 ibid. 85 Howarth, J. (2005), Messages To The World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden, (Fairfield: Verso), p. 107 86Kramer, C. and Michalowski, R. (2005) “War, Aggression and State Crime: A Criminological Analysis of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq”. The British Journal of Criminology 45 (4). (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 449 87 Spencer, A. (2016), “New Versus Old Terrorism”, in Jackson, R. (eds), Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies (London: Routledge), pp. 269-290 88 Gunning, J. and Toros, H. (2009), “Exploring a critical theory approach to terrorism studies”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), p. 90

18 its affiliates as an exceptionally threatening and uncompromising enemy. Consequently, the use of violent counterterrorism to eliminate this extraordinary threat was discursively legitimised as appropriate, necessary, strategically effective and morally righteous.

In sum, the Bush administration’s framing of the events that took place on 9/11 as well as the portrayal of an evil, irrational and extremely threatening terrorist other at war with civilisation and American values enabled it to discursively legitimise violent counterterrorism and the GWOT as appropriate, necessary, strategically effective and morally righteous. This essay now turns to analysing how the Obama administration legitimised the use of violent counterterrorism. It argues that although there are some apparent changes in the discourse, the Obama administration’s legitimisation of violent counterterrorism rests upon the same central features of the Bush administration’s War on Terror discourse.

4.2) The Obama Administration

Barrack Obama took office on the 20th of January, 2009. His election generated a wave of hope and enthusiasm for many of those who opposed the large-scale military operations of the Bush administration. For many political commentators and voters, his election signalled a decisive rupture in the discourse and practice of the War on Terror.89 Obama distanced himself from the Bush administration’s terrorism discourse by placing emphasis on “targeted strikes” in “the war against Al Qaeda and its affiliates” rather than using the language of the “global war on terror”.90

[W]e must define our effort not as a boundless “global war on terror,” but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America (23 May 2013)

Obama’s discourse also stressed that some of the Bush administration’s policies, such as the use of and imprisoning suspected terrorists in Guantanamo bay, were counterproductive in the battle for “hearts and minds”. Obama officially prohibited US state

89 Jackson, R. (2011), “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of) change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama”, International Politics, 48(2-3), p. 390 90 The Washington Times, “White House: 'War on terrorism' is over”, 6 August 2009, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/06/white-house-war-terrorism- over/?fbclid=IwAR2UJo21QKjVv7BRx7x2-NJih3Y-lNmMjLYJFZ-da1wvmwLLq2tDd5tcIW4

19 actors from using torture and sought to close Guantanamo Bay.91 The Obama administration also used legal discourse to legitimise violent counterterrorism far more than the Bush administration.92 However, in accordance with the Bush administration, the Obama administration discursively legitimised violent counterterrorism as appropriate, necessary, strategically effective and morally righteous. Like the Bush administration’s, this discourse rested upon the core narratives about the threat of terrorism, the terrorist other and America’s role in the world.93

4.2.1) Terrorism and War

Like president Bush, president Obama used the discourse of war in relation to terrorism.

Our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred. (Obama, 20 January 2009)

We are indeed at war with al Qaeda and its affiliates. (Obama, 21 May 2009)

Al Qaeda terrorists and their affiliates are at war with the United States, and those that we capture – like other prisoners of war – must be prevented from attacking us again. (…) we must hold individuals to keep them from carrying out an act of war. (Obama, 21 May 2009)

We are at war with people who have perverted Islam. (15 February 2015)

In the context of war, the use of retaliatory violence appears legitimate. Thus, by asserting that the US is at war with Al Qaeda, Obama legitimises the continuation of violent counterterrorism. Moreover, Obama’s description of “the terrorists” as a “network of violence and hatred”, like the Bush administration’s discourse, dehumanises the terrorist other and presents violent counterterrorism as necessary and strategically effective. Indeed, violent and coercive approaches to counterterrorism appear appropriate as it seems unlikely that a violent and hateful enemy would negotiate. Moreover, “hatred” is an

91 Starr-Deelan, D. (2014), Presidential Policies on Terrorism: From Ronald Reagan to , (New York: Palgrave MacMillan), p. 160 92 Ellison, E. (2013), “A Critical Discourse Analysis of President Barrack Obama’s War on Terrorism”, Dissertation Human Rights Masters UCL 93 Jackson, R. (2011), “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of) change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama”, International Politics, 48(2-3), pp. 390–411

20 extreme emotion that implies the irrational and hence, uncompromising nature of “the enemy”.

Our troops have fought bravely against a ruthless enemy. (27 March 2009)

Its leadership has been decimated. Dozens of terrorist leaders have been killed. (6 December 2016)

Here, Obama’s use of the adjective “ruthless” implies that the terrorists lack basic human traits such as compassion and empathy. These rhetorical techniques stimulate antagonism and minimise the interlocutor’s sympathy for the terrorist other. Therefore, as in Bush’s counterterrorism discourse, the Obama administration uses the language of war in relation to terrorism and dehumanises the terrorist other in a way that naturalises and legitimises violent counterterrorism as necessary and appropriate.

Obama’s mantra on the necessity to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda also fits into this warring narrative.

[W]e have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That is the goal that must be achieved. That is a cause that could not be more just. And to the terrorists who oppose us, my message is the same: We will defeat you. (Obama, 27 March 2009) (emphasis added)

Our military and counterterrorism professionals have relentlessly pursued terrorist networks overseas -- disrupting safe havens in several different countries, killing Osama bin Laden, and decimating al Qaeda’s leadership. (6 December 2015)

Indeed, the aim is not to find a non-violent way to resolve the conflict between the opposed factions, it is to destroy and decimate “the enemy”. Given the asserted violent and hateful nature of “the terrorists”, Obama’s discourse presents their defeat through military means as “a cause that could not be more just”. Typical of Obama’s counterterrorism discourse, the use of violence to defeat “the enemy” is associated with the notion of justice, and by extension, moral duty.

21 Similarly to the Bush administration, the Obama administration morally admonishes itself from the deaths of innocents in Afghanistan. More broadly, it places blame for the GWOT on the shoulders of the 9/11 attackers.

I remind everybody, the United States of America did not choose to fight a war in Afghanistan. (Obama, 27 March 2009)

[O]n January 20th, I will become the first President of the United States to serve two full terms during a time of war. Now, we did not choose this fight, but once it came to us, the world saw the measure of our resolve. (6 December 2016)

Asserting that the US went to war out of necessity portrays war and violence as legitimate and inevitable responses to terrorism. It naturalises the use of violence in reaction to terrorist incidents. This discourse also echoes the notion that US foreign policy prior to the 9/11 attacks played no role in motivating the attacks. Indeed, if the US did not choose to invade Afghanistan because it did not choose to be attacked, how can one argue that the US’ foreign policy choices played any role in the 9/11 attacks? This discourse, like the Bush administration’s, portrays the US as a resolute victim whose moral duty was to wage violent counterterrorism in response to the attacks it suffered.

4.2.2) American exceptionalism and Civilisation vs. Barbarism

The myth of American exceptionalism plays a prominent role in how Obama grounds his justification for violent counterterrorism in the notions of justice and duty. As in the Bush administration, Obama’s terrorism discourse builds American identity in opposition to the terrorist other.

[W]e will use all elements of our national power to defeat al Qaeda, and to defend America, our allies, and all who seek a better future. Because the United States of America stands for peace and security, justice and opportunity. That is who we are, and that is what history calls on us to do once more. (27 March 2009)

[P]eople who have no scruples and would willingly and gladly kill innocents. Al Qaeda is not constrained by a constitution. Many of our adversaries are not constrained by a belief in freedom of speech, or representation in court, or rule of law. (20 April 2009)

22 [T]errorists offer the injustice of disorder and destruction (…) a hateful ideology. (21 May 2009)

[W]e need not sacrifice our security for our values. That, after all, is the unique genius of America. That’s what makes the United States of America different as a nation. (21 May 2009)

[L]et’s make sure we never forget what makes us exceptional. Let’s not forget that freedom is more powerful than fear (6 December 2015)

Obama uses rhetorical oppositions to situate the US’ fight against terrorism within the narrative of the historic and epic struggle between the “good guys” and the “bad guys”. Indeed, according to the discourse, terrorists represent “injustice”, “disorder”, “destruction”, “fear” and a “hateful ideology” whilst the US stands for “freedom”, “peace and security, justice and opportunity.” The quote on Al Qaeda’s lack of constraints exemplifies the way in which Obama glorifies the US in contrast with the blood-thirsty “enemy”. Further, this positive self-representation and negative other-representation is reminiscent of the Civilisation vs. Barbarism meta-narrative as Obama contrasts America’s values, constitution and legal constraints – discursive signifiers of the US’ status as a “civilised nation” – to “the terrorists’” lack thereof. Indeed, Obama describes the terrorists other as “an enemy that heeds no borders or laws of war”.94 By inscribing the administration’s war against Al Qaeda within the myth of American exceptionalism and the meta-narrative of Civilisation vs. Barbarism, Obama presents the use of “all elements of our national power” – including military force – to defeat Al Qaeda as a morally righteous and necessary venture that is consistent with the US’ historical role of defending and promoting its values.

