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Le Riviste Elettroniche Dell'università Degli Studi Di Milano

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Le Riviste Elettroniche Dell'università Degli Studi Di Milano Le riviste elettroniche dell’Università degli Studi di Milano Ottobre 2016 Premessa La piattaforma Riviste UNIMI nasce nel 2008 con le riviste Doctor Virtualis e Lanx alle quali si aggiunge nel 2009 la rivista Altre modernità. Conta, ad aprile del 2016, 28 riviste attive e 3 collane, per un totale di 4627 articoli pubblicati con un numero di downloads – per gli anni fra il 2011 e il 2016 – che supera il milione. E’ da notare come il numero delle riviste sia progressivamente aumentato nel corso del tempo e come le discipline coperte siano ora più varie e comprendano anche l’ambito delle scienze della vita. Sono peraltro previsti la nascita imminente di nuove riviste e l’ulteriore passaggio sulla piattaforma di riviste sinora in formato cartaceo. FIGURA 1-NUMERO RIVISTA OSPITATE DALLA PIATTAFORMA "RIVISTE UNIMI" 1 498659 249911 123241 109844 85431 65294 46747 FIGURA 2 - DOWNLOAD COMPLESSIVI PER ANNO Per la consistenza del patrimonio editoriale, la piattaforma UNIMI è attualmente da considerare la maggiore d’Italia. Attraverso di essa si esprimono parti significative della ricerca prodotta in Ateneo. Con la firma della Policy sull’Open Access nel maggio del 2014, la nostra Università si è dunque trovata pronta nell’affrontare la sfida dell’Accesso Aperto: una sfida che risulta fra le più innovative nel campo della diffusione dei risultati della ricerca e destinata a cambiare in modo significativo le pratiche della loro pubblicazione e circolazione. La piattaforma delle riviste è di fatto non solo contenitore di ‘quantità’, ma soprattutto punto di convergenza di un alto numero di studiosi UNIMI che, con estrema dedizione, lungimiranza e impegno, da anni ha reso possibile il progressivo e notevole ampliamento della piattaforma stessa. Più di 30 comitati editoriali, altrettanti e prestigiosi comitati scientifici, un numero crescente di giovani studiosi resi responsabili dei meccanismi di comunicazione della ricerca, un insieme di ricercatori sempre più esperti nei modi, implicazioni e sviluppi dell’editoria in Open Access, sensibili ad un’etica delle scienze che le rendano aperte, partecipate, visibili, dunque influenti, da dieci anni lavorano nella nostra Università in modo incessante, affinché si affermi un modo di comunicazione del lavoro scientifico autenticamente disposto al confronto, al dialogo, alla libera circolazione delle idee. I dati illustrativi che seguono hanno come primo obiettivo quello di evidenziare l’entità delle forze messe in campo dalle singole riviste e collane: il numero di articoli pubblicati, gli studiosi e le istituzioni di appartenenza coinvolti, le rigorose procedure di revisione, le indicizzazioni di qualità sempre crescente, l’enorme quantità 2 di downloads (con il conseguente aumento del numero di citazioni), certificano non solo la bontà del formato digitale e aperto, bensì la sua efficacia nel richiamare ulteriormente l’attenzione della comunità scientifica sulla ricerca prodotta nella nostra Università. Definitivamente internazionali, le riviste e le collane della piattaforma esperimentano nel modo più convincente il significato di una internazionalità che non va cercata nelle geografie delle edizioni, ma nella capacità di attrarre lettori di ogni provenienza, di coinvolgere un vastissimo numero di studiosi stranieri, di proiettarsi nella transnazionalità vera dell’ambiente digitale. La ricerca prodotta e mostrata attraverso la piattaforma si offre così alla valutazione della comunità scientifica nel suo complesso e si assume da qui la responsabilità di mantenere un livello tale da soddisfare le esigenze pubbliche di qualità e di innovazione. La trasparenza della valutazione è, infatti, condizione intrinseca dell’Accesso Aperto: circolando liberamente, senza gli ostacoli economici determinati dal mercato editoriale e dalle politiche degli abbonamenti, istantanea nella diffusione, illimitata nelle possibilità di raggiungere i propri interlocutori, l’editoria Open Access così come viene praticata nella nostra piattaforma, ovvero attraverso una gold road gratuita per chi legge e per chi pubblica, mostra i risultati scientifici conseguiti consapevole del loro rigore. La visibilità dei gruppi di ricerca si amplia in modo sempre più consistente, confermandone un ruolo trainante e di impatto. Il grande sforzo sinora compiuto per realizzare la piattaforma si è svolto non solo grazie alle intelligenze e alle competenze, ma anche grazie alla generosità di un lavoro che non ha chiesto altra ricompensa se non i benefici della ricerca e della sua diffusione. Al fine di consentire l’ulteriore arricchimento della produzione editoriale di UNIMI nella forma dell’Accesso Aperto, ciò che si auspica è ora il sostegno dell’Ateneo affinché il formato, le procedure, la presentazione di tale patrimonio scientifico siano resi omogenei, allo scopo di poterlo proporre come il frutto di un interesse