A MODEL of SELF-REFLEXIVITY and ITS RELATIONSHIP to DEPRESSION and SOCIAL ANXIETY SYMPTOMS a Thesis Submitte

THE REFLEXIVE SELF: A MODEL OF SELF-REFLEXIVITY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO DEPRESSION AND SOCIAL ANXIETY SYMPTOMS

A thesis submitted to Kent State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Stephen David Mullet

August, 2009

Thesis written by Stephen David Mullet B.A., Kent State University, 2006 M.A., Kent State University, 2009

Approved by

______, Advisor Richard T. Serpe, Ph.D.

______, Chair, Department of Sociology Richard T. Serpe, Ph.D.

______, Dean, College of Arts and Sciences John R.D. Stalvey, Ph.D

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES………………………………………………...vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………viii

I. INTRODUCTION: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM…………………….1

a. Psychological Dilemmas of

Modernity…………………………………...... 1

i. Emile Durkheim and Anomie……………………………………..1

ii. Karl Marx and Alienation…………………………………………1

iii. Max Weber and the Iron Cage…………………………………….1

iv. Georg Simmel and Marginality……………………………………2

b. Mental Health as a Social Problem……………………………………...... 2

i. Current U.S. Spending on Mental Health Services…………...…...2

ii. Projected Scope of Problem: W.H.O. Statistics…………………...2

c. Agenda for the Current Project…………………………………………....3

i. Assess the Mental Health Benefits of Self-Reflexivity…………...3

ii. Typology of Self-Structure………………………………………..3

iii. Self-Reflexivity Rooted in Dual Nature of Humans……………....3

II. MAN AS HOMO DUPLEX…………………………………………………..5

a. Theoretical and Philosophical Tradition on Duality of Self…………...…5

iii

i. Work of Emile Durkheim…………………………………………5

ii. Work of Friedrich Nietzsche………………………………………6

iii. Work of Sigmund Freud…………………………………………..6

iv. Work of G.H. Mead……………………………………………….7

b. Sociology’s Neglect of the Dark Side……………………………………..8

III. THE REFLEXIVE SELF: UNIFYING THE DIVIDED PERSONALITY…..9

a. Durkheim and the Notion of

Balance……………………………………...... 9

b. Borrowing from Psychoanalytic Thinkers: Freud and

Jung………………………………………………………………………..9

c. Bringing it all Together: William James’

Varieties...... 11

IV. OPERATIONALIZING THE HOMO DUPLEX…………………………...16

a. The Custom of Thinking in

Dichotomies………………………………...... 16

b. Case Example: Concept of Psychological Androgyny…………………..16

c. Rationale for Basing Study on Control Orientations…………………….17

V. LITERATURE ON CONTROL BELEIFS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-

BEING……………………………………………………………………….19

a. Attribution Theory……………………………………………………….19

b. Rotter’s Concept of Locus of Control……………………………………20

c. American Culture’s Emphasis on Individualism and Internal Control…..20

i. Scientific Support for the Psychological Benefits of Perceived

Personal Control………………………………………………….20

ii. Why External Control Beliefs May Be

Beneficial………………………………………………………...20

iii. Self-Esteem and Internal and External Control Beliefs: Work of

Matthew Hunt……………………………………………………22

VI. HYPOTHESES………………………………………………………………25

a. Constructing a Typology of Self-Reflexivity using the Notion of Homo

Duplex……………………………………………………………………25

b. Statement of Hypotheses…………………………………………………26

VII. DATA AND METHODS…………………………………………………....30

a. Description of Sample……………………………………………………30

b. Measures………………………………………………………………....30

i. Independent Variables……………………………………………30

ii. Dependent Variables……………………………………………..32

iii. Control Variables………………………………………………...34

c. Analysis Strategy: Six Stages………………………………………...….36

VIII. RESULTS……………………………………………………………………39

a. Descriptive Statistics……………………………………………………..39

b. Bivariate Correlations between Variables in Study……………………...39

c. Effects of Internal and External Control on Depression and Social

Anxiety…………………………………………………………………...42

d. Reflexive Self Typology on Depression and Social Anxiety (Median

Split)……………………………………………………………………...45

e. Reflexive Self Typology on Depression and Social Anxiety (Quartile

Split)……………………………………………………………………...48

f. Interactions between Reflexive Self Typology and Socioeconomic

Status……………………………………………………………………..52

IX. DISCUSSION………………………………………………………………..57

a. Summary……………………………………………………………...….57

b. Contributions……………………………………………………………..59

c. Limitations…………………………………………………………...…..61

d. Policy Recommendations………………………………………………...63

X. REFERENCES……………………….……………………………………...64

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

FIGURE 1: Theoretical Constructs……………………………………………………....37

TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics………………………………………………………....40

TABLE 2: Bivariate Correlations………………………………………………………..43

TABLE 3: Independent Effects Of Mastery and Powerful Others Beliefs on

Depression………………………………………………………………………..44

TABLE 4: Independent Effects of Mastery and Powerful Others Beliefs on Social

Anxiety…………………………………………………………………………..45

TABLE 5: Reflexive Self Typology on Depression (Median Split

Criteria)…………………………………………………………………………..48

TABLE 6: Reflexive Self Typology on Social Anxiety (Median Split

Criteria)………...... 49

TABLE 7: Frequencies: Quartile Split…………………………………………………..50

TABLE 8: Reflexive Self Typology on Depression (Quartile Split

Criteria)…………………………………………………………………………..51

TABLE 9: Reflexive Self Typology on Social Anxiety (Quartile Split Criteria)……….53

TABLE 9: Interactions between Reflexive Self Typology and Socioeconomic Status

Indicators………………………………………………………………………...55

vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost I would like to thank my thesis committee, without whom this study would not have been possible at its current level of quality: Richard Serpe, the chair, whose invaluable wisdom and experience provided me with direction and inspiration throughout the completion of this work; Andre Christie-Mizell, who in just a short time managed to significantly improve my skills in research methods and statistics; and Kristen Marcussen, who pressed me to focus my ideas and introduced me to the literature in the sociology of mental health and illness. More broadly, I would like to thank my colleagues in the sociology department with whom I have already shared many great times, both in and outside the classroom – I could hardly ask for a better intellectual community in which to develop my ideas. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, who have always encouraged me to develop my interests and passions and have supported me in my decision to further my education.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM

The situation of the modern man is a precarious one, and the founding fathers of sociology took it as their charge to elucidate this “problem of modernity.” Theorists such as Karl Marx, Max Weber, Georg Simmel and Emile Durkheim dealt with the changing circumstances of life as social structure changed from the static simplicity of primitive and agrarian societies to the dynamic complexity of modern industrial societies (Tucker

2002). One issue that each of the founding theorists dealt with pertains to the implications of modern social arrangements for psychological well-being. While each theorist addressed this problem in their own way, using different terminology and pointing to different causal mechanisms, they all agreed that the development of modern society as having undesirable consequences for the self.

Emile Durkheim (1893 [1998]) through his concept of anomie highlighted the deleterious consequences that rapid social change can have on one’s sense of meaning and identity. Karl Marx focused on the capitalist economic system, emphasizing the sense of alienation that results from one’s inability to control the direction and product of his or her own labor (Tucker 2002:98-99). The modern tendency for rationality to infiltrate the various sectors of social life are highlighted in the work of Max Weber, who contended that this heightened state of rationality caused a general state disenchantment, in which life loses its sense of awe and wonder (Tucker 2002; Ritzer & Goodman 2004).

Georg Simmel (1903 [2004]) highlighted the significance of urbanization and its result of increasing the physical proximity of diverse socio-cultural groups, a situation conducive to fragmentation of the self (Simmel 1908 [2004]).

While it has been more than a century since these theorists wrote, they are worthy of mention in that they may have foreseen the current epidemic of mental illness facing contemporary society. Based on the results of current estimates, it appears that the founders of sociology were correct in their grim prospectus of modern society and mental health. Estimates suggest that in any given year approximately 28-30 percent of adults in the U.S. will suffer from some form of mental illness (Mark et al. 2005). In 2001, the

United States spent $104 billion dollars on substance use and mental health services, which made up 7.6 percent of the total expenditures on medical services (Mark et al.

2005). From the year 1991 and 2001 total spending on mental health services in the U.S. grew by 5.6 percent.

The epidemic of mental illness facing the contemporary U.S. is unlikely to subside at any time in the near future. To illustrate the high cost of mental illness to society are estimates provided by the World Health Organization (Murray & Lopez,

1996). The W.H.O. estimated that in 1990, mental illnesses represented 5 of the 10 greatest sources of “disability” worldwide with “unipolar major depression” ranking first, alcohol use fourth, bipolar disorder sixth, schizophrenia ninth and obsessive compulsive disorders tenth (21). The W.H.O. estimated that in 1990 mental illnesses represented about 10.5 percent of the total world “burden of disease” and expects that by the year

2020 it may reach about 15 percent of the total disease burden (Murray & Lopez, 1996).