Here are further examples of Obama’s discursive portrayal of the US' historic duty, ability and commitment to defend its values on a global scale:

[A]s we stand at this crossroads of history, the eyes of all people in all nations are once again upon us – watching to see what we do with this moment; waiting for us to lead. (24 February 2009)

But this is not simply an American problem (…) The safety of people around the

94 See 27 March 2009, in appendix

23 world is at stake. (27 March 2009)

[P]art of what makes us, I think, still a beacon to the world, is that we are willing to hold true to our ideals even when it’s hard, not just when it’s easy. (29 April 2009)

American leadership has always been elevated by our ability to connect with people’s hopes, and not simply their fears. (23 May 2013)

I believe that the United States military can achieve any mission; that we are, and must remain, the strongest fighting force the world has ever known. (6 December 2016)

Although Obama does not explicitly use the language of good vs. evil, his use of the myth of American exceptionalism and allusions to the narrative of Civilisation vs. Barbarism to legitimise counter-violence and the continuation of the GWOT are broadly consistent with the Bush administration’s.

4.2.3) The threat of terrorism

In line with the discourse of the Bush administration, Obama’s portrayal of the terrorist threat legitimises violent counterterrorism as necessary, morally virtuous and appropriate. Obama embraced the “new” terrorism thesis promulgated by the Bush administration and highlighted the risk of the potential use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists.

[T]he challenges of a new and dangerous world. Today’s dangers are different, though no less grave. The power to destroy life on a catastrophic scale now risks falling into the hands of terrorists. (15 July 2008)

Now, we worry – most of all – about a rogue state or nuclear scientist transferring the world’s deadliest weapons to the world’s most dangerous people: terrorists who won’t think twice about killing themselves and hundreds of thousands in Tel Aviv or Moscow, in London or New York. (15 July 2008)

[T]errorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can (…) an enemy that heeds no borders or laws of war. (27 March 2009)

Right now, in distant training camps and in crowded cities, there are people plotting to take American lives. That will be the case a year from now, five years from now,

24 and – in all probability – 10 years from now. (21 May 2009)

[T]he terror and extremism that threatens our world’s stability. (25 May 2009)

These quotes further exemplify how “the enemy” is dehumanised and demonised in Obama’s terrorism discourse via the same rhetorical techniques used by the Bush administration. Further, the threat of terrorism is depicted in a way that presents the need for immediate and significant action as necessary and urgent.

Jackson notes how despite there being no international terrorist attacks on American soil since 9/11 and the studies indicating that the terrorist threat is overblown,95 Obama did not seek to reduce the perceived threat of terrorism during his first election campaign and throughout his first term.96 On the contrary, Obama initially reiterated the Bush administration’s discourse about the scale and scope of terrorist threat. However, during his second term, Obama softened his depiction of the terrorist threat.

We have to take these threats seriously, and do all that we can to confront them. But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11. (23 May 2013)

Today’s terrorists can kill innocent people, but they don't pose an existential threat to our nation, and we must not make the mistake of elevating them as if they do. (6 December 2016)

Nonetheless, Obama’s discourse on and practice of counterterrorism affirmed that the threat posed by terrorism was great enough to legitimise a global assassination programme and the continuation of the GWOT. In sum, although the Obama administration signalled a departure from certain elements of the Bush administration’s discourse and practice of counterterrorism, notably with regards to Guantanamo Bay and US personnel’s use of torture, its legitimisation of violent counterterrorism was largely consistent with that of its predecessor. Indeed, in line with the Bush administration, the Obama administration legitimised the use of violent counterterrorism as appropriate, necessary, strategically effective and morally righteous through its depiction of the terrorist threat, dehumanisation

95 Mueller, J. (2006), Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them, (New York: The Free Press) 96 Jackson, R. (2011), “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of) change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama”, International Politics, 48(2-3), p. 407

25 of the terrorist other and by situating the War on Terror within the myth of American exceptionalism and the meta-narrative of Civilisation vs. Barbarism. This paper now turns to analysing how the Trump administration has sought to legitimise its use of violent counterterrorism thus far.

4.3) The Trump Administration

When Trump won the presidential election in November 2016, the discourse and practice of the post 9/11 War on Terror was a decade and a half old. It had become – and remains – an integral part of mainstream discussions about security and foreign policy. As aforementioned, the “War on Terror” discourse was built on discursive pillars erected before 9/11 and has consistently served to legitimise the use of violent counterterrorism.97

During the election campaign, Trump sought to politically capitalise on the subject of terrorism and American hostility towards the terrorist other. He repeatedly criticised Obama’s avoidance of the term “radical ”,98 argued that torture be reintroduced as a method for gathering intelligence99 and suggested that along with the terrorists, the families of terrorists should also be killed.100 Although his tone was different from Obama’s cautious and legalist approach to discussing terrorism and counterterrorism, Trump’s terrorism discourse relies on many of the same rhetorical tropes used by both the Obama and Bush administrations.

4.3.1) Civilisation vs. Barbarism and American Exceptionalism

Bartolucci’s analysis of over 600 Trump speeches offers a revealing insight into these similarities.101 Just as his predecessors, Trump defined American identity positively, contrasting it with his negative representation of the terrorist other. Indeed, Trump refers to the terrorist other as “vicious”, “vile”, “barbaric”, “savage”, “evil”, “horrible, horrible

97 See footnotes 69 and 70 98 Engel, P. (2016), “Trump releases statement on Orlando attack: Obama 'should step down'”, Business Insider, 12 June 2016, https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-obama-resign-radical-islamic-terrorism-2016- 6?international=true&r=US&IR=T&fbclid=IwAR0d9_qomc0u6fMUyno44wMnKnI6YrrmTRxFzrtaSXrTGI- vAG2JmPHkeGk 99 Diamond, J. (2015), “Trump on torture: 'We have to beat the savages'”, CNN, 6 March 2016 https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/06/politics/donald-trump-torture 100 LoBianco, T. (2015), “Donald Trump on terrorists: 'Take out their families'”, CNN, 3 December 2015, https://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/donald-trump-terrorists-families/ 101 Bartolucci, V. (2018), “The Discourse on Terrorism of Donald Trump” in Kowalski, J. (eds), Reading Donald Trump, pp. 127-147

26 enemies.”102 This other is opposed to the American self that Trump describes as “innocent, generous, brave, good-working people, freedom’s lovers and defenders, and determined and resolved.”103 Like Bush, Trump repeatedly refers to the terrorist other as “evil”. As aforementioned, this discursively legitimises violent counterterrorism as necessary and morally righteous.

In accordance with his predecessors, Trump inscribes the GWOT in the myth of American exceptionalism and far more explicitly than Obama, in the narrative of Civilisation vs. Barbarism.

We will reinforce old alliances and form new ones, and unite the civilized world against radical Islamic terrorism, which we will eradicate completely from the face of the world. (20 January 2017)

Today, billions of faces are now looking at us, waiting for us to act on the great question of our time. Will we be indifferent in the presence of evil? (21 May 2017)

It was a barbaric and vicious attack upon civilization. [in reference to the 2017 Manchester bombings] (25 May 2017)

Terrorists are engaged in a war against civilization (…) Civilization is at a precipice (26 May 2017)

[T]o join the community of responsible nations in our fight against common enemies and in defense of civilization itself. (6 July 2017)

Trump consistently portrays terrorists and terrorism in opposition to civilisation and depicts the US as its defender. In accordance with the Bush and Obama administrations, he uses the language of war in relation to terrorism. This is combined with the dehumanisation and evilification of the terrorist other and the assertion that terrorism poses an existential threat to civilisation itself. These discursive framings legitimise violent counterterrorism as necessary, strategically effective, morally commendable and historically desirable.

4.3.2) The threat of terrorism and the need to act

In a rift from Obama’s later discourse but in accordance with the Bush

102 ibid. p. 134 103 ibid. p. 135

27 administration and the beginning of Obama’s presidency, Trump portrays terrorism and terrorists as posing an extreme and existential threat.

And we will work with you on the frontlines to keep America safe from terrorism— which is what I began this with—terrorism, a tremendous threat, far greater than people in our country understand. Believe me. I’ve learned a lot in the last two weeks. And terrorism is far greater that the people of our country understand. (February 8 2017)

There are tremendous threats to our country. (10 February 2017)

ISIS is one group, but others have formed. Frankly, they're all over the place. (5 April 2017)

This is accompanied by his call for immediate, decisive and – if necessary – vicious counterterrorism:

We have to get rid of ISIS. Have to get rid of ISIS. We have no choice. (21 January 2017)

[W]e have no choice but to annihilate them. (30 January 2018)

All nations have a moral obligation to speak out such violence. All nations have a duty to work together to confront it and to confront it viciously, if we have to. (2 February 2017)

We have no choice. This is my great priority because it is my first duty as President to keep our people safe. (9 June 2017)

We have no choice, we cannot, and never will, back down. We will never ever give up. We cannot fail. (25 July 2017)

Like the Obama and Bush administrations, the Trump administration asserts that the use of violent counterterrorism is a moral duty and necessity, not a choice. As aforementioned, this naturalises the use of violence and portrays violent counterterrorism as an inevitable and righteous endeavour. Moreover, Trump’s assertion that “we cannot fail” implies the necessity to act. It also suggests that his approach to violent counterterrorism is likely to be strategically effective and therefore, successful.