collettivo ed espressione dello stile della nostra Università. A fronte di un capitale così significativo, e al fine di promuoverne l’incremento, resta da impegnarsi in un’azione che migliori la comunicazione della sua esistenza e consistenza. Tale azione rientra a pieno titolo nel campo della comunicazione adeguata dei risultati della ricerca, consentendo inoltre di consolidare i ragguardevoli risultati sinora raggiunti e svilupparne le qualità di esperienza editoriale e scientifica di riferimento. Emilia Perassi Paola Galimberti Delegata del Rettore per l’Open Access Responsabile Ufficio Valorizzazione delle Pubblicazioni Scientifiche 3 4 Riviste: ACME Altre Modernità Aristonothos Carte romanze Concorso De Musica Doctor Virtualis Dike ENTHYMEMA InKoj. Interlingvistikaj Kajeroj (chiusa) Interfaces HAF Italiano LinguaDue Itinera Lanx Lebenswelt Materiali di Estetica nóema Prassi ecdotiche della modernità letteraria Rassegna di Diritto, Legislazione e Medicina Legale Veterinaria Cross. Rivista di Studi e Ricerche sulla criminalità organizzata Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior Rivista italiana di Paleontologia e Stratigrafia RT. A Journal on Research Policy and Evaluation Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale Studia austriaca Studia theodisca tintas Collane: Biblioteca di Carte Romanze di/segni Food in 5 ACME http://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/ACME Online dal: volume n. 66, nn. 1-2, anno 2013 Codice Etico: http://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/ACME/about/editorialPolicies#custom-0 Licenza: 4.0 6 Redazione: Virna Brigatti, Università degli Studi di Milano Direttore: Edoardo Esposito, Università degli Studi di Milano Comitato direttivo: Andrea Capra, Università degli Studi di Milano Comitato scientifico: Jocelyn Benoist, Université Paris I – Sorbonne Caroline Patey, Università degli Studi di Milano Irene Piazzoni, Università degli Studi di Milano Paolo Rusconi, Università degli Studi di Milano Paolo Spinicci, Università degli Studi di Milano Yves Chevrefils Desbiolles, Institut Mémoires de l'Édition Contemporaine Oliver Janz, Freie Universitët – Berlin Georges Letisser, Université de Nantes (FR) Francisco Rico, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona Focus and Scope: Acme si propone come luogo di riflessione e approfondimento degli studi di ambito umanistico, e vuole offrire testimonianza sia del lavoro di maestri riconosciuti, sia della ricerca dei giovani più meritevoli, formatisi in particolare – anche se non esclusivamente – nei corsi di laurea dell’Università degli Studi di Milano. All’ampiezza delle discipline che vi sono rappresentate – dalla letteratura all’arte, dalla storia all’archeologia, dalla filosofia alle scienze del territorio e alle lingue e culture europee ed extraeuropee – fanno riscontro, in una sezione di tipo monografico, approfondimenti specifici su questioni di interesse dell’uno o dell’altro ambito, non senza aperture interdisciplinari e attenzione alle problematiche metodologiche. Un sezione di rapide recensioni vuole inoltre costituire occasione di informazione e di dibattito sull’attualità e gli sviluppi delle scienze umane. Peer Review: revisione scientifica anonima Repertori di indicizzazione: DOAJ - Directory of Open Access Journals ERIH PLUS- The European Reference Index for the Humanities and the Social Sciences ACNP - Catalogo italiano dei periodici Pleiadi - Portale per la Letteratura Scientifica WorldCat - The world's largest library catalog 7 Articoli pubblicati: 51 Fascicoli pubblicati: 5 Numero autori: 47 Autori stranieri: sì Visualizzazioni/Accessi (al 22/09/2016): ACME 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 8 Altre Modernità http://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/AMonline Online dal: 2009 Codice Etico: http://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/AMonline/about/editorialPolicies#custom-0 Licenza: 3.0 9 Redazione: Direttore: Emilia Perassi, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italia Vice direttore: Nicoletta Vallorani, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italia Editors in chief: Emanuele Monegato, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italia Laura Scarabelli, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italia Editorial Staff: Elisabetta Bevilacqua, Università degli Studi di Milano Elisa Cairati, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italia Daniele Croci, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italia Sara Ferrari, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italia Serena Guarracino, Università degli Studi di Napoli "L'Orientale", Italia Anna Pasolini, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italia Ilaria Parini, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italia Marianna Scaramucci, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italia Margherita Quaglia, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italia Comitato scientifico: Paolo Caponi, Università degli Studi di
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