The above figures illustrate the necessity for continued scientific investigation in the area of mental illness and the current project aims to further research in this area.

Grounded in a long tradition of theoretical thought on the nature of the self, I seek to construct a model self-structure conducive to warding off the stresses and strains of modern society. I theorize that the social-psychological concept of self-reflexivity (Mead,

1934; Owens, 2003:206) is an essential prerequisite of optimal social functioning and it is through the mechanism of self-reflexivity that the theoretical model proposed here exerts its beneficial effects on psychological well-being.

Based on a long tradition of social and psychological theory, I construct a four- category typology of self-reflexivity, representing variable degrees of this attribute. In order to test the potential benefits of self-reflexivity for mental health I compare each of the four categories of the typology with respect to the number of symptoms of depression and social anxiety reported by individual within type. The proposed research may have significance at the basic and applied levels of research and may be helpful in directing future research and guiding clinical interventions.

The human capacity for self-reflexivity is rooted in man’s dual nature. Thus, I will begin in Chapter 2 by outlining the long theoretical and philosophical tradition on the notion of man as “homo duplex” (Hynes, 1975:87; Schilling & Mellor, 1998:195).

Borrowing from psychological theorists (Freud 1923 [1989]; Carl Jung 1957 [2006];

William James 1902 [1982]), I discuss in Chapter 3 the implications of psychical duality for issues of mental illness. In chapter 4, I devise a general strategy for operationalizing the dual self in order to study it empirically. In Chapter 5, I introduce the social-

psychological terrain of interest for the current study, which involves an empirical test of integrated psychical duality using the concepts of internal and external control orientations. In Chapter 6, I present a number of hypotheses for testing the proposed theoretical model. The methodology and results of this study are presented in Chapters 7 and Chapter 8. I conclude in Chapter 9 with a discussion of the findings.

CHAPTER II

MAN AS HOMO DUPLEX

Homo duplex, homo duplex! The first time that I perceived that I was two was at

the death of my brother Henri, when my father cried out so dramatically, „He is

dead, he is dead!‟ While my first self wept, my second self thought, „How truly

given was that cry, how fine it would be at the theatre.‟ I was fourteen years old

-Alphonse Daudet (James 1902 [1982]:167)

A long theoretical and philosophical tradition on human nature emphasizes the dual character of the self. The concept of man as “homo duplex” represents the division in the human organism between what on the one hand may be described as the social, human and moral components, and on the other, the antisocial, atavistic and amoral components (Hynes 1975:87; Schilling & Mellor 1998:195). This concept can be traced to Kant who recognized that the instinctual base of humans operates contrary to the development of moral behavior, requiring that individuals must actively strive to become moral beings based on a rational foundation (Schilling & Mellor 1998:195). This view of human nature is prominent in the work of myriad thinkers, ranging from Arthur

Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud and William James to Georg

Simmel, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and G.H. Mead (Meštrović 1989:272).

Durkheim, for instance, derived his categorical typology of suicide (Hynes 1975) from the view of man as homo duplex. Durkheim viewed the moral (i.e. “social”) life of

humans as functioning to regulate the egoistic hedonism characteristic of mankind‟s natural disposition in order to secure collective solidarity. As a result he proposed that various forms of suicide may result from disequilibrium in the manner in which social systems regulate these opposing features of the human condition. Hence, societies demanding excessive subordination to collective interests may be plagued with high rates of what Durkheim terms “altruistic” suicide; whereas societies providing little in the way of moral integration may tend towards higher rates of “egoistic” or “anomic” suicide.

Under this model, societies strive for equilibrium or “balance” between the egoistic and altruistic components of human nature (Hynes 1975).

Friedrich Nietzsche viewed the entire course of history as a dialectic between these opposing sides of the human condition. In the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche (1886

[2000]) conceived of two psychological orientations to life, which he termed the

Apollonian and Dionysian. Nominally derived from two Greek deities, Nietzsche uses the metaphor of the hazy dream-state to describe the Apollonian orientation to life, characterized by a structured orderly existence and denial of the passions; in contrast, he uses the metaphor of “intoxication” to describe the Dionysian, who engages in an exuberant celebration of life (33-37). Nietzsche attributes the excellence of the Greek tragedy to its fusion of the Apollonian and Dionysian temperaments, since this allows one to experience the full spectrum of the human condition. Nietzsche‟s work is regarded to have had a fundamental influence on the work of Sigmund Freud, who proposed a tripartite model of the mind as consisting of a dialectic between the “id” and “superego,” mediated by the diplomatic function of the “ego” (Freud 1923 [1989]). The primitive

impulses residing in the id are in conflict with the moralistic force of the superego, while the ego serves to mediate these conflicting forces and organize behavior.

Finally, the homo duplex is evident in the work of G.H. Mead. Mead emphasized the reflexive nature of human behavior (Mead 1934:136). Mead described reflexivity in terms of a dialectic between the “I,” which represents an internal mechanism serving to make sense of gestures gleaned from others in the environment and the “Me,” which encompasses the system of meanings that a social group assigns to objects within their environments. It is the tension, or dissonance created between these two forces that permit creative, or “reflexive” action. During any given social situation the individual must interpret all relevant cognitive stimuli, conceive of a working definition of the situation, and then when it comes his or her time to act must channel internal energies to provide a socially pleasing response to the cues and gestures provided from others in the situation. Under this model, the individual actor must negotiate the impulsive component of the “I” with the social “Me” in order to construct an acceptable social performance.

While every individual engages in this sort of internal dialogue during interaction, this does not preclude the possibility for variation in the degree to which individuals favor expression of the either side of the self-duality. Some persons, for example, may possess a strong “Me” but a weak “I” or vice versa and these tendencies will be reflected in one‟s personality and social identity, the consequences of which will be dealt with in-depth later.

While the duality of the self is highly prominent in the work of sociology‟s founders as well as many of the early philosophers who provided the basis for the

emergence of social theory, ironically, sociology as a discipline has tended to present a one-dimensional model of the self. Generally, sociology has emphasized the cognitive aspects of behavior in its focus on external determinants of behavior such as social norms and role-expectations. As Meštrović (1989) notes, this comes at the neglect of recognizing the darker side of human nature, which is characterized by the primitive atavistic tendencies that still serve to influence human behavior. Indeed, it may be that this “other side” of sociology has been neglected (Meštrović 1989:272).

This tendency may have the unintended consequence of leading to a lack of a unified conception of the self as a totality. Examining the structure of the self in terms of its dual components may help to further advance our understanding of the self. This may have particular relevance to the study of mental health and illness since such phenomena are highly individualistic in nature. The purpose of this particular study is to create a heuristic model of dual self-structure that can help strengthen our understanding of psychical duality and the way that it serves to influence behavior and its consequences. I contend that a healthy integration or balance between the dichotomies within the self leads to a greater capacity for reflexive action and inter-situational flexibility. After presenting the model and its theoretical foundations I conduct an initial test of this model by examining the associations between a four-category typology of self-duality and symptoms of depression and social anxiety. In order to do this, however, requires further examination of the implications of the psychic dualism for optimal social functioning, an issue that will be addressed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III

THE REFLEXIVE SELF: UNIFYING THE DIVIDED PERSONALITY

We recognize two antagonistic forces, tendencies, or characteristics, either of

which, if left unaffected would approach infinity; and it is by the mutual

limitation of the two forces that the characteristics of the individual and public

mind result.

-Georg Simmel (1904 [1957]:541)

Given that the self is dual, a key issue that arises pertains to how these opposing forces – the instinctual and moral drives – may be reconciled. As described above,

Durkheim emphasized that there is an optimal balance between the moral integration of society and the necessity of permitting individuals some degree egoistic expression

(Hynes, 1975). The contention that the functioning of both individuals of societies requires this sort of healthy integration between the egoistic and the altruistic is prominent in the work of other theorists in more psychological traditions. For purposes of this paper, the works of psychological theorists such as Sigmund Freud (1923 [1989]),

Carl Jung (1957 [2006]) and William James (1902 [1982]) will be of particular interest, since they speak more directly to the issue of mental illness.

This need for fusion of opposing aspects of the self can be seen in the work of

Freud (1923 [1989]) and Jung (1957 [2006]) who proposed that the route to psychological well-being and the release from the anxieties of modern life was through

the resolution of the conflict between conflicting aspects of the psyche - e.g., the conscious and the subconscious. Only by abandoning the self-flattery characteristic of mankind’s conscious thinking by coming to terms with the more unsettling aspects of one’s own inner nature residing in the subconscious could man rid himself of anxiety and other psychological problems. In this case, it is the union of conscious and the subconscious life that optimizes mental health. Otherwise, the subconscious remains repressed and a source of anxiety and discomfort.