In sum, in line with the terrorism discourse of the Bush and Obama administrations,

28 Trump depicts the threat of terrorism as extremely grave, requiring urgent action, dehumanises the terrorist other and inscribes the war on terror in the myth of American exceptionalism and the myth of Civilisation vs. Barbarism. In so doing, like his predecessors, Trump presents the use of violence to counterterrorism as necessary, legitimate and appropriate.

“You’re talking about sneaky dirty underhanded people that want to kill our civilians, they want to go after our civilians, they want to kill – not only our civilians, all over the world — and it’s gonna be stopped. It’s gonna be stopped. Somebody criticized me the other day. They asked me what I’d do and I said I’m going to bomb the s*** out of them”104 (emphasis added)

Although his speech is often more informal or less “presidential” than his predecessors’, Trump builds on the same post-9/11 terrorism discourse narratives to legitimise violent counterterrorism.

Having analysed how the BOT administrations discursively legitimise the use of violent counterterrorism, this essay now turns to analysing the effects of the US’ practice of violence under the auspices of the War on Terror in Yemen. In the following section, this essay discusses whether the US’ practice of violent counterterrorism since 9/11 has been necessary, strategically effective or morally righteous.

5) US violent counterterrorism in practice: the case of Yemen

This part analyses violent US counterterrorism in Yemen since the declaration of the GWOT and compares and contrasts the effects of this violent campaign with the discursive legitimisations of violent counterterrorism analysed in the previous section. It begins by giving a brief overview of the Yemeni political context in which US military involvement took place. Then, with reference to administration documents and TBIJ’s database, it outlines the objectives and means of the US’ counterterrorism operations. Next, using a collection of media, think-tank and NGO reports, it assesses the impact of this involvement on the incidence of terrorism and the strength of non-state terrorist organisations in Yemen. The findings of this analysis are then critically contrasted with the discursive legitimisations of

104 Leahy, M. (2015), “Donald Trump Again Vows to ‘Bomb the S*** Out of ISIS’; Ridicules Weakness of Obama and Clinton”, Breitbart, 17 November 2015, https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2015/11/17/donald-trump- vows-bomb-s-isis-ridicules-weakness-obama-clinton/

29 violent counterterrorism discussed above. The section concludes that, in opposition to the discursive legitimisations analysed in the previous section, violent US counterterrorism in Yemen has been strategically counterproductive and morally condemnable. The final part discusses the broader implications of this analysis of violent US counterterrorism, beyond the case of Yemen.

5.1) Context of US’ military involvement in Yemen: a brief overview

5.1.1) Yemeni politics and the GWOT Due to the complexity of the political developments leading up to the current situation and the limited available space, this essay cannot give an in-depth summary of the political and historical context. Nonetheless, as context is crucial for understanding the relationship between violent counterterrorism and non-state terrorism, it is important to provide a brief historical and political outline of the circumstances in which violent US counterterrorism in Yemen began and developed.

Political stability and unity in Yemen has been historically elusive due to the plurality of competing elites – regional, tribal, religious, military – that populate the country’s territory and those seeking to influence Yemeni internal affairs from abroad. The ongoing war in Yemen inscribes itself in a long and bloody history of different internal and external powers vying for political and economic dominance.105 After a series of conflicts, North and South Yemen reunited in 1990 and Ali Abdullah Saleh became president under the new constitution in May of that year. After reunification, the central state attempted to administer and maintain political unity through an intricate balance of power between different elites, notably state and tribal leaders.

During the Soviet-Afghan war, some Yemenis went to help the US-backed Mujahedeen in Afghanistan to defeat the Soviets.106 After the war, many of these returned to Yemen and formed the basis of the group that later became known as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).107 According to the US State Department, al Qaeda in Yemen announced its merger with factions of al Qaeda in in January 2009, to create

105 Salisbury, P. (2016), “Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State”, Chatham House, p. 7 106 International Crisis Group, (2017), Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base, Middle East Report N°174, p. 2 107ibid.

30 AQAP.108 The al Qaeda cells in Yemen did not pose a particular threat to then president Saleh’s regime, indeed, the group was reportedly part of the structure of power that kept his regime afloat.109 However, in the aftermath of 9/11, Saleh saw a political and financial benefit to aligning his regime with the Bush administration’s War on Terror.110 Consequently, he offered his services to the Bush administration in its fight against terrorism. Saleh was warmly received and since then, the US has undertaken violent counterterrorism in Yemen with the Yemeni state’s accord. However, the domestic political situation has undergone some drastic changes since the US’s initial military involvement in the country under the mantle of counterterrorism.

Shortly into Saleh’s reign, an opposition movement emerged from the north-western region of Saada. This became known as the Houthi movement because it was headed by Hussein Al-Houthi, until he was killed by Saleh’s army in 2004. The Houthis criticised Saleh’s regime for being corrupt and for discriminating against the Zaydis; a Shia community populating the North-Western regions.111 They argued that Yemen’s sovereignty and the well-being of Yemenis were being disserved by Saleh’s government.112

The killing of the Houthi leader, Hussein Al Houthi, led to an armed insurgency that continues to be headed by Hussein’s brother, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. The insurgency culminated in six small wars, between 2004 and 2010 opposing the Houthis and the central state.113 In 2011, in the midst of what came to be called the “Arab Spring”, protest against the government peaked, leading Saleh to resign and cede his presidential powers to his Vice-President Abdu Rabbu Mansour al-Hadi in November, 2011. In February 2012, Hadi was officially elected president. The Houthis contested this nomination and continued to oppose the government.

5.1.2) The Saudi-led, US-supported war in Yemen In 2015, the Houthis, backed by Saleh and forces loyal to him, conquered Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. The president resigned, the parliament was dissolved and the Houthis took

108 United States Department of State Publication (2010), “Country Reports on Terrorism 2009”, p. 145 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141114.pdf 109 Scahill, J. (2013), Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield, (New York: Nation Books), p. 57 110 ibid. 111 Byman, D. (2018), “Yemen's Disastrous War”, Survival, 60(5), p. 145 112 ibid. 113 Salisbury, P. (2016), “Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State”, Chatham House, p. 11

31 control of the central administration. Hadi fled to Aden and then to Riyadh. Whilst in Aden, Hadi declared that the Houthi coup was illegitimate and proclaimed himself Yemen’s constitutional president. In March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of Middle Eastern and African states declared war against the Houthis. Since then, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have heavily bombarded Yemen, with considerable technical and material assistance from the US.114 The Saudi-led coalition also installed a blockade, preventing food and medicine from reaching large swathes of the population.115 Consequently, the UN estimates that more than 20 million Yemenis are food insecure, half of whom are on the verge of starvation and 17.8 million people lack access to safe water and sanitation in what the UN calls the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”116

The US government formally supports the Saudi-led war in Yemen to “restore the UN-recognized government of Yemen and preserve Saudi territorial integrity from incursion by Yemen-based Houthi rebels.”117 However, the US has also justified its support for the war as being part of its counterterrorism efforts in Yemen. Indeed, in a leaked internal memo justifying the continuation of US support for the war in Yemen during the Trump administration, – then head of the CIA, now secretary of state – writes that “Saudi Arabia and the UAE are strong counterterrorism partners.”118 Pompeo also wrote “[t]he Administration believes that the support that the United States provides to Saudi Arabia and the UAE is helping defeat ISIS-Y and AQAP”.119 Furthermore, US support for the war in Yemen, like the US military’s declared deployment in 19 countries to date, was legitimised through Congress’ September 2001 Authorisation of Military Force (AUMF), enacted in the context of the GWOT.120

114 Kouddous, S. (2015), “With US help, Saudi Arabia is obliterating Yemen”, PRI, 30 November 2015, https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-11-30/us-help-saudi-arabia-obliterating-yemen 115 Gladstone, R. (2017), “Saudi Blockade of Yemen Threatens to Starve Millions: U.N.”, , 8 November 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/08/world/middleeast/yemen-saudi-blockade.html 116 United Nations, “Humanitarian crisis in Yemen remains the worst in the world, warns UN”, UN news, 14 February 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1032811 117 Dalton, M. and Shah, H. (2018), “U.S. Support for Saudi Military Operations in Yemen”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 23 March 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-support-saudi-military-operations- yemen 118 Oakford, S. (2018), “Here is Mike Pompeo’s Memo Justifying U.S. Assistance to Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s War in Yemen”, , 13 September 2018, https://theintercept.com/2018/09/12/yemen-pompeo- uae-saudi-certification-human-rights/ 119 ibid. 120 Peña, C. (2017), “Here's why authorization to use military force is so important”, The Hill, 12 April 2017, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/363182-heres-why-authorization-to-use-military-force-is-so-

32 As aforementioned, detailing the context of US counterterrorism and military intervention in Yemen is important for assessing the results of this involvement. Indeed, awareness of the principle power struggles in Yemen is useful for evaluating the effects of US military action on non-state terrorist groups and how this relates to the political situation. Having established the context in which the US is militarily engaged in Yemen, this section now turns to assessing the objectives, means and consequences of this involvement.

