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D. Maltoni, D. Maio, AK Jain, S. Prabhakar Handbook of Fingerprint

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Extract from: D. Maltoni, D. Maio, A.K. Jain, S. Prabhakar Handbook of Fingerprint Recognition Springer, New York, 2003 Index (Copyright 2003, Springer Verlag. All rights Reserved.) Index Border control; 43 A Brute force; 280; 293; 302 Abstract labels; 239 C Acceptability; 7 AFIS. See Automatic fingerprint Calibration; 60 identification systems Cancelable biometrics; 301 Analysis. See Fingerprint analysis Cellular phones; 43 Arch; 174 Certificate authority; 292 Arcing; 244 Certifier; 292 Attended biometric application; 6; 8 Challenge-response; 299 Authentication; 3 Circumvention; 7; 40; 281 Automatic capture; 15 Class set reduction; 241 Automatic fingerprint identification Class set reordering; 241 systems; 1; 12; 24; 27; 50; 53; 57; 79; Classification. See Fingerprint 129; 135; 137; 150; 169; 197; 202; 264 classification Automatic teller machine; 43 Classifier combination. See Integration Closed biometric system; 7 B Coercion; 40; 282; 307 Collectability; 7 Bagging; 244 Collusion; 282 Behavioral characteristic; 2 Combination. See Integration Best practices; 17; 21; 169 Common biometric exchange file format; Binarization; 113 41; 294; 308 Biometric identifier; 2; 9 Comparison of biometrics; 7 Biometric recognition; 2 Composite. See Mosaicking Biometric system; 3 Compression. See Fingerprint image applications; 5; 43 compression errors; 13 Computer network logon; 43 evaluation; 19 Confidence intervals; 21; 35 Biometrics. See Biometric identifier Confidence value; 239 Boosting; 244 Confusion matrix; 190 Bootstrap; 21 Contamination; 40; 282 Borda count; 241 342 Index Contextual filters; 107; 116; 208 E Cooperative biometric application; 6; 8 Ear biometric; 9 Core; 84; 102; 150; 151; 158; 166; 176; Echography; 65 264 e-Commerce; 43 detection; 96; 102; 200 Edit distance; 153 Corpse identification; 43 Edward Henry; 23; 84; 173 Correctional facility; 43 Electronic data security; 43 Correlation; 137 Electrostatic discharge; 63 differential; 138 Encryption. See Cryptography in Fourier domain; 140 Enrollment; 3 nagative; 236 Equal-error rate; 15 normalized; 138 Error-correcting code; 304 Cost-benefit analysis; 308 Covert acquisition; 282 F Covert biometric application; 6 Credit card; 43 Face biometric; 9 Criminal investigation; 43 Failure to capture; 15 Criminal stigma; 46 Failure to enroll; 15 Cross-correlation. See Correlation Failure to match; 15 Crossing number; 119 Fake finger; 54; 286 Cryptographic strength; 26; 280 False acceptance; 13 Cryptography; 41; 296 False match; 13 public-key; 297 False match rate; 14 symmetric; 296 False non-match; 13 Curse of dimensionality; 237 False non-match rate; 14 False rejection; 13 D Fault-line; 101 Feature language; 38 Dab impressions; 58 Feature saliency; 29 Denial of service; 42; 281; 285 Feature suitability; 29 Digital signature; 296 Finger geometry biometric; 10 Direction; 88 FingerCode; 166; 167; 188; 189; 191; 197 Direction difference; 141 Fingerprint acquisition. See Fingerprint Discrete Wavelet Transform; 79 sensing Distance from feature space; 249 Fingerprint analysis; 83 Distance learning; 43 Fingerprint applications; 43 Distinctiveness; 7 Fingerprint binarization; 94 DNA biometric; 9 Fingerprint classification; 33; 173 Double loop; 174 continuous classification; 34; 195 Driver’s license; 43 sub-classification; 194 Dynamic programming; 153 Index 343 Fingerprint classification methods; 176; errors; 17 178 Fingerprint image characteristics; 55 multiple classifier-based approaches; area; 56; 75 187 depth; 56 neural network-based approaches; 185 dynamic range; 56 performance; 190 geometric accuracy; 56 rule-based approaches; 180 number of pixels; 56 statistical approaches; 183 quality; 56 structural approaches; 182 resolution; 55 syntactic approaches; 181 Fingerprint image compression; 27; 79 Fingerprint configuration; 263 Fingerprint image storage; 26; 79 Fingerprint enhancement; 104; 113; 114; Fingerprint indexing; 1; 19; 33; 173; 194; 116; 132; 176; 186 241; 245 recoverable region; 105 Fingerprint individuality; 25; 231; 257 unrecoverable region; 105 Fingerprint matching; 31; 131 well-defined region; 105 correlation-based; 33; 135; 137 Fingerprint feature extraction; 28; 86 minutiae-based; 33; 135; 141 core detection; 96 performance; 168 enhancement; 104 ridge feature-based; 33; 135; 164 local ridge frequency; 91 Fingerprint mosaicking; 77 local ridge orientation; 87 Fingerprint quality; 55; 56; 104; 105 minutiae detection; 113 Fingerprint recognition; 3 minutiae filtering; 124 Fingerprint registration; 102; 150; 151 registration features; 96 Fingerprint representation; 28; 83 ridge count; 128 Fingerprint retrieval; 194 segmentation; 94 performance; 199 singularity detection; 96 strategies; 197 Fingerprint generation; 