In his work The Ego and the Id Freud (1923 [1989]) discusses manic-depressive illness as a case example for applying his structural theory of mind. He notes that the psychological state known as depression results from the wrath of an overbearing superego crushing all expression of libidinal energy residing in the id. The result is overly constrained and inhibited behavior on the part of the sufferer due to a painful awareness of his or her own impulses. The depressive state is characterized by a pattern of behavior lacking in any spontaneity or zest for life. In contrast, the manic outburst represents the polar opposite of this state of affairs and is often characterized by hyper- sexuality and delusions of grandiosity and represents an adaptive response to these conditions. The manic episode is the result of the internal psychic struggle in which the id - in a final act of self-preservation - usurps the power of the superego and achieves unbridled expression in the manic episode. The pattern repeats indefinitely, being characterized by intermittent cycling between these two opposite psychological states.

While Freud’s structural theory of mind depicts a crude portrait of man’s dual nature, identifying key drives within the organism (e.g. sexual, self-preservation, species-

preservation, aggression) that correspond to this duality he provides little account of the cognitive life of individuals as represented by attitudes and beliefs, which sociology takes as its primary focus. In this respect, William James (1902 [1982]) proposes an interesting theoretical model of the mind-body duality. The work of James can also be of assistance in helping to devise of method of operationalizing the homo duplex using traditional sociological research methods.

In his Varieties of Religious Experience, James (1902 [1982]) develops a model of the self that he regards to be the healthiest. James calls this the personality of the

“twice borne soul,” which results from the unification of the “sick soul” with the “healthy soul” (167). This typology for all practical purposes represents three qualitatively distinct modes of consciousness. By James’s account, consciousness can be conceptualized as a conglomeration of beliefs about the world and self. These beliefs color one’s perception of reality and shape the aspects of reality that individuals attune to, as well as provide a framework for social behavior and action.

In describing these categories, James asserts the dual nature of man. He states:

“. . . man has a dual nature, and is connected with two spheres of thought, a shallower

and a profounder sphere in either of which he may learn to live more habitually. The

shallower and lower sphere is that of the fleshly sensations, instincts, and desires, of

egotism, doubt, and the lower personal interests.”

James identifies the religion of the “sick soul” as being attuned to these

“shallower” aspects of the human condition, which lead to a life of fear, pessimism, consciousness of the evil aspects of human nature, consciousness of one’s own sin and

the sin of others (127-165). In contrast the religion of “healthy mindedness,” is characterized by unbridled “optimism,” “courage,” “hope,” and “trust” (95-96).

Although James labels the optimistic type the “healthy” variety, this does not prevent him from being critical of this disposition. It may be that the label “healthy” reflects more what the society at large regards as ideal, rather than James’ own views. In fact, upon a close reading of the text the reader will find that James appears to offer considerable admiration of the sick soul throughout his work. James criticizes the healthy soul on grounds of an inability to tolerate any sort of prolonged suffering, as well as a blatant refusal to acknowledge any possibility of evil in man’s inner nature, often going so far as to deny the existence of evil outright (127-130). James negates this perspective pointing to the fact that evil and suffering are legitimate aspects of reality, pointing to certain inevitabilities such as illness and death (162-165).

The point James’s makes is that each of the two types has something that they could afford to borrow from the other, leading to his conceptualization of the “twice- born” soul (166-167). According to James’s account the twice born represents individuals of the sickly variety whom have undergone a religious conversion, adopting the healthy-minded mentality of their more optimistic counterparts. However, the pessimism of their former character does not merely vanish, but is still ingrained in their new character, making these individuals the healthiest in the end due to their ability to see the world from both perspectives.

This account given by James is consistent with symbolic interactionist notions of self-reflexivity. Mead (1934) viewed self-reflexivity as a product of the dialogue

between the “I” and the “Me.” It is the tension resulting from the antagonism between the impulsive elements of the self and the social components residing in the moral conscience that enables individuals to act in a conscious and creative fashion. It is the influence of these two opposing forces impinging upon individuals that make reflexive action possible. Simmel (1904 [1957]), in his work “Fashion”, for example, writing on the dualism of human nature states: “an action that results from less than a majority of fundamental forces would appear barren and empty” (541). In other words, it is the manner in which the ego reconciles the instinctual and social impulse that makes tasteful social action possible. A predominance of either one of these extremes results in behavior that is offensive to collective sentiment. Overly instinctual behavior would be regarded with repugnance to the socialized observer, whereas overly moral behavior would be viewed as lacking flare or bravado.

Summing up the above discussions, the mechanism through which integrated self- structure contributes to optimal psychosocial function may perhaps lie in its influence on individual capacity for reflexive action. The dimensions of man’s instinctual life have parallels at the psychological level in the form of man’s cognitive experiences, such that certain ideas and perspectives may represent natural extensions of some of the universal features in the human condition. For instance, it would not be much of a stretch to contend that certain ideas, such as “good” and “evil” are relatively universal conceptions that share relatively high consistency in their behavioral manifestations across cultures.

Such a phenomenon would likely reflect that these ideas reflect a universal struggle of all cultures to negotiate the dual nature of man, with those with the darker aspects of the

human conditions being defined as evil and the more pro-social aspects of the human condition being regarded as good. While this account may seem to reduce the mind to an epiphenomenon of physiological processes this need not be the case. Despite the possibility that certain ideas may have their origins in biological structure; this does not preclude the potential for the mind to acquire its own autonomy once these universal aspects of human nature are codified into language.

CHAPTER IV

OPERATIONALIZING HOMO DUPLEX

As evidenced by the work of James, the dual categories of mind may have logical parallels in the cognitive life of individuals. James (1902 [1982]) emphasized the manner in which the sick soul tends to have a belief system characterized by pessimism and consciousness of the evil components of human nature whereas the healthy soul tends toward a more optimistic worldview, fixating on the qualities of humans that may be characterized as good. Sociologists have long been accustomed to thinking in dichotomies. Concepts such individualism-collectivism, universalism-particularism, instrumental-expressive, egoism-altruism, masculine-feminine are integral to the sociological lexicon. By linking these concepts to their respective counterparts within the dual structure of the psyche may provide a powerful framework for the integration of a large body of research in the social-psychological tradition. Indeed, the implications of dualistic thinking may suggest that many of the most prominent concepts in sociology may load on two distinct factors paralleling the basic dualism between mind and body.

Previous work in a number of areas provides some interesting applications of the idea that a balance or integration of opposing psychological categories may have beneficial outcomes for mental health and psychosocial functioning. Studies on psychological androgyny (Bem 1974, Bem 1975, Woodhill et al. 2003) from the gender

literature provide an interesting case example. Conventional common-sense practice is marked by a tendency of defining individuals from a “trait” perspective. It is typically thought that a person can either be masculine or feminine, but not a combination of the two. The notion of psychological androgyny debunks the notion of gender identity falling on a masculine-feminine continuum by viewing it as a dimensional construct.

According to the androgyny model, some individuals may exhibit behaviors rigidly defined as masculine or feminine whereas others may possess attributes characteristic of both genders (Bem 1974).

The concept of androgyny may have its origins in the work of Carl Jung, who regarded androgyny as a natural development that is gradually repressed during the socialization process as people are taught to adopt the rigid sex-role categories of society

(Guastello & Guastello 2003:664). According to Jung, the structure of the human mind contains a masculine component with he termed the “animus” and a feminine component termed the “anima.” The expression of these opposing aspects of the psyche is believed to represent a healthier personality (Guastello et al. 2003:664).

Some scholars have proposed that the androgynous identity possesses the greatest mental health benefits for individuals since its multidimensional self-structure promotes cross-situational adaptability. In intimate relationships for instance the androgynous individual can quickly engage in characteristically masculine or feminine behaviors depending on the needs of the situation. Experimental research has confirmed the benefits of the androgynous identity for cross-situational flexibility (Bem 1975) as well as its benefits for psychological well-being (Woodhill et al. 2003). Furthermore,

researchers examining the effects of gender identity on intimate partner violence find that males classified as “undifferentiated” (those who score low on both masculine and feminine attributes) exhibit a greater probability of engaging in spousal battering in intimate relationships (Barnett, Miller-Perrin, & Perrin 2005:323; LaViolette, Barnett, &

Miller 1984; Sugarman & Frankel 1993).

However, other research suggests that it may be the masculine identity alone that is most beneficial. Guastello and Guastello (2003) in their review of the literature on androgyny note three competing models accounting for the relationship between gender identity and mental health (664). One perspective stresses gender role “congruence;” that is it is healthiest for individuals to enact behaviors consistent with their biological sex; second, is the “masculinity” perspective, through which masculine role-performances lead to the best mental health; and third, is the androgyny model just described (Guastello

& Guastello 2003:664-665). In any case, some gender scholars are projecting that the androgynous type may become the “standard” for mental health in the future (Bem

1975:643, Bem 1974:162).