5.2) Violent US counterterrorism in Yemen since 9/11: objectives and means

5.2.1) Objectives

US counterterrorism in Yemen officially aims to defeat Al Qaeda and other non-state terrorist groups and eliminate the terrorist threat that they pose.121 The Obama administration argued that its counterterrorism operations in Yemen also aimed to promote democratic governance and economic prosperity in the country.122 In accordance with its “America First” mantra, the Trump administration has distanced itself from the democracy promotion and humanitarian rhetoric used by the Obama and Bush administrations.123 Overall, in accordance with the GWOT, the main objectives of violent US counterterrorism operations in Yemen have consistently been to reduce the incidence of terrorism in the country, “degrade, disrupt and destroy” non-state terrorist groups, deny them safe havens and minimise the terrorist threat these groups pose to US national security interests.124

5.2.2) Means

The US’ pursuit of these objectives has been multifaceted, it has included providing financial aid to the central government, counterterrorism training for Yemen’s military, logistical and technical support to Yemeni military operations, commando raids and the

important; Gordon, R. (2018), “Forget ‘America First’—Donald Trump’s Policy Is Drones First”, The Nation, 25 May 2018 https://www.thenation.com/article/forget-america-first-donald-trumps-policy-is-drones-first/ 121 U.S. Central Command (2018), “CENTCOM updates counterterrorism strikes in Yemen”, 6 February 2018, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/1433499/centcom-updates-/ 122 Obama Administration (2011), National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011, p. 14 123 Heer, J. (2018), “Trump’s Disdain for Democracy Promotion”, The New Republic, 6 March 2018, https://newrepublic.com/article/147290/trumps-disdain-democracy-promotion 124 Department of Defense (2016), “U.S. Central Command Announces Yemen Counterterrorism Strikes”, 9 May 2016, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/755391/us-central-command-announces-yemen- counterterrorism-strikes/

33 coordination and execution of airstrikes.125 As the topic of this essay is the language and practice of violent US counterterrorism, its focus with regards to Yemen is on the effects of the US’ use of violence in its counterterrorism strategy.

According to the BIJ, violent US counterterrorism in Yemen has primarily consisted of drone strikes, airstrikes from conventional jet aircraft and cruise missiles.126 Due to the covert nature of these operations, the exact number of strikes and raids carried out by the US in Yemen since 9/11 is unknown to the general public. However, it is possible to estimate the scale and effects of US counterterrorism operations in Yemen by analysing information from media reports, think-tanks, the work of various non-governmental organisations and the attacks that the US has officially recognised.

TBIJ has compiled an extensive list of reported US covert operations in Yemen. As detailed in the methodology section, TBIJ’s reporting provides reliable information about covert US activities. Its dataset consists of reports from the US and Yemeni governments, military and intelligence officials and “credible media, academic and other sources.”127 This section relies heavily on TBIJ’s database for detailing the means and results of violent US counterterrorism operations in Yemen since 9/11.

The first known lethal US covert operation in Yemen after 9/11 occurred on November 3, 2002. A CIA controlled predator drone fired a hellfire missile at an SUV, killing 6 suspected terrorists.128 The UN’s Human Rights Centre condemned the strike as a “clear case of ”.129 The Bush administration retorted by asserting that the UN Special Rapporteur had no jurisdiction over “any military operations conducted during the course of an armed conflict with al Qaida”.130 In 2004, then Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, issued a secret executive order authorising US special forces to conduct worldwide operations against Al-Qaeda. This, combined with president Saleh’s authorisation provided the justificatory bases for US military operations in Yemen. In September 2009,

125 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “US strikes in Yemen, 2002 to present”, last accessed 04/2019, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lb1hEYJ_omI8lSe33izwS2a2lbiygs0hTp2Al_Kz5KQ/edit#gid=323032 473 126 ibid. 127 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Yemen: Reported US covert action 2012” https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/yemen-reported-us-covert-action-2012 128 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Yemen: Reported US covert actions 2001-2011”, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-2001-2011 129 ibid. 130 ibid.

34 General Patreaus ordered the creation of the “Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force” in order to carry out covert operations in the CENTCOM area that do not necessitate presidential permission and/or reports to congress.131 These manoeuvres have enabled the successive presidencies to carry out secretive counterterrorism operations in Yemen.

The chart below illustrates the BIJ’s compiled data on reported US covert action in Yemen from 2001 to March 2019:

Table 1: Reported US Covert Operations in Yemen, 2001- March 2019132

Confirmed US Possible US airstrikes, including airstrikes, including Other US operations drone strikes drone strikes

Number of strikes 318-338 125-145 91-142

People killed 897-1252 481-706 122-131

Civilians killed 91-142 33-94 83

According to TBIJ’s database, only one strike took place under the Bush administration and the Obama administration drastically expanded the drone programme as well as the US’ military involvement in Yemen.133 Since his inauguration, Trump has further increased violent US counterterrorism in Yemen.134 Table 1 suggests that the US has primarily relied on armed drones to conduct its covert operations in Yemen. The chart below shows the variation of intensity of US drone strikes in Yemen from 2001 to March 2019.

131 Mazzetti, M. (2010), “U.S. Is Said to Expand Secret Actions in Mideast”, The New York Times, 24 May 2010 https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/25/world/25military.html 132 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “US strikes in Yemen, 2002 to present”, last accessed 04/2019, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lb1hEYJ_omI8lSe33izwS2a2lbiygs0hTp2Al_Kz5KQ/edit#gid=323032 473 133 ibid. 134 Purkiss, J.; Serle, J. and Fielding-Smith, A. (2017), “US Counter Terror Air Strikes Double in Trump’s First Year”, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 19 December 2017 https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-12-19/counterrorism-strikes-double-trump-first-year

35

Table 2: US drone strikes in Yemen, 2002 - March 2019135

As evidenced by the chart, the Obama administration expanded US reliance on drone strikes to carry out violent counterterrorism in Yemen. This increase in drone strikes coincides with the spread of the so-called “Arab Spring” to Yemen.136 In accordance with his campaign promise to “bomb the s*** out of” suspected terrorists, Trump has further increased violent counterterrorism in Yemen, as shown by the large spike in attacks in 2017 and media reports.137

Indeed, “targeted killing” has become a cornerstone of US counterterrorism policy in Yemen. Following its arrival to the White House, the Obama administration set up a weekly teleconference of over 100 security personnel to discuss which individuals should be the

135 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (2019), “Strikes in Yemen”, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone- war/charts?show_strikes=1&location=yemen&from=2002-1-1&to=now 136 Woods, C. and Slater, E. (2012), “Arab spring brings steep rise in US attacks in Yemen”, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 29 March 2012 https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2012-03-29/arab- spring-brings-steep-rise-in-us-attacks-in-yemen 137 Purkiss, J. and Serle, J. (2017), “Unprecedented number of US drone and air strikes hit Yemen”, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2 March 2017, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-03- 02/unprecedented-number-of-us-drone-and-air-strikes-hit-yemen

36 targeted for assassination.138 Individuals who were put on the kill list – or “disposition matrix”139 – after presidential authorisation were then routinely killed by drone strikes in places such as , Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen.140 According to the 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance released by the Obama administration in 2016, in order to qualify for one of these strikes, an individual had to pose an “imminent threat” and their capture needed to be deemed “unfeasible”.141 However, critics such as Human Rights Watch note that the Obama administration did not disclose a fixed criteria used to establish imminence or feasibility.142 Further, in parallel with the vagueness of these standards, the US government has never revealed how they are applied nor which evidence is necessary to satisfy them.143 Moreover, reports show that the Obama administration typically opted to assassinate suspects without providing evidence of an imminent threat nor sufficient reason to disqualify the “capture” option.144

The Obama administration’s violent counterterrorism in Yemen was initially only aimed at the leaders of AQAP. However, it later expanded its targeting policy.145 Indeed, the Obama administration began using “pattern of life analysis” to conduct “signature strikes” instead of “personal strikes” in Yemen.146 This method involves selecting and assassinating individuals in virtue of social activity and behavioural patterns without US

138 Becker, J. and Shane, S. (2012), "Secret 'Kill List' Proves a Test of Obama's Principles and Will," New York Times, May 29, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al- qaeda.html 139 Cobain, I. (2013), “Obama’s secret kill list – the disposition matrix”, , 14 July 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/14/obama-secret-kill-list-disposition-matrix 140 For an extended description, see: Scahill, J. (2016), The Assassination Complex: Inside the Government's Secret Drone Warfare Program, (New York: Simon & Schuster) 141 Obama Administration (2016), Presidential Policy Guidance, Targeted Killings 2013, p. 11 https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3006440-Presidential-Policy-Guidance-May-2013-T 142 Human Rights Watch (2013), “Joint letter to President Obama on Drone Strikes and Targeted Killings”, 4 December 2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/11/joint-letter-president-obama-us-drone-strikes-and- targeted-killings 143 Kaufman, B. (2018), “Trump is unshackling America's drones thanks to Obama's weakness”, The Guardian, 17 September 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/17/the-cia-is-back-in-the- drone-business-trump-is-unshackling-americas-drones-thanks-to-obamas-weakness 144 Coll, S. (2012), “Kill or Capture”, The New Yorker, 2 August 2012, https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily- comment/kill-or-capture; Becker, J. and Shane, S. (2012), "Secret 'Kill List' Proves a Test of Obama's Principles and Will," New York Times, May 29, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership- in-war-on-al-qaeda.html 145 Ackerman, S. (2013), “Barrage of drone strikes in Yemen show flaws of US counter-terrorism strategy”, The Guardian, 12 August 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/yemen-drone-strikes-us-policy 146 Chamayou, G. (2015), “Pattern of Life Analysis”, in A Theory of the Drone, (New York: The New Press), pp. 46-51