203 Fingerprint scanner; 26; 42; 53; 54; 132 area; 208 attack; 284; 285 background; 221 cryptography; 291 distortion; 219 examples; 69 frequency image; 213 Fingerprint scanner features; 69 global rotation; 221 automatic finger detection; 69 global translation; 221 encryption; 69 in batch; 228 frames per second; 69 orientation image; 209 interface; 69 perturbation; 221 operating system; 69 ridge pattern; 214 Fingerprint sensing; 26; 53 validation; 224 ink-technique; 53 variation in ridge thickness; 218 live-scan; 53; 59 Fingerprint identification; 3 off-line; 53; 57 344 Index on-line; 53 Identification system. See Fingerprint Fingerprint sensor; 54 identification Fingerprint verification; 3 Impostor distribution; 14 errors; 13 Indexing. See Fingerprint indexing Focal point; 103 Information content; 26; 233; 294 Formation of fingerprints; 24 Infrared imaging; 9 Francis Galton; 22; 85; 173 Input; 131 Frustrated total internal reflection; 59 Integration; 36; 236 Fully automatic system; 5; 8 architecture; 237 Fusion. See Integration level; 239 Fuzzy vault; 307 loosely coupled; 37; 239 FVC2000; 17; 75; 169; 200; 203; 229 rules; 241 FVC2002; 75; 136; 169; 203; 229; 279 scheme; 241 strategies; 237; 241 G tightly coupled; 37; 239 Inter-class variability; 28; 134; 175 Gabor filters; 109 Internet access; 43 Gait biometric; 9 Intra-class variability; 28; 31; 131; 175 Galton details; 85 displacement; 131 Galton’s classification; 173 noise; 132 Galton-Henry classification; 174 non-linear distortion; 132 Generation. See Fingerprint generation partial overlap; 132 Genuine distribution; 14 pressure; 132 Geometrical distortion; 60 rotation; 131 skin condition; 132 H Intrinsic coordinate system; 155 Habituated users; 6; 8 Inverse Discrete Wavelet Transform; 80 Habituation; 67 Iris biometric; 10 Hand geometry biometric; 10 IrisCode; 266; 304 Hand vein biometric; 9 Irregularity operator; 100 Henry Fauld; 22 Henry’s classification; 174 J Herschel; 22 Juan Vucetich; 173 Hill climbing; 41; 231; 294 History of fingerprints; 21 K Holograms; 60 Hough transform; 146 Key; 43; 296 private; 297 I public; 297 replacement; 42 Identical twins. See Twins session; 299 Index 345 Keystroke biometric; 10 problem formulation; 141 with pre-alignment; 150 L without alignment; 154 Missing children; 43 Latent; 1; 26; 58; 176 Mix-spectrum; 92 Left loop; 174 Modulation transfer function; 57; 110 Linear symmetry; 124 Morphological operators; 95; 118; 218 Logistic regression; 241 Mosaicking; 78. See Fingerprint mosaicking M Multibiometric system; 233 Magnetic card; 3 Multiclassifier system; 236 Masquerade attack; 204 Multimodal biometric system; 36; 233 Master fingerprint; 204; 208 Matcher; 33 N Matching. See Fingerprint matching National ID card; 43 Matching pairs; 13 Natural distribution; 176 Matching score; 13 Negative recognition system; 5; 13 Mated pair; 33 Nehemiah Grew; 21 Mayer; 22 Neyman-Pearson; 242; 250; 252 Measurement value; 239 NIST Special Database 14; 35; 58; 191; Mechanical guide; 77 199 Medical records management; 43 classification results; 192 Minute details. See Minutiae NIST Special Database 4; 34; 35; 190 Minutiae; 30; 85 classification results; 191 bifurcation; 30; 85; 119 NIST Special Databases; 169 crossover; 85 Non-attended biometric application; 6 duality; 86 Nonce; 299 termination; 30; 85; 119 Non-contact; 9; 10 trifurcation; 85 Non-cooperative biometric application; 6; Minutiae correspondence; 143 8 Minutiae detection; 113 Non-habituated users; 6 binarization-based; 114 Non-invertible transform; 302 grayscale-based; 120 Non-linear distortion; 35; 132; 138; 160; Minutiae filtering; 124 216; 219; 273; 289 gray-scale-based; 126 Non-matching pairs; 13 structure-based; 124 Non-standard environment; 6 Minutiae matching; 141 alignment; 142 O distortion; 160 global vs local; 156 Odor biometric; 10 point pattern matching; 144; 145 Off-line system; 4 346 Index One-way hash function; 298; 302 Private biometric application; 6 On-line system; 4 Private biometrics; 301 Open biometric system; 7 Probability of (minutiae) occurrence; 262; Operational evaluation; 20 263 Optical sensors; 59 Probability of a false association; 265 direct reading; 62 Probability of a false correspondence; 259 electro-optical; 62 Probability of fingerprint configuration; FTIR; 59 261 FTIR with a sheet prism; 61 Public biometric application; 6 optical fibers; 61 Purkinje; 22; 173 Orientation; 87 consistency; 88 Q reliability; 88 Quality index. See Fingerprint quality Overt biometric application; 6; 8 R P Rank label; 241 Parenthood determination; 43 Rank values; 239 Passport control; 43 Receiver operating characteristic curve; 15 PCASYS; 187 Recognition; 3 Penetration rate; 19; 190 Recognition system; 3 Performance; 7 Registration point; 103 Permanence; 7; 258 Replay attack; 40; 285; 296 Personal digital assistant; 43 Representation.
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