While this research does not test a model of androgyny, it applies the same theoretical principles behind its relationship with psychological and situational flexibility to dimensions of individual beliefs about control of over the environment. I choose to test the mental health effects of the dualistic self-structure in the context of one’s beliefs about control for a number of reasons. First of all, a considerable amount of empirical research in sociology has documented that one’s level perceived and actual control over life circumstances holds crucial implications for mental health and well-being (DeNeve et

al. 1998:213; Chorpita & Barlow 1998:7; Pearlin & Schooler 1978; Lachman & Weaver

1998). Second, most research on perceived control and mental health issues research tends to take a narrow focus, viewing perceptions of internal control as the primary control orientation yielding positive benefits for mental health. There is relatively little attention given to the possibility that possessing an external control orientation – singly or in combination with an internal orientation - may also possess some utility as a coping mechanism. And third, beliefs about perceived control are some of the most widely studied concepts in sociological social psychology and provide a convenient base from which to examine the theoretical prospects of dual self-structure.

CHAPTER V

LITERATURE ON CONTROL BELEIFS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING

Two fundamental categories of the mind pertain to the way individuals make causal explanations for external events. These perspectives on control can be seen reflected in the literature on attribution theory (Kelley & Michela 1980), which identifies two main sources from which individuals may perceive causality over life’s happenings.

When seeking to explain events, individuals may choose to make either external attributions by assigning responsibility to the external environment, or they may make internal attributions by perceiving responsibility to lie within the actions and dispositions of the individual themselves.

Individuals may also apply this line of reasoning when reflecting upon their own self-concept. Throughout the course of interaction and daily life, individuals evaluate their own circumstances and can choose to attribute responsibility either to themselves or to external forces. According to symbolic-interaction theory, after the individual has acquired a gradually increasing repertoire of experience through the life course a more definitive conception of self emerges (Ritzer & Goodman 2004:334-373). Through a process of social learning, individuals develop a self-conception in reference to their own beliefs of personal control, such that individuals displaying a preference for attributing causality of to external environments are said to possess an external locus of control

whereas individuals displaying a tendency to attribute life-circumstances to their own agency can be said to possess an internal locus of control (Rotter 1990:489, 490).

In an American individualist society, internal attributions are integral to cultural values and assumptions. Thus, it is no surprise that when thinking about the effects of these attribution styles internal locus of control is generally regarded as more psychologically beneficial than an external orientation. A great deal of empirical research linking control beliefs to psychological well-being finds that perceptions of internal locus of control have beneficial mental health outcomes (DeNeve et al. 1998:213,

Chorpita & Barlow 1998:7). Mastery is a popular concept reflecting this internal attribution style that has been linked to positive mental health outcomes, serving to buffer the stresses and chronic strain (Pearlin & Schooler 1978, Lachman & Weaver, 1998).

This type of thinking about the relationship between control beliefs and psychological well-being is so widespread that it has almost become a taken-for-granted assumption that internal attributions are superior to external attributions when it comes to promoting good mental health.

However, the idea that internal orientations to control are always beneficial has been subjected to some scrutiny. Lachman and Weaver (1998) for instance, cite literature showing that perceived internal control may not always be beneficial. Among works cited is Strickland (1978) who notes the connection between a need for personal control and the Type A personality, which is characterized by neurotic controlling behavior that has been implicated in cardiovascular disease. Furthermore, research suggests that being granted control and direction over others only to later lose the control privileges may lead

to exceptionally poor mental health after this control is lost (Schulz 1976, Schulz &

Hanusa 1978). Also, throughout life there will always be events that no one, no matter how powerful can control. Research on widows has found that recently bereaved women with strong feelings of mastery and internal control suffered more greatly then widows with an external locus control (Wortman et al. 1992).

Not only can a high internal locus of control be detrimental when contingent events are dissonant with one’s own sense of control, but an orientation characterized by a chronic belief in the ability to control externals may have detrimental consequences in its own right. Looking at the symptoms of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder from the

DSM-IV-TR (2000), for instance, one may notice how the compulsive rituals performed by such individuals are often aimed at the prevention of some feared and undesirable event. In this sense, the chronic control orientation appears to be directly linked with the pathological disturbance.

In sum, no one, no matter how powerful, can control everything. In fact, through constant efforts to control external objects the individual himself may become a slave to the externals themselves. In this sense, chronic controlling behaviors may paradoxically lead to greater sense of loss of control as individuals get trapped in an addictive game of trying to control valued objects in the environment. This perspective can be seen reflected in the philosophy of stoicism (Lebell 1995). Stoic philosopher Epictetus for instance advised individuals that the route to human happiness involved the abandonment of all efforts to manipulate the externals and live a life of inner truth. Under this philosophical system individuals are advised to live according to nature by acting morally

in all situations and performing well in one’s occupation. From the stoic perspective the only things that an individual can truly control are one’s own actions and one’s attitudes towards events.

However, the problem with the stoic philosophy is that it is largely inconsistent with an American culture that glorifies personal celebrity and material rewards; thus, it would probably be relatively unappealing to most. However, it helps to illustrate an orientation to life that may have its relative merits. While a stoic sense of resignation may not be the ultimate route to positive psychological well-being, it is unlikely that a pathological sense of mastery is advisable either. Thus, the healthiest self-concept is likely the one that integrates the two opposing orientations into a unified whole. Through a paradoxical integration of conflicting aspects of the psyche, individuals may be able to find some relief from the anxiety and strain of modern social conditions.

Research linking the self-concept to internal and external control beliefs has also supported this principle of dual categories and its relationship to a healthy self-concept.

Matthew Hunt (2001) for example, looks at the relationship between one’s level of self- esteem and attribution styles regarding beliefs about poverty. Self-esteem is commonly defined of one’s evaluation of his or her own personal self-worth and has been linked to reduced symptoms of mental illness in countless studies (Rosenberg & Owens 2000).

Hunt (2001) examines associations between self-esteem and individualist and structuralist explanations for poverty. Individuals endorsing the individualist explanation of poverty tend to blame individuals in poverty for their situation, making internal attributions; individuals endorsing structuralist explanations on the other hand tend to

blame the “system,” perceiving external forces to be responsible for poverty. Hunt

(2001) finds that the higher self-esteem people tend to show no real preference for either one of these styles, tending to possess both sets of beliefs. These findings depict the high self-esteem person as holding a detached indifference to assigning blame for poverty.

These results may indicate that a balance between these apparently opposite sets of beliefs may be related to superior self-esteem, which can be taken as proxy for other indicators of mental health and social functioning. Perhaps higher self-esteem individuals have made the realization that both of these sets of beliefs may possess some degree of truth, which provides persons possessing both sets of control beliefs better cognitive equipment for reflexive understanding their own experiences and warding off psychological distress that may lower self-esteem.

Other theorizing on self-esteem, particularly the “self-esteem motive” might suggest some further mechanisms through which this sort of cognitive flexibility may operate. This body of theory suggests that individuals with high self-esteem make

“selective attributions” about events in a generally self-serving fashion (Gecas 2001:87-

88). When good things happen in life the high self-esteem person is likely to make internal attributions as to the origin of the event. When bad things happen the high self- esteem person is likely to make external attributions as to the cause for said event. This dynamic orientation to interpreting external events serves to protect the self-concept when it is under threat and enhance the self-concept in face of positive affirmation.

Persons lacking both sets of beliefs may be plagued by the inability to make selective attributions in order to protect the self concept when it is under threat.

In sum, the above literature may suggest that the healthiest individuals do not adopt narrow-minded, one-dimensional worldviews and orientations to the environment; rather, it appears that more mentally healthy individuals embrace a variety of different, sometimes seemingly antagonistic perspectives, which enables them to more easily weave in and out of social situations that may be unusual or straining on individuals adopting one-or-the-other orientations to the external world.

CHAPTER VI

HYPOTHESES

Following this line of thinking I propose to test the above principles using the dimensions of perceived personal (or internal) control, as measured by “mastery”

(Pearlin, 1978) and perceived structuralist (or external) control, as measured by the

“powerful others” scale (Levinson 1981) in order to examine their effects on psychological well being. Using a dimensional approach to these issues, I have constructed a four-category typology useful for classifying individuals based on the style of their orientation to control over the environment.

Inspired by the androgyny model (Bem 1975; LaViolette, Barnett, & Miller 1984;

Sugarman & Frankel 1993), individuals can fall into one of four types: (1) reflexives- individuals scoring high on both mastery and powerful others beliefs; (2) undifferentiated-individuals scoring low on both mastery and powerful others beliefs, (3) internals-individuals showing a predominant preference for making personal attributions about life’s happenings (high mastery, low powerful others); and (4) externals- individuals showing a predominant tendency towards perceiving control over life events as residing in other individuals in the social structure (low mastery, high powerful others).

Membership within categories of the typology was determined by assigning a score of “1” to individuals meeting criteria for membership (median and quartile splits) within each of the four categories. Respondents who did not meet the criteria for classification in a given category were assigned a score of “0.” In the regression analysis below coefficients for each of four categories reflect that average difference between members and non-members of that particular category (e.g. coefficient for reflexives represents the mean difference in symptoms between reflexives and the combined average of undifferentiated, internals, and externals and so on). Results of a number of tests reveal that these dummy variables do not function like typical dummy variables, and do not require the specification of an excluded category.