37 knowledge of their “precise identity”.147 This practice began under the Bush administration but its use expanded to Yemen during Obama’s presidency.148 Throughout his presidency, Obama’s administration relied heavily on armed drones for targeted killings in its strategy to “disrupt, degrade and destroy” AQAP. Then CIA director referred to armed drones as “the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al Qaeda leadership.”149

Since Trump’s inauguration, his administration has significantly increased violent counterterrorism in Yemen.150 According to the BIJ, the Trump administration conducted a minimum of 161 drone and air strikes in Yemen during its first year.151 The Trump administration has lowered Obama-era criteria for resorting to violence,152 provided the CIA with more independence in designating and executing targets153 and has labelled three provinces in Yemen as “areas of active hostilities,” thereby enabling broader military involvement and increasing the risk of civilian casualties.154

The Trump administration has also increased the opaqueness of its counterterrorism operations.155 For example, whereas the Obama administration minimised the amount of civilians officially recognised as having been killed by US strikes by posthumously identifying military aged men killed by US armed drones as “enemies killed in action”,156 the Trump

147 ibid. p. 47 148 Zenko, M. (2012), “How Many Civilians Are Killed by U.S. Drones?”, Council on Foreign Relations, 4 June 2012, https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-many-civilians-are-killed-us-drones 149 Shachtman, N. (2009), “CIA Chief: Drones ‘Only Game in Town’ for Stopping Al Qaeda”, Wired, 19 May 2009, https://www.wired.com/2009/05/cia-chief-drones-only-game-in-town-for-stopping-al-qaeda/ 150 Purkiss, J. (2018), “Trump's first year in numbers: Strikes triple in Yemen and Somalia”, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 19 January 2018, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2018-01- 19/strikes-in-somalia-and-yemen-triple-in-trumps-first-year-in-office 151 ibid. 152 Rosenthal, D. and Dejonge Schulman, L. (2018), “Trump’s Secret War on Terror”, The Atlantic, 10 August 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/trump-war-terror-drones/567218/ 153 Lubold, G. and Harris, S. (2017), “Trump Broadens CIA Powers, Allows Deadly Drone Strikes”, The Wall Street Journal, 13 March 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-gave-cia-power-to-launch-drone-strikes- 1489444374 154 Savage, C. and Schmitt, E. (2017), “Trump Administration Is Said to Be Working to Loosen Counterterrorism Rules”, The New York Times, 12 March 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/12/us/politics/trump- loosen-counterterrorism-rules.html 155 Borger, J. (2018), “US air wars under Trump: increasingly indiscriminate, increasingly opaque”, The Guardian, 23 January 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/23/us-air-wars-trump 156 Friedersdorf, C. (2012), “Under Obama, Men Killed by Drones Are Presumed to Be Terrorists”, The Atlantic, 29 May 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/under-obama-men-killed-by-drones-are- presumed-to-be-terrorists/257749/; Scahill, J. (2015), “The Assassination Complex”, The Intercept, 15 October 2015, https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/the-assassination-complex/

38 administration has outright dismissed reporting civilian deaths caused by its drone strikes.157

Having discussed the context, objectives and means of violent US counterterrorism in Yemen, this section now turns to assessing the effects of these policies on the incidence of terrorism and the strength of non-state terrorist groups.

5.3) Effects of US military involvement in Yemen

5.3.1) US support for the Saudi-led war vs. US counterterrorism objectives

As the US plays a crucial role in the Saudi and Emirati bombing campaign in Yemen, it carries responsibility for the effects of this Saudi-led war. Indeed, according to the US Central Command “the United States has provided the coalition with vital intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and logistics information”.158 The US has also helped refuel Saudi and Emirati warplanes between bombing missions159 and has sold billions of dollars worth of weapons to the government of Saudi Arabia.160 Beyond logistical and material assistance, US support for the war also provides the coalition with political cover.161 The executive director of the Arab Center in Washington DC, Khalil Jahshan, argues that the Saudis would end the war if the US retracted its support.162

However, reports have shown that non-state has benefitted both directly and indirectly from the Saudi-led war in Yemen. The Associated Press (AP) reports that coalition forces have allied themselves with factions of AQAP in their anti-Houthi struggle.163 Coalition forces paid AQAP cells to leave certain areas and others received Emirati and Saudi money as well as US weapons to defend themselves against Houthi

157 Reuters, “U.S. halts reporting of civilian deaths by drone outside war zones”, 6 March 2019 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-drones-idUSKCN1QN2PD 158Kouddous, S. (2015), “With US help, Saudi Arabia is obliterating Yemen”, PRI, 30 November 2015, https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-11-30/us-help-saudi-arabia-obliterating-yemen 159 Schmitt, E. (2018), “U.S. Bills Saudis and Emiratis $331 Million for Refuelling Warplanes in Yemen”, The New York Times, 13 December 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/politics/us-saudi-uae-yemen- fuel.html 160 Lamothe, D. (2015), “How U.S. weapons will play a huge role in Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen”, The Washington Post, 26 March 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/03/26/how- u-s-weapons-will-play-a-large-role-in-saudi-arabias-war-in-yemen/?utm_term=.de0e00468ada 161 Harb, A. (2019), “Saudi Arabia would end Yemen war without US support, experts say”, Middle East Eye, 1 March 2019, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-would-end-yemen-war-without-us-support- experts-say 162 ibid. 163 Micheal, M.; Wilson, T. and Keath, L. (2018), “US allies, al-Qaida battle rebels in Yemen”, Associated Press, 7 August 2018, https://apnews.com/f38788a561d74ca78c77cb43612d50da

39 forces.164 AP also reports that AQAP members joined anti-Houthi coalition ranks, increasing the influence and legitimacy of the organisation.165 Moreover, the Saudi-led bombing campaign, that the US has both directly166 and indirectly167 participated in, has pushed some Yemenis to seek protection from non-state terrorist groups or to unite with these groups to seek revenge and pursue violent opposition.168 Further, the economic disruption and political turmoil caused by the war has enabled non-state terrorist groups to gain local popular support and legitimacy in the regions where they provide basic and sometimes crucial services – such as humanitarian aid, arbitration and security.169 Indeed, according to the US Bureau of Counterterrorism, AQAP and ISIS-Y have exploited the political and security vacuum that the war has generated.170 All of the above strongly suggests that the US’ support for the war in Yemen has been counterproductive towards achieving its counterterrorism objectives. Indeed, high-level US military officials have reached the same conclusion.171

As aforementioned, the US-supported coalition’s bombardment and siege warfare in Yemen has led an more than 80% of Yemen’s population, an estimated 24.1 million people, to be in need of assistance and protection.172 An estimated 10 million people are suffering extreme levels of hunger and the number of Yemenis in “acute need” is growing.173 Thus, not only is the US’ active support and active participation in the war – partly justified in terms of counterterrorism – counterproductive toward US counterterrorism objectives, it is also morally reprehensible. These observations are in direct opposition with the presidential

164 ibid. 165 ibid. 166 Emmons, A (2016, “U.S. Enters Yemen War Directly For The First Time With Attack On Houthis”, The Intercept, 13 October 2016, https://theintercept.com/2016/10/13/u-s-enters-yemen-war-directly-for-the- first-time-with-attack-on-houthis/ 167 Kouddous, S. (2015), “With US help, Saudi Arabia is obliterating Yemen”, PRI, 30 November 2015, https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-11-30/us-help-saudi-arabia-obliterating-yemen 168 International Crisis Group, (2017), “Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base”, Middle East Report N°1 169 ibid., pp. 11-12 170 United States Department of State Publication (2018), “Country Reports on Terrorism 2017”, p. 163 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/283100.pdf 171 Carter, A. and Dempsey, M. (2015), “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Ash Carter and General Martin E. Dempsey in Briefing Room”, Department of Defense, 16 April 2015, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/607041/ 172 United Nations, “Humanitarian crisis in Yemen remains the worst in the world, warns UN”, UN news, 14 February 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1032811 173 ibid.

40 discursive legitimisations of violent counterterrorism as strategically effective and morally righteous.

5.3.2) Violent US counterterrorism in Yemen: a model for counterterrorism? According to the BIJ, reported violent US counterterrorism operations in Yemen since 9/11, including possible drone strikes, have killed 1500-2089 individuals.174 TBIJ reports that between 207-319 of these were civilians.175 AQAP was created in 2009 and since then, the US has increased its use of violent counterterrorism in Yemen.176 In 2009, US officials estimated that there were less than 300 core AQAP members.177 From 2011 to 2018, the US officially estimated that AQAP’s membership grew from “several hundred”178 to being in the “low thousands”.179 This indicates a direct correlation between the increase of violent US counterterrorism in Yemen and the growth of AQAP. Testimonies of Yemenis affected by violent US counterterrorism suggest that beyond correlation, US strikes and the growth of AQAP are causally linked.180 By 2017, International Crisis Group (ICG) estimated that AQAP was stronger than it had ever been.181 Moreover, Ansar Al Sharia and the ISIS faction in Yemen (ISIS-Y) did not exist before the GWOT.182 Therefore, although violent US counterterrorism in Yemen has officially sought to destroy Al Qaeda and other non-state terrorist organisations in the country, the membership of these groups in Yemen has grown.