There are six proposed hypotheses for empirical testing. The first two deal with the independent effects of the mastery and powerful others scales on symptoms of depression and social anxiety. The latter four deal with the effects of the typology of self-reflexivity on reported symptoms of depression and social anxiety. Based on the literature on mastery, higher scores on this scale have been linked to numerous mental health benefits (Pearlin 1978; Lachman & Weaver, 1998). Thus the following is predicted for mastery and outcomes of depression and social anxiety:

H1: There will be an inverse association between scores on mastery and symptoms of depression and social anxiety, all other things equal.

Figure 1. Theoretical Constructs

Mastery Powerful Others

Reflexives Undifferentiated Internals Externals

As with mastery, given the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, there is also reason to suspect that perceptions of structural control may also be associated with some mental health benefits as measured by lower levels of depression and social anxiety. As noted in the discussion of stoic philosophy above efforts to manipulate the external environment may be futile to a certain degree, with those attempting to “change the inevitable” experiencing distress over their inefficacy. While the benefits gained from an orientation of structural control may not be as great as those yielded by high perceived mastery, it is expected that perceived structural control will still be associated with some modest reductions in depression and social anxiety. Thus, the following association is expected for powerful others beliefs and depression and social anxiety outcomes:

H2: Ceteris paribus, There will be an inverse association between scores on the powerful others scale and reported symptoms of depression and social anxiety.

I hypothesize that each of the four categories in the reflexive self typology will exhibit a unique relation with mental health symptoms. Based on the prior theoretical discussion, expression of both dimensions of the homo duplex should provide the most versatile tool kit for stress buffering and effective social action. A high score on mastery should permit individuals to take credit for their successes, as well as give them motivation to take action to improve their own life circumstances. In addition, a well- developed conception of structural control should also provide a means of explaining away and absolving one’s sense of responsibility for one’s failures in lieu of the life’s inevitable vicissitudes. Thus, the following is predicted:

H3: All else equal, reflexives will exhibit significantly fewer symptoms of depression and social anxiety symptoms than all other categories.

In contrast, individuals lacking any definite theory of the environment will be limited in terms of their capacity to engage in effective social action and will also lack the cognitive tool kit necessary to define and interpret life events. Individuals lacking perceived personal control may be unable to act agentically to improve their life- circumstances or take credit for life successes. Furthermore, without a well-developed theory of structural control these same individuals may be less able to explain away negative situations resulting from external social structural forces. Based on this reasoning it is suspected that the following relationship will be observed between the undifferentiated category and depression and anxiety symptoms:

H4: Ceteris paribus, undifferentiated individuals will exhibit significantly more symptoms of depression and anxiety than all other categories.

Based on James’ notion of the “healthy soul,” as well as the sociological literature regarding high mastery as the prima facie of psychological well-being, it is expected that individuals high in just internal control beliefs will gain some benefits in the form of fewer symptoms of depression and social anxiety than those classified as undifferentiated and those classified as externals. However, since they lack an adequate theory of external control they may suffer from what James (1902 [1982]) describes as an inability to tolerate suffering. One can imagine, for instance, how such individuals may have particular trouble cope with those aspects of life that lie outside one’s personal control.

Thus, the following relationship is expected:

H5: Individuals classified as internals will report fewer symptoms of depression and anxiety than externals and undifferentiated, but more symptoms than those classified as reflexives, all else equal.

Finally, while individuals with a highly expressed orientation of external control, but little in the way of a conceptualization of internal control may be limited in terms of being able to manipulate the external environment, such individuals may gain a modest benefit in the sense that they can buffer psychological distress by attributing responsibility for life events to outside forces. Given this a priori conjecture, the sixth and final hypothesis is as follows:

H6: All other factors constant, individuals with a preference for external control attributions will experience more depression and anxiety symptoms than internals and reflexives, but less than undifferentiated persons.

CHAPTER VII

DATA AND METHODS

Data (see Stets & Harrod 2004) for this study are taken from a random-digit dialing telephone survey of approximately 1,107 individuals 18 years of age or older conducted at a survey research laboratory located at California State University. Individuals were sampled based on residence in Los Angeles County with preference given to racial minorities, particularly, blacks and Latinos. Based on a conservative estimate, the response rate is approximately 64 percent. The sample is divided evenly among the three predominant racial groups in the United States and is approximately 1/3 Latino, 1/3 black, and 1/3 white. The percent Latinos roughly matches the actual proportion living in

California; blacks are slightly over-represented by approximately 7 percent and whites are underrepresented by approximately 30 percent. In order to facilitate comparison between racial groups, individuals that did not self-identify as black, Latino, or white during data collection were excluded from the analysis. In the statistics reported in the results section below, whites serves as the comparison group for interpretation of racial dummy variables.

Independent Variables

Pearlin Mastery Scale - respondents were asked questions pertaining to their level

of perceived control over life circumstances. Mastery (Pearlin, 1978) is generally regarded as a global measure of “personal” control over outcomes in the environments

(Skaff, Pearlin, Mullan, 1996:247). Items in the mastery scale include: “I have little control over the things that happen to me,” “What happens to me in the future mostly depends upon me,” and “Sometimes I feel like I am being pushed around in life.” The instrument is coded so that higher scores indicate a greater sense of mastery. The Pearlin

Mastery Scale has a Cronbach’s Alpha internal reliability coefficient of α=.786 for the study sample.

Powerful Others - respondents were also asked to complete an inventory measuring the extent to which they perceive their life to be dictated by forces outside their own control. This measure provides an estimate of the degree to which individuals perceive situations in their life as influenced by other individuals in the social structure.

These items were selected from the Powerful Others Scale (Levinson 1981). Items measuring external control beliefs include: “Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me,” “My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others,” and “Although I might have good ability, I will not be given leadership responsibility without appealing to those in positions of power.” The Political and Economic Locus of Control scale is coded so that higher scores indicate greater perceptions of social structural control over one’s life. Cronbach’s Alpha internal reliability for the Powerful Others Scale was calculated at α=.648 for our sample. In order to ensure that the powerful others scale is conceptually and empirically distinct from the Pearlin Mastery scale, exploratory factor analysis with varimax and quartimax rotations was conducted on items from the two 32

inventories. Results confirmed two distinct factors, suggesting that these two scales indeed represent opposite psychological categories.

Dependent Variables

Depressive Symptoms - symptoms of depression were measured using a modified version of the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) as is described in (Radloff 1977). The version of the CES-D used for this study includes 7- items scale asking respondents about the frequency with which they have experienced symptoms of a depressive disorder. Items include: “I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing,” “I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family or friends,” “I felt lonely” and “I was happy.” Initial tests of the internal reliability of the 7-item scale yielded a relatively weak (α=.581) Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient. Given these findings we decided to drop the two positively worded items

(e.g. “I was happy”), leaving a total a 5-items. This decision is supported by results of our own factor analysis, as well as past studies indicating that the positive and negative affect items included in the CES-D may not represent the same latent construct and instead represent two separate dimensions (Sheehan et al., 1995; Schroevers et al., 2000).

The final Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient for the five items measuring negative affect is

α=.847.

Respondents were given the option of rating the degree to which they experienced these symptoms on a scale of 0-10 (0= none of the time, 10= all of the time). While this coding metric differs from the 0-3 metric of the original CES-D, a number of tests were 33

run in order to ensure functional equivalency with the original response set. First, the 10- point response set was collapsed into a 4-point metric reflecting that of the original.

Next, the 0-10 and 0-3 versions of the scales were then correlated to assess consistency; a robust correlation of r=.964 was found. Finally, the models identical to those shown below were run using both the modified and original coding metrics. The significance of coefficients in the regression models remained virtually unchanged for each version of the CES-D scale. However, there was one instance of a focal variable dropping to non- significance after the inclusion of controls that did not drop to non-significance when using the 0-10 scale. These tests suggest that the 0-10 coding metric may yield a more sensitive measure of depression than the 0-3 coding. That said, given the exploratory nature of this research as well as the desire to maintain the integrity of the original data the 0-10 coding metric was chosen for the reporting the final results.

Social Anxiety- Respondents were also asked six questions pertaining to their experiences with symptoms of social anxiety. The 6-item scale included in the data set is a modified version of the Interaction Anxiousness Scale (IAS) as described in Leary

(1983). Items include: “I often feel nervous even in casual get-togethers,” “Parties often make me feel anxious and uncomfortable,” and “at ease speaking with members of the opposite sex.” Responses range from 0 (not at all characteristic) to 10 (extremely characteristic). Since this response metric also differs from the original version of the

IAS, which includes possible response values of 1-5, we ran the same battery of tests run on the CES-D above. After collapsing the 0-10 version down to a 1-5 metric matching the original scale the two scales were correlated, yielding a coefficient of r=.984. Both 34

versions also functioned equivalently as outcomes in the predictive models shown below.

To maintain data integrity, the original 0-10 coding metric was selected for reporting.

As with the CES-D, after finding a relatively low internal reliability coefficient

(α=.560) for original 6-items interaction anxiousness scale, it was decided to drop the two positively coded items (e.g. at ease speaking to opposite sex) in favor of exclusively negatively worded items. This decision was supported by factor analysis, results of which indicated that the positively and negatively worded items fall on two distinct factors. Final internal reliability of the results of this study was measured at α=.806.

Control Variables

The study includes a standard set of control variables, including measures of race, gender, socioeconomic status and age. These variables were chosen not only because controlling for them is standard practice in sociological research, but also because of their well documented associations with psychological disorder and other health related outcomes.

Race is measured with dummy variables coded for Latinos and blacks, using whites as the excluded category. Asians and “other” racial groups were removed from the sample, in order to isolate a clear comparison group (whites). While race is a social structural variable that is thought to matter for mental health outcomes, the nature of the relationship between race and mental health is unclear. Despite the long history of discrimination against minority groups, such as African Americans and Hispanics, there is still a large degree of uncertainty over why, or if race matters for mental health. For 35

instance, while blacks have often been found to possess greater levels of psychological distress than whites in numerous studies, these race differences often drop to non- significance once controls for socioeconomic status are added to regression models

(Kessler & Neighbors, 1986:107). On the other hand, Mexican Americans have been found to report fewer symptoms of psychological distress than non-Mexicans (Mirowsky

& Ross, 1980). The growing literature on the “Hispanic Paradox” may yield some insights into this matter (Franzini, Ribble & Keddie, 2001). One explanation from this literature is that Hispanics may possess more extensive social support networks than whites, which might potentially yield some health benefits. That said, I will refrain from predicting any relationship between the racial controls and the depression and social anxiety outcomes.

Socioeconomic status is measured using two sub-indicators: (1) annual personal income, measured with a 12-category ordinal scale (2) years of education, measured with a continuous measure ranging from 0-20. Socioeconomic status is perhaps the most consistently observed correlate of psychological distress in sociological research and is regarded to be patterned by an inverse association with most indicators of mental health and physical health more generally (Link & Phelan, 1995). This well-documented inverse association between socioeconomic status indicators and disease is expected to be observed in the analysis for this study.

For the dummy variable measuring gender, males (coded 1) and females (coded

0). Gender is another variable that has been observed to possess strong relationships with mental health indicators, although the jury is still out on the nature of these relationships. 36

For internalizing disorders (e.g. depression and anxiety) women are typically found to display more symptoms than men; however, for externalizing disorders (e.g. antisocial personality and substance abuse disorders) men are typically observed to display more symptoms than women (Umberson, Williams & Anderson, 2002:192). Since this study deals with internalizing symptoms as its outcome variables, it is expected that women will report a greater number of symptoms of depression and social anxiety than men.

Age was calculated using an interval measure of respondent’s year of birth. Also, due to the wide age-range in the sample (18-95) it was suggested that we include a quadratic, age2 term in the regression equation. Age is generally found to be inversely related to symptoms of depression and anxiety (Christensen et al. 1999). This relationship is expected to hold for the current study.

Data Analysis

Effects of independent variables were assessed using linear regression analysis, with unstandardized coefficients reported in the results below. The mastery and powerful others scales were used to construct a four-category typology representing four styles of interpreting the environment in reference to attributions of situational control.

Individuals scoring high on both mastery and powerful others were assigned “reflexive” status. Respondents scoring low on both scales were assigned “undifferentiated” status.

Individuals scoring high on mastery, but low on powerful others were labeled “internals” to reflect their preference for internal (or personal) attributions. Participants scoring high on the powerful others scale were labeled “externals” reflecting the predominance of 37

external (or structural) attributions in their interpretational style.

The analysis proceeds in six stages. I first report descriptive statistics for the sample. Second, I present bivariate correlations for all variables included in the study.

Third, I report the results of linear regressions examining the effects of mastery and powerful others on depression and anxiety symptoms. This will permit exploration of the independent effects of each of these sets of control beliefs.

Fourth, I move into the heart of this analysis, which entails the analysis of the effects of reflexive self typology on symptoms of depression and anxiety. In order to explore the utility of these concepts as a heuristic tool, I first examine the effects of a median split on the dimensions of mastery and powerful others on depression and social anxiety. By median split it is meant that respondents grouped as reflexives were those who scored above the median on both dimensions; undifferentiated, those who scored below the median on both dimensions; internals, those who scored above the median on mastery but below the median on powerful others beliefs; and externals, those who scored above the median on powerful others beliefs and below the median on mastery.

Fifth, after examining the strength of effects using the median score as a cut- point, I test the strength of the typology with a more stringent cut-point by splitting each dimension at its quartile values. In this case, “reflexive” status was assigned to individuals scoring greater than one quartile above the median on both mastery and powerful others; “undifferentiated” status was assigned to individuals scoring less than one quartile below the median on both dimensions; “externals,” less than one quartile below the median on mastery and greater than one quartile above the median on the 38

powerful others scale; the group labeled “internals” represents individuals scoring greater than one quartile above the median on mastery and less than one quartile below the median on the powerful others scale (see figure above). These criteria were used in order to observe the degree to which the relationships strengthened as more stringent cut-point criteria were assigned.

Sixth, after examining the effects of the reflexive self typology using the quartile split, I proceed with an analysis of interaction effects between the two measures of socioeconomic status: (1) annual personal income and (2) highest year of education completed. Since an inverse association between socioeconomic status and myriad indicators of psychological well-being (Link & Phelan, 1995), these interaction terms should help to assess the stress-buffering effects of the reflexive self typology. However, there were no hypotheses proposed predicting these interactions, making this a largely exploratory section. Analysis will conclude with a discussion of these findings and their implications.

CHAPTER VIII

RESULTS

Stage I – Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics for the variables included in this analysis are displayed in

Table 1. After excluding Asians and “other” racial categories from the sample, we were left with a sample of 1007 respondents, 30.6 percent of which were white, 32.7 percent

Hispanic and 36.7 percent black. Approximately 39.2 percent of the sample was male.

Respondents averaged 13.47 years of education and had an average age of 42.4 years.

The average annual personal income for the typical respondent was just below the

$25,000-$30,000 category. The average household income for respondents was just under the $35,000-$45,000 category. The average scores on mastery (personal/internal control) and the powerful others scales (structural/external control) were 21.44 and 34.33 respectively. The average scores on depression and social anxiety were 14.64 and 14.99 respectively.

Stage II – Bivariate Correlations

Bivariate correlation coefficients are displayed in Table 2. As one can see, both the mastery and the powerful others scales are negatively associated with symptoms of depression and anxiety. Contrary to conventional wisdom (see above) both sets of beliefs

appear to be associated with reduced symptoms of these disorders. While the inverse association seen with mastery and these outcomes is well documented in the literature, the inverse relationship between perceived external/structural control has received much less attention. As discussed above, most of the literature in the sociological tradition

(aside from the few articles cited above) emphasizes the universal benefits of mastery, often overlooking the possibility that perceptions as structural control may offer some mental health benefits.

Another finding to take out of Table 2 is that the correlation between mastery

(personal) and powerful others beliefs (structural) is positive - which is perhaps counter-

intuitive given that one would expect an inverse association between these apparent

“opposites.” This positive association between mastery and external control suggests that these concepts may not fall on a continuum and in fact represent dimensional constructs.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, individuals who are high in perceived personal control are also tend to score higher in perceived structural control. As an explanation for this seeming paradox, perhaps it would be most accurate to say that to a certain degree mastery over one’s environment entails not only power to control one’s own environment, but also an understanding of those situations and circumstances where one does not possess personal control. It is not difficult to see, for example, how such an orientation would facilitate political action, which requires a shrewd understanding of when one should pick his or her battles and/or make appeasement and alliances.

Lastly, the bivariate correlations in Table 2 can also assist in the identification of some of the correlates of the reflexive self typology constructed for this study. It was suggested by a reviewer that due to the nature of some of the theoretical explanations for why the “reflexive” self structure might lead to positive mental health outcomes (e.g. self-serving appraisals of events/self-esteem motivation) that this construct may be more prevalent in men than women. The results in Table 2 offer some support for this proposition. Although not significant, the correlation coefficient between gender and

“reflexives” is a positive (male=1) r=.022, which suggests that slightly more men possess the reflexive self-structure.

Looking at the correlations between gender and the other categories within the typology, one will find that more women tend to fall into the “internals” category,

whereas a greater number of men fall into the “externals” category. These associations – both significant – might support some of the theoretical propositions stated above, particularly, that excessive perceptions of personal control may lead to a neurotic Type A behavior among women. On the other hand, the greater proportion of men falling in the externals category may reflect a male tendency towards stoical equanimity.

Stage III – Depression and Social Anxiety Symptoms on Powerful Others and Mastery

Scales

The independent effects of mastery and powerful others on depression and social anxiety symptoms are presented in Table 3 and Table 4 below. These tables demonstrate that the inverse associations between mastery and powerful others perceptual systems and symptoms of depression and anxiety remain relatively stable before and after the inclusion of controls. As seen in model 1, the unstandardized coefficient for mastery and depressive symptoms is b= -1.680 before the inclusion of controls, dropping slightly to b= -1.498 after the inclusion of controls. As seen in models 3 and 4, the powerful others scale exhibits a considerably smaller inverse association with depressive symptoms (b= -.496), but drops only slightly to b= -.402 after the inclusion of controls.