A large collection of interviews and reports provide evidence for the claim that violent US counterterrorism in Yemen has generated support for non-state terrorist groups. In 2013, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a report named: “‘Between a Drone and Al-

174 See Table 1 175 ibid. 176 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “US strikes in Yemen, 2002 to present”, last accessed 04/2019, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lb1hEYJ_omI8lSe33izwS2a2lbiygs0hTp2Al_Kz5KQ/edit#gid=323032 473 177 Raghavan, S. (2012), “In Yemen, U.S. airstrikes breed anger, and sympathy for al-Qaeda”, The Washington Post, 29 May 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-yemen-us-airstrikes-breed- anger-and-sympathy-for-al-qaeda/2012/05/29/gJQAUmKI0U_story.html?utm_term=.33835cef719f 178 United States Department of State Publication (2011), “Country Reports on Terrorism 2010”, p. 204 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/170479.pdf 179 United States Department of State Publication (2018), “Country Reports on Terrorism 2017”, p. 328 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/283100.pdf 180 Singh, A. (2015), Death by Drone, (New York: Open Society Foundations); Raghavan, S. (2012), “In Yemen, U.S. airstrikes breed anger, and sympathy for al-Qaeda”, The Washington Post, 29 May 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-yemen-us-airstrikes-breed-anger-and-sympathy-for- al-qaeda/2012/05/29/gJQAUmKI0U_story.html?utm_term=.d25b1c0534f9 181 International Crisis Group, (2017), Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base, Middle East Report N°174 182 ibid. p. 6

41 Qaeda’, The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen”.183 The report documents the effects of violent US counterterrorism on Yemeni civilians. It investigates six US counterterrorism operations in Yemen. The locals interviewed for the report stress the unpopularity and counter-productivity of these violent counterterrorism operations. For example, a relative of villagers killed by violent US counterterrorism in Yemen asserted: “America’s goal is to defeat Al-Qaeda. Instead they are creating more Al-Qaeda.”184 An Open Society Foundations (OSF) report on the effect of drone strikes in Yemen corroborates this view. It found that, according to multiple Yemeni interviewees, US drone strikes are counterproductive as some of the close friends or family members of individuals killed by violent US counterterrorism join AQAP to seek revenge against the US or the Yemeni government.185

A Yemeni man, whose village was struck by a drone strike, testified to the senate in 2013. He stated that: “[w]hat radicals had previously failed to achieve in my village, one drone strike accomplished in an instant: there is now an intense anger and growing hatred of America.”186 This testimony, among those relayed by HRW and OSF, reflects the deeply counterproductive effects of violent US counterterrorism in Yemen. Indeed, according to the HRW report:

“Popular discontent with the US airstrikes—evidenced by demonstrations, roadblocks, and confirmed in interviews with scores of Yemeni citizens as well as security analysts, diplomats, and journalists—has generated hostility toward the United States and undermined public confidence in the Yemeni government. Security analysts believe this significantly bolsters the ranks of AQAP.”187

Furthermore, AQAP exploits the unpopularity of the US’ drone campaign to recruit new members. As Shane and Becker note, drones replaced Guantanamo Bay as a primary

183 Human Rights Watch, (2013), "Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda”: The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen 184 ibid. p. 67 185 Singh, A. (2015), Death by Drone, (New York: Open Society Foundations), p. 75, 78, 84, 96 186 The Independent, “Yemeni man brings the horror of drone strikes home to US Senate”, 24 April 2013, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/yemeni-man-brings-the-horror-of-drone-strikes- home-to-us-senate-8586860.html 187 Human Rights Watch, (2013), "Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda”: The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen”, p. 24

42 recruiting tool for militants.188 This practice is exemplified in the winter 2013 edition of AQAP’s magazine, “Inspire”:

In Yemen, they roam over Muslim houses, terrorizing children, women and the weak. Moreover they bombard “suspected” targets in villages, towns and cities (…) without the need to identify the real identity of the target, whether Al-Qaeda or not. (…) Obama is declaring a crusade! These missiles have no eyes and their launchers are more blind. They kill civilians more than .189

As described in the literature review, a growing amount of publications provide support for AQAP’s claim that armed drones terrorise the populations that they surveil and bomb.190 In 2013, forensic psychologist Peter Schaapveld presented his research on the psychological impact of drone warfare in Yemen to a UK parliamentary subcommittee. He found that 91% of those he examined in Yemen were suffering from “significant symptoms” of post-traumatic stress disorder.191 According to Rolling Stone magazine, Schaapveld said that as a result of violent US counterterrorism, the Yemeni population “by any figure is hugely suffering” and that drone-induced fear “is traumatizing an entire generation.”192

Therefore, the available evidence strongly suggests that the terror generated by drone surveillance and bombardment is counterproductive toward US counterterrorism objectives for a number of reasons. Firstly, according to numerous reports and civilian testimonies, the use of drones to kill individuals in Yemen results in the deaths of innocents and terrorises large swathes of the population. According to interviews and aforementioned research conducted in Yemen, this produces support for non-state terrorist groups. Second, violent US counterterrorism in Yemen discredits the Yemeni state as it is seen as complicit in

188 Becker, J. and Shane, S. (2012), "Secret 'Kill List' Proves a Test of Obama's Principles and Will," New York Times, May 29, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al- qaeda.html 189 in Human Rights Watch, (2013), "Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda”: The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen”, p. 26 190 See for example: Birch, M.; Lee, G. and Pierscionek, T. (2012), “Drones: the physical and psychological implications of a global theatre of war”, Medact, https://www.medact.org/wp- content/uploads/2012/10/report-drones-2012.pdf; or: Cavallero, J., Sonnenberg, S.; and Knuckey, S. (2012), Living under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan, (Stanford: International Human Rights and Conflict Resolutions Clinic); (New York: Global Justice Clinic) 191 All-party parliamentary group (2013), “Report on the Psychological Impact of Drones”, p. 3 https://appgondrones.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/report-of-the-appg-on-drones-march-20131.pdf 192 Salama, V. (2014), “Death From Above: How American Drone Strikes Are Devastating Yemen”, Rolling Stone, 14 April 2014, https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/death-from-above-how-american- drone-strikes-are-devastating-yemen-97688/

43 US terror. According to the HRW and OSF reports, this drives political instability and violent opposition. Third, the terror caused by violent US counterterrorism provides support for AQAP’s recruitment narrative – that the US is a brutal and murderous state that kills at will. This narrative is also corroborated by the aforementioned lack of transparency and unaccountable nature of the target selection process. Thus, by engaging in covert violent counterterrorism that terrorises local populations, the US tacitly endorses Al Qaeda’s self- identification as a freedom-fighting organisation that is opposed to a hegemonic terrorist state.

As stated in the literature review, this thesis aligns itself with the scholars who argue that the US’ use of drones to surveil and bombard populations amounts to state terrorism. Given the testimonies of Yemenis subjected to drone warfare and evidence presented here, there seems to be little grounds, other than semantic objections addressed in the literature review, on which one can defend the notion that drone warfare used to surveil and bombard populations in Yemen is not state terrorism.

The US’ use of cruise missile strikes and commando raids to conduct violent counterterrorism in Yemen has also resulted in the deaths of civilians and been a source of terror for the Yemeni population. For example, the first strike authorised by the Obama administration was fired from a US Navy vessel and killed an estimated 41 civilians on impact.193 According to reports, the strike was supposed to kill an AQAP leader and consisted of up to five tomahawk missiles equipped with cluster munitions.194 The bombs rained into a poor mountainous village and spread unexploded munitions on a 1.5-kilometer radius that later claimed other innocent victims.195 The strike caused widespread indignation, reinforced local opposition to violent counterterrorism operations and provided AQAP with an opportunity to promote their anti-American agenda.196

As shown in table 1, violent US counterterrorism in Yemen has primarily consisted of various kinds of airstrikes. However, the US has also used ground troops to carry out violent counterterrorism operations in Yemen. Indeed, Trump authorised a controversial

193 Human Rights Watch, (2013), "Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda”: The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen, p. 67 194 ibid., pp. 67-75 195 ibid., pp. 72-73 196 ibid., p. 77; Scahill, J. (2013), Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield, (New York: Nation Books), pp. 217-223

44 commando raid in Yemen within 10 days of his inauguration.197 The White House estimated that the raid killed 14 members of AQAP but the assault is also reported to have killed 25 civilians.198 As ICG argue, these violent operations increase local hostility toward the US and the Yemeni government which is seen as complicit in these actions.199 Accordingly, ICG notes that as “[c]ampaigns against jihadists hinge on winning over the population in which they operate”, the US should avoid operations that kill civilians and alienate communities.200

There is little available data regarding the impact of the US counterterrorism operations in Yemen on non-state terrorism since Donald Trump took office. However, given that the Trump administration continues to support the Saudi led war and has increased the violent counterterrorism policies that proved counterproductive under president Obama, it is likely that these policies will continue to generate circumstances that serve the expansionary interests of Al Qaeda and other non-state terrorist organisations in Yemen.