Model 5 includes both mastery and powerful others in the same model and shows that the unstandardized coefficient for the powerful others scale drops considerably when mastery is controlled for.

As one can see, when including mastery and powerful others in the same model, a coefficient of b= -1.533 is observed for mastery and depressive symptoms, whereas a smaller coefficient of b= -.238 is observed for the powerful others scale and depressive symptoms. However, these coefficients remain fairly stable after the inclusion of controls, both of them dropping only slightly: mastery drops from b= -1.533 to b= -1.373 and the powerful others coefficients drop from b= -.238 to b= -.220. This suggests that beliefs of mastery may exert a stronger protective effect against feelings of depression than powerful others beliefs, although both exert a negative effect. These findings appear to be relatively similar to those presented in Table 4, which depicts the relationships

between these variables and symptoms of social anxiety. Results of both tables support the hypotheses proposed earlier.

Stage IV –Reflexive Self Typology under Median Split Conditions

The results of stage 4 of the analysis are presented in Table 5 and Table 6 below, in which the relationships between the typology of self-reflexivity (median split criteria) and symptoms of depression and social anxiety are explored. The results for depressive symptoms are displayed in Table 5 below. Model 1 depicts the associations between reflexive and undifferentiated status and depression; model 2 the associations between reflexive status, undifferentiated status, controls variables and depression; model 3, internal and external status alone; model 4 internal and external status plus controls;

model 5 includes all four focal variables alone; and model 5 includes all focal variables with the controls.

As one can see in models 1 and 2, reflexive status is associated with fewer depressive symptoms than the combined average the other categories (represented by score of “0” in the coefficient), as indicated by the highly significant negative coefficient of b= -5.027. Undifferentiated status exhibits a strong positive association with depressive symptoms with a coefficient of b= 7.228, showing that these individuals appear to experience more symptoms of depression than the combined average of the other categories. Models 3 and 4 display the effects of internal and external self- structures on symptoms of depression. As one can see, the “internals” category does not exhibit a significant association with symptoms of depression, which may suggest that perceptions of internal control alone may not provide any protection from feelings of depression when compared to the combined average of the other types. On the other hand, the coefficient for “externals” is a significant b= 3.401, which suggests that solely possessing a conglomeration of external control beliefs may be slightly conducive to depression when compared to the average for the three other categories.

After including all four categories of the typology into the same model, one finds that the relative number of symptoms reported by members of each category remains relatively consistent. Consistent with hypothesis 1, “reflexives” report the lowest levels of depression relative to the average of the three categories. Consistent with hypothesis

2, individuals classified as “undifferentiated” report the greatest number of depressive symptoms relative to the combined average of the remaining other categories. As

predicted in hypothesis 3, “internals” report the more symptoms of depression than reflexives, but less than those grouped as “externals” or “undifferentiated”. Finally, as expected based on hypothesis 4, externals reported more depressive symptoms than reflexives and internals, but less than persons classified as undifferentiated.

Similar effects for the typology of self-reflexivity, albeit, with some slight differences in pattern, are found for social anxiety symptoms. The results are displayed in Table 6 below. The structure of the three analytical models is the same as for depressive symptoms shown in the table above. Notice that the coefficient (b= 3.643) for undifferentiated self-structures and social anxiety symptoms of anxiety is approximately one-half that of the coefficient for this category and depression (b= 7.700). Reflexive status as well has a slightly smaller coefficient with social anxiety (b= -4.338) than for depression (b= -5.027). Model 2 in Table 6 shows that the presumed protective effects of reflexive self-structure and the deleterious effects of undifferentiated self-structure remain significant after the inclusion of controls, each dropping by approximately one point on the Interaction Anxiousness scale.

Models 3 and 4 in Table 6 show very modest effects for the internals and externals categories in predicting social anxiety symptoms. The coefficients for both of the categories reached only marginal significance at p<.10 in model 3, and drop to non- significance after the inclusion of controls in model 4. However, in models 5 and 6, the coefficient for “internals” status raises back up to marginal significance when all categories of the typology and controls are included in the model. Generally, models 5 and 6 illustrate the durability of coefficients for “reflexive” and “undifferentiated” status

and mental illness symptoms, as indicated by social anxiety symptoms in Table 6.

Stage V – Reflexive Self Typology under Quartile Split Conditions

Moving on to stage 5 of the analysis, it is now time to examine the relationships observed when adjusting the cut-point criteria on the two dimensions of mastery

(personal control) and powerful others (structural control). Before reporting the results, it is important to take a glimpse at Table 7 below. After assigning a cut-point at either one quartile above or below the median on the mastery and powerful others, it was found that relatively few individuals met the criteria for classification as having internal or external

self-structures. As reported in Table 7, these cut-point criteria yielded a total of 99

“reflexives,” 72 “undifferentiated,” 28 “internals,” and 21 “externals.” Given the small number of individuals within each category, statistical power is lower for the following regression, also leaving the possibility of unstable estimates. However, given the potential of this stage to further elucidate the theoretical utility of the reflexive self typology for predicting mental health outcomes, it was decided to proceed with the analysis. However, given the above, the results for this stage of the analysis should be interpreted with caution.

The results of the Stage 5 analysis using a quartile split are displayed in Table 8 and Table 9 below. The first thing one might observe is that the magnitude of the effects of reflexive and undifferentiated status on depressive symptoms is substantially increased, as one would expect given that these categories include only those individuals who had scored in the top 25 percent (reflexives) or the lowest 25 percent

(undifferentiated) on the mastery and powerful others dimension. In model 1, the coefficient for reflexive status and depression symptoms is negative and significant at b=

-6.125, indicating that on average respondents meeting the criteria for assignment in the

“reflexive” category on average report 6.126 fewer symptoms of depression than those individuals who do not meet the criteria for members ship under quartile split conditions

(represented by score of “0”). In contrast, undifferentiated status is significantly associated with depressive symptoms in the positive direction, with a coefficient of b=

11.516. These coefficients are slightly reduced, yet remain significant, after the inclusion of controls, dropping to b= -4.405 and b= 9.770 respectively.

While the internals and externals categories only achieved marginal significance under median split criteria, under quartile split conditions the reach respectable

significance, as one can see from models three and four. Internals status is negatively associated with depressive symptoms, with a significant coefficient of b= -7.661.

Externals status is positively associated with depressive symptoms, with a significant coefficient of b= 7.393. All coefficients remain significant in model 6, controlling for all variables in the study, and maintain values similar to those in previous models net of controls.

Moving on to Table 9 the columns containing unstandardized coefficients for the reflexive typology and social anxiety symptoms, one sees similar effects for the reflexive and undifferentiated categories, but not for internals and externals. Reflexive status is significant and negatively associated with social anxiety symptoms, with a coefficient of b= -5.648 (before controls) and a coefficient of b= -4.476 (after controls). However, internals status only attains marginal significance (p<.10, b=-3.700), in models 3 and 4, and externals status fails to reach significance altogether. These patterns remain relatively unaffected in model 6 after the inclusion of all categories in the typology and controls.

Stage VI – Interaction Effects between Reflexive Self Typology and Socioeconomic Status

Finally, proceeding to the sixth and final stage of the analysis, it is time to examine the results of tests for interaction effects between the typology of self-reflexivity and measures of social stress, as indicated by low levels of personal income and years of education completed. The effects of eight separate interaction terms and the effects on symptoms of depression and social anxiety are presented in Table 10 below. As one can see from the table below, significant interactions were found only for three of the four categories in the reflexive self typology (median split) and annual personal income.

Furthermore, these terms were only significant for the outcome of depressive symptomology. The term reflexives*income is not significant, but values at b= -.203.

The term undifferentiated*income is significant at b= -.756. Internals*personal income is significant at b= -.930. Externals*income is significant at b= -1.135.

In order to interpret these interaction effects, one must direct attention to the coefficient for income alone, which is a non-significant b= .206. The interaction terms represent the changes to this slope of this coefficient for individuals within each category of the typology. For reflexives, the slope of depression regressed on income is not significantly reduced, but can be calculated as .206 - .203 = .003. Thus, among individuals falling in the reflexive category, differences in annual personal income are not significantly related to any differences in depressive symptoms. For individuals in

the undifferentiated category, differences in annual personal income do appear to be associated with differences in mental health status. The slope of annual personal income on depressive symptoms can be calculated for the undifferentiated category as follows,

.206 - .756 = -.553. This slope of b= -.553 for individuals in the undifferentiated category suggests that for individuals with undifferentiated self-structure an increase of one point on the annual personal income scale used in this study is associated with an average decrease of .553 points on the scale measuring depressive symptoms (CES-D).