In sum, despite the fact that violent US counterterrorism in Yemen has killed members of AQAP and has been described as “successful” by Obama,201 the US’ strategy has failed to decrease the scale, scope and power of non-state terrorist groups as well as the prevalence of terrorism in Yemen. As the numerous reports and local testimonies detailed above suggest, non-state terrorist organisations have directly benefited from the Obama and Trump administrations’ support for and participation in the Saudi-led war. Indeed, the US Bureau of Counterterrorism notes that due to the “political and security vacuum created by the ongoing conflict (…) AQAP’s area of influence has increased since the onset of the civil war”.202 Accordingly, as non-state groups have increased in membership and influence, the threat they pose to America is greater than it was before violent US intervention.

197Shabibi, N. and al Sane, N. (2017), “Nine young children killed: The full details of botched US raid in Yemen”, The Bureau of Investigation, 9 February 2017, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-02- 09/nine-young-children-killed-the-full-details-of-botched-us-raid-in-yemen 198 ibid. 199 International Crisis Group, “Counter-terrorism Pitfalls: What the U.S. Fight against ISIS and al-Qaeda Should Avoid”, Special Report n°3, 22 March 2017, p. i 200 ibid. 201 Rampton, R. (2015), “Obama defends U.S. counter-terrorism strategy in Yemen”, Reuters, 25 January 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-obama-idUSKBN0KY0G120150125 202 United States Department of State Publication (2018), “Country Reports on Terrorism 2017”, p. 163 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/283100.pdf

45 As aforementioned, a large variety of factors have led to Yemen’s current political situation. However, US participation in the war and violent US counterterrorism operations have contributed to create the violent and volatile circumstances that non-state terrorist groups exploit. Moreover, violent US counterterrorism and military involvement in Yemen under the auspices of the GWOT has killed many innocents, played a major role in the development of the humanitarian crisis that has put millions of lives at risk and has terrorised large swathes of the population who live under US aerial surveillance and bombardment. Overall, this has contributed to create an environment that serves the expansionary interests of non-state terrorist groups and is counterproductive towards achieving US counterterrorism objectives.

The effects of violent US counterterrorism in Yemen are in stark contrast with the discursive legitimations constructed by successive US presidents since 9/11. Indeed, as analysed in the previous chapter, the Bush, Obama and Trump administrations presented violent counterterrorism as appropriate, necessary, strategically effective and morally righteous. However, as we have seen, US counterterrorism in Yemen has been strategically counterproductive and has contributed to creating an extremely severe humanitarian crisis. In light of this analysis, it would be strategically and morally misguided to argue that violent US counterterrorism in Yemen has been either appropriate, necessary, strategically effective or righteous.

The following discussion explores, beyond the case of Yemen, the broader implications of the gaping rift between the presidential discourses used to legitimise violent counterterrorism and the effects of the US’ practice of violent counterterrorism.

5.3.3) Broader implications

The GWOT, declared on 20 September 2001, is now almost 18 years old. Yet, the amount of non-state terrorists, non-state terrorist groups and terrorist attacks have all greatly increased during that period.203 It is worth taking a closer look at the effects of violent US counterterrorism since 9/11 to appreciate the scale of this failure.

203 Institute for Economics & Peace (2018), “Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the impact of terrorism”, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf

46 In October 2001, with UN support, the US launched a war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. In 2019, the Taliban remain a strong force in Afghanistan204 and according to a 2019 UN report, Al Qaeda views Afghanistan as a safe haven.205 The war has created untold suffering and misery for many Afghanis, which has ultimately increased support and recruitment for the Taliban.206 The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, in part discursively legitimised in counterterrorism terms,207 has resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths208 and millions of displaced people.209 Before the war, Al Qaeda had a very small presence in Iraq. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) came to prominence in reaction to the US-led invasion of Iraq.210 In 2014, and as a direct consequence of US military involvement in Iraq, ISIS erupted onto the international scene; conquering large areas of Iraq and parts of Syria.211 ISIS now controls far less territory but has morphed into “an atomized, clandestine network of cells engaged in guerrilla attacks, bombings and targeted assassinations”.212 The suffering and misery caused by the group’s expansion and the continuing military campaign to destroy the proclaimed caliphate are direct consequences of US actions undertaken under the auspices of the GWOT.

The US’ counterterrorism failures are not reserved to the Middle East and Afghanistan. After declaring the GWOT, the US created AFRICOM to combat terrorism in

204 Sarwary, B. and Hussain, M. (2019), “After 18 Years of War, the Taliban has the upper hand in Afghanistan Peace Talks”, The Intercept, 15 February 2019, https://theintercept.com/2019/02/15/afghanistan-peace-talks- taliban/ 205 Joscelyn, T. and Roggio, B. (2019), “UN: Al Qaeda continues to view Afghanistan as a ‘safe haven”, Long War Journal, 5 March 2019, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/03/un-al-qaeda-continues-to-view- afghanistan-as-a-safe-haven.php 206 Sarwary, B. and Hussain, M. (2019), “After 18 Years of War, the Taliban has the upper hand in Afghanistan Peace Talks”, The Intercept, 15 February 2019, https://theintercept.com/2019/02/15/afghanistan-peace-talks- taliban/ 207 Kramer, C. and Michalowski, R. (2005) “War, Aggression and State Crime: A Criminological Analysis of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq”. The British Journal of Criminology 45 (4). (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 448-449 208 Iraq Body Count, Database https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/ 209 Cohen, R. (2008), “Iraq’s Displaced: Where to Turn?”, The Brookings Institution, 31 December 2008, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iraqs-displaced-where-to-turn/ 210 Kirdar, M. (2011), “Al Qaeda in Iraq”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 15 June 2011, https://www.csis.org/analysis/al-qaeda-iraq 211 Hasan, M. (2018), “Blowback: How ISIS was created by the U.S. invasion of Iraq”, The Intercept, 29 January 2018, https://theintercept.com/2018/01/29/isis-iraq-war-islamic-state-blowback/ 212 Schmitt, E.; Gibbons-Neff, T.; Cooper, H. and Rubin, A. (2019), “Its Territory May Be Gone, but the U.S. Fight Against ISIS Is Far From Over”, The New York Times, 24 March 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/24/us/politics/us-isis-fight.html

47 Africa.213 The US has ground troops present in many countries across the continent.214 The Obama and Trump administrations have used drone warfare as part of their counterterrorism strategy in Africa, most notably in Somalia, and Niger.215 Despite these efforts, non-state terrorism throughout the African continent is far greater now than it was on the eve of the GWOT.216 Indeed, factions loyal to Al Qaeda and ISIS now exist in many African countries.217 emerged and is spreading beyond the borders of Nigeria.218 Al Shabab has grown and has become more active in Somalia.219

Many factors have contributed to the rise of non-state terrorism in the 21st century. Among these are issues such as the presence of armed conflict, wide-spread human rights abuses, the level of economic development and socio-economic factors.220 Therefore, it would be too simplistic to surmise the increase of non-state terrorism to the US’ use of violent counterterrorism. However, research referenced in this chapter demonstrates that in many cases, violent US counterterrorism has contributed to create conditions that facilitate the growth of and local support for non-state terrorist groups. Accordingly, although violent US counterterrorism is not the only reason non-state terrorism has increased since 9/11, the evidence analysed here suggests that US actions have contributed to this growth.

This chapter discussed how violent US counterterrorism in Yemen has been counterproductive as it contributes to create circumstances that facilitate the expansion of non-state terrorist organisations. However, the counterproductive nature of US

213 For an in depth and pertinent analysis of US counterterrorism in Africa, see: Keenan, J. (2013), The Dying Sahara: US Imperialism and Terror in Africa”, (London: Pluto Press) 214 Savell, S. (2019), “This Map Shows Where in the World the U.S. Military Is Combatting Terrorism”, Smithsonian Magazine, January 2019 https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/map-shows-places-world- where-us-military-operates-180970997/ 215 Seligman, L. (2018), “Shadowy U.S. Drone War in Africa Set to Expand”, Foreign Policy, 4 September 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/04/shadowy-u-s-drone-war-in-africa-set-to-expand/ 216 Institute for Economics & Peace (2018), “Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the impact of terrorism”, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf 217 Searcey, D.; Schmitt, E. and Callimachi, R. (2016), “Al Qaeda’s Branch in Africa Makes a Lethal Comeback”, The New York Times, 15 March 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/world/africa/al-qaedas-african- offshoot-makes-a-lethal-comeback.html; Miller, E. (2018), “ISIS is expanding in North and West Africa”, The Arab Weekly, 6 May 2018, https://thearabweekly.com/isis-expanding-north-and-west-africa 218 Idris, A. (2019), “The Boko Haram Sect and Growing Terror Networks in West Africa”, Medium, 8 Jan 2019, https://medium.com/the-internationalists-journal/the-boko-haram-sect-and-growing-terror-networks-in- west-africa-part-one-a6e0345e03c0 219 Institute for Economics & Peace (2018), “Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the impact of terrorism”, pp. 17-18, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf 220 ibid., p. 58;

48 counterterrorism in Yemen is symptomatic of the greater phenomenon whereby violence begets violence. Smith a Zeigler’s analysis of terrorism before and after 9/11, published in 2018, suggested that “counter-terrorism policies of governments in Muslim majority countries and foreign states intervening militarily on their behalf since 9/11 are provoking more terrorism than they are preventing.”221 If one is concerned with how to reduce the incidence of terrorism, the above analysis may lead to the following question: how can the US change its counterterrorism policy so that it is no longer counterproductive? A partial answer to this question can be found in Noam Chomsky’s straightforward observation: “Everyone’s worried about stopping terrorism. Well, there’s a really easy way: Stop participating in it.”222 For example, as detailed above, the use of drone warfare to conduct counterterrorism terrorises civilian populations. Therefore, as it is a form of terrorism, the US should not engage in drone warfare to “counter” terrorism.