The slope for internals is calculated by the same means: .206 - .930 = -.724. Thus, for internals, a one point increase in income is associated on average with a decrease of .724 symptoms of depression. Using the same formula, the slope of income on depression for individuals in the externals category is .206 - 1.135= -.929, suggesting that increases in annual personal income for members of this group is associated with greater reductions in depressive symptoms than all other categories.

Although income does not appear to be associated with decreases in depressive symptoms for reflexives, this does not mean that membership in the other categories is preferable. Rather, these interactions may generally suggest that income matters for those individuals already possessing suboptimal tools for coping with stress. Thus, if the theoretical propositions of this work are accurate, reflexives are better at coping with stress at all levels of income.

In other words, the lack of a significant interaction term for this group may suggest that these individuals do not need high incomes in order to ward off depressive experiences.

In contrast, for individuals with less coping resources, such as undifferentiated individuals and those classified as externals, increases in income serve as much needed resources in order to ward off psychological distress. It appears that a lack of personal resources in the form of a complex cognitive understanding of the environment may lead to a greater need for structural resources such as income. In contrast, those individuals with high personal resources in the form of a sophisticated understanding of the environment, as well as a keen ability to utilize this understanding to effectively navigate the social world may be less dependent external social structural resource, such as income.

CHAPTER IX

DISCUSSION

Recapitulation

This study represents an attempt to conceptualize, measure, and test a model of self-reflexivity and its associations with mental health outcomes. The justification for such a model was discussed in the introductory chapter, where the situation of modernity was identified as posing a number of adverse consequences for psychological well-being.

The primary aim of this study was then identified as presenting a model of self structure that is highly adapted to these modern social conditions, with self-reflexivity conceptualized as an important mechanism for this adaptation. The human capacity for self-reflexivity was theorized to reside in the duality of the self. The notion that an ideal

“balance” or integration of the diametrically opposed elements of the self is conducive to a healthy personality was elaborated upon in the subsequent chapter with emphasis on the works of psychological theory. Approaches to operationalizing the homo duplex were subsequently discussed. The agenda for the current project was then described in depth, pointing to the way that duality with respect to one’s beliefs about the origins of control over events in one’s life may influence mental health outcomes. Finally, hypotheses and methodology were proposed, which preceded the reporting of test results.

On the whole, the proposed hypotheses found strong support in the empirical tests. Unstandardized regression coefficients for virtually all models revealed that individuals whom had been identified as possessing the most “reflexive” self-structures tended to consistently report the fewest number of symptoms of depression and social anxiety relative to the average of non-members of that category. This, for the most part, remained consistent under both the median split and quartile split conditions.

Individuals grouped in the undifferentiated category consistently reported the greatest number of symptoms of depression and social anxiety relative to the other categories across both median split and quartile split conditions. This may indicate that these individuals possess the lowest levels of self-reflexivity, perhaps due to the fact that for whatever reason they do not appear to have developed any strong orientation or theory of the environment that permits them to act effectively in situations or develop clear understandings for events.

Internals, as predicted, exhibited lower levels of depression than undifferentiated and externals, but less than those classified as reflexive (except for quartile split conditions for social anxiety, in which internals actually reported fewer social anxiety symptoms than reflexives). This may suggest that this category of individuals, while possessing high levels of perceived personal control - which was found to be highly associated with reduced levels of depression and social anxiety – may be lacking in well- developed conceptualizations of the ways in which individuals are sometimes inevitably subject to forces outside of one’s own control. With just a small stretch of the sociological imagination one could see how such individuals might be deeply unsettled 59

by those situations in which their beliefs are personal control are disconfirmed by events resulting from the initiative of other individuals.

Finally, individuals classified as externals generally reported fewer symptoms of depression and social anxiety than undifferentiated, but more symptoms than internals or reflexives. This was consistent with the theoretical and hypothetical propositions put forth in this work. The mental health ranking of this category relative to the others may reflect the modest benefit that may come with adopting the view that one’s life circumstances are influenced by structural forces. The modest mental health benefit of this view may reflect a sort of stoical equanimity, in the sense that individuals are freed of some degree of anxiety that may come with viewing the self as responsible for the outcomes in one’s life. One could see how individuals might be able to avoid feelings of guilt, for example, by adopting such an orientation.

Contributions

This study makes a number of contributions to the social psychological and mental health literature. First of all, it makes a bold attempt at advancing dimensional conceptualizations of the self, which are fundamental to sociological self-theory, but are often neglected in its measurement (Burke & Tully, 1977; Burke, 1980). The model proposed identifies two key dimensions of self, on the one hand, the moral or social components, and the amoral and atavistic components on the other. While Freud was a key theorist popularizing such a model, it was demonstrated here that this conceptualization of human nature is actually highly prominent in conventional 60

sociological traditions. By linking many of sociology’s popular dichotomies to this dichotomy within the psyche, this thesis makes an interesting theoretical contribution that is worthy of further consideration.

Second, the results of this study suggest that sociological researchers may want to consider the potential mental health benefits of other ways of perceiving and understanding the world. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this study finds that greater structural control beliefs as measured by the powerful others scale, are inversely associated with symptoms of depression and anxiety, a relationship that appears to receive relatively little attention in literature. Furthermore, this study even provides some evidence that perceived personal control alone in the absence of some concept of external control may not offer much of a mental health benefit. Under the median split conditions above, for instance, the coefficient internals category failed to reach full significance for depression and social anxiety, suggesting that this category does not significantly differ from the average number symptoms reported by the three other types. Furthermore, the positive correlation between the mastery and powerful others scales suggests that these beliefs sets rarely occur in isolation; rather, individuals high in internal control also tend to have developed conceptualization of external control, suggesting that part of mastery over the environment also entails understanding those areas where one lacks personal control.

And third, this model may have utility for other important research questions. For instance, the characteristics of some of the most basic social roles may lend themselves to individuals favoring one or the other – or both – aspects of the psychical duality. For 61

instance, factory work would likely require someone with a strong belief that “powerful others” control one’s own destiny, whereas occupations such as political leadership and business management may require stronger concepts of mastery. This self-role interaction can operate as both social selection and social causation processes. In order to understand issues related to role achievement and socialization within roles it might be useful to measure both dimensions of the psyche and examine how the integration of the self changes with tenure in social role and conversely how one’s self-structure influences choices related to role-acquisition.

The theoretical framework put forth here could also be subjected to some confirmatory tests by incorporating the concept of “self-monitoring” (Snyder &

Gangestad, 1986). The profile created of the “reflexive” self is similar to the idea of

“self-monitoring” in that it entails adapting one’s self to the various situations one encounters throughout the course of daily life. Thus, if the “reflexive” self indeed exhibits higher reflexivity than the other types, then it should exhibit the highest correlation with the self-monitoring scale of all the other types. By combining these concepts symbolic interaction theorists should be able to enhance their understanding of the concept of self-reflexivity as well as its consequences for social interaction and functioning.

Limitations

Despite the contributions of this study, there are also some limitations. First, the typology may have been constructed in a less than ideal way; that is, the measures of 62

personal and structural control may only approximate truly “opposite” perceptions of control. The powerful others scale falls under the “locus of control” brand whereas the mastery scale used is the one designed and popularized by Pearlin (1978). However, since mastery is generally regarded to represent a measure of “personal control” (Skaff,

Pearlin, & Mullan, 1996), that is, the belief that one has control over one’s life, and the powerful others scale represents the belief that other individuals control one’s circumstances, this distinction makes for a relatively concise self-other contrast. The factor analysis conducted on both scales, however, at least partially resolves some of the doubt surrounding this issue.

Second, while the theoretical statement made in the first half of the article proposes that there is a specific “balance” to the antagonistic dimensions of the homo duplex, this study does not identify any particular ratio of one dimension to the other that can be viewed as optimal. Part of this may be due to the measurement issues that may make it impractical to repeatedly test and compare results of various cut-points for optimal mental health benefit. Thus, the final models are simply based on stark high- high, low-low, low-high, high-low distinctions. Nonetheless, it was not in the scope of this study to identify such an optimal balance, although this might be an area for further exploration.

Third, while the theoretical propositions driving this research stated that internal

(or personal) and external (or structural) control beliefs systems may represent cognitive manifestations of two opposite drives in the biological organism, this is an extension that may not be testable. Instead this represents the musings of this author based on the 63

theorists discussed in first half of this article. Whether this proposition is correct is another matter for debate amongst the scholarly and scientific communities.

Policy Implications

Finally, the results may have some implications for clinical practice in the mental health profession. Based on the results, it appears that it may be inadvisable for practitioners to simply seek to increase clients’ perceptions of mastery or personal control. Rather, the results suggest a much more nuanced approach to defining situations is advisable. For instance, simply seeking to raise client mastery may be counter- beneficial should these patients have these mastery beliefs disconfirmed in their daily experience. Such a myopic approach might render then disillusioned patients further resistant to treatment. It may be that patients should be taught how to accurately appraise situations, as well as the skills necessary to maximize individual agency under opportune conditions and minimize distress in refractory circumstances. It is with this multidimensional thinking that self-reflexivity should be optimized yielding to the most effective social performance.

CHAPTER X

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