Beyond reducing its direct contribution to terrorism, the US would be likely to make strategic counterterrorism gains if it stopped terrorising populations. Indeed, the largest study of suicide bombing, commissioned by the Bush administration, found that in over 95% of the cases, those committing these acts of terror were motivated by the strategic and secular goal of ending perceived foreign occupation and oppression.223 As seen in the case of Yemen, US state terrorism motivates individuals to join non-state terrorist organisations and it is therefore counterproductive toward US counterterrorism objectives.

Another way for the US to improve its counterterrorism policy is to not pursue actions that worsen economic and political circumstances that are conducive to violence and non-state terrorism. As ICG note in a special report on counter-terrorism, the primary catalyst for the growth of ISIS and Al Qaeda is political turmoil in the Muslim world.224 Therefore, if the US wishes to reduce the incidence of terrorism and support for non-state terrorist groups in that region, it should avoid conducting violent counterterrorism campaigns that increase political turmoil by systematically killing civilians and terrorising local populations. In this vein, pursuing non-violent means of conflict transformation aimed

221 Smith, M. and Zeigler, S. (2017), “Terrorism before and after 9/11 – a more dangerous world?”, Research & Politics, 4(4), p. 6 222 Junkerman, J. (2002), “Power and Terror: Noam Chomsky in Our Times”, Documentary Film 223 Pape, R. (2005), Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, (New York: Random House), p. 210 224 International Crisis Group, “Counter-terrorism Pitfalls: What the U.S. Fight against ISIS and al-Qaeda Should Avoid”, Special Report n°3, 22 March 2017, p. i

49 at reducing cycles of violence, fostering negotiation and dialogue, alleviating economic anguish and addressing political corruption is likely to be more fruitful toward reducing non- state terrorism than the violent approach favoured by US administrations since 9/11.225

In sum, studies and the available evidence show that beyond the case of Yemen, violent US counterterrorism has tended to increase the incidence of terrorism and the suffering of civilian populations. Therefore, there are strong strategic and moral arguments against violent US counterterrorism. The strategic argument rests on the observation that the US’ use of violence in the GWOT has been counterproductive toward reducing the incidence of terrorism, overcoming the threat of terrorism and defeating non-state terrorist groups. The moral argument against the US’ legitimisation and practice of violent counterterrorism can be developed in reaction to the consequences that these have had on human well-being. Indeed, in its practice of violent counterterrorism, the US has launched two fully fledged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have caused millions to flee their homes and have led to hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths.226 Moreover, as detailed above, numerous studies reveal that the US’ drone programme has terrorised and continues to terrorise the populations living under drones. The GWOT and the US’ terrorism discourse also served to legitimise global extrajudicial assassination,227 extraordinary rendition228 and torture programmes.229 These violent policies have contributed to destabilising vast areas of Africa and the Middle East, causing severe economic, psychological and physical tolls on the civilian populations. Accordingly, in moral terms, as violent US counterterrorism has caused considerable human suffering in the places it has been practiced, it should be condemned and its practice should end. Furthermore, in strategic terms, the available evidence suggests that if US representatives wish to reduce the incidence of non-state terrorism, they should not discursively legitimise and authorise current US practices of violent counterterrorism.

225 Jackson, R. (2017), “CTS, counterterrorism and non-violence”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 10(2), pp. 357- 369 226 Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs (2018), “Costs of War”, Brown University, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human 227 Calhoun, L. (2016), “Targeted killing and drone warfare”, in Jackson, R. (eds), Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies (London: Routledge), pp. 403-425 228 Blakeley, R. and Raphael, S. (2016), “Rendition in the “war on terror”, in Jackson, R. (eds), Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies (London: Routledge), pp. 383-402 229 Brecher, B. (2016), “Torture”, in Jackson, R. (eds), Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies (London: Routledge), pp. 360-382

50 6) Conclusion

This essay contrasted the language used by US presidents since 9/11 to legitimise violent counterterrorism with the effects of violent US counterterrorism in Yemen. The first part found that despite some superficial variations in the presidential discourses, the successive administrations depended on similar narratives and rhetorical devices to legitimise violent counterterrorism. It found that each administration legitimised violent counterterrorism as appropriate, necessary, strategically effective and morally righteous. The research went on to show that since the declaration of the GWOT, no US administration has enacted substantial discursive or practical shifts away from the use of violence as a means to reduce terrorism. Indeed, the W. Bush, Obama and Trump administrations consistently supported violent counterterrorism in language and practice.

The second part of the research found that, in direct opposition to the discourses employed to legitimise the GWOT, violent US counterterrorism in Yemen has been strategically counterproductive toward the stated aims. Moreover, in contrast with the assertions of presidential discourses, US military involvement in Yemen under the mantle of counterterrorism is morally condemnable as it has terrorised the civilian population and played a major role in creating the ongoing humanitarian crisis wherein, according to the UN, at least 80% of the Yemeni population is in need of humanitarian assistance. Therefore, the research found that the effects of violent US counterterrorism in Yemen negate the discursive legitimisations that violent US counterterrorism is appropriate, necessary, strategically effective and morally righteous.

The case study led to a short reflection on the broader implications of this analysis for evaluating the effectiveness and moral justifications of violent US counterterrorism beyond the case of Yemen. In conclusion, this research found that the presidential legitimisations given for violent US counterterrorism are inconsistent with the effects of violent counterterrorism in practice. As the US’ discourses and practice of counterterrorism have failed to reduce the incidence of terrorism as well as the power of non-state terrorist organisations and have increased the suffering of civilian populations, this thesis encourages critical engagement aimed at destabilising and changing dominant understandings of and political responses to non-state terrorism.

51

7) Appendix

7.1) George W. Bush

11 September 2001, “Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-the-terrorist-attacks

14 September 2001, “Remarks at the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-national-day-prayer-and- remembrance-service-0

20 September 2001, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11” https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress- the-united-states-response-the-terrorist-attacks

11 October 2001, “The President's News Conference”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-1089

12 October 2001, “Remarks to the March of Dimes Volunteer Leadership Conference”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-march-dimes-volunteer- leadership-conference

20 October 2001, “Remarks at the Chief Executive Officers Summit in Shanghai”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-chief-executive-officers- summit-shanghai

24 May 2004, “Remarks at the United States Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-united-states-army-war- college-carlisle-pennsylvania

52 7.2) Barrack Obama

15 July 2008, “Remarks in Washington, DC”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-washington-dc

20 January 2009, “Inaugural Address”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/inaugural-address-5

24 February 2009, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-1

27 March 2009, “Remarks on United States Military and Diplomatic Strategies for Afghanistan and Pakistan”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-united- states-military-and-diplomatic-strategies-for-afghanistan-and-pakistan-0

20 April 2009, “Remarks at the Central Intelligence Agency in Langley, Virginia”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-central-intelligence-agency- langley-virginia-1

29 April 2009, “The President's News Conference”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-1124

21 May 2009, “Remarks at the National Archives and Records Administration”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-national-archives-and-records- administration

25 May 2009, “Remarks at a Memorial Day Ceremony in Arlington, Virginia” https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-memorial-day-ceremony-arlington- virginia-11

23 May 2013, “Remarks at National Defense University”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-national-defense-university

15 February 2015, “Remarks at the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-white-house-summit- countering-violent-extremism

6 December 2015, “Address to the Nation on United States Counterterrorism Strategy”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-united-states- counterterrorism-strategy

6 December 2016, “Remarks on United States Counterterrorism Strategy at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-united-states- counterterrorism-strategy-macdill-air-force-base-florida

53 7.3) Donald Trump

20 January 2017, “Inaugural Address”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/inaugural-address-14

2 February 2017, “Remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-national-prayer-breakfast-24

8 February 2017, “Remarks at the Major Cities Chiefs Association Winter Meeting”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-major-cities-chiefs-association- winter-meeting

10 February 2017, “The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference- with-prime-minister-shinzo-abe-japan

21 January 2017, “Remarks at the Central Intelligence Agency in Langley, Virginia”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-central-intelligence-agency- langley-virginia-2

5 April 2017, “The President's News Conference With King Abdullah II of Jordan”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-with-king- abdullah-ii-jordan-0

21 May 2017, “Remarks at the Arab Islamic American Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-arab-islamic-american-summit- riyadh-saudi-arabia

25 May 2017, “Remarks at the Dedication Ceremony for the Berlin Wall Memorial and the 9/11 and Article 5 Memorial in Brussels, Belgium”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-dedication-ceremony-for-the- berlin-wall-memorial-and-the-911-and-article-5

26 May 2017, “Statement on the Terrorist Attack in Minya Province, ”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-terrorist-attack-minya- province-egypt

9 June 2017, “The President's News Conference With President Klaus Iohannis of Romania”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-with- president-klaus-iohannis-romania

6 July 2017, “Remarks in Warsaw, Poland”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-warsaw-poland

25 July 2017, “Remarks at a "Make America Great Again" Rally in Youngstown, Ohio”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-make-america-great-again-rally- youngstown-ohio

54

30 January 2018, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union”, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress- the-state-the-union